AHISTORY OF FUUTA TOORO,
1890s-1920s : SENEGAL UNDER COLONIAL
RULE. THE PROTECTORATE
By
Mouhamed Moustapha KANE
VOLUME 1
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHYLOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
ICO~";L·MmCk;J",.·"".GAC"'
. POUR l'ENS!:lGN[M~i'l r SL5?Efl;l:UR
: C. A. M. E. S. -
OUAGi\\DOUGOU
[Arriv6e .22. .M0H ..1()gS.. " ...
1987
•. Enre~istn§ sous n° # O· 2· () 9.2-. i

---

In Memoriam
Ceerno SJydu Kan,
Abdul Salaam Kan,
Hamedin Kan
and Baylaa 1Jan,
For their inceresc
in Fuucanke Culture and Hiscory.
To my beloved MJrema,
Jinndaa and lictle Salaam
ii
I
I
I
I

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ABSTRACT
A HISTORY OF FlJlJTA TOORO 1B905-19205:
SENEGAL UNDER
COLONIAL RULE.
THE PROTECTORATE
By
Mouha~ed aOlistapha Kane
The
history
of
Fuuta Tooeo
during
the
colonial
period
is
largely
still
to be written.
Both early and Inodern Africanists
have
tended to
focus
on
the
pre-colonial
era,
with
particular
reference
to
the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
At
a
time '..Jhen the development of
the
Senegal
Riv~r basin--of which Fuuta Tooro constitutes the middle
section· -seems
to
be
the
order
of
the
day,
fi.lling
this
gap
is
of
essence.
The district
reports concerning the
inter-war period,
most of
which
remained
closed
to
the
public
until
~ery
recently,
are
now
accessible
and
provide
a
wealth
of
information
far
more
considerable
than in any other categor~ of archival material.
Our study is based on
these same reports and on numerous oral traditions collected in Senegal
and
Mauritania
from
either
Dramatis
PersonnRe·-former
canton
and
village
chiets~ -ordinary
eye
'..sitnesses
of
events.
or
inheritors
ot
local "tormal
traditions."
The
chief
purpose
of
this
study
is
to
provide
as
complete
a
picture
as
our
sources
can
allow,
ot
late
nineteenth
and
early
twentieth
centuries'
Fuuta Tooro,
particularly between 1890-1891,
the

---

Mouhamed Moustapha Kane
year
of
final
occupation
of
the
region by
the
French,
and 1920,
the
close of three decades of Protectorate Administration.
Various
issues are dealt with here,
chief among which,
the estab 4
lishment
of
the
colonial
administration,
the
role
and
evolution
of
local
chiefship,
and
the
application
of
colonial
principles
to
the
people
of
Fuuta.
In
addition,
the
study
focuses
on the operation of
colonial
ins ti tutions ,
the
direct
impact
of
colonial
demands--
particularly
during
the
war--and
the
various
changes
(territorial,
political, cultural and social).
Because
the
Fuutankoobe,
especially
the
Umarians,
distinguished
themselves by a long tradition of suspiscion and resistance,
the French
took all
their
time
to
purge
the aristocracy of elements deemed least
reliable,
and applied such cough measures as demotion,
deportation,
and
confiscation,
to neutralia:e the former
"Dissidents."
The French moved
also to weaken the aristocracy and further subordinate it,
through the
abolition of slavery,
the restricting of traditional rights,
and
the
readjustment of territorial domains.
The
creation
of
Mauritania
bred,
despite
the
fact
that
both
territories
were
under
French
control,
some
of
~he
most
vicious
partition related conflicts in colonial ~est Africa.
~e also reassess generalisations about segments of the
traditional aristocracy that took an active part in the administration
of
colonial
Africa.
Depending
on
the
nature
of
the
relationship
between
them
and
the
people,
the
stakes
and
risks
involved,
local
agents of the administration showed sometimes unwillingness to alienate
their brethren.
This calls
for nuances in the characterization of
I
I

---

Mouhamed Mou.stapha Kane
those who,
for
some
reason or other,
were bound to either collaborate
or cooperate with the colonial regime.
It is also our conclusion that
the
"Indigenat Code,"
often
taken
to
be
a
mere
disciplinary
device,
fulfilled
economic
functions
as
well.
The
section regarding popular reaction
to
colonial rule shows
the
reluctance
of
the
people
of
fuuta
to
accepc
every
form
of
exploitation and oppression,
and how
the
French
felt
sometimes
forced
to reckon with such reluctance.
Finally,
the multifaceted contribution to the first World
Uar,
in
conditions
almost
peculiar
to
Fuuta
Tooto,
helps
unders tand
the
historic
proce.ss
of
its
gradual
decline
and
marginalization,
in
comparison
with
the
northern
and
Western
sections
of
Mauritania
and
Senegal.

---

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
l.Je
regard
this
achievement.
as
the
result
of
both
our
personal
effort and the
invaluable assistance--material,
intellectual,
moral and
otherwise--of various
institutions,
individual
colleagues
and
friends,
and family members.
For several years
in a row,
the United States Information Services
provided,
through
the
laudable administrative help of
the
Institute of
International
Education,
the
necessary
funding
for
the
completion
of
our programme.
The collection of both oral and archival data involved
extensive
travel
to
Paris
and
~ithin the
Republics
of Mauritania
and
Senegal.
During
the
course
of
this
field
work
we
'.... ere
honored
to
receive
a
dissertation
research
grant
from
the
Ford
Foundation.
The
Ministry
of
E.ducation
of
the
Republic
of
Senegal,
in
tune
,.... ith
its
policy
of
Formation
des
Cadres,
accorded
the
no-less-useful
leave
of
absence,
for
the
pursuit
of
the
degree
of
Doctor
of
Philosophy.
Finally.
the
personnel
of
the
different
archival
services.
Archives
NCltionales
de
la
France
(Overseas
Section),
Archives
Nationales
du
Senegal and Archives Nationales de Mauritanie,
proved most helpful
in
facilitating
access
to
and
ekploitation
of
the
indispensable
raw
material.
This
is
the
place
to
thank
them
all,
particularly
the
American Cultural
Center
at
Dakar,
Dr.
Horovitz
and
the
staff or
the
i i i

---

Ford
Foundation-West
Africa,
Hazel
Greenfield
and
the
personnel
of
1.I.E--Chicago,
our
colleague
Mr.
Iba
Oer
Thiam,
the
Ministre
of
Education
of
the
Republique
Senegal,
and
his
staff,
Mr.
Saliou
Mbaye
and the personnel of the A.N.S
(especially Oiop, Ndiaye and Sane),
the
people of
A.N.F.O.M. and A.N.M.
in Paris and Nouackchott, and finally,
the
~t.aff
of
the
M.
S.
U.
African
Studies
Center
and
the
History
Department.
In
the
academic
realm,
we
have
had
the
pleasure
to
work
·..,ith
Professors
Haro Id
Marcus,
for
"General
Africa
and
the
Horn;"
Harry
Reed,
for
"Afro·American History;"
Gordon Stewart,
for
the
"History of
the
British
Empire;"
William
Derman,
in
the
field
of
"Economic
Anthropology. "
We
thank
them
for
de·.roting
their
time
and
sha ring
their
ideas
all
these
years.
To
Professor
David
Robinson,
our
academic adviso r,
commi t tee di rec tor,
and
co - author,
we owe an immense
debt
of
gratitude.
As
we
treaded
along
this
exciting but
difficult
path,
he
remained
a
loyal
friend
and
an
able
guide.
Through
sound
professional advice,
probing comments,
challenging criticism and moral
boost,
he
encouraged us to alvays strive for
the best.
We
can
but
extend
our
thanks
to
our
colleagues
and
former
professors
at
the University of Dakar,
particularly Boubacar Barry and
Oumar Kane,
vhose
unflinching
confidence
and
continued
encouragements
proved
also
a
valuable
stimulus
in
our
quest
for
excellence.
The
colleagues
in
Nouackchott,
uncle
Oumar
Ba,
Ibrahima
Sal-l
and
Seydou
Kane,
helped
find
adequate
informants,
set
up
intervi'evs
and
even
provide information.
to
the best of their ability.
For tIlLs and other
iv
l
I

---

l',
. r -
·1
things,
we
owe
them and all
our
informants
in Senegal and Mauritania,
many a thank.
Our
friends
in
Eas t
Lans ing,
espec ially Rudi te
Robinson,
Mamadou
and Melvina Gueye,
Kitty,
and Gayle for her help;
in Kalamazoo,
Don and
Connie,
John and Amy;
in Nouackchott,
Oumar Cil.laandi,
Ousseynou Fall,
my cousins
from Lekseyba--the
l i s t is
in no wise exclusive--Demrnba Sih
and
his
family
in
Paris,
and
my
friends
and
relatives
in
Senegal,
surely deserve
kind
regards.
Last,
but
certainly
far
from
the
least,
my
wife
and
my
daughter,
;·idrema
and
J inndaa,
with
the ir
love
and
patience,
helped
co
persevere
all
the
way.
To
them and to
the
lovely
little
Adul
Salaam,
we
dedicate
this
modest
result
of
our
common
sacrifice.
v

---

CONTENTS
Page
ACKNO\\JLEDC El1ENTS ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
.
Vl
LIST OF TABLES
.
.
xii
LIST OF MAPS
xiii
LIST OF APPENDICES
.
.... ' .... . xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
.
.
xv
PREFACE
A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .1
THE SECONDARY LITTER;TURE
.
1
THE STUDY PROPER
7
ARCHIVAL AND ORAL SOURCES
.
12
NOTES
20
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1:
FUUTA TOORO AROUND IB50
23
A.
THE LAND AND THE MODES OF LIVELIHOOD
23
B.
THE PEOPLE OF FUUTA TOORO
30
C.
THE FUUTANKE STATE
35
NOTES
40
PART TIlO: TIlE FRENCH AND FUUTA TOORO.
POWER AND DIPLOMACY. 1850-1890
CHAPTER 2:
FRENCH INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN TEE AREA ... 48
A.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STAKES.....................
.48
B.
CHANGING CONDITIONS "''ID SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICY.. . .
.50
C.
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS THE DIFFERENT REGIONS
OF FUUTA......................................
. ... 53
1.
The French and Dimat..............
'"
.53
2.
The French and Damga. . . . . . . . . . .
.
57
vi
I
I
I

---

3.
Th~ French and Tooro
62
4.
The French and Central Fuuta
67
al
The Bones of Contention
_ _
67
bl
The Franco-Wan Alliance and the Laaw and Yirlaabe
Protectorates of 1877
69
NOTES
74
CHAPTER 3: THE FINAL MOVE AGAINST FL~TA TOORO:
DODDS'
C~~PAIGN AGAINST ABDUL BOOKAR KAN, 1890-1891
81
A.
EVENTS PREPARATORY TO THE FINAL CONQUEST IN 1890
81
1.
The Fall of Segu
81
2.
Sarrmba Jaadana and the Insurrection in Laaw
82
3.
Alburi's Exile in Fuuta Tooro: 1890........
.
84
4.
The Assassination of Commandant Abel Jeandet
86
5.
The Assassination of Sheh Mamrnadu Maamudu. . . .
.
88
B.
THE )ODDS COLUKN AND ITS CO~SEQUENCES 1890-1891.
90
1.
The Preparations of the Column
90
2.
Military Operations and Political Results of the
Column........................................
.
92
CONCLUSION OF PART T\\lO...........................
..
97
NOTES
99
PART THREE: TilE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIlE COLONIAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER 4:
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS FORMER "DISSIDENTS"
N~D MEASURES AGAINST TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
103
A.
POLICY VIS A VIS FO~~ER "DISSIDENTS"
103
1.
The Return of Former "Dissidents"
and the
Implementation of French Policy
104
2.
Moves against Abdul Bookar's Relatives and Former
Allies..
.
110
B
TERRITORIAL CHANCES AND SELECTION OF RELIABLE
CHIEFS
114
1.
Western Fuuta and Laa~
_
115
al
Dimat
115
bl
Tooro and Halaybe
116
cl
Laaw
120
2.
Central Fuuta
122
al
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
122
bl
Boosooya
124
3.
Eastern Fuuta:
Damga and Ngenaar
125
al
The Modification of 1893
126
bl
The Modificatiort~of 189B and the Nomination of
Abdul Salaam Kan
128
cl
The Nomination of Hammadi Alfaa Bah in Ngenaar
129
C.
THE CHECKS ON TRADITIONAL AcTHORITY
130
1.
The Abolition of Land Rights
130
2.
Containment Policy vis a vis Slavery and
Monitoring of Chiefs
133
vii

---

NOTES
138
CHAPTER 5:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAL RULE IN
MAURITANIA fu~D ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR FUUTA TOORO:
1904-1920
147
A.
THE MOORS AND FUUTA TOORO:
1890-1904
147
B.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRENCH RULE ON THE NORTH Bfu~K:
1904 to 1913
153
1.
Dimat
155
2.
Tooro
157
3.
Halaybe and Laaw
159
al
Halaybe.......................
.
159
bl
Laaw...................
.
160
4.
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe, Neere, Kaedi,and Haqama
161
al
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe...........
.
161
bl
Neere
162
cl
Kaedi..............
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
.
163
dl
Haqama - Li tama
164
C.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CREATION OF HAURITP~IA
165
1.
Emigration to the North bank
166
2.
Rivalries among local Chiefs
171
3.
Inter-Community Land Disputes
_
_
173
a/
Tukuloor-Moor Disputes
174
(1) Sheh Sidiya Baba versus Mbooyo
174
(2) The Alayidi-Ideylik Dispute
177
bl
Intra-Tukuloor Land Disputes
178
(1) Land Issues in Laaw.......
..
179
(a) Chief Aamadu Sammba's Claims in 1906
179
(b) The Conflict among Amrenaabe
180
(2) Conflicts in Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
183
(a) The Conflict among the Alayidi: 1908-1919
183
(3) Land Disputes in Damga
189
(a) Aali Sammba Jom versus Sule S. Jom: 1907-1917
189
(b) The Njaw Land Issue: Padalal versus \\.Iaali.1907-1914 .. 191
(c) Abdul Salaam Kan versus Maqama-Litama: 1912-1918
193
CONCLUSION OF PART THREE
196
NOTES
204
PART FOUR: CONTINUING CHANGE ON TIlE SmITH BANK
CHAPTER 6:
ADMINISTRATIVE CHP~GES ON THE SOUTH BANK:
1904-1920
217
A.
CHANGES IN \\.IESTERN FUUTA
·. '
217
1.
Dimat
217
2.
Tooro
:
221
B.
CHANGES IN CENT~~L fUUTA
222
1.
Laaw
223
2.
Boosoya
224
C.
CHANGES IN EASTERN fUUTA
228
viii
I

---

CONCLUSION OF PART FOUR
230
NOTES.....
.. ........
..
231
PART FIVE: THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COIDNIAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER 7:
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS fu~D
COLONIAL CONTROL.
"
237
A.
THE FRENCH LEVEL.
238
1.
The Governor and Commissioner,
_
238
2.
Commandants and Residents
239
B.
THE AfRICAN LEVEL.
244
1.
Canton Chiefs
_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
244
2.
Village C h i e f s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.249
3.
Interpreters................
., .253
4.
Cercle Guards.
_
254
NOTES
256
CHAPTER 8:
TAXATION, INDIGENAT, FORCED LABOUR,
COnSCRIPTION
263
A.
TAXATION:
EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES
263
1.
From Payment in Kind to Payment in Cash
264
2.
Evolution of Tax Rates and Consequences
266
B.
INDIGENAT AND FORCED LABOUR
273
1.
Indigenat
273
2.
Forced Labour.
277
al
Telegraph Maintenance
279
bl
H a u l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.280
cl
Porterage and Requisition
_ .. 281
d/
Road Construction and Maintenance
282
C.
CONSCRIPTION
283
CONCLUSION OF PART FIVE......................
.
287
NOTES
302
PART SIX: FUlITANKE RESPONSE TO COIDNIAL RULE
CHAPTER 9:
THE POPULAR RESPONSE
317
A.
THE REACTION TO THE IMPOSITION OF CHIEFS fu~D
TERRITORIAL MODIFICATIONS....................
. .. 319
1.
The Example of Boosoya:. 1891.
320
2.
The Example of Halaybe: IIll8 -1902
321
3.
The Opposition of Cede to "Exogenous Chiefs:"
1901-1913
324
4.
The Opposition to Raasin Kan in Dimat: 1903-1904
327
5.
Reaction to Territorial Readjustments. _
329
B.
REACTION TO LAND CONFISCATION AND DONATIONS
331
C.
REAGTION TO TAXATION, FORCED LABOUR fu~D CONSCRIPTION. 335
1.
Reaction to Taxation
_
_
335
2.
Reaction to Forced Labour and Requisition
337
3.
Reaction to Conscription for
the Military
_
339
ix

---

D.
CULTURAL RESISTANCE...
.
342
1.
Islam
}42
al
The Revolt of Aamadu Alfaa~SA: 1894-1895
343
bl
The "Mahdist" Revolt of Aah Yero Joob 1906-1908
346
cl
The Passive Reaction of Islam
350
2.
OTHER FO~~S OF REACTION TO COLONIAL RULE
353
al
Popular Attitudes Toward "French School"
353
bl
Cultural Reaction:
Slandering and folklore as
weapons
358
CONCLUSION OF PART SIX
, .360
NOTES
370
PART SEVEN:
ruUTA TOORO A.."lD IIORLD liAR I:
CONTRIBUTION AND CONSEQUF~CES
CHAPTER 10:
HUK..\\N AND ECONOMIC CONTRI BUTION. . .
.
379
A.
HUMAN CONTRIBUTION.
.
379
1.
Organisation
_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.379
2.
Evolution of Conscription
_
_
381
al
Among the Masses
381
bl
Among the Loyal Leading Families
386
3.
The Pressure on the North Bank
389
4,
Popular Attitudes against War-Time Conscription
393
B.
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION.........
. .. 398
1.
Financial:
Taxes and Special Contributions
398
2.
Supply of Grain and Cattle..............
.
403
NOTES.................................
.
405
CHA?TER 11:
CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR 1 IN FUUTA TOORO .. 412
A.
ECONOMIC CONSEqUENCES
412
1.
Drain on Resources
412
2.
Economic Crises
_
415
B.
SOC IAL CONS EQUENCES
'
.416
1.
Famines and Food Shortages..................
.416
2.
Emigration and Other Social Effects
422
3.
Impairment of Education,
Trade and Other
Activities
,
425
C.
POLITICAL CONSEqUENCES
426
1.
Spirit of Disobedience among the People
426
2.
Spirit of Rebellion among War Veterans
428
a/
The General Context of the IncLdents
,430
bl
Incidents Following the Discharge of
Tirailleurs
434
(1) Baydel Sammba Affair in Laaw 1919
435
(2) Crises at !'!baan: 1919-1920
435
(3)
Crises in Ferlo: 1919-1921...................
.
437
(a) Yero Makam Affair..........................
.
437
(b) The Ceerno Lamin Affair
438
x
l

---

D.
LESSONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND REASSERTION OF
FRENCH COLONIAL AUTHORITy
439
CONCLUSION OF PART SEVEN
443
NOTES
449
SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
A.
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY FUUTA TOORO AND FRENCH
EXPANSION
456
B.
ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF FRENCH COLONIAL
RULE
458
C.
THE DIRECT IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE AND FUUTANKE
RESPONSE TO IT
_
462
D.
WORLD WAR 1 fu~D ITS IMPACT ON PJUTA TOORG
473
E.
A BALANCE SHEET OF COLONISATION DURING THE
PROTECTORATE. . . .
. . . . . . . .
. ... 478
1.
Society..........
. .478
2.
Economy..........
.
484
3.
Infrastructure.............
.
487
NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
'. . .
.
491
REFERENCES.......................
.
493
I.
BIBIOCRAPHICAL GUIDES.
.
493
11.
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES....
.
493
A.
ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION.
.
493
1.
Archives Nationales de la France:
S.
Outre-Mer
_ .493
2.
Archives Nationales de Mauritanie....
. .494
3.
Archives Nationales du SenegaL........
.
" . . 495
B.
ORAL TRADITION. . . . . . . . .
.
508
1.
Fonds James P. Johnson:
I.F.A.N.-Dakar..
.
508
2.
Fonds David W. Robinson: I.F.A.N.-Dakar...
.508
3.
Field IntervLews Conducted BY Moustapha Kane
in Senegal and Mauritania....
.
_
509
C.
UNPUBLISHED THESES:
.
511
l.
Doctoral Dissertations....
.
, .511
2.
Master's Theses.
'., .512
I l l .
PUBLISHED SOURCES... .. .. .. .. .
. .. .. .
. ., .513
l.
Journals
and Periodicals.....
.
513
2.
Nineteenth Century Sources.
.
514
3.
Twentieth Century Sources....
.
514
xi
I

---

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.
wolof and Tukuloor Troops taking part in the
Dodds Campaign of 1890-1891
91
Table 2.
Nominations of Chiefs in Tooro 1890-190]
117
Table 3.
Abdullaay Kan's Career to 189]..............
. .. 12]
Table 4.
Evolution of Dimat from 1890 to 1928
220
Table 5.
Administrative Tours of Duty in Fuuta Districts
242
Table 6.
Indigenous Personnel in service at Kaedi in
June 1903..............
.249
Table 7.
Conscription in Fuuta cooro 1890-191]
286
Table 8.
"Political Gifts"
in Support of Fuuea Chiefs,
1905-1913
291
Table 9.
Social Composition of the Student Population at
Matam in 1917...................
.
]55
Table 10. Recruitment in the Districts of the South Bank,
1 9 1 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
. .38]
Table 11. Recruitment in the Districts of the North Bank
in 1915
.
.384
Table 12. Recruitment on the South Bank,
1917.
.
]85
Table 13. Recruitment in Fuuea Tooro,
1918 ....
.386
Table 14. Recapitulation of Conscription Statistics,
1914 to 1918
.
'"
.]89
Table 15. Cattle Sales from the South Bank 1914-1917 . . . . .
. .. 400
Table 16.
Evolution of Millet Prices per 100 klg from
Producers.......................
.
414
Table 17.
Escale of Pador:
Evolution of Prices of Imported
Goods
from 1914 to 1917
416
Table 18. Evolution of Population (South Bank) 1914-1918
42]
Table 19.
Demographic Evolution on the South Bank:
1914-1916
424
xii

---

LIS, OF HJ\\J'S
1.
Traditional fuuta Tooro.
(Both Banks)
131
2.
"Senegalese Fuuta"
or South Bank
.
..
.......... 137
,.~
".1\\'<-
3.
CercleSof Matam (1906)
.
.
154
LIST Of ILLUSTRATIONS
1.
Meeting bet~een Colonel frey and Abdou Boubakar 1886
73
xiii
I

---

APPF..NU J.X.ES
1.
Administrative Changes in Tooro:
The "Jeandet Constitution"
of 1883 ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
2.
The ALayidi North-South ConfLicts:
Land Disputes and Settlement of January 1911 ....
. .522
].
Interrogation of Yoro Kode1 (Age ]5),
taken prisoner
after the debacLe of Dagana (190B)
.
.52]
4.
Intelligence Report on a H.arabout Considered "Reliable" . . . 524
5.
Intelligence Data on a Cleric Considered "Dangerous"
52G
6.
PartiaL War Effort in the Cercle of Podor (19L5).
. ... 52B
xiv
I

---

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INSTITUTIONS:
A.C.C.T. :
Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique.
A.S. C.:
African Studies Genter.
A.N.F.O.M. :
Archives Nationales de la France
(Section Outre- Mer).
A.N .11.. :
Archives Nationales de Mauritanie.
A.N. S.:
Archives Nationales du Senegal.
C.R.A. :
Centre de Recherches Africaines.
(Univ.
Sorbonne).
1.F.A.N. :
Institut
Fondamental
d'Afrique
Noire.
(Now
called,
Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire--Cheikh Anta Diop).
M.A. S. :
Mission d'Amenagement du Senegal.
O.M.V.S. :
Organisation Pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal.
O.R.S.T.O.M. : Office
de
la
Recherche
Scientifique
et
Technique
d'Outre-Mer.
(French).
TITLES:
D.A.P. :
Directeur des Affaires Politiques.
D.P.A. :
Director of Political Affairs.
D.A.1. :
Directeur des Affaires Indigenes.
T.C.M.:
Territoire Civil de Mauritanie.
DOCUMENTS:
B.C.E.H.S.A.O.F.:
Bulletin du Cornite d'Etudes Historiques et
Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise.
B.I.F.A.N.:
Bulletin de l'Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire.
C.E.A.:
Cahier d'Etudes AFricaines.
C.O.R.S.T.O.M.:
Cahier
de
l'Office
de
la
Recherche
Scientifique
et
Technique d'Outre Mer.
C.J.M.V.:
Cahier de Jussieux,
Le Mal de Voir.
C.J.A.S.:
Canadian Journal of African Studies.
H.A.;
History in Africa.
I.J.A.H.S.:
International Journal of African Historical Studies.
J .A.H.:
Journal of African History.
3.0.:
JournalOfficiel.
(Senegal et Dependances).
M. S. D. :
Moni teur du Senegal et Dependances.
N.A.-1.F.t. .•N.:Notes Africaines
--I.F.A.N .. /.
N.E.A.:
Nouvelles Editions Africaines.
R.C.E.A.:·
Revue Canadienne d'Etudes Africaines.
Also
(C.J.A.S.).
R.F.H.O.M.:
Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer.
R.S.H.:
Revue Senegalaise d'Histoire.
xv

---

PREFACE
A HISTORlOGRAPHICAL NOTE.
THE SECONDARY LITERATuRE:
A
survey
of
che
literature
abollt
Fuuta
Tooro
and
to
a
larger
extent,
about
Senegambia
i1.nd
t1auricania,
reveals
a
neglect
for
the
hisc:ory of
the colonial period ~r se.
Nineteenth and early t~entieth
century
sources
are
most
of
the
time
the
w'ork of colonial officials,
often
military
officers,
ethnographers.
~lnd
orien::alists.
Titles
~ithin
this
body
of
literature
generally
suggest
an
imperialist
orientation and
sho'vJs
a
desire
on
the
part of
the authors
to
justify
in ~he eyes of both the Government and the public,
the request for an
all
out
military
campaign
against
the
peoples
and
states
of l,.jestern
Sudan.
Ch ie f
among
those
'.... orks,
for
our own
purposes,
are
Frederic
Carrere
and
Paul
Holle's
De.
la
Senegambie
Francaise
(1855),
and
General
Louis
Faidherbe's
~~e~~S~e~n~e~g~a~l~,
l~a~~F~t~-a~n~c~e__~d~a~n~s__~l_'~A~f~r~i~q~u~e
Occidenta1e (1889).
They often give misleading information on the life and politics of
Fuuca
Tooro,
something
thac
stemmed
from
both
a
limited knowledge
of
the
society
and
an
obvious
desire
co
depict
it
as
a
"fanatic"
and
serious
obstacle
to
French
trade
along
the
river.
In
spite
of
this
bias ho~ever, they shed light on the
secessionist attLtudes of western
Fuuta,
as
encouraged
and
supported
by
the
French
und
to
a
lar-ger
degree,
the contradictions of Fuuta Tooro as a state.
1
I

---

2
ConcinuLng
this
tradition
of
"imperial
scholarship,"
Colonel
Gouraud's
La
Pacification de
la
Mauritanie
(1910)
and General
Duboc's
Mnuritanie along with some other similar studies,
deal lnoscly with the
conquest
of
~oorish territory 1
touchiilg
upon
Fuut<1 Tooro
(north ba!1k)
only
to
give
a
limited
credit
co
Fuutanke
participation
in
the
successive
military
cBlnpaigns
chat
punctuated
the
establishment
of
French ruLe in Mauritania.
The
firse
quarter
of
-c.he
c·....entietl\\
century
SCi''';
the
emergence
of
"Afro-ce:l.tric"
sentimeni:.s
and
the
development
of
Africanist
studies
among French colonial officials.
To this wave we owe the Chroniql1es du
routa
Senep.:alais
(1913),
a
translation
from
Siree
Abbaas
Soh's
two
Arabic
manuscripts
by
Maurice
Delafosse
and
Henri
Caden,
and
Delafosse's
own
Haut
Senegal-Niger
(1912)_
Much
l~ter, Felix Brigaud
and
Vincent
Monteil
follo"'ed
in
their
footsteps
and
published
historical
traditions
on
Senegal
during
the
19605.
All
these
..... orks
purported
to
respond
to
the
urgent
need
to
understand
Senegalese
societies
and
their
past
history.
As
..... ith
the
other
regions
of
Senegal,
they
focus
essentially
on
the
political
history
of
Fuuta
Tooro,
from
the early dynascies
to the dO'WTlfall of the Almamace ..
Re 1 igion
in
Senegal
has
also
been
the
focus
of
French
administrative
inquiry
and
scrutiny,
particularly
in
its
northern
part,
Fuuta Tooro.
In this regard,
Paul Marey's
important ..... ork, ;:tudes
sur
l'1s1am
au
Senegal
and
Etudes
sur
l'lslam
en
Mauritanie
(1917),
w~s
one
of
t:1e
earliest
major
surveys
of
Islam
in
Fuuta
Tooro.
It
devotes attention
to
Islamic
schools
in
the
region,
Tijani and Qadiri,
small
and
large,
extremist
and
moderate,
collaborative
~nd
neutral.

---

3
But,
i.n
trying
to
divide
the
congregations
into
subversive
and
non-subversive,
Marey's
work
remains
affected
by what
Pr.
Qumar
Kane
termed "crusader's mentality",l which characterized many a study on the
subject. 2
As
disputes
over
land
became
more
and
more
intriguing
and
threatened
administrative
tranquillity
in
many
districts,
the
administration
ordered
investigation
and
thorough
surveys
of
the
land
tenure
system
carried
out.
A
series
of
studies
resulted
from
such
endeavour:
"Rapport
sur
le
droit
de
propriece
des
colades
dans
le
Chemama"
by
Lieutenant
Paul
Cheruy
in
1911;
"Etude
sur
la
tenure
des
terres
indigenes
au Fouea dans la vallee du Senegal"
by Inspector Jean
Vidal
in
1924;
and
later,
['.... 0
other
studies,
"Du
regime
des
terres
chez
les populations du Fouta Senegalais"
by Abdoul Salam Kane and "Du
regime
des
terres du Fouta anterieurement a
l'occupation Francaise"
by
Gaden in 1935.
These studies are
all of socio-historical
interest and
give an idea of the context in ~hich they ~ere generated.
r,.;nether
they
focus
on
Islam,
politi.cs,
or
socio-economics,
these
earlier ~orks often have something in common.
They do not
fall under
the category of professional historical studies.
The
third
set
of
studies
by
colonial
officials
'.... as
a
series
of
contributions
by both historians
and non-historians.
Chief among them
are
the
studies
oy Prosper Cultru, Georges Hardy, Andre Villard,
and
Andre
Sabatie
on'
the
conquest
of
Senegal,
its
administration
and
"development,"
between 1910 and
the Second World War.
But,
instead of
a
history
of
the
peoples
of
Senegambia.
the
authors
wrote
mostly
of
French "pacification" of this part of Africa.
Consequently they often

---

4
turned <l blind eye
::c: :'::~;.e processes of change in Senegambian 50ciecies.
The
need
to
correct
the
bias
of
colonial
historiography
led
to
',..,hat
is
generally
termed
the
"nationalist"
phase
of
African
historiography, one chat by-passes the colonial period, perhaps co more
easily avoid
the
"EurocentLic"
temptations,
ar'.d deal directly '... ieb.
:::.he
pre-coloni.al
3
pase.
To
ch is
urge
we
owe
some
fine
pieces
on
the
history
of
Senegambia
and
~auritania by both African and non- ..... frican
scholars. 4
This
fever
for
the
pre-colonial
history
of
• c
.
: ..... L r~ca
has
made
a
wealth
of
contributions
to
the
history
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
Pr.
Oumar
Kane's
series
of
articles
published
in
the
Bulletin
de
l'I.F.A.N.
and
Cahiers
ct' Enldes
~\\fricaines, based
on
an
intilflate
kno'..,rledge
of
oral
traditions and a
thorough archival
investigation,
enhance
the awareness
of
poli.tical
developments
under
the
rule
DE
the
Deeniyankoobe.
They
also shed light on the rela;:ions between the
people of Fuuta and their
Moorish
neighbours
to
the
norch,
and
on
the
pa~tern
of
regional
authority within the miCdle valley of Senegal River. 5
The
first
generation
of ~aster's
theses
supervised
by
Pr.
Qurnar
Kane
~n the eJ.i"ly 1970s.
generally
focus
on
politic.al
aspects
of
the
pre-colonial history of Fuuta Tooro. 6
James
Johson's
dissertation
on
the
"Almarnate
of
ruta
Toro
1770-1836"
is
an analysis
of
the
theocratic
revolution
that
took place
in
t.he
l770s
and
established
the
ne·.....
regime
of
the
Almamis.
The
hist.ory
of
this
regime
from
its
very
incepti.on,
its
internal
contradictions
and
the
rise
of
the
Jaggorde
as
well
as
the
gradual
intrusion of the
French,
receive a chorougll treatment.

---

I
III
5
Articles by Pr.
David Robinson on "The Islamic Revolution of Futa
Toro" and "Abdul Qadiri and Shaykh Umar"
illong with The
Islamic Regime
of Fuuta Tocro by Mouscapha Kane
and
David
Robinson,
have
reinforced
the
5 cudy
0 f
the
AImama ce .
Pr.
Robinson's
other
books,
Chiefs
and
Clerics:
Ahdul Bokar and
the Historv of Futa Toro
(1975) and The Holv
\\.Ja.r
of
Umar
Tal:
Western Sudan
in
the
Kid·Nineteenth
Century
(1985),
deal
thoroughly
'Jith
the evolution of
the Almalll<1te within
the context
of French expansion during
the
second half of
the
nineteenth century.
the
rise
and
fall
of
Islamic
reformism,
and
the
evolution
of
the
Umarian Jihad and its consequences on Fuuta Toaro.
These
last •.... arks ",ere all based on a
remarkable
familiarity with
and
knowledge
of
Arabic
and
French
material
supported
by
a
huge
colleccion of high-quality oral traditions.
A final
important
source
on
Fuuta Tooro,
Leland Conley
BarrO'.J'S
dissertation
on
"General
Faidherbe,
the
Maurel
& Prom Company
and
French
expansion
in
Senegal"
(1974),
provides
a
detailed
and
lucid
analysis of
the first phase of French expansion in Fuuta Tooro through
the
dominant
role
of Governor
Faidherbe
and
the
Saint· Louis
merchant
community.
These
histories
of
the
18th
and
19th
centuries
are
of
great
utility
in setting the
general context of expansion along
the
river,
the agonising dismemberment and downfall of
the Almamate.
But,
as
ie'
appears,
the
twentieth
century
is
generally
absent
from
the
historiography
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
Perhaps
it
is
because
the
colonial
period was one of respite,
"in the shadow of the
swords" as Pr.
Hubert
Deschamps put it,
without material for heroic history.

---

6
As
of
now,
only
a
very
few Master's
theses
at
the
University of
Dakar,
have
dealt- - in
a
limited way- -with
the
canton
chiefs
of
Fuuta
Tooro. 7
As
for
Ailsa
Auchnie's
dissertation
on
che
"Commandemenc
Indigene au Senegal,"
it
focuses
on
the
regions of Kajoor,
Baw01,
and
Casamance.
The several doctorates
done
in Mauritania and Senegal
chat
cover
the
colonial
period
hardly
include
Fuuca
100ro
in
their
treatment.
They
generally
favour
the
urban
centers
and
the
regions
and
peoples associated with
the
development of
peanut cultivation.
The
numbe-r of
theses and books churned out on
the Hourides and the "peanut
basin"
certainly speaks for
itself. 8
Another
tendency
within
the
historiography
of
colonialism
is
to
deal '..Jith
large
issues on larger areas and,
until recently,
to compare
the
British
and
French
systems
of
rule,
particularly
in West
Africa.
This
trend has
produced SOlne valuable
works
such
as Michael
Crowder's
West
Africa
Under
Colonial
Rule
(1968);
Jean
Suret-Canale's
French
Colonialism
in
Tropical
Africa
1900-1945
(1971);
and
Anthony
I.
Asiwaju's
Western
Yorubaland
Under
European
Rule
1889-1945
(1976).
Despite a
primary concern about
the
establishment of colonial
rule and
its operation,
they deal with the consequences for African peoples.
More
recently.
Henri
Brunschwig has
published a
study
on African
collaboration
within
the
French
African
empire.
His
Noirs
et
Blancs
clans
l' Afrique
Noire
Francaise
1870·1916.
posits
that
the
coloni;:.ation
of Africa was as much the work of Blacks as of Whites.
In
general,
works
of
this
type,
because
they
deal
with
large
areas and broad issues,
tend to make overgeneralisations about European
rule
and
African
response
that
"are
not
always
supported
by
sound

---

7
research on limited areas and restricted time periods."g
THE STUDY PROPER:
Proceding
from
this
historical
context,
'Ne
can
summarize
che
reasons
for
embarking on
a
history
of
Fuuta Tooro
from
1890
to
after
One
reason
for
this
endeavour- - though
by
no
means
the
1lI0st
important--is
of
a
sentimental
sort.
As
a
native
of
fuuta
who
grew up amid
the
traditions of the
land,
~e ha~e always craved for a
better and deeper understanding of its long and eventful history.
Such
keen
interest ',,/e
had already
translated
into
a
Master' 5
thesis
at
the
Uni'Jersity
of
Dakar
in
the
early
19705,
"Le
Laa .....
et
les
Halaybe
1.81.0-1.890. "
This
study
DE
the
institutions
and
political
history
of
two
pro'Jinces
of
Fuuta
Tooro
during
the
nineteenth
century
certainly
befitted
the
erstwhile
"nationalist"
mood
and
context
of
African
historiography.
But.
above
all,
we
were
left
with
a
sense
of
unfinished
business,
a
yet-to-be
sattsfied
impulse.
More
so
because
Fuuta,
a
region
that
contributed
imm~nsely to
the
history
of
Western
Sudan,
has
entered
ever
since
colonial
occupation
a
phase
of
steady
decltne
worsened
by
recurrent
cycles
of
drought.
Th is
makes
the
colonial
period-·one
of
transition
from
the
glorious
past
to
the
present predicament--all the more attractive
to a historian anxious
to
pose
and... answer
a
range
of
questions
not
always
addressed
by
the
traditional
historiography.
We
sought
to
make
use
of
the
new
and
enriching experience earned over
the
years
of a
Ph.D programme
in the
North American academic world and.
since we are especially preoccupied
with
contributing
to
the
challenging
task
Senegalese historians
have
I
I
I

---

recently
assigned
themselves,
to
help
complete
the
historical
tableau
of Senegambia.
The
present
study
purpo!:'"ts
to
give
as
full
a
picture
as
our
sources can allow,
of life and events in Fuu~a during the late 19th and
early
20th
centuries.
Initi.ally,
our
in::.ention
'..Jas
to
do
a
general
history
for
the
period
under
s::udy,
which
implied
the
tackling
of
po 1 i t ica 1,
.
1
socla ... ,
economic
and
cultural
issues.
Despite
the
availabiiity
of
relevant
data
on
the
various
aspects,
ho ....·ever,
circumstances have
forced us
to
cut back on
the
economic
and cultural.
As a
result,
our study
remains essentially a socio-political history of
the
region between 1890 and the 1920s.
Tilese
temporal
limits
have
been
chosen
for
their
significance
in
both
a
general
and
particular
sense.
The
early
limit of
1890 marked
the
end
of
organized
military
resistance
in
Fuuta
Tooro,
with
the
surrender
of
the
Central
Fuuta
aristocracy
and
the
death
of
Abdul
Bookar Kan
(1891),
in a word,
the bringing of
the whole of Fuuta under
French colonial control.
The
later
limit on
the
other hand,
marked a
new
departure
following
the
First
C;orld
l,.lar,
the
end
of
the
protectorace period.
In
terms
of
substance,
the
study
deals
with
several
sets
of
issues,
particulary
the
establishment
of
the
colonial
administration,
the
role
of traditional authority wf~hin such a context,
the
evolution
of
local
chiefship
(losers
and ',.;inners).
and
the
relation of colonial
administrative
principles
to
local
realities
and
practice.
At tent ion
is
also
devoted
to
the
operation
of colonial
institutions,
the
direct
ilnpact
of
colonial
demands
(taxation,
confiscation,
conscription,
..

---

9
indigenat and forced labour)lO upon the subjects,
and Lhe reach of what
some like to refer to as the
"Colonial State."
The study also concerns
itself ~ith the response DE the people co
colonial
rule
i.n
general,
especially
the
changes
imposed
upon
the
traditional
political-administrative
landscape.
The
last part of che
study
addresses
the
impact
of
che
human
and
economic
contribucion
to
the
War,
and
che
many
and
varied
crises
that
erupted
during
che
conflict and its aftermath.
Within
che
framework
thus
defined,
we
sec
out
to
test
some
generalisations
germane
to
imperial
history,
and
discuss
issues
that
have hitherto
remained outside
the focus
of scholars of the
area.
In
starting
·.... ieh
a
review
of
the
period
1850-1890,
we
reemphasize
the
status of Senegal River as a critical avenue of French expansion to the
ease,
a~d
a
place
of
confrontacion
between
french
and
Fuutanke
strategic interests and stakes.
At the same time,
French attitudes 'lis
a vis
the Almamate and the response of individual regional authorLties,
give a hint of major confrontations and political "new deals"
ahead.
Fuuta
Tooro
was
until
the
conquest
of
Mauritania
a
single
territorial
entity.
Treating
Fuuta
Tooro
as
it
was,
a
territory
sitting astride
the
Senegal River
and not
simply one of
the pieces of
the
present
day
republics
of Mauritanta
and
Senegal,
is
one
of
the
merits
of
this
study.
In
this
vein,
it
parts
with
the 'eradition
Jewsiewicki
ascribes
to
"nationalist"
historiography,
which
long
remained
a
prisoner
of
the
concept
of
"nation-state"
and
"turned
the
national setting into the natural setting of historical studies."ll
The
question
of
the
creation
of
Mauritania
makes
FU'Jta
Tooro

---

I
IIII
iO
!
rank
among
the
most
interesting
cases
of
partition
of
echno-cultural
I
entities in Africa.
It shows
that problems arose not simply when areas
fell
under
the
domination
of
two
different
European
powers
such as
in
the
Niger-Nigeria.
Benin·Nigeria and
many
other cases,
but
also
even
when
~hey were split between two territories under the same colonial
umbrella.
In this wise,
the study deals with the various disputes over
land and
land-related issues,
bet'..... een not
only Tukuloor
and Moors,
but
also among Tukuloor ~ummunities of the
[WO
banks of
the
Senegal River.
The
cifficul.ties
that
beset
the
[·...;0
ac.ministrations
as
a
result
of
such disputes are also examined.
also
re assess
general isations
about
segments
of
the
traditional
aristocracy that took an active part
in the
adminiscration
of
colonial
Africa.
We
argue
that
one
should
conduct
a
tho~ough
investigation in the comportment of local agents,
rather than lump
them
all
togecher
into one
basket of
"collaborators."
Our
analysis of
the
attitude of village
chiefs
leads
to
the
conclusion
chat
this
category
should be credited for
having very often
indulged
in patent and daring
shows
of
solidarity
with
their
constituents.
We
look
into
the
situation of province and canton chiefs,
their meagre
revenues and the
many obligations
imposed on them by
their milieu.
We suggest,
without
justifying
their
actions,
that
much
of
the
corruption,
mismanagement
and
exploitation
stemmed
in part
from
the
disproportion between
their
i
earnings
and
the
requirements
of
the
society
in
which
they
lived.
,
jI·
Finally,
we
posit
that
the
"Indigenat
Code."
hitherto
construed
as
a
\\
purely
disciplinary
component
of
the
French
colonial
superstructure.
fulfilled economic functions as well.

---

I I
The
section regarding
the popular reaction
co colonial rule
shows
thac,
as during
the period of mil~tary resistance,
the
people of Fuuta
were
among
those
who
expressed
most
strongly
their
resent.ment
for
foreign dOlnination.
There
is hardly any form of resistance,
military,
administrative,
and
cultural
to which
t.hey
did
not
resort.
Taxat ion,
Forced
Labour,
Conscription,
and
"French
School"
all
triggered
appropriate
responses
as
the
masses
grew weary of arbitrary decisions
and del1lands.
Finally,
the human and economic contribution of Fuuta to World war
I,
in
circumstances
then
unparalleled
in
Mauritania
and
Senegal,
the
drain on people and resources,
the
famines
chat ensued,
the
decline of
trade
and
agriculture,
and
the
renewed
trend
of
emigration
that
resulted
from
this
situation,
further
info~ms on the historic process
of
marginalizotion
and
impoverishment
of
the
region,
to
the
clear
advantage of the
"peanut and railway basin."
By
the
end
of
the
period
under
study
the
society
in
Fuuta Tooro
had undergone
significant--though not al~ays drastic--changes.
At
the
top,
some
individual
lineages
emerged more
powerful,
better educated,
and
sometimes
richer.
At
the
bottom,
some
former
domestic
slaves
by
virtue
of
la\\Js
abolishing
the
institution,
enlistment during
the
War,
and
as
a
result
of
their
struggle
thereafter,
became
free
and
gained
access either to land o'Jnership or sharecropping.
Because of declining
economy,
famines,
and heavy demands on the part of the administration,
the
bulk
of
the
Fuutankoobe
experienced
a
degradation
of
their
standards of living.
\\Jhile
the
administration
made
attempts
at
containing
the
effects

---

of
locust
swarms
and
cattle
epidelnics,
diversifying
agricultural
production,
improving
hygiene
and
sanitation,
and
building
roads,
it
did
nothing
to
promote
irrigation,
and
very
little
to
bore ',,,;ells
and
help pastoralists cope with the lack of water.
Due
to problems
and shortcomings discussed earlier
in relation
to
the
historiography,
and
the
novelty
of
this
study,
we have
based our
work
first
and
foremost
on
archival
and
oral
sources.
These,
not'..;ithstanding
some
inevitable
biases,
proved
extremely
valuable
i~
reconstructing the colonial episode of Fuucanke hiitory.
ARCHIVAL AND ORAL SOURCES:
Underlining
the
irreplaceable
role
of
local.
post
reports
in
any
attempt
at
writing
the
history
of
the
incer-war
period
in
Afr ica,
Huberc
Deschamps
stated
that
"they
alone,
completed
by
the
oral
traditions,
would
provide
a
precise
picture
of
reality."l2
This
statement
applies
perfectly
well
to
our
study.
Indeed,
;:he
reports
emanating
from
the
districts
of
the
valley
more
than
the
general
and
synthetic
reports
of higher spheres,
supplemented by the
testimonies--
direct
and
indirect--of
the
colonial
situation,
shed
light
on
the
period
under
investigation.
and
help
to
frame
a
history
of
the
"colonized"
in lieu of the "colonizer."
Beyond
the
overseas ~section
of
the
French
national
archives
(A.N.F.D.M.),
and
the
correspondence
between
the Ministry of
Colonies
and Governors-General of West Africa,
we have devoted our attention and
efforts
to
the
Archives
Nationales
dll
Senegal
(A.N.S.),
and Archives
Nation<11es
de
Mal.lrit<1nie
(A.N.M.),
particularly,
t~e district
reports

---

13
(Rapports
de
Cercles).
Fortunately
our
research
coincided with
the
li:ting at
the
A.~.S of restrictions on the use of district reports
and
monographs
germane
to
the
and
'Ni ch
che
organization
of
archival
material
transferred
from
Saint-Louis,
the
headquarters
:or
colonial
Mauritania,
int.o
the
Service
National
des
Archives de Mauritanie at No~ackchott.
OU::'
period
scares
with
the
est.ablishment
of
colonial
rule
in
FUll ca
Tooro.
The
concern
for
consolida:ion,
la',.;
and
order
requl~ed
that
adniniscracors
have
cognizance--sometLmes--of
the
most
trivial
elements
of
the
lives
and
activities
of
communities
under
their
juriSdiction.
This
rendered
intelligence
gathering
rl
pressing need,
and
a
systematic
activity ..
It
·....as
no
longer
based
on
occas ional
runaway slaves,
local
traders,
or
telegraph agents~·main suppliers of
informa~ion
in
the
pre·colorlial
period--but
on
canton
and
village
chiefs,
as
well as on administrators on
tour of their cicumscriptions.
Thus,
the official
reports
provided direct and
"internal,"
rather
than
"external"
evidence .13
In
matters
of
inter-community
or
inter·
individual
disputes.
collective
or
individual
disobedience,
natural
phenomena
like
hwnan
and
cattle
epidemics,
droughc
and
others,
commandants and special commissioners were often senC to conducc direcc
inquiries.
Otherwi.se,
the
administration
reii.ed
heavily
on
canton
chiefs,
who
were
kept
regularly
informed by
their
village 'chiefs
or,
when the latter were suspected of ill-will, by networks of spies within
local communities.
Hardly anything went unnoticed by either element of
the
administracive
apparatus.
This
guaranteed
the
steady
flow
of
qualitative
and
quantitative
information,
and
rendered
"bush
reports"

---

far
richer
in detail and substance
than synthetic
reports generated by
both Lieutenant-Governors'
and Governors-General's offices.
Moreover,
at
che
opening
of
the
twentieth
century,
highec
authority
encouraged
local
adminiscrators
t:o
conduct
surveys
and
indulge,
whene'Jer
their
heavy
desk '.... ork
permitted,
in
the
writing
of
short monographs on their administrative units.
This
accouncs
for
the
fl~rry of Notices on t:he various cercles and land tenure systems during
our
period
and
after.
lJ:1i le
formal
reports
inforrLl~d on
che
daily
administrative
life,
these
pioneer
anthropological
and
historical
surveys provided interesting data on che culture and main traits of the
evolution
of
different
groups.
Starting
about
the
same
time,
local
administrators
became
more
and
more
interested
in
che
census.
As
a
result,
delnographic
data
~as
also
accumulated
on
occaSions,
as
administrators
tried to keep track of both deaths and births.
But.
det3iled
though
these
reports
may
be.
they ·,.Jere
not
free
from
flaws
and
biases
i:-:herent
in
both
the
process
of data
gathering
and the concerns of the different members of the chain of transmission,
sometimes
tainted
by
objective
and
subjective
parameters.
\\ihile
village
chiefs
were
not
always
inclined
to
provide
accurate
information,
especially
·,..Ihen
this
had
a
bearing
on
administrative
demands
(taxation,
conscription
et
aL .. )
or
could
lead
to
severe
repression.
carrcpn chiefs
sometimes relayed false
information so as
to
placate
local
administrators,
inflate
the
census
and·.by
the
same
token·-increase
their
tax· related
premiums,
neutralize
political
enemies and
trouble makers.
or poison
the mind of che commandant about
the
rival
chief
of
a
neighbouring canton.
',..!ere
there
a
scandal
of a

---

(
lS
SOft,
the
chief had every
interest
in rnisinformLng the commandant,
in
order to elude the full impact of the latter's anger.
Corrunandants
had
their
limitations
too.
In some
cases
they
~ere
geographical.
The size of cercles like Matam and Pador was an obstacle
--if
not
an
alibi--for
administrators
not
to
visit
the
most
remote
parts
of
the
discricc.
Hence.
the
likelihood
for
inaccu~ate
information
to
feed
monthly
reports,
and
the
inclination
of
some
administrators
to
duplicate
their
predecessors'
census
data,
surveys,
or
observations
on
the
people
and
chiefs.
Class,
not
to
say
racial
biases and double standards, also prevailed at times.
wnen reports did
not
reflect
the
bourgeois
disdain
for
feudalism or
monarchism or
the
middle
or
lower middle class
administrators,
they ofeen displayed an
overly praiseful
tone
for
those chiefs deemed reliable and strict,
or
irritation at communities noted for lack of cooperation and inclination
to rebellion.
Finally, just as chiefs and other agents, administrators
were
equally
anxious
to
secure
regular
promotion
in
their
careers.
Consequently,
some
would not
hesitate
to
relay inaccurate
information
that
would
please
Saint-Louis,
earn
:hem
a
good
score
in
annual
ratings,
or
lead higher authority
to condone
the methods
they applied
in response
to local crisis situations.
M{lny examples elucidate L.hese
observations.
Next
to
archival
work
in
Paris,
Dakat~ and Nouackchott,
we
have
conducted as many interviews as our time ana resources allowed,
in both
Mauritania
and
Senegal;
the
cities,
where
economic
conditions
have
recently forced people to migrate,
as
well as
the valley of the river
that divides Fuuta right down the
middle.
In the course of our field

---

, '
16
work,
we
have
dealt
with
several
types
of
traditions;
"formal"
tradicions
such
as
the
return
from
Naaro.
the
execution
of
Lamtooro
Sidiki,
the
death
of
Abdul
Bookar.
often
cold
and
retold
with
some
variations
throughout
the
land;
and
"personal
recollections"
such
as
the
stories
of
local
chiefs,
administrative
demands
and
responses
of
the
people,
revolts,
famines,
epidemics
et
a 1. 14
They
conscitui:e
a
blend of Historie (told history)
and Geschichte
(lived history).
An effore ~as made to diversify. at best,
the set of informants by
incervie'.... ing
within
and
outside
r:he
chiefly
families,
men
and
women,
griots
and
amateur-traditionalists,
older
and
middle
aged,
chose
with
modern
education
and
chose
without.
Several
factors
were
given
consideration
in
the
selection
of
informants.
Some
informants,
like
Bah,
Kan,
Cubbu.
and
Sal
have
a
solidly
established
reputation
as
kno!...iledgeable
traditionalists,
and
were
of
great help
to both Johnson
and Robi.nson
(late
19605),
and
to
us
(early
19705)
HaVing witnessed
the
early
pal-t
of
the
colonial
era
and
served
.1.S
agents
of
the
administration
in
various
capacities,
they
proved
all
the
more
interesting
for
our
purposes.
Since
canton
and
province
chiefs
knew
some
of
the
details
of
the
dal-to-day
administrative
business,
it
was
only fit
to
interview a
few.
In spite of some
reservations on the part
of some of these
interviewees,
the decision proved rewarding.
Also,
because
women
within
the
aristocracy
of
Fuuta
Tooro
were ~
generally
well
informed,
if
not
influential,
we
made
i t
a
point
to
interview
some
surviving
wi.ves
and
daughters
of
chiefs
and
ruling
families.
They
often
provided
valuable
material
on
"dynastic"
intrigues,
songs,
and comments apropos
some Comtnandants,
or chiefs.

---

17
wnen
the
archLval
materlal
was
mute
on
particular
issues,
or
provided
information
that
required
a
confirmation
or
a
conflicting
view,
we
often
chose
Co
vi-sit
the
scene
of
the
event
and
calk
co
surviving eye witnesses or descendants of the DrRm~tis Personae.
Such
was che case with che "Mahdist"
events chat shook Galoyaabe and Dimat,
the
revolts
thac
upset
the
authority
of
'la,]ya
Kan
and
Sall\\nba
Elfekki
Aan,
che cLamatic face of Ardo Galoya Abdul Soh, and other occurrences
In
general,
people
belonging
::0
fo:mer
slave
lineages
proved
hesitant to provide information, ofcen contene with standard renditions
of Ioea 1 events.
This
often stemmed
from both a
fear of contradicting
the
prevalent
account,
and
a
lack
of
interest
in
the
particular
histories.
Interestingly
enough,
some
good
informacion
came
from
chiefly
families and anateur historians
racher
than er-iots who,
contrary
to a
traditional
belief
among
historians,
appeared
less
well
equipped
on
many issues. 1S
If o~r
study has proved anything,
i t
must be that oral traditions
should
no
longer
be
considered
a
mere
"ingredient,"
an
extremely
secondary source, but
indeed an inseparable twin of arc~ival material,
when ic comes Co che history of colonial Africa.
w~ile on a number of
issues
archival
and
oral
data
intersected
and
proved
mutually
corrobora;:ive,
tradition
sometimes
provided
a
fuller
and
more
comprehensive
picture.
Most
important,
archives
were
sometimes
strangely
mute
on
questions
that
captured
collective
memory
to
the
point
of
resulting
in
what
one
might
call
Widespread
" formal
tradicions.'·
The assassination or deporcation of Ardo Galoya Abdul Soh

---

18
by
Colonel
Dodds,
Mammacu
Abdul
Bookar I s
exile
to
the
Gambia,
Yero
Makam's
rebellion
in
FerIo
among
other
issues,
remained
untraceable
despite
meticulous
investigation of
related archi'Jes
and
periods.
In
che
absence
of
tangible
reasons
for
such
amiss ions,
one
can
only
st.:rmise
that
administrators
deemed
e'/ents
not
imporcanc
enough
to
deserve a
formal
report,
or purposefully witheld information to avoid
blame from higher authority.
O'Cher
than
0\\1"[
own
material,
'We
have
availed
ourselves
of
the
"Fonds Robinson,"
collec~ed in the 19605.
Although most of them apply
to
the
nineteenth
century,
chei:.-
quality
and
rele'lance
for
the
first
decade of our period,
made them useful for our study.
Jus t
as
archival
documents,
oral
traditions
also
presented
limitations.
in
addition
to
the
eradit:ional
lack
of
precision
often
decried.
The subjective dimension was at eimes noticeable,
as was
the
brand
of
wonderment
that
stamped
some
of
the
accounts
relating
to
nineteenth
century
"mahdisc"
leaders.
Conversely,
on
accounts
regarding chiefs
deemed "exogenous"
or
"too strict,"
people displayed
more readiness if not more "objectivit.y."
The
recentness
of
events
and
the
nature
of
our
t.opic
aroused
varied attitudes among our informants.
SOlne were surprised at our keen
interest in late nineteenth and early twentieth century personnages and
events .• In
one
instance.
in
Halaybe,
\\..Jhen ·..·e expresseu
interest
in
the "Nooro migration"
and
early canton chiefs, some simply said:
wnat you are interested in is not real tarikh [Arabic
",ord
for
History]
like
Al-Hajji
Umar
for
example;
What
you
are
asking
here
is
no
tarikh,
it
is,
yesterday {i.e: too recent}.16

---

19
It
may
·,.;ell
be
that
they--as
many
thurlEers
of
colonialism and
"nationalist"
historians--regard
[he
colonial
period
as
poor
in
macerial Eor heroic histo~y.
They may consider the humiliating return
from Naoro and ~he era of coloni.al oppression,
as sequences thac do not
stand comparison with
the glorious debuts of the Umarian saga,
or the
fluctuating
relations
between
the
Almamace and Saint-Louis.
Finally,
the concern for eventual divulging of "sensitive"
imformaticn (see note
15),
our
close
relation
to
some
of
che
chiefly
families
u;H.ler
historical
investigation,
and
the
lingering
effects
of
erstw~ile
north~sout~ land disputes recently propped up by the prospects of dam-
related development ~ere, more than once,
sources for suspicion.
Only
rounds
of
interviews.
coupled with due
explanation
and definition of
the goals of ~ritten history, helped dispel such mistrust.
I.J i th
bot':1
'.n i t t:en
and
oral
sources,
che
afol'ementioned
limitations
may
have
Some
sway--however
limited--on
some
of
the
information.
But,
they
do
not
affect:
the
general
richness
and
relevance of
the evidence.
No one can empty collective or individual
memory of its social content.
j
IiIi!
I,
I
I
I
iI
I

---

NOTES
l.
Quoted
by
Mohamed
Mhodj
and
Mamadou
DiouE
in
"L'Historiographie
Senegalaise:
Bilan
des
pratiques
accuelles
et
Perspectives".
l5p',
(p.
7).
This
piece
...... as
also
published
under
the
ti-=le
"Senegalese
Historiography:
Presenc Practices
and Future Perspecti'J€s"
in African
Historiographies:
What
Hiscor'l
for
Which
Afri.ca?;
Editors:
Bogumil
Je ...... sieNicki and David Newbury.(Sage Series on African Moderr.ization and
Development,
vol.
12 October 1985,
320p).
See
also
in
the
same
edition:
M.artin
Klein' 5
article: "The
Development of Senegalese HistorioBraphy."
2.
Paul Marey's was
just one of a series of studies on Islam by
colonial
officials
for
the
same
purpose.
Among
ochecs:
Maurice
Delafosse,
L'Etat Actuel de
l'Islam en A.O.F
(1910);
Alain Quellien,
La
Politicue
Musulmane dans
l'A.O.r (1910);
Robere Arnaud,
L'Islam et
la Politique Musulmane Francai;een A.O.F (1912).
3.
For a critical analysis oE the evolution of the Historiography
of
Africa,
see
among
others:
Bogumil
Jewsie·.... icki
and
Da·"id
Newbury,
1985,
op.cit.;
Philip J.Curtln,
"Pre-colonial history".
Copyright A.H.A
(1964-1974);
Henry
Bernstei.n
and Jeac,"ues
Depelchin,
"The
Object
of
African History,
A Materialist
Perspective"
in Historv
in Africa,
#6,
1979;
Bogumil Jewsiewicki,
"L'Histoire en Afrique ot..:. le Commerce des
Idees
Usagees"
in
Canadian Journal
of African
Studies,
vol.
13,
i-2,
1979.
Jean
Copans,"D'Un
,~fricanisme a l'autre"
in C.J.A.S,
vol.
13,
1-2,
1979.
4.
On the American side,
the Ph.D dissertations of
the 19605 and
19705,
especial.l.y
those
of
Lude
G.
Colvi.n
on
Kajoor
(1972);
Eunice
Charles on the Kingdom of Jolof
(1973);
and Quinn Charlotte's study on
the Gambia (l967).
On the
French side
the works of Yves Saint-Martin on the Tukuloor
Empire
(1967
and 1970);
Cenevleve Desi.re Vuill.emin's on the Gum Trade
and the History of Mauritania (1961 and 1962).
N.B:
North
American
Ph.D. dissertations
represent
half
the
doctoral level studies on the history of Senegambia;
40 of 88 computed
in 1983.
See Mbodj
and Diouf,
op.cit.
On
the
African
side:
The
works
of
Boubacar
Barry,
Abdoulaye
Ba thi ly,
Sekene
Mody
S issoko,
Mohamed
Mbodj,
Mamadou
Dlouf.
and
a
series of dissertations
in French universities.
I
20
I
I
I

---

21
5.
Pr.
OumJ.r
Kane
has
just
completed
an
extensive
history
of
Fuuta 100ro during the reign of the Deeniyanke Satigis.
6.
Especially,
"Le
Laaw
et
les
Halaybe
au
1ge
siecle"
by
Moustapha Kane;
"Le Yirlabe-Hebbidbe
et
le Bossea" by
late
Bayla wane;
"Le Toro et le Dirnar" by Saydou :-1ourou TOl:re;
and "Les Relations entre
les H<1.al-Pulaar'en et les Brakna 1850-1903" by lbrahima Aboll SaIL.
Until recently.
Master's
theses
formed almost half the writings on
the
History
of
Senegal
(111
of
238
in
1983).
Of
unequal
v~lue and
length,
SOme
running up
to
300
pages,
they
showed
some::imes
thorough
archival
and
oral
research.
(See,
Martin
Klein
and
Mbodj
1985,
op.eit) .
7.
Cargui
Diouf,
"Abdoul
Salam
Kane:
Chef
de
Cancan"
(197G);
Kalidou Oia110,
"Les Chefs de Canton et de Prov~nce du Fouta Senegalais
jusqu'en 1960"
(1985).
B.
ihe
major
ones
being:
Cheikh
Tidjane
Sy,
La
Confrerie
;;eneg?_latse
des
Hour-ides
(Paris
1969);
Jean
Copans,
Les
Marabouts
de
l'Arachice
(Paris
1980);
Donal
Cruise
O'Brien.
Sair:ts
and
Politicians
(Camb.idge,
1975).
9.
Martin
Klein,
Islam
and
Imperialism
in
Sene2:al:
Sine-Silloum
13~7-191~ (1968).
10.
Bruce
Berman
and
John
Lonsd<1le,
"Coping
with
the
contradictions:
The
develo?ment
0: the colonial state
in
Kenya
1895-1914" in Journal of AfrLcan Historv
(J.A.H) 20,
1979,
pp.
487-505.
11.
Bogumil Jewsie ....... icki,
"L':"1istoire en Afrique"
op.eit,
p.
7S.
12.
Hubert
Deschamps,
"French
Colonial
Policy
in
Tropical
Africa
between
the
t .......o
world wars"
in
France
and Britain
in AfrjcA:
Imperial
Rivalrv
and Colonial
Rule
edited by
Professors Gifford
and w.M.
Roger
Louis,
Yale University Press,
2d printing,
19 7 8,
p.
543.
13"
Pr.
Oavid
Robinson
characterizes
French
material
on
the
Umarian
movement
as
"External
Evidence."
that
is,
onc
genera ted
indirectly from outside.
See David Robinson The Holv War of Umar Tal:
The Western Sudan in
the
Mid-Nineteellch
Centurv.
(Clarendon
Press,
Ox:o.d,
1985,
434p;
Chap:e. I:
The Evidence.
14.
For
categories
of
oral
traditions
see,
for
instance:
Philip
O.Curtin,
"Field
Techniques
for
collecting and
processing
oral
data."
In, J .A.H, LX, 3,
1968,
pp. 367-395.
15"
One
colleague
in
Mauritania
advanced
as
a
reason
for
the
reluctance
of
some
Griots
in
providing
information, their
increasing
perception
of
Historians
as
rival
custodians
of
the" past.
This
may
have to do with
the radio shovs
run by French educated traditionalists.
I
J

---

22
16.
See
interview
with
Urnar
Hammadi
Jah
and
Ceerno
Saada
Lam,
Boghe (Mauritania), April 1985.

---

PART ONE:
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I:
FUUTA TOORO AROUND 1850
A:
THE LAllD AND THE MODES OF LIVELIHOOD
Located on the far western edge of the Sudan Le belt and straddling
the Senegal River,
Fuuta 100ro stretches east~west from Bakel to Dagana
along ~ot~ the M~uritanian and
Senegalese banks.
Owing to dLsci~cti~e
human,
economic and
physical
features,
it
is often referred
to as
the
"middle
·;alley."l
Centered
around
the
river's
240
mile
arc
running
south-east
- -north-west
(Bakel-Baggee) ,
then
eas t - wes t
(Baggee-DJgana),
that
stretch
of
soil
has
for
long
suffered
from
such
reaLities
as
the
diversity
of
interests,
the
consequent
incernal
opposition
and
the
inevitable exposure co fragmentation and external enemies,2
Bounded on the norch by the Mauricanian Sahara desert
and on the
south oy
the
semi-desert called
the
Ferlo.
Fuuta
Tooro
lies entirely
in
the
dry
northern
fringe
of
the
savannah called
the
Sahel. 3
This
gives
Fuuta
Tooro
a
sahelian
type
of
climate
characterized
by
t'.oiO
sharply defined
seasons during the year;
one dry,
the other rainy.
The rainy season lascs three to four months from June
to October.
Despite
the
relatively
ID"
rainfall
(300-500mm),
it
alla"s
for
the
growing of such crops as
the small
millet or ~uuna, beans or nebbe and
secondary crops
like
gourds or .dene and ground nuts. 4
Because of the
23
I
I

---

24
heat,
moisture
and
frequency
of
diseases
the
rainy
season
was
a
dangerous
one
for
Europeans
and
the
French
never
ventured
to
launch
major military expeditions inland until
the early
18605.
As for
the dry season it covers the rest of the year
from October
to June:
sometimes peaking at
the
405
on the
temperature scale,
with
the blowing of the Harmattan. 5
In
tune
',.;ith
the
seasonal
sahelian
pattern.
the
vegetal
cove~
remains
generally poor.
It consists mostly of the
growing scrub and
grasses,
green only throughout
the short
rainy
interlude for
the good
of cattle
and cattle herders·-and,
of
the much
traditional Gawdi
trees
(Acacia ~ilotica), which until few years past formed fairly picturesque
plantings.
This absence of
luxuriant vegetation except
for
few
spots,
would
hinder
guerilla
warfare
and
leave
the
resistors
·.... ith
no
alternative
but to take the field with colonial forces
~n the open.
Terrain-'... ise,
there
is
nothing to
remind one of
the
hilly Fuuta
Jaloo
or
the
Mande
World
to
the
south
east. 6
Except
for
the
few
hillocks
(30
to
BOrn high)
that
timidly
stand along
the river between
Demrnbankaane
(up· stream)
and
a
line
running
from
Boki-Jawe
to
Haayre-Mbaar,
flatness
is
the
most
common
form
of
relief
with
the
presence
of myriad
depressions
due
to
the
river
and
its numerous arms
and
tributaries.?
The
harshness
of
the climate and
environmental
conditions
would
have
rendered
life
a
misery.
and
made
the
region
suitable
only
for
ext.ensive
grazing
were
it
not
for
the
"Great
River."
the
local
designation of River Senegal.
The
latter defines
Fuuta
Tooro so well

---

25
that the
region can be called a
"gift of the
Senegal River,ltS
Once a
9
year the much more abundant rains to the south fill up the Fuuta Ja100
basin,
the
"Water
Tower"
of
West
Africa:
the
waters,
in
chei r
impetuous
flo .....
to
the
Atlantic,
make
the
Senegal rise and flood over
much
of
the
region
around
July-August.
The
flatness
of
the
terrain
oet~een Bakel and St. Louis
helps the river extend its arms for as
Ear
a~ield as fifteen
miles on either side.
This,
coupled with the boost
of
a
re;.J
t~i.bc.taries (Norde,
Urfa
and
Gorgol).
causes
the
river
to
flood a basin of 54,000 square kilometres. LO
The waters recede generally by rlovember-December.
r..,rhile
the earth
is
moist,
the
farmers
can
plant
the
~o:1mrne
or
large
millet,
corn,
cotton,
sweet:
potatoes,
gourds,
and
indigo,
thereby
compensating
for
[he
sometimes
poor
rainfall
and
highland
harvests.
This
double
cycle-cultivation made
possible by the
flooding ll and
regarded by
the
Fuutanke as
~a privilege, an honor and a token of blessing",12 has won
Fuuta Tooro
the status of "double-barrelled gun,,13 otherwise expressed
by
the
saying:
"Falo
falotoo
ko
Heege"
or
"che
Falo
prevents
famine." 14
In
sum
Feuta
Tooro
is
a
rather
slender
expanse
of
soil
with
a
south-north
extent
varying
between
ten
to
fifteen
miles
and
breaks
down
into
1,..t aa lo
or
flood-plain,
and
Jeeri
or
highland. 15
On
the
Jeeri,
land has
little scarcity
value.
This,
added
to the relatively
low
productiVity,
accounts
for
the
little
interest
people
show
in
acquiring
it.
In
fact,
Jeeri.
land
belongs
to
·....homever
clears
and
cultivates
it:
Nevertheless,
it
has
been
subject
to
soil
classi-
fication,
and one
distinguishes
five
categories
of
soil,
each with a

---

26
traditionally adapted crop.16
In
marked
contrast
to
the
Jeeri,
Waalo
is
limited
in
extent,
remarkably fertile,
and highly productive,I7
For
these
reasons,
the
history
as
·..;ell
as
che
institutions
of
Fuuca
Tooro
have
long
been
stamped
by
the
struggles
for
its
ownership
and
che
body
of
rules
gover:1ir,g
ies
exploitation. IS
These
rules
form
a
system
coherently
defined
and
respectfully
cransmicced
from
one
generation
to
anoche:-,
from time immemorial to the presenc. 19
T'",'o
kinds
of
rights
constitute
the
cencerpoles
of
che
system:
the
"right ot cultivation,,20 and che
"right of
o·..,;r:ership."
The
first
is acquired chrollgh clearing (Lewre)
a piece of land and confers upon
a ;Jerson or a
family
the
status of "master of fire"
(Jam Jeyngol)
or
"master
of
che
axe"
(Jom Jammbere).
This
status can be
passed
on by
'Ji~tue of contract subject co revocation whenever deemed necessary.
On
the
other hand
the
right of ownership
is paramount
and often
stems
from
the
first
occupation of
the
land around
che
village
(Res
nullius
prima
occupanti).
As
such
it
originates
either
from
a
myth,
chat
is a
so-called magico-religous
contract with the
spirits,
or
from
the
aforementioned clearing.
In either case it is consecrated
by the
fixation
of
boundaries
arid
the
defense
against
any
encroachment
from
outside. 2l
Land
can
also
be
owned
by
force
or
by
dec is ion
of
the
stai:e,
particularly when "vacant by virtue of emigration or absence of
male
inheritor,
convicti()~l for
criminal
offense
or
simple
failure
to
cultivate. ,,22
It
was
precisely
such
precedents
thac
the
French
invoked.
in
league
with
a
few
individuals
and
groups,
to
justify
the
various assaults on the Fuutanke land tenure system.
I

---

27
Consistent
with
the
local
saying,
"There
is
no
land
without
dues",23 the mastership of the land whether it devolves on the
state,
a
group.
or
an
individual,
makes
for
several
kinds
of
revenues
incumbent upon
the
"masts,,::, of fire"
or any other
tenant
farmers.
The
land O'...lner usually collects an annual
Nioldi,
a
fee
of "entrance
into
cultivation"
which authorizes one to
cultivate after the water recedes
each year.
and a Coot-tiigu or
"repurchase payment," which one has to
make
in order
to
enjoy
the
deceased's
right to cultivate.
This
last
one is akin to a
"transfer fee."
bes c
known of all
the
fees
is ':-.5 aka 1
(f!."om
the Arabic
'..J'o:d
Zakat) .
le consists of one-tench of the harvest;
initially
ie was the
sha~e of the disabled and :he poor. but it ~as
gradually diverted from
i.cs
religious
content
co mean simply
the
lando ....rner's
lot.
As such
it
·,.,;as
both
a
symbol
of
influence
and
a
source
of
wealth
for
the
aris tocracy,
important
enough
to
draw
the
attention
of
the
French
colonial authority.
Subsidiarily,
the
"master of
the
land"
is
also
entitled
to
the
Nafoore,
an assortment of services and gifts sometimes
in the
form of
'..;ork-days
on
the
farm,
the
Kawngal
in compensation
for
fishing
on a
ri'Jer
flowing
across
his
land,
the
Naaii
or
"dra'...ring
water
fee"
and
the ~ (~one), the share of any animal
slaughtered on the land. 24
The master of the
land is generally vested with the title of
Jom,
Ardo,
or
Kamalenku
among
the
Fulbe;
Elimaan;
Ceerno;
Farba
or
J aaga!:'aaf
among
the
Toorodbe
and
Sebbe.
He
manages
the
land
as
a
family
estate,
supervising its distribution as well as
the
arbitration
,

---

28
of disputes relative
to
it.
and ensures the proper distribution of the
taxes
collected,
among the
designated
recipients. 25
Thus
the
"master
of
the
land"
is
not
the
"master"
in
the
western
sense
of
the
word
"oT...,-ner.
He
is
at
best
a
manager
of
a
property
defined
first
and
foremos~ as indivis and extra commercium.
He can neither sell nor give
i t
a'..... ay.
This
may
well
account
for
people's
refusal,
in
somE
instances.
to dispose of the propercy of those who had emigrated to the
eas c,
as the French urged them to do.
Un for tuna te 1 y .
the
complexity
of
the
rules,
the
exploitative
character
of
the
various
rents
and
taxes
saddling
the
tenants,
:he
fragmentation
of
farm
land
due
to
the
strict
application 0:
Shad' a
(Islamic
law),26
the variation
in
~he amount of flooding
from year to
year made farming on the waalo problematic.
This situation was
further
complicated
by
the
intensification
of
Moorish
raiding
from
the
18th
century
on,
·.... hich
caused
the
fuutankoobe
to
retreat
and
concentrate
the best of agricultural
activities on the south bank.
No wonder
land disputes
and
settlements of
this
sort became
the
basic ingredient of political life before and afcer
the
conquest,
and
consumed
much
of
the
administrators'
time
and
energy
throughout
the
colonial
era. 27
For
these
reasons
and
despite
the
conquest
of
Hauritania 'which
provided some basis
for
r~lief, the people of Fuuta
would
take
co
expansion
(Umarian
movement)
aJ1d
emigration
to
other
parts of Senegambia,
particularly as
taxes
and r:he monetizacion of the
economy weighed
heavily.
Al though
agriculture
is
the
most
important
and
universal
activity,
fishing
(Awo)
and animal
husbandry
(Coggal)
rank among
the
'c".

---

29
28
'llta1
activities
of
the
people
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
Fishing
is
an
activity
of
·....hich
the
Subalbe
are
considered
both
specialists
and
experts bue,
other amateur groups
like
the Sebbe and Maccube
practice
i t
for
their
own
subsistence
needs
along
Senegal
River,
its
arms
(caal-li)
as
well
as
on
the
major
ponds
(beeli).
During
the
rain:,
season
and
in
good
years,
catches
are
sufficient
enough
;:0
allow
exchange
for meat,
milk,
a~d other cairy produces,
on
the markets of
che highland villages.
Herding
concerns
most
commonly
cattle
and
sheep.
The
pastoral
nomads,
call ed
the
Fulbe,
are
the
main
specialists,
but
almost
every
?uutanke
raises
cattle
and
combines
the
activity
1Jith
agricultur~.
Only donkeys used for transport by Lawbe and
horses
for warfare by the
~ealchy
aristocracy.
seem
to
be
a
monopoly.
Cactle
herders
experienced hea~~ losses due especially
to Moorish thefts and colonial
demands
which
peaked
during
the
First
World
war,
and
the
series
of
epidemics
that struck animals from the 19th century on.
Artisanry,
like
fishing,
is
a
response
to
the
imperatives
of
subsistence economy and reserved to a
particular group
the
Neenbe,
or
craftsmen. 29
Both artistic and utilitarian,
artisanry was
profitable
berore
the
invasion of Fuuta Tooro by
European manufactured goods. 30
Last
and
perhaps
lease,
hunting
and
gathering
or
Mohbe 31
are
complementary
and peripheral
activities;
in time of famine,
gathering
the
Paggiri
('..Jater
lily
grains)
was
quite
common. 32
At
some
point,
gum
..... as
so
abundant
and
available
to
the
jeeri
villages
that
some
commandants
proposed
to
impose
i t as
a
tax
in kind and faciltate
the
gatheoing by digging
wells thooughout the jeeoi-feolo aoea. 33

---

30
During
t.he
nineceenth
century,
Fuuta
Tooeo
enjoyed
a
relative
sufficiency which colonialism and its demands,
in concert with natural
calamities, would later greatly compromise.
B.
THE PEOPLE OF FUuTA TOORO
Boch
''''ri;:eeo
sources
and
oral
tradition
trace
the
history
of
ruuta Tooro at lease as far back as tne 8th century A.D.
Owing
co its
scrategic
location
betweetl
the
Arabo-Berber
and
the
Negro-Afri~an
'""arlds,
and
especially
to
its
relati'Je
ferciiity,
the
Senega 1
Rivet
'/alley has long pulled like a magnet peoples of
various ethnic origins
and
various
livelihood
preferences
on
their
migration
~est
and
SOI..,th'..:ard.]6.
wllile some of them
continued on their journey
(many (bue
not
all]
Lebu,
Seeree[ and
;...rolof) ,35
others
opted
for
se;:tling,
thus
forming
under
the
influence
of
Islam and
through
sedentarisation,
a
n~'... breed of
people organized into a
ne·..... scate:
The Arab g~ographers
T
called
it Takrur before it became Fuuta Tooro. 36
Between
the
9th
and
18th
centuries
A.D.
several
regimes
have
succeeded one another,
Three at least are worthy of
attention because
of their
imprint on
the history of
the
region:
Manna,
Deeni'lanke and
the Almamate. 37
The
first
regime
consolidated Takrur
under Waarjaabi
who became
the
first
L",mtooro
and
imposed
Islam
a
religion
which
would
later
becolne so central
to fuutanke
tradition
and history,38
The
Deeniyankoobe
took
over
in
early
16th
century
under
Koli
Tenella,
After
having
overthrown
the
Tonnjon
and
freed
the
people
from the yoke of the Mali Empire,
Koli unified the various
states
i~to

---

31
39
one huge
territory astride
the river and named
ie
Fuuta 100ro.
The
Deenivankoobe
for
the
first
time
set
a
strong
and centralized state
machinery
around
the
Satigi
(calling
of
the
Deeniyanke
ruler)
and
40
initiated a
land reform without precedent in
the history of Fuuta.
Finally,
during
the
1760s
and
1770s,
a
group
of
clerics
called
Toorodbe
(beggers
of
alms),
resenting
the
authoritarian
rule
of
the
DeeniyankQobe and
their lack of concern for
the
territorial
integrity
of
Fuuta
Tooro
in
face
of
the
Moorish
enemy,
initiated
a
political
agitation
and
organized
an
armed
insurrection
that
resulted
in
the
eviction of
the
regime.
The
Almamate,
as
the ne~ regime ~as called,
proclaimed Islam as
,rReligion of the
state,"
reorganized
the country
on
theocratic
bases
and,
following
in
the
footsteps
of
the
previous
regime,
carried on
a
large
scale
land
redistribution
in accord with
its
philosophy and political interests. 4l
This cursory glance at the political history of Fuuta
Tooro helps
explain how ethnicity and Islam combined to
fashion a
ne~ people,
the
Tukuloor,
a
name
given
the
"Haal-Pulaar'en"
(speakers
of
Pulaar)
by
the
neighbouring
Walof and Africanist
scholars. 42
Only
these
factors
can
account
for
the
qualities,
military
skills,
ardent
religious
proselycism,
gifcs
in
statesmanship
and
proclivity
for
agriculture,
which
a llowed
for
so
long
a
resistance
against
the
Europeans. 43
As
early
as
che
19ch
ceQcury
they
formed
che
majority
(80%)
of
a
population
estimated
at
300,000
in
mid-century,
with
a
density
approximating 90 per square mile. 44
In a
way similar
to most people of Senegambia,
the
Tukuloor form
a three-tier society with a relatively complex
struccure,45
The
three
I
I
I

---

32
main
strata
are
from
the
top
down.....ard;
Rimbe
(sing-Dime)
or
"free
men,"
Neenbe
(sing-Neeno)
or
artisans
and
entertainers I
and
Jivaabe
(sing-Jiyaado) or "slaves.,,46
Fulbe 47 and Toorodbe as
"Rimbe ardiibe"
(leading free men)
constitute
the apex of
the society from
which the
rulers
of
yesteryear
(Satigeebe
and
Almameebe)
came.
They
also
provide
in
some
cases
vi llage
heads,
(Joom,
Ceerno,
Elimaan,
Kamalenku,
etc.).
The
Toorodbe
as
founders
of
the
Almamate,
resisted
French
attempts at disintegrating the political
e~city throughout the
19:::h
century
·....hile
the
Fulbe,
in
many
cases,
adopted
a
conciliat·?ry
stand
and
were
even regarded by
the
French
in
the
first
half of
the
century
as,
hoped-for
substitutes. 48
As
they
continued
to
provide
Canton Chiefs
and welcomed
French education,
some
of
them managed to
preserve
their
privileged position throughout the colonial era.
Next,
the "Rimbe huuniibe"
(courtisan free men)
or
commoners made
up of Sebbe,
Jaawanbe and Subalbe lived
in a
relation of clientship to
the
leading
lineages. 49
The
Sebbe.
probably the most numerous,
are
from Mande and Wolof
origin and played an
important
role
in politics
as
the
backbone
of
the
armies
and
political
constituencies
that
guaranteed Toorodo and Pullo hegemony.
For that reason one
finds many
land owners and tax collectors among them.
The
Subalbe,
mostly
of
Wolof
origin
from
nearby
Waalo
and
congregating along
the waterway,
remained for
geographical as
well as
social reasons aloof from political matters.
In their
relation to the
political
authority
they
often
relied
on
Toorodbe
and
Fulbe
as
intermediaries,50 confining themselves
to fishing
and farming much of
the rich Pale (sg-Falo) on the banks of the
river and its arms. 51
..

---

The
smallest
group
of
the
"Rimbe
huuniibe,"
the
J aawanbe,
reportedly
of pullo origin.
served as
traditional
counsellors
to
the
chiefs.
Under
colonial
rule
they held so
important a
s~ay on
canton
chiefs
thut
tradition
as
'...rell
as
colonial
administrators
tended
at
times
::'0
blame
them
for
some of
the
negative
decisions
of
the
local
-·, ... 1--or1· -v 52
a·~L..,1
L..~
•
These
commoner
lineages,
owing
to
their
numbers
and
distribution
~hroughout the
country,
often
dominated
in
particular
·:i.llages
and
areas.
As
the
majority
of
the
subjects
and
'Jillage
chie fs,
they
bore
the
brunt
of
the
exploitation
inherent
in
the
colonial situation and,
no '..... onder,
~ere mos~ prone
to petitioning a~d
opposing
passive
resistance
to
colonial
administrators
and
local
chiefs.
Finally,
the
Neenbe
(sg=Neeno)
break
up
into
Naa lankoobe
and
A~lube
(entertainers)
and Fecciram Golle
(lit-those ~hose loc is manual
labor)
or artisans.
They divide along professional
lines
into several
sub-groups:
blacksmiths,
jewelers,
leather
workers,
weavers,
potters
and several sorts of entertainers.
Like the Jaawanbe,
some Neenbe used
to attach themselves to chiefs. 53
At
[he
very
bottom
of
the
society were
the J i.vaabe
or
"slaves"
referred
to
as
halfaabe
(lit-slaves
with masters)
and Gallunkoobe or
soo:-tiibe
(lit-those
who
have
redeemed
themselves),
nominally
free
but
incurring
some
stigma
particularly
with
respect
to
matrimonial
relations.
Most
slaves
came
from
the
non·Muslim
and
non-Pulaar
speaking
communities
to
the
south-'.... est
(Wolof
and
Seereer).
south
(Mandinka
along
the
Gambia)
and
south-east
(Mande
speaking
people
of
the Upper Senegal valley).54

---

34
This
had
to
do
with
the
face
that
enslaving
a
Muslim
Tukuloor
within
Fuuca
Tooro
was
strictly
forbidden~ chief among
the
bones
of
contention bet~een the Almamis and the Europeans in
the 18th and 19th
centuries was precisely chat issue. S5
Furthermore,
since slaves made
up
the
best of
the
labor force
and
in some cases of the militia,
the
loss
of
these
[0
French controlled
territory by
flight,
kidnapping or
purchase
posed
a
significant
threat
to
culci'fation
and
the
slave-
.
1
56
owr'!l<1g c
ass.
In
addition,
slaves
were
used
as
universal
value
in
exchange
operations
and.
during
colonial
times,
as
substitutes
for
conscripts
especially
in
times
of
war.
This
would
account
ror
some
of
the
political disturbance that took place after the
war in many cercles. S7
Sex and age are other elements of importance within the
tukuloor
society.
Women are
often
subjected
to a
lower status
and
therefore
enj oy
a
low
key
ro le
on
the
pub 1 ic
arena,
Mos t
of
their
time
and
energy
is
devoted
to
domestic
life.
Their
only
role
in
politics
consists of allo~ing for alliances and bonds
bet~een leading families.
I
I
The
~radition survived both conquest
and colonial rule as most chiefs
t·
i
would use,
among other me~ns of consolidating their position,
ma~riage'
in
administrative
capitals
and
among
influential
urban
families,
as
well as in various villages of their cantons.
Young
people
are
the
other
dependeD':
ca tegory
and
often
come
together into
Pelle
(sg-Fedde) or age-groups which,
prior to
marriage
and family-raising,
play an important role in the lives of individuals,
irrespective of
their caste or social status.
It is
the microcosm and
the carbon copy of the larger society,58 the locus of apprenticeship in

---

35
politics,
exercise
of military skills,
in a word,
in dealing ·.... ith the
basic ingredients of day-ta-day
life.
The Pelle could be called upon
::0
perform
collective
work
in
the
fields
or
military
duty
whenever
needed.
Hence
1 ineage
heads
and
French
officials
used
them
as
the
reser'fe
for
the
yearly
recruitment
for
the
military,
throughout
the
colonial era.
C.
El:: ,UUTNJKE ST.".TE
In
the
early
18505
c·.... o
French
observers
from
St.
Louis
defined
fuuta Tooro 2.5 "a theocr8i:ic-aristocracic republic"
',,",here "the offices
of
provi.nce,
canton and village
chiefs
are
hereditary.
Only
chat of
Head of state, who as a rule has to be a Muslim priest,
is elective.,,59
!....That
the
authors
of
the
quote
meant
was
chac,
mid-cencurv
Fuuta
"",'85
~uled by an Almaami,
a
sort of
"Commander of
the
Faithful"
'.....ho,
fLrst
among equals,
shared his power with elements
of the arLstocracy
of Toorodbe
and Fulbe,
and
that
there
were
long established regional
patterns of political authority.
The
basic
political
unit
in
Fuuta
'..... as
the
wuro
(pI-Cure)
or
village.
The
leadershi.p
of
the
Village
generally
devolved
upon
the
eldest
male
of
the
founding
family
e.lected
by
a
council
of
senior
elements
of
the main
free
lineages,
a:1d '..Jas
recognized by
all as
the
"Jom
Wuro"
(Mast~r of the village). 60
Ever
since
the
theocratic
revolution and
the
establishment
of
Islamic
law,
the
"Jom
Wuro"
is
seconded by an t'Elimaan"
:the Imaam of the Mosque)
if not supersedet by
him,
in
administering
the
community
and
dispensing
justice
in
cases
involving minor offense. 61

---

36
In
particular
situations
however,
land
o·...mers
retained
such
considerable influence in community affairs that the
"Jam !.Jura" had to
reckon
wi ch
them.
This
was
the
case
in
the
important
'Jillage
of
Golleere-Laaw where
the Kamalenku
appeared as
no
more
than a
"first"
among
"equals"
who,
in
their
capacity
as
"Jam
Leede'en"
(Heads
of
sections)
of
the
town,
held a Tabalde
('....ar drum),
a small retinue and
could
even
collect
taxes. 62
The
relation
of
the
village
to
the
national
level '.<las
not
that
visible
as most villages often
tended to
fo:.-m
part
of
a
cluster
under
a
paramount
chief
from
a
particular
1 .
~lneage,
who
"usually haC.
the
authoric:1
to
tax
cr.e
crops
and herds,
settle the disputes
that could not
be
resolved at
the
local level and
mobilize the able-bodied
men for military campaigns. ,,63
Several
clusters
of
these
villages
constituted
the
province.
There were.
from the eastern limit called Tata Baccili down to
Dagana,
the
',o/'esternmost
point
of
Fuuta
Tooro,64
seven
provinces:
Nge;1aar,
Boosoya,
Yirlaabe,
Hebbiyaabe,
Laaw, Tooro and Dimat. 65
These differed from one another as to size,
and political as
well
as economic importance throughout the 19th century.
Very
rarely would
the
~hole
province
recognize
one
single
leader
and
the
fact
that
Lamtooro
in
Tooro.
Elimaan
Dimat
in
Dimat
and,
to
a
certain extent,
Abdul
oookar
in
800soya
succeeded
in
getting
some
recogni tion
or
enjoying paramountcy ~as more an exception than
it ~as a rule.
At
the
very
apex
was
the
Alrnaami
~ho
embodied
religious
and
political
leadership.
Since
the
days
of Abdul Kadeer Kan,
the
first
to
set
the
example,
the
Almaami
was
in
theory
vested
wi ch
the
authority to confirm and depose all lower office
holders,
settle cases

---

37
on appeal
and decide
issues
of war
and peace.
In
the early
1850s he
had lost some of this clout but retained relative authority.
In cases
of
death
sentence
at
the
provincial
level,
the
sentence
could
be
executed
only
after
ratification
by
the
Almaami.
Moreover
the
I
execution took place
only at the Almaami's place of reside~ce.66
Justice
'-las
run
in
strict
accord
to
Shari'a
and
struck
by
its
' C
severi ty,
flogging,
cutting of
ears
and
death
being
common,
even
1.:-
under
particular
circumstances
wealth
and
social
status
could
attenuate
them.
To
a
great
extent,
however,
the
powers
of
the
Almaami
counterpoised
by
the
influence
of
the
Jt'tggorde
(sg-Jaggarga1)
,.ha
constituted
the
electoral
council. 67
These
~ere
mostly
Fulbe
originally call~d upon to help the
Toorodo movement recover its breath
after
many
of
its
elements
had
been
killed
in
battle,
and
they
got
their
first
oppor;:unity
to
act
as
electocs
,.....hen
they
unseated Abdul
Kader and named his
successor:
"Having demonstrated to themselves and
to
the
nation
their
ability
to
de;:ermine
the
ruler,
they
kept
this
power,
continued to exercise it,
and thus came to be recognized by the
people,
and by the men who owed their position to them,
as electors.,,6B
OWing
to
their position in a
federation where
the Almaami
had to
elect a
central
Fuuta
village
as
residence,
their vital
role
in
the
struggle
agains;:
the
Deeniyanke
regime,
the
size of
their
population,
as
well
as
the
nwnber
of
their
clerics
and,
finally,
the
economic
importance of their provinces,
the
three
"aabe " dominated the council
to
the
virtual exclusion of
the
three "koobe.,,69
From
then on,
they
embarked
on
making
and
unmaking
rulers
in
accord
to
a
logic
best

---

38
described
by
Oumar
Kane
who
wro Ce:
"After
their
betrayal
and
the
assassination of Abdul
Kadiri,
they managed to
turn all almamis [sic}
into
<=.heir
0'.10
men.
The
guiding principle of their policy was neveY
to elect an
almami capable of imposing upon them.,,70
In addition,
the Jaggorde had divided up some of the
villages of
Tooro,
along '...ri.ch their lands,
giving themselves
control over
fields,
rents
and
taXes
there. l l
That
caused
~tollien, a French explorer,
;:0
say the
following about Aali Dunndu,
Elimaan Siree,
and other chiefs:
"Each
of
them
is
proprietor
of
a
portion
of
the
country
and,
they
jointly
exercise the sovereign authority",72
Since the power of the
Jaggorde
'...ras
based
on
possessions
and
clientage
they
often
handed
I
dow~ their position to other members of their
famil v 73
o
.
Thus
in the early
lBSOs almaamis were still elected and
checked
by the sons and grandsons of the former Jaggorde,
particularly Bookar
Ao.li
Dunndu,
Elirnaan
Rinnjaw
Faalil,
Ceerno
Holle
and
oL-hers,
the
firs::
two
·,..;eighing
equally
and
so
heavily
on
the
council
that
in
January
18~7 a French
official who had contact with fuutanke
leaders
identified
them as "the t·..JO principal chiefs of Fuuta. ,,74
Such
was
the
situation
in
mid-century
Fuuta
Tooro.
In
the
society
and
politics
of
the
time,
land
ownership,
geography,
demography,
and
strategy
combined
to
render political power
diffuse
and dilute at
the village, provincial as well as national
level.
The
almamate was becoming more and more an oligarchy of
the most powerful
men and
groups
instead of the most just and
learned,
and
the center
gro·..... ing
more
influential
than
the
periphery,
a situation
that caused
fissiparous
tendencies
to
develop
and
left
western
Fuuta
virtually
.

---

i
I
39
i ndepe nde n c.
Although the state remained Islamic in ics sense of
religious and
social
identity,
its
foreign policy was
no
longer
governed by Islam.
Secular
questions
of
trade,
security,
privilege
and
prestige
now
predominated '..;hich,
in
cur:1,
paved
the
'.Nay
to
criticism f:om within
and to reform movements
chac boeh
FUll Ca
and the
French would ha'le
to
~~ckon with throughout the
19th century.
It was against such a backgrou:1d tnae the French voted upon a more
decisive and forward policy starting in the early 18505, and sec about
injecting
cheir
authorit/
through
a
careful
combination
of
power
and
diplomacy.

---

NOTES
1.
Term usually applied to Fuuta Tocro by geographers in contrast
co
the
upper
and
lower
valleys
with
less
important
flood
plain
and
differen~ ethnic groups.
2.
Not only under
the old fulbe
regimes but also and especially
under the almamate, which will later serve greatly French interests.
3.
From
Arabic,
meaning
"shore"
or
"border,"
referri:1g
to
the
edge
of
the
desert,
in
James
Johnson
The
Almamate
of
Futa
Toro
1770-1836:
A
Political
History,
?
23
(hereafter,
The
Almamate),
Ph.D.,
Wisconsin,
1974.
4.
Several commercial reports
indicate in the 18505 the abu:1dance
of "beref"
and the notable development of oil seeds.
see l\\..NS:
13G120 :
Correspondance commandant Podar au Gouverneur. 1855-1861.
5.
From the
Fanti ·.... ord Haramota
(Ghana)
a d!."'y-parching
land wind
',.;hich
obscures
the
air
with
a
red
dust-fog.
It
blows
in
the
upper
Guinea
coase
between December
and
February,
while
in
Fuuta
it
sweeps
generally in March-April.
6.
For
a
detailed
geogra?hy
of
Fuuta
Tooro,
see
P.
Michel,
A.
Naegele,
Charles
Toupet
in
Le
Senegal
septentrional·
apercu ohysique,
Department
de
Geography,
Faculte
des
Lettres
Nations
Vnies,
Dakar
B. P. 154.
Also J.
Boutillier,
P.
Cantrelle,
M.
Causse,
C.
Laurent et
Ihierno Ndiaye in La movenne vallee du Senegal,
Paris,
1962 (hereafter,
La moyenne vallee).
7.
Demmbankaane is the eastern limit of Fuuta while Boki-Jawe and
Haayre-Mbaar are villages respectively on the eastern and western edges
of central Fuuta, on the south and north banks.
8.
Expression that brings
to mind the picturesque relation often
established between Egy?t and the Nile.
9.
Gambia
and
Niger
rivets
also
originate
from
the
same
Fuuta
Jaloo area in the Republic of Gu~nea.
la.
Of which 33,000 due
to
the
3 major
tributaries between Bakel
and Kaedi on the north bank;
10,000 between Kaedi and Dagana on the
40

---

41
Mauritanian side
and finally,
11,000 between Bakel
and Dagana on
the
south
bank.
For
details,
see
Etude
socio-economique
du
bassi"
du
fleuve
partie
A,
Chap.
I,
"Geographie
physique,
Etude
Provisoire,
O.M.V.S.
1980 Dakar,
(hereafter Etude socio-economigue),
11.
I t
is
estimated
that
200,000
ha
of
flooded
land are
farmed
annually
in
Fuuta Tooro;
Mamadou Wane
"Reflexions
sur
le droit de
la
terre
coucouleur,"
Bulletin
de
l'I.F.A.N.,
tome
42,
serie
B.
no
It
1980, p.
94 (hereafter "Reflexions").
12.
See "Reflexions"
op. elt.,
p. 98.
13.
"Futa
is
like
a
double-barrelled
gun.
The
owner
fires
one
against the enemy and keeps the other in reserve.
As for Fuca it farms
in
the
highlands;
if
thl~
harvest
is
bad
it
has
the
flood
plain
in
reserve."
David Wallace Robinson quoting H. Gaden, Chiefs and Clerics:
Abdul
Bokar
and
the
Historv
of
Futa
Toro
1853-1891,
?
1
(hereafter
Chiefs and Clerics).
14.
One
at
the
several
categories
of
farm
land
on
the
.....aalo;
derives
from
falaade
(to
thwart,
to
bar
against).
Literally
the
expression translates as follows:
"what the falo wards off is famine."
See "Ref1exions"
ibid,
p.
94.
15.
l..)aa10 and Jeeri are
the main ones but there is a third called
Jeie~ol
located
between
the
two,
inundated
only
in
instances
of
important
flood and only
for
a
short period of
time
(0
to
3 weeks).
Jeieg01
derives
from
ieide
"to
pretend
to
hit."
Rarely
under
cultivation,
it
constitutes
the
favorite
location
of
villages
for
reasons
of
security
as
well
as
easy access
to either waalo or
jeeri
farms.
For
a
description
of
the
Jeiegol
with
its
characteristics,
see
~amadou Wane, ap. cit. p; see also Etude socio-economique, parie A, op.
cit.,
pp.
A1-19 and 20.
16.
Ba 1 i 01
(semi-black)
is
propicious
for
feela
type
of millet;
:"aneewo
(white)
or hovnga
(light);
ieeri-seeno hartula·...o,
see:1o·geddo
etc.
For details see.Mamadou Wane,
ibid,
pp.
92 and 93.
17.
Waala land also breaks down into several categories, see ~a:1e,
op. cit.
18.
This is not to contend that "the Fuutanke saga is the daughter
of
hunge r"
as
Hamadau
Wane
accuses
some
peop le
of
implying
("Reflexions.
op.
cit., p.
91).
19.
The
most
recent
and
comprehensive
study of
the
land
tenure
system of
Fuuta Tooro
is,
in our view,
Mamadou Wane
"Reflexions"
op.
eit., based on a critical review of the literature,
thorough field work
and an
intimate
knowledge
of the society of which he
is part.
Only,
Mr. Wane seems to overemphasize the superstructural elements.

---

42
20.
The
term "right"
is here used only for purposes of convenience
inasmuch as
the
possibility of farming
is
retained only
respective of
certain specified conditions and cannot be passed on at will.
21.
This
may
be
the
origin of
the
expression
"renndube
muudo
e
fetel"
meaning:
"those ......ho
share
the muud and
the gun."
(muud-a pot
......orth 4 kgs used to measure millet),
22.
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs
and
Clerics,
op.
cit.,
pp.
3-4.
The
saLigeebe
(deeniyanke
rulers)
used land granting as
a
political ploy.
50 did almaami Abdul who
initated
the
reform known as
"feccere Fuuta I
(licerally~the distribution of fuuta).
23.
"leydi alaa ndi
alaa hujjaaji";
See ~ane, "Reflexions,"
op.
elc., p.
124.
24.
The payment of most of these fees
is nowadays optional.
25.
He
shares
the
revenues
...... ith
the
tax
collector,
the
heads
of
families and sometimes the provincial or central authority (i.e.
satigi
or almaami).
26.
For
a
detailed
survey
of
the
implications
of
shari' a
on
property see Youssouph Gueye,
"Essai sur les causes e~ les consequences
de
la micro-propriete au Eouta toro."
Bulletin de l'I.F.A.N
tome XIX,
Serie B, no.
1-2, 1957,
Dakar.
27.
The
motto
within
Commandants'
quarter
or
semestrial
reports
·....as
land
settlements,
as
evidenced
by
the
following:
"the
muslim
tribunal
has
dealt
during
this
quarter
with
numerous
cases
generally
related
to
that
eternal
issue
of
farmlands."
(Commandant
de
Kaedi
a
D.A.1. , 2 0
t"imestre 1897 A.N.S.
2 Gl-94).
28.
F. Carrere and P.
Holle noted in the l850s that:
"Agriculture
is
held
high
in
this
country:
nobody
can dispense
with
tilling
the
land.
Even the almami has his own farm and while he does not farm with
his own hands,
always oversees the work of his slaves."
F. Carrere and
P.
Holle:
De la Senegambie Francaise,
Paris,
Librairie de Firmin Oidot
Freres,
FHs et Cie.
rue Jacob,
56,
1855 (hereafter De la Senegambie).
29.
From
Nenoobe
meaning;
"those
who
adorn"
referring
to
the
quality of artisans,
dexterity.
There are as many activities as there
are artisan castes, entertainers set aside.
3D.
Mouhamed
M.
Kane,
"les
Peuples
de
la
moyenne
va llee
et
du
del ta:
Trandi tions
fondamentales
et
evolution."
Etude
socio-economique,
op. cit.,
p.
All-54.
31.
This may be
used as a generic
term but,
in fact,
the calling
varies according to the fruit sought after.
Thus,
bultaade is used for
gum (dacce);
sammude is used for
the zizyphus Mauritania
(Jaabe).
For the
scientific designation of the
flora we used mostly Chapter

---

43
I
of che Etude Socio·economigue,
"Geographie du bassin," op.
elt.
32.
It
is
mentioned iro several
reports of administrators
from the
districts of Fuuta Tooro.
33.
See for
instance,
A.N.S.,
2G19-22
(Matam a D.A.I.).
See also,
2G14-40
(Commandant
Podor
a
D.A.I.
201
trim.
1914)
2G18-40,
Salde
Jan. -Fev.
1918.
34.
Some moorish traditions call them r'Baafur"
and prese~t them as
the
ancestors
of
che
modern
':..'olof,
Soninke,
Seereer
and
~~ar.nden of
Senegambia.
(Felix
Brigaud:
Histoire
traditionnelle
du
Senegal
Imprimerie du gouvernement,
St.
Louis,
1962.
35.
Archeology
and
oral
tradition have
revealed
traces
of
their
sojourn.
36,
walil
or
Seneehana
later
to
become
the
kingdom
of
f.Jaalo;
5i11aa near Kaedi
in Fuuta Tooro: Galemmbu or Galam near Bakel.
37.
Each,
synonymous ~ith the
predominance
or
the
influence of a
par:::.icular
ethnic group;
Jaa-Gogo,
fulbe
from
the east
(9th-11th cent.
A.D.) Manna soninke
(11th-14th cent.
A.D.);
Tonnion,
Malinke associated
'.... ith
Mali
empire,
14th-15th
centuries);
Lam-Termes
and
Lam-Taaga,
a
mixture
of
Fulbe
and Berbers,
pastorialists
who
reigned mostly
on
the
north bank,
(15th-early 16th centuries).
38.
Not
only
that
led
the
Lebu
and
Seereer,
opposed
to
the
new
faith,
to
continue
their
migration
south'""ard but,
will
later
justify
the overthrow of
the Manna,
accused of brutal
proselytisation,
by
the
Tonnjon
dynasty,
and
of
the
Deeniyankoobe
by
the
Toorodbe,
and
much
later
constitute
the
rallying
cry
of
the
fuutanke
reform
moveme:1ts
against French invaders throughout the 19th century.
39.
Koli
named
the
country
after
one
of his
·.... arriors,
the
path
finder
who,
according
to
the
tradition,
discovered
the
country
by
following a parrot.
3rigaud
gives
another
completely
different
version,
linking
the
name to
the Jaa-Gogo dynasty;
Histoire traditionnelle,
op.
cit.,
p.
30.
40.
A dissertation is being completed by Oumar Kane
(University of
Dakar)
that
will
greatly
enhance
our
knowledge
about
the
dynasty
and
that particular period of fuutanke history.
41.
For
a
detailed
study
of
the
reasons
for
the
clerical
assumption
of
power
in
Fuuta
Tooro,
the
means
used
to
achieve
it and
the
structure of government established,
the major sources
are:
James
Johnson,
The
Almamate,
op.
cit.
and
D.
Robinson,
"The
Islamic
Revolution
of
Futa
Toro,"
in
International
Journal
of
African
Historical
Studies,
VIII,
2,
1975,
(hereafter,
"The
Islamic
revolution") .

---

44
42.
Fuucankoobe,
which
underlies
citizenship
(the
inhabitants
of
the
region),
is
also
common.
In
this study we shall use
these
terms
indifferently but, ~ith the wolof orthography (Tukuloor) in lieu of the
English (tokolor) or the French (toueouleur).
43.
They
·..ere
some
of
the
las t
people
to
lay
down
arms
in
Senegambia
and
probably
the
ones
whom
the
Fteneh
dealt
the
most
decisive blows throughout the conquest.
44.
Sixty percent for Robinson who makes a distinction bet~een the
Tukuloor and the Fulbe (30%).
For the most reasonable figures for ~ha~
time,
see Robinson,
Chiefs and Clerics, op.
eit., pp.
184-185.
45.
Here,
we
draw essentially
from
Yaya Wane Les Toucouleurs du
Fouca
Toro:
strat.ification
sociale
et
structure
familiale,
I.F.A.N.
Dakar, 1969 (hereafter Les Toucouleurs).
46.
Rimdude also means "to be pure,"
"spotless"
or "of good aloy."
Thus,
Rimbe
may
have
been
originally,
the
absence
of
slaves
in
someone's entire
genealogical
line.
For Neenbe,
see no~e 29.
livaab~ is a corruption of Jevaabe,
"those who are owned"
(by someone),
from Jevde~to own,
to be the master of ...
47.
Colonial
administrators
and
later
Africanists
make
a
distinction which,
in our opinion,
does not suit the Fuuta Tooro case.
Deenivankoobe
and
Yaa1albe
are
here
considered
as
a
stratum
just
as
Toorodbe and others
The pastoralists of the highland are called Fulbe
jeeri in reference to their nomad-pastoralist status.
48.
See Carte re and Holle;
Seneeambie,
op. eit.,
pp. 135- 136.
49.
Sebbe
has
come
to
designate
the
"foreigners"
synonymous
of
"baleebe"
in Fuuta Jaloo.
Subalbe,
from
"eukku
ballo"
(pick
and
take)
a
primitive
fishing
technique.
Jaawando,
from "Jaawdo anndude"
(lit-quick to understand) Mouhamed
M.
Kane
Le
Laaw
et
1es Halavbe·
Institutions
et
Evolution
de
1810 a
1890.
Memoire
de
Maitrise,
Universite
de
Dakar,
1975,
p.
127.
(hereafter,
Le Laaw et les Halavbe).
50.
In
some
cases
the
Subalbe
ended
up
losing
the
political
leadership of their own villages,
(Matam for
instance) where
t',JO
Fulbe
lineages
wielded power
for. m~ch of the
time
since the almamate.
Only
in 1930 were
the
Subalbe
to
regain
the
chiefship of Matam
(Interview
with Ibraahiima Seribaa Cubbtl, Matam 29 July 1985).
51.
The
highest perce:ltage
of people
fanning
their own piece of
land
in opposition to renting,
is
found among
the Subalbe.
Less
than
20%
of
the
Fuutanke
population,
they
own
and
farm
30%
of
the
Pale.
Mouhamed M.
Kane quoting J.
L.
Boutillier,
"Les
peuples de la moyenne
vallee" op.
elt., PAll-59.

---

45
52.
Even
though some of
them
take
to farming.
for
the
influence
of a jaawando counsellor,
see our
interview with Siree Buubu Bookum, a
Jaawando from M'Bummha Wh0 gives an account of the relationship between
his
father
Buubu
Kummha
and
Aamadu
Sammba
wan,
the
chief
of
Laaw
(Dakar,
18 and 20 July,
1985).
Also
reports
from
the
Corrunandant of
Podor
point
at
exactions
of
1
;",l a tulaabe
(courtisans)
in the name of Aamadu Sammba.
See also A.N.S.;
2G13-59
and
2G1S-43
(Commandant
Podor a Gou'lerneur,
Janvier
1913,
and
Avril 1915).
53.
It
became
politic
among
chiefs
to
attract
Neenbe
heads
of
lineages
for
not
only ~as
the
importance
of
a
chief
measured
to
the
number
of
courtisans
but
also
these
became
~henever
needed,
the
Liaisons
with
their
own castes.
A case
in point '..... a5
the relationship
bec·...·een
Demmba
Taal
(a
wood
worker)
and
Abdul
Bookar
Kan
a
central
fuuca
chief.
After
the
death of
the
chief,
Demmba committed suicide,
preferring death to surrender.
54.
See
D.
Robinson
Chiefs
and
Clerics,
op.
cit.
p.
6.
This
status of foreigner was emphasized through the designation of
'~accudo'
:,y '... hich
the
Fuutankoobe
refer
to
a
slave,
and deriving
from mai iude
(ta be
lost)
or majiuda
(the lost one)
meaning also
the "ignorant"
(of
the scriptures).
For
patterns
of' "domestic
slavery"
in Africa,
see:
Suzanne M.eiers
a nd
I g 0 r
Ko p y to f f :
oS"l"a"-v,,-e....r-,,v_,,-ij.2n,-,A:cf=-=.r..i."c,-,a'-'..:....cH"i",s"t",o"-"r..ic,c,-,a"l"--"a"n"d<...."A,,-n,,c,,,h,,-r
..
_",o-"D"o"l"o,-g",-"i"c.=a,-"l
Perspectives.
University of
Wisconsin
Press,
197i.
Parts
I
and 11,
pp.
3-102.
SS.
Yaya
Wane's
contention
that
every
individual
in
Tukulaor
society
'..... as
a
"potential
slave
for
one
did
not
hesitate,
(in
league
~ith slave raiders]
to catch the weakest
in one's own village and sell
him ... Before
anyone
could
notice
it
was
too
late,
the
raiders
...... ere
already several miles a',,;ay
from the village,"
is questionable for
that
...... as so out of tune with Almamal and Tukuloor moral
law that it could in
no way have been common practice.
The quotation is from Les Toucouleurs du Fouta,
op.
cit,
p.
68.
56.
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs and Clerics,
op.
eit.
p.
6.
57.
For
the
importance of slaves as
universal
value,
see Marrunadu
Njaari Mben;
"The Toorodbe and the Deeniyankoobe"
in Moustapha Kane and
David Robinson,
The Islamic Regime of Fuuta Tooro, An Anthology of Oral
Traditions
Transcribed
in
Pulaar
and Translated
int~~English, African
Studies Center,
Michigan State University,
1985 (hereafter Anthalogv).
For
the
substitution
of slaves
for
conscripts,
see
our
interview
with lbraahiima Seribaa Cubbu, op.
ci~., Ha~am July 29, 1985.
See
also A.N.S.,
2Gl-45 "Rapport mensuel Hatam,
Janvier 1899," and
2G13-52
"Rapport
mensue1
de
Salde
Octobre
1913,"
in
which
the
administrators complained about the ract.
58.
For details on the
Fedde,
see Yaya Wane,
Les Toucouleurs,
op.
cit.,
pp.
27-29.
For
the
role
of
youth
in
African
societies
in

---

46
general,
see
the wealth of French anthrological
studies
among others,
Claude
Meillassoux:
Anthropologie
Economique
des
Gouros
de
Cote
d'Ivoire Paris, Lahaye, Mouton 1964.
See also, Marc Auge:
Theorie des
Pouvoirs
et
Ideologie:
Etude
de
cas
en
Cote
d'Ivoire;
Collection
Savoir, 1975, 439p.
And, finally, Ernmanuel Terray's Le Marxisme devant
les Societes Primitives.
Francois Maspero,
Paris 1972, 173p.
59.
F.
Carrere et P.
Holle,
De
la Senegambie
Francaise,
op.
eit.,
p.
127.
60.
"t1aster"
in
contrast
to
"Head"
of the
village may spell
the
frequent
overlap
between
political
leadership
and
land ownership,
as
;:.he
"Jam Wura"
often
belongs
to
the
founding
lineage
that
supposedly
cleared
the
land
or
tamed
the
spirits,
earning
thereby,
the
title of
Jam Levdi.
61.
In some villages the Toorodbe clerics grew too powerful at the
expense of the former Fulbe or commoner lineages.
A case in point was
MbuITunba
where
"through
a
gradual
accumulation of political
power
a.nd
prestige,
the Wan superseded the
Soh
in
the
leadership ... and confined
t.he Jom to a second class status of land owner."
Mouhamed M. Kane,
Le
Laaw et les Halavbe, op. cit., p. 43.
62.
Under
colonial
rule
they
collected
taxes.
These
were:
Elimaan Baarangol
(Grand Elector
in the almamate);
Jom Darnde;
Elimaan
Busoobe.
The second name designated in each case the name of a section
of the village.
That applied
to several villages.
Mouhamed M.
Kane,
Le Laaw, op. c it., pp. 30 - 38.
63.
D. Robinson, Chiefs and Clerics. op. c i t , p. 10.
64.
For reasons of convenience we used the word "province" for the
sum of village clusters.
Tata Baccili (fort walls) of the Baccili rulers of Gajaaga Kingdom,
a
picturesque
way
of
showing
that
Fuuta
bordered
on
Gaj aaga
in
the
east. .
Dagana:
the
Al;nameebe
regarded
as
the
western
border
of
Fuuta
Tooro,
an imaginary line running across the poles of the mosque of the
village of Dagana.
65.
Ngenaar divided into Negnaar-Boosoya
(~est) and Ngenaar-Damga
(east).
The clear cut distinction between the
two occurred only when
the
French
started
their
dismemberment policy,
and
became
a fact
of
situation and a household word under colonial rule.
66.
Carrere and Holle, op. cit., p. 128.
67.
Jaggorgal:
(Grand Elector)
from iaggude:
to hold or sustain.
The image is rather striking as the Jaggorde came through time to wield
the real power at the virtual expense of the Almaami.
68.
The Almaami was
taken prisoner by the Damel of Kajoor at the
. ,

---

47
battle of Bunnguy.
The
Damel
kept
him at his court for
three months,
treating
him
with
consideration
rather
than executing him.
Finally,
Amari
Ngoone
responded
to
the
entreaties
of
the
futankoobe,
and
sent
the almaami back on a beautiful horse (see Johnson, "The Almamate," op.
cit.,
p.
182,
and
p.
269).
See
also
D.
Robinson,
"The
Islamic
Revolution,"
op.
eit.;
Lucie
Colvin,
"Kajoor
and
its
dimplomatic
relations
with
St.
Louis
du
Senegal
1763-1861,"
Ph.D.
Columbia
University,
1972
(hereafter
"Kajoor").
See also,
"Almaami Abdul,
Aali
Siidi and Aali Dunndu rr in H.oustapha Kane and David Robinson, Anthology,
op.
cH.,
pp.
53-64.
69.
The
Aabe
were:
Boosovaabe
Yirlaabe,
and Hebbivaabe,
'..;hile
the
three Koobe T,oJere:
Damgankoobe,
Laa',.:ankoobe,
and Toorankoobe.
The
dominant Jaggorde were:
Aali Dunndu and Aali Maamuudu
(Bo050ya), Aali
Siidi (Hebbiyaabe),
and Amar Belaa (Yirlaabe).
70.
Qumar Kane,
"Les Unites Territoriales du Fouta Toro"
Bulletin
I.FA.N.,
T.X:O:'1,
series
B,
no.
3,
1973.
(Hereafter
"Les Unites"),
p,
62.
Johnson devotes
a whole chapter
to the rise of ~he Jaggorde,
bet~een 1796 and 1836.
71.
For
the
fiefs
of central Fuuta chiefs in
these provinces,
see
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs
and
Clerics,
op.
cit.
pp.
188-190;
see
also
Johnson,· The Almamate,
op.
cit.,
chapters 1'1 and '11.
72.
Robinson quoting H.ollien,
Chiefs and Clerics,
op.
cit.,
p.
19.
In
fact,
Mollien paid Aali
Dunndu
the
same
respect
as
he
did
to
the
Almaami
in
matters
of
gift
giving
and
salutations,
which
further
indicates
the
prominence
of
the
man.
(Reverdit
a
Gouverneur
de
Grammont,
20/7/1847, A.N.S.),
13G33.
73.
Contrary
to
Robinson's
contention
that
"it
was
virtually
impossible
for
a
person
to
transfer
to his
son or any other relative,
the
particular combination of alliances,
wealth
and
power
that he has
fashioned for himself"
(Chiefs and Clerics,
p.
10).
74.
Earlier
on,
in
1831,
Elimaan
Rinnjaw's
brother
summarized
their
position
when
a
St.
Louis
trader
refused
to
pay a
customs duty
demanded by
Elimaan
and,
in his
view,
unauthorized by
Almaami
Yusuf.
The brother retorted that
"such approyal was quite unnecessary because
the
Almami
could
not
contradict
Eliman
Rinjaw's
actions
since
the
Eliman
named
the
ruler
and
could
remove him
if displeased with him"
(J. Johnson,
"The Almamate, " op. cit.,
p.·A24).

---

PART TWO:
THE FRENCH fu~D FUUTA TOORO:
POWER AND DIPLOMACY, 1850-1891
By
virtue
of
its
location,
the
size
of
its
population
and
its
relatively flourishing agriculture,
Fuuta Toora was in mid-19th century
an important but difficult state to deal with for
the French colony of
Senegal
(made up mostly of Wolof areas).
Because
of
the
impossibility
over
a
long
period
of
time
of
a:-ri"'ing
at
a
long-sr::anding
agreement
with
the
Almarnate.
the
French
~ould build upon previous policies and relationship patterns to
both
exploit
the
divisions
and
resort, to
shows
of
force,
until
the
mos t
hostile
groups
became
isolated
and
weakened
enough
to
be
dealt
a
decisive blow in the last decade of the century.
CHAPTER 2:
FRENCH OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS IN THE AREA
A.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STAKES
The
first
obvious
interest
the
French
had.
in
Fuuta
Tooro
•....as
economic.
The
river
trade
was
the
life
blood
of
the
St.
Louis
community and the agricultural products of the region were,
along
with
chose
of Gajaaga
(up-river),
essential
to
their
survival.
The best
agricultural
supplies
(cerea1s),
came
from Fuuta which,
as
indicated
earlier,
enj oyed
two
harvests.
In
addition
to
supplying St.
Louis,
the
region provided the
traitants or
traders,
with
the millet needed
to exchange for
the gum Moors brought to the trading posts. 1
48

---

49
In
several
respects
Fuuta
Tooro
also
played
a
maj"or
role
in
relation
to
navigation and access
to
the upper river valley.
First of
all,
the
main
channel
of
the
river
was
racher
narrow
and
boats
frequently incurred gunfire.
arrows and rocks projected from the banks.
Shoals
made
naviga cion
crick:/,
and
grounded
boats
depended
a
g ..-eat
deal upon local populations to push them
back into deep wacer.
I f
the
inhabit.ants
',.,;e!~t:: hostile
at
all,
thev
could
impose
a
bleak
fate
on
boaes
and crews by pillaging
the merchandise and killing the sailors,
or simply letting them
wait for a tug ship to sail up from St.
Louis. 2
Between 1840 and 1850 for
instance.
no single year passed without
the
pill.aging
of
boats
by
villages,
in
the
province
of
Laa'J,3
or
exchange
of
gunfire
betwe2.~ them and
grounded
ships.
In
fact,
the
F!"e~ch frequently encouraged local residents to help ships in distress
D':, of:ering re·..;ards
to villagers. 4
Fuutankoobe
also often catered to
c!"1e
boatmen's
needs
in, wood
for
fuel.
On
the
same
L:our
mentioned
e.arlier
(note
3),
the
French official
provided jibeeri with ten axes
ror
him
and hi.s
people
to
"cut down
the
timber meant
to
help
save on
coal,"
and even made
propositions as
to
the
establishment of "timber
yards"
in several Villages,S to such end.
Any
maj or
war,
hoscility
or
hampering
of
the
river
trade
therefore.
often
left
St.
Louis
bereft
of
necessary
food
stuffs
and
revenues,
thus
causing
near-famine
conditions
in
St.
Louis
and
neighbouring walof states. 6
This
is why,
conscious
of that dependence
and
anxious
to
get
the
trade
going,
Se.
Louis
occupied
itself
in
placating
the
Almaami(s)
through
treaties
and cus toms
payrnenL:s,
and
resorted
to
display
of
force
only
on
a
rather
occasional
and
I
I
I
I

---

50
7
exceptional basis.
But,
despite
these
treaties
and yearly
customs,
the
Tukuloor
kept
delaying
ships
and
thwarting
trade
along
the
river
throu.gh the second half of the 19th century.8
Franco-Tukuloor relations also
involved political stakes.
First (If
all,
in
their Islamic
identity,
the
Fuutankoobe held
almost everyone
else
in
contempt.
They
considered
the
Blacks
of
the
colony
as
"sullied bv contact wi ch infidels".
This,
in their
eyes justified the
pillaging of thei~ ships ,3nd those of the French. 9
Another ma tter of
poli:.:::ical
concern
for
St.
Louis
'..Jas
tha t
fuuta
Tooro,
as
an
influential
polity,
migh<:
forge
an
anti-french
alliance
with
neighbouring areas.
Consequent on all of
this,
ut\\til
1850 :he French
relied
more
on
diplomacy
and
applied
avoidance
when
possible.
Scarting in 1850 ho~ever, the
changing conditions dictated a shift in
policy vis a vis
Fuuta Tooro.
B.
CP~~GING CONDITIONS AND SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICY
The
close
of
che
first
half
of
the
19th century
coiLlcided
~ith
changes
in
French perceptions at both
local
and mecropolitan
levels.
One
of
the
most
important
changes
~as
the
sudden
resolve
of
the
St.
Louis merchant community
co see
that
an end be put
definitively to the
prevailing trade conditions along the river.
,r...."hen
the
crisis
reached its highest
pitch
in 18')1,
the
merchants
addressed
a
petition
to
Governor
Protec,
complaining
most
bitterly
about the attitudes of the populations of the valley,
and urging him to
intervene
decidedly,
even
at
the
cose
of
blocking
commercial
activities
for
a
few
years.
Among other
things,
they
asked
for
the

---

51
abolicion of
the
escales
and
the
substitution for
these,
of permanent
and fortified
trading factories
at Dagana and Podor. 10
On top of all,
they urged
the
Ministry
to
appoint
an
agressive Governor,
for enough
years
to
familiarize
himself with
the
geo-poli~ics of Senegambia
in
general,
and
the
valley
in
particular,
as
....ell
as
enough
funds
to
carr-y
on
the
badly
needed
policies.
In France,
the
Ministry
echoed
favourably such requests by ordering
the abolition of
the escales
and
"customs"
as early as
1854 and urging that
the French reign supreme on
the ~aterway.ll
A final
token of approval
on the part of t~e Ministry
~as the appointment of Louis Leon
Cesar
Faidherbe,
a man expected to
be an expansionist, Governor of the colony of Senegal,12
This
appointment
lessened
the
long
standing
animus
·oet·..... een
the
administration
and
the
merchant
corrununity,
allowing
for
the
earnest
cooperation--moral and material--of
that class,13 cooperation that was
necessary
for
any
attempt
at
restoring
the
limited
French
prestige
along the river to succeed. 14
In
other
respects,
there
were
developments
on
the
Senegambian
scene
that had a bearing on Fuutanke politics and by
a return effect,
on French interests in the valley.
Chief among
these developments was
the
reform
movement
and
the
holy
war
of
Al-Hajji
Umar
Taal
in
the
upper Senegal-Niger.
Umar Saydu Taal was born
in Halwaar
(Tooro)
of a
learned Tooroodo
family,
in
the
e~rly
1770s.
Following his cocanic
and Islamic schooling,
he went on a
pilgrimage to Mecca
(ca.1830),
and
stayed
in
the
Middle-East
and
other
countries
of western
Sudan
for
years,
acquainting
himself
with
the
principles
and
doctrine
of
the
Tij aniyya
Sufi
Order,
and
studying
the
s truc tures
of
Central
and
.. _.

---

52
Western Sudanic Islamic
5 tates .
He scarted a "Holy War"
against the
non·Muslim Mande
states of ~he east and soon attracted many followers
from many
corners of Senegambia particulary Fuuta and his politically
home
province
of Tooro.
Although Umar did
not
return
to
Fuuta
bet~een 1847 and 1858, he exerted enormous influence over the
life of
its
citizens.
His envoys
constantly sue ceded
in finding
recruits to
join
the
campaign
in
the
upper
valley
and
he
',..ras
very
critical
of
Fuutanke ·,.;eakness
in relation
to
French
pressures. IS
On the whole,
Umar' 5
sympathizers \\.Iere most acti'Je
in
the
c·...o
extremities of Fuuta
Tooro closest to the
French posts of Dagana
and Fador in the ves~ and
Sakel
in
the
east:.
This
agi tation
and
propaganda
on
t~e
part
of
Umarian
en'Joys
set
in
motion
a
continuous
mOVeme:1t
of
population
coward
the
ne~ly
established
Tukuloor
s ta te ,
a
movement
still
remembered in oral tradition as.
the
"Nooro Emigration"
(Fergo Nooro).
Thus,
judging from the developments of the early 18505,
one
can
take as high on French agenda,
the folloving strategic
objectives:
1. To abolish the system of escales
and "customs"
payments.
2.
To pull
che Waalo kingdom out of
the Trarza Moors'
grip and
protect
the
agricultural
population
of
its
south
bank
from
Moorish
chrea~.
J.
To
increasingly meddle
in
the politics of
Fuuta Tooro and set
in motion a process of disintegration of the almamate.
4.
To contain Umarian recruitments.
These
objectives
vere
not mutually
exclusive and often
requLred
similar tactics
that Faidherbe was not slow in laying
out.
wllile the
first
required
a
major
and
slNift
operation
against
the
Hoors,
the

---

53
second
implied
the multiplication of
fortified poses
along the
river.
The
third
involved
favouring
the
emergence
of
a
pro - French
party
in
Fuuta
and
using
the
"customs"
as
a
political
ploy
to
prevail
on
the
Almaami not to harm French interests. 16
The fourth implied making good
use
of
most
Fuutanke
leader' 5
antipathy
for
AI-Hajj i
Umar,
to bring
them
gradually
into
an anti-Umarian alliance.
The
last--but not the
least--objeccive dictated an encouragement and a backing of centrifugal
:o~ces within the almamaLc. 17 The effect of the last
one was to deal
with
the
peripheral
provinces
of
Fuuta
on a
separate basis,
and draw
on
che
familiarity
'''''lth
their
ruling
lineages,
to
set
patterns
for
future policies.
C.
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS THE DIFFERENT REGIONS OF FUUTA
1.
THE FRENCH AND DIMAT
Stuck
between
the
Wolof
territory
of
~aalo
and
the
Fuutanke
province
of
Tooro,
tha.t
westernmost
section
of
Fuuta
emerged
as
a
?ro'ILnce no earlier than the 18th century, when Almaami Abdul
Qaadiri
forced its people to resettle on the south bank of river Senegal. IS
Owing
~o
their
prominence
in
Islamic
studies,
the
Kanhanbe
(Kan
lineage)
soon earned precedence
over
the Wolof and
Fulbe
groups,
and
their
Elimaan
(traditional
ruler),
who
played
a
role
in
the
Islamic
re'Jolution
of
1776,
quickly
became
the
spokesman
of
the
twelve
villages,
stretching
from
Dagana
(west)
to
Njaayeen
and
Lobbudu
(east) .19
They
maintained
their
identity
and
expressed
their
preponderance
by
applying
"jalmacc,"
the
name
of
their
Elimaan's
village.
to the whole province. 20

---

54
Of all
the provinces of Fuuta,
Oimac was
the one that
inflicted
greatest damage upon the St. Louisian river trade.
An
account of 1858
read as fo110·....·s:
Masters
of the
S·~negal river bank~ at a place called
Cacho, where [he flood-plain shrinks between the high
and bushy edges,
the toucouleurs
(of)
Dimar remained
for a long time the terror of sailors of Senegal who
had
to
go
through
that
passage..
The
people
of
Se-Louis
even
to
;:':lis
very
da?,
speak
ab.,rays
with
sorrow and
resentment
of che
innumerable
losses both
in
lives
and
goods,
the
people
of
Dimar
caused
to
them in chose old days 21
Ho'",,'ever,
on
the
other
hand,
the
French '..,rere
at
times
interested
in
Dimat,
par::icularly duri:lg
the
period of
the
agricultural schemes
of
the
1820's.
Hence,
the
long
period
of
hostility
interrupted
by
lulls
under
~he
reign
of
Elimaan
Buubakar
Kan
(late
18th·mid
19th
centuries) .22
The
tone was set
in
dealing separately with Dimat when
in 1843,
the
French
signed a
treaty
in which
they agreed to bestowing
0"
on Elimaan separate
OIcustoms."~.J
In 1849,
following a
long period of
pillaging
by
the
inhabitants
of
Dimat,
the
French
launched
a
successful expedition against the province.24
The
death
of Elimaan Buubakar
in
1851 and
the advent of his
son
Elimaan Saydu Buubakar coincided with the French resolve to
neutralize
Dimat on a permanent basis.
In 1854,
Governor Protet,
frustrated over
~the unsuccessful parleys about land for the
construction of a fort at
.Podor,
seized upon the assassination of
a French traicant to launch an
expedition.
Killing two birds
with
one stone,
he
occupied Podor and
destroyed Jalmacc,
the
capital
of
Dimac
chat
had until
then enjoyed
the
reputation
of
impregnability.25
The
continued
sympathy
Elimaan

---

55
Saydu displayed vis a vis both Dmar and the Trarza Moors,
led Faidherbe
to
destroy
the
t.own
of
Boqqol
and
authorize
gunboat
raids
against
Oimat
in
1855.
He
subsequently
forced
Elimaan
Saydu
to
sue
ror peace
and
la~er,
he
had
him
arrested
along
with
several
notables
and
appointed
his
cousin
Abdul
Booli
Kan
ne~
ruler.
As
a
coken
of
I
allegiance,
the
new
Elimaan
signed ~ith the
Governor
a
"Protectorate
treaty"
on 18 June 1858, consecrating the
separation of Dimac with the
res:
of
ruuta
(article
1)
and
the
"freedom"
of
trade and abolition of
"customs"
(article 3).26
M.eam...hile,
many
notables
had
emigrated
to
the
north
bank,
in
protese
of
Abdul
Bo01i'5
appointment
by
the
French,
The
deposed
Slimaan
Saydu
continued
in Jalmacc
to
arouse
and
exploit
anti-French
sentiments,
especially among the youth,
A year
later,
Abdul
3001i was
so
ineffective
in defending
French
interests
and
ruling
the
province
that,
in
June
1859,
French
Commandant
Faron '",as
ordered
to
land
at
Risga on his '..Jay back from Siidi Eli' s
camp,
arrest
Elimaan Saydu,
and
bring him along
to
St.
Louis. 27
Following
the
arrest and deportation
of
El imaan
Saydu,
his
son Mammadu
Daadaa
Kan,
apparently
in cahoots
~ith
the
population,
assassinated
his
uncle
and
French
appointed
ruler. 28
Faidherbe
reacted
swiftly
to
the
incident
by
formally
annexing
Dimat to
Fre<lcn territory,
deporting sixty
to seventy people
from
Jalmacc and imposin& a collecti?e fine of 100 gras
(13 ounces) of
gold
and
100
cattle,
and
issuing
a
warrant
for
tne
arrest
of
the
assassin. 29
To
ensure
that
the
successor
would
be
equally
well
disposed
towards
French
interests,
Governor
Faidherbe
gave
Jaalo
Hammoodu Kan,
brother of
the
slain
ruler,
all
the
gold,
and appOinted
I
I

---

56
him new "Elimaan Dimat_"
But,
once
again.
the
overall
situation within
the
province
and
Fuuta Tooro
in general,
did not move
towards a lasting settlement with
the
French.
The
people
of Dimat grew
increasingly
resentful
of the
loss
of
sovereignty
to
the
colony.
In April
1863,
spurred by
some
chiefs,
notably
Ardo
Nannga
and
Elimaan
Penndaaw
Saydu
Kan,
they
!"e fused
to
pay
taxes.
Governor
Faidherbe
immediately
dispatched
an
expedition of 450 men under
the command of Lieutenant Flize,
Director
o'f
External
Affairs,
who
forced
Elimaan
Penndaaw
and
Ardo
Nannga
to
surrender,
collected a
total of
200
francs
in taxes and 30 sheep from
the
Fulbe
Baraykaati.
and
cook
c·""elve
hostages.
El imaan
Canngaay
Kammadu.
a
cleric
who
staunchly
opposed
the
protectorate
and
was
believed to be the mastermind of the
tax rebellion,
was also
arrested
and deported to Goree Island,
in western Senegal.
After
Elimaan Jaalo himself
displayed
anti-French
sentiments
and
accL~udes in 1862,30 the French decided against appointing a new chief
for Dimat.
Instead,
every village became "autonomous"
until 1883 when
Governor Servatius appointed Mammadu Daadaa Kan on his
return from ex·
ile,
chief of
(he whole province.31
T'..;o years
later,
the latter was
deposed and
the villages reverted once
again to
the status of "auton-
omy" under the nominal supervision
of the chiefs of Waa10,
until 1891.
~nat the overview of Franco-Dimatan relations reveals is that this
province
bore
indeed
the
brunt
of
French
expansion. in
Fuuta
Tooro.
Closer
to
St.
Louis
and
Dagana
and
easily
accessible
to
French
gunboats,
Dimat was often punished for both its crimes and those of the
almamate. 32
Therefore, establishing relations
with St.
Louis could in

---

57
its
eyes
secure
peace
as
well
as
allow
for
a
basis
for
autonomist
policies
vis
a
vis
the
almamate.
The
province
was
not
slow
in
realizing
French
objectives,
and
this
accounts
for
the
'"acillation
between allegiance
to
Fuuta and
the
desire
for peace ',.;ieh St.
Louis.
Although the French achieved
little in Dima~, having failed to gee its
ruling class
to adopt a
totally pro-French stand,
the consequences for
the
~rovince were nonetheless great.
First of all.
by building a fore
at
Dagana
and
later at
Fanay,
a
major
town
in Dimat,
the
French had
attained
a
major
objective,
the
ability
to
use
the
province
as
an
observatory
from
which
they
could
monitor
closely
the
situation
in
ruuca Tooro,
and intervene when and if needed.
Second,
by
deposing
and
deporting
Elimaa~
Saydu
Buubakar,
a
process
was
initiated
that
would
lead
to
the
assassination
of
Abdul
Booli
and
for
a
while,
a
total
disarray
within
the
ruling
lineage.
Third,
the
French learned through time,
not to
trust
the Kanhanbe and
this
led
to
the
autonomy
of vi llages,
the
severing of
the
umbilical
cord with Fuuta,
and the annexation of
Dimat to Waalo.
In this wise,
Dimat
proved
a
test
area
for
the
French
who
would
replicate
these
policies
later--dividing
ruling
lineages,
deposing
and
deporti.ng,
granting
autonomy
to
single
villages
and
imposing
"exogenous"
chiefs
on
particular
regions
and
populations,
and
piecing
together
traditionally separate political units--elsewhere in Fuuta Tooro.
2.
THE FRENCH AND Dfu~G~
This province was traditionally known as Ngenaar and divided
into
Ngenaar-Damga (east),
and Ngenaar-Boosoya (west).
Damga
enjoyed,
just

---

58
like
Dimac
at
the
other
end
of
Fuuta,
the
status
of
refuge
for
political
exiles.
Because
of
the
recency of
the
occupation of most
pares
of
this
province,
i t
is
often
referred
to
as
"Koodi"
(newly
occupied).33
Pe rhaps
more
than
the
0 cher
provinces
Damga
contained a diversity of groups and leading lineages.
There was a hose
of local chiefs,
"loom"
at Matam,
"Ardo Ngiril"
at Wuro·Soogi,
"Ceerno
Wanwanbe"
ac Kanel,
"Almaami-Deeniyankoobe"
at Padalal,
to mention just
Cl.
few. 34
In
some
'Nays,
Damga
shared
some
features
with
Dimat.
It
felt
also frustrated by central Fuuca's attempts at dominating the almamate.
Another
similarity
'..;a5
the
proximity
of
French
forts,
in
this
case
3akel and later Medine,
and the
influence of the Umarian movement from
che east.
Third,
Damga ~as in the east strategically as important for
the
trade
as
Dimat was at
the
western gate of Fuuta Tooro,
while
its
river front
villages
were
fair
prey
to
French
retaliatory
gunboat
raids.
These
similarities
existed
side
by
side
with
differences.
The
peripheral
location
of
Damga
did
not
translate
into
a
peripheral
status
as
'.... as
the
case
\\o1ith
Dimat.
Though
Damga
did
not
pr?vide
Jaggorde,
i.t
shared
the
illustrious
right
af
providing
Almameebe. 35
Second,
the
fact
that
many
people
were
of
recent
central
Fuutanke
extraction
or
provenance
allowed
for
some
leverage
over
communities
and villages on the part of Boosoya and Yirlaabe.
As a matter of fact,
such western villages
as
Boki-Ja·....e,
Doondu,
J0\\o101,
and Giray
served
the interests of Abdul Bookar Kan during the 19th century. 36
Likewise,
communities
around
Ndulumaaj i,
Go go ,
and
Wuro-Soogi
identified
with
I
I
I

---

59
Yi rlaabe ,
preserving
their
titles,
'tArdo
Nigiril"
at
Wuro-Soogi,
"Ceerno
Funeebe"
at Goga,
and often siding with
them in
time of war.
A third difference,
related
to
the second,
was
the
plethora of chiefs
and
the
absence
of
a
universally
recognized
leading
lineage,
a
paramount
chief
for
the
French
to
deal with
and
rely upon.
For all
these
reasons
the
French
would
find
Damga a
tougher
nut
to
crack in
comparison with Dimat.
In
addition,
the length of chat section of the
river
from
Gaawol
(west)
to
the
border
~ith Gajaaga
(east)
rendered
navigation
difficult,
and the
likelihood of attacks on French shipping
all
the more real.
One
part i.cular
incident
that
rekindled
the
tens ion
bec'ween
St.
Louis
and Damga was
the assassination at Nganno
in 1854 of the French
craicanc Malivoire by Mammadu Hammaat Wan.
Subsequently,
following a
series
of
other
incidents,
Faidherbe
ordered
the
indiscriminate
!
i
bombing
of
all
riverfront
villages
in
Damga.
The
same
year,
knowing
i
that ad-hoc
gunboat
raids
were
no
fasting
solution to
the permanent
i
,
problem
of
trade
along
chat
stretch
of
the
valley,
the
Governor
I1
I
proposed the construction of two forts between Podor and Bakel,
one at
I
Salde,
the
other
at
Matam,
as
the
most
efficient
way
of
deterring
I
central and eastern
Fuutankoobe from attacking shipping.
I
Thus,
in July 1857,
Faidherbe decided
to
erect a
fott at
Matam.
On 14 September 1857,
th_.villages between Ngijilon and Matam,
spurred
by
the
propaganda of escapees
from Medine- -where
French and Umarian
forces
had clashed--decided
co
thwart
the
construction.
The
French
quickly reacted,
setting fire
to thirty
villages.
A few days later a
large
number
of villages
and
chiefs
coalesced
to declare war on
the
I
I

---

60
French,
and
on
27
September
400
Fuutankoobe
attacked
the
croops
stationed
at
Hatam.
They
were
repulsed
after
four
days
of
heaV"J
fighting
and
cannon
shelling3?
After
repeated
gunboat
raids,
the
chiefs of Katam
and neighbouring villages embarked on ?arleys with the
commandander
of
the
"Basilic '1
and
agreed
to
live
under
French
prDtec::ion. 38
The
same
yea;:,
Governor
Faidherbe
sailed
up
to Hatam.
He
visited
with
the
chiefs
and
exchanged
gifts.
Shortly
after,
an:-:ious
co
guarancee
maximum
security
conditions
in
;:he
area
of
the
area
of
::he
fort,
he
plotted
the
assassination
of
a
chief
in
a
neighbouring village. 39
Then,
having
temporarily
secured
the
tranquillity
of
Xatam,
Faidherbe
turned
to
the
most
difficult
issue
in Damga,
the
diffuse
character
of
political
authority.
Th is,
and
the
confus ion
tha t
prevailed
in
the
wake
of
the
Umarian
departure,
rendered
more
imperative
than
ever
the
selection
of
a
paramount
figure
and
che
sealing
of
a
lasting
Franco-Fuutanke
arrangement
in
this
area.
In
September 1859,
a
protectorate
treaty was
signed that consecrated the
independence of Damga vis a vis
Fuuta
and the Almaami.
and placed the
myriad chiefs under
the umbrella authority of French appointed Elfekki
Mohammadu
A.
Jaatara,
of
the
"Aan"
family
of
Gaawol. 40
In
1860
the
province
was
formally
annexed
to
the
colony
and
in
August
1863
a
confirmation
treaty
was
signed between director of political
affairs
·flize and the several chiefs.
Far
from
spelling the
end of problems
as
i t ·.... as
intended to,
the
measure
marked
the
beginning of new difficulties.
first of
all,
the
Elfekki(s)
tried
to
rule
Damga
but
had
no
significant
traditional

---

61
claim
to
the
allegiance
of
the
people,
except
for
a
brief period
in
the
18205
when
E.
Aamadu
Jaatara
was
po·.erful
enough
to
defy
the
almamace.
Second,
as
was
often
the
case
when
the
French
backed a
particular
ruler,
E.
Mohammadu
A.
Jaatara
used
their
aid
[the
Commandant's]
to
impose new taxes and
to raid villages with an army of
former slaves picked up in the
wake of the Umarian exodus.
These acts
so eroded
the authority
of the
"Aan"
and the French,
and so
infuriated
SL.
Louis
that by 1864
the
Elfekki and his son were deported to Gabon,
and someone
from another family appointed in his scead. 41
Third,
Abdul Bookar Kan,
a central
Fuuta chief,
held some
sway on
life
and
politics
in Damga. 42
This
chief consistently
tried
to
turn
Damga
into his
own sphere of
influence,
especially
after western and
part
of
central
Fuuta
proved
irremediably
lost
to
the
co lony.
He
could count on support
from both
the
Sebbe
warrior group of his ally
Maalik Hammaat,
the Jaa...... anbe
of Kanel
and
Boki-Jawe,
as well as good
friends
among
the
Deeniyankoobe
and
Yaalalbe.
Sy
the
early
18805,
Abdul B.
Kan had so marred
French and Elfekki's efforts at ruli~g the
area
that
St.
Louis
was
ready
to
place
the
province
under
his
authority.
Towards
the
end
of
the
18805
Archinard
himself
acknowledged
the
Elfekkis'
failure,
and suggested that
"the right man
with
sufficient
prestige and
respectability
[be
found]
to
lead Damga
as
a
French
protectorate. "u}
To
Archinard
no
oite
could
fit
the
description
be t ter
than
tne
c ler ic
Sheex
Mammadu
Maamudu
Kan
who,
having
turned Maqaama
and
environs
into his
turf,
dreamed of ruling
the ~hole province of Damga on behalf of the French. 44
Contrary
to
Dimat
then,
Damga
lacked
throughout
the
nineteenth

---

I
62
century an umbrella authority susceptible of
facilitating the cask for
the French.
The history of St.
Louis--Damga relations
is
a history of
the
failure
to
control
Damga
through
the
"Aan"
family,
and
contain
Abdul Bookar Kan's claims to political influence.
The question ~as not
resolved until
the
early twentieth century.
It paved the way for the
elimination of
the
"Aan,"
and
the
emergence
of
other
lineages
in
t.!'1e
area.
3.
THE FRENCH AND TOORO
100ro had the oldest provincial identity in Fuuta.
It
originally
dominated an area extending from Dagana in the west to Tulel-Bawdi near
Olol-Jaawbe
in
the
east,45
and
from
Lake
Rkiz
and
Ued
Kecci
in
the
north,
to
Labgar
(Ferlo)
in
the
south. 46
Unlike
Damga,
100ro
was
under
the
sovereignty of
the
Lamtooro,
whom
the
others
(A::-do,
Cee~no
and
Elimaan)
~ecognized as
paramount
chief.
Within
the
almamate
however,
Tooro
seemed
to
be
in
an even more
ak~ard predicament
than
Dimat and Damga.
Although it sold a
large portion of the agritultural
goods
consumed
in
St.
Louis
or
resold
to
the
Moors,
and
was
the
province through which Fuuta received most of the merchandise purchased
from
St·Louis,
central
Fuuta
and
not
Tooro
collected
the
customs
on
these transactions.
Frusr.rated over the death of Abdul Qaadiri and the
role
of
the Jaggorde,
Tooro was
not
slow
in proclaiming its autonomy.
La te r,
the
French,
eager
as
a lways
to
take
advantage
of' fissiparous
tendencies,
started dealing with the province on a separate basis.
Despite
the
successive
treaties
signed and
the
Podor
expedition
of 1854,
the
ruling class
in Tooro
sho;.;ed no real
inclination to play

---

63
:he
game
until
1859.
The
main
reason
for
the
dilly-dallying of
the
chiefs
'Was
once
again
the
considerable
s""ay
Umar
Taal
held
on
his
native province.
They 'Were caught in a bind between serving the French
and
responding
to
the
desire
of
those
of
their
subjects
who,
more
intensely
than
in
the
other
provinces,
internalized
and
actively
supported Umar's
mission.
Thus,
Lamtooro Hammee Aali Sal would change
attitude
to~ards French interests almost every two to three months from
1855
forward,
and
i.ncur
Faidherbe '5
reprisals.
By
the
time
Lamtooro
HZlmmee
left
to
join
to
the
Umarian emigration
in 1859,
the French had
learned that the only political guarantee in TaDro resided in a binding
agreement
·.... i::h
anti-Umarian,
if
not
pro-French
forces.
Hence,
the
same year
they helped elect Hammadi
Bookar,
a
man as
Robinson rightly
rema rked,
"of
proven
hostility
towards
Umar,"
and
signed
the
"protectorate
treaty"
of
10 April
1859.
This
creaty
recognized
the
independence of the province,
set out its
obligations to refuse asylum
to
enemies
of
St.
Louis,
promised
the
establishment
of a
fort
on
the
eastern
border
with central
Fuuta,
and abolished
trade
customs
within
the
territory.
Also,
because
i t construed Tooro as extending "on the
river
from Mao
to Alebe
and on
the marigot
from Dao
to Aere"
(art.l),
it
gave
the
Lamcooro
jurisdiction over Haayre
and Halaybe,
which had
severed
ties with Tooro long before.
As
the
Lamtooro
took advantage of French protection
to
establish
a despotic
rule,
a
revolt broke out in 1862.
After the
assassination
of
the
French
appointed
Lamtooro
Siree
Gelaajo
Sal,
the
French
retaliated
against
all
villages
along
the
Ouwe
tributary
and
signed
with
Sanunba Umahaani,
a ?ro-Umarian chief,
the
"a:1nexation
treaty"
of
I
r

---

64
March
1863. 47
More
than
all
previous
agreements,
this
one
marked
a
turning
point
in
the
history
of
Tooro.
Tooro
was
now
part
of
the
colony of Senegal
and cercle
(district)
of
Podor.
The
treaty removed
the
villages
around
Pador
completely
from
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Lamtooro and placed
them under
the authority of the
French Commandant
(district
officer)
thus
creating what
went
down
in local history as
"the
,....hice
man' 5
mosquito
net. ,,48
Then,
from
1869
to
1878
Lamtooro
Sammba,
no''''
turned
pro-French,
would
help
deal
·..;ieh
the
Maadiyanke
threa t
(1869-1875),
partially subjugate the Halaybe,
and guarantee the
French hold on Tooro despite the continuing
emigration to Naaro.
His
replacement,
Lamtooro
Mammadu
Mbowba
(1878-1882),
a
former
student
of
the
"School
of Hostages"
(future
School
of Sons of Chiefs
and
Interpreters)
and spahi Lieutenant,
resorted to
expropriation and
appointment
of
friends
on
an unprecedented
leve 1.
He
proved overly
brutal during
the
"Pons
campaign"
of
1881,
and bullied French allies
so
much
that
the
end
result
was
to
make
the
Tooro
protectorate
less
'....orkable
than
ever before.
From his
deposition
in May
1881
to
1890,
the French would
appoint four consecutive rulers.
A
number
of
generalisations
can
be
dra~~
from
the
study
of
Franco-Tooranke
relations
in
the
nineteenth
century.
The
first
is
that,
nowhere
in
Fuuta
could
French
"dismemberment"
aims
meet
·.... ith
more. propitious conditions than in the exploited and constantly bullied
Toorq.
Craving
for
recognition
and
power
over
a
province
most
accessible
of
all
to
French
gunboats
the
I
Lamtooro(s)
had at
first,
every interest
in welcoming French
offers of regular revenues
throu~h
trade, and tacit protection from both the Moors and central Fuuta.
. ....

---

65
On
the
other
hand
Tooro
....... as
the
home
of
Umar
Taal,
'..Tho
had
started
a
"holy war"
in
the
east
and
intended
to
pressure
for
con-
tinuing support
in human and economic
terms.
Many people,
stirred by
Umarian propaganda therefore realized,
perhaps more
than their rulers,
that
the
French had an
axe
to
grind,
and
resented very much becoming
French
subjects
and
having
to
pay
taxes
to
the
lIinfidels,"
who
had
been the subordinate party of years past.
Along with the Umarian,
the "Halaybe factor"
also had a bearing on
the
situation of Tooro
(see
introduction and note
45).
In
reinstating
the jurisdiction of Cede over Halaybe-Haayre,
the
French satisfied the
military
and
strategic
need
of
pushing
back
the
line
of
demarcation
with
central
Fuuta;
by
the
same
token
however,
they
commited
the
political
mistake
of
rekindling
the
fire
of Halaybe
hatred
for
the
Lamtooro(s).
Finally,
by buttressing the Lamtooro,
the French reinforced him as
a
regional
leader
and
gave
him
the
power
and
will
to
withstand
the
erstwhile
enemies of Tooro.
At
the
same
time,
one
might argue,
they
undermined
his
legitimacy.
Contradictions
were
bound
to
arise,
ac-
counting
in part
for
the
rate of turnover on
the
throne of Gede.
Of
the
eleven chiefs
who
ascended
the
throne
between
1854
and 1890,
one,
Siree Gelaajo (1860-1863) was assassinated,
and six were deposed by the
French. 49
This reveals the degree u£ instability and the high level of
French
apprehension.
In the
thirty six year period of time,
the
average
reign
per
individual
ruler
did
not
exceed
three
years.
Second,
of those eleven Lamtoro(s),
three at least (Hamrnee Aali, Samrnba
Umahaani,
Hamrnee
Gaysiri)
joined
in
the
holy
war of Umar Taal at one

---

66
time
or
another;
two of
them served
for
c·..... O
terms.
In other words,
the French had to acknowledge their
popularity and reckon with it.
As for Lieutenant Mammadu Mbowba,
although a former student
and a
good officer,
once appointed Lamtooro he showed extreme
re luc tanee to
abide by French orders to be friendly with their
allies.
10 is highly
probable that one of the
reasons
for
his deposition was
that he could
not change his abusive ways on that matter. 50
Sidiki
on
the
other
hand,
could
not
come
co
grips
with
the
"Halaybe
question"
and also
indulged
in some
abuses.
Because of
his
g~o~ing unpopularity,
the French deposed him in 1887 and
appointed his
cOl!.sin Hamrnadi ~.laataagu.
In
sum,
the
degree
of
instability
within
the
protectorate
reveals,
first
of all,
the
delicate
position of
(he
rulers,
torn
as
they ~ere,
bet~een the bid for
autonomy and
their
treaty
obligations
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
fear
of
harming
the
Umarian
cause
and
incurring banishment on the other.
It also highlights
the competition
bet~een the two branches of the Cede ruling
family
(Decce and Hammadi
Ngaay) .
Finally,
the power of the
Lamtooro(s)
became
increasingly a
matter
of
great
concern
for
French
authorities.
Over
the years
they
had
grown
~ealthy and secured connections within
the
influential
St.
Louis
community.
These
questions
and
others
clamoured
for
answers
•.....hich
were
to
come
in
1890,
in
the
form
of a
political
"new,deal"
kno\\""TI as
the
"Jeandet constitution."
I
I

---

67
4.
THE FRENCH AND CENTRAL FUUTA
aj THE BONES OF CONTENTION
Laaw,
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
and
Boosoya
were
the
heart
of
the
almamate
and,
perhaps
for
that
reason,
the
center
of
the
Franco-
./ Tukuloor puzz le.
As
the main beneficiaries of the status quo,
central
Fuuta
leaders,
the
Boosoyaabe
in
particular,
were
most
alert
to
outside
threats
and
most
concerned
~ith
the
preservation
of
the
almamate.
Thus,
central Fuutanke and French interests proved
incongruent on
several
coun::s.
The
issue
of
territorial
integrity
and
political
SO~Jereignty was
t:he
first
bone
of
contention.
As
advocates
of
the
"Grand Fuuta"
central Fuuta
leaders were accustomed to considering the
almamate as extending
from rata Baccili to as
far
afield as
the first
pillars
of
the
mosque at Dagana,
in Waalo
territory.
In
that wise,
they
resented the construction of forts at Dagana,
Podor,
and Matam as
infringements
on
Fuuta's
sovereignty.
As
it
turned
out,
the
posts
proved essential
in the
injection of French authority
in
eastern and
western Fuuta from the 1850s onward.
So, while accepting the protectorates as a fact of
the situation,
central Fuuta chiefs tried their utmost to keep the fire of anti-French
sentiments
going
in
these provinces,
and
engaged
in battles
against
the
colonial
troops
several
times
during
the
1860s.
In 1862 a deg!:ee
of French
influence was
already noticeable
in western Fuuta.
Tooran-
koobe were
reluctant to submit to the French and yet
fearful of adopt-
ing a clear anti-French attitude.
A great many of them declared that,
I
I

---

68
We are between the Almami and the Governor.
Let them
iron
things
QUC.
If
the
Almami
wins,
Toro
will
belong
to
hem;
ef
the Governor wins,
we will
become
hes
[subjects] 51
The
almamate
also
encouraged
Halaybe
opposition
LO
bo~h
the
French
and
theer
proteges
and
often
endulged
en
pellageng
the
protectorates.
In
1860
for
instance
the
air
was
so
full
of
anti-
French sentiments,
chat central Fuut.a chiefs and Wol Heyba Moors
could
easily get Mammadu Biraan (a pro-French almaami)
to join in raiding the
Damga protectorate. 52
/Slavery was another source of difference between the two
parties.
Up until
the early nineteenth century i t was the Almaami(s) ~ho opposed
the
trade
in
Muslim
Fuutanke
slaves.
Now,
i t
was
the
French
administration
that
apparently
wanted
to
liberate
any
slave
who
set
foot
on so-called French
soU.
conformeng
to
the
27 April 1848 decree
which in its artecle 7
stepulated that "Le sol de la France affranchet
l'esclave
qui
le
touche".53
This
liberating
principle
was
quite
disturbing
in the
eyes of an aristrocracy
that prized slaves so much,
and would continue to plague the
relations
for quite some
time.
Even
though
the
French sometimes
returned
the
slaves
of
their
allies,
the
question
came
once
again
to
the
fore
during
the
1880s
and
the
Governor's
reply
to
a
complaint-letter
from
Abdul
Bookar
Kan,
was
quite indic~tive of French resolve to annoy the chiefs.
The
Governor
semply saed,
I
understand
what
you
said
about
the
captives
[domestic
slaves]
but,
our
laws
are not
the
same as
those
of
Fouta and
I
have
no
right
to
change
them.
We
cannot deny freedom to those captives who come
to
seek it in our forts and our cities. 54

---

69
._ Fi.nally,
the
construccion
of
the
celegraph,
especially
on
the
Salde-Bakel section,
aroused discontent and hostility
between 1880 and
1885.
Abdul Bookar opposed che plan and laid
out specific conditions.
Many
Fuutankoobe
saw
the
telegraph
as
a
direct
infringement
on
the
sovereignty of the state and flocked more
than ever to his standard,
as
t~e only uncompromised leader.
This led to a French military offensive
and ultimately to the Hoore-Foonde agreement of 1885. 55
Not all central Fuuta was equally hostile
to
the
French.
In
the
province of Laa.....
the
"Wan"
family of Mbununba had been
relatively w~ll
disposed
towards French
interests since
the early
nineteenth century.
Their relationship would gradually turn into
an alliance.
b/ THE FRAlJCO-WAN ALLIfu~CE,
AND THE LAAW AND YIRLAABE
PROTECTO~~TES OF 1877
Relatively small
in extent,
Laa ..... is "sandwiched" bet'..... een Tooro and
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe.
Laa .....
developed
a
sense
of
provincial
identity
only
at
the
beginning
of
the
nineteenth
century,
thanks
to
its
Almaami(s)
Biraan
Ibraa
and
his
son
Mammadu
Biraan
Wan. 56
While
..... estern
Laaw
remained
traditionally
hostile
to
their
bid
for
predominance,
the
"Wan"
managed
to
consolidate
their
po ..... er
in
the
eastern
portion
through
redistribution
or
land
reconquered
from
the
Moors,
acquisition of slaves and hoarding'~f wealth from taxes and raid
on an unprecedented level.
At
the national
level
they spun a web of marriage
alliances
..... ith
some
distinguished
families
to
counterpoise
the
influence of
central
Fuuta
Jaggorde,
and
establish
themselves
as
a
ruling
dynasty.
I

---

70
Furthermore,
by allying with
the
"Kan" of Mboolo-Biraan they were able
to
obtain
a
large
portion of
the
much
prized
customs
duties
paid by
the
French.
By
the
18605,
they had grown
so wealthy and prestigious
thac,
"Mammadu
Biraan.
·..... as
the
single
most
powerful
and
wealthy
individual
in
Futa and was
constantly receiving suitors
for
the hands
of his daughters and nieces."S?
The shrewdness of the
"Wan" made
them understand
the need
to ....... in
French alliance.
Biraan,
in his competition and ~ars with
Yusus Siree
Lih,
several
times
Almaarni between
1818 and
1835,
remained constantly
in touch with St.
Louis and its Governors who regarded him as "the best
dis;:>osed
cowards
our
interests.
wnen
Mammadu
came,
he
fa llowed
in
his
father' 5
footsteps,
taking
an
interest
in
the
Governor I 5
friendship,
especially Louis
Faidherbe's.
He played a key role in the
cession of land for
the
construction of French forts as well as
in the
proteccion
of
river
r.rad~.
This
equation
of
Almaami
Marnrnadu
Biraan
·.... ith
"collaboration"
was
one
among other
reasons
why he was deposed
several times and several times had to go into exile, before his
final
eviction in 1865-1866.
After he disappeared from the
political scene,
his
son
Ibraa Almaami
took charge
and
inherited
the status of Laaw's
standard bearer and
the
redoubtable
task of
resisting the hegemony or
Boosoya.
With
the
death
of Mammadu
Siley,
his
Girlaajo
cousin and
ally
against
Boosoya,
Ibraa's
despair
~as
it
its highest pitch.
In
October
1876,
following
his
father's
advice,
he
paid
a
visit
to
governor Briere de L'lsle,
asking for aid. 58
A year later,
a treaty of
protectorate
over Laaw and Yirlaabe was signed at Galoya on 24 October
1877 ,
which
recognized
Ibraa,
Ismaayla
Siley
and
Abdul
Bookar

---

71
respectively
as
chiefs
of
Laaw,
Yirlaabe,
and
Boosoya.
The
consequences
for
Ibraa
and
Laaw
were
important.
Apart
from
the
support
in
face
of
the
Boosoya
threat,
he
obtained
from
the
French
that
Haayre
and
neighbouring
villages,
which
had
been
under
the
nominal
jurisdiction
of
the
Lamtooro,
be
annexed
to
Laaw.
This
-Q
territory '.....ent dovm in history as "Ibraa Almaami's lunch.")'
Ibraa !..,Ias
also
granted
customs
duties
on
the
Laaw
section of
the
river.
Just
li~e the Almaami, he appointed his
own customs collector Daree Cillo,
to collect them at the village of Juude-Jaabi on his behalf. 60
Ibraa
continued
the
tradition
of
raiding
in
non-French
all ied
territories
as
the major
source of acquisition of slaves
and cattle.
In
addition,
from
1877
on,
he
took
part
in
major
French
campa~gns,
~hich proved an easy way of accumulating wealth
in the form of booty.
By
the
late
nineteenth
century he
had
grovm even wealthier
than his
father
and
forefather.
An
account
has
it
that
when Aamadu Maadiyyu
threatened
to
attack Hbumlnba
sometimes during the
early 1870s,
Ibraa
came
out
with
six
hundred
slave-soldiers
to
deter
the
cleric
from
carrying
out
his
plan. 61
Between
Ibraa
and
the
French
a
solid
alliance
was
sealed
that
would
be
reinforced by
the
joinc
campaign
against Abdul Bookar in 1890-1891,
and would ensure the perpetuation of
the Mbummba dynasty
for many decades.
As for the Yirlaabe,
the little province whose ruling family
long
enjoyed Aali Dunndu's backing,
its new chief Ismaayla was
but a shadow
of
his
deceased
brother
Manunadu,
unable
to
cope
with
internal
foes,
much less withstand Ibraa Almaami's paternalism.
His weakness and the
new context would
later
tempt
the
French
to
look for substitutes
for
l

---

72
the "Aan"
of Pete.
Abdul
Bookar on
the
other hand,
remained
from
the
1860s
onward,
despite
the
shrewd
and
tactful
interludes
of
peace
and
the
secular
character
of
his
struggle,
one
of
the
most
consistently
anti-French
leaders
of
nineteenth
century
Fuuta
Too ro .
Abdul
and
his
home
province
of
Boosoya
constituted
a
symbol
of
Fuutanke
national
struggle.
From Dimat
to Damga,
people
admired his attitude and,
as a
French official
tesitified,
"the
mosc
fanatic
[sic]
awaited
only
the
least
sign
on his
part
to
join
his
warriors
and help
him
in his
so
called
god-given
mission
to
reconstitute
former
Senegalese
routa". 62
He considered as nul
and void ~he treacies of protectorate over Dimat,
Laa..."
Tocro and
Damga,
and regarded their leaders as
"traitors"
to the
cause
of
Islam
and
Fuuta.
In
the
words
of
Governor
Quintrie
he
"always
knew
when
the
time
was
ripe
to
meddle
in
the
i~ternal
dissensions
and sow
trouble
and defiance
[sic]
among
the
populations
,of Toro,
Lao and Irlabe.,,63
The
target of his propagandists and envoys
was
especially
the
youth
and
these
were
always
prepared
to
revolt
against the aforementioned chiefs.
Because
of his
inclination
to
renege
on
agreements
signed
with
them and his ever burning desire
to control central Fuuta,
if not all
Fuuca.
the French knew it would be difficult
to come to terms with him.
As
their
plans
for~~the conquest
of
West
Africa
reached
the
critical
turning
point,
the' French
concluded
that
a
decisive
action
against
central
Fuuta
and
Abdul
bookar,
was
a
sine
gua
non
for
bringing
t~e
whole
of
Fuuta within
the
fold.
Thus,
in 1890,
St.
Louis
planned an
all out military
operation under the command of Colonel Dodds.

---

'~:~.~~~?:,;..:::~:..: ..
. ,;.~:"
~
~
~
w
• \\ "£I ••• L - Il"" •• ". to" OG~".IL.'.I' • ., 1:.0 -tl.~ ••. •• h_ .r-...- ..... __ I~J
FIgure 1.
Meeting between Colonel Frey and Abdou Boubakar,
1886.
Reprinted
from Henri Frey Cote OcciJenta]e d'Afri~,
ParIs,
1890 .
. _------_.-...._.----- _._.. ~'_._-. ~ .---,..

---

NOTES
1.
For
de tai Is
on
trade.
see:
Genevieve
Des i re
Vui Ilemin,
Essai
sur le
Gommier et
le Commerce de
la Gomme dans
les Escales du Senegal.
These secondaire, Montpellier,
1961.
(Hereafter,
Essai sur le Gommier)
See also,
A.N.S:
Series 13G.
2.
David Robinson:
Chiefs and Clerics,
op.cit.,
pp.
28-29.
3.
The unwillingness of the Laa~ankoobe to repay for the pillaged
merchandise
and
the
frequency
of
such
acts
so
frustrated
the
French
that
Governor Bouet himself led a retaliatory expedition against Kasga
in
August
1846.
(Mouhamed
M.Kane,
"Le
Laa ......
et
les
Halaybe",
op.eit.,
pp.
54 - 5) .
4.
In 1850 a French "Director of Political Affairs"
had to stop Ht
Juude-Jaabi
(Laaw)
to see Jibeeri "an important notable who had been of
great assistance
to the "Serpent" during the accident of 1845."
A.N.S:
13G-33,
sous-dossier
1,
"Situation Generale
du Haut
Fleuve",
(Rapport
de
Tournee.
Reverdi t,
Directeur
des
Affaires
Politiques,
1
Octobre
1850,
p.
9).
Juude-Jaabi-
(lit:
the
ford
of
the
ziziphus
Mauritania)
'""as
a
riverine Village in the province of Laaw, very much dreaded by
navigators.
5.
A.N.S:
l3G-33,
"Rapport de Tournee",
p.
9.
6.
James
Johnson,
The
"Almamate",
op.cit.,
(pp.
319-320),
says
that
for
example
in
1813,
grain
that
in normal
times cost six to nine
dollars
a barrel
in
St.
Louis
could not be had for
seventeen and even
rose
to
sixty
dollars
before
a
new
crop
began
to
come
to
market
in
September.
7.
A series
of
treaties
were
signed during
the
first half of the
nineteenth
century
both
with
central
and
regional
authorities:
1806,
1808,
1834,
1843
and so on ... ,
whereby
the
French Government
accepted
to
pay
"customs"
to
chiefs,
and
have
individual
ships
pay
a
specific
quantity and assortment of goods according to their size
For the collection of "customs" at the port of trade of Dirmboyaa.
see:
David Robinson,
Chiefs and Clerics,
op.cit.,
.
p29;
See also M.
Kane
and
D.
Robinson,
Anthology,
op.cit.,
pp.
43-49;
See
also
J.
Johnson "Almamate, " op.eit.,
p.
460.
74
i

---

75
But,
despite these treaties and customs the people of Fuuta
kept delaying ships and thwarting trade along the river
through
the second half of the century,
which led two St.
Louis
inhabitants to
observe the following:
The
people
of
Fouta
boldly
claim
that
the
river
belongs
to
them.
The Salde passage
is,
according
to
them,
a
gate
that
they have
the
right to keep closed
as
long
as
we
do
not
pay
tribute.
Exceedingly
exigent
on
that
matter,
they
value
the
idea
of
imposing
upon
us
more
than
the
material
gain
this
involves.
See,
F.
Carrere et P.
Holle,
Senegambie,
op.cit.,
p.
132.
9.
Carrere et Holle,
op.cit.,
p.
132.
10.
Louis Leon Cesar Faidherbe;
Le Senegal.
la Fran.ce dans
l' Afrigue
Occidentale;
Librairie
Hachette
et
Cle,
79
Blvd St Germain,
Paris 1889,
p.
116.
(Hereafter Le Senegal).
11.
Louis L.
Faidherbe,
Le Senegal,
op.cit.
p.
122.
12.
Faidherbe
served
t ....... o
terms
as
Governor
of
Senegal;
One
from
1854 to 1861,
che ocher from 1863 to 1865.
13.
Marc
Maurel,
an
influent
merchant
befriended
Faidherbe,
providing
at
times,
useful
advice
in
political
matters.
For
the
....... orking
relationship
between Faidherbe
and the merchant community,
see
Barro'"s
Lalland Conley,
"General Faidherbe,
the Maurel et Prom Company
and
French
Expansion
in
Senegal".
Ph.D,
U.C.L.A,
1974,
973p.
(Hereafter,
"Faidherbe, Haurel.")
See
also,
Abdoulaye
Bathily;
"Aux
origines
de
l' Africanisme, les
consequences
de
l' oeuvre
ethno-historique
de
Faidherbe
sur
la
colonisation au Senegal"
in,
Cahier de Jussieu:
Le Mal de voir,
Paris,
collection 10/18, numero 2,
1976.
(Hereafter,
"Aux origines.")
14.
For Faidherbe's action,
see Barrows Lalland,
op.cit.
See
also
David
Robinson:
Chiefs
and
Clerics
op.cit.;
"Faidherbe,
Senegal,
Islam",
Master's thesis,
Columbia University,
1965.
15.
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs
and
Clerics,
op. cit.,
p.
37.
For
the
confron-.:ation
·..... ith
the
French
along
the
Senegal
river,
see
also,
D.
Robinson,
The
Holv
War
of
Umar
Tal:
Western
Sudan
in
the
Nineteenth
Centurv.
Oxford
Studies
in
Afr ican
Affair s,
Clarendon
Press,
198 5,
434p.
(Hereafter,
The Holv War.)
16.
The
Almaami
and
Fuutanke
officials
at
a
local
level
placed
grea t
va lue
in
the
"cus toms"
paymen ts
for
several
reasons:
The
"customs"
recognized
their'
sovereignty,
furnished
them
with
a
prime
source
of
patronage
for
buying
the
support
of
important
leaders,
and
constituted a major source of military supplies.
For the importance of
"customs"
(Kubbal
in
Pulaar),
in
weakening
the
almamate,
see
our
interview with Abuubakri Qaalid Bah, Nouackchott-Mauritania,
3/18/85.

---

(
'.
76
17.
Previous administrators did noC heed the "divide and rule"
as a
principle of practical politics
in dealing with Fuuta Tooro.
Although
Governors
Schmaltz
and
De
Fleuriau
alluded
to
i t
in
the
18105,
the
French generally rejected it.
Governor Lecoupe in 1821 not only lent a
deaf ear
to Almaarni
Biraan's
offers
in his
war against Yusuf but,
also
refused to deal with lower Fuuta on a separate basis.
(M.
Kane,
"Laaw",
op.cit.,
p.
49)
and (J. Johnson "Almamate" op.cit.,
pp.
407-409).
18.
Dimat emerged for certain during the eighteenth century.
As
for
the
other
provinces,
Johnson' 5
contention
that
"no
province
existed
when
Abdul
Kader
came
to
power"
is
not
evidenced
by
oral
tradition.
19.
The
"Kan,"
descendants
of
Hammee
J~uldo
Kan,
reportedly
of
Arab
origin,
retained
leadership
in
Nj aayeen,
Penndaa~,
Jalmacc,
Canngaay and ranay.
The Fulbe
(10 Ururbe and 5 Wodaabe factions)
were "Jom'en"
(village chiefs) before the "Kan"
took over.
The Walof controlled especially Boqqol and Gaa'e.
Fo~ details on the province see, J. Johnson,
"Almamate"
and
D.
Robinson Chiefs and Clerics.
See also,
A.N.S:
"Le Dimar"
in Moniteur du Senegal et Oependances,
3e
annee,
num.llO,
4/5/1858;
And
finally,
Saydu
Kan
and
Ibraahiima
Kan.
Nouackchott,
24/3/1985;
Faatimata Jiggo,
Nouackchott,
15/4/1985.
20.
Jalmacc,
the
corruption
of
"Jola
majja"
(lit:
get
into
the
river and get drowned),
became
"Dimat"
and then because of the French,
"Dimar."
The province ..... as
formerly known as "Hoore Fo~ru" (the head of
the
hyena).
Untaped
intervie~ ~ith
Ceerno
Aamadu
5ih
at
Fanay,
20/7/1985.
21.
A.N.S:
"Le
Dimar"
in
MO:1iteur,
op.cit.,
p.
2.
This
account
tallies
..... ith
oral
traditions
among
the
people
of
Dimat .....ho still call
"cacho,"
Luggere luubngel,
meaning "stinking abyss"
because of the many
people
killed
in
the
area
and
the
fetid
odor
of
the
corpses.
(F.
Jiggo,
passim).
22.
After a successful expedition in 1804 which killed 200 people,
burned 10
villages
and
captured
600
people
mostly
women
and
children
sold as slaves,
the Frencll sent a second that ..... as met ..... ith a successful
defense
and
ended
in
a
loss
of
100
men
including
the
commanding
Officer,
and
a
disastrous
rout.
Traditions
have
preserved
alive
the
souvenir
of
French prisoners ~ho were put
to
farm the
fields
and herd
the sheep etc...
(FaatimataJiggo,
Ibraahiima Kan,
passim).
For
details
on
the
expedition,
see J.
Johnson
"Almamate t'
op.cit.,
pp.
201-207.
23.
Seydou Nourou Toure,
"Le Toro et le Dimar face a la
penetration
francaise
1816-1854",
Memoire
de
Maitrise,
Faculte
de
lettres et Sciences Humaines,
Universite de Dakar,
1974-5,
pp.42-3.
(Hereafter,
"Toro et Dimar").

---

77
24.
Seydou
N.
Toure,
op.cit.,
pp.
45-6;
A.N.S;
Moniteur
1858
op.cit.
25.
For
the
Podor-Jalmacc
expedition,
see:
D.
Robinson;
Chiefs,
op.cit.,
pp.
38-39; S.
N. Toure;
"Toro et Oimar",
op.cit.,
pp. 49-59.
Barro'''''s
L.
"Faidherbe,
Maurel"
op.eit.,
pp.
179-186.
Louis
Faidherbe;
Le Senegal,
op.cit.,
pp.
116-118.
See also,
A.N.S:
10-7 "Expedition de Podor"
1853-1854.
26.
See Barrows,
"Faidherbe,
Maurel," p.
350.
27.
For details on the treaty see; A.N.S:
13G-5 F-51/52.
See also,
Moniteur.
118,
3e annee,
29/6/1858,
(p.
1).
28.
For
an
account
of
the
assassination
see
our
interviews
with
Seydu Kan and Ibraahiima Kan,
passim.
Archives
indicate
that
the
murder
took
place
in
"obscure
circumstances" which seems
to confirm the tradition.
The
assassin
first
sought
refuge
ar:
Hoore-Foonde
where
Almaami
Mustafa
got
rid
of him.
Then
he
went
( 0
Mauritania
at
Sheh
Sidya's
place.
The
cleric
surrendered
him
on
condition
that
he
not
be
executed.
For the disposal of the fine see,
Barrows
Lalland,
op.eit.,
pp.
628-629.
29.
For
the
equivalence
between
English
and
French
currencies
during
the
times
of
the
slave
trade
see,
Philip
D.
Curtin,
Economic
Change
in Pre-Colonial Africa,
(Supplementary Evidence).
University of
'..Iisconsin Press,
1975;
150 pages.
(p.
59).
30.
Later,
Elimaan Jaalo
Kan,
in
a bid
to
express his
anti-French
sentiments
and
his
allegiance
to
the
Almaami
of
Fuuca,
visited
with
Almaami
Ceerno
Demmba
Lih
and handed him over
gown and flag,
insignia
of french protection,
and joined in the battle against french
forces
in
September
1862.
Following
that,
he
was
arrested
along
with
Serin
Nannga
and
Ceerno
Ass
and
deported
to
Goree
Island.
A.N.S:
10-23,
"Expedition du Fouta:
Combat de Loumbel," p.
13.
for
the arrest and deportation of the chiefs and the conditions of
their
captivity
as
recorded
by
oral
tradition,
see,
lbraahiima
Kan,
passim.
31.
After
Sheh
Sidya
handed
him
over
on
condition
that
he
be
pardoned,
Mammadu Daadaa was
deported to Gabon,
got~married there to a
Christian
woman
and,
when
he
came
back
in
1883,
had
become
a
bit
"Europeanized,"
wearing
constantly
shirts
and
trousers
which
won him
the
nickname
"Jom
Geppungal"
(i.e.
The
wearer
of Y-shaped
trousers).
All
this
and
the
role
b"
played
in
the
conquest
of
French
central
Africa,
may
have
aroused
the
Governor! s
confidence
in him.
Governor
Servatius
granted
him
land
on
which
to
found
a
T"'.ew
capital
Oaara- Salaam,
for
the
deported
of
Oimat.
(Seydu
Kan,
i.nterview,
Passim).

---

78
32.
This was probably why,
in a meeting summoned by almaami Ma~~adu
Biraan
in
1857,
Elimaan
Seydu,
tired
and
conscious
of
Dimatls
sacrifice,
could not help declaring,:
"t1any a
time,
I
mobilized forces
in
the
name
of
others'
[Fuutankoobe]
cause,
and when war broke
out
I
was left alone to fight it.
I have never enjoyed customs and shall not
fight
precisely
now
for
them."
See,
A.N.S:
Moniteur,
number
51,
17 /3/1857.
33.
Koodi:
From Honaade ""
to
conquer or colonize.
Almaami fl.bdul
Qaadiri Kan
in the early stage of the almamate established colonies to
check the vanquished Fulbe.
For examples of west€,rn
and cent~al Fuuta colonies in Damga,
see;
Oumar
Kane,
"Les
Unites".
op.elt.,
p.
624.
See
also,
Mouhamed
Kane,
"Le LaaT
et les Halaybe",
op.eit"
p.
85.
....
34.
For
the
diversity
of
institutions
in
Darnga,
see
Oumar
Kane,
"Les
Unites",
op.cit.,
pp.
624-625.
See
also,
J.Johnson,
"The
Almamate",
op.cit ..
pp.
135-139,
and Mohamadou Ba,
"Notice sur Magama"
in B.I.F.A.N,
1.4,
1939,
pp.
743-761.
35.
Of the thirty three almaami (s) bet'",een 1776 and 1890,
at least
seven
came
from
the
Damga
and
some,
like
Raasin
Selli
Talla
from
Sincu~Bamambe, served several terms.
36.
Other villages in the Jeeri such as Seedo,
Sanndaraabe,
Pammbi,
Caankon,
Leggi,
Fummi
haara - Demmbube
and others
us ed
to
pay
taxes
to
the Kan of Daabiya.
(Robinson,
Chiefs
op.cit.
p.188).
37.
The
nine
villages
that
coalesced
were
Wuro-Soogi.
Oogo,
Jannjooli,
Boynaaji,
Nabbaaji,
Ndulumaaji,
Duumga,
Kanel,
and
Seeno-Paalel.
(Mouhamed Kane,
"Le Laaw'·.
op.eit.,
p.
60).
38.
The
main
negotiators
were
the
Jom
of
Matam
and
his
three
brothers,
Sule,
Bakkaar and Siree Diiye Bah,
along, with Elimaan
Aliw,
the
chief of Wuro-Soogi.
Sule was
sent as
a
hostage.
Elimaan
Ali T
held
a
secret
meeting
with
the
Commander
of
the
"Basilic"
and
....
pledged his
full
collaboration,
promising
to spy for
him and,
"either
execute
or
send him
any person
deemded hostile."
(A.N.S:
Koniteur,
81,
2d year,
10/11/1857, p.
3).
39.
The chief in question was Siree Diiye Bah,
the chief of
Siiwe.
The assassination was carried out by the rival Deeniyanke
family of Yoro Hammadi Umar Bah.
This is how one account about
the event goes.
Barka Jom was back on vacation from the
"School of Hostages."
People drew a welcome party in his honour.
The Europeans were
after
him
[Siree
Diiye I.
Yero
served
as
g,uide
(he
was
a
renowned
hunter)...
They
arrived
and
killed
Siree
Diiye
on
that night.
They cut his head off and placed i t on a
stake,
in the open.
This Siree Diiye Bah should not be confused with the one time "Almaaroi"
of the Deeniyankoobe and later chief of the canton of Padalal,
who died

---

79
in
1900.
Tradition
claims
that
Siree
took
to
cutting
telegraph
lines
but,
this
does
not
square
with
the
fact
that
by
the
1880s
the
administration had
still
to
complete
the
construction
of
the
line
on
the hundred and
fifty mile section from Salde to Bakel.
It is likely
that he had reneged on his previous engagements respecting the presence
of the
fort
and
the
security of
trade,
perhaps under
the
influence of
central Fuuta chiefs.
For
more
on
this
account,
see
our
interview with Malal
S.Cubbu,
Matam,
29/7/1985.
Following
the
incident
Yero
Harnmadi
became
the
first
French
appointed
chief
of
Matam,
and
passed
on
the
chiefship
to
his
descendants.
40.
For details on the
treaty see,
A.N.S:
Moniteur,
4e annee,
182,
20/9/1859.
41.
Elfekki
Mohammadu died
in Gabon while
his
son Baydi,
later a
spahi captain, was schooling.
The new "Elfekki" was Hammadi AI-Hajji Kan and,
perhaps because a
descendant
of
almaami
Abdul
Qaadiri,
he
·..,ras
referred
to
as
"Almadmi
ilamga"
rather
than
Elfekki.
His
rule was very brief
(August
1864 to
early 1865).
See D.
Robinson,
Chiefs, op.cit.,
p.
205.
42.
See note 36 above.
44.
Kalidou Diallo, quoting Archinard,
"Les Chef", op.cit.,
p.
34.
45.
He
'.rote
the
Governor
a
letter
in
February 1889 saying:
Know
that Ngenaar~Damga begins in the west at Gaoul and ends
in the east at
Dembankane,
that the Bosseabes never stop pillaging the inhabitants
[of
Damga] .. I have now hope
in God and in you
[the Governor]
that you will
entrust me
this
section ...
Send me a
coat,
a
sword,
a French flag and
an officer with ten men who will,
along with me,
inspect
the country.
See A.N.S:
13G-143
"Correspondance avec
les Chefs
Indigenes du
Fouta; 1846-1890".
46.
In
the
west,
the
later
province
of
Dimat
was
under
the
jurisdiction of
the
lamtooro,
while
in
the
east,
Halaybe and part of
Farba
Waalalde' s
domain
were
integral
parts
of
Tooro.
However,
the
decline of the chief following the Islamic revolution as well as pride,
would cause both Halaybe and Dimat
to deny having ever been under such
jurisdiction.
This
accounts
certainly
for
the
differences
and
cQ~fusions in the traditions to which Johnson refers.
I
47.
Between the eighteenth century and the almamal reconquista,
the
right
bank
remained
under
Moorish
control
and
Fuutanke
communities
settled
only
with
the
agreement
of
these
chiefs.
For
details,
see
I
Johnson's "Almamate" and Oumar Kane's "Les Unites," op.cit.
48.
The
villages
of
Podor,
Coofi,
Suyuma,
~awle,
Duwe,
Dado,
I
Foonde-As,
and Jaataar passed under
the jurisdiction of the Commandant
of
Podor,
wh ich
made
people
call
the
area,
"Fab iOI)
Tuubaak".
(Buubu
I
I
. ", ~ .. "
I

---

80
Sal,
interview at Podor on 23/7/1985).
49.
For the list of Lamtooro(s)
during this period see,
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs
,op.eit.,
p.
204.
50.
Interview with Hamedin Kan at Gede
(Tooro),
on 24/7/1985.
SI. A,N.S:
10-23 "Expedition du Fouca",
op.cie.,
p.
8.
52.
Mouhamed M.
Kane,
"Le Laaw" , op.cit.,
p.
60.
53.
Francine
Ndiaye,
"La Colonie du
Senegal
au
temps
de Briere de
I
L'Isle
1876-1881",
in
B.I.F ..~.N,
serie
B,
T.XXX,2,
Avril
1968,
pp.
463-512.
(p502).
I
On slavery as a bone of contention see,
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs,
op.eit.
II
54.
A.N.S:
13G-154
Salde,
1880-1890,
(Gouverneur
a
Abdoul
I
Boubacar Ali Doundou.
roi du Bossea).
)).
For the confrontation over the telegraph line,
see
1
Robinson,
ChieFs,
op.eit.
I
56.
For the emergence of the "Yan,"
see Johnson op.eit;
,
Robinson.
Chiefs
op.elt.
I
57.
Robinson,
Chiefs,
p.
23.
I
58.
Governor
BrLere
sent
a
3,000
strong
column
in
1877
and
saved
Laaw and Yirlaabe from being overwhelmed by central Fuutanke troops.
59.
"Bottaari Ibraa Almaami."
60.
Intervie·.... ·.... ich
Ibraa Mammadu Wan,
grand son of
Ibraa
Alrnaarni;
~ouackchotC, 24/3/1985.
61.
Aali
Gay
Caam,
"The
Maadiyanke
movement",
in M.
Kane
and
D.
Robinson,
Antholoev,
op.cic.
pp.
154-155.
62.
A.N.F.O.M:
Senegal
I,
72a,
Gouverneur Quincrie
to Minister of
colonies,
8/1/1885.
63.
A,N.F.O.M:
Quintrie to Miniscer,
op.cit.

---

CHAPTER 3: THE FINAL MOVE AGAINST FU~TA TOORO: DODDS'
CAMPAIGN AGAINST AEDUL BOOKAR Kfu~,
1890-1891
A.
EVENTS PREPARATORY TO THE FINAL CONQUEST IN 1890
L.
THE FALL OF SEGU
During
this year a series of events
cook place
chat ~ere to speed
up
the pace of confrontation in Fuuta Tooro.
The
first of such events
was
the destruction of the Tukuloor empire
in the Upper Senegal-Niger,
.~set off by commandant Archinard when in February 1889, without warning
St.
Louis or Paris, he cook the fortress of Kunjan by storm. 1
This caused Ahmadu Laamjuulbe.
son and successor of Umar
Taa1, -to
call upon his countrymen,
many of whom started flocking
to the aid of
the
Umarians.
The
resumption
of
emigration
to
Naoro,
aggr ava ted by
discontent vis
a vis the rulers of Laaw and
Tooro,
caused anxiety for
the French who tried to stop
it.
In Tooro where the migration took on
threatening forms,
they favoured the nomination of Lamtooro Siidi Abdu1
Sal
in January 1890,
as successor to Hammadi Naataagu ~ho left to join
Ahmadu. 2
In April, Archinard stormed Segu after heavy artillery
shelling.
Just
as
Jalmacc
in
the
l850s,
Segu ",as
up
until
then
considered
impregnable.
Thus,
the news of the fall of Segu
aroused bewilderment
and dismay among
the populations
of Fuuta
Tooro.
In the province of
Dimat for instance,
the Commandant of
Dagana indicated that:
81

---

82
The
news
of
the
fall
of
Segu
has
aroused
various
reactions.
The
p~pulations are apalled.
Many cannot
believe in the cdpacity of the French army to conquer
Segu,
which
the
marabouts
(clerics]
used
to present
as
protected
by
the
baraka
[blessings],
of
the
Lamdioulbe
[Commander
of
the
Faithful]
and
as,
too
far afield to be reached.
The effect of such victory
is most positive
for
our policy
in Dimat.
The
times
of massive emigration are,
I believe,
gone for good.)
The
impact
cook on ne~ proportions with the capture of
Ku;akaari
t~O months lacer.
2.
S~~'\\BA J?~DAliA AND THE INSURRECTION IN WESTERN LAAW
Ac
about
the
same.
time
as
the
Tukuloor
Empire
collapsed,
there
',.,;a5
a
dire.ct
challenge
to
the
authority
of
Ibraa
Almaami
a:1d
the
French
protectorate,
instigated
by
a
'.... estern
Laa·....,anke
c le r le
named
Sammba Jaadana Njaac.
This
cleric,
whose
earlier career
is
not well
known,
reportedly
studied
abroad
and
returned
to
his
home
near
Kasga,
in
about
1889.
Soon the news spread that he was a Wali
(holy man)
of the same stuff as
the
eighteenth
century
revolutionaries
and
the
nineteenth
century
reformers Umar Taal and Ceerno Barahiimi,
that he had mastered the art
and science of making bullet-proof amulets,
performing miracles.
Some
even said he. had an army of angels. 4
In
a
very
short
time
people
from both western
Laaw and
eastern
Tooro
swarmed
into
his
fortified
Village
at
Gawdal-Kooli,
near
Haayre-Mbaar
on
the
north
bank.
He
thus
created
a
situation
as
wor~isome for Ibraa Almaami as the one Ceerno Barahiimi, a founder of a
reformist
movement
and community
at Maqama
(Damga),
created
for Abdul
Bookar
and
the
Almaami
back
in
the
l860s.
At
first,
Ibraa
seemed

---

83
conciliatory and urged him not cave
in the
"malevolent"
propositions of
~estern Laa~ankoobe.
He
proposed
to appoint
the
cleric Oadi
(judge),
and promised him slaves,
land,
and a ~ife.
But,
carried
away
by
success,
the
cleric
flatly
rejected
these
offers
and remained poised ready
to
fight.
The chief of Laaw attacked
the marabout three
times c:: Simbaraaji,
Luggere-Kooli and Gawdal~Kooli,
'Ni thout success.
Each
time he
suffered many casualties
and was
forced
to
retreat. S
After a
coalition of Laaw,
Tooro and ~aalo backed by the
French
razed his village
in April
1890,
the
cleric
fled
to Halaybe and
then
to Giime,6
the home of
the Dwlad Noqmas Moors,
whose chief Moqtar
~ol Hameyda handed him over to Ibraa Almaami.
After he had the cleric
decapitated,
the chief of Laaw wrote
to the Gover.or
saying:
The
intention
of
the
tidiani
student
Samba
Diadana
was
to
stir
the
country
up
and
sow
disorder.
I
hereby
let
you know
that
the
battle
that
took
place
be tween
Samba
Diadana
and
me,
r fought it on your
behalf.
and on behalf of all the learned men of Fouta
whom
this
false
prophet set
out
to crush ...
I
think
it
is
necessary
to
punish
-c.he
people
of
Kasga
and
force
them
to
go
home,
as
this
would
set
a
good
precedent for others
in times to come. 7
The
conflict
in Laaw proved a very serious
one and appeared as a
reaction
of
the
people
to
French
appointees
and policy.
The
wind
of
rebellion
swept
not
only
through
western
Laaw
but
also
in
eastern
Tooro.
In
March
many
Toorankoobe
refused,
~t
the
instigation
of
Elimaan Abdul
Tabara and
in open defiance
to
the Governor's order,
to
I,
join Lamtooro Siidi Abdul and march against
the cleric.
Like·.... ise,
the
iI
Hal aybe,
who
gave
Sammba
J aadana
asylum,
refused
to
hand
over
his
family
and
goods.
as
the
Commandant
of
Podor
urged
them
to
co.
In

---

84
fact,
ohey
harboured
a
good
number
of
the
cleric's
followers. 8
Moveover.
Sammba
J aadana
was,
reportedly.
intent
to
es tab lish
close
ties with Abdul Bookar and
Boosoya.
His followers
later tried to join
the Boosoyaajo.
finally,
by
comparing himself to Sileymaani Baal,
Almaami
Abdul
and Sayku Umar,
Sanunba Jaaclana was
rekindling the
spirit of
"Militant
Islam"
and
"true"
reform,
something
the
French wanted
to
root out of
Fuutanke mentality foreve~.
3.
ALBURI'S EXILE IN fUUTA TOORO:
1890
The
conquest of
the ~olof kingdom of lalof also had an
imporrarlt
impact
on
the
course
of
events
in
Fuuta.
Since
1888
rwnours
had
persisted
that
Alburi
Njaay,
the
king
of
lolof was
in
close
contact
with
Ahmadu
Lamjuulbe
and
was
giving
emigration
to
the
east
very
serious consideration.
In IB~. Governor Clement Thomas,
charging that
Alburi
intended
to ~mount a vast coalition aimed at ousting the French
from Senegal"
and seizing upon raids conducted
in French protectorates
by
Jolof
forces,
decided
to
neutralize
the
Buur-ba,
and
annex
his
kingdom for
good.
In May 1890,
french
forces
under
the conunand of the
St.
Louis
mulatto colonel
Dodds,
with
the
tactical
support of allies
from Bunndu,
Saalum, Waalo, and Fuuoa,
invaded the capital Ya~-Ya~.9
Few weeks before the invasion however,
the Buur-ba had
managed to
cross
the Ferlo desert with his people and reach
Boosoya,
where Abdul
Bookar agreed
to grant him asylum.
The
Governor,
ablaze with anger,
called
upon
Abdul
and
the
other
Boosoya chiefs
to
either
get
rid of
Alburi,
or
have
to
face
the
consequences.
To
that
ultimaoum
the

---

85
Boosoyaajo
replied
that
his
comportment
·.... a5
in
tune
..... ith
the
same
tradition
of
Fuutanke
hospitality he
applied
to
Lamtooro
Sammba ..... hen
the French forced him into exile.
He gave assurances
that he ..... ould by
no means
let Alburi harm French
interests but,
hinting the possibility
of emigration he ..... ent on to say:
If you agree ;,ith us "e .. ill be pleased ...
[If not),
we have no other homeland than Fouta,
the land of our
ancestors;
That is all we want,
if not, the world of
God is ~ide enough. 10
The
C'wO
parties
were
clearly
at
variance
on
this
issue.
\\.lhen
confrontation
seemed more
imminent
than
ever
with
the
memory
of
the
I
1862
and 1881 campaigns still
fresh
in
their mind,
the Boosoya chiefs
expressed
their
resolve
to
abide
by
French
instructions.
and
deny
asylum to Alburi.
At a meeting held south of Kaedi,
on the north bank,
Ceerno Molle spoke the mind of many.
saying:
Abdul,
Europeans
are
coming from
the west,
Europeans
are
coming from
the east;
Boosoya and Ngenaar alone
can
not
fight
the
Europeans.
The
war
you
are
now
planning,
it is better that we renounce it. l l
Thereupon.
Abdul Bookar decided to cross the river with family and
followers
to
Moorish
territory,
with
the
view
to
harassing
the
enemy
from
this
vantage
point.
In
July-August,
as
many
people
started
crossing the river,
whereupon Ibraa Almaami and Ismaayla Siley moved to
Kasga
with
an
army
of
three
hundred
and
fifty
men
to
bar
Sammba
Jaadana's
followers
from
joining
the
Boosoya
forces.
Meanwhi le J
a
French
gunboat
bombarded
Kaedi
and
the
construction
of
a
fort
got
·,:undenlay.12
! I

---

86
Following
the
bombardment
in
August,
Alburi
~esigned himself to
allowing
che
less
motivaced of his
people
to
go back home.
Those who
wished
could
stay
and
fight
alongside
Abdul' s
forces
while
the
most
I
determined would continue on the journey to Naoro. 13
Alburi's
stay
in Fuuta provided St.
Louis
~ith the
long
awaited
casus
belli.
It
proved
a
golden
opportunity
for
them
to
strike
decisively at Boosoya,
the heart of Fuutanke national
resistance.
From
:~e~ on,
the ?r~nch and Abdul embarked on a collision course.
~.
THE ASSASSINATION OF CO~~iDANT AB EL JEfu~DET:
1890
Abel
Jea~det ~as a young French officer who served as a colonial
administrator
in
Senegal
from
1887
to
1890.
He
first
se rved
as
a
Commandant
de
Cercle
(district
officer)
in
Kajoor,
before
acting
as
"Director
of
Political
Affairs"
in
St.
Louis,
and conducting
several
important missions among the Brakna Moors,
as well as
in Boosoya.
~~en
in
1890
administrator Pages,
Commandant of Podor,
proved
incapable
of
dealing
with
the
political
crisis
in
Tooro,
Governor
Clement
Thomas
sent Jeandet to take care of matters. 14
In
the
month
of
August
he
was
instructed
to
le'ry
a
sizeable
contingent from Tooro and Halaybe and try,
along with Ibraa Almaami and
Ismayla Siley,
to'corner Abdul's forces and facilitate
the
task for the
Dodds
co lumn.
On
2- ..September,
the
contingent
of
four
hundred
troops
was camping at Haayre-Laaw.
waiting for
the Halaybe contingent to join
in.
The
morning
of
the
incident,
Elimaan
Abu
Kan,
interpreter
and
brother of Lamtooro Siidi Abdul,
introduced Jeandet to Baydi Kacce,
a
soldier
of
Lamtooro
charged
with
disobedience
and
i l l
disposition

---

87
co~ards recruitment.
Jeanctec then scolded Baydi saying:
You refused to obey your chief,
I hereby fine you two
cows.
In addition,
since you have proven unworthy of
your status as soldier you will hand me over your gun
and,
for
the
rest
of
the
journey,
serve
as
my
porter. 15
T~o minutes later,
the humiliated soldier came back and killed him
~ith seven shots at close range.
The French treated
the incident as a
conspiracy,
instigated
by
ch,;::
branch
of
the
Cede
royal
family
most
unhappy
with
the
"Jeanctet
constitution"
drafted
earlier,
one
that
demoted
Lamtooro
to
a
lower
level
chief
of
Gede
and
neighbouring
'.. illages.
A swift and peremptory retaliation ensued.
The
assassin
and
[WO
princes.
foriTler
lamtooro
Sidiki
Sal
and Mammadu Yero,
were
publically
decapitated,
their
bodies
put
into
bags
and
thrown
into
the
Senegal
River.
Baydi's
head was
placed on a
stake
in
the
Podor
square.
The
memory
of
this
unmerciful
retaliation
remains
alive
in
the
mind
of
Fuutankoobe who recall
that:
All
the
Fuutankoobe
suffered
from
it,
those
who
par took
of
it
[assass ination 1
as
we 11
as
those
who
did not
for,
they
[the
French]
did not
'.ant
such
a
thing
to
repeat
itself.
After
having brought
them
[prisoners]
they
killed
them
in
an
awful
manner,
a
shameful
execution
right
on
the
IrJeandet
square."
Most
remarkably,
the
drum was beaten,
wherever
there
was
a
notable
in
a
village- -because
th~ treated it
as a conspiracy connected with Lamjuulbe--whoever was
said
to
be
of
good
parentage,
was
brought
over
and
forced
to
attend.
People
formed
a
circle,
·.Jith
a
line
of
spahi-~oldiers
around;
wnoever
showed
reluctance
to
stare
at
it
[the
execution],
was
flogged. 16
Although French authorities blew the incident out of proportion in

---

88
oreer
to
justify
a
spectacular
retaliation,
one· should
re-examine
Robinson' 5
judgement
chat
:=he
incident
had
no
connection
with
resistance.
Ac tually,
i L~
can
be
cons trued
as
the
end
result
of
a
mounting tens~on which,
in Toota,
was at its highest pitch.
The reform
Jeandet.
initiated
appeared
to
many
as
a
supreme
expression of
French
interference
with
the
po1itics
of
Tooro.
The
people
of
Tooro
w,~re
showing reluctance to join in the war against central Fuuta whose cause
',.;as
now
identified
with
that
of
Islam.
The
dcstrict
of
Cede
for
instance
provided only
forty men
instead of
the
two
hundred and
fifty
initially
required.
Elsewhere,
peapl e
refused
to
supply
:::.he
column
~ith
the
necessary
provisions.
That
was
the
reason
why
Jeandet
esca.blished,
prior
to
his
death,
a
"black
list"
of
vLllages
to
be
fined
and
punished
at
the
end
of
the
campaig!'l..
Later,
Aubry
Lecomte
·..... ou~d
fine
them
collectively
400
cattle,
20
horses,
and
1,000
shotguns. 17
One
can
even
cons~der
the
fine
of
shotguns
as
a
pre~emptive effort at disarming a population on the brink of rebellion.
In
any
event,
the
Whole
sequence
.... as
to heighten
the
French sense of
danger and their determination to "deal firmly"
with any opposition.1 8
5.
THE ASSASSINATION OF SHEH ~~'~DU MP~DU
As
indicated earlier,
(note
45 chapter
2),
Sheh Mar.'l.madu had
long
thirsted
for
an
appointment
as
chief
of
Damga
protectorate.
In
October
1890,
the
governor
acceded
to his
request
and he journeyed to
St.
Louis for confirmation.
According to one tradition,
before he left
St.
Louis,

---

89
He
had already discussed matters Wlt~ the Europeans.
They had signed a
treaty.
He
[sheh) had agreed that.
since
European
civilization
would
not
harm
their
religion
in
any way,
would
leave
their
mosques
both
lilrge
and
small
alone,
one
could
resign
temporal
power
to
them.
He
therefore
advised
the
Fuutankoobe
to be wise enough to resign themselves
to
accep~ing European ruLe. 19
Upon return
the sheh wasted no time in spreading the word of
his
nominrtcio:1
and,
as
intent
to
Lend
ie
additional
'",eight,
he
::ravelled
to ~o..-ndol.de, an old scrcnghold of Abdul Bookar.
Meanwhile,
the
latter
chief had vowed not to let sheh Mamrnadu and his like,
"sell Fuuta ot..:t."
One
night.
in
November
1890,
Abdul' s
'...rarriors
crossed
the
river
by
canoe,
surprised hiro
in
1~~-le middle
of
the
night and assassinated hi.m
in cold blood. 20
From a
French
perspective,
this
was
the
last: straw.
At a
time
Nhen attacks
on shipping,
harassment
of mail
couriers
and
burning of
telegraph
poles
multiplied
by
the
day,
the
incident
convinced
the
Governor
that
it
was
high
time
to
intervenE"
decisively
in
cent.ral
Fuuta.
There were a number of elements Se-Louis could capitalize upon;
The
bombardment of Kaedi
had
left
many a
Fuutanke
in an unprecedented
panic.
with Archinard's spectacular victories on
the Tukuloor empire,
Ahmadu sayku's
charisma had waned.
Finally,
Abdul Bookar by receiving
Alburi Njaay and arousing the manifest anger of the French, had further
estranged himself from a number of Boosoya chiefs.
All of this decided
the Governor
to shift gears
in the preparation of a final expedition.

---

90
B.
THE DODOS COLUMN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES:
1890-1891 21
1.
PREPARATIONS OF THE COLU~~
In late November,
the Governor sent a gunboat with
the mission to
maintain
contact
between French
posts,
and check on Abdul's
partisans
by preventing any concentration on their part.
Each post was reinforced
by two artillery men and fourteen Tirailleurs (African soldiers), while
a
contingent
of
twenty-seven,
including
one
French
and
one
African
officer,
5~aj'ed on board ship as a strike force.
As
for
the
column
itself,
Dodds,
on
the
advice
of
!..laalo
chief
'{amar Mbooc,
decided
to delay
i t
for
a
reT
eeks,
in order to mobilize
..,
•.....
~he maximum number of porters after
the
harvest,
and
facilitate
troap
;noveffienC 'with
the
clearing
up
of
the
vegetation.
By the same
coken.
such
delay
would
allow
him
to
receive
fresh
reinforcements
from
Dahomey.
On 30 December
1890.
a
first
convoy departed
from
St.
Louis with
one tug-boot,
one personnel carri~r, one stable-boat,
and a two hundred
ton ship of food
for sixty days and
for
the
entire column.
The column
comprised a
thirty-one member staff under the command of Colonel Dodds,
seven hundred troops and more
than two hundred civilians
(interpreters,
guides.
camel and donkey drivers,
horse care-takers etc ... ).22
The
expedition
involved
also
the
support
of
eight
wolof
and
Tukuloor local chiefs,
cQmmanding more than t~o thousand troops.

---

91
TABLE 1:
Wolof and Tukuloor troops taking part in
the Dodds campaign of 1890-1891.
--- ------- .. ---.-------- .-- ---.--- - -- --
---------------------.----
Provinces
Ch iefs
: Cavalry
:Foot-soldiers
----------------------------------------------------------------.
~.Jaalo and Dirnat
Yamar Mbooc
156
225
Njambuur-Merinangik: Biraama Nj aay
M.aaj 00 t:" Toro
318
60
Kaj oor
Demrnba waar Sal
Ibra FaatLm Saar
436
167
Laaw and Yi rlaabe
Ibraa Almaami wan
Ismaayla Si.ley Aan
LUO
500
Damga
Elfekki. Aamadu Bayl'"
60
300
Total
1,170
1,252
Source:
A.N.r.O.M:
Senegal IV, 69.
Before
the
expedition
left
St.
Louis
the
Governor made
it
clear,
as
J aureguiberry
had
on
the
eve
of
the
1862
campaign agains t
central
Fuuta,
that:
the
column should •.... reak havoc
on
that
part
of ::he country
so
as
to
discourage
forever
any
future
attempt
at
rebellion
against
French authority.
In his instructions
to Colonel Dodds he emphasized:
The
campai.gn you will
be
conducti.ng
should be
most
severe and by no means a campaign of palavers similar
to
those
previously
held
in
Fouta
for,
as
I
told
Ibraa
and
a
few
Bossea
envoys
in Salde,
we
have
to
wage war since we
are forced
to,
in such a
way as
to
mark
the
minds
of
the
present
generation
and
its
immediate
descendants,
to
whom
the
memory
of
repression
will
be
transmitted
more
vivid
than
ever. 23
In addition to fighting enemy forces,
Doeds ·.... as also
instructed to
im?ose heavy
and exemplary
fines
on
all
villages where
frequent
blows
to French domination and security justified the principle of collective
responsibi 1 i ty.
Among
the
targetted
villages
were
the
'""'
"Aa.,am"
vil1ages,2 4
guilty
of
telegraph
pole
burni.ngs;
Jowol
and
Doondu,
concentration ?oints and passage sites for Abdul's forces and,
finally,

---

92
villages
in
Tooro
deemed
accomplices
in
the
assassination
of
Abei
Jeandet.
Last,
but
not
leas::,
the
Commander
'....as
instructed
to
establish
colonial rule
through collaborating chiefs and design the best possible
administrative organization for Fuu~a Tooto.
2.
MILIT.~~Y OPERATIONS NID POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE COLU~~
On
21
January
1891,
the
column
met
with
the
Laaw,
Kajoor,
and
Njambuur
contingents
a::
Nguy,
in
the
Yirlaabe.
The re,
the
French
distributed
identity
cards
and
strips
of
different
colour- ~ to
facilitate movements of troops and allow the a~my to distinguish allies
from
enemies·-and
ammunition.
Once
this
was
done,
Dodds
proceded
to
Hoore-Foonde where he met with ceerno
Malle,
Bummuy and other Boosoya
chiefs
who
had
abandoned
Abdul
Bookar. 25
Then,
Ibraa
Almaami
was
instructed
to cross
the
river
and march on Abdul's camp at Ragg.
The
Ngenaar contingent was
to head for Ngijilon,
Doondu,
and other riverine
villages,
while
the Commandant of Bakel along with Siree Diiye Bah and
his
Haayranke
contingent.
were
assigned
the
mission
of
barring
those
returning from Nooro,
from reaching the river.
The hard core of the
column,
the colonial
troops,
encountered no
serious
resistance
and
conducted
mostly
retaliat.ory
operations,
destroying
villages
guilty
of
sabotage:
On
26
January
for
instance,
Adminiscrator
Allys
had
Jo,",ol
set
aflame.
On
3
February
Captain
d'Hut.eau
destroyed
Baar~a,
arresting
all
the
people
involved
in
harassing mailmen,
and he later executed them in Matam.
It was
the African auxiliaries,
especially those from Fuuta,
who

---

93
did
the
most
fighting,
taking
captives
(from
the
Noorankoobe)
and
cattle,
in considerable numbers. 26
In April 1891, Abdul Bookar who had
retreated further north with family and followers to Moorish territory,
established a base at Legleyta, and launched a series of daring attacks
on both the
north
and south banks,
seizing cattle and provisions.
He
ordered
the
assassination
of
Ibraa
Abdul
the
new
Elfekki
of
Damga,
Si-ree Diiye
the Deen:'yankt':! ally 0: the French,
and Baabalih,
the chi.ef
of Oogo, but he succeeded only in eliminating t~e last one.
By
June
of
1891
Ibraa
Almaami
and
his
six
hundred
Tukuloor
and
Moor troops
had give~ up pursuing an enemy,
deemed too mobile and much
versed
in
scorchcd-ea::'th
tactics,
La
be
caught.
Ibraa had gone home
lea'-:ing
only
a
Ei fey
men
contingent
to
patrol
the
neighbourhood
of
Kaeci..
The only
alternative
left was
che economic weapon.
In mid·]une,
Governor Lamothe decreed a ban on sales of grain and ammunition to any
-
,
Moor other than t~eir Brakna, Twabir,
and Adrar allies.
The ban was to
be applied from WaalaIde
(Laaw),
all
the way to Bakel
in the east,
and
·..as
intended
to
starve
Abdul
and his
allies. 27
It
was
probably
the
impact
of
such
a
policy
combi:1ed
'Nith
the
estrangement between Moors.
and :ukuloor,
that prompted Abdul's brother,
Aali Bookar,
and his son,
Xammadu Abdul to surrender,
along with half the army in late :uly.28
IJith
only
one
hU:1dred
men
left
and,
the
Ad' r~r and Bakkar Moors
too
busy
jockeying
for
political
power
to
pay heed
to
his
own
fate,
bereft
of
provisions
and horses,
Abdul was
seriously considering ~ays
and means to come to terms with the French when Moqtar Wol Usman,
chief
of
the
$ratit Moors,
had him assassinated on 4
August
1891 29
In a

---

94
manner
similar
to
the
local
tradition,
a
French
source
described
the
assassination as follows:
Abdul
was
trying
to procure
millet.
He
went
to
the
Ndaiat
and QuId Rassoul
with a
score
of toucouleurs
l Tukulor
warriors] _
Albouri
was
supposed
to
accompany him
but vanished
at
the
last moment ...
On
his
way back
to
his
camp,
he
stopped by
the
Daouas
[Dwaysh]
clerics'
tent to have a
talk with Moqtar wo!
Usman.
After
the palaver,
just as Abdul
was
coming
out of the tent with the two toucouleurs accompanying
him,
the Moors fired off all
their guns at his back.
He
fell
to
the
ground
pierced
with
bullets.
The
Moors
fled
iIT~ediately
taking
with
chem
Abdul's
horses and slaves,
and leavirlg it to the marabouts
to
bury him. 30
The
era of Abdul
Bookar Kan and
the au~onomy of Fuuta TOcIa
had
b~come past history.
But,
as Robinson rightly remarked,
nthe amount of
money,
energy
and
time
expended
by
the
French
to
es tabl ish
their
control was in itself a tribute to the tenacity of the Boseyaajo.,,31
More
than
military,
Dodds'
feat
was
political.
By
signing
the
various
treaties
wit.h
Fuut.anke
chiefs
he
consecrated
the
bringing of
the whole of Fuuta Tooro under colonial rule.
Fi rs t,
the treaty of 11
February
1891
placed
Damga,
now
11 independent, "
under
the
protection
and suzerainty of the French Government.
Damga and Ngenaar united into
one
province,
were
headed by
Ibraa
Abdul wan,
nephew of
the
chief of
Laaw and
French
appointed paramount
chief with
the
title
of Elfekki,
and then subdivided into small units called cantons.
Then,
on
25
February
1891,
another
treaty
was
signed
at
Kaedi
between Dodds
and
the
principal
leaders and notables
of Boosoya.
The
three
traditional
distric~s
of
Boosoya
became
cantons,
under
the
leadership of
three
local chiefs:
worgo-Boosova with Hoore-Foonde as

---

95
oapital
and
Bummuy
Sammba
Jeynaba
as
chief;
Hirnaange~Boosoya with
Rinnjaw,
and
Elimaan Abdul
Aac
and,
Funnaange-Boosova,
\\oo'ith
Cilon as
capital
and
ceerno
Malle
Bookar
Lih
as
chief. 32
The
treaty
also
recognized
as
!lFrench
territory"
the
fort
of Kaedi
and
the
area one
kilometre
radius
surrounding
it
(article
4).
In
addition,
Boosoya
ceded
to
the
colony
an
area
t'Wo
kilometres
long
and half a kilometre
'didc on the left bank,
oppOSite Kaedi
(article 5),
cession of strategic
import
should
the
French
have
to
intervene
in
Funnaange-Boosoya
or
Ngenaar,
later.
Having
signed
the
Boosoya
treaty,
Dodds
moved
on
to
Yirlaabe-
Hebbiyaabe.
The treaty he signed there on 2 March divided the province
into
four
cantons
headed
by,
Ismaayla
Siley
(Yirlaabe-Pece),
Elimaan
~ammad'J
(Yirlaabe-Jeeri),
Raasin
Kan
(Yi::laabe-Alayidi),
and
Satigi
Sammba
Umar
(Hebbiyaabe).
The
treaty
provided
that
these
chiefs,
independent
from
one
another,
should
at
a
later
date
elect
a
"President"
of
the
confederation,
who would
act as
Chef Suoerieur of
"Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe.,,33
Mboolo-Alkaati,
a village previously annexed
to
Boosoya,
passed
under
the
jurisdiction of
Satigi
Hebbiyaabe
while
Galoya,
in
former "Galoyaabe"
territory, became part of Yirlaabe-Pete.
Finally,
on 5 March,
~ treaty was signed with Ibraa Almaami
and a
few
Laawanke
notables.
It
reconfirmed
lbraa
as
chief
of
Laaw
as
a
whole.
I t
acknowledged. ,the
transfer of Haayre - Laaw and ne ighbourhood
from
Tooro,
a
transfer. that
took
place
in
1878,
by
fixing
as
t:he
western
border
of
Laaw,
a
line
running
through
Bokke
and
Halaybe
northwa::d to Kooga,
and plunging downward by Dodel and Jaaynga,
before
fading into the Ferlo wilderness.

---

96
Despite
their
specificities.
these
treaties
shared
a
nLUnber
of
corrunon
provisions,
all
suggestive
of changing
trends
in
the political
destiny of Fuuta Tooro.
In each one,
an article stipulated freedom of
trade
for
French
traitants.
The
old
"customs
duties"
paid
to
local
chiefs,
disappeared from political vocabulary.
Another provision insisted that no single chief at any level could
ally himself with another,
or embark on a war of any scale, without the
Gove:norls
authorisation.
This
was
an
effort
to
end
the
hitherto
independent policy of Fuuta Tooro and
the
probability of allying with
I
others against the French.
I
A third recurrent clause
indicated that no chief would be allowed
l
co maintain rights of any kind on villages of Fuuta located outside of
I,
.
~
their
territories,
wheter on the south or on
the north bank.
Thus,
by
iI
one
stroke
of
the
pen,
the
age-old
tax and
fief
rights
that
provided
[
po ..... er,
prestige,
and
political
influence
under
the
almamate
was
ended. 34
I
On the other hand,
the French pledged to recognize and not to in-
f
terfere
with
the customs,
traditions,
and institutions of Fuuta Tooro,
following the usual procedure in the signing of protectorate treaties.
Finally, all provinces accepted to pay the fine
imposed by Colonel
Dodds
as
well as
to acqui t
a
one
franc
yearly
tax. 35
In addition
to
signing
treaties,
Dodds and Governor Lamothe decreed.~hat any Fuutanke
..
who
joined
Abdul
Bookar
or
Aamtlu
Sayku,
would
have
his
land
and
properties
forfeited. 36
This
measure
portended future
difficulties we
shall be dealing with in later chapters.
In swn,
contrary to
French expectations.
Dodds had succeeded at a

---

97
fairly low cost in human and material losses,
to fulfill the mission of
subjugating [he central Fuutanke aristocracy and laying the foundation
of permanent French rule.
During the campaign 1;)[aa Almaami, Siree Diiye. Ismaayla 5i1ey and
several
other
chiefs
had
won booty
as
well
as
French
friendship.
In
this
sense,
che campaign benefitted
them
to a
considerable
extent and
proved a harbinger of the political changes that were to come.
CONCLUSION OF PART T~O
The
18505
and
60s
proved
a
watershed
in
[he
history
of
Franco-
Tukuloor
relations.
The
conditions
of
the
river
trade had become
so
frustrating
that
the
Se-Louis
merchant
community
could
not
help
pressuring
for
a
Governor
more
adept
at
forward
policies,
and
more
committed
to restoring French interests and prestige along the
Senesal
River.
Thus,
as
soon as
he was
appointed Governor
in 1854,
General Louis
Faidherbe
embarked
upon
abolishing
the
so
called
"humiliating"
conditions
of
trade
along
the
wate'!:"""'ay,
putt.ing
a
close
to
Moorish
interference with Waalo politics and disciplining and dismembering the
almamate.
Using
both
force
and
persuasion,
the
French
succeeded
in
dealing separately with the provinces,
gradually detaching Dimat,
Tooro
and
Damga
from
Fuuta,
before
signing with
Laaw
and Yirlaabe
the
1877
treaty which further
isolated Boosoya.
But,
French
achievements
seemed limited as anti-French sentiments
grew st.ronger
in Dimat and Tooro,
owing
to both
the Umarian
influence
and
the
growing
frus era ti.on
of
the
rul ing
1 ineages.
In
Damga,
the

---

98
attitude of the French appointed Elfekki(s) coupled with Abdul Bookar's
attempts
ae
undermining
the
Modus Operandi,
rendered
the
protectorate
less workable
than expected.
On
the
other
hand,
Laaw
and
its
chiefs
remained
constantly
and
consistently pro-French, which enhanced their capacity for accumulating
wealth
and
spinning
an
ever
wider
web
of
political
and
military
alliances within and outside of Fuuta Tooro,
while providing St.
Louis
~ith an invaluable counterpoise to Boosoya hegemony.
~~en conditions in Senegambia came to dictate a final assault on
Fuuca
Tooro,
the
French had
already
sufficiently
isolated
Boosoya
and
Abdul Bookar,
and they had created the conditions
for mounting a large
scale coalition of African
allies.
The hosting of Alburi,
the fall of
Segu,
and
the
assassination
of
Sheh
Mammadu
Maamudu
Kan
in
1890
provided
both
the
justification
and
the
psychological
factor
for
hii:ting hard.
By bringing about Abdul Bookar's death,
and signing treaties with
the
provinces
of Fuuta,
Dodds
and
the Governor had only set a process
in
motion.
The
consolidation
of
French
rule
required
a
number
of
measures
that
administrators
in
the
field
would
carry
out,
largely
before World War One.

---

NOTES
1.
For
the
destruction
of
the
Tukuloor
empire.
see:
Yves
Saint-Martin,
L' Empire
Toucouleur
et la France
1848 -1897.
("Le Livre
Africain,"
Paris,1972).
A.
Sydney Kanya-Forstner,
The Conquest of the
T,Jestern
Sudan:
A
study
in
French
Military
Imperialism.
(Cambridge
University
Press,
1969,
296p).
Oloruntimehin
Olatunji:
The
Segu
Tokolor
Empire;
(London,
1972).
Meniaud Jeacques:
Les
Pionniers
du
Soudan:
Avani:,
avec et apres Archinard,
1879-1894.
(2 volumes.
Paris
1931) .
2.
A.N.S:
2D11-1,
Podor
1838-1893.
Commandant
a
directeur
des
affaires politiques,
telegrammes,
3-6/1/1890.
3.
A.N.S:
2D6-11,
Dagana,
Bulletins
mensuels
1889-1894:
Adminiscrateur Edouard Martin a directeur des affaLres politiques,
4/1890.
4.
A.N.S:
13G-154,
Salde;
Correspondances 1888-1890;
112-113,
Ibra
Almamy
a
Gouverneur,
6/5/1890.
For
the
Sammba Jaac'.ana
affair,
see
also:
A.N.S:
2D11-1,
Podor,
op.cit.,
Commandant
a
Directeur
des
Affaires
Politiques,
Mars-Mai
1890.
M.
Kane
and
D.
Robinson,
Anthology,
op.cit.,
pp.
159-167.
D.
Robinson,
Chiefs
and
Clerics,
op.cit.,
pp.
152-153.
M. Kane,
"Le Laaw" , op.cit.,
pp.
78-80.
5.
Among
the
dead
were
his
brothers
Abdul
Biraan,
Mammadu
Hammaat,
his cousin Biraan Abdul and his nephew Suwaa Hawolii.
(See Anthology op.cit.)
6.
For
the Has' ani' a words I
we use
a
transcription suggested by
Mrs.
Wol Sheh,
of the Institut Mauritanien de la Recherche Scientifique
(I.M.R.S),
to whom we express our
thanks.
Some errors in transcription
should
be
our
own
responsibility
or
the
result
of
typographical
mistakes.
7.
A.N.S:
13G-154 op.cit.,
Ibra Ben Mohamed Ben Almami Birane a
Gouverneur,
8/5/1890.
Many
people
from
Kasga,
Duungel
and
Juude-Jaabi
(western
Laaw) ,
had
fled
to
Podor
to
escape
the chief's retaliation.
Later,
most of
them came back.
Traditions mention that Ibraa was so upset with the death of Abdul
Biraan,
that he had three scores of young Kasgalnaabe all of whom were
"first born males" killed and buried around his brother's grave.
99

---

100
8.
A.N.S:
2Dll-l,
Podor, op.cit; Commandant a'dir.aff.pol
23/3/1890.
9.
For
the
conquest
of
the
kingdom
of
Jo10f,
see:
Eunice
A.
Charles;
Pre-colonial
Senegal:
The
JoloE
Kingdom
1800-1890.
AErican
Studies
Center,
Boston University,
1977.
Vincent Manteil;
Esquisses
Se.negalaises:
(Walo,
Kayor,
Dyolof,
Mourides.
Un
visionnaire).
Universite de Dakar,
I.F.A.N,
1966.
10.
A.N.S:
13G-154,
Salde op.cit.; pp.
122-123, Abdoul Bocar Ali
Goundou,
Roi du Bossea au Commandant de Salde, 4/7/1890.
11.
Ceerno Molle ~as backed by the Jowgelnaabe,
Bunngunaabe,
and Elimaan Rinnjaw,
while many
Sebbe
from Ngenaar and Boosoya,
along
.ith the Fulbe from Njaakir and 8aalaaji,
abided by Abdul's position.
For
details
on
the
meeting,
see
our
interview
with
Abuubakri
Qaalid Bah,
ProEessor of Arabic at the I.M.R.S,
Nouackchott,
18/3/1985.
See
also,
Seega
Nan;
"The
death
of
Abdul
Bookar"
in
Kane
and
Robinson, Anthology,
op.cit.,
pp.
169-177.
12.
For
the
bombardment
of
Kaedi
and
its
aftermath,
see:
A.N.S:
13G-156-7-8 Kaedi;
Correspondances diverses 1885-1903; Comma~dant de la
"Cigale" a Commandant de la Marine,
30/7/1890.
·-13.
French
sources
mention
70
men,
70
women,
and
92
children
arriving at
the post of Salde and requesting authorisation
to go back
to Jolof.
(A.N.S:
UG-156 op.cit;
Gouverneur a SOlis-secretaire d'Etat
aux Colonies,
8/1890).
French
sources
often
indicate
that
Alburi,
abandoned
by
his
people,
continued on to Nooro with only ten cavalry men (13G-156,
Allys
a
Salde,
7/8/1890)
which
seems
to
be
an
exaggeration on
their
part.
Those
Jolof-JoloE
who
stayed
make
up
the
present
day
"Njaay
Farba Cenele" communi ty.
~Abuubakri Qaal id, pass im) .
16..
For
details
on Jeandet's biography,
see:
D.H.
Gausseron;
Un
Francais
au
Senegal:
Abel
Jeandet.
(Paris,
Librairie Ancienne Honore
Champion;
Editeur Edouard Champion,
5 Quai Malaquais 6e,
1913).
For
the
assassination
and
the
ensuing
controversy,
see:
A.N.S:
13G-135, Podor;
Affaires de Podor,
Meurtre de Jeandet 1890.
See
also
our
interviews
wi th:
The
fami ly
of ·Maam
Nj aak
Kan,
Nouackchott 21/3/1985;
Hamedin Kan, Gede,
passim,
24/7/1985;
Buubu Sal,
rodor,
passim.
15.
A.N.S:
UG-U5,
op.cit;
Rapport
du
capitaine
Pineau
sur
l'assassinat de Jeandet, Septembre 1890, (p.
32).
16. Tijjaani Maam Njaak,
passim.
The execution fostered wonderful praise songs in memory of Lamtooro
Sidiki.
See Hamedin Kan,
passim.
Tradition correlates to written sources on the execution.
In
his telegramme to the commission,
the Director of Political
Affairs
instructed:
I

---

101
Have
the
princes
executed
in
the
same
manner
as
Baidi
catie . . .
It
is necessary that
the memory of
the punish~
meot lasts,
therefore it has to be widely known among
the
indigenous
inhabitants of all regions.
(A.N.S:
l3G-135
passim,
D.A.P.
Tautain
~ Podor,
tele~.
661
du
13/9/1890) .
17.
For the tension in Tooro, see: A.N.S:
13G-13S,
Pineau op.eit.
See also,
13G-156: Kaedi 1885-1903:
2D11-l Podor, passim.
lB.
A.N.S:
13G-U5, op.de
!'.'~'crJ L"comte a Dir.Aff.Polit.
21/9/1890.
19.
Demmba .faawando Bookum,
interview 25/10/1984.
20.
For an oral account of the assassination,
see Robinson.
Chiefs. op.cit, p156.
21.
For this section we rely essentially on archival material:
A.N.S:
ID-55,
Colonne Dodds
dans
le
Fouta 1890-1891.
13G-156 Kaedi,
passim.
lG-331 "Monograph Le du cerc1e du Gorgol" par
l'Administrateur
Adjoint
Coup.
(Kaedi
1908).
A.N.F.O.K:
Senegal
et
Dependances
IV,
dossier
69.
Colonne
du
Fouta
1890-1891
(Rapport
du
colonel Dodds du 5/6/1891.
22. A.N.F.O.K:
Senegal IV, dossier 69,
op.cit.
23. A.N.F.O.M:
Sene~al IV, dossier 69, op.cit.: Gouverneur Lamothe
a Sous-secretaire d'Etat aux colonies,
2/1/1891.
24.
There
is
a
string
of villages
in
Boosoya
called
-
"Aanameej i"
(Baarga,
Godo,
Tulel Calle,
Siwol,
Wuro-Siree,
Coday,
Gol} etc ... ) from
Cilon as
far
afield as Hoore-Foonde.
Perhaps from
"Ar Naam"
(come and
eat),
pointing
to
a
tradition
of
hospitality
for
new
Corners
in
the
area.
25.
On his way to Hoore-Foonde he took care of "Ardo Galoya"
Abdul
Soh,
an ally
of A'cdul
Bookar who
reportedly
took
to
ransacking
any
ship
that
failed
to
pay
him
customs
duties
after
the
French
abolished
them.
Although
archival
sources
are
mute
on
his
fate,
tradition holds
Dodds
responsible
for
having Ardo
Abdul
executed and
his home and property destroyed and seized.
For
the
disappearance
of Ardo
Abdul
Soh,
see
our
interviews
with
'his son Ardo Samnba at Galoya (July 1985),
and with Abuu Jallo at
Caaroy-Dakar (4/8/1985).
26.
On
24-25
January 1891,
l'craa Almaami
attacked in the Ragg a
camp
that Abdul had already partially evacuated.
He
took considerable
booty in slaves and cattle left behind.
On 5 February,
Siree DUye Bah supported by Lie\\ltenant Keller,
the
Corrunandant of Bakel,
repulsed thousands of "Noorankoobe,1I taking also a
great many slaves and cattle.
(A.N.F.O.M:
Senegal IV, passim).
l

---

102
27.
A.N.S:
lG-331,
"Gorgol", op.cit.
28 _
Abdul
himself
had
grown
desperate
at
this
point but
feared
being betrayed at Kaedi.
He had never set foot on the soil of a French
post.
Alburi
for
his
part would not
surrender without assurances of
being
reinstalled
as
Buur-ba
of Jolof.
(A.N.S:
2010-8
Matam-Kaedi-
Salde;
Bulletins politiques,
agricoles et commerciaux par L.
Lesbuis,
1/8/1891) .
29.
The
Sratit
Moors,
former
allies
of
Abdul
Bookar,
were
now
befriending
the' French.
They
assassinated Abdul
as
a
pledge of good
will vis a vis St.
Louis.
Later on, Mammadu Abdul explained that the assassination was
a
plot
between
Moqtar
\\,101
Usman
and
his
nephew
Sarnmba
Filali,
in
cahoots
·... ich
Alburi.
This
is
what
the
Commandant of Kaedi
reported,
and one may not take
it at face value.
30.
A.N.S:
lG-331,op.cit.
For an oral
account of the
assassination,
see
"Fonds Robinson"
in
Bulletin de L'I.F.A.N
interviews with Bani Gise,
Seega Na~, and Ceerno
Saydu Kan.
See al~o Kane-Robinson, Anthologv, op.cit., pp.
169-177.
31.
O.
Robinson,
Chiefs,
op.cit.,
p.
152.
32.
Worgo- south;
Hirnaange- west;
Funnaange- east.
During the almamate all three made up the province of Boosoya under the
paramountcy of either Elimaan Rinnjaw,
or the leader of the Kan-Daabiya
family.
33.
For the details on the treaties with Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe,
Laaw
and Oamga see,
A.N_F.D.M:
Senegal IV,
doss.69,
op.cit.
34.
See note 23 of the chapter two.
35.
The people of Fuuta Tooro called the fine,
"Alamaan Oodds," a
corruption
of
the
French
a
l' amende
as
in
(rnettre
a
1 1 amende-
to
fine).
Subsequently,
the word came to mean simply "tax."
36.
We
have
not
been
able
to
find
the
decree
in
the
archives.
Judging
from
the various
reports
it was proposed
in 1890 and enforced
starting in the spring of 1891.

---

PART THREE:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER 4:
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS
FORMER "DISSIDENTS"
AND WEAKENING OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
A.
POLICY VIS ,\\ VIS FORMER "DISSIDENTS"
French
administration
in
Fuuca
roceo
referred
to
the
people who
emigrated
to
the
east
and
those
who
joined Abdul
Bookar
in
1890,
as
"dissidents."
These
were
considered
for
a
long
time
T1dangerous"
elements,
~orth
keeping
an
eye
upon.
French
suspicion
towards
the
"Umarians"
goes
back
to
the
18505,
·.....hen
the
administration
came
to
realize that Umar Taal and his empire were a potential stumbling block
for
their
conquest
of
western
Sudan.
Moreover,
the
continuing
emigration of the
Tukuloor
to
the east had become,
as Boubacar Barry
put
i t ,
"the most visible expression of their hostility towards
French
presence
in
Fuuta
Toceo." 1
From
rhe
18705
onwards,
the
chiefs
of
Laa~. Tooro,
and even Boosoya had helped block the massive
emigration,
to some extent.
In 1889-1890,
in face
of the apparent failure of such
policy,
the
administration
added
to
its
arsenal
the
powerful
and
age
old
weapon
of
land
confiscation:
Governor
Lamothe
enacted
in
1890,
under
the
proposition
of
Colonel
Dodds,
a
decree
empowering
French
~authority to seize the land and properties of any so called dissident,
and give them to pro~French or so called loyal elements. 2
In
some
cases,
this
measure
',.;ras
applied
to
whole"
village
conununities.
The
first casualties of
this decree were
the villages in
103

---

104
Boosoya
that
massively
joined
Abdul
Bookar
Kan.
In
late
1890,
the
administration
seized
the
land
that
many
people
from
Cilon,
Gababe,
J09Co,
Jal,
and Sincu owned on
the north
bank,
and annexed
it Co the
"state domain".
It furcher decided
that ownership of this land would
be transferred to its
tenant
farmers.
The
decision
was
to
affect
many
in
the
province
of
Damga
too.
Following
the
assassination
of
Sheh
Mammadu
Maamudu
in
(November
1890),
Colonel
Dodds
seized
che
land
around
che
villages
of Maqama,
Litama,
and Horndolde,
accused of supporting both Abdul
Bookar and the
Laaamdo-Juulbe. 3
All
the
land
passed
inco
the
hands
of Abdul
Salaam
Kan,
son
of
the
slain chief,
as
a grant.
The recipient being
then a
teenager,
unable
to
exercise his property
rights,
it was
decided chat
the
people
should pay a
J
franc
fee
per
individual
tenant
farmer,
and
chat the monies thus collected,
would be applied Co his education. 4
Within
this
same
province
of
Damga,
Siree
Diiye
Bah,
chief
of
?adala1
and
ally
of
the
French,
taking
advantage
of
the
numerous
departures
and seizing on Dodds'
orders
regarding "dissidents,"
helped
himself to considerable expanse of land around Njaw.5
Both the Maqama
donation
and
the
Njaw
"seizure,"
would
arouse
numerous
disputes
that.
·.... ill
be
dealt
with
in
chapters
ahead.
The
Njaw
seizure
in
itself
portended
the
many
abuses
that
the
"Lamothe
decree"
brought
about,
which would intensify with the
return of emigrants starting in 1891.
1.
THE RETUR-"I OF FORMER "DISSIDENTS" AND THE IMPLEMENTATION.
OF FRENCH POLICY.
For
those
who
emigrated
to
Nooro,
trouble
did
not
start
upon
return but rather, during the destruction of the Umarian Empire,
and on
\\
I
,
j
I
I
\\1
1
1

---

105
,..,
the way back to
Fuuta Tooro.
First of all,
after the fall of Naoro in
January of 1891,
che Tukuloor were
split
into
two groups,
confined to
restricted areas,
and forbidden
to
travel
in and out of Kaarta without
a
pass.
or
to
communicate
...... ith
their countrymen
in Fuuta.
They were
assigned Elimaan Rinnjaw and
Maalik Sammba,
as chiefs respectively of
cne eastern and southern parcs. 6
~
Shortly after the fall of Nooro and the rear guard battles
led by
Alburi Njaay,
Ahmadu Seyku,
who had decided on the ~iira (emigration),
urged
a 11
the
Tukuloor
to
e i the~
fa 110w him
and
go
eas t,
or
proceed
home
to
Fuuta
Tooro. 7
This
advice.
coupled
with
the
frustrations
inflicted
upon
them
by
the
military
administration
of l,·lestern
Sudan,
II
led many to opt for a return. S
I
I
The
Tukuloor
army's
"long
march"
home,
with
women,
children,
cattle
and
slaves,
proved painstaking and,
to
many,
fatal.
Moorish
'I
plunderers,
colonial spahis and ~ild beasts on land,
crocodiles in the
\\
river,
thirst
and
hunger,
each
took
its
toll
of
the
exhausted
and
desperate
cro~d.
People
ate
just
about
everything,
from
raw meat
to
I
I!
leaves.
Women,
tired and more preoccupied ~ith their own safety, often
i
I
abandoned
their
infants.
This
gloomy
sequence
of
Fuutanke
history
is
still
remembered
by
the
few
survivors
and
their
children. 9
French
description
of
the
ten
thousand
people
who
arrived
at
Matam
in
mid,February 1891,
suggests
the magnitude of the hardships
they had to
go through:
All
are
in
the
most
profound
misery,
and
give
out
from a
distance,
a
fetid odor.
Many died of hunger
on
the way;
Many fall breathless while coming down,
or climbing the river's edges.
One also notices many
wounds
and
among
the
men,
particularly
the
chie fs.
I
I

---

106
wounds
caused
by
the
many
battles
they
had
survived. IO
This
was
not
all.
The
French
shot
many
of
the
leaders,
and
seized
whatever
cattle,
horses,
weapons
and
slaves
they
had brought
along. l l
The
reception
was
so bad
that,
of
the
thousands
Commandant
Archinard had ousted from Western Sudan,
in a second expulsion in 1893,
ma ny neve r
go t
home.
Warned
that
they
had forfeited
everything,
and
often
too
exhausted
to
contin'..le,
a
considerable
number
of
people
seccled
in
southern
Damga,
central
Fuuta,
and
even
further
nort.h
in
Gidimaxa:
wnen they arrived there,
they learned that their land
had
been
confiscated
and
chat
t.hey
ran
the
risk
of
being
executed
upon
arrival.
Many
found
land
was
plentiful
and
there
was
enough
to
eat
and
drink;
Consequently,
they
settled.
This
is
why
all
these
villages,
Kali-Nooro,
Buljubbaae,
Salke-Daxana,
and
Wuri r ance
(four
sizeable villages),
house
many
Hel-
Moodinallankoobe.
Instead of going all
the way back
to Daw and 000101,
they chose to stay in Gidimaxa. 12
Thus,
one
of
the
main
effects
of
the
"Lamothe
decree. n
was
to
force
people
into
permanent
exile.
However,
for
a
long
time
after
their
return,
and for
many a
"Kaartanke,"
as
the French administration
came
to
label
them,
abusive
confiscation
of
land,
cattle
and
slaves
soon became part of daily life.
As
these people grew angrier and more
and more
rebellious
to
such arbitrary action,
the so called '''~aartanke
troubles"
became also
the basic
ingredient of daily administrative and
political life,
particularly in the province of Tooro. 13
For example,
in May 1891,
a
Pullo named Moodi Raamata addressed a
letter
to
E.
Hostains,
the
Conunandant
of
Dagana,
complaining
that

---

107
Ceerno MoIle Bookar,
chief of eastern Boosoya, seized ten of the cattle
~
he had brought
along
from Nooro.
Since
it "",as
a
few months
after
the
proclamation of the "Lamothe
decree," one can safely conclude that the
plaintiff
never
won
compensation14 .
That
French
administrators
deliberately turned a blind eye on local chiefs'
abuses,
is borne out
by a June 1891 report in which administrator Molleur said that village
chiefs visited with him almost every day,
asking what to do with people
con~inuously coming from Naoro woith slaves, horses, and guns. Before
even taking
the advice of the
Political Affairs'
Bureau on the matter,
he
ordered
that
the
slaves be
freed,
and
the horses
and guns
sent
to
St- Louis
for auction sale,
to
feed
the colonial
treasury.
The opinion
of
the
Commandant,
an opinion ~idely shared ~ithin the administration
then, ~as tha t
It
is
inacceptable
that
people
~ho ~ere hostile
to
us,
be
allowed
to
enjoy
the
ill-gotten
gains
they
often acquired at our own expense. IS
The year 1893 was
a year
of
"kaartanke
troubles"
par excellence
in
Tooro,
for
many
of
the
ten
thousand
people
expelled by Archinard
came
basically
from
that
province.
During
the
last
quarter,
administrator
Riquetty
reported
tensions
created
by
the
over
three
thousand
returnees,
all
of
whom ~ere
angry at
the
confiscations,
and
determined
to
recover
their
property
rights.
The
same
report
did
indicate however,
that administrators had done their utmost to preser~e
the so called rights of "loyal subjects."16
In fact,
the measures against these "Kaartanke"
only
intensified
their hostility
to~ards the French.
By December 1893 some headed back

---

108
for
Wasulu,
to
join in Samori Tuure' 5
continuing struggle
against
the
French.
In 1895,
the
bulk of the village of Edi
(Tooro).
fled
to
the
bush,
to
avoid
providing hospitality
to
the
Commandant
of
Podor,
and
helping solve some pending administrative issues.
Ardo Edi,
the Canton
Chief,
told
the
Commandant
that
the
protest
'..... as
organized
by
Kaarta
returnees,
'..... ith
the
support
of
t,"",o
notables
kno'\\.ofTI
for
their
proven
anti-French sentiments.
A few days
later,
Commandant Allys
fined
the
three villages of the district 500
francs,
and promised to send guards
to help Ardo cope with the situation. l7
On
this
same
tour,
the
Commandant
took
prisoner
to
Podor,
a
"Kaarcanke"
from
the
village
of Kooga
(Tooro),
charged with
e:<.citing
already hostile
populations,
against
French authority.18
Often times,
the
"Kaartanke",
impotent
in
face
of
the
administration,
would
pour
conc.empt on
the
immediate
neighbour whom his
land had been entrusted
to.
One such case occurred in Madiina-Njaacbe in December 1898 when a
man
named
M.anunadu Jallo
was
fined
three
bolts
of
"Guinee
cloth"
for
insulting Demmba Haawa,
a
man
then
farming his land by virtue of the
"Lamothe decree.,,19
Of all
provinces,
Halaybe proved most
fertile
in
expropriation-
related
troubles.
Two elements
at
least help explain why:
First of
all,
the Halaybe made up a good proportion of the western Fuutankoobe
who went to, and came back from, N'00ro. 20
Second,
Elimaan Ab~ Kan, the
one time chief of Seeloobe, was perhaps of all,
the one who showed most
overzealous in implementing the policy.21
Already
in
1895,
under preceding chief Elimaan Ma~~adu Daada Kan
(1890-1898).
the Halaybe had created
tension by refusing
to
pay Asaka
I
I
I

---

109
(land),
and Njoldi,
(entrance
into
cultivation)
fees. 22
That outright
refusal
was
perhaps
meant
to
stress
the
absurdity
of
a
situation
whereby,
they were forced to pay fees on land which they were no longer
permitted to farm.
Starting
in 1898,
difficulties would arise
as
Elimaan Abu,
then
chief
of
Halaybe.
continued
imposing
heavy
fines
and
applying
land
expropriation
to
chose
accused
of
obstructing
administrative
procedures,
tax
collection,
conscription,
and
the
like.
He
also
granted land
to members of his entourage,
most of ~hom were foreign to
the area.
In 1900,
he even alienated
"Elimaan Puri,"
a Naoro returnee
and
single
most
important
landholder
in
the
region,
hence
one
of
the
most
influe~tial notables. 23 These acts were to plunge Halaybe into a
political crisis of rare nagnitude,
as the whole community mobilized to
fight
back.
The
crisis
ended only
in
1902,
with a
solution we
shall
deal with in a later chapter. 24
In sum,
what
the
French
initially
intended
to
be a
sheer
menace
aimed at deterring
people
from
joining massively
the
Tukuloor
empire
in the
east,
became as
the emigration continued
unabated,
a
policy in
and of
itself.
From 1891 onward,
i t
took
on a new dimension,
that of
re'...'arding
"loyal"
subj ec ts ,
and
demonstrating
the
capacity
of
the
administration to have any
Hdissident"
pay what one can term,
a
"high
pr..ice."
ror
their
attitudes
and
actions.
Subsequently,
village
and
C<inton
chiefs
SO
indulged
in
an abusive
and opportunistic
application
of
the
law
that,
i t
ultimately
back-fired.
Instead
of
abating
subvers ion.
the
law
aroused
and
in tens ified
po 1 i tical
tens ions
and
estrangement between the rulers and their "Kaartanke ll
subjects.
While

---

110
St.
Louis
was
toO
far
to
sense
the
political and
administrative heat
generated
by
the
policy,
administrators
on
the spot
could not help
worrying.
Thus,
in late 1900,
the
Commandant of Pador,
tired of the
troubles
and
perhaps
envious
of
the
tranquillity
enjoyed
by
the
neighbouring
districts,
sanguinely called for
the
repeal
of
the
law
and
the
possibility
for
former
"dissidents"
to
take
back their
land.
In a letter to the Director of Political Affairs,
he said:
In rnv opinion
i t
is
necessary
to
put
an end to
that
question of Nioranke,
source of
the difficulties
be-
(',.,reen
the
chiefs
and
the
people,
by
forbidding
the
rormer
[chiefs)
to
take any action in that wise.
and
urging
them
to
equate
all
the people
returning
from
the
Sudan with
those who never emigrated.
Ten years
of
punishment
are
more
than
a
sufficient
price
for
the crime [sic]
they committed in joining the
Lamdo
Dioulbe in Nior6. 25
Apparently,
neither St-Louis nor
the chiefs paid due heed to such
appeal for,
abuses against the returnees went on unchecked for few more
years.
People
were
so
frustrated
that
in 1902
some
wanted
to return
co Nooro but,
orders were out
to execute any person encountered on the
roads
to Western Sudan without a written permission.26
In
Halaybe
where
the
situation
was
exeptionally
instable,
the
administration
had
in
1902,
to
appoint
Bookar
Baydi
Jah.
a
former
Umarian and powerful local leader,
chief of the canton.
2.
MOVES AGAINST ABDUL BOOKAR'S RELATIVES AND ALLIES
The
first
action
against
Abdul
Bookar
Kan's
followers
was
the
I
deportation of his brother and son
to Gabon,
following
their surrender
I
in
summer
1891.
This
measure
served
basically
two
complementary
I
I
I

---

111
purposes:
First,
i t was
meant
to be a reminder
that the
era of Abdul
Bookar and
the preponderance of Boosoya had ended.
Secondly,
it would
help
Ceerno
Molle
Bookar,
a
signatory
of
the
"Boosoya
treaty"
and
French appointed chief,
more comfortably rule over eastern Boosoya.
by
removing
the
possibility
of
threats
and
interference
from
the
Kan-Daabiya family.
Two years
later.
the
French and
their allies severed the
last tie
between
Daabiya
and
Jolof,
by
persuading
Xaar
Yalla,
(Alburi
Njaay's
daughter).
to
divorce
her
exiled
husband,
Mammadu
Abdul
Bookar.
The
verdict
pronounced
on
22
June
1893
by
the
judge
of
Kajoor
was
predicated on the fact that,
"the detainee lived in a pagan
[sic]
land.
Since
she
enjoys
no
alimony
and
one
is
afraid
that
she
betrays
her
husband,
divorce is preferable according to Islamic law.,,27
At no time
were
the sentiments of the lady alluded to.
~~at is more,
Islamic law,
as
the
judge
himself
mentioned,
allows
for
a
divorce
only after
four
years,
whereas less
than three had lapsed.
After eight years,
Mammadu Abdul and his uncle ~ere pardoned
and
brought
back
in
1899.
But,
the
long exile had
left Mammadu
Abdul' s
feelings
for
Ceerno Molle
unaltered
and,
hardly was
he
back when he
started
causing
the
new
Ceerno Molle
(Maamudu),
new
worries.
Three
years
later,
he was exiled again,
at the
town of Base,
in the Gambia. 28
Abdul
Bookar's
reI3.tives
were
not
the
only
people
under
suveillance.
In
Summer
1897,
a
man
named
Demmba
Alarba,
one of
his
former allies,
along with some Owlad Ayd'
Moors ambushed and killed at
Ballel
twenty
five
~~atit warriors and their chief Radi Usman, one of
Abdul's
assass ins.
The
French
considered
this
a
highly
provocative

---

112
crime,
and sentenced Demmba
to death
in Saint-Louis.
Interim Governor
Ballot transformed the sentence into deportation to the Congo. 29
Another
ally,
Demrnba
Daramaan
Wan,
who
was
sentenced
to
six
months'imprisonment and 7E bolts of "guinee cloth" for participating in
the assassination of Seh Mammadu,
was denied the right to go home after
his
liberation
in
1892.
Notwithstanding
the
valuable
services
he
provided in
the
"pacification"
of
the
region of Kaedi,
and the support
of its Commandant,
Demmba Daramaan's
requests to return were repeatedly
rejected by
Ibraa
Almaami,
the
Commandant
of Podor,
and
later,
chief
Abdul AZiz. 30
He
remained a
constant matter of concern for both Podor
and
Mbummba,
until
he
was
executed
in
March
1900
for
aiding
and
abetting in the assassination of Abdul Aziz. 31
Imprisonrnenr and deportation were not the only forms of punishment
incurred
however.
Some
were
also
stripped
of
their
political
functions.
A case
in
point
was
the
dismissal
of
Ceerno
Celol
Abdul
Siree of Kanel,
and
the Ceerno Funeebe of Gogo,
both
from the province
of Damga.
The
former ~as
the
head
of the
influential Jaa~ando family
of Kanel and,
by virtue of his
title,
both an
important land owner and
a powerful chief.
An old ally of Abdul Bookar,
he had taken part in the
assassination of Seh
Mammadu and,
on insistence of
the chief of Damga
Ibraa Abdul ~an, ~as spared execution in 1892.
After he ~as reinstated
"Ceerno
Celol,"
he
began
annoying
the
chief
of
Kanel,
hamPering
his
administration.
This
got
worse
when
Abdul
Salaam
Kan
was
appointed
chief of Damga
few years
later.
As
the Commandant of Matam explained
in January lB9B:
This young chief,
always
in contact with his father's
I
r

---

::.::. ":"
Cl3
assassin,
informed me of his
repugnance
to living in
such
proximity.
For
political
as
well
as
security
reasons,
and given
the numerous
offenses against the
discipline
on
the
part of Abdul
Siree,
I
decided on
his dismissal,32
Likewise,
Ceerno Funeebe,
the
one
time supporter of Abdul
Bookar
in Goga,
was dismissed as
traditional political leader of his village.
It
took the Commandant of Matam a whole day of palavers,
as he put it,
"to
convince
them
[and
their
large
followings]
that
their
titles ...
and
the
corresponding funtions,
were
at
odds
with
the
current organi.-
zation
of
Damga,
that
there
could
not
exist
alongside
the
chief ap-
pointed
and
recognized
by
the
French
Government,
any
local
authority
exercising
parallel
action
and
enj eying
equal
influence
within
the
region.,,33
Once
reassured
that
the
decision
would not
affect
their
rights
as
landholders
and
managers,
they
found
no
major
difficulty
accepting
it.
On
the
whole,
Abdul
Bookar's
partisans
suffered
less
injustice
than
former
Umarians.
This may
relate
to
the
stiff open,
persistent,
and
lasting
nature
of
Umarians'
opposition.
It
may
also
have
been
easier and less risky for local authority to make attacks on individual
Umarians and
their property than on the often powerful allies of Abdul
Bookar.
The
French
even
began
the
reinstatement
of
the
Kan-Daabiya
family
in
1902,
when
they
nominated
Bookar
Abdul
Kan,
perhaps
under
pressure
from
the
people of Boosoya,
chief of
the eastern part of the
province.

---

11"
B.
TERRITORIAL CHANGES AND SELECTION OF RELIABLE CHIEFS
During
the
first
decade
of
colonial
rule
in
Fuuta
Tooro,
the
French
were
concerned
with
the
various
chiefs
and
the
power
they
wielded within their respective
territorial units,
as much as
they were
worried about former "dissidents.
As elsewhere in the colonial world,
they
had
some
basic
political
and
cultural
goals
in
mind.
They
in::ended
to
imbue
the
chiefs
with
"French"
sense
of
obedience
and
respect
for
administrative
hierarchy
and
centralization,
as
well
as
French methods
of governing
the
people.
They also wanted
to
instill
inco the mass of subjects some sense of,
and respect for,
"French'l la·....
and order.
This appeared to
them as
a
sine qua non for
the successful
colonial administering of Fuuta Tooro.
Yet.
some
difficul~ies
remained.
Very
few
members
of
the
aristocracy
had
been acquainted with
French norms
through
the
"School
of Sons
of Chiefs
and
Interpreters,"
Second.
the
French
knew
for
a
fact
that their success depended a
great deal upon the
comportment of
these
chiefs
vis
a vis
their subjects,
and the
manner
in which
their
orders
would
be
carried
out.
Third,
the
many
territorial
units
of
Fuuta Tooro were either too large and
conducive to autocracy (of some
rulers),
or
too small
to suit
the
needs of administrative efficiency.
For
these
reasons
and others,
administrators devoted
their
energies,
during
this
early
period.
to
weeding
out
the
"unreliable'" ..elements
from
the
Commandement
Indigene
of
Fuuta,
as
we 11
as
adj us ting
and
readjusting
territorial
units.
As
if
recency
of
contact
.......ere
a
crucial
factor.
western Fuuta and
Laaw enjoyed a
relative
stability,
while
central
and
eastern
Fuuta
bore
the
brunt
of
administrative

---

115
turnovers and rearrangements.
1.
WESTERN FUUTA AND lAAW
a/
DIMAT
This
province
had been
part
of
the
colony
of Senegal
ever
since
1863. 34
After the dismissal of chief Elimaan Mammadu Daada
in 1885,
the
province
was
once
again
dismantled,
and villages
reverted
to
the
status
of
"autonomous units,
under
the
nominal jurisdiction of Waalo
chiefs.
In
1888,
the
COlTUTIandant
of
Dagana,
i:lvoking
the
"racial
c.iversity",
and
the
large
size
of
his
circwnscription,
proposed
the
creation
of
a
unique
province
composed
of
exclusively
Tukuloor
villages.
But, St.
Louis flatly rejected the
proposition.
Later, on
15
January
1890,
a
gubernatorial
Order
conferred
the
"protectorate"
status upon the villages of Oimat.
And,
on 13 April 1891,
another such
decision
pulled
the
different
villages
together
into
one
single
province.
The
new province
got a
ne'....
chief
in
the
person of
Samrnba
Camka Naam,
a Wolof from
Boqqol.
and was administratively attached to
the
district
of
Dagana.
No
change
was
to
occur until
the
death
of
chief Sammba
Camka Naam, in early 1903.
At
this point,
the administration decided
to divide
the
province
into ~alves: western and Eastern Dimat.
The first
section,
comprising
Dagana,
four Wolof villages,
and three Fulbe
nomad camps was entrusted
to
Baabakar Naam,
son of
the
defunct chief,
while
the
second with
its
seven Tukuloor and six Fulbe villages was placed under Raasin Kan,
son
of the chief of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe province.

---

116
The sources do not mention any reason for the 1903
administrative
change
in
Dima t.
But,
two
reasons
suggest
~hemselves.
First,
the
administration
may
have
felt
that
Baabakar
Naam
was
no
val~able
replacement
to his father,
as chief of both Dagana and Dimat districts.
Second,
appointing a member of
the
traditional
ruling family of Dimat
~as no attractive solution to the administratLon,
given the established
anti-French sentiments of Jalmacc.
Whatever the reasons,
the division of the province and
nomination
of new chiefs generated opposition and caused
difficulties for the two
ehtefs,
that will be dealt with in a
followLng chapter.
bl
TOORO ~~D HALAYBE
Because the chiefs of Tooro had gro'~ wealthier and more
powerful
over the "protectorate"
years,
and adopted at times "strange"
attitudes
in the eyes of the French,
the administration
had grown cautious about
them as
......ell.
By
the
late 1880s,
i t
became increasingly "necessary"
to abate
the power of the
Lamtooro.
Since such power depended a great
deal on the extent of the province and the number of villages he ruled,
St.
Louis
found
the
demotion of Lamtooro
to
a
lower
level
chief of a
smaller
territory,
the
most
logical
solution
to
the
crisis
at
Gede.
This
accounts
for
the
application of
the
1890
UJeandet
Constitution"
referred
to
earlier.
This
"constitution,"
as
it
was
called,' broke
Tooro up
into six
little
cantons:
Mbantu,Edi,
Gede,
Podor,
Seeloobe,
and Halaybe.
The
traditional
Fulbe
chiefs,
Ardo Edi and Ardo Mantu,
were promoted
to canton chiefs.
Elimaan Baaba Hawa Kan,
chief of Podor
(town),
became head of
the
canton of the same name;
Two others were
I
I
.J
L

---

117
appointed
for
Halaybe
and
Seelooba,
while
Lamtooro
Siidi
Abdul
Sal
became !'simple"
chief of Gede and its four neighbouring villages. 35
TABLE 2 :
Nominations of chiefs in Tooro 1890-1903
Cantons
Chiefs
: Term in office:Reason for leav-
1'fbantu
:Ardo Abdul Siidi
1890-1906
died in office
Edi
:Ardo Baaba Daado
1890-1893
deposed
: S ileymaani Bah
1894-1896
deposed
:Ardo Abu
1901-
Cede
:L.Siidi Abdul Sal
1890-1899
deposed
:Tamiimu Siley Lih
1899-1903
resigned
Seeloobe
:Elimaan Abu Kan
1890-1898
deposed
:Ismaayla Joob
189-1902
deposed
:Farba Birom Sih
1902-
Pocor
:Elimaan B.Ha....... a Kan
1890-1899
deposed
:Elimaan Mammadu D.Kan:
1899-1903
died in office
Halaybe
: Elirnaan Mammadu D.Kan: 1890-1898
deposed
:Elimaan Abu Kan
1898-1902
deposed
: Elim.Mamrnadu Moktaar
Feb--Aug 1902
deposed
Source:
A.N.S:
13C-43; 46,
and 9C-23.
This
table suggests
three obse~Jations:
The
fragmentation
of the
province
of
Tooro,
the
pro-French
nature
of all
the
chiefs
and
the
rapid rate of turnover.
First,
these
cantons
were
very
small
administrative
units.
According to the 1896 census,
of 24,567 people,
the most populous
was
the .canton of Seeloobe
(5,768
inhabitants),
and
the
smallest,
that of
Podor, with only 2,067 inhabitants. 36
Second,
all
these chiefs were either veterans of French
colonial
~ars, or former interpreters.
Elimaan Abu (Seeloobe),
who was the son
of
Elimaan
Coofi
Ibraahiima
Kan,
served
as
Interpreter
to
Colonel
Combes during the campaign of 1885 in
Western Sudan,
and taught at the

---

118
"School
of
Hostages"
at
Kaay.
He
had
earned
a
medal
of
Officier
dtAcademie
for his role in
propagating the French language in Western
Sudan.
Ismaayla
Joob,
a
former
Sergeant
in
the
"Senegalese
Rifle
Corps,"
had participated in the campaign of Malagasy.
S ileymaani Bah
fought
in
Nooro
against
Ahmadu
(1891),
and
in Dahomey,
where he
got
·..lOunded
and
'..on
the
"~edal of Dahomey" (1894).37
Even
the
demo red
Lam~ooro Siidi
Abdul
had
taken
part
in
the
campaign against
Sammba
Jaadana
and,
according
to
an
1893
report,
was
doing
everything he
could
to
ingratiate
himself
with
the
French.
This
is
how
the
Commandant recommended him:
It would be a good thing to
let Larntoro
remain head
of this territory.
I have but to commend him for the
way he serves
(the administration].
No complaint has
ever
been
filed
against
him.
Vithout
having
to
reconstitute Tooro
as
it was,
i t would be
indispens-
able
and
highly
politic,
to
enhance
the
power of
a
man
who
is
profoundly
devoted
to
us,
and
enj oys
a
real authority within the country.
(38)
Third,
the
rate
of
turn
over
is
striking
and
suggests
both
difficulties
between
chiefs
and
people
and,
in
some
cases,
French
resolve not to tolerate disobedient and abusive chiefs.
of the
twelve
chiefs,
only
two died in office.
One
resigned,
perhaps under duress,
~hile nine chiefs were purely and simply deposed.
Ilustrative
of
difficulties
with
people
was
the
deposition
of
Elimaan Abu
Kan and
Ismaayla Joob.
The
former 'Was,
as we
mentioned
earlier,
particularly severe
in applying French
confiscation policies
to former
"dissidents" and in resorting to
his
"Tiwaande"
rights (see
note
21),
between 1896 and 1898,
That
is why,
in
the
conclusion to

---

119
the
inquiry
he
conducted
on
this
chief,
Commissioner
Decressac-
Villagrand wrote:
As
a
close
look
into
these
different
cases
shows,
there
have
been
several
instances
of power abuse
on
the
part
of
Elimaan
Abu.
In many
cases
this
chief
has
wrongly
invoked
the
name
of
the
Government
[colonial administration]
to impose certain fines,
or
procure
.certain
gains...
Today,
the
population
is
reques ting
his
dismissal.
I
can but
second
such
a
request, while transmitting i~.39
This conclusion caused eventually the dismissal of Elimaan
Abu as
chief of Seeloobe in 1898.
The same year he was appointed
in Halaybe,
as a replacement to Elimaan Mammadu Daada Kan,
reportedly apathetic and
"unfit" for command in a canton deemed "most difficult to handle".40
Ismaayla
J oob,
the
ch ief
who
succeded
El imaan
Abu
in
See loobe
(1899),
was
also
reported
to
have
exerted
a
"despoiling
tyranny"
on
his
people,
fining,
exploiting and jailing
indiscriminately.
In 1902
~r.
Valzi,
the
Commandant
of
Podor,
portrayed
him
as
a,
"man
impervious
to
any
idea
of
justice
and
honesty
[s ic},
a
poor
man
promoted by an unhoped chance,
to
the
dignity of chief", who believed
that
he
had
more
power
over
his
subj ec cs
than
a
mas te r
over
his
slaves. 41
On the Commandant's
proposition, he ~as dismissed in 1902.
Others
were
often
deposed
for
disobedience
and
non
compliance
with administrative
orders.
Ardo Baaba,
chief of Edi,
was
dismissed
in
1893
on
grounds
that
he
not
only
failed
to
repo rt
to
the
Commandant,
but
also
prevented
witnesses
of
a
crime
from
doing
so.42
Finally,
in 1899,
Siidi Abdul Sal,
former chief
of Gede, was deposed.
There
is
no
evidence
of
mismanagement
or
·.... rong
doing.
The
only
evidence
may
be
that
he
was
becoming
relatively
popular,
perhaps

---

120
learning
from
past errors,
and was
seeking his
long
lost chiefship of
Tooro
as
a
whole.
After
an
unsuccessful
request
in
1891,
he
wrote
again
to
the
Governor
in
1895,
assuring
him
that
all
the
people
of
Tooro,
rich
and poor,
powerful
and
weak,
strongly wanted him back in
office. 43
By
the close of the nineteenth century,
relations bet~een
chiefs
and
people
had
seriously
deteriorated.
In
1901,
the
Commandant
of
Podor himself acknowledged
the
"hatred of
the
populations for
their
chiefs," and complained about occasional extorsions on the part of some
of them.
The only remedy he wanted applied however,
was the nomination
of
a
"paramount
chief"
to
obviate
the
disorder
and
bring
about
"administrative
unity'l
in
Tooro. 44
But
no
territorial
reform
would
take place
for quite a
while.
Only changes
in personnel were made in
1902-1903, ~ith the
nominations of Bookar Baydi Jah (Halaybe), Mustafa
Kan (Podor),
Aamadu Moktaar Wan (Gede),
and Farba Birom Sih (Njum).
cl
lAAW
Contrary
to
the
other
provinces,
Laaw
did
not
undergo
many
changes.
In 1890,
the treaty maintained Ibraa Almaami Wan as chief and
recognized the annexation of Haayre and its clusters
to the province.
Ibraa Almaami was one of the most "reliable"
allies of the French
in
Fuuta
Tooro.
Since
the
1870s,
he
had
taken part
in
almost
al.l
French military campaigns.
His "unfailing loyalty"
had won him both a
"First class
Gold Medal"
and a medal
of the
"Legion of Honour."
When
Ibraa
Almaami
requested
permission
to
go
on
pilgrimage
to
Mecca,
French authority
not only
accepted,
but
also paid
for
it,
on grounds

---

121
that
i t
',.)ouId
enhance
his
prestige,
just
as
i t
did with
Interpreter
Bu-El-Mogdad
1. 45
Upon
his
return,
the
Governor
helped
fund
the
construction of a mosque
in his capital,
Mbumrnba.
The French had many reasons to maintain Ibraa.
Apart from
being
loyal,
he
had
the
reputation
of
knowing
how
to
"tame"
subversive
populations.
Even the Halaybe,
reputedly
"ungovernable",
feared being
p laced
under
his
jurisdiction,
something
Ibraa
had
al.....,.ays
requested
from
St.
Louis.
In
1893,
a
French
official
made
the
following
comment:
I do not know how Ibra Almamy rules Lao internally ...
But,
".,hat
a difference,
in comparison with Toro!
All
Abdul Aziz,
[Ibraa's brother and deputy)
needs
to do
is
whisper
orders.
and
they
are
carried
out
im-
mediately ...
During
my
entire
trip,
~ithout
any
variation,
I
have
noticed
the
same
thing
[obedience
to Ibraa and his broLherl. 46
Another reason was
the
influence
Ibraa Almaami had all
around,
o'..;ir'.g
to
blood
relations
and
political
alliances
with
many.
The
French
could
count
on
him
to
advise
Ceerno
Molle
(Boosoya),
his
brother
in
Laa·...,.
Ibraa Abdul his
nephew,
the
Yirlaabe of Pete,
and
even the Brakna Moors with whom he had
maintained strong ties.
For
all
these
reasons,
Ibraa
Almaami
enjoyed
almost
a
unique
status as chief,
taking advantage of several chiefly
rights including
the title of "Almaami,"
illstead of "chief'! of Laaw. 47
After the death
of the chief, his brother Abdul Aziz
inherited the position, with the
Governor's approval,
and ruled
until his assassination in March 1900.
At this point,
another
brother,
Aamadu Sammba Wan took over,
for
the
whole first quarter of the twentieth century (1900-1925).

---

122
2.
CENTRAL FUUTA
aj
YIRLAABE-HEBBIYAABE
As ~e mentioned before,
the
1891
treaty with Yirlaabe
stipulated
that the
four cantons would merge
into a confederation headed by a Ch~f
Superieur.
But,
French authority had specified
neither when,
nor who
'...;ould
become
the
head
of
the
confederation.
The
promised
change
occurred
in
early
189& ,..,rich
the
nomination of
Abdullaay Kan as Chef
Superieur (paramount chief) of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe.
Al [hough
the
administration
invoked
the
so
called
"racial
affinity"
among
the
populations
of
the
four
cantons,
(Jeeri,
Alayidi,
?ece,
and
Hebbiyaabe),
ana its concern about more
efficient economic
developme:1t
for
the
province,
one
should
not
lose
sight
of
some
pertinent
factors.
First
of
all,
Ibraa
Almaami
",ho
had
for
long
dreamed of ressuscitating the function of
'IAlmaami" on his m...T1 behalf,
cove ted
the
lit tIe
province
very
much.
Given
the
age-old
rivalry
be t'.... een
him
and Abdullaay Kan,
it ...... as
expec ted
tha t
such nomina t ion
,....ould
have
a
chilling
effect
on
Ibraa t s
ambitions. 48
Second,
even
though Abdullaay Kan "'as
raised
in
St.
Louis
and
spent
most
of his
life time
there,
he
had
ties among the Yirlaabe-Alayidi who were thus
more
likely
to
accept
him
than Boosoya or Tooro,
which he had wanted
to run
in 1891 and 1892. 49
Third,
the fact that he "'as a graduate of
the "School of Chiefs and Interpreters," and che innumerable services· ..
he
had
rendered.
made
the
French more
confident
in him
than
in
any
other
Fuutanke ally.
As
the
follo",ing
table
sho",s,
his
credentials
were quite impressive .
••

---

123
TABLE 3:
Abdullaay Kan's career to 1893.:
'Year
: Post
:Campaigns and missions:
Rewards
1867
:Int. St-L
Int.
Kajoor mission
1869-1876
:Salde
: Interpreter
1876
:Podor
: Interpreter
1879-80-81 :Podor
:Pons column in Boosoya:lst.cl.Silver.M.H
1883
:St-Louis
:col.Wendling (Kajoor)
1883
:St-louis
:col.Voyron (Boosoya)
:l.cl.Gold M.Honour
1884
:St-Louis
:col.Remy (Ealaybe)
1386
:St·Louis
:col.agst.Lat J and S.L:
1889
:St-Louis
:Mission to Brakna
1890
: St-Louis
:Dodds col.agst Alburi
:Nicham Iftikar Med
1891
: St- Louis
: Dodds c 1. ags t. A. Bookar:
1893
:St·Louis
:Mission to saalum
Col.- Column. (military campaign); M- Medal.
Source: A.N.S:
lC-1674 'Abdoulaye Kane, personal file'.
Later,
Abdullaay Kan won
the
"Benin Black Star Medal"
in
1897,
and
the
"Legion
of
Honour"
in
1898.
This
"model
servant",
as
an
administrator
once
called
him,
was
instructed
in
1894,
to
pursue
the
French "civilizing mission"
by opening a school at
Salde before year's
end,
and
to
promote
moral
and
agricultural
development
in
his
circumscription. 50
Abdullaay
Kan's
nomination
did
bring
about
some
policical-
administrative changes.
The four initial cantons had actually
become
one
larger
u'.1it,
and
their
chiefs
practically
turned
into
vi llage
chiefs.
The
ne .....
paramount
chief
also managed
to
get
Ismaayla Siley
Aan,
chief of Pete connected
to Mbummba
and
possible rival,
fired in
1897.
Abdullaay
Kan
continued
as
Chef
Superieur
until
1913.
His
province
.....as
considered
the
most
stable
of
all,
and
his
request
to
retire a full
ten years earlier i~ 1903, .....as flatly turned down. 51

---

124
bl
BOOSOYA
The major consequence of the 1891 treaty was
the breaking
up into
three
districts
under
the
supervision
of
Ceerno
M:olle
Bookar
Lih,
chief
of
eastern Boosoya.
But,
a
crisis was
to
break
out as
Ceerno
Molle
tried
to
assert
and
enjoy
rights
that
formerly
accrued to
the
Almaami of Fuuta,
at the expense of both
his colleagues and subjects.
As
early
as
1892,
he
wrote
a
letter
to
Governor
De
Lamothe,
complaining that Commandant Laborie
(Kaedi)
had stripped him of all the
rights
alledgedly
accorded
by
Colonel
Dodds. 52
A fe'. cases of abuse
ensued that added to
French mistrust
in him.
In fact,
the Commandant
of
Kaedi
described
the
chief as,
a
"fanatic"
who had accepted French
authority
with
great
reluctance
and
only,
"to
'..Jait
and
see ...
and
suffer the cohabitation with Whites until
the advent of
the messeng~r
of God,
supposed to liberate the believer and chase
the unbeliever" .53
In 1893,
his
title of
"Chef Superieur" was ablolished,
and in 1895 he
died.
Ceerno Molle Maamudu Lih,
his successor,
ruled for six
years.
On
grounds
that his
exactions had won him the animus of
the bulk of the
Boosoyaabe,
he was
deposed
in 1902,
and replaced,
for
the first
time,
54
by a member of the Kan-Daabiya family,
chief Bookar Abdu1 Bookar.
In the
two other cantons
the situation remained relatively
calm.
In
the
western
and
northern
Boosoya chiefs were
replaced
mos tly for
reasons of age of death. 55
During
the
period
1891-1904,
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
and
Boosoya
experienced
also
another
kind
of administrative
change.
First,
they
formed with
Damga,
the
cercle of
Sa1de-Matam,
with
Kaedi
as
capi tal
....
.',:
-
:':"-0_.-' _ .• ~.:::,~ .

---

125
and a miLitary officer as chief administrator.
Then,
in 1892 after the
dismantling
of
the
cercl~,
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
was
annexed
to
the
cercle
of Podor.
Three years
later,
in 1895,
the
two provinces were
united afresh
to constitute
the cercle of Kaedi.
This last reform was
justified by
the
fact
that
too many political
intrigues ~ere going on
bet~een Moors and
Tukuloor on
the
one
hand,
and among Moorish
tribes
Of'.
the
other,
that
no
Moorish
chief
proved
capable
of
insuring
:.he
security
of
navigation and
freedom
of
trade bet~een Doondu
(Ngenaar),
and Kasga
(Laa~), and around the crading poses of Kaedi and Salde. 56
3.
DA.~GA AliD NGENAAR
In marked con;:rast to Laaw,
Damga ~as the ?rovince of Fuuta
that,
for
a
varie;:y
of
reasons,
experienced
most
administrati'/e
change.
Just
as
it
proved
the
least
workable
protectorate
between
the
l860s
and 1880s o"'-'ing
to size and diversity of
grou?s,
it continued to pose
problems
to French authority long
after the final conquest.
Here too,
;:he annexation treaty broke
up
the province into thirteen tiny cantons
headed by chiefs,
supervised by a French appointed E1fekki,
Ibraa Abdul
:":an. 5 7
In dismembering the province as
it did,
French authority
aimed at
t·..... o bas ic
goals;
One was
to
diffuse authority
to
the
maximum extent
pos~ible and prevent individuals from
concentrating too
much pOwer in
the i,r hands.
The other was
to provide
the various communities, wrongly
referred to as "races",
with their "natural"
leaders chosen from among
themselves.
But,
such
a
policy was
a
double-edged
sword
ror,
the
plethora
of
cantons
thus
created actually
increased
the
difficulties
I
I
I

---

126
for
both
local
and
French
authorities.
The
first
problem
was
the
territorial
imbroglio
that
stemmed
from
the
overlapping
of
several
dis tric cs.
For
instance.
one
could
find
within
the
district
of
Demmbankaane the enclave of Loobaali,
which fell
under the district of
Pada1a1.
Conversely,
an enclave of :.Jaawnde in Demmbankaane'··belonged to
the
canton
of
Padalal.
Likewise,
many
people
of
the
district
of
P.ulnde possessed farm land between
the villages of Yella and Loobaali.
The
canton of Kanel
O~ the
other hand,
comprised so many enclaves of
the district of Sincu-Bamambe
that
i t enjoyed almost
no
farming
rights
on the norch
bank of Senegal River.
finally,
the
chiefs
of
Kanel
and
Hor;ldolde
·..;ere
constantly
at
loggerheads over the issues of land distribution and related
rents and
tax
rights.
These
problems
produced
two
major
changes
in 1893
and
lS9S.
a/ THE MODIFICATION OF lS93
The
territorial
reform
of
1893
came
about
essentially
as
a
solution
to
the
intriguing comportment of
"Elfekki"
Ibraa Abdul
Wan.
This chief ~as in and of himself, a sum of administrative
problems for
the
French.
First,
he
held
a
title
to
which
he
had
no
traditional
claim
and' which
had- -as
the
French
well
knew- -proven
inoperative
in
decades past ..
Second,
not: only did each group ·.... ant a chief of its o',m
but also,
eac~ chief under
Ibraa
Abdu1,
was jealous
of his
autonomy
and
prerogatives.
The
third
and
most
serious
problem
for
the
administration
was
that
Ibraa
Abdul
equated
his
function
as
Chef
Superieur with
the status and prerogatives of former Almaarni(s).58
As
I
I
,

---

127
a result, he stubbornly
clung to what he deemed his "natural" right to
collect
taxes
on
land and produce,
appoint and dismiss
local chiefs,
as well as
dispense justice without possibility of appeal before the
Commandant.
11hen
in
1893
Matam
strongly
opposed
his
ambitions,
Ibraa
Abdul
requested an appointment with
the Governor
to
iron
things
out.
This
prompted the reform of 1893.
In an unequivocal reply, Governo~ Lamothe
scolded
the
chief,
indicating
that
his
function
of
"Chef
Superieur"
conferred no
"absolute
power"
upon him,
advising
that
both
the chief
d~d Cee:rno
Mol1e
(eastern
Boosoya)
be
demoted
to
ordinary
"Canton
chief,"
and strongly warning that:
If the chiefs of Damga and Bossea prove recalcitrant,
we
could
very
well
advise
them
that
·.Ne
can
easily
dispense with their services now. 59
Thus,
on
28 February 1893,
paramount-chiefship was
abolished in
Damga and Boosoya, and Ibraa Abdul and Ceerno Molle were granted by the
colonial
Government,
compensatory
annual
pensions
of,
respectively
3,000
and
2,000
francs.
"Grand
Damga"
was
broken
up
into
Ngenaar
(distric~s
of
Gaawol,
Matam-escale,
and
wuro-Soogi)
and
Damga
"proper,"
now composed of eight districts. 60
Ibraa Abdul became chief
only of the canton of Kanel,
with only the privilege of presiding over
the
newl);:
created
"Assembly
of
notables",
as
nominal
Elfekki.
The
change
did
not
improve
matters,
as
the
province
fell
into
near
anarchy;
the
people
cared
little
about
the
po·.....erless village
chiefs.
Those in turn,
paid litcle a:tention to their canton chiefs whose means
to tighten
their grip seemed limited.
Many people began taking taxes

---

l28
directly to
the Commandant at
Matam,
thus by-passing local authority.
Administrator Victor Allys
reported
the people as
saying
that,
"there
is no more chief in the country. Matam is the only [authority] we know
of" .
He
blamed
the
situation on his
predecessors
and
cheir
"direct
:-u le 1t
patterns
of
administration. 61
From
l89S
on,
success ive
administrators would voice a strong concern for reform in Damga,
which
finally came in l898.
bl
THE MODIFICATION~
OF l898 AND THE NOMINATION
OF ABDUL SALAAM 1(&'1
Abdul
Salaam
Kan
was
the
son
of
the
slain
chief
Seh
!'1ammadu
Maamudu.
He witnessed the assassination but was saved in extremis 62 by
his
aunt
and
then sent
to
St.
Louis.
After. he
finished school
in Se.
Louis,
he
was
sent
to
Tunisia
where
he
first
studied
at
the
"Lycee
Carnot,"
before graduating from the French-Arabic "College Alaoui"
with
flying colours.
Besides
land,
he
was
promised Maqama and
its
region,
as
canton.
The
canton
was
entrusted
to
his
grand
father
Ceerno
Maamudu pending
his graduation and return from Tunis.
Upon
his
return
in
1895,
he
,first
served
as
school
teacher,
before being sent as an assistant and trainee
to Abdul Aziz Wan,
chief
of Laaw. 63
Meanwhile,
Damga
had grown more
chaotic
as
chiefs
maneouvred and
indulged
in
false
census
taking,
embezzlement,
and even subversion. 64
In 1896-l897 Hammadi Yero, the chief of Ngenaar, was fired and replaced
first by Elfekki Aamadu Baylaa Aan,
chief of
Hulnde, and then by the
young Abdul Salaam Kan (l897).
. .. ~ -" .

---

129
The reform of 1893 still left many things to be desired.
le
had
only
created
a
situation
tantamount
to
that
of
Tooro,
with
cantons
small both in size and population;
Hulnde and Horndolde
were cases in
point,
',yich
respectively,
one village
of 252
inhabitants,
and one of
1,003.
Thus,
in
Summer
1897.
administrator
Aubert
after
touring
Damga,
proposed the
reorganization
of
the
province
into
six new and
more viable
administrative,
ethnic,
and demographic units.
On 3 March 1898 a consolidation cook place.
The
four cantons of
Maqama,
Sincu-Bamambe,
Seeno-Paalel,
and Kanel were
pulled together to
constitute
the
single
canton
of Kanel,
under
Abdul Salaam Kan.
The
three
others,
Haa~re, Hulnde,
and
Demmbankaane merged
into
one
under
the
sooninke
chief Bakkari
Maamudu.
The canton of
Padalal '~as joined
with l.Jaawnde,
and Ferlo-D;lmga was maintained. 65
In addition,
sections
of the north
bank were joined to each of the south bank cantons.
Despite
administrators'
complaints
against
the
chiefs
of
Ferlo
(1906),
there would be no major change until 1907. 66
cl
THE NOMINATION OF K~~~DI ALFAA BAH IN NGENAAR
In
the
canton
of
\\Juro-Soogi
(western
Ngenaar).
Elimaan
Demmba
Kayli Jallo was
chief
since 1890.
Starting in 1899,
the
situation
deteriorated and he
started having difficulties
of
all
sorts
with
the
people.
People showered
the Commandant of Matam
with complaints.
On
the
proposition
of
the
latter.
the
chief was
fired and replaced by
Hammadi
Alfaa
Bah
in
October
1901.
In January
1902,
Hammadi
Alfaa
became chief of both Wuro-Soogi and
Matam-escale.
vacated by Barka Jom
since 1898.
I

---

130
The
new
chief
was
a
former
sailor who
had
participated
in
the
campaign
of
1883 against central Fuuta.
There
is
no
mention
of his
passage
at
the
"School
of
Sons
of
Chiefs
and
Interpreters,"
but
he
probably
could
read,
write,
as
well
as
speak
French. 67
He
was
the
grandson
of
Yero
Hammadi
Bah,
the
very
one
that
helped
Governor
Faidherbe
get
rid of anti-French
elements
in Matam
(chapter
2),
and
became
the
first
French
appointed
chief
there.
He
be longed,
as
Commandant
Michelangeli
noted,
to
"a
family
whose
members
have
campaigned
·..... ieh
us
all
along,
and
often
give':l
their
1i'/e5
for
our
cause.,,68
idieh
the
nomination
of
Hammadi
Alfaa
and
Abdul
Salaam
eastern
Fuuta
came
into
an
era
of
relative
stability.
Abdul
Salaam
screnghtened ties with traditional families of Damga,
through marriage
alliances,
befriended the Soninke ruling group,
while neutralizing and
dividing
Fulbe
rivals.
The
repression
of
former
"dissidents~
(execution
of
Umarians
in
1894-5)
helped
reassert
French
authority.
In Ngenaar,
chief Hammadi Alfaa fared well by establishing a reputation
of uncorrupt
chief,
and
avoiding
direct
confrontation with
the
rival
-
"Aan"
familiy of
Gaawol.
C.
THE CHECKS ON TR~DITIONAL AUTHORITY
1.
ABOLITION OF LAND RIGHTS
As was shown in the introduction~ conquest and distribution
of
land
and
land
rights had always been pivotal
in history and
life
within
Fuuta
Tooro.
The
political
power
and soc~al prestige
of the
leading strata depended on their position vis a vis land,

---

Dl
)(
a ,.fT•.4'''"r-",
~
A c....~,
'"
Y..• ~.
'"
.7.._ .? '"
Map 1.
Traditional Fuuta Tooro
(Both Banks)

---

132
This
importancE
did
not
elude
the
French
administration
which
very
quickly
decided
to
deal
with
the
matter.
The
first
arguments
about
land rights were voiced in late 1892,
in a letter
signed and sent from
Rufisque
by
Mr.
Huchard.
an
influential
French
man
es tabl ished
in
Senegal.
It
was
argued
that
the
Asaka,
(technically
"alms"
but
in
practice
tax on produce)
indigenous
chiefs recieved,
was an impediment
cO
French
admi~istrators'
authority,
and
had
the re fore
to
be
abolished.
In his advocacy.
Mr.
Huchard insisted chat "asaka,"
keeps
[the
farmE:.r]
in
a
state
of permanent
poverty
and
misery.
le
hampers
the
development
of
agriculture and paralyses the efforts of the
farmers,
obliged
to
share
in
the
absence
of codes
fixing
the
rights
of
their
overlords,
the
maximum
and
minimum
[dues] exactable.
Huchard
proposed
instead,
a
3
franc
per
capita
tax,
of which
a
fixed return would accrue
to the chief. 70
No·,.,rhere
were
the
tradition
of
"asaka"
and
other
similar
rights
more
engrained,
and
the
situation
Huchard
decried
in
Bawol
more
obvious,
than
in Fuuta Tooro.
On the
canton chiefs'
own
avowal--they
had every reason
to conceal
it--only 5~ of the Fuutankoobe owned their
farm
land
in
1899.
For
reasons
of
tolerance
and
political
tact
however,
the
administration paid no ~eed to Huchard's appeal
in
Fuuta
Tooro
until November 1899 when,
a
"confidential
letter" was circulated
among administrators
in
the
"Valley,"
informing them of the abolition
of
the
"entrance
into
cultivation"
right
(Njoldi)
and
recommending
thenceforth,
the
transfer of property rights
to anyone who ~ould farm
land for five
to six consecutive years.
The
avowed
goal
was
to
allow
for
the
development of
individual

---

DJ
"small holding,"
regarded by many as conducive to
short
~erm increase
of
agricultural
production,
by
freeing
individual
iniriacive
and
incentive from the grip of landed
classes.
Some saw in such measure a
means
of
paving
the
way
to
the
establishment
of property rights
for
newly liberated slaves.
A real
factor seemed to be
the undermining of
::he
power
base
of
the
aristocracy,
parcicula~ly the
chiefs.
In
abolishing
land
rights,
che administration could more
easily
curn the
cnlefs
into salaried employees,
and
thereby reinforce
its control over
them.
Hence.
a year later,
Governor Chaudie got all
the chiefs
to
sign
the
"1 October 1900 agreement"
whereby they acknowledged the rights of
the
French
Government
to
vacant
land
(Bayti)
as
sanctioned
by
conquest,
and
solemnly
rennunced
their
previously
related
rights.
In
compensation,
they
were
granted
a
right
to
regular
returns
on
all
taxes collected on behalf of the
administration,
a right which village
chiefs would obtain only half a decade later. 72
2.
CONTAINMENT POLICY VIS A VIS SLAVERY AND
MONITORING OF CHIEFS
The
French were very reluctant
to abolish slavery
in
Senegambia.
Many
a
Governor
regarded
"abolition"
as
socially
impossible
and
?olitically ?eri11ous. 7J
Yet,
the
"liberating
principle"
remained a
bone
of
contention
throughout
the
nineteenth
century.
Th is
was
so
because
the
administration
perceived
slavery
as
one
of
the
bases
of
social
power,
and
as
incompatible
with
the
imperatives
of
economic
exploitation it envisioned.
Therefore,
from
1891
on,
the
administration
would
gradually

---

134
assert
its
~illingness
to
substitute
material
incentive
for
the
obligation to work,
and "extract former masters
from their easy
life",
To
contain
the
institution,
the
administration
resorted
to
various
methods.
As
always,
it
was
the
enemies
to
whom
the
"liberating
principle"
applied
first:
Many
former
Umarians
lost
their
"domestic
slaves."
So did many former allies of Abdul Bookar and the princes of
Cede
accused
of
conspiracy
in
1890. 74
Evidence
sugges Cs
that
some
adminis trators
talked
chiefs
into
freeing
slaves,
in
order
to set a
good precedent.
Elimaan Abu,
chief of Seeloobe.
was
congratulated by
Commandant Allys
in
1895
for
gathering his
forty
slaves
on the public
square
of
Pador
and
liberating
~hem
all
after
having
declared
publically
that
all
men
·..... ere
created
free.
Elimaan
'..... as
also
very
strict in punishing those who ill-treated their slaves
in the canton of
Seeloobe.
The
administration
also
indulged
in
the
repurchase
of
slaves,
primarily to enroll them in the colonial army and the
work force.
The
fact
that
the Commandant of Matam asked for
"an
important quantity of
guinea"
bolts of cloth fo': such purpose,
is a clear
indication that the
operation was a rather large-scale one. 7S
In some caseS administrators
used
heavy
fines.
refusal
to
deliver
passes,
and
imprisonment,
to
deter
people
from
conducting
domeitic
trade
in
slaves.
Others
prevented
masters
from
going
after
sla..v",es,
conformably
to
Governor
Ponty's
1901
"circular"
on
fugitives.
Judging
from an
1899
report,
such policy seemed to be
working in the cercle of Xatam where:
A decrease in the purchase and exchange of slaves has
been
reported.
Ever since
the massive
liberation of
captives
[by
the
French
administration],
the natives

---

,,".',', '
135
have
began
to
realise
that
a
captive
no
longer
constitutes
stable
property
for
his
master;
therefore.
they tend to spend their savings in buying
cattle.
Among
themselves,
within
their
own
transactions,
they
accept
a
captive
only when faced
with no other alternative. 76
In 100ro
and
Dimac ""here
the
trade
seemed most active,
perhaps
due to the proximity of the Moors,
administrators
continued applying a
se'.'ere
repression
long
afterwards.
In
Yirlaabe,
a
man
convicted
of
beating
his
51ave
to
deach was
impri50ned and
fined
by
the
chief
in
September 1900
His thirteen slaves were liberated automatically.
There ~a5 another case of severe punishment in Dekole in 1903.
A
man accused of selling nJO
"captives" was asked a 500
francs'
deposit
and
sent
to
search
for
the
two
men
and
bring
them
back.
The
Commandant
subsequently
made
i t
a
policy
to
fine
both
buyers
and
sellers,
at
least
t'.lice
as
much
as
the
price
of
the
slave
involved.
This
appears
co have
had a
decisive
deterrent effect since hardly any
other case of sale was
mentioned during the following year.
Close monitoring of the French appointed rulers was another means
of control over
the
aristocracy.
After
the
conquest,
two objectives
appeared
high
on
the
administration's
agenda.
First,
it T,.;anted
to
keep
the
chiefs
constantly
reminded
that
the
era
of
kings
and
r'kinglets"
was
definitively
out,
and
that
they
were
mere
inter-
mediaries,
answerable
to
:he French
supervisor,
sole master on board
the
administrative
ship.
Second,
the
French set out
to
prove
to
the
masses
that
they
intended
their
relations
T,Jith
the
chiefs
to
be
of
essentially
"democratic"
nature.
People were given now the liberty to
complain about any abuse or unjust settlement to the Commandant.

---

136
They
could
file
suits
against
chiefs
in
some
cases.
They \\.lere
even
made
to
believe
that
the
decision
Co keep
chiefs
in
power
res ted
in
~he final analysis wich them.
During
this
period,
as
one
would
naturally
expect,
the
people
c
took the administration~of its word
and exerted,
though
sometimes for
vindictive
purposes,
the
maximum pressure
possible,
while
the chiefs
continually aired grievance against what
they
saw as
French sponsored
acts
of
rebellion.
Ceerno
Molle
and
chief
Ibraa Abdul,
for
instance
vehemently
protested.
But,
on
the
whole,
these
complaints
led
to
deposition
of
chiefs
only
when
the
French
\\.lere
themselves
not
interested in keeping one.
By the
time Mauritania was created in 1904,
the
French had
mace steady progress with respeCt to consolidating their rule
in
Fuuta
Tooro.
Much
',.,ras
s t i l l
to
be
done
however,
regarding
slavery,
the
organisation
of
the
north
bank,
and
the
"disciplining"
of
local
chiefs.

---

11
"
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A
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R
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Diondoli •
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NGUfNAR
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FOUTA TORO
_._._ . ..1.
l'lap 2.
lISenegalese Fuuta" or South Bank

---

NOTES
1.
Boubacar
Barty,
"Le
Mouvement
Omarien
et
le
Renouveau
de
l' Islam Militant"
in,
Revue Senegalaise d'Histoire,
volume 1,
number 1,
Octobre-Decembre 1980,
Dakar;
pp.
70-81.
2.
In a
way,
this
was
not unprecedented
in the history of Fuuta
Tooro.
Previous
regimes
frequently
used
land
as
a
political
ploy,
confiscai:ing
it
in cases
of crimes
against
che
state,
or bestowing it
upon political
supporters.
New regimes
often carried out land reforms
of their own liking.
(See Introduction).
3.
According to one
tradition,
the people of Maqama had written a
letter
to
Laamdo-Juulbe,
denouncing
Sheh
H.ammadu
for
"selling
the
country ouc"
to
the
French,
and requesting his
aid and advice.
Another
version
claims
that
Maqama
used
to
provide
Sheh Marnmacu
wich
an escort
of
three
hundred
warriors
every
time
he
had
to
go
on
tour but,
failed
to do so on that particular day of the assassination,
.hich
suggests
that
they
had been
involved
in
the
plot.
(Ibraahi lma
SaIl,
Lecturer at the Ecole Normale Superieure of Nouackchott,
from his
interview with Sammba Naawel at Maqama).
See
also
our untaped
interview with Usmaan Mbow alias
"Delegue, tI
Nouackchot[ 14 March 1985.
4.
A.N.M:
01,
"Concessions
a
titre
precaire"
(Questions
de
terres dans
le Gorgol:
Plainte de Adama Babali au Secretariat General
du Gouvernement,
26jJjc9J6.
5.
A.N.S:
2G14-7
Mauritanie,
"Rapports
trimestriels
1914"
(1
:::rimestre);
A.N.M:
El-87
Mauritanie,
"Rapports
d'ensemble
1906-
1919."
(1912).
6.
For
Archinard'
orders
in
dealing
with
the
Tukuloor,
see,
A.S.
Kanya-Forstner,
The
Conquest
of
the
~estern Sudan,
op.cit.
See
also,
Yves Saint-Martin,
L'Empire Toucouleur, op.cit.
7.
See
our
interview with
Mammadu Book€ir
Baydi Jah on,
"Bookar
Baydi and the Nooro migration",
section J.
Boghe,27j4j85.
8.
According to Y.
Saint-Martin, Archinard ordered the Commandant
of Nooro,
"to spare no effort in hwnil ia ting the
tukulor and favouring
the other ethnic groups,
to protect all
the muslim elements and,
among
the
muslims,
those
who
are
not
Tijaniyya
affiliates".
(L' Empire
Toucouleur,
op.cit., p. 156).
138

---

139
9.
One
of
the
most colourful
oral accounts of it is
the halaybe
~radition on the journey home
led
by Bookar
Baydi Jah,
one of Ahmadu
Seyku's war chiefs,
who would become canton chief of Halaybe
from 1902
to 1913.
(Interviews with Maamudu B.
Baydi,
Bukkari Aamadu Raasin and
Umar Hammadi Jah, Boghe Harch-April 1985).
For
other accounts
see
also,
interview wi ch Mbaare Bah and Dahaa
Kan, passim.
10.
A.~l.F.O.H:
Senegal et
Dependances,
69,
"Rapport du Colonel
Dodds," op.eit.
11.
Maamudu Kan,
chief of Maqama fought
them and captured cattle,
slaves,
as well as
the ~ives and son of Alburi Njaay.
(A.N.S: Journal
OfEiciel, Senegal et Dependances,
26/2/1891).
i2.
Dahaa Kan,
intervie'N,
section 2,
passim.
Others stayed around Guuriiki.
Many settled
in central Fuuta,
at
(ilon,
'..... here
a
section of
the
town
is
still
called
"Halaybe.
(Umar
~ammadi Jah, passim).
13.
The
bulk
of
the
Umarian
returnees
were
from
Tooro;
Of
the
7,557 who arrived at Matam in mid-February 1891, 6,947 were
f~om Tooro,
and
only
few
from
the
rest
of
Fuuta
and
the
neighbourhood
of·
S<:.
Louis.
14.
.:.... N. S:
206 - 2
Dagana
"Correspondances
1891-1897."
(Commandant a Directeur des Affaires Politiques,
5/5/1891).
15.
A.N.S:
2Dl1-1 Podor,
"Correspondances 1838-1893."
(Commandant Molleur a Dir. Aff.
Politiques, 4 crimestre,9/6/91).
16.
. A.N.S:
2D11-,
Podor
"Bulletins
trimescriels
1891-1854,
(Administrateur
Riquetty
a Dir. AfL Politques,4 trimestre, 11/12/
1893) .
17.
2Dl1-10
Podor "Rapports de tourness et missions,
1893-1914,"
(Adm. Victor Al1ys en tournee dans le Toro, 4-5/1895).
18.
2Dl1-2,
Podor
"Correspondances
1894 -1898. "
(Commandant
D.A.P,
telegramme du 8/5/1895).
19.
A.N.S:
2Dl1-12,
Podor
"Recensement 1891-1898."
(Journal de
Marche dans le Lao, Decembre 1898, p. 2).
20.
See cur
intervie'.... with Ceerno Saada Lam and Umar Hammadi Jah,
~
section
2,
"Nooro
migration
and
expropriation
in
Halaybe."
Boghe,
25/4/1985.
21.
Of
the
twenty one
charges brought against
the chief,
several
related
to
~ooro returnees.
It
was
also
established
that
the
chief
largely abused the Tiwaande,
the
traditional right of a chief to settle

---

140
disputes
personally,
once there are enough testimonies and the culprit
has pleaded guilty.
Fines collected from the Tiwaande usually accrued
to the chief himself.
A.N.S:
13G-46,
Podor " Chefs Indigknes."
(Dossier Dec"essac-Villagrand,
5/4/1897).
22.
For
this and the following accounts on the Halaybe,
see:
A.N.S:
2Gl-155
Pador "Rapporrs policiques, agricoles et
commerciaux 1895",
and 2DU-14,
Podor "Emigration 1895-1903"
(Plaintes contre Elimane Abou 1900-1902).
23.
Elimaan Puri
(Jiggo
family)
is,
thanks
to his
important land
holdings,
the
head
of
a
....... hole
client-community
called,
"Purinaabe"
(chose
who
farm
Puri-land).
For
details
on
the
"Elimaan
Puri"
see,
~tollhamed M. Kane;
"Le Laaw et les Halaybe",
op.eit.,
pp.
91-94,
24.
~e shall revert to this in the chapter on reaction to colonial
rule.
25.
A.N.S:
2D11-3
Podor
"Correspondances
1899-1901."
(Adm.
Va1antin a D.A.P,
23/10/1900).
26.
A.N.S:
1G-331 "Monographie du cerc1e du Gorgo1 1908."
(p.
24).
27.
A.N.S:
M-242 "Cour d'Appel du Tribunal Musu1man."
"Affaires 1894-1900":
(Adm.
du Cayor a D.A.P,
22/6/1893).
The
verdict
was
pronounced
in
the
presence
of
Demmba
Waar
SaIL,
Chef
Superieur
of
the
"Kajoor
confederation",
Ibra
Faatim,
chief
of
Bawol;
Meysa Mbay,
chief of Mexe;
Buuna Siidi,
representing the "Njaay"
family,
and Ceyaasin, clerk of the tribunal.
28.
One tradition has it that,
Ceerflo Molle,
to get rid of Xamrnadu
Abdul,
cast a spell
in the
form of a talisman attached to the wings of
a sparrow.
He would have died,
it is said,
had not a young man killed
the bird with a snare.
(Ceerno Aamadu Kan, Kao1ack,
October 1984).
Mammadu Abdu1 Bookar lived in Base
(The Gambia),
until
the
early
1940s.
29.
A.N.F.O.M:
"Senegal et Dependances,
IV,
1897."
Dossier 128;
Affaire Demba A1arba,
8/1897.
30.
Knowing every
inc.h of the desert,
as a
former member of Abdul
Bookar's
army,
he became
an agent of the
French and helped pursue and
capture Moorish
"dissidents."
His
request
for
permission
to
found
a
vi llage near wan-wan,
on north - bank Laaw,
was ·turned down as we 11, and
he had to live
in Kaedi for a while.
For details on this affair,
see:
"Dossier Demba Daramane, "
A.N.S:
13G-47
Matam-Podor;
"Chefs
indigenes
1892-1898."
(Dossier
Demba Daraman).
31.
Another accomplice,
Bookar Abdul,
was sentenced to one year's
imprisonment at Kaedi,
and was not allowed to go home until late 1904.

---

l41
"Situation politique et organisation administrative,
1905."
32.
A.N.S:
13G-47 passim;
Extrait du rapport du cere le de Matam,
1/1898.
33.
A.N.S:
2Gl-144
Matam,
"Rapports trimestriels 1898."
(2e trimestre, Mai-Juille':).
34.
Governor's
Order
of
16/7/1863
officially
annexed
it
to
the
Arrondissement
of
St.
Louis.
Later
on,
by
the
Order
of
6
November
1882,
individual
villages
were
incorporated
to
the
cercle
of
Dagana,
and placed under the "Direction Of Interior."
From l883
to 1885
Dimat formed a single province headed by chief
Elimaan
Mammadu
Daadaa
Kan.
See,
A.N.S:
101-1
"Historique
de
l'organisation administrative."
35.
The new canton of Cede comprised:
Cede,
Njum,
Giyaa,
Njaawara,
and Ja'ambo.
On
3
August
1890,
a
month
before
the
assassination
of
Jeandet,
Lamtooro Siidi Abdul Sal wrote
to the Governor pledging his acceptance:
I
hereby
acknowledge
having
been
advised
of
the
orders given the commandant.
allowing each village of
Tooro
to chose
a
chief;
Being a
true
French
[sic],
and
having
been
a
protege
of yours
[of
the
French I
for
so
long,
I
welcome
this
new
situation
with
earnest pleasure.
(A.N.S:
2Dll-l Podor,
passim).
36.
Charles Becker and Victor Martin
(G.N.R.S.);
Jean Schmitz and
~onique Chastanet
(O.R.S.T.O.M.),
with
Saliou Hbaye
and Jean Francois
~aurel
(Archivistes).
Les
Premiers
Recensements
au
Senegal
et
l' Evolution
Oemographigue
Partie
1
Presentation
de
documents,
Oakar
I
1983, p.
174.
37.
In addition,
Ardo
~bantu Abdu Siidi was the one who captured
Baydi
Kacce
Paam,
the
assassin
of
Jeandet,
and
handed
him
over
to
French authority.
(Ghapter 2).
Ardo
Baaba
Hawa
(Podor)
accomplished
several
missions
for
the
French
that
won
him
the
IINicham
Iftikar"
medal,
and
strong
recommen-
dation
from
Captain
L.
A.
Caiton,
Co~~andant of
Podor,
in
1883.
(A.N.S:
lG.
2683
Dossier individuel).
Ardo Edi 8aaba Daado played a role in blocking the Umarian
emigration.
See Kalidou Oial10,
"Les Chefs de canton!1 op.cit.).
Mammadu
Daadaa
Kan,
former
Gabon
exile proved
a useful
auxiliary
in
the
conques t
of
French
Gentral
Afr ica.
(A. N. S :
lG. 2284),
and
became chief of Dimat (See note 34 above).
Tamiimu Siley Lih was a former Interpreter.
38.
A.N.S:
2Dll-l passim;
L.Vincent,
Commandant Podor a
D.A.P,
teleg.
9 of 11/1/1893.
39.
A.N.S:
13G-46
passim;
Enquete
au
sujet
de
Elimane
Abo~l,

---

142
~
39.
A.N.S:
13G-46
passim;
Enquete
au
sujet
de
Elimane
Abou,
5/4/1897.
40.
A.N.S:
9G-23
Pador
"Situation
politique
et
organisation
administrative 1901".
(2e
trimestre,
janvier 1901).
41.
A.N.S:
13G-46 passim.
Ismaayla Joob had been previously dismissed
in 1897,
~hile he was
can~on chief of Joa1 (western Senegal) for the same reasons.
42.
Sileymaani 8ah who replaced him in 1894,
was also deposed for
being
"safe,
apachei:ic ...
causing
a
great
deal
of
injustice
[sic] ...
Cancelling
on
his
own
authority,
judgements
delivered
by
the Qadi
of
Pacor."
A.N.S:
13G-46 passim.
43.
A.N.S:
2011-1
passim;
Podor
a
O.A.P,
20/4/1891.
2011-2
passim;
Siidi Abdul i
Gouv.
21/11/1895
44.
A.N.S:
2Gl-160
Podor "Rapports mensuels 1901"
(No·I.)
Commandant Valzi proposed Elimaan Abu Kan as Chef Superieur
with
a
6,000
francs'
monthly
salary,
and
Raasin
Kan
as
Elimaan
Ab~'s
"Deputy" for Halaybe.
But,
Saint-Louis flatly rejected the proposition
on ground
that
the Corrunandanc "listened
too much
to Abdullaye Kane and
Elimane
Abou
who,
although
faithful
agents,
tend
always
to
put
forth
their
own
interests".
(A.N.S:
2Dll-3
Podor
"Correspondances
1899-1901. ")
45.
For a full
report on the pilgrimage see; A.N.S:
2011-3.
Piece 1,
"Pelerinage de Ibra Almamy Avril-Octobre 1893".
46.
A.N.S:
2011-10,
passim;
L.
Vincent en tournee
dans
le Lao.
(~aalalde, January 1893).
47.
According
to one of his
nephews,
the Wan chiefs always kept a
seal
marked,
"Senegal
et
Dependances.
Limamou
Lao. 1t
(Biraan
Aamadu
Sarrunba,
F .R).
This tallies ...... ith ...... ritten sources
in which Ibraa Almaami
-..;as always
referred
to as,
"King of Laaw,"
instead of
It Province
chief"
like others.
48.
Abdullaay Kan himself alluded to it..
In a letter he wrote to
the
Director
of
Political
Affairs
applying
for
the
chiefship
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe, he concluded:
I know full well that some of our allieQ chiefs would
very much like
to command
them [YitlaabeJ,
but I
can
assure
you,
Mr.
director,
that
this would only cause
trouble.
(A.N.S:
2011-1
passim;
Abdoulaye
Kane
a
O.A.P,
20/8/1890).
Contradictions
and
border
problems
would
arise
la ter .
and
for
quite a while.

---

143
account
of
this
adroit
rej eetion
see
a
later
chapter
on
"Response
to
colonial rule."
In 1892 Abdullaay Kan applied for a post in Podor but,
Commandant
Xolleur
turned him down.
Shortly after~ards, Abdullaay Kan's domestic
slave.
Saada
Hasan,
attempted
to
assassinate
the
Commandant.
For
details
of
the
inquiry
relating
to
it,
see
A.N.S:
2Dll-l
passim:
"Affaire Sada Assane."
50.
A.N.S:
13G-156 Kaedi
"Correspondances diverses 1885-
1903";
Commandant a Abdoulaye Kane,
25/4/1894.
51.
Abdullaay Kan
filed
the
request
in December
1903,
apparently
taking account of his
career as
Interpreter
and combining it with
the
years
of
Superior-chiefship.
But,
the
Governor denied him
retirement
on
grounds
that
the
laws
of
18/4/1831
and
5/8/1879
required
thirty
years of active duty for one
to win such rights.
Another consideration
•..... 0.5
that
Mohc:1mmadu
Lamin
Kan,
the
son
proposed
as
substitute,
...... as
deemed
,ryoung
and of apathetic
character,
without
the
energy required
for
a
chief,
particularly
of
a
province
as
important
as
the
Irlabe-Hebiabe."
See,
A.N.S:
2DlL-4
Podor
"Correspondances
1902-1905."
2Dll-IO
passim,
"Rapport
de
tournee
de
Repiquet
dans
le
Irlabe-Hebiabe,
Septembre 1904."
In the end the chief was maintained until 1913.
,
52.
A,N.S:
13G - 4 7
passim,
Thierno
Molle
Bokar
a
Gouve rneur ,
Decembre 1892.
53.
A.N.S:
13G-47 passim,
Lt.
Pelletier Commandant Kaedi a Colonel
Commandant en Chef des Troupes,
30/1/1893.
Such
mistrust
caused
the
French
to
post
Ibraa
Raabi
(would
be
Ceerno Molle Maamudu Lih),
as his assistant.
54.
For
the difficulties with Ceerno Molle Maamudu see,
A.N.S:
13G-47 passim.
55.
In western Boosoya chief Bummuy Sammba Jeynaba was
the subject
of frequent complaints from administrators.
He was deposed in 1895 for
reasons of age
and physical
inaptitude.
His
successor
Bummuy Hammaat
Njaay,
accused of poor performance,
was
replaced a year
later by then
young Bummuy Aamadu Hamjatu.
In northern Boosoya,
the
transition proved smooth.
Elimaan I'fraa
succeeded
to
Elimaan
Beelinaabe Abdul,
who
died
in
1894.
Accused of
performing
poorly
because
of
his
age
and
health,
he
was
replaced by
Koolaado
Bah
in
1895,
Later,
in
1907,
the
aging
Koolaado
Bah
was
himself replaced by Alfaa Siree,
56.
A.N.S:
13G-162 Matam,
"Correspondances 1888-1898"
D.A.P a Administrateur Matam, 16/3/1895,
57.
Canton
Chief

---

144
57.
Canton
Chief
Ngenaar (Gaawol)
"Elfekki" Hammadi Yero.
Matam (Escale)
Barka Jom Bah.
Wuro-Soogi
Elim. Demmba Kayli Jallo.
Eastern FerIa
Elimann Buubakar.
Yes tern Ferla
Aamadu Ibraa (son of El.)
Kanel
"Elfekki" Ibraa Abdul Wan.
Seeno-Paalel
Ceerno Hadiya.
Padalal
Siree Diiye Bah.
Horndolde-Maqama-Litama
Ceerno Maamudu Kan
(Int).
Hu1nde
Elfekki Aamadu Baylaa Aan
Demmbankaane
Buubu Haawa.
Haayre
Abdul Kariim Kan
Sincu-Bamambe
Ceerno Ngappugu C.Mammadu
A.N.S:
13G-47;
IG-292 "Monographie du cercle de Matam 1904";
IG-331
"Honographie
du
cere le
du
Gorgol
1908";
Sous-serie
lC.
"Dossiers individuels.
58.
Ibraa Abdul,
like his uncle Ibraa Almaami and o~her members of
the
Wan
family
(former
provider
of
Almamis),
considered
himself
".':".lmaami" by birth.
59.
A.N.S:
IJG-47 passim: Gouverneur a Commandant de Kaedi,
4/2/1893.
60.
Haawre,
Hulnde,
Demmbankaane,
Sincu-Bamambe,
Sincu-Garba,
'uro-Soogi.
Padalal.
and Kane1.
61.
A.N.S:
13G-162 passim.
(Rapport de
tournee dans
le Damga par
Victor Allys,
2-28/1/1895).
Perhaps,
as
a
result
of
these
complaints,
the
Director
of
Political
Affairs
(D.A. P)
sent
a
letter
to
the
Commandant of Matam a
month
later,
reminding him of
the
"Order of 22 September 1887" on the
"indirect"
nature of French rule within the "Protectorates."
(13G-162,
op.cit.
16/3/1895).
62.
Raamata Ceerno Maamudu rolled
the
then youn. boy
in a mat and
put
it·
up
against
the
wall.
(Moustapha
Kane
ana
David
Robinson,
interview with Buuna Abdul Salaam Kan,
Dakar 29/5/1985).
The
presumably
thick
file
on
this
chief
is
unfortunately missing
in both the French and Senegalese archives.
See
also,
Gorgui
Alioune
Diouf,
"Abdoul
Salam
Kane
che f
de
canton,"
Memoire
de
Maitrise,
Dakar
1975,
55.p.
This
study
has
a
laudatory overtone however.
63.
In a letter to Abdul Aziiz Wan,
the D.A.P.
concluded:
He
[Abdul Salaam] will stay with you until such time
he
has
acqui red
enough
exper ience
on
the
peop le
and
affairs of the land,
to take the command reserved for
him.
(A.N.S:
lC.2556,
D.A.P
a
Abdoul
Aziz,
16/6/1896) .

---

145
Si.ree Di.i.ye Bah (chi.ef of Padalal),
and to sti.r hi.s subjects up agai.nst
him by
invoking the chief's overzeal
in collecting
taxes.
He used the
same tactic against Barka Jam,
chief of Matam.
"Elfekki"
Harrunadi Yero
conducted clandestine census
and collected
taxes on his own behalf.
Ibraa Abdul failed regularly to register more than 800 friends and
relatives in the sole village of Kanel.
Ceerno
Hadi' a
omitted
to
register
half
the
people
of
his
own
village of Sincu-Bamambe.
In
aggregate,
Hostains,
the
Corrunandant
of
Matam,
estimated
that
"fifteen to
twenty
thousand people never paid and are not paying taxes
in the province of Damga."
(A.N,S:
2D10-llop.cit,).
65.
The six new can cons were:
Cancon------- :------------Territory-----------:--Tocal population
~genaar
Gaawo------Kundel
16,140 inhab.
M'acam
Wuro-Soogi-· - - -Sincu-Garba
15,601
Kanel
Sincu-Bam--Horndolde--Maqama
14,000
Padalal
+ Waawnde
13,777
Demmbankaane
+Loobaali,
Haawre and Hulnde
8,013
:erlo-Damga
Eastern + Western districts
2,699
A." ,S :
2D10-11 op,cit.
66,
Only changes
in personnel:
In Padalal,
Buubu Dii.'e
replaced
his
deceased
brocher
Siree,
in
May
1901;
in
Damga
Naaki
Mammadu
succeeded co his brother Bakkari,
who died in March 1901.
Uich
che
death of Si.iree Dii'e
(signatory of
the
1863 treaty and
acti.ve
ally
in
the
1890-1 campaign),
and
the death of Bakkari Hammadu
(former
sailor,
"Dahomey"
and "Silver war"
medals bearer),
France
lost
two important allies in Damga.
67,
A.N.S:
lC.1660,
No mention was made of hi.s
passage
at
the
"School of Sons of chiefs and Interpreters."
68.
A,N.S:
2Gl-147
Matam "Rapports mensuels 1901" (Octobre).
69.
A,N,F.O,H:
Senegal VII,
17b;
Hr.
Huchard a Depute Jamais,
27
Rue Pelletier, 7/12/1892.
70.
Mr.
Huchard
illustrated
it
to
shore
up
his
case
with
an
example.
He argued that
Bawol,
wich its 174,000 inhabitants would pay
522,000 francs,
of which the chief (Teen) would be more than willing to
take
100,000
as
a
fair
substitute
for
his Asaka,
the
rest accruing to
the colonial
treasury.
71.
A.N,S:
2G8-46 Hatam "Rapport annuel d'ensemble 1908."
(24p) ,
(A
propos
de
la
circulaire
du
27
Novembre
aux Administrateurs
de
la
va11ee) ,
72.
For the "1900 agreement" see, A.N.S:
2G6-3 Senegal I,

---

146
72.
For the "1900 agreement" see, A.N.S:
2G6-3 Senegal I,
,
"Rapports
politiques
trimestriels"
(2e
trimestre;
Lt-Gouverneur
a
Gouverneur General A.O.F ).
See
also,
A.N.S:
2G6-24;
2G6-25
(Gouverneur General
a Ministere
des Colonies,
1906).
Some
village
chiefs
chafed
at
the
decision
and
continued
to
collect
Njoldi
and
Asaka
taxes
on
"Bayti
land"
wi thout
the
administrators'
knowing.
For examples of the sort see,
administrators'
complaints about the
chiefs
of Ngijilon,
Oogo,
Gankinaabe,
and Jannjooli.
(A.N.S:
2Gl-147
op.cit,
5/1901).
73.
For
the
study of French policy on slavery,
its contradictions
and
ambiguities
see:
Renault
Francois,
L'abolition de
l'esclavage
au
Senegal
1848-1905.
Jean
Louis
Boutillier,
"Les
Captifs
en
A.O.F
1903-1905"
in
B.I.F.A.N.,
B,
no,
2,
Dakar
1968.
t1baye
Gueye
"L'Affaire Chautemps et la suppression de l'esclavage de case a Goree,"
3.I.F.A.N
,op.eit.
Jean
Suret-Canale,
L'Afrique
Noire
Pre-coloniale
et coloniale,
tome 2,
op.eit.
74.
The Commandant of Podor liberated Lamtooro Sidiki Sal's
slaves.
(A.N.S:
2D11·1 op.cit,
Podor a D.A.P,
7/1/1891).
75.
A.N.5':
Matam
"Dossiers
divers
1894-1912"
(!'!atam a
D.A.P,
27/2/1894).
76.
A.N.S:
2Gl-146,
Matam
"Rapports
trimestriels
1899"
(le
crimestre) .
In September 1895,
a
"Village de
Liberte" ·,.,as created ac. Siiwe on
the north bank,
within four miles from Matam.
Podor had also its own.

---

CHAPTER 5:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAL RULE IN MAURITANIA
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR FUUTA TOORO: 1904-1920
During
the
second
half
or
the
nineteenth
century,
especially
during
the
last decade,
the Moors
remained as
they had been ever since
the
""
seventeeth
century.
a
critical
element
in
the
equilibrium
and
evolution
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
Because
of
the
French
laisser·fa~re
attitude,
their action became more and more obstructive of tranquil and
?roductive life on both banks of the Senegal River.
In the early 1900s the French, moved by imperatives of stability
along
the
river
combined
with
the
need
to
link
their
possessions
of
North
and
l.Jest
Africa,
created
the
colonial
territory
of Mauritania.
This
creation was
to have various political,
demographic,
and economic
consequences on Fuuta Tooro.
A.
THE MOORS AND FUUTA TOORO:
1890-1904
The Moors were the Arabo-Berber neighbours of the Fuutankoobe to
the north,
accross the Senegal river.
From the seventeenth century ~n.
after the division of their society into two major sections,
the Zwaya
(clerics),
and the Hasan (warriors)
the Moors had maintained close ties
with
their neighbours
to
the
south. 1
Broadly
speaking,
these
nomadic
Arabo-Berbers
were organized into clans and tribes,
regrouped from the
seventeenth century on,
into three major confederations stretching from
west to east:
Trarza extending from the ocean to
the neighbourhood of
147

---

148
Pador
on
the
north
bank;
the
Brakna confederation,
from
Pador
to
the
environs
of Kaedi;
the
Ida' .....ays.
from Kaedi
to
Bakel.
T[1.ese sizeable
territories
corresponded
to
the
north
bank
provinces
of
Dimat,
Tooro-Yirlaabe-and part of Boosoya,
and finally,
Damga.
In accord with
their
style
and
mode
of
livelihood,
these
Zwaya
and Hasan have
often
adopted a
different attitude vis a vis
the people of Fuuta:
Generally,
e.ach "big family"
in Fuuta Tooro enjoyed the friendship and alliance of
one
particular
Moorish
tribe,
often
the
one
.....hose
territory
lay
directly opposite on the north bank. 2
Zwaya
(cleric)
Moors
usually
indulged
in
commercial,
religious,
and
pastoral
activities.
They
therefore
constituted
the
most
productive
and
peaceful
section
of
Moorish
society.
Most
of
them
nurtured
peaceful
and
spiritual
relations
with
many
segments
of
the
Fuutanke
aristocracy,
which sent
its
sons
for
schooling,
and
received
bl~ssings in return for alms and various
presents.
On
the
other
hand,
the
brash
Hasan
warrior
tribes
lived
essentially on war,
raiding,
and exaction of tribute on weaker Moorish
tribes
as
well
as
the often defenseless
populations
of Fuuta.
Harass-
ment
from
the various warrior
tribes
was
the
main reason for
Fuutanke
retreat
on
to
the
south
bank
ever
since
the
seventeenth
century.
Contrary
to
the
Zwaya,
the
Hasan were
adept
at
meddling
into
Fuuta
Tooro's
internal
affairs,
providing
opportunistic
military
~upport to
one
party
or
another,
and
frequently
prolonging
the
. conflicts
artificially,
for
the
sake
of
amassing
booty.3
These
relations
and
alliances
were
generally
more
stable
in
Central
and
eastern
Fuuta.
But,
even
there,
Moorish
war
bands
roamed
around
the
north bank,
and

---

149
re 1 ished
in
pillaging
chose
Fuucankoobe
whose
chief
they
did
noc
befriend.
As
these
relations
grew
weaker
because
of
French
intrusion
and
cancral,
t:-t€
decade before
the conquest of Mauritania
was
to
witness
an
intensification
of
raiding
and
pillaging
on
either
side
of
the
river. 4
This
had
to
do
with
the
permissive
attitude
of
the
Fre:1ch
administration,S
which
in
turn
relacect
to
some
basic
elements:
the
status
of
Moorish
t€,:ritory,
and
the
concern
for
the
security
of
trade.
First,
Moorish
territory ....as
under
French
domination only
on
a
theoretical
bas is.
France
had
always
considered
its
"Senegalese"
possessions
to
extend
as
far
north
as
the
"Cap
Blanc"
but,
the
~ostility of the people and the minimal economic value of the land had
kept Moorish territory in~ependent in practice, of French control.
Second,
for
the
most
of the
nineteenth century.
the
French
were
too
busy
strugglLng
to
establish
themselves
in
Senegambia
to
contem-
plate
extending
their
co~trol on to the north bank. 6
Whenever
they
envisioned
doing
so.
the
administration
and
the
military
found
chemselves blocked by the opposition of the
merchant community,
afraid
that
a
war
of
conquest
might
jeopardize
the
security
of
trade
altogether.
Since
profit
and
tranquillity
around
the
trading
posts
were
the
overrid.ing
concerns
in
dealing
with
Moorish
confederations,
french policy tended,
starting in 1890,
to fOllo\\o1 the principle of non
interference
with
Moorish
internal
affairs,
and
concern
itsel.f
with
getting
the
different
chiefs
sign
and
abide by various
treaties
and
agreements.

---

150
Chief among these treaties was that of 12 December 1891
signed by
Ahmeddu Siidi Eli on behalf of his father the king of Brakna confedera-
tion.
This treaty "placed the Brakna Moors,
their properties and their
territory
under
French protectorate,"
and engaged
the
king to "punish
all
the
raids
and
pillaging committed by various
tribes
[sic] >
at
the
expense of the people of che left bank and any other French subject."?
It also recognized Siidi Eli's o~~ership rights on the
stretch of
land bet·..... een
Lobbudu·Du'e
and
the
Laaw·Halaybe
border,
on
the
non:h
bank.
It ruled that all the Tukuloor farming on
that portion of land
should pay
the
Brakna
king a
regular
rent of
2,000 bolts
of
"Gubee
cloth,1I
consisting of horses,
grain,
cloth,
money,
sugar and tea,
in
care
of Mohammed
Njaak
and
Ibraahiima
Lih,
his
appointed
collectors
for
Podor
and
Halaybe
areas,
respectively.8
Finally,
the
treaty
forbade
the
Moors
to
cross
the
river
and
wander
on
the
south
bank
bearing weapons.
Similar
treat.ies
were
subsequently
signed
with
other
"tribes ll
'""hereby
some
influent.ial
chiefs
recognized
by
the
French
as
Chefs
d' Escales
pledged,
in
exchange
for
customs
duties,
to
guarantee
the
securi~y around, and the regular flow of gum and millet supplies to the
main
trading
pos ts
along
the
river. 9
Subsequently
however,
these
chiefs
proved
either
incapable,
or
hesitant
to
risk
their
forces
and
prestige
in
effective
police
operations
against
the
bands
of
plunderers.
Thus,
throughout
the
period
1891-1904
and
beyond,
Fuuta
Tooro was
to experience
the most
intense and relentless
raiding in the
form
of
cattle
thefts
and
abduction
of
people,
most.ly
women
and
children.

---

151
A few examples may give an
idea of the intensity of such raiding.
In October
1893,
an
Owlad Ahmed
party of a hundred
and
fifty
rifles
stormed the Boosoya river f~ont village of Jowol and took 500 sheep. In
the process they killed five people and abducted two. 10
In June
of
1895,
in
the
canton of
Podor,
Brakna Moors
stole
24
donkeys,
192 sheep,
3 horses,
and 2 male cows,
abducting a shephe"d. ll
Scill,
in 1903 the Owlad Ta'ala Moors,
following
French refusal to pay
cuscoms
to
Bakkar Wol Sweyd Ahmed,
raided a herd of 200 cattle at the
quarter of Gataaga
(Kaedi),
in broad daylight and
in full view of the
French post.1 2
Judging from the scattered reports one can estimate the losses for
Fuuta Tooro during the year 1903 at
200 sheep and 900
cattle stolen,
53
'.... omen
and
children
abducted,
and
8
men
killed
in
raid~related
skirmishes. I]
This
intensification of
raiding
activity and violence
chat
took
on
the
dimension
of
"collective
hostility"
as
one
adminis era tor
pointedly
ca lIed
it.
was
the
response
of
Bakkar
Wol
S'.... eyd Ahmed
to
French
occupation
of
Trarza
land.
Failing to get all
Hoorish
tribes
to
coa lesce
aga ins t
the
French I
Bakkar
resorted
to
terrorism
against
the
populations
of
the
south
bank
under
French
protection.
During
this
whole period of pillaging the administration
proved
neither
uniformly,
not"
consistently
protective
of
the
populations
of
Fuuta Tooro.
The
use of
customs
as a ploy against Moorish chiefs did
not
prompt
the
latter
to
intensify
their
police
activities
to
deter
Moorish
bands
from
causing
havoc
on
Fuuta.
On
the
contrary.
many
believed
that
these
same
raids
constituted
an
important
source
of

---

152
revenue for
the chiefs,14
In
addition,
many chiefs feared retaliation
and were
reluctant
to risk their power and respectability
in what they
regarded as
"vulgar armed robberies.
With
few
exceptions,
French
administration
reacted
in
a
veey
timid way.
It refused both to arm the Tukuloor and to grant them
the
right
of hot pursuit,
contenting itself with
the
very
inefficient and
limited
system
of
"Gwn"
patrol,15
that
is,
occasional
police
o?erations
conducted by snail armed groups
under
the corrunand of 10,:<11
canton chiefs.
These
chiefs
sometimes
shared
the
frustrations
of
the
people,
In this wise, Abdul Aziz
Wan,
chief of Laaw (1895-1900),
senc
a
letter
to
the
Director of
Political Affairs
in late 1896 requesting
permission to deal with
the raiders.
The letter read:
I myself know how to get him [Ahmedu]
co behave buc,
I
cannot
do
anything T,.,1ithout
informing you.
In
the
event this Moor continues
to disrespect my country,
I
entreat you to let me take care of him. 16
In
the
reply
to
this
letter
St:.
Louis
urged
the
Commandant
of
Fodor
to
"let Abdul
Aziz
know
in
the
clearest fashion,
that we cannot
afford
to grant him such
request. ,,17
Also
in 1902 an
administrative
report
on
Halaybe
clearly
indicated
cha't
people had
grown weary,
and
were
ready
to
defy
French orders
and strike
back.
It
insisted
that
che
Halaybe
found
French
protection
"totally
inadequate,"
and
were
utterly
opposed
to
allowing
raiders
to
go
unpunished.
I t
concluded
chat,
"it would be
certainly
impolitic
to
demand
them or even suggest
to them,
placid inaction ...
in face of thefts,
plunder,
and murders."IS
Despite
all
these
problems
however,
the
administration
·seemed,
for a
number of reasons,
more disposed to resorting to
diplomacy.
As

---

153
one administrator put it later;
The situtation
indicated quite clearly
then,
that we
could but play politics with the Moors.
We were not
prepared
to
occupy
their
country,
and
a
milit.ary
action
limited
to
a demonstration against one single
tribe,
the
Touabir
[Twabir]
for
instance,
had
no
chance
of
success.
It
would
have
resulted against
these elusive nomads,
in a considerable exhaustion of
men and horses and could well have ended in a blow to
our prestige. 19
The first
concrete suggestion came in 1901,
when
the
Director of
Political
Affairs
proposed
a
string
of
military
posts
as
one
major
solution against
the Dways.
It was agai~st this
background of raids,
murders,
and
frustrations
of
the
Fuutankoobe
that
the
administration
finally
decided
to
brush
aside
the
St.
Louis
merchant.
community's
concerns,
and
lay
the
foundation
for
a
permanent
occupation of
the
north bank and parts of Moorish
t.erritory.
B.
THE ESTABLIS~~ENT OF FRENCH RULE ON THE NORTH Bfu~K:
1904-1913
In
late
1899,
the
Trarza
and
Brakna Moors
invited t.he
French to
arbitrate
a
difference
between
them,
and
help
bring
about
a
settlement. 20
The sending of Xavier Coppolani,
a veteran of Algeria
well
versed
in
Hasaniyya
and
Arabic,
as
"Commissioner
of
the
Government
General
in ,Moor ish
Terrico!:'y."
t.o
arbitrat:e
the
Trarza-
Brakna
dispute,
set
in
motion
a
process
.... hich
the
French
called
"penetration
pacifique."
In late
1902 and early 1903 both
kings of
Brakna
and
Trarza
signed
"protect.orate
treaties U
'oIlith
the
French.
Coppolani
organized
their
t.erri tories
into
cercles.
and
created
a
string of military posts north of the river,
to
protect Fuuta Tooro.

---

.,
~-.
!
i[,
[
I
,;
I,.
.::
L.'.,
.'
.~
."\\
"
....\\.
I.....

---

155
During
ehe
rese of 1903-1904,
Coppolani
occupied himself
in
"pacify-
ing"
and organizing the cercle of
Gorgol.
around and east of Kaedi. 21
As
for
the
organization
of
what
one
might
call
"north
bank
Fuuca,"
i t started in 1904 and continued up
to
the eve of World War T.
The
first
administrative
decision
setting
it
in
motion
was
the
"General
Order"
of
10
April
1904
dismaneling
the
former
cercle
of
Kaedi,
until
then
constituted
of
Bo050ya
(south
bank)
and Kaedi and
neighbouring villages
(noroh bank).
This
Order annexed 50050ya to the
cere le of Matam,
and the north bank
to
the newly created "ProtectO[3Ce
or Moorish territories." while
leaving
south
bank
seasonal
migrants
ur:der
the jurisdicri.on of Matam,
(article 2).
In
late
1904
Commissioner
Coppolani
established
the
borders
of
the
new
territory
with
Senegal,
and
the
conditions
upon
....·hich
the
people
of
the south bank were
allowed
to
continue
farming
across
the
r i ve r .
It was
ruled
that
the
river would become
the
natural
border
bet.."'een
the
two
territories,
from
the
commune
of St.
Louis
(''''est),
to
ehe
Karakoro
river
(ease),
thae
"all
ehe
villages
on ehe
right ba~k
from
Ndiago
(included) >
to
the
border
wieh Upper-SenegaL-Niger would
be administered exclusively (sicJ
by ~he authorities of Mauritania,
to
which they were responsible for paying taxes.,,22
This
paved
the
way
for
the
re-creation
of
Fuuta
on
the
ncr,-h
bank,
and the setting of the~ ~"Comrnandement Indigene"
there.
1. DlMAT
The
section
of
Dimat
on
the
north
bank
was
referred
to
as
the
canton
of
Teekaan,
after
its
capital. 23
Located
on
the
north
bank

---

156
from Beppaa-sookaam (west)
to Mbarwaade river (east) t
this
westernmost
uni t
was
administratively
the
only
Tukuloor
canton
at tac hed
to
the
district of Trarza
(Mederdra).
It housed Tukuloor elements,
WaleE,
as
well as Haratin Moors
(i.~: former
slaves).
~~en Coppolani created it in 1904. he appointed Njaay Aliw
Kan,
son
of
Aliw
Kan
the
former
chief
of
Teekaan
and
member
of
the
influential family of Elimaan Dimat.
No~hing in the sources,
written
or oral,
suggests
that he had ever gOlle to
the
"School of Hostages"
or
participated
in
a
campaign
or
mission
on behalf
of
the
French.
The
only .honorific
distinction
mentioned
in
his
personal
file
-",as
the
"Beoin Black Star,"
which he 1,Jon much
later.
His selecoion probably
stems
from
the
events
of
1903.
In
this
year,
a
political
crisis
stirred
Dimat
as
the
people
strongly
objected
to
the
nomination
of
chief Raasin Kan.
Aliw
Kan,
the chief of Teekaan, was arrested along
~ith Ceerno Usmaan
Sih,
Elimaan Demmba Kan and others,
and deported to
southern
Senegal.
An account by Faatimata Jiggo describes Aliw Kan's
reaction as follows:
They
[the
French],
wanted
to
appoint
[chief]
a
man
named
Raasin
Kan
but,
the
people
of
Dimat
refused.
At
that
time
Mauritania
and Senegal
(i.e:
north and
south bank]
were not separated,
there was no border.
A lot of
trouble
followed.
Some
of
the
elders were
sent
to
Gabon,
others
taken
to
prison.
Njaay Aliw
was
then studying the Coran,
he heared of i t and came
ove r .. ,
He
was
advised
to
open
hos ti li ties
agains t
Raasin
Kan
in
retaliation
but,
brushed
the
advice
aside,
saying
that.
Raasin
Kan
was
his
peer.
He
secretely sent a
letter to Raasin Kan.
Raasin left,
and he replaced him in the village. 24
Despite
the
apparent
simplifications
of
this
quote,
it
does
suggest that Njaay Aliw was very cautious,
and that his nomination was

---

157
seen by Coppolani as a way to diffuse the crisis.
as well as consecrate
the a~tonomy of the north bank.
Throughout his career as chief, Njaay Kan incurred nO blame or ad·
ministrative sanction.
The same
informer quoted above adds
that Njaay
Aliw
"was
not a
severe person.
He
never
ordered
anyone beaten.
He
".;as not unfair
to
the people.
He was 8
man of mercy."
This statement
tallies with all French reports of the late teens and early twenties,25
This
had certainly something
to
do
with
the
man's
character
and
background
as
cleric.
But,
one
must
also
recognize
that
Teekaan
enjoyed somewhat favourable
conditions:
The re was
one
single
ruling
family.
fairly
united in comparison with others.
Second,
most people
had left
the
south bank
to
protest
French
rule.
This,
combined with
the deporta;:ions of 1903 may have
persuaded many that Teekaan was the
last asylum.
Thus,
Teekaan
proved more stable
than any other canton,
and its chief remained in office until his death. 26
2.
TOORO
This canton was created in 1906.
Two men competed for the post of
chie f;
Ibraahiima Lih.
the
tax collector of the Brakna chief in the
area of Podor,
and Elimaan Abu Kan,
former Interpreter and canton chief
at Seeloobe and Halaybe (chapter 4). Perhaps in view of his past record
and services
to French cau~e,
the
latter won and became chief of Tooro
(Mauritania).
The canton·extended on a hundred and thirty kilometres'
length,
from Mbarwaade river to Njorol in the east. 27
The capital was
Dar-El-Barka,
a
village
founded by
Elimaan Abu himself on
the
same
year. 28

---

158
In
marked
contrast
to
his
fortunes
in
Seeloobe
and
Halayhe,
Elimaan's
rule
in north bank Tocro proved relatively
tranquil.
Polit-
ical
reports
emanating
from
the
Residence
of
Boghe
between
1908
and
1924
mention
his
name
in
relation
to
conflicts
only
twice.
In
September
1911
he
complained
to
the
ne",ly
appointed Resident
against
lbraahiima Lih,
accusing
the
latter of having sold state
land
(bayti)
·... ithout
permission. 29
He
proposed
the
expulsion
of
Ibraahiima
Lih.
But.
Resident Mere who knew the chief was
trying to get at his arch-foe
and,
re ferr iog
to
his
predecessors'
records
(espec ially
the
Cher.1Y
~eport),
dismissed
the
case
as
closed.
The
second
time
a minor diffi-
culty arose was
in 1913 when
some
people,
perhaps spurred by the same
Ibraahiima Lih,
tried to resuscitate a
fourteen year old land dispute,
upon the new Resident's a~rival.
Once again,
aware of the controversy.
the
Resident
simply
ignored
the
complaints.
Until his
death
in
1924,
Elimaan Abu was constantly praised as a
man who "ruled his people with
tact
and consciousness."
Oral
tradition also
atcests
to
the absence
of difficulties and even to
the chief's paternalistic attitude towards
his subjects,
attitude that was to later serve his son and successor. 30
The
reasons
for
this
change
in attitude were
several:
First
of
all,
the
chief must have
drawn useful
lessons
from his
experience
in
Seeloobe and Halaybe.
Second and relatedly,
he
had chosen to live in
a relatively isolated place,
away from his
subjects,
using auxiliaries
to
deal
....,ith
them.
Third,
Ibraahiima
Lih,
the
age-old
rival,
lived
nearby.
The
chief
kne ..
he
..ould
take
advantage
of
the
slightest
incident or case
of authoritarian
comportment,
to poison
the mind of
his subjects and stir them against him.
So did administrator Mere, ....,ho

---

159
regarded
Ihraahiima
Lih
as
"useful
counterpoise~
to
the
chief,
particularly
in
light
of
his
profound
knowledge
of
local
issues
and
people 31
Finally,
the
relationship
between
Elimaan
Abu
and
some
influential Zwaya
families
or chiefs such as Sidi Mohamed Bekkay,
must
have had an impact on the attitude of Haratin subjects.
3.
HALAYBE AND lAAU
a/
HALWBE
This
north
bank
canton
was
created
in
1906
and
screeched
from
Njorol,
the border with Tooro,
to Carlol,
the eastern border with Laaw.
The
first
chief
of
this
canton
',..ras
Hammadi
Bookar
Baydi
Jah
son
of
Bookar
Baydi,
the
chief of Halaybe
south bank.
wnen his
father,
long
reconciled with
the
French,
had accompa~ied Coppolani duri.ng the ca~n­
paign of Adrar,
Hammadi
had assured
the
interim.
Under
the
father and
son,
the
two cantons seemed to
form one single unit under the aegis of
Bookar
Baydi,
given
the
influence
the
latter had on both banks.
For
t'.... o years,
the
two chiefs
tried
to
run the cantons as their own hovst::,
consorting to
tax people on both banks,
often on an abusive and indis-
criminate basis.
This not only generated hostility on the part of the
people of Daara,
Boghe,
Demet and elsewhere,
but also prompted
French
administrators
to
perceive Hammadi
Bookar as
a man,
"much more
inter-
ested
in serving his
father~s interests
than
in performing his
duties
(sic)." The end result was the "resignation" of Hammadi Bookar,
and the
nomination
of
Jibi
Aminata.
another Halaybe
notable
and adversary
of
Hammadi
Bookar
in 1908. 32
The
new chief would rule Halaybe but for a
short while.

---

160
bl
UvW
This
small
canton
caught
between
Halaybe
(west)
and
Yirlaabe
(east),
also
came
into being
in 1906.
The first man to be
entrusted
conunand
there
was
Lamin
Sanunba
Baas,
a
man
from
Ahdalla
(n.b),
who
participated in the Coppolani campaign of 1904-5.
The
cap i tal of the
canton was
established at Abdalla.
For
reasons
not
specified,
Lamin
Sarnrnba resigned in 1908 and was replaced by Baylaa Biraan Wan. 33
A
graduate
of
the
"School
of
Sons
of
Chiefs"
(1902),
Baylaa
Siraan proved as an important auxiliary on the north bank as
Abdullaay
Kan was
on
the
south.
He
served
first
as
Interpreter
at Matam and
3akel prior to being transferred,
at his own request,
to
the cercle of
3rakna
in
the
newly
organized
territory
of
Mauritania,
in
1906.
Serving at Aleg and Mal,
he
took an
active part in the "pacification"
of
Mauritania,
which
earned
him
the
chiefship
of
Laaw
in
1908.
Shortly
after
his
nomination,
he
requested
permission
to
raise
a
contingent of Laawankoobe and join in
the Gouraud column in the Adrar
mountains,
in 1909.
At the
battle of Rasremt
(April 1909), he won an
"Original Combat Wound Certificate",
along with a "Legion of Honour"
as
a civilian.
Two years later,
he joined in the column of Colonel Patey
and
participated
in
the
"Hodh
campaign, 11
which
won
him
the
"Sahara
Medal"
(with
bar). 35
As
a
result,
he
was
to
rank
among
the
local
chiefs most favoured by the French administration, and thus
become one
of the HUntouchables" of the Commandement Indigene.
The
last
token
of
devotion
to
the
French
cause
(the
Sahara
campaign)
was
perhaps
elemental
in
the
merging
of
Laaw
and
Halaybe
into
one
single
administrative
unit
in
1912.
This
merging occurred

---

161
for
C~O
reasons,
apparently;
first,
Jibi
Aminata,
the
chief
of
Halaybe,
was
not
coping
effectively
with
his
administres,
and
the
chief of the south bank,
Bookar
Baydi.
He was reportedly so involved
in
corruption
that his
:iubjects
were
in
the
end
reluctant
to
submit
their
differences
to
his
arbitration,
referring
directly
to
the
Resident
of
Boghe
instead. 36
This
led
the
Resident
to
demand
his
resignation,
and
give
serious
thought
to
the
possibility of merging
Halaybe and
Laaw.
The
second
concern
was
to
extend
Bayla
Biraan' 5
canton
as
a
re ...... ard
for
his
many
and
valuable
services
during
the
conquest
of
Mauricania.
This
'..... as
meant
to
provide
him
with
what
one
Resident
called,
"s ta::.us and revenue of his calibre."
Since
the
Halaybe
had
no
traditional
ruling
family,
it
was
be 1 ieved
eha t
wi ch minimal
tae t,
the
chie f
of
Laa.... could handle
them
pretty well.
Thus
in March 1912,
the administration
prevailed on Jibi
Aminata to
resign,
and created the ne ..... canton
of
"Laa..... -Halaybe" under
the
command
of
Baylaa
Biraan
Wan,
who
elected
residence
at
Boghe.
Until
1914 when
the
chief
volunceered for
the War,
he encountered no
major difficulty,
which had to do with both his tact and the weariness
of the Halaybe and the change in their attitude. 37
4.
YIRLAABE-HEBBIYAABE,
~EERE, KAEDI fu~D MAQAMA
a/
YIRLAABE-HEBBIYAABE
Created in 1904,
this canton was much smaller than its south
bank
counterpart.
It stretched from opposite Tebegut (Salde)
in
the west,
to
r..Joolwn-Haataar
in
tr.-?;
east.
At
the
creation
of
Mauritcm::'a

---

162
Abdullaay Kan,
the chief of the south bank,
had managed to get his son
Mammadu Larnin appointed chief. 38
The
capital Cengelel or Taybata,
was
located just opposite Tebegut.
After
Mammadu
Lamin
died
of
illness
in
1906,
Abdullaay
Kan
recommended once again a protege
and son-in-law Yaaya Kan,
as
interim
chief 39
The
latter became
chief of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
(north bank)
in March
1907
by decision of Montane Cap-de
Base,
Commissioner of the
Government General in Mauritania (C.G.G).40
wnile
the
relationship
bet~een
Abdullaay
Kan
and
Yaaya
Kan
deteriorated over
the
years,
the
latter managed
to
get
along with his
own administres and administrators.
bl
NEERE
This tiny territory of eight villages initially. was the
northern
portion
of
the
canton
of
Hirnaange-Boosoya.
In
1904,
r,.,.·i ch
the
creation of Mauritania,
the cercle
of Matam-Salde ·.... as
abo li.shed,
the
south
bank
(Boosoya)
annexed
to Matam,
and
the
north bank
integrated
with Mauritania.
First,
Elimaan Aali
Idi Kan,
graduate. of the
"School of Sons
of
Chiefs"
and
chief
of
the
village
of
Neere,
served
as
intermediary
between
the
villages
and
the
Commandant
of Kaedi.
Starting in 1908,
the
Commandant of Kaedi
suggested the
creation of a
canton around the
village of Siiwi but,
the administration showed indifference
to such a
proposition.
When in 1912
the
idea was broached again,
the people of
Neere who
resented being
placed under
the
command of the
Bees
(chief
of Kaedi and of
commoner social origin)
requested to
form a canton of

---

163
their
own,
under
their own chief.
To achieve
the minimum number of
ten
required
to
form
a
canton,
the
village
of
Neere
broke
up
into
Neere-f,.Jaalo,
and
Neereyel
(little
Neere),
while
wQolum-Neere
broke
away from the original village of Woolum.
A small
canton was
thus
created that
stretched
from
the
eastern
border with Yirlaabe
(Woolum-Haataar)
to Beelinaabe,
a
fe~ miles wes~
of
Kaedi.
The
man
elected
canton
chief
was
Elimaan
Abbaas
Ac,
a
member of Rinnjaw's ruling family and an important land o'NTIer. 42
cl
KAEDI
The canton or Kaedi created in 1904 depended for some
time
on the
Commandant of Gorgol and h~d no real chief.
Biri Jagana,
the Soninke
chief of Gataaga
(section of
the
town of Kaedi),
collected taxes
and
presided
over
the
tribunal
of
the
cere le .
Following
his
death
in
October
1907,
different
Commandants
tried
vainly
to
appoint
Bees
Aamadu,
chief of Tulde (the other half of the town).
For several years
therefore,
Bees Aamadu performed
the
tasks
of tax collector and presi-
dent
of
the
tribunal
without
enjoying
the
status
or
revenues
of
a
canton chief. 43
Finally, on 1 January 1912,
Bees Aamadu was officially
comfirmed chief of
the
small
canton extending from Beelinaabe
(west)
to
Haayre-Garli,
a
hill' few miles
east of matam.
le
corresponded
to
part
of
Ngenaar,
and
was
'IIl~ch smaller and fa.r less populous than the
adjacent south bank. 44

---

164
dl
MAQAMA-LITAMA
Litama-Maqima constituted
the
largest
administrative
unit
on
the
north bank.
It was made of part of Ngenaar and all of
northern Damga,
and extended from Garli
(west)
all
the way
to Sane-Loobaali and wompu,
on
the
border
with
Gajaaga
(east).
As
in
Neere
and
Kaedi,
the
Commandant initially dealt directly with village chiefs and used mainly
a
tax
collector,
in
the
absence
of
a
canton
chief.
For
four
years 1
Abdul Salaam Kan.
the chief of
Damga
(Senegal) with considerable land
on
the
north
bank,
served
as
tax
collector
on
behalf
of
the
administration of Gorgol.
Starting
in
December
1907,
Captain
Martin,
the
Commandant
of
Gorgol,
underscored the
fact
that Abdul Salaam Kan
lived on
the
south
bank and was under
the orders of the Commandant of Matam.
He could not
therefore
attend
to
the administration of
Litama-Maqama.
In point of
fact,
the
bulk
of
1907
taxes
of
the
district
were
still
due
to
be
collected
as
of
January
1909.
Abdul
Salaam
whose
canton
had
been
enlarged with
the adjunctjon of Padalal and
Demmbankaane districts
in
1907, was clearly in no position to
perform regularly and normaily the
duty of tax collector for Litama. 45
As
a
result
of
pressure
from
Commandants,
Abdul
Salaam
was
repiaced
in 1909 by Siree Baaba Lih,
an Interpreter at Kaedi.
Shortly
after,
in
mid-1909,
Siree
Baaba
Lih died,
and Malal Buubu Aan became
tax
co llec tor
for
the
canton of
Litama- Maqarna.
Malal Buubu Siree of
Yella
was
the
son
of
Buubu
Siree
and
the
nephew
of Baydi
Elfekki,
former arch-enemies of Abdul Bookar Kan.
The members of his family of
Gaawol were the first
to rally around French standard in mid-nineteenth

---

I
165
century.
A graduate of the "School of Sons of Chiefs,"
Malal had long
craved
the
chiefship
of
Litama-Maqama
which
he
considered
his
forefathers'
turf.
He wanted to enjoy
the
same
favours as his cousins
of the
south bank.
But, Kaedi had turned down his application in 1906
on
grounds
that
the
administration of Mauritania did not
contemplate
appointing
canton chiefs.
He
finally
got his
nomination
in December
1912 and,
as was
the case with
the
chiefs
of Neere and Kaedi,
took up
his duties in January 1913. 46
This
brief
revie'.....
of
the
est.ablishment
of
French
rule
on
the
north
bank
calls
for
several
remarks:
administrative
units
on
the
north
bank
were
generally
smaller
than
those
on
the
south
bank.
Second,
considering
the
evolution
of
the
south
bank during
the
first
decade
and
the
administrative
turnover,
north
bank districts
proved,
~ith
the
exception
of
Halaybe
and
Maqama,
somewhat
more
stable.
Finally,
conflicts between chiefs and
their
subjects.
often
the main
reasons
for
deposing
or
transferring
chiefs,
were
quite
rare
in
the
nor::h.
This
was
due
to
factors
we
have
already
touched
upon
in
the
case of Tooro
(N.B) and which we shall revert to further down.
C.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CREATION OF MAURIT~~IA ON FUUTA
The
establishment· of
French
rule
on
the
nor::h
bank was
meant
to
help
meet
two
objective;;:
one,
::0
help
complete
the
conquest
of
Mauritania by using Ross~, Boghe,
and Kaedi
as bridgeheads;
the other
to
create
the
conditions
for
a
systematic
occupation
and
mise
en
valeur of
the north bank,
by putting an end to
decades of terror from
I
the Moors.
I
I
I
I

---

166
But,
while
the
occupation of the north bank provided a base
for
the
"pacification"
of
the
Moors
it
engendered
problems
of
various
I
sorts
for
Fuuta
Tooro
that
were
unexpected
and
often
very
much
over~helmed administrators.
These problems constitute
the
subject of
this section.
1. EMIGRATION TO THE NORTH BANK
It
is
generally
believed
that
Fuuta
Tooro
started
off
on
the
fertile and land abundant north bank,
thac communities were established
as
far
afield
in Moorish
territory
as
Lake Rkiz
(west),
and Haayre-
~~gaal and Mal
(east
and
center).
As
the
Hasan
(warrior)
Moors moved
from Morocco
southwards
in
their search
for
pasture land,
and as
the
slave
trade
developed along
the Senegal River generating a
climate of
violence,
wars and capture,
the
Black people started retreating on to
the
south
bank
for
their
own security. 47
The
Fuutankoobe
still bear
testimony to
this fact
through a proverb saying;
"The south
[bank] was
inhabited only after
the occupation of
the
north
[bank]
proved
impos-
sible.,,48
The Islamic regime could not bring about
the reoccupation of
the
north
bank
and
had
to
content
itself w,ith
establishing
sentry-
villages
at
the
numerous
fords
along
the
river,
to
guard
against
Moorish
raids. 49
Thus,
as
Lericollais
remarked,
only
three
vi llages
existed on the north bank between Podor and Kaedi,
at
the beginning of
the
nineteenth
century.
And,
not
more
than ten
villages were
to be
founded in almost half a century, between 1850 and 1890. 50
The massive emigration to the north bank was certainly one of the
most. important. changes t.h~ creation of Mauritania brought
about..
Tnis
II
\\

---

167
emigration took place all along the
river,
from
Dimat
(west)
to Damga
(east) .
The
first
signs
of
this
massive
exodus
appeared
in January
1905
when
canton
chiefs
complained
to
the
Com.mandant
of
Pador
that
their populations,
excited by persistant propaganda,
had begun crossi~g
to
the
north bank.
Aamadu Sarrunba \\.lan,
the
chief of Laaw,
particularly
complained
chat,
1'.... 0
men,
Lamin
Sammba
and Aamadu
Pennda
Sukki,
are
sowing
considerable
disorder
saying
that
on orders
J
of Corrunissioner Coppolani,
any person farming on the
right
bank should no
longer stay on
th_e
left bank.
Many look forward to crossing the river.)l
The
two
men
circulated
an
open
letter
written
in
Arabic
and
French and allegedly emanating from Coppolani.
urging the
people
to
emigrate
to
the
north bank,
where
they were supposed to pay no
other
taxes than the traditional Asaka.
Shortly after,
on january 11 Bookar Baydi,
the chief of Halaybe,
informed
Podor
that
many
had
left
Demet
and
crossed
the
river
to
Ndormbos.
He
added
that,
"only
two heads of households stayed,
the
rest
have
crossed
to
the
right
bank. I!
He
went
on
insisting
t~at he
needed instructions regarding the matter.
Meanwhile,
the
virus
of
emigration
had
begun
affecting
the
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe,
further east.
On 28 January.
the Conunandant
of
Podor
was
to
receive
a
similar
telegrarrune
f::-om
its
,C"h"e"-f"-_~S"u,"p",e"-,,r-,,i,",e,,u
...
r
warning
that
the
inhabitants' of
\\Jenndin
had
started
crossing
the
river,
under
the
pretext
that
they would not be
paying
taxes on the
north bank.
A month later,
the people of
Jorbuwol and surroundings in
Boosoya,
and many Soninke of Ngenaar
and Damga followed suit.
By May,

---

168
some
chiefs
had
begun
crossing
the
river
and
vainly
attempting
to
force
people
back
to
the
south
bank. 52
To
deter
people
from
emigrating,
the
administration of
Senegal
embarked on a campaign
to
destroy
the
myth
regarding
the
alleged
fiscal
and
land
rights
exemptions
on
the north bank.
To stop
the unchecked movements of the
Fulbe
pastoralists
it
·....a5
also
decided
that
any
person
involved
in
such
emigration
would
pay
0.25
francs
per
male
cow
and
a
lamb per
sheep herd,
as
passage
right
to
the
administration of :1aurita:1ia,
as
well as 1/40 of
the value of his or her herd upon return.
to the south
bank administration. 53
But,
after a temporary lull due to these administrative
measures,
emigration resumed more steadily than ever,
peaking between August and
November as
the '.... aeers
rE:ceded
from
the much
coveted Waalo
land.
It
resumed with such force
that the
Chef Superieur of Yirlaabe could not
help expressing the fear
to see his canton turned into a "desert.,,54
In the cercle of Matam,
one
thousand people emigrated during the
months of October and November 1905 alone;
Of those,
five hundred and
fif~y seven from the sole canton of Hirnaange-Boosoya.
Another
three
hundred
people
from
the
villages
of
Guuriki-Sanunba
Jom
and
Barkeewi
(cancon of Padalal)
were
authorized to
emigrate
in 1907 after having
acquitted
their
taxes
for
the
previous
year. 55
This
emigration may
have
been
prompted
both
by
land
disputes
among
Deeniyankoobe
and
Yaalalbe
and
by
the
annexation
of
Padalal
and Denunbankaane
to Abdul
Salaam's canton
of Damga,
in 1907.
A few months later,
an unspecified
number
of
people
left
Kundel-Worgo
(Senegal)
for
Kundel-Rewo
(Mauri tania) .56
I
I

---

169
As many people continued to emigrate
illegally,
that is,
without
paying due taxes and obtaining authorization, which
entailed financial
losses
to
the
colony,
an Order was
issued on 14 September 1907 urging
che
administration
of
the
north
bank
to
force
back
any
emigrant
~ithout due
authorization.
Despi te
this
Order,
emigration continued
unabated,
both
legal
and
illegal.
Reports
continued
to
point
to
its
"paralyzing"
effects
on
the
administration
of
the
Valley
(1908),
to
propose the abolition of
fiscal differences and tax exemptions applied
to the north bank
(1911-1912),
and to stigmatize emigration as a draft
dodging
technique (1915).57
The
Eac tors
accounting
for
this
emigration
·..,rere
many
and
often
interrelated.
Chief
among
them
·..,ras
the
subjugation
of
most
Moorish
·..;arrior
aristocracies,
subjugation
that
rendered permanent
settlement
on,
and exploitation of the
north bank both
safer and easier.
As
on
the south bank a decade earlier,
so
also on the north bank much of the
land formerly owned by "dissident" tribes
(O.. lad Ahmed, O.. lad Abdallah)
was
confiscated
and
redistributed
to
allies,
Moors
and
Tukuloor
alike. 58
Where it
was not redistributed,
land became "state property"
and the
rights hitherto enjoyed by
the Moors were reduced to a minimum
(decree of 25 February 1902), or abolished for good (1903).
The
second
factor 'was
the
genuine
desire
expressed
by
the
administration of the Territoire Civile de Mauritanie
to see what
one
might
call
the
"useful
part"
of
Mauritania
occupied
by
Fuutanke
agriculturalists.
There
is
little
doubt
that
the
administration
regarded
the Negro-African people as more
likely
to help develop the
territory's
agriculture
and swell
its
treasury
through
taxes
than
the

---

170
bare ly- subj uga ted
Arabo - Berber
nomads.
It
resorted
to
a
variety
of
incentives (tax exemptions on
a three years'
period,
absence of forced
labour,et al ... ),
to
attract people.
The administration of Mauritania
even pressured
that
of Senegal and
the
Government General to
further
facilitate
the
endeavour.
In
a
report
co
the
Government General
in
1905,
the Commissioner of the T.C.X.
made it clear that:
On
the
other
hand,
the
Government
of Senegal
cannot
deny
any
one
~ho
has
fulfilled
his
duties
[i.e:
aquitted
his
or
her
taxesJ
and
falls
under
no
penalty,
the right to move to the right bank, ~hen it
is his best interest to do
59
50.
Because
they had an axe
to
grind,
local chiefs on
the north bank
also
proved
another
motive
pOwer
in
this
emigration. 60
Financially
speaking,
these
chiefs
were
often,
"Worse
off
tha:1
their
south bank
counterparts.
Enj oying
no
salaries,
they
had
to
content
themselves
T,.;it.h
meagre
returns
(lO~)
on
taxes,
rarely
amounting
to
more
than
1,000 francs,
hence they encouraged tax payers to cross over. 61
Other
notables
played
the
game
of
the
north
bank
chiefs,
often
out
of
political adversity.
In Damga
for
instance,
Ibraa Abdul Wan and Buubu
Diiye
Bah,
respectively
deposed chiefs
of Kanel
and
Padalal
(1907),
stepped up
an active
propaganda
in
favour
of emigration,
from
their
own villages of
the south bank.
Fourth,
as has ever been the case throughout the history
of FUuta
Tooro,
some
resorted
to
emigration
as
a
form
of
political
protest
against
their
chiefs,
or
as
a
way
to
evade conscription. 62
Finally,
relative demographic pressure may have been an important factor.
More
than 20,000
"Umarians"
returned
to
Fuuta rooro between 1891 and
1894

---

171
alone.
Because
of
the
less
hostile
attitude
of
the
French
adminis-
tration
after
1894
and
the
relative
security
on
the
roads
to Western
Sudan,
more
people
continued
returning
from
the
east
until
the
early
19005.
The
demographic T,cessure thus created,
and the confiscation of
land from former "dissidents"
on the south bank rendered the north more
than
attractive
to
the
land-needy
communities
of
the
south.
As
a
result,
many villages were founded on the north bank,
thereby relieving
Fuuta
from
the
above
mentioned
pressure. 63
By
1914
the
Tukuloor
emigrants
alone
formed
one
third
of
the
population
of
the
Semama
(southern Mauritania)
chat is,
33,000 out of a total of about 9,000. 64
2.
RIVALRIES A~ONG LOCAL CHIEFS
r.Jith
the
exception
of
Dimat
-",here
Fuutanke
settlement
on
the
north bank goes
further back in
time,
one of the major effects of
the
emigration
was
to
either
arouse
conflicts,
or
intensify
rivalries
between north and south bank chiefs.
Because the north
bank fell,
up
until
1904,
under
the
jurisdiction of
south bank
chiefs,
the latter
clearly
stood
as
losers
in
the
creation
of
Mauritania
and
the
emergence
of
new
centres
of
power
just
oppos i te
the i r
s t rongho 1 ds .
Virtually all
canton chiefs
sensed
the
menace
involved and spared no
.
... ,
effort
or
political
manoeuvring
to
get
a
close
re1atlve
or
protege,
,
i
appointed.
!
!
In
Ha laybe,
Bookar
Baydi
J ah
managed
to
have
his
oldes t
son,
i
i
Harnrnadi Bookar,
appointed chief of Boghe.
But,
the administration and
I
the people were not slow to realize
the serious
inconveniences of such
\\i:
a
nomination,
and
substitute
Jibi
Aminata
for
the
I
young chief,
(.,ee
iIIIII,iI

---

172
section 3 of this chapter).
In Laaw too,
the
Chef Superieur played a
similar
game.
Aamadu
Sammba
Wan
wrote
to
both
the Administrator of
Mauritania
and
the
D.P.A,
requesting
the
nomination
of
his
younger
brother Abdurrahim Wan,
chief of Laaw-Rewo. 65
Perhaps on the advice of
the Commandant of Pador
Lemorte,
the request was
flatly turned down on
grounds
that
"judging
from
information
found
in
the
archives,
this
individual
is very much feared by the
inhabitants
of Laaw.
It was
a blow that Mbummba conti~ued
to resent and translated into
opposition
to
nominee
Lamin
Sammba
Baas
(see
Laaw
above)
a
member of a
former
I
client
family of Abdalla,
deemed
to be of
less
illustrious
parentage.
The
Wan
ulitimately
won
the
battle
with
the
nomination
of
Baylaa
Biraan.
Another
interesting
case
of
lobbying
occurred
in
Yirlaabe
with
Che f
Superieur
Abdullaay
Kan.
The
latter
succeeded,
like
Bookar
Baydi,
in
getting
his
own
son
Mammadu
Lamin,
posted
at
Cengelel
as
chief
of
the
north bank.
\\Jhen
the
untimely
death
of
Mammadu
Lamin
took
place
in
1906
and Haarnidu,
his
second son,
~as
rej ec ted as
too
young
to
rule,
Abdullaay
Kan
managed
to
obtain
the
nomination of his
protege
Yaaya
Kan
as
interim
chief,
apparently
wi th
the
view
to
securing the office later for then
young Haamidu.
But,
Yaaya Kan,
the
new chief of Yirlaabe-Rewo
found his
feet and obtained confirmation as
titular
chief,
whereupon
a
ca t
and
dog
fight
ensued
that
was
to
culminate
in
the
land
disputes
opposing
the
Alayidi
communities
of
Mauritania and Senegal, before and after World War 1. 66
With
respect
to
Litama-Maqama,
Abdul
Salaam
was
able
to
hang on
for some time.
·An informant from Maqama described his influence
in the
I
r

---

173
following terms:
Every
year,
Abdul
Salaam
used
to
send
his
Jaagaraaf(s)
[tax
collectors].
In
fact,
the
canton
chief was a mere figurehead for,
he
[Abdul S.]
owned
the
land.
He
was
more
influential.
His
father
[uncle]
was
head of
the
[village
[Maqama].
This
is
why
any
ch ief
who
fa i led
to
be
in
h is
good
books,
would ultimately pack up and leave. 67
These rivalries among chiefs fueled the fire of inter-
community land disputes.
3.
INTER-COMtruNITY LAND DISPUTES
Before
proceeding
any
further.
it
is
essential
to
set
the
political-administrative background
that stemmed from the
creation of
Xauritania.
It was clear from the very outset that
the administration
of
that
territory
intended
to
place
some
restriction
on
the
exploi tation
of
land
on
the
north
bank by
the people
from across
the
river.
In
a
letter
to
the
Governor General of French West Africa
in
1904,
Commissioner
Coppolani
had
indeed
pointed
out
that,
"the
indigenous
people
living
on
the
left bank,
with
their
names
on
the
assessment
books
of
Senegal
are
by
specific
exception
[[only]]
authorized
to
continue
farming
any
land
the
regional
Res ident
would
have acknowledged as
their own."
He added that "the cultivation of any
other land would require authorization on the pqrt of Mauritania~ local
authorities
and would be subjected
to
the
payment of Achour
[fee]. ,,68
The door was
therefore wide open to
interpretations of
all sorts.
Few
years later,
Mauritaninan local authorities
seized upon this principle
to
bar
people
from
farming
on
the
north
bank.
Moreover,
as
the

---

174
administration
of
Senegal
often
stated,
the
administration
of
Mauritania
displayed
a
"protectionist"
attitude
and
relished
classifying
"unclaimed"
(terre morte),
any piece
of land reclaimed by
the bush,
follo~ing a long period of lo~ flood,
Local authority on the south bank also played a role.
At times it
deliberately
refused
to
acknowledge
and
abide
by
the
principle
of
reci-procity
T..Jhich
granted
farmers
and
herders
on
the
IlIQ~h,
easy
access
to
the $otith bank.
This
led the Resident of
Boghe to complain
in June
1914 that,
since the arrival of a new
administrator at Pador,
the people
of Mauritania had great difficulty getting a pass
from the
administration
of
Senegal:
"Because
the
new
administrator
left
the
decision
to
deliver
passes
in
the hands of canton chiefs,"
he
said,
"in
the
canton
of
western
Toro,
formal
requests
for
passes
are
systematically turned dowr.. 1l69
a/
TUKULOOR-MOOR OISPUTES
(1)
SEH SIDIYA MBA 'JERSUS MBOOYO
The
influential Moorish cleric ~as,
the
chief of
the
O~lad
Biri
tribe,
was
a
close
ally
of
the
French
and
a
personnal
friend
to
Coppolani
and
all
the
successive
administrators
of
Mauritania,
particularly Commissioner and Governor Henri Gaden.
Given his
eminent
role in the "pacification"
of the territory he had become just like the
other influential Moorish cleric Seh Sa'ad Bu,
an "untouchable. u70
He
enjoyed considerable prestige and favours
from the administration,
and
his rights and properties were respected and protected.
As
mentioned earlier,
(note
58),
Seh
Sidiya Baba had
resumed
the

---

175
exercise of property rights
on the north bank of Tooro
in
1904.
But,
at
the
time
of
confirmation,
French
authority
took
no
decision
concerning
the
line
of demarcation between
the
cleric's
property and
that
of Mbooyo,
a
village
located on
the
south bank just opposite
the
above
mentioned property.
Thus,
when
in 1909
the cleric ordered his
fields sown,
the village of Mbooyo
promptly filed a tomplaint with the
Res idenc
of
Boghe,
accus i'ilg
the
marabout
of
trespassing
the
long
disputed
limi Cs.
In
order
to
settle
the
dispute,
the
Commandant of
Aleg
consulted
the
Qadi
(judge)
of
50ghe
Aamadu Moxtar
Saaxo.
The
latter proposed
three alternatives
co the parties
involved:
a)
To
abandon
the
land of
"Lugac"
[ 0
the Tukuloor,
on condition
that they pay dues
to Seh Sidiya.
b)
To
let
Seh
Sidiya
keep
the
land,
provided he
compe~sated the
Tukuloor
for
their
tilling,
(a
similar
settlement
had
already
been
agreed upon between the cleric and the village of Donnaay),
c)
To accept as
the ultimate
limit.
a
line dividing the
disputed
zone
in half.
Both
parties
spurred
these
propositions.
The
Moorish
clerit
rejected
the
first
proposition,
showing
reluctance
to
leave
the
Tukuloor
on
what
he
considered
his
own
land.
He
seemed
equally
unhappy
about
the
second
proposition,
ar·guing
that,
by
farming
land
that was
not
theirs,
the
rukuloor had alread.y: been amply
compensated
for
their labour.
The Tukuloor on the other ·hand
flatly rejected the
second
and
third
suggestions.
and
refused
to
approve
the
official
delimitation.
This refusal
led administrator Roos
to force
the
people of Mbooyo

---

176
out
of
the
village
of
\\.Ie.ha,
allegedly
located
on
the
cleric's
land.
RODS
also
declared
them
unwelcome
at
Ras
-El·K'ra
for
similar
reasons,71
Despite
the
administrator's
arbitrary
rejection
of
Mbooyo' 5
claims,
the
Tukul'Jor
brought
the
issue
up
once
again
the
following
month.
At
last,
the
administration
voted on meeting both
parties half-way by setting the line of
demarcation at the very middle
be t"'een
the
Foonde
(Hmi t
sugges ted
by
t1booyo)
and
the
Podor- Regba
path
(limit claimed by the
emissary of Seh Sidiya).
In a
last effort
to settle
things
for
good.
it
was
decided
that a commission headed by
Commander
Benri Gaden,
of the Commission of the Government General in
Mauritania,
'..... ould
visit:
with
the
cleric. 72
Because
the
sources
are
mute
on
the
issue
from
1911
onwards,
it
is
possible
that
a
solution
relatively
satisfactory
to
both
parties
was
arrived
at
sometime
in
1910. 73
I t
is
to
be
acknowledged
however J
that
two
elements
at
least
complicated this affair:
First of all,
the administration's
decision
to
reject
outrightly
the
Tukuloor
claims
and,
second,
the
blatant
ill-will shown by Seh Sidiya's envoy.
In 1909,
this
envoy was accused
by
the
administration
of
"'antonly
dragging
his
feet
and
failing
to
report back as objectively as possible to the cleric.
Finally, whether
the
village
of Mbooyo
was
right
or wrong
would
remain
hidden
from
vie",.
But,
jUdging
from
the ",ay this affair "'as handled all
the "'ay
through,
it
appears that the administration had no qualms about siding
with
its major ally in Mauritania.
from the very outset.

---

177
(2) THE ALAYIDI--IDEYLIK DISPUTE
In
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe,
as
Cheruy
pointed
out,
the
Moors
conducted only occasional raids and did not indulge in permanent
occupation of the north bank.
As a result,
the Haratin Ideylik
had
always
lived
in
peace
wi th
the
Tukuloor.
paying
them
fees
for
farming
their land.
Thus,
the
crisis
of 1911 was
almost
accidental.
It
proved
less
complicated
than
the
first
one,
perhaps
owing
to
the
social status of the Mauritanian party
involved.
The crisis
of 1911 broke
out
in relation
to
the
exploitation
of
the
"Kerel"
land
on
the
north
bank,
which
the
Alayidi
had
let
the
Haratin exploit ever since the early 1890s,
in exchange for cultivation
fees.
Tradition allowed a proprietor to
take his
land back following
a seven years'
period of inexploitation.
Thus,
the Alayidi decided in
November
1911
to
terminate
the
contract.
This
decision brought about
resentment
that
threatened
to
blow
the
crisis
out
of
proportions.
Thanks
to
the
mediation
of both
the
Resident
of
Boghe
and Abdullaay
Kan,
the chief of the
south bank,
the
thirty five farms under dispute
were
returned
to
the
Ideylik Moors and
the
initial
te~ms of agreement
restored on a permanent basis.
Aftervards,
Tukuloor-Moor
disputes
were
simply too
numerous
and
too
frequent
to be mentioned.
Suffice
i t to indicate that
from 1911
until
after
the
War,
conflic ts
of
this
kins!
were
to
multiply
as
"repentant Moorish
dissidents"
came
back and. expressed
the
wish,
if
not
the
resolve,
to
recuperate what was
their due.
Such was
the case
whenever Moorish pastoralists moved into Tukuloor farms or pastureland.
Finally,
while
the
archives
of
the
Brakna
(Tooro- Laaw- Yirlaabe)

---

178
were replete with such incidents,
those of Gorgol
(central and eastern
Fuuta)
have
very
few.
This
may
relate
to
the
older
and
stronger
Moorish presence
on the
north bank of
western Fuu:a,
and the absence
of Moorish allies and land owners such as Seh Sidiya.
Also,
the people
in this part of Fuuta Tooro
had often managed ever since the Almamate,
to successfully
reclaim their land.
bl
INTRA-TUKULOOR LAND DISPUTES
These disputes often opposed the same communities on eicher
side
of
the
river.
They divide
into
two categories:
Incidents
that one
may classify as
"minor"
and
relating to
harvest
time,
tax collection
or
fowling,
which
can
involve
occasional
violence;
and
others
that
were
more
serious
and
durable,
related
to
traditional
rules
of
community leadership or organization.
Examples
of
the
first
category
were
the
conflicts
between
Fulbe
nomad pastoralists of the south,
and sedentary Tukuloor farmers of the
north.
The
north
bank being
richer
in
pasture
land,
the
Fulbe
were
~ont to cross the river in defiance of administrative regulations and
restrictions.
Many
spent
most
of
the
year
on
the
north
bank where
their herds destroyed forests and farms.
Following vain complaints on
the
part
of
Boghe
and
Gorgol
administrators
and
endless
discussions
bet~een the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal and the Commissioner of
Maur i tania,
local
conununi ty
members
often
took
the
law
in
the ir
own
hands.
One such
incident erupted into violence at Daawalel
(Yirlaabe-
Hebbiyaabe
north
bank)
in
1908.
opposing
farmers
and
pastoralists.

---

179
Many people were wounded as a result,
and the Commandant of Aleg had to
make several arrests. 74
Despite
the
frequency
of
these
incidents,
those
of
the
second
category
appear
to
have
had
great.er
divisive
effects
on
the
communities.
The
following
cases
of
community
disputes
in
Laaw,
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe and Damga are representative of this category.
(1)
LAND ISSUES IN LAAW
(a)
CHIEF Afu~DU S~~BA'S CLAIMS IN 1906
In
the
province
of Laaw
the
first
land
issue
between
Mauritania
and Senegal
arose
in 1906,
when
the Chef Suoerieur of
the south bank
voiced
claims
on
land,
invoking
"privileges
accorded
verbally
by
several Governors and administrators of Pador to the almamis of Lao.,,75
Annoyed
by
such
claims,
the
Commandant
of
Pador
urged
St.
Louis
to
qUickly
find
a
solution
to
the
problem
by
applying
one
of
the
following propositions:
Acknowledging the rights of the people of the south bank to land
on ~he north, and sanctioning these rights once and for all.
-
Abolishing
the
chief's
rights,
if
necessary
by
providing
him
with a compensatory annual rent in specie.
Getting
the
people
of
the
south
to
forego
definitively
their
rights on the north bank.
-
Subordinating
the
right
to
exploit
lahd
(on
the north bank)
to
emigration.
While
the
third proposition (renunciation of north bank land) was
rejected.
and
the administration played with the
first
(acknowledgment
•

---

180
of rights)
and
the
fourth
(emigration),
there
is no evidence that the
second
(abolition
of
the
chiefls
rights)
was
ever
implemented.
Inasmuch as
the
issue did not
resurge
in
reports of following years,
there
is
reason
to
believe
that
the
Chef
Suoerieur
renounced
his
rights in exchange for satisfactory compensation.
(b) THE CONFLICT AMONG AMRENAABE
The name
"Arnrenaabe"
is derived from the term "Amre,"
designation
of vast tracts of land on the north bank.
co-owned
and administered by
the
"Wan"
and
"Baas"
families
of
Xbummba
(Senegal)
and
Abdalla
(~auritania) ,76
Both those who owned and
those who exploited the land
came to be ~eferred co as "Amrenaabe" (lie: The people of Amre) ,
From
the
reoccupation
of
the
north
bank
(early
nineteenth
century)
to
the
creation
of Mauritania,
the
community encountered
no
major difficulcy managing
the
property.
The
tradition
of
appointing
an
Elimaan
(here
tax
collector)
the
oldest
from
among
the
Baas,
and
the
Ceerno
\\.Ianwan
(Supervisor)
the
oldest
from
among
the
Wan.
was
followed quite strictly.
The creation of
Mauritania was
to introduce
some
changes_
Lamin
Sarnmba
Baas
was
appointed
chief
of
the
north
bank,
a position
the
Wan coveted
in order
to achieve complete control
of
the
·..hole
area,
Second,
in
1908
Colonel Gouraud,
Commissioner of
the
Government
General,
abolished
the
Asaka
tax.
Third,
and
more
importantly,
Gouraud
set
a
serious
precedent
by
ordering
that
land
managers
be
either
picked
among
the
people
of
the
north
bank,
or be
required to elect domicile there.
In his letter of 8 September 1908 to
various administrators of Mauritania, he insisted that:
I

---

181
Regarding these nominations I have always advised you
that,
land
supervisors
because
they are
to
some
ex-
tent
the
agents
of the administration of Mauritania,
should
be
picked
naturally
[sic]
from
among
those
upon whom
it has
authority,
that
is,
the
inhabitants
of the right bank. 77
Since
"Elimaan Amre"
Umar
Aadama
happened
to
live
on
the
south
bank and was on bad terms with both Baylaa Biraan (chief of
Laaw) and
his brother Ibraa Biraan (interim chief in 1908),
Lieutenant Girolani,
the Resident
of Boghe,
decided
to demote him
in August 1909 and have
Jeydi
Aminata,
a
Mauritanian
resident
and
protege
of
Baylaa
Biraan,
appointed in his stead. 78
This decision started off a deluge of complaints to the Commandant
of Podor.
Jeydi was accused of collecting taxes and
sharing all with
Baylaa
Biraan
and
his
brother
Ibraa.
In
addi cion,
the
Amrenaabe
complained that Jeydi was neither a full member of their community,
nor
a
democratically
elected
land
manager,
but
rather
he
was
selected
arbitrarily
by
the
Resident
of
Boghe
in
complicity
~ith
the
~an
brothers.
Following
discussions between the
Commandant
of
Podor and
the
Resident,
the
latter
acknowledged
the
flaw
in
the
procedure
and
agreed
to
a
regular
meeting
at
Boghe
for
an
open
election.
On the
other· hand
he
doggedly
stuck
to
the
principle enunciated by Gouraud
regarding
the
residence
requirement.
At .the
September
1909
meeting
Mammadu
Baas,
from
Abdalla
(north
bank),
was
elected
ne~ Elimaan. 79
Defenseless in face of the administration of
Mauritania,
the people of
the
south
bank
complied
reluctantly
with
the
decision.
No
serious
dispute
broke
out
until
January
1911
when
Elimaan
Hammaat,
from
Abdalla
(n. b),
and Ceerno Umar
from Abdalla
(s. b),
differed about
the
sharing of taxes.
The
former and the people of the north bank refused

---

182
to
give
Ceerno
Umar
and
the
notab les
of
the
south
bank
what
"by
tradition"
seemed
to
be
their
due.
In
fact,
tradition
did
not
strictly
require
an
Elimaan
to
share
taxes
collected on the
land he
supervised,
but
any person
in
this
capacity often thought it wise
to
give part of it to his electors,
depending on their age and importance.
After
the matter was put to
the
tribunal of Boghe,
Elimaan pledged to
bestow on his relatives
in Senegal part of the
produce,
as a token of
gratitude.
In
1919,
a
conflict
opposed
the
Amrenaabe
of Mauritania
and
the
Wan~anbe
of
the
south
bank,
in
relation
to
election
procedures.
Because
the chief of Laaw
(North)
threatened
to
depose
the
"Elimaan"
for
incompetence,
Abdalla
(Mauritania)
tried
to
deny
the l.Jan of the
south bank their
traditional rights as
electors.
This
prompted Ibraa
Biraan
and
Hammaat
Sammba
to
file
a
complaint
on
behalf
of
the
"Arnrenaabe"
(s. b)
and called upon
the
administration and
the
tribunal
of
the
cercle
to
arbitrate.
Referring
to
Lieutenant
Cheruy,
who
had
become
an
au thori ty
in
preceden ts
throughout
the
Semama,
the
judge
reasserted
the
traditional
right
of
Mbumrnba
and
Abdalla
(s,b)
to
partake
of
the
election
of
Elimaan
Amre.
The
Resident
took
the
opporcunity
to
reassert
the
so called right
that
the
French
inherited
from
the
Almaami(s),
to
control
Elimaan's
management
and even
depose
this
office holder when necessary.
Resident Mazin
felt
at
some
point
so
overwhelmed
by
problems
of
the kind that he proposed the merging of the two banks in the
Brakna:
All
these
conflicts
would
end
the
day
these
populations
of
the
same race
[sic]
on
the
two
banks
I

---

18J
would be reunited under one single command.
This may
be the most logical decision to take,
and the easiest
way to go about ruling both banks. 80
(2)
CONFLICTS IN YIRLAABE-HEBBIYAABE
Three communities in particular were affected by the
partition of
Fuuta
Tooro:
The
Aan-Aanbe,
Yirlaabe-Alavidi,
and
Hebbivaabe.
Conflicts
among
them
revolved
mostly
around
the
election
of
land
supervisors,
land
distribution,
and
sharing
of
taxes.
Given
the
violent
form
it
took,
the
involvement
of
local
authorities
on
both
banks,
and
the
duration
of
the
crisis
it
occasioned,
the
dispute
bet'.Jeen
the
Alayidi conununities proved undoubtedly,
the most
important.
of them all. 81
Ca) THE CONFLICT ~~ONG THE AI~YIDI:
1908-1919
The
Alavidi
were
a
conununity
of
eleven
clans
divided
by
the
creation
of
Mauritania
into
t'""o
groups
on either
side
of
the
river.
Their
land
straddled
the
river
between
Abdalla
and
Daa"'alel
in
the
cantons of Mbaan
(Mauritania)
and Salde (Senegal).82
For centuries it
had
been
subjected
to
strict
rules
of
oW'llership
and
exploitation.
Their
Ardo
(master
of
land),
traditionally
elected
among
three
families descending from Koli
Tenella (El Hidi,
El Tugay,
El Ngoona),
supervised
the
distribution
of
land
anti
related
taxes.
He
was
assisted
by
a
Jaagaraaf
and
a
Kamalenku,
collectors
chosen
respectively from the El Soogi and Sohsoobe clans.
In 1908,
the "Gouraud decision"
referred to earlier,
confined the
majority of the Alayidi to the land of the south
bank,
lending thereby

---

l84
·...reight
and
substance
to
the
northerners'
claim
for
autonomy.
This
also
generated
a
great
deal
of
tension.
The
table
on
land disputes
during
the
month
of
January
1911,
shoW's
demonstrably
the
level
of
intensity these disputes often attained (see appendix 2).
In facL:,
until 1917,
a hundred and seventy five
"Alayidi" or
the
north bank,
one
fourth of the
total,
enjoyed the
"lion's share" of tax
produce at the expense DE the seven hundred living on the south bank. B3
But,
because
they enjoyed
the
support of
Abdullaay Kan,
former Chef
Suoerieur of Yirlaabe and Alavidi himself,
the people of the south bank
never resigned
themselves
to
their loc as did their fellow Aan-Aanbe.
In May 1917, Abdullaay Kan,
in line with his "war of influence"
against
Yaaya Kan.
the
chief of
the
north bank,
and his
tendency
to champion.
the
rights
of his
administres,
prevailed
on Henri
Gaden,
new
Commis-
sioner of Mauritania,
to
reinstate
the
status
quo ante,
by
restoring
the
rights
of
the
southerners.
Following
Gaden's
de'c is ion.
the
situation was reversed.
The Alayidi of Senegal
started encroaching on
their
neighbours'
rights,
as
the
settlement
of
most
disputes
was
gradually
left
to
the
tribunal
of
the
south
bank.
Th i s
caused
the
Attorney General of French West
Africa to address
to Governor General
Gabriel Angoulvant a
lerter,
complaining about Salde's
biased way of
handling
the
1917
Luggere
and
Sobbal
land
disputes
between
the
two
riverine
communities.
The Attorney General who strongly believed the
judiciary procedure flawed and
the Mauritanians wronged,
did not
have
kind words
for Satigi
Siree Abbaas Soh and Mohammadu Abdul Raabi,
the
two
local
magistrates who
initiated the
settlement.
Said the Attorney
General:
I
I

---

,,'",
185
As
for
the
former
{Siree
Abbaas],
the
most
knowledgeable
[of
the
two],
the
ties
of
friendship
and dependence d,at link him to the Kane of Salde are
well
knoWTl.
And
we
know
from
experience
that
professional
honesty
for
a
Toutouleur
[Tukuloor]
comes always after his personal interests
[sic].84
The
entire
year
1918
was
marked
by
a
series
of
conflicts.
In
April,
a violent
fight broke
out.
Many people were seriously wounded
and
only
a
prompt:
deployment
of
authorities
on
both
sides
prevented
further casualties.
Bet~een April and June,
a
thorough
investigation
was
conducted
by
both
the
Commandant
of
Salde
and
the
Resident
of
Boghe,
which resulted in the arrest of sixteen people,
the bulk of them
from
the
Senegalese
side. 85
A month
later,
the crisis deepened with
the
intident
of
"Cooj i-Ngulli"
of
4
May
1918.
On
one
night,
some
Senegalese
Alayidi
with
Salde's
benevolent
neutrality,
if
not
countenance,
crossed
the
river
and
tried
to
seize
the
tax
produce
stocked
in
Jaagaraaf
W'uldu
Boys i' s
compound.
Wuldu Boysi held them
prisoner
in his
home.
By June,
as
the
"Alayidi"
failed to agree upon
the
choice
of
a
ne ........
Ardo,
the
matter
was
submitted
to
vote.
The
Senegalese being
the majority,
Hammadi
Baaraan,
a man
from
the
south
bank,
was
elected Ardo
along ........ ith
a Jaagaraaf and a
Kamalenku.
Once
again
the
Mauritanians
refused
to
abide
by
the
electoral
results
and
several
incidents ensued that prompted a
more dec~ive administrative
intervention.
In January
1919,
the
French
sent
Jean Vidal,
Admininstrator
in
Chief
and
Inspector
of
Administrative
Affairs.
along
with
the
Cadi
Superieur of Boghe Aamadu Moxtaar Saaxo,
to conduct a
thorough inquiry

---

186
and bring
about
a
lasting
solution
to
the
problem.
Thus
in March-
I
April,
through
what
became
known
as
the
"Vidal
Convention,"
Ardo
Hammadi
Baraan
Bah
agreed
to
appoint
wuldu
Boysi
(Mauritania)
main
j aagaraa f.
By June 1919 Paris Leclerc,
the Commandant of Salde, could
write:
Today
the
fier~e
Ouldou
Boysse
has
become
the
faithful
follower
of
ardo
Amady
Barane
and
spends
most of his time on the left [south] bank. 86
It
took eleven years
to diffuse
the crisis
and reconcile
the
two
branches of the Alayidi community.87
Other
conflicts
also
plagued
the
tranquillity
of
the
cantons
astride the river:
Yirlaabe-Pete against the Hebbiyaabe of Mauritania,.
and Jaanankoobe
(n.b) against Funeebe
(s.b).BB Most of them proved less
serious
than the Alayidi crisis however.
I t
appears
tha t
land
disputes
be tween
the
two
banks
took
more
serious
forms
in
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
than
in neighbouring
provinces.
As
recognized
by
both
oral
and
written
sources,
the
onus
of
responsibility
lay
on
the
chiefs
of
both
cantons.
Abdullaay
Kan
(Salde), had several reasons for getcing involved.
Because he belonged
to
the
Jallube
clan
of
the
Alavidi
group,
he
seemed
to
consider
the
defence
of
their
interests
as
one
of
his
prime
responsibilities
and
his
"natural"
mission.
Besides,
he had vested interests
in promoting
the
pre -eminence
of
the
south
bank.
A second
reason was
that,
given
his
long
career
as
a
collaborator
and
his
consequent
prest:ige
as
a
symbol of French authority, Abdullaay Kan relished over-emphasizing his
power
and
influence.
This
so
annoyed
administrators
on
both
sides

---

187
that
one
Resident,
after Abdullaay
Kan's
retirement,
had
this
to say
about
the continuing influence
of the Chef Superieur:
Everything
is
all
right
in most parts of the
cercle
of
Chemama.
The
only
source
of difficulties
is
the
cercle
of
Diorbivol
[Salde]
where,
despite
the
initial
agreements
requiring passes
to
be
delivered
by
Boghe
to
pastoralists
of
the
left
bank,
this
former
chief
of
the
Irlabe-Aleydi,
Abdoulaye
Kane,
incessantly causes
us
trouble
through his bad advice
and his
incitations
to independence
[sic].
Invoking
his
prestige
of
years
past
and
[being]
a
fine
speaker,
he
tries
to make everyone believe that his
permission
or
that
of
his
commandant
suffice
to
freely move one's flocks. 89
In
addition,
the
former
chief
of
Yirlaabe
and
his
son
and
successor Haamidu Kan had been waging a war
of influence on Yaaya Kan
ever since
the
l~tter had become titular chief of the north bank.
It
~as hardly a coincidence therefore,
that the crisis peaked in the years
1917-1918,
a few months after Yaaya Kan obtained official confirmation
of his
chiefship and the very year he
tranferred his headquarters from
Cengelel
near
Salde
to
Mbaan
a
bit
further
upstream. 90
Last,
by
backing their people the Kan-Salde responded not only to the demand of
kinship
but
also
to
the
desire
for
material
gain
since
they
were
beneficiaries
of a
share
of land as members of the Alayidi community,
and of tax rebates as chiefs.
The
fact
that
Abdullaay
Kan
obtained
from
Commissioner
Henri
Gaden
the
land
referred
to
earlier
(note
88)
amidst
the
dispute,
suggests that he intended to take full advantage of the confusion going
on then.
As
for Yaaya Kan who,
to some extent,
was on the
defensive,
he also had more than one reason to back his
administres.
By so doing
he set out to
further assert and enhance his prestige and independence

---

188
vis a vis Salde.
Moreover,
he needed to get his tax paying population
to
expand
on a
continuing
basis.
The
most
efficient ',jay
to
attract:
people on to the north
bank was not only to secure them land,
but also
and
especially.
to
see
to
it
that
their
"rights"
......ere
constantly
safeguarded.
Finally.
it is not all certain that Yaaya Kan himself had
no plans for acquiring land of his o·Jn. 91
All of this not ...... ithstanding,
it would be ...... rong to contend,
along
'..11th
the
administration
that
the
chiefs
"are
in
actuality,
the
prime
cause
of disagreement between
the
inhabitants of
the
two banks."
In
actuality,
the
people
of
the
north bank saw
Mauritania as a
land of
opportunities
and
hitherto
frustrated
ambitions.
Many.
as
the
administrator of Jorbuwol put it:
Went and established themselves on the
right bank
[Mauritania)
in the hope of being elected "masters of
land."
Being
the
only
[members I
of
the
community
living
on
the
ri.ght
bank,
they have every chance
to
be elected. 92
Therefore,
it was only natural that they fought to preserve rights
that in normal circumstances they would not have enjoyed.
The people of
the
south
bank
on
the
other
hand
were
defending
not
on ly
conc re te .
economic
interests
but
also
the
age
old
tenets
of
the
soc ie ty.
the
control
of
elders
over
means
of
production
(land).
surplus
(tax
produce)
and
even,
by
indirection,
means
of
reproduction.
By
substituting the
residence criterion for
age
in
the
election of land
supervisors.
the
administration
of
Mauritania
had
in
fact
attacked
these principles as well as the
basic democratic right of the majority
(Southerners)
to decide .
.. '
I

---

189
Some
administrators
seemed to understand this upsetting effect of
che
policy
on well
established structures
and practices.
Apparently,
it
was
such
awareness
of
the
situation
that
caused
R.
Eloi,
administrator
of
Jorbuwol.
to
appeal
to
Lieutenant
Colonel
Gaden
to
repeal the "Gouraud decision"
in February 1917.
(3) Lfu~D DISPUTES IN DN~GA
With respect to the intensity of the disputes between Kauritanians
and
Senegalese.
Damga
is
comparable
only
to
the
province
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe.
Three main conflicts absorbed the time and energy
of administrators on either side:
The
conflict bet~een Aali and Sule
Sammba
Jom,
and
those
arising
from
Col one 1
Dodds'
land
donations,
between Padalal and waali on the one hand,
and Abdul Salaam Kan and the
people of Maqama-Litama on
the other.
(a)
~~LI SN~BA JOM VERSUS SULE S. JOM:
1907-1917
Aali
and
Sule were
ewo of
Sammba Jom's many children,
who
were
entrusted
the care of considerable
landed property bequeathed by their
father. 93
In late 1906 and early 1907 Aali decided to emigrate to ch.
north bank where most of
the
land was
located.
He
founded,
with his
many
slaves,
the
village
of
Faduwa,
just
opposite
that
of
Juude-
Guuriiki.
Following
this
emigration,
the
land was
divided
up
among
Sa~~ba Jom's children.
Starting in 1913, difficulties
relating to
the
issue
intensified
and
the
Commandant
of Kaedi
blamed most of
them on
Seh Muusa Kamara,94

---

190
Accord would prevail within
this
family
if a cleric
from the left bank.
a freed slave of Samba Diom's did
not sow discord for his own advantage for,
within the
sharing out among the children of Samba Diom,
part of
the
land
has
b=en
reserved
and
entrusted
to
the
cleric's care.
wnile
it
is
not certain whether
this
cleric was
~he one to blame
for
the
whole
affair,
both
brothers
questioned
the
procedure
and
complaints
were
to
multiply
between
1913
and
1914,
forcing
both
administrations
to suspend the collection of taxes on the land,
pending
a
lasting
settlement
of
the
dispute.
Finally,
in December 1914,
the
Commandant
of
Kaedi
met
with
the
two
brothers
and
Abdul
Salaam Kan,
chief
of
Damga
and
representative
of
the
administrator
of Matam.
An
agreement
known
as
the
11 Faduwa
convention"
was
arrived
at
which
organized the management of the
land and fixed
the rights of each one,
concerning the property inherited from Sammba Jom. 96
According to one informant, Aali and Sule ended up with a
hundred
plots
each.
They were
supposed
to manage
them
as
collective
family
property
(Joowre)
but
ultimately
usurped
the
land
at
the
expense of
other
brothers
and
sisters.
This
allowed
Aali
to
eventually
consolidate his
properties by
founding
the
village
of Boggel,
a bit
further on the highland of the north
bank,
in 1915.
The convention of Faduwa did not end the disputes however
for,
in
March 1917 P.almide de Raffin,
the Commandant of Matam,
received while
touring Damga,
many complaints
about
trouble
that
Aali
still
caused
the people of the
south bank farming
in
Mauritania.
The
inhabicants
of
the
three
Guuriiki
(villages)
were
so
cired of
it
all
that
th~y
were ready to "abandon Souley
and emigrate
to
the
right bank to avoid
I

---

191
97
the
vexations
of
their
land
proprietors. l
Naturally
Raffin,
•
concerned as he was by the threats of emigration,
promised to meet with
his north bank counterpart in order to find the best solution possible.
Neither
Kaedi,
nor Matam made
any reference
to
the
issue afterwards,
which suggests
that the
two brothers had been subsequently
brought to
adopt
a
more
reasonable
attitude
vis
a
vis
their
tenants.
Our
informant Mbaare Bah does mention that Aal! and
Sule had at some point
rea 1 ized
tha t
they
5 tOOG
to
lose
everything,
should
they
contin'.le
annoying the
"Captain"
and
the
"Civilian,"
as
the Conunandancs
of Kaedi
and Matam were often
respectively addressed.
They decided to settle
their quarrels and try to consolidate
their gains.
The
French
administration
was
prepared
to
bear
with
the
two
scheming brothers
for
several
reasons:
Their
father,
Sammba
Jam Bah
was an early ally of the French in eastern Fuuta.
Moreover,
Aali Sammba
Jom who had
influential uncles
in Kaay
and
good
friends
in St.
Louis,
had
rendered
services
by
volunteering
for
diplomatic
missions
in
Moorish territory.
Both brothers
proved to be influential auxiliaries
of the administration on either side of the river.
Cb) THE NJA~ LAND ISSUE:
PADALAL VERSUS ~AALI,
1907-1914
Padalal
and
Waali
were
two
Deeniyanke
villages
located
respectively on the south and north banks.
Their dispute concerned the~
land of Njaw,
on the north bank.
Siree Diiye Bah,
Deeniyanke chief of
Padalal,
had
occupied
the
land
vacated
by
"dissidents"
in
1891,
invoking
the
"Dodds - Lamothe
decree. 11
As
returning
"dissidents"
reclaimed
their
land,
Buubu
Diiye,
the
brother
and
successor
of
the
I
I

---

192
chief,
along with his
cousin Siidi Boongal,
chief of Waali,
continued
to claim property rights, brandishing without any written evidence,
the
aforementioned decree.
This
ques t ion
took on
neW'
dimens ions
fa llowing
the
crea tion
of
Mauritania,
the
peo?le
of
the
north
bank
showing
more
and
more
reluctance
to recognize
the so
called rights.
The administrators
of
Gorgol
and Macam had
to get
together and draw the
r'Convention
of 10
June
1906"
recognizing
certain
rights
to
the
chiefs
of
Padalal
and
IJaali,
while
removing
some
of
the
land
from
their
grip.
At
the
instigation
of
Buubu
and
Siidi
Boongal,
it
soon
became
a
conflic t
opposing the communities of Mauritania and
Senegal,
and the chiefs of
villages
surrounding Padalal and
IJaali.
In
late
1907
for
instance,
the administration report~d
mutual denunciations of chiefs concerning
embezzlement
of
tax
funds
to
ei ther
authori ty, 98
In
face
of
this
mounting tension,
the
assistant administrators of Matam and Kaedi met
at
T...Taali
on
27
December
1907
to
reconfirm
the
rights
of
farmers
to
cultivate
without paying fees to either chief.
For
several
years
the
Deeniyanke
chiefs
kept
on
conte,sting
the
decision of the administration on grounds that they were right and they
were "the former masters of the country," and
resuscitate
the dispute
with each' passing administrator.
Buubu
who had influence on the north
bank,
induIg~d in intrigues
placing his own men as chiefs of villages,
"to look after his
interests and keep an eye on his enemies
in regard
to the Ndiao land issue. r,99
In 1914 following new incidents,
the Commissioner of
Mauritania,
in accord with
the Lieutenant~Governor of Senegal,
held a meeting at
I

---

19]
Kaedi with
the
administrators of Gorgol
and
Matam.
He urged both of
them
to
go
to
iJaali
and,
"in
concert,
after
hearing
all
part.ies
concerned and following a thorough
inquiry on the spot, solve once and
for
all,
this
big
issue
which,
it
seems
to
me,
is
ripe
for
a
solution."lOO
This
issue
did
not
linger
on
indefinitely,
more
so,
because
Buubu
Diiye
was
in
no
position
to
shore
up
his
claims
by
p:-oviding
a
related
"act
of
donation."
More
importantly,
he
was
regarded ever since
his dismissal in 1907 as a "trouble maker."
(c)
ABDUL SALAAM KAN VERSUS MAQAMA-LITAMA:
1912-1918
This
issue
shares
with
the
previous
one
two
basic
features:
It
resulted
from
Dodds'
donation of 1891
and
in
the
frustration of both
Gorgol
and Matam administrations,
as well
as
local chiefs and people.
Most
of
the
land
around
Maqama- Litama
and
Horndolde,
as
mentioned
earlier,
was
confiscated and
granted
to
Abdul Salaam Kan as
a \\.Jay of
imposing a penalty on the people of the region and compensating for the
death of the chief's father.
Unlike
Buubu Diiye, Abdul Salaam Kan did
carry
documents
duly attesting
to
the
donation. lOl
In addition,
the
regular
correspondence
between
the
Lieutenant-Governor
of
Senegal and
the Commissioner of
Mauritania forced Kaedi
to
take
these claims more
seriously than those of the Deeniyankoobe.
On
the
other
hand,
the
donation
posed
a
nwnber
of
procedurial
problems
that
added
to
the
pertinence
of
the
contestants'
claims.
First of all
the
French,
who had no
idea of [he
extent of the
land,
I
did not bother specifying the boundaries
in the
"Act of donation. ,,102
Second,
one of the justifications of the donation was that Seh Mammadu,
I
l
I
I

---

194
Abdul Salaam's
father,
was a land owner in the region,
prior to French
conquest. I03
This premisse led the French to indiscriminately
include
in
the
donation
of
the
so
called
"state
domain"
(Bayti
land),
some
collective land (Joowre)
previously
owned and managed by families who
sometimes
had
nothing
to
do
with
the
assassination.
Third,
Abdul
Salaam,
perhaps
more
than
Buubu
Diiye,
used
this
land
as
leverage
against
~he chiefs and
people
of
the
region,
(see
note
67).
Beside
scoffing
at
the
canton
chiefs,
this
interfere(!ce
with
the
administra~ion of
Gorgol
truly
bothered
Kaedi.
1 t
caused
Captain
S:eff,
i:he
Commandant
of
Kaedi,
to
depose
Yerel,
the
chief
of
Wuuro-Yerel in 1913 on grounds that,
"this chief is always on the norch
bank,
visiting
with
Abdoul
Salam,
whom
he
obeys
blindly
and
whose
malice
[sic] he constantly serves,"104
For
all
these
reasons,
opposition
to
Abdul
Salaam
evolved
from
mute
and
localized
in
the
1890s
to open and widespread from the early
teens
onward. 105
By
1912
the
Maqama-Litama
land
arrangement
was
labelled anachronistic and a "permanent source of discontent among the
populations."
Captain Nicolai,
the Commandant of Kaedi,
called for its
disappearance. 106
In
late
1912.
both
the
Lieutenant-Governor
of
Senegal and the Commissioner of Mauritania brought pressure
to bear on
Abdul
Salaam Kan who,
"with
finer
feelings"--so
it was
said--"adhered
to the
principte of a settlement."
Thus, by joint orders from the two
heads
of coloni~s, a co~r.ission was
formed on
15 March 1913
composed
of:
-Captain
Steff,
Commandant
of
Gorgol
and
president
of
the
commission.

---

195
-Mr.
Lignieres. Commandant of Matam.
-Ceerno Bookar Bah, Cadi superieur of Kaedi.
-Aali
Samrnba
Jam,
representative
of
the
landowners
of
the
nort.h
bank.
-Abdul Salaam Kan, chief of Damga. 107
After
a
survey
of
the
land
and
a
three
day
meeting
of
the
commission, Abdul Salaam agreed to give back three Kolaade (Duge,
Jejegol
and Moda)
to
Sileymaani
Lamtaaga and his
family,
in
exchange
for
1,000
bolts
of
"guinea
cloth"
(800
within
four
months,
the
rest
~ithin a year,
starting from March 1913).
Concerning the
Litama
land,
three
Kolaade
(Liyora;:::,
Gelaajo
and
Fiiltu·bayre)
were
returned
to
Demmba Gelaajo
for
2,500 francs,
due and payable within four months,
starting
on
the
same
date.
As
for
the
river
front
farms,
its
claimant,
Hammee
Isaa,
abandoned his
"rights" and pledged to continue
paying cultivation fees to Abdul Salaam,lOa
No estimation of the l3nd
retroceded
was
given
by
the
commission.
No
figure
on
the
number
of
tenants
farming
the
land retained was
advanced
either.
But,
judging
from
the
conditions
of
the
transaction
and
the
pressure
it
took
to
bring it about,
it is safe to conclude that Abdul Salaam had lost
much
of
the
"family
land"
located
on
the
north
bank,
to
its
original
proprietors.
This Maqama convention of 1913 had
certainly brought a
solution
to
the
land
crisis.
bur:.
it
also
set
a
precedent
for
the
beleaguered
tenant
farmers
of
the
north
bank,
which
was
conducive
to
continuing resentment and protest. 109
Just
as
with
Seh
Sidiya
Baba
and
Abdullaay
Kan,
so
also
with
Abdul Salaam,
"untouchability"
and "inviolability" of old allies
took

---

196
precedence over the seemingly legitimate claims of the common man.
The
Maqama convention of 1913 was
devised
to both prevent
the
lingering of
an
administrative
eris is,
and
preserve
the
interests
of
an
age-old
ally.
It appears that a great deal of conflicts between north and
sou:h
bank chiefs,
as well as disputes opposing the
two
communities occurred
in Laaw.
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe and Damga,
generally
in
the districts of
Boghe
and
Corgol.
Dimat,
Tooro
and
Boosoya
experienced
in
the
main,
much
fewer
conflicts
of
the
sort.
As
we
alluded
to
earlier,
the
scarcity of
incidents
in
these
provinces
related
to
a
longer
presence
on
the
north
bank
and
to
often
long
standing
agreements
with
the
people across the river, be they Moor or Tukuloot.
CONCLUSION OF PART THREE
In
order
to
consolidate
their
rule
in Fuuta
Tooro
during
these
early
years,
the
French
intitiated
and
enforced
a
series
of
administrative
decisions.
Understandably,
i t
was
the
"dissidents,"
former Umarians and allies of Abdul Bookar Kan,
who were shaken most as
a
result
of
the
implementation of
such
policies.
The
Umarians,
who
proved most sensitive to arbitrary
colonial actions,
especially in the
province of TODro where their
numbers and the overzealousness of local
chiefs made matters worse,
suffered land confiscations and other forms
of repression for a
much
longer
time.
Labelling someone an "Umarian"
became
for
more
than a
decade,
the
easiest way
to
get at one's
foe.
Almost
thirty years after Governor Lamothe decreed the confiscation of
their land,
many Umarians were still being victimized in that
regard.

---

197
After World War I,
the administration took to delivering passes
to war
veterans,
for
them
to
emigrate
to
the
north
bank
and
settle
on
the
land
of
former
Umarians.
This
seemed
so
absurd
eha t
Maz in,
the
Resident
of
Boghe,
could
not
help
denouncing
the
dec is ion
arguing
that,
most Umarians having already disappeared,
i t was wrong
to visit
their
"insubordination"
upon
their
descendants
and
that
the
administration
stood
to
gain
strictly
nothing
but
to
hurt
its
prestige:
Since every single Tukuloor family,
on whichever side
of
the river,
counts at least one former Umarian,
no
group
would
escape
if
the
measure
were
to
be
generalized. 111
As
for
former
followers
of
Abdul
Bookar
Kan,
many
of
them
suffered
imprisonment
and deportation.
Whereve r
they were
perceived
as
a
threat
to
local
authority,
their
influence
was
cons iderab ly
reduced
through
either
demotion
as
chiefs,
or
abolition
of
some
of
their
rights
as
land
owners.
In
the
main
however.
they were more
easily rehabilitated.
The
French
were
also
careful
in
selecting
reliable
chiefs
for
their administration.
They paid special heed to family
background and
the
tradition of allegiance and services
to
French
cause in the hope
of satisfying two objectives:
Insure the
reliability of a chief, and
comply with
" the traditional
sentiment of the natives by preserving
for
our
auxiliaries
among
them,
the
full
authority
that
birth
provides. ,,112
Although few chiefs had gone to French school,
literacy
was not yet one of the
prime criteria.

---

198
In order
to
limit the
power of the chiefs,
the French
initiated
territorial changes,
sometimes cutting units down
to
size,
sometimes
consolidating
tiny cantons
into more viable administrative units under
new chiefs with a record of proven
reliability and sympathy for French
cause.
Thus,
while
the huge
territory of Laarntooro was divided into
six
small
cantons,
Damga
and
Ngenaar
in
the
east were
consolidated
from their thirteen or
so tiny districts into two large administrative
units.
Through
both processes "reliable" chiefs were to emerge,
among
them
people
like
Abdul
Salaam
Kan,
Hammadi
Alfaa
Bah
(Damga
and
Ngenaar),
Abdullaay
Kan
(Salde).
At
the
same
time
the
system
of
"collective
complaints"
and
"open
letters "
to
administrators,
established as the major monitoring technique,
helped the French
weed
out
those
they did not
trust,
from
the
Commandement
Indig~ne of Fuuta
Tooro.
This triggered the departure from the political scene of chiefs
like
Ibraa
Abdul
Wan
(Damga),
Ceerno
Molle
Maamudu
Lih
(Boosoya),
Ismaayla Siley Aan (Pete) and others.
The administration set out to curb systematically the
river based
trade
in slaves between 1.g90 and 1903.
The French
abolished slavery
officially in 1906.
They also suppressed
certain rights based on land
ownership
and
proclaimed
the
principle,
"the
land
to
those who
till
it."
Much of the
time however,
these
laws and priniciples remained a
dead
letter,
and
. the
administration
showed
a
double
standard
all
along.
Most
chiefs a~d pro-French notables kept their slaves in utter
disregard
for
the
decree
of
1908,
which
required
all
the
indigenous
agents
of
the
administration
in
French
west
Africa
to
free
their
"captives," a euphemism the French substituted for the
term "slaves."

---

199
l.Jhat
is
more,
the
admini5tration had no
qualm
about
accepting
tht~~e
slaves as substitutes for sons of the aristocracy,
during conscription
times.
As
for
the
punishment
or
deposition
of
chiefs
guilty
of
mistreating
their
subj ects,
abus ing
or
embezzling
funds,
they
were:
firm only vis ~ vis those deemed "untrustworthy"
agents.
In that wise,
the incidents that occurred in Damga,
Boosoya and Yirlaabe
(referred to
above), were cases in point.
On the other
hand, blatant laisser-faire
'.-/as
applied
to
the
so
called
"good
agents."
In
this
case,
French
administrators
condoned
abuses
rather
than condemning
them,
often on
grounds
that
the
chief's
subjects
were
"hard
to
handle"
(Laaw,
Halaybe,
Seeloobe,
Ferlo),
or
that
it was
the
price
to
pay
for
the
"tranquillity,
perfect submission and timely and regular tax payments"
(Yirlaabe) ,113
As
for
the
abolition
of
land
rights
(1899-1900),
the
ultimate
expression of French inroads on the land tenure system
of Fuuta Tooro,
i t was
largely
and
widely
ignored.
Within
village communities many
continued
to
demand
what
they
considered
their
rights,
while
many
others
continued
to
pay
what
they
deemed
their
dues.
Some
chiefs
proved
incapable
of
enforcing
the
laws,
while
others
were
met
with
disobedience
and
obstruction of
administrative
tasks
on
the
part of
the
displeased land tax collectors.
It was
this
powerlessness of the
people,
perhaps
weary and overwhelmed by the aristocracy,
that cat:.sed
the
administration
to
step
back
from
its
previous
engagements
and
restore
those
rights,
despite
the
sorrow
it
brought
to
some
tenant
farmers.
This
is how one administrator described the
mixed reaction

---

-.-, .
200
this shift in attitude generated:
The
i.ndi.genous· peop le.
the no tables
[land ownets]
i.n
particular,
have welcomed
the neWS of the reinstate-
ment of
the Ndioldi
[entrance
into cultivation fee];
The
other
natives
[tenant
farmers]
realize
now with
great
regret
that
they will continue paying rents on
land
that
their
:>\\offi
ancest.ors had
tilled and always
farmed,
and that
they will never be
in a position to
own it 114
,,'hat
all
of
this
does
suggest
i.s
that
i.n
Fuuta
Tooro
as
elsewhere,
the
French
Md
not
al·....ays
base
their
policies
on
the
principles and objectives
they had i.n mind,
but also on the hard
fac ts
and
realities
they
were
faced
wich;
And
that
the
people,
in
their
acceptance of the colonial situation,
did not always swallow the pills
prescribed by
colonial authorities.
Fi.nally
i t
suggests
that
above
all,
colonial
rule
seemed
to be
in these
early days more of a series
of
trials
and
errors
than
an
imposition
of
ra .....
and
indiscriminate
force.
On another
count,
Moorish raiding had wrought great
destruction
upon
Fuuta
Tooro
and
compromised
the
security
and
stability of
the
society in the nineteenth century.
This
situation in part forced the
French
to
occupy
permanently
the
north
bank.
The
creation
of
Mauritania at the opening of the
twentieth century proved to be of far
reaching consequences for
Fuuta Tooro.
On
the
positive
side,
the
setting of French
administration
and
the
creation
of
new
ca<1tons
allowed
for
a
massive
emig~ation
and
systematic
reoccupation of
the
north bank.
Th is
relieved
the
south
bank from demographic pressure,
helped take advantage
of
vast
tracts
of good land,
and develop agriculture on an
unprecedented scale.
The

---

201
development of agriculture provided
revenues
through sales of surplus
produce.
Some of the revenues accrued to the colonial
treasury in the
form of taxes.
Because
people
emigrated
from
the
south
bank,
they
were
fully
aware of the administration's capacity to repress.
They tended there-
fore
to
refrain
from causing useless
trouble.
Likewise,
the chiefs,
~ho had had some experience on the south
bank and were now supervised
by a mili~ary administration
(Commandants, Residents and Commissioners
being
all
military
officers
because
of
the
persistant
resistance
of
Moorish
tribes),
seemed less
prone
to
induleing
in abuses
and blatant
corruption.
This
is why most canton chiefs of
the north ba~k, with the
exception of Halaybe and Litama-Maqarna, had a history of
stability and
limited turn-over,
relative to those of the other
side of the river.
On
the
negative
side,
the
creation
of Mauritania
rekindled
the
rivalries
between
chiefs
of
the
two
banks
anc
triggered
a
war
of
influence.
The
device
used
by
the
administration
of
Mauritania
to
/
encourage
emigration,
the
decision
to
favour
its
2dmini.~stres
in
matters of
land distribution,
tax collection and
election of "masters
of
land, tI
sowed
discontent
among
the
people,
aroused
violent
conflicts,
and
compromised
dangerously
the
stability
and
good
neighbourliness
of
communities
on
the
two
sides
of the
river,
for
a
long time.
In all the resulting
conflicts,
the French,
the chiefs and
local communities had each a share in the responsibilities:
The French
for
ini t ia t ing
a
policy
that
upset
the
Dld
sDcial
equilibrium,
the
chiefs
for
blowing the
differences
out of proportions
and exploiting
them for their own ambitions, and the communities for pushing too far

---

202
with decisions they often knew were not right.
The
~Gouraud decision"
of 1908,
like
the
"Lamothe decree"
of
the
1890s, ulitimately backfired.
As the disputes went on,
the
peoples on
both sides
tried to play Boghe against Podor,
Kaedi
against Matam,
in
a
~ord,
to oppose
administrators of Mauritania and Senegal.
Thus,
in
1913
Captain
Steff,
the
Commandant
of
Gorgol,
complained
that
his
cercle was constantly invaded by
riverine populations of neighbouring
districts ~ho, in utter
disregard for laws and regulations prevailing,
behaved like
"vandals and plunderers."
"wnen caught," he said,
"they
cross
back to
the other bank and go tell
their more or less distorted
tales to their chiefs.
wnen slli~oned to Kaedi with their notice,
they
claim
that
they
have
been
forced
out
of
their
villages
on
the
left
bank." US
In
this
same
report,
Steff complained of rumours
that all
the
land
on
the north bank was
to be
returned
to
the
populations of
the
south,
that
"the
administrator
of Matam was
in
command on bo th
banks
and
that
I
was
only his younger brother.'t
These
rumours,
the
Commandant
contended,
were
spread
on
purpose
and
nurtured
by
overzealous native agents of the south bank, with
the view to stopping
the emigration from Senegal.
These
same
administrative
difficulties
made
the
Commandant
of
Gorgol request as early as 1911:
A
surVey
of
the
land
tenure
system
profound
enoug~
to
help
secure
from
the
mess
[sic]
of
indigenous
concepts,
few
simple
principles
susceptible to serve as a basis for the establishment
of easily applicable common law. 116
Studies of the kind were all the more important in Gorgol
because

---

203
Lieutenant
Paul
Cheruy's
survey
of
the
Semama
had
proven
a
workable
tool
in resolving
land disputes.
Echoing these
requests.
a series of
studies would emerge a decade or two later. ll7
It was
these same
frustrations over the endless disputes
and the
misunderstanding
persisting
between
Commandants
on
both
sides,
that
prompted several propositions
of annexation of the
north bank to the
colony of Senegal.
In 1911,
the Commandant
proposed that a strip ten
kilometres
wide
on
the
Mauritanian
side
be annexed
to
Senegal.
The
proposition
was
expanded
later
into
Governor
General
Gabriel
Angoulvant's
1916
project,
and
refined
by
interim Governor
General
Cloze1
in 1917,
in
the
form of a
report
to the Ministry of Colonies.
It
advocated
the
necessity
of
forming
after
the
W"ar,
in exchange
for
advantages
to
the
British and Portuguese elsewhere,
"a compact group
of French
colonies or countries under French influence from Rio de Oro
all
the way down to the southern border of our Gabon. ,,118
One of the
reasons
for
such
a
proposition
was
that
it
would
solve
the
thorny
question of the partition of Fuuta Tooro,
by placing both
banks under
the jurisdiction of the sole administration of the
colony of Senegal,
while Moorish
territory would be
part
of an
integrated French North
Africa.
The fact that the
idea was
to be
ressuscitated several times
from
1919 onwards
is
evidence
enough
that
the
creation of Mauritania
had,
from
the
point
of view of
Fuuta as well as
the
administration,
created as many problems as
it had solved.

---

NOTES
1.
For details on the society and groups among Moors,
see:
Charles
c.
Stewart;
Islam
and
Social
Order
in
Mauritania.
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford,
1973,
204 p.
(Hereafter,
Islam).
See
also,
Genevieve
Des iree-Vuillemin;
Contribution
a
1 1 Histoire
de
la
Mauritanie
de
1900
a
1934.
Editions
Clairafrique;
2,
Rue
Sandiniery, Dakar,
1963, 412 p.
(Hereafter,
Contribution)
2.
Almost each "big family"
in Fuuta Tooro enjoyed the friendship
and military alliance of at least one Moorish tribe,
often its directly
opposite neighbour cn the north bank:
Tooroodo family
Moorish tribe
wan of Mbummba (Laaw)
Owl ad Noqmas and Twabir
Kan of Daabiya (Boosoya)
Idaw'ays and Owlad Heyba
Sal of Gede
(Tooro)
Brakna Owlad Seyyid
Kan of Dimat
(Dimat)
Trarza royal family,
For
details
on
the
relations
between Moors
and Tukuloor
during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
see:
Ibrahima A.
SaIl in,
"Les
Relations
entre
les Halpulaar'en et
les
Brakna
1850-1903";
Memoire de
Maitrise,
Universire'
de
Dakar,
1977-1978.
(Hereafter,
"Les
Relations.")
Oumar
Kane:
"Les
Maures
et
le
Fouta
Toro
au
Vllle
siecle",
in
Cahiers
d'Etudes
Africaines,
54,
XIV-2,
pp.
237-252,
Sorbonne, 1974.
(Hereafter,
"Les Maures.")
3.
Ko Hevba koo dev nattii bal1al!,
(The Owlad Heyba were wont to
continue
raiding even after
peace
had
been signed between
their
ally
and
the
other
Tooroodo
adversary).
This
dictum
is
now
applied
to
anyone
who
trespasses
the
bounds
of help
to
satisfy his,
or her,
o...'Tl
desires.
4.
This
attitude
had
indeed
loosened
up
in
comparison
with
Governor Faidherbe's policy. especially vis a vis Trarza Moors.
For
Govenor
Faidherbe's
tough
stand
against
the
Moors,
see:
General Louis Faidherbe;
Le Senegal. op.cit.,
pp.
121-125.
5.
For same elements on French attitude
towards
the Moors
in t~ls
period,
see:
'Sylvaine
Trioullier
nee
Moreau;
"Saint-Louis
et
la
Question
Maure
1895-1905."
Memoire
de
Maitrise
d'Enseignement,
Universite de Paris I, Centre d'Etudes Africaines, Octobre 1972,
149 p.
6.
See the literature on French conquest in Senegambia,
especially
in Uolof and Sereer states of western Senegal.
204

---

205
7.
Ibrahima Abu Sa11,
"Les Relations",
op.cit"
pp.
194-195.
8. An "entrance into cultivation"
right (Njoldi) was also given to
these collectors,
whenever an individual expressed the need
to farm on
the north bank.
See,
Lieutenant Paul Cheruy:
"Rapport", op.eit ..
p.
8.
9.
1
February
1892,
protectorate
treaty
"ith
Sratit
chiefs
'Jul
Muqtar and Wul Rasul (rene"ed in March 1894),
Two
treaties
were
signed
with
Idaw' ays
chief
Bakkar
wol
Sweyd
Ahmed
on
19
March
1895
and
15 January
1896.
Bakkar
"as
accorded a
regular
tribute
of
1,000
strips
of
guinee
cloth.
For
the
details
of
these treaties see; A.N.S:
lG-331 passim,
pp.
31-46.
10.
A,N.S:
2D10-8,
Cercle Matam-Salde-Kaedi
1885-1894.
Bulletins
politiques et economiques,
numera 294, Octobre 1893.
11.
A.N.S:
2G1-155,
Podor:
Rapports
poli tiques
et
economiques
1895.
(Aout)
12. A.N.S:
lG-331, Monographie,
passim.
13.
Ibrahima
Sall
for
his
part
estimates
these
at
60,000
francs
~orth of cattle herds, more than 100 women and children abducted and 30
men killed in raids related combat,
("Les Relations" op.cit.,
p.
200).
He may have considered figures
from Halaybe which we did not come
across.
14.
Some administrators did react from
time to
time.
For instance
Allys,
the
Commandant
of
Podor,
took
a
tough
stand
against
Brakna
Moors.
Because he armed and organized regular patrols
of river front
villagers
every summer--raiding season par excellence-~the area around
Podar "as spared for t"o years.
A.N.S:
2Dll-9,
passim.
At times,
French Government reimbursed the people on these customs
directly,
In
1899,
the
Director
of
Political
Affairs
sent
a
5,350
francs
money
order
to
Victor
Valantin,
the
Commandant of Podor.
as a
compensation for
Brakna pillaging
i~ his
cercle
during
the
period of
1895-1899, "hich "as "orth 6,380 francs.
15.
The word
"Cum"
may have
been derived
from the Hasaniyya
term
Guum meaning "stand up! ," given the ad hoc nature of such patrol groups
often formed suddenly in reaction to a raid.
Edward
Hostains.
the
Commandant
of
Matam,
proposed
to
let
the
Tukuloor conduct a large scale operation against the Brakna or let the
Trarza
Moors
invade
their
territory
as
a
decisive
remedy.
The
proposition "as reiterated by V,
Valantin the Commandant of Pador but,
St.
Louis
paid
no
a ttention
to
such
sugges tions .
A. N. S:
2D10 - 8
(Matam) and 2G2-47 (Pador) op.cit,
16, A.N.S:
1.2556 ap,cit;
Abdul Aziz a D,A,P.,
12/10/1896,
17. Direct. Aff. Pa1i': a Commandant Podor,
31/12/1896.

---

206
18. A.N.S:
2G2-47,
P0dor op.eit.,
Fev-Mars 1902.
19.
A.N.S:
lG-33l op.eit.,
section IV "Traites signes et politique
envers les Edouaieh," pp.
39-40.
20.
For
the
beginning
of
French
involvement
in
Mauritania
see,
Genevieve
Des iree - Vuillemin,
11 Apercu
his torique
de
la
Mauri tanie
du
XIXe
siecle
a
l'independance't
in,
Introduction
a
l'Histoire
de
la
Mauritanie,
Editions
du
C.N.R.S,
Paris
1979,
421p.
A.N.S:
lG-33l
op.eit.;
9G-22
"Situation
politique
et
administrative,
Mouvernents
des
populations
du
Fleuve 1905";
2010- 3:
"Arrete du Gouvernement General
portant
suppression du cercle
de Kaedi,
10/4/1904";
A.N.M:
El-lO and
El-87 Mauritanie l'Rapport general 1905".
21.
In
1905,
Commissioner
Xavier
Coppolani
organized
the
"Tagant-Adrar" mission,
and was assassinated.
Other campaigns
followed
until
the
eve
of
World
War
I
(Gouraud
in
1908,
Patey
1909,
Mouret
1913),
to quench Moorish resistance.
22.
A.N.S:
9G-22
op.cit.,
Coppolani
a
Gouverneur General
A.O.F,
16/12/1904.
The
decision was
confirmed by
the
decree
of 25
February
and
the
Order
of
25
March
1905.
Later,
in
December,
a
new
Order
(18/12/1905)
reorganized
the
circumscriptions
of
Mauritania
into
cercles
(A.N.M:
El-87op.cit.).
23.
Teekaan was an old village--probably one of the oldest--on the
north
bank,
and
..... as
founded
following
a
political
crisis
in
Dimat,
during the nineteenth century.
It kept the status of refuge throughout
the nineteenth century.
An emigration occurred
in
1855
to protest the
arrest of Elimaan Saydu Buubakar Kan by the French.
24 _
Faatimat4.1 Jiggo,
passim,
section
1.
See
also
Saydu
Kan
and
Ibraahiima Kan,
passim.
25.
One
report
particularly
attested
that:
Njaay
Kan enjoys
the
high esteem of his subjects upon
whom he does have an authority, whLch
would
increase
if
he
showed
more
energetic.
(A.N.M:
El-98
"Renseignements sur les chefs
indigenes").
26.
We have not come across the date of his death and were not able
to
infer
it from
the
information on his
successor's
rule.
All we know
is
that Abdurrahim Kan,
his
son and successor,
ruled until
independance
and
the
reform
abolishing
canton-chiefship
and
creating
the
"Arrondissements.""
(F. Jiggo,
passim).
27. Not to be confused with the river traditionally regarded as the
border of Fuuta Tooro with Gajaaga
to the east.
For Elimaan Abu's rule
in Daar-EI-Barka
see,
our
interviews with Tijjaani and Ami Maam Njaak,
passim.

---

207
28.
The
first name was 1Juro-Elimaan (the village of Elimaan).
It
was changed into the Arabic Dar-El-Barka (the abode of good fortune)
on
suggestion of the chief's friend and mentor,
the Kunta Moor cleric Sidi
Muhamed El Bekkay.
29.
For this and the following see:
A.N.~:
Archives du cercle du
Brakna,
Rapports
politiques
1908-
1921.
(Septembre
1911
et
3e
trimestre 1913).
30.
Maam
Nj aak Kan,
succeeded
to
his
father
and
ruled until his
death
in
October
1976.
(A.N.S:
2G24-l6
Mauritanie
"Rapports
politiques 1924 par Gouverneur Gaden").
31.
Boghe, "Rapports
policiques"
passim;
Administrateur
Mere
~
Commandant d'Aleg,
septembre 1911.
32.
Lieutenant Gauthier a Commandant d'Aleg.
33. Boghe op.cit., Lieutenant Gauthier a Aleg, Juillet 1908.
No
evidence
suggests
that
Lamin
Sammba
Baas
was
involved
in
embe~zlement, abuse or any other kind of wrong doing.
This leads one
to conclude that it was an arbitrary or otherwise motivated
substitution.
34.
We have
not
been able
to
find Baylaa Biraan1s file
in either
Senegalese
or Mauritanian archives.
Our
interviews with
his
son and
former assistant Hammaat Baylaa Uan, Demmba Jaawando
Bookum, and Siree Buubu Bookum have helped fill the gaps.
Baylaa
is
remembered
in
oral
tradition
as
one
of
the
most
intelligent
and
articulate
chiefs,
witness
the
several
proverbs
and
dictum attributed to him (Demmba Jaawando and Siree Buubu op.cie) .
35.
As a civilian he earned the "Medal of Agricultural Merit ll ,
the
"Benin Black Scar" and the "Knighe of the Legion of Honour" medals.
Later,
Baylaa
Biraan will
volunteer
for
the
duration of
the war
and finish
it with a wound
(from a shell splinter) and a promotion as
Non Commissioned Officer (Sous-Lieutenant).
36.
For
this
and
the
following
see;
A.N.M:
Boghe
"Rapports
politiques ll
op.cit.;
Resident
Mere
~
Commandant
d'Aleg,
Septembre-Octobre 1911.
37. After the War,
he resumed his functions until 1935 when he was
called upon to fill the vacancy in Laaw (Senegal) 1935-42 and 1945-50.
In 1942
the canton of Laaw-Halaybe was dismantled and the portion
annexed to Tooro, under Maam Njaak Kan.
38.
For oral information of the canton of MbaaD,
see our
interviews with Seh Yaaya Kan,
former chief of the can~on. and
Umar Bah,
(Nouackchott March 19B5).
...
_
:
..':

---

208
39.
Abdullaay
Kan
had
first
tried
to
get his
son Haamidu,
then
young assistant
to Abdul Salaam Kan (Damga)
to succeed Mammadu Lamin.
But,
the administration deemed the latter too young for the position.
40.
He
remained
in
power
until
his
death
in
1943.
His son Seh
Yaaya Kan
succeeded him and ruled for
three and a half years and was
replaced by his uncle Abdul Aziz Kan who ruled until his death in 1966.
41.
Confirmed
by
the
23
December
Order
of
Lt-Colonel
Mouret,
Commissioner of
the Government General,
the
same
that
nonminated Bees
Aamadu
chief
of
the
canton of
Kaedi,
and Malal Buubu Siree,
chief of
the
canton
of
Maqarna-Lit.arna.
(A.N.M:
El-98
Gorgol;
"Dossiers
des
chefs indigenes et de notables importants").
42.
Elimaan
Abbaas
ruled
until
1918
when he
was
deposed
by
the
French.
See:
A.N.M;
El-48
Gorgol,
"Rapports mensue1s
1906-1918".
(Juillet 1908).
See
also
interview
..... i ch
Mammadu
Jet)
from
iJoolwn
Neere,
Nouackchott, 13/4/1985.
43.
Bees Aamadu
remained
in office until
the
early 1920s despite
his old age and blindness.
44.
Former
t.urf
of
Ceerno
Barahiimi
Kan
and
Seh
Mammadu
Maamudu
Kan,
father of the chief of Damga.
For the province of Litama-Maqama we have relied on: A.N.M:
El-48
Gorgol op.cit.;
El-98 Gorgol op.cit.
Interviews with Mbaare Bah and
Dahaa Kan passim.
45.
Captain
Malafosse,
the
Commandant
of
Gorgol,
had
to
request
from the Commandant of Matam that the chief be placed at his disposal,
in order
to
collect
the remainder of the 1908 taxes.
(A.N.M:
El-48
op.cit,
Decembre 1908).
46.
Five
years
later,
he
was
to
fall
prey
to
the
low
economic
status
of
north
bank
canton
chiefs
and
most
of
all,
the
serious
challenge besetting Litama-Maqama chiefs,
the considerable influence of
Abdul Salaam Kan and his uncles.
In fact,
chief Malal Buubu was caught in a quandary amidst several
enemies;
The Yaalalbe,
Deeniyankoobe (particularly Jaaje Jegeri),
and
Abdul
Salaam
Kan
who
o'roed
the
land
most
people
were
farming,
and
thereby held considerable sway in the region.
Yaalalbe
and
Deeniyank-opbe
Fulbe
retained some
influence
too,
as
evidenced by the saying:
"Between Basakorolooje and Waltunde Guuriiki,
people
know
neither
God,
nor
the
European,
Jom
is
the
only
one they care about."
Finally,
the chief was
not
in good
terms
with Hammadi Alfaa Bah
either.
He
regarded
the
latter
as
a
successful rival
to
the
Elfekkis
in Ngenaar.

---

210
Bokar Abdul Kan, chief of eastern Boosoya
was granted
several
Kolaade
(farm
land)
in
the
Fori,
north
bank.
See,
Boghe:
Reports op.cit ..
1911;
Umar Bah,
interview,
section I,
passim.
59.
A.N.S:
2G5-9
Mauritanie;
"Rapports politiques
trimestriels
1911",
1 trimestre, pp.
12 -13.
60.
Elimaan Abu Kan
(Tooro).
Jibi Aminata
(Halaybe).
Lamin Sammba
(Laaw) .
Yaaya
Kan
(Yirlaabe~Mbaa~),
and
some
Deeniyanke
chiefs
in
eastern Fuuta.
61. This financial predicament ~as such that, administrators of the
north
bank
continually complained and called for
similar
advantages
(i.e:
Salaries and 4% returns on taxes) enjoyed on the south bank.
This
is
ho\\ol one
ac.ministrator described
the
lot
of one chief of
Maqama-Litama in 1913:
Overwhelmed
~ith
debts,
always
contracts
usurous
loans
and
his
creditors.
spurred
by
his
poli tical
foes,
harass
him
constantly,
which
makes
matters
worse for him.
A.N.M:
Boghe.
Politcal
reports
1911-1916;
El-48
Gorgol
op.cit.;
El-98
op.cit.
A.N.S:
2Dll-5
Podor.
"Correspondances
1909-1913"
(D.A.P.
a Commandant Podo~ octobre 1902).
62.
In
1910
three
notables
in
Seeloobe
(Elimaan
Habi,
Jaagaraaf
Abdul
and Aarnadu Tafsiiru),
with an established record of suberversion
against
chief
Birom
Sih.
instigated
the
emigration
of. 13
families
totalling 70 people.
from the Village of Mbooyo.
After Podor requested
their extradition,
the
three were fined 100 francs
each,
and sentenc~d
to 15 days imprisonment.
63.
According
to
Lericollais,
68
Villages
were
founded
be tween
Podor
and Kaedi
from 1890
to 1930.
as against 10 for
the same sec tor,
between 1850 and 1890.
The
population
of
the
cercle
of
Podor
(south
bank)
increased
insignificantly from
75,756
in 1891 to
84,
700
in 1950.
which further
attests
to
the
demographic
redistribution
of
the
early
twentieth
century.
64.
A.N.M:
D-I09,
"Dossier du Gouvernement General
1913-
1918".
(Population
du
Chamama par
le Lieutenant-Colonel Mouret.
numero
39 du
6/5/1914).
65.
For
this
and
the
following.
see:
A.N.S:
2Dtl-4
Podor.
"Correspondances
1902 -1905. "
(Amadou
Samba.' chef
superieur
Lao
A
Administrateur en chef de la Mauritanie.
6/10/1905;
Lernorte Commandant
Podor a Lt.
Gouverneur du Senegal,
6/10/1905).
66.
Even though Haamidu Kan had replaced his father in the meantime
(1913).
67.
Interview with Dahaa Kan,
section 4,
passim.

---

211
68. A.N.S;
9G-22 op.cit.,
Coppolani a A.a.F,
16/12/1904.
69.
Boghe:
"Rapports
1908-1921"
op.cit.,
Resident
a Commandant
Aleg,
30/6/1914.
70.
For details on Seh Sidiya and his political career see,
Charles C.
Stewart,
Islam op.eit.
71.
Boghe:
lIRapports"
op.eit.,
Aoue,
Septembre,
Octobre,
Novembre
1909.
72.
Henri Gaden,
Administrator and Africanist,
was
the Governor of
Mauritania
from
1917
to
1927,
an Arabisant and
friend
to many Moorish
tribes,
in particular Seh Sidiya and the Owlad Biri.
The
other members
of
the
commission were:
Mr.
RODs,
Resident of
Boghe;
M.r.
Antonin,
Resident
of
Mederdra:
And
Mr.
d'Harneville,
representing the cercle of Pador.
73.
Although
the
reports
of
1910
were
missing
from
the
dossier.
Because
of
the
raging
land
issues
in
present
day
Mauritania
(in
relation to river basin development),
some dossiers are missing at the
Mauritanian archives.
74. A.N.S;
2G8-11;
Mauritanie "Rapport annuel 1908",
11p.
75.
A.N.S:
2G6-3;
Senegal
"Rapports trimestriels 1906" Senegal a
A.O.F,
2d trimestre,
16/7/1906.
76.
The Wan and Baas
families
were,
at some point,
chased from the
north bank by the Moors.
The reoccupation of the north bank took place
under Almaami Biraan Wan,
in the early nineteenth century,
For det.ail
on Amre and Amrenaabe see,
P.
Cheruy,
"Rapport" op.cit.,
pp. 42-43.
77.
Letter quoted by the Resident of Boghe,
September 1909.
78,
For the crisis among "Amrenaabe" see:
Boghe;
1908-1921 op.cit,
4e trimestre,
Septembre 1909-Janvier 1911 and 4e trimestre 1919.
79.
At
the
meeting
Umar
Aadama,
who
had
accused
the
brothers
(Baylaa and Ibraa Biraan)
of unduly appropriating 110 francs
from
the
Nioldi taxes,
was punished for defamation.
80.
Boghe,
1908-21,
op.cit.;
Boghe
a
A1eg,
Decembre
1919.
This
proposition
met
with
no
heed on
the
part
of
the
authorities and
the
conflicts would continue until this day.
For the conflicts between the Wan and the Baas regarding the dues
paid
by
the
Haratin
Ideylik
(1978)
and
the
series
of
disagreements
between the Amrenaabe communities of the two banks over the election of
"Elimaan Amre, n
(each bank elected its own Elimaan),
see our
interview
with Ibraa Mammadu ~an (Nouackchott 24/3/1985).

---

212
81.
For
the
conflicts
among Aan-Aanbe
and between Jaanankoobe
and
Funeebe,
see appendix 4).
82.
The
11
clans
being:
El
Hidi,
El
Tuga,
El
Ngoona,
El
Soogi,
Sohsoobe,
Faafaabe, Jallube,
Senngeteebe,
Penndajurnaabe,
Sihsiibe,
and
Demmbube.
For
the
list
of
the
Kolaade
owned by each of these clans,
see P.
Cheruy's "Rapport"
op.eit.,
p.
52.
83. Among these 175 beneficiaries of these rights were:
Faafaabe
11
(families) .
Sihsiibe
10
Senngeteebe
32
Penndajurnaabe 74
Jallube
9
El Hidi
13
El Tuga
5
El Soogi
1
El Ngoona
6
Sohsoobe
4
Demmbube
3
(h.N.S:
104-18
"Correspondance
au
sujet
des
terres
des
Irlabes
Aleydis des 'deux rives du Senegal 1919-1930."
84.
h.N.S:
9G-35
"Situation
poiitique
et
organisation
administrative."
(L' hffaire
des
terrains
de
Lougere
et
de
Sobbal Mai
1918) .
85.
For the 1918-1919 crises see:
h.N.S:
2G18-28
Salde "Rapports
mensuels
1918"
(Avril-Novembre).
2G19-23
Salde
"Rapports
mensuels
1919"
(Janvier-Mai).
Boghe:
1908-1921 op.cit.,
(Mai 1918).
h.N.M:
104-18
"Correspondances
diverses:
Terrains
aleydi
des
deux
rives 1919-1930."
86.
h.N.S:
2G19-23, op.cit., rapport du mois de Kai.
87.
The
reconciliation
was
not
permanent
however.
In
1929~1930
following Ardo's
dismissal
of his Mauritanian assistant,
wuldu Boysi,
the
Alayidi
of
the
north
bank
would again break away and
elect
their
own
Ardo.
h. N. S:
104 -18
op. ci t;
Abdoulaye
Kane
"
Command.
Podor,16/1/1930.
The
Kan-Salde
eventually
kept
the
laRd
of
Njoobit
and
Kerel
donated by Commissioner Gaden to hbdullaay Kan.
88.
1/
The Yirlaabe-Pete were also opposed to the Hebbiyaabe
of the north bank, over rights on "Sawalelo" land,
tilled by the former
while belonging to the
latter.
This conflict proved less serious than
the hlayidi's,
and the Kauritanians
(Hebbiyaabe),
ultimately recovered
their land.
2/
hnother
dispute
pitched
the
Jaanankoobe
(n.b)
and
the
Funeebe (Lih of the south bank) communities one against the other.
It

---

213
broke out in 1918 over rights on the
land called "Waalo Jaan"
(Kolaade
of Kerlaan, Mannga, Mariwidta and Duma)
located on the north bank.
The J aanankoobe
refused
to pay Asaka
taxes
to
the
descendents of
Almaarni
Mamrnadu
Lamin
Li~..
to
whom
Governor
Lamothe
had
granted
the
land
by
virtue
of
the
10
November
1894
decree
and
thanks
to
the
intervention
of
Abdullaay
Kan.
The
land
in
question
belonged
to
"dissident"
Funeebe
who
had
allowed
the
Jaanankoobe
to
farm
it
well
before
the
1890s.
But,
because
of
exceptionally
low
floodings,
the
Jaanankoobe had discontinued farming it ever since 1906.
Despite Abdullaay Kan's backing of the Funeebe,
the Mauritanians,
supported by Yaaya Kan
and Baylaa Biraan.
won the
case
in the end and
continued
to
farm
the
land
until
the
nationalization
of
land
in
Mauritania during the 1970s.
See,
Boghe:
1908-1921 op.cit., 4e trimestre 1918.
See also our interview with Umar Bah,
passim.
89.
Boghe;
Rapports
politiques,
op.cit.,
le
trimestre
1914 par le
Resident F.
Paris.
90.
For
an
account.
of
the
transfer
from
Cengelel
to
Mbaan,
see
interview with Umar Bah,
passim.
91.
Abdullaay
and
Haamidu
Kan' s
allegations
that
Yaaya
Kan
had
unduly
appropriated
a
Kolongal
on
"Sawalelo"
land
in
1918,
even
if
unfounded,
leads
one
to
believe
that
the
chief
of
Mbaan had
indeed
'les ted
interes ts.
For
this,
see,
Boghe
op. c it.,
1918.
See
also,
interview with Rasuulu Lih, Dakar Juillet 1985.
92.
A.N.S:
2G-17
Salde
"Rapports
mensuels
1917"
(Janvier,
par
Commandant R.
Eloi).
93.
Sammba Jom Bah was a former Umarian who had made peace with the
French.
For political reasons he had contracted matrimonial alliances
with
several
distinguished
Fuutanke
families.
In
land
and
slaves,
Sammba Jom was perhaps the most endowed Fuutanke of this epoch.
94.
Seh
Muusaa
Kamara
was
a
cleric
and
author
of
remarkable
ethne-histories
of
Fuuta
Tooro
which
have
been
the
subject
of
many
commentaries
and
articles.
The
most
recent
is
David
Robinson's
forthcoming article on the life and work of the cleric.
95.
Captain Steff expressed the desire to conduct an investigation
about the land farmed by t.he cleric and his disciples to see whether or
not it should be returned to the "natural heirs of Samba Diem"
A.N.M:
El-52 Gorgol "Rapports du cercle 1913-1919"
(Rapport de tournee
du 17/5/1913).
For an oral account of this conflict see our interview with Mbaare
Bah
(Grand son of Aali Samrnba Jom) and Dahaa Kan (also great grand son
of Sammba Jom),
section 4,
passim.

---

214
96.
A.N.M:
El-48
op.cit,
4e
trimestre 1914.
This
is how Mbaare
Bah describes the "Faduwa Convention":
My
father
told me
that
they
[the
two brothers]
made
this arrangement
between them in strict secrecy and
that he himself could not know much about
it because
he was
sent away on
that
particular
day;
That Aali
and Sule locked themselves in at Faduwaa all day long
from
dawn
to
twilight
and
there
were
two
slaves
of
Aali's
and
two
slaves
of
Sule's
who
guarded
them,
armed
with
a
sword
each,
and
ordered
to
cut
the
throat
of
anyone
who would
want
to
try
to
come
in
and find out.
My father
told me
that,
only
from that
time
on,
did
things
start
co
quiet
down.
(Interview,
section
3,
pass im) .
97. A.N.S:
2G17-30, Matam:
"Rapport mensuels 1917"
(Mars).
98. A.N.M:
El-48, Gorgol.
op.cit.,
December 1907 report.
99.
Captain
Steff
constantly
complained
that
Buuhu
Diiye
caused
crouble for the administration of Gorgol.
(El-48 op.cit,
4etrim.
1913) .
100.
A.N.S:
2G14-17,
Mauritanie
"Rapports
trimestriels
1914"
(La
question des terrains de Ndiao, Avril 1914).
101.
Among
other
papers
he
had
the
Governor General's
letter of
13/11/1897 confirming the donation,
and D.P.A's telegramme of 23/3/1900
also
conforming
the
donation
on
behalf
of
the
Governor
General.
(A.N.M:
0-1
"Concessions
a
titre
precaire
1913-1936"
(Questions
de
terrains du Gorgol).
102. As was for instance the case in Governor Servatius'
donation to
chief
Elimaan Mammadu
Daadaa
Kan
in June
1883.
Both
the
length
(20
kms)
and
width
(8
kms)
were
specified.
A.N.S:
2D6-5
Dagana
"Correspondances
1908-1913"
(A
propos
de
la
donation
de
terrain
a
Mamado u Dada).
103.
Seh
Mammadu Maamudu es tablished as
a
po li tical
leader
in
the
region,
and following the example of Ceerno Barahiimi,
in the 1870s, he
provided
spiritual
and
political
leadership
to
settlers
from
other
provinces
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
For
details
on
this
episode
see,
Ahmadu
Bah's Chronigue.sur le village de Maaama,
op,ci~.
104. A.N.M:
El-48, Gorgol,
4e trimestre '1913,
op.cit.
105. Maqama's refusal to pay taxes
to Abdul Salaam Kan goes back to
1898.
The
argument
was
that
the
chief
did
not
guarantee
them
protection against
the Moors,
living as he did,
in Kanel on the Jeeri
of
the
south bank.
Wergely' s
(Commandant
of Matam)
proposition
that
the chief moved to Maqama periodically (dry season) was then rejected.

---

215
Instead,
Abdul
Salaam's
uncle
Mammadu
Lamin
Kan
was
elected chief of
the village in April 1899 to fill the gap.
106. He also called for a systematic study of the land tenure system
as one of the key solutions to the crisis.
107.
For
the
commission
and
its
conclusions
see:
A.N.S:
2G13-S1
Matam "Rapport.s mensuels
1913".
(Mars)
A.N.F.D.M:
Senegal
I,
Dossier
97, 4e trimestre 1912.
(Dakar,
18/2/1913, 9p.).
108. Abdul Salaam Kan finally retained as Bavti land,
the following
Pale and Kolaade:
1.
Dancaal'li (Litama).
2.
Dancaal'li
(on Maqama river).
3.
Falo Faliiba
4.
Pale:
Jogodu,
Duunde,
Soofi,
and Nguy.
5.
Kolaade:
Moda,
Maqarna,
Duundewal.
Aali
Siidi,
Gigali,
Gallaadi
Kooba,
Ka'i, Cubol, Gawur lommbal,
Burle, and Hammee.
6.
The
expanse
of
the
Jeeri
land
bounded
by
Fugo
river
(east),
Boowel-Gasi
(north).
Yufalel
river
(west),
and
the
Kolaade
of Maqama
(south).
109.
New
protest frorr
1926 on,
would lead to a new "Conventiorl of
1 May 1929," while
the protest instigated by Mammadu Bah,
chief of the
canton
of
Litama-Maqama
(1936-1958)
would
toll
the
bell
for
Abdul
Salaam's landed property on the north bank,
with the repurchase of the
land by the administration of Mauritania in 1955.
110.
The only crisis of magnitude one could come across concerning
Dimat,
was
the
incident of May 1918 opposing Moors and Tukuloor in the
region of Butilimit:
Some
300 Tukuloor and Haratin Moors
embarked on a
violent
conflict over
illicit Jama
land sales
to Tukuloor.
The Moors
resented
the
so-called
appropriation
of
good
land
by
people
of
the
south bank.
The
two
administrations
had
to
send
military
contingents
to
Dar·Es-Salam to end hostilities and submit the issue
to the
tribunal of
Trarza.
(For
details
see,
A.N.S:
2D6-20,
Dagana
"Conflicts' de
terrains
1891-1919.")
In
Boosoya,
occasional
incidents
occurred
here
and
there,
particularly
between
the
river
front
Villages
of
Gababe
(s. b)
and
Beelinaabe
(n. b).
Most
of
these
incidents
were
minor
in
nature
and
involved individual community members.
111.
Boghe,
"Rapports" op.cit., 4e trimestre 1919.
112.
Ailsa
Auchnie;
"The
Commandement
Indigene
in
Senegal
1919-1947";
Ph.D.
Dissertation,
School of Oriental and African Studies
(S.O.A.S), University of London,
1972 (p.
75).
113.
For Abdul Aziz and Elimaan Abu see, A.N.S:
lC.2556 and 13G-46,
(Dossiers individuels); Abdullaay Kan : lC.1674.

---

216
114.
A.N.S:
2Gll-51 Podor "Rapports mensuels 1911"
(Sept).
Much of
the
opposition
Tamiimu
Siley
encountered
in
Gede
(lB99-1900)
was
instigated
by
tax
collec tors,
bes ides
the
members
of
the
Gede
royal
family.
See,
A.N.S:
2Dl1-3
Podor
"Corresponda~ces 1899-1901"
(11/6/1900) .
115,
For
this
and
the
folowing see:
A.N,M:
El-52,
Gorgol op,dt"
Commandant Steff A Commissaire du Gouvernement General, 17/5/1913,
116, A.N,M:
El-48 Gorgol,
op,cit"
Avril 1911,
117.
Such as Henri Gaden's
"Du Regime des terres dans
la vallee du
Senegal
au
Fouta
anterieurement
a
l'occupation
Francaise"
(1935);
Abdul
Salam Kane's "Du Regime des
terres chez
les populations du Fouta
Senegalais"
(1935);
Jean
Vidal' s
"Etude
sur
la
tenure
des
terres
indigenes
au
Fouta
dans
la
vallee
du
Senegal"
(1936).
All
were
publ ished
in
the
Bulle t in
du
Comi te
d' Etudes
His tor iques
et
Scicntifiques (B.C.E.H.S).
They are very informative in nature but also misleading because
of patent biases,
personnal interests in the case of Abdul Salam,
and western cliches in ~he conception of property in the case of
Gaden and Vidal.
118, A,N,M:
l7G-58,
"Remembrement de l'A,O,F 1916-1918."

---

PART FOUR:
CONTINUING CHANGE ON THE SOUTH BANK
CHAPTER 6:
ADMINISTRATIVE C~Ju~GES ON THE SOUTH BANK, 1904-1920
As
we
alluded
to
in
the
conclusion of
the
last chapter,
while
the
cantons
of
the
north
bank
remained
relatively
stable
from
the
beginning,
rnos t
of
those
on
the
south
bank
continued
to
experience
changes
in both personnel and size,
although on a
smaller scale than
during the 1891-1904 period.
Eastern and
Western Fuuta on the whole,
bore
the
brunt
of
these
changes.
The
general
trend
was
in
the
direction of consolidation.
A.
C~Jti~GES
IN WESTERN FUUTA
1.
DIMAT
In
Dimat
few
changes
took
place.
Following
the
death of chief
Sammba Camka Naam in 1903,
Dimat was divided into two cantons,
east and
west,
commanded respectively by Raasin Kan and Baabakar Naam.
Naam was
accepted without
great difficulty;
he
replaced his
father
in a
canton
that
had
a
Wolof
population.
Kan
was
rejected
as
a
"foreigner",
without
traditional
claim to
rule
the
province.
The
French were
able
to
impose him only
through a
strong intervention.
Raasin Kan subsequently ruled eastern Dimat but,
as the commandant
of Dagana indicated,
he was not effective:
217

---

218
Young
and
timid,
Racine
Kane
did
not
have
the
authority required
to
impose himself on a population
that was
[from the outset]
reluctant to accept him as
chief.
He has
caved
in,
surrounding himself with
a
bunch
of
indiv:_juals
who
took
advantage
of
his
weakness.
As a result,
there
is a deficit of 10,000
francs,l
By
1906,
the
people
had
grown
resentful
of
Baabakar
Naam' 5
rule
also.
Both
chiefs
aroused
discontent
on
the
part
of
their
administrator.
The
Governor himself
criticized
them
severely.
This
~eakness coupled with a lingering opposition,
a constant
defiance
of
orders and refusal to pay taxes,
led to another
consolidation in 1906.
After Raasin
Kan was
dismissed,
eastern Dimat was
left without
canton
chief and returned to
the pre-1890 situation of "autonomous"
villages.
It stayed that way for a long time after 1906. 2
In
1913,
Governor
General
\\.Iilliam
Ponty's
divised
the
so-called
Politique
des
Races,
a
policy
involving
the
division
of
former
provinces
into
cantons
intended
as
far
as
possible
to
be
units
comprising
the
same
"ethnic"
groups
with
their
"natural"
leaders
as
chiefs. 3
This was applied to Dimat,
and resulted in
its division into
four
smaller
units:
Boqqo1,
Dimat
Nomade,
Dimat
Sedentaire,
and
Galojiina.
For
almost
two
years
these
chiefs
were
considered
on
trial, and enjoyed no revenues but the
2% returns on taxes. 4
Later,
in
April
1915,
the
Commandant
of
Dagana
seized on
the
condemnation of the
t~o chiefs of Fanay and the Ardo of the
nomads and
invoked the small size of the cantons to propose the restoration of the
former eastern and western cantons. S
St.
Louis acquiesced.
The canton
of
Fanay
(3,240
inhabitants),
was
annexed
to
Gaaye-Boqqo1
to
constitute
western
Dimat.
Baabakar
Naam
continued
to
rule
this

---

219
section.
At
the
same
time,
the
ch irteen
Fulbe
nomad
camps
were
annexed
to
Jalmacc-Njaayeen
to
constitute
ea~ter~ Dimat, with a total
of 4,387
ir,habitants.
This
canton was placed under
the
rule of Umar
Barahiirni
Kan. 6
This
new
consolidation
lasted
only
six
years.
1n
1921,
the
thief
of eastern Dimat was
tried by the
tribunal of Dagana
for
"brutality
and
abuse
of
authority"
and
sentenced
to
one
year' 5
imprisonment
a.nd
(''';0
years'prohibition
froIT.
staying
in
the
cercle. 7
Following
his
official
deposition
by
the
decree
of
13
July
1921,
eastern Dimac was once again split into Dimat
sedentaire under Aamadu
Sal from Cede. and Dimat nomade under
Bakkari Jo.o.10. 8
T~e s~udy of the evolution of Dimat shows that the French, through
a
constant
"changing
of
the
guards,"
tried
out
several
methods
of
admininstrative
control
in
the
province.
Dimat
had
moved
from
the
status
of a
single
province
under
Samrnba Camka
(1890),
co
that of two
cantons
(1903),
then
of
a
set
of
autonomous
villages
(1906)
before
being
divided
into
four
smaller
units and
then consolidated in 1913.
le
was
consolidated
again
into
Eas t
and 'es t
in
1915
and,
fina lly
split up into three in
1921.
(See Table I,).

---

220
TABLE 4:
EVOLUTION OF DIMAT FROM 1890 TO 1920
1890:
Grand'Dimat.
1903:
W. Dimat
E. Dimat
Baabakar N.
Raasin K.
1906:
W. Dimat
Autonomous V.
1913 :
Boqqol-Gaaye
D.
Nomade
D.
Sedentaire
Galoj iin
B. Naam
Ardo.
Amar
M. Seydu Kane
H.S.
So,",
1915:
W. Dimat
E. Dimat
B. Naarn
U.B. Kane
1921 :
W. Dimat
D.
nomade
D.
sedencaire
B. Naam
Bakkari jaal0
Aamadu K. Sal
1928:
W.D.
annexed to Dagana---------
_
E.Dimat to
Podor----

---

221
2. TOORO
The French had largely attained their objective of 1890 which was
basically
the
elimination
of
Lamtooro
as
traditional
beneficiary
of
political
pre-eminence
and
allegiance
all
over
the
province.
Time
seemed
ripe
to
consolidate
the
province
into
much
more
cohesive
and
ef£icent
administrative
units.
The
firs.t
proposition of consolidation
came
from
administrator
Charles
Mathieu,
the
Commandant
of
Pador,
in
[he
autumn
of 1909.
In
essence,
Mathieu
found
the
division
into
six
cantons obsolete and the province as being too small to justify
it any
Longe r .
He
regarded
consolidation
as,
not
only
the
best
way
to
administer
efficiently
the
province
but
also,
as
a
means
of
saving
considerably
(about
4,460
frances,
some
30%)
on
the
budget
of
his
cercle 9
After
two
years
of
repeated
propositions
and
the
condem-
nation
of
Bookar
Baydi
Jah
chief
of
Halaybe,
for
embezzlement
of
funds,
St.
Louis acceded to
the
request.
The
Order of 10 August 1911
abolished the cantons of Gede,
Edi,
and
Halaybe and discharged their
chiefs.
Tooro
was
consolidated
into
three
larger
cantons
under
Mustafa
Kan
(Podor-Gede),
Aamadu
Moqtar
tJan
(Mbanw-Edi)
and
Farba
Birom Sih (Seeloobe-Halaybe).lO
In
1913
the
administration moved
to
reduce
the
three
cantons
to
t'Wo.
Administrators of Podor accused Mustafa Kan of "extreme
inertia"
and claimed that:: he was hiding "under his apparent nat::ure of respect::ful
and
submissive
agent,
a
disobedient
and
hypocritical
character. 10
Moreover,
the
chief
...... as
accused
of
embezzling
taXes. 12
This
last
difficulty led the administ::ration
to require village chiefs to deliver
tax
receipts
directly
to
the
Commandant.
The chief's choosing of an

---

222
old offender
as
a
close
friend also won him criticism on the part of
the administration.
In late 1912, after he travelled with this friend
to
Dakar
to
attend
the
14
July
ceremonies,
in
defiance
of
the
Commandant's
advice,
the
Governor
decided
that
he
could
not
be
maintained
in
office. 13
Thus,
in
October
1913
Mustafa
Kan
was
dismissed
and
his
canton
split
between
Seeloobe-Halaybe
and
Mbantu-Gede.
Aamadu
Moxtaar
\\Jan
and
Farba
Birom
Sih
thus
became
chiefs
of
much
larger
units,
in
accord
with
Governor
General's
principle that,
"it seems rational whenever circumstances allow it,
to
extend the
command of those [chiefs) who enjoy real and truly deserved
crust."
From
1913
on,
there
were
t~o TacIOeS);
east
and west.
The
ne~ consolidation was confirmed by the Lieutnant-governor's
Order of
23 December 1913 and later reconfirmed by Governor
general's Order of
10 January 1914. 14
B.
CHfu~GES IN CENTRAL FUUTA
In
central
Fuuta
Laaw
and
Boosoya
went
through
some
administrative
changes
while
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
experienced
almost
none.
In 1912 Abdullaay Kan
the chief of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
finally
retired
and
was
replaced by
his
son
Haamidu,
effective
January
1913.
With Abdu11aay Kan's reti-:ement the province became a simple canton and
Haamidu Kan,
an ordinary canton chie'f~ instead of Chef Superieur as his
father
was.
This
involved
a
cha'nge
in
importance
vis
a
vis
the
province
of
Boosoya,
and
a
change
in status,
t:he
son
enjoying much
less
pres tige
and
revenue
than
the
father. IS
Although
he
first
resorted to harsh methods
to win
the obedience of the
people,
Haamidu

---

223
Kan
enjoyed
the
full
support
of
the
administration
and
remained
in
office for a long time. 16
1.
UAW
Ever since the assassination of Abdul Aziiz and the
nomination of
Aarnadu
Samrnba Wan
in 1900,
this
province had
been the most stable of
all.
Yet,
the Chef Duperieur of
Laaw did pose a number of problems to
the
administration.
As
early
as
1900
he
was
accused
by
one
adminis!:rator
of
comporting
himself
like
the
pre-colonial
chiefs
of
Fuuta,
of handling Laaw
as if i t were a
"conquered land,"
resorting to
confiscation,
requisition of labour,
applying fines "disproportionate"
to the crimes co~nited, among other things.
Despite these difficulties
no major administrative change would take place for almost a decade. I7
In 1910
the Commandant of Pador built
~o great length
a
case against
the chief.
His long report includes the following observations:
The
province of Laaw is too
important for one single
chief
especially
i f this
chief
is
a man
like Amaclou
Samba ... He
lives
with
apathy
on
the
prestige
bequeathed by his elders.
Amadou does not govern the
province
at all ... He
lets his entourage govern as
i t
pleases...
The
tribunal
of
Laaw
functions
very
poorly.
Plaintiffs often have to wait for months and
months
to
get
their disputes settled.
I
have
tried
every
method
to
get
Amadou
Samba
show
finer
sentiments and to turn him into an ordinary chief ... r
have even punished him but,
to no avail ... ,.18
Indeed
Laaw
was
an
impor~ant
province.
With
its
31,000
inhabitants
i t
was
the
largest
in
population
within
the
cere le
of
Poclor.
These
cons idera ti ons
prompted
the
commandant
to
propose
the
division of the
province
into
two
sections:
Laaw
proper under Aamadu

---

224
Sammba and Haayre-Laaw under
a
second chief
to
counter the
authority
of
the
Chef Superieur.
Along with
the
creation of
this
new canton,
the commandant also proposed a
second tribunal.
In the
summer or 1911 these propositions won the approval of the
Lieutenant-Governor.
On
la August by the same Order
aforementioned,
the
administration
appointed
Madaani
Njaay,19
an
Interpreter
from
Galoya,
chief of Haayre-Laaw sector.
A month
later,
the
tribunal was
created (Order of 12 SeptEmber)
>lich the chief as president,
t>lO local
magistrates
and
two
assistants.
Madaani's
ru le
did
not
las t
long
however.
In
1912 he
>las
accused of embezzling
funds,
dismissed and
replaced
by
Ibraa
"bdul
Aziiz,
another
nephew
of
Aamadu
Sammba. 20
This
time
the
chief
of
the
western
section was
subordinated
to
the
Chef
Superieur
and
Laaw
was
administratively
reconsidered
one
single
province.
Despite
the
repeated complaints
of
administrators
against
Aamadu
Sammba,
Laaw
remained
under
this
chief's
supervision
until
1924 21
The
inability
of
local
administrators
to
come
to
terms
with
the
"Laaw
issue"
related
to
the protection
its
chiefs
enjoyed at a higher
level.
as a result of the long established alliance >lith St.
Louis and
the
entrench~ent of the Wan as a ruling family within a province ~here
it was virtually impossible to substitute
anyone else for it.
2.
BOOSOYA
Until
1907
Boosoya
>las
ruled
by
three
canton
chiefs:
Bookar
"bdul,
the
son of Abdul Bookar Kan,
replaced Ceerno Molle
in 1902 and
reigned
on
eastern
Boosoya
province.
Bummuy
Aamadu
Hamj atu
ruled

---

225
~estern Boosoya, while Koolaado Bah led the canton of Southern Boosoya.
In 1907,
changes
occurred.
The
administration
discharged Koolaado
Bah
for
age
reasons,
while
Bummuy
Aamadu
H.
and
Bookar
A.
were
dismissed
for
embezzlement
of
colonial
funds.
Following
these
dismissals
Boosoya was
left withou~ canton chiefs
for
several years.
As was all too often the case
in Dimat,
village chiefs dealt directly
with the Commandant of Salde,
cercle created in 1907 and to which the
province
'.Jas
annexed
by
virtue
of
Governor
General's
Order
of
18
January 1907. 22
Bet~een 1907 and 1912 administrative chaos prevailed in Boosoya.
?eople
frequently
refused
to
pay
taxes
and
most
village
chiefs
for
fear
of
becoming
unpopular
were
reluctant
to
collaborate
..... ith
the
administration. 23
In
the
absence
of
a
canton chief,
people
took
to
electing
as
village
chiefs
'.... eak
men
deposing
them
as
soon
as
those
chiefs
tried to
assert
their power.
To put an end to such "anarchy, rl
c:he
administration
felt
obliged
to
get
an
interim
chief
appointed,
pending
the
availability of a man
"energetic enough and well disposed
to
our
cause. ,,24
Thus,
in
February
1913,
an
assembly
of
village
chiefs,
called upon to choose a canton chief, unanimously elected Abdul
Ali Kan,
nephew of Abdul
Bookar and chief of Daabiya,
as
the
head of
the entire province. 25
The
situation did not change
significantly under
the new
chief.
Abdul
Aali
was
illiterate
and
appeared
more
accomodating
than
his
predecessors.
He
was
accused by
the
administ.ration
of
relatives
and
friends
having
t.oo
many
friends
and
relatives
in
Boosoya
to
rule
effectively.
Moreover,
during the conscription campaign of 1914 he did

---

226
little
to
help
provide
recruits.
Of
the
fourteen
required
from
Boosoya he only gave
four.
Under
those circumstances,
Abdul Aali was
deposed
and
replaced
in
June
1915
by his
brother
Baydi Aali
Kan,
an
"Interpreter of Tribunals"
at Dakar,
who had applied for
the post ever
since 1913. 26
The population did not dispute his traditional claim to
the post,and Baydi Aali ruled in a strict manner. 26
Also,
seizing on verbal promises
from Governor General Clozel,
he
i<1dulged
i<1
the
collection
of
taxes
that
formerly
acc rued
to
the
Almaami(s)
of
Fuuta.
A series of crises
ens~ed the causes of which
one Commandant of Salde summarized
pretty well. 27
In
the
summer of 1919
Baydi Aali clashed ~ith Ceerno Molle
over
the
issue
of
Tabalde
(war
drum)
and
a
number
of
people
filed
complaints
accusing
the
chief
of
"putting
up
the
posts
of
village
chief for sale and nominating the highest bidder. ,,28
This crisis led
to
Baydi
Aali' s
s,",spension
in September
1919
and his
replacement by
his
brother
and
predecessor
Abdul
Aali
Kan.
M.eanwhile,
the
administration
opened
an
inquiry
led by
Inspector of Administrative
Affairs Jean Vidal.
The
latter concluded that the chief was victinl :>f
a
plot,
given
the
"denials
and
retractions
on
the
part
of
the
witnesses
even of
those who proved most assertive at the outset such
as
Kome
Labuuda. ,,29
with
respect
to
the
assumption of
land rights,
Vidal
concluded
that
the
chief
was
rat;her
misled
by
the
careless
intercession of administrator Richard with Governor
General Clozel. 30
Despite
Commandant
Leclerc's
charges
that
those
retractions
of
witnesses
resulted
from
threats
and
intimidation on
the part of the
chie f ,
the
Inspector
·.".,ho
seemingly
placed
a
higher
premium
on
the

---

227
chief's
administrative
Efficacy,
concluded
that
"inspite
of
his
mistakes ... Baydi
Aali
should
return
to
his
office
of
chief
of
the
province of Boseya for,
there
is no doubt whatsoever that he would not
have
incurred such accusations
if he had not been an energetic chief,
earnestly devoted to
our principles.· 31
Thus,
in the spring of 1921,
Baydi Aali
once
again replaced his brother as chief of the province,
this time to remain in office much 10nger. 32
The evolution of Boosoya from 1907
to
1921 suggests a number
of
remarks:
With
the
elimination of
the
several canton chiefs
in
1907
the
administration applied
to
the province
the
system of
"autonomous
"/i llages"
in
Dimat
had
proved
a
political·administrative
expedient.
Just as in the latter province however,
so too it failed to
work in a region that enjoyed a longer history of rebelliousness within
Fuuta
Tooro.
This
failure.
coupled
with
the
constant
rejection
of
"exogenous"
chiefs
forced
the
French
to
definitely
reckon
with
the
'Kan-Daabiya' whom they had previously rejected.
Abdul Aali Kan indeed
hardly satisfied the criteria of the administration.
He was
illiterate
and
reluctant
to
command
the
people
of
Boosoya
through
tough
administrative measures.
He
was
not
in
any
....'ay
imbued with
French
ideas
as
his
brother
Baydi
was
reported
to
be.
He
also regularly omi tted to
mention
the
names
of
some
one
thousand
people
of
Daabiya,
his
own
village
on
annual
tax
records.
Finally,
he
provided
only
four
of
the
fourteen
recruits
required
from
his
province.
In
many
ways,
Abdul
Aali
had
remained,
l'ennemi hereditaire
de
la France,
as he was
once
called,33
All of this not withstandir.g,
he was called upon to assure the interim

---

228
,.....hen
his
brother
incurred
a
suspension
in
August
1919.
Also,
the
abolition
of
the
three
cantons
in
Boosoya,
and
the
nomination
of a
Chef
de
Province
conseccated
the
definitive
consolidation
of
the
province throughout the colonial era.
C.
CHANGES IN EASTERN FUUTA
The
'..... inds
of
consolidation
::hen
s'w"eeping
through
the
rest
of
Fuuta
did
not
spare
the
eas::ern
!Jart,
the
provinces
of
Damga
and
Ngenaar.
There
too,
the
administra::ion
seemed
more
committed
::han
ever to bringing the territory and the
people under stricter control.
Commandants
in Matam did not:
have
a hard time making a
case
for
it.
As
early
as
1903-1904
they
started
denouncing
the
spirit
of
insubordination
of
the
chiefs
of
Ngenaar,
Padalal,
and
the
t'..... o
Feda(s) :
The chiefs of Ngenar,
Padalal and the
t~o Ferlos are
incapable
of
conforming
to
our
principles:
They
remain
attached
to
pre-colonial
ideas
in
their
comportment
vis
a
vis
the
people
under
their
rule.
Many
facts
go
unnoticed
to
us
because
the
natives
fear them and do not dare complain. 34
These complaints
led
the
administrators
of Matam to
propose
the
abolition of the ~estern Ferlo canton and its fusion
~ith Padalal, and
the annexation of the eastern section to the canton of Demrnbankaane. 35
Although
these
propositions did not
meet ~ith the ·antire approval of
higher spheres,
Aamadu Ibraa W,
Ferla]
was dismissed' in 1904 and Ferla
conso 1 ida ted
unde r
Elimaan
Bookar
until
the
death
of
the
latter
in
1907,
This
year
proved
a
watershed
in
the
administrative
history
of

---

229
eastern
Fuuta.
First
of
all,
on
18
January
1907
Ferlo
was
split
again.
The
western
half
was
annexed
to
the
canton
of Matam under
chief Hamadi Alfaa Bah,
while
the
eastern half was
integrated into the
can ton
of
Damga
led
by
Abdul
Salaam
Kan.
This
same
year
Damga
absorbed
the
cantons
of
Dernmbankaane
and
Padalal
whose
chiefs
were
fired.
A
few
months
later
Elfekki
Aamadu
Baylaa.
the
chief
of
Ngenaar,
discharged.
allegedly
for
reasons
of
age
and
ineffectiveness
and
appointed
"honorary
chief"
and
president of
the
Tribunal de
Province.
The canton of Ngenaar was annexed to the canton
of Matam. 36
A
final
and
lastin[~ administrative
change
occurred
i:1
Oc tober
1907 when
the
two
cantons
of
Feria were
reunited into one
larger unit
and placed under Sammba Elfekki A.B.
Aan.
One can advance two reasons
for such sudden change:
First,
the
French may have realized that the
annexation' of
too
wide
a
region
and
too
elusive
a
people
(Fulbe
nomads)
to
Matam
and
Damga
ran
counter
the
principles
of
administrative
efficiency,
given
the many
problems
of communication.
In addition to being inoperative the measure was likely to increase the
power
of
Hamadi
Alfaa
and
Abdul
Salaam
in
proportions
the
administration ~ould not wish.
Second,
Sammba
Eifekki was
the son of
Aamadu Baylaa.
His nomination
as chief of "Grand Ferio"
may have been
on the
part
of
the
French,
a move
to compensate
the
"Aan"
family for
the
dismissal
of
the
former
chief
of
Ngenaar.
At
any
ra te.
this
consolidation was
[ 0
bring about
administrative
stability
in
eastern
Fuuta for half a century.37

---

230
CONCLUSION
Be~ween 1904 and 1920 most cantons of the south bank
continued to
experience changes both in personnel and size.
With the exception of
Dimat where
t.he administration
resorted alternately to
consolidation
and division,
the
tendency was
to
consolidate
to
the maximum extent
possible.
Division and consolidation consti~uted also in the hands of
the
administration
political ploys used occasionally to
either purge
the
Commandement
Indigene,
or
reward
those
deemed
valuable
chiefs.
These measures were sometimes
related to what Klein pointedly referred
to
as
"The desire
of each administrator to leave his own mark on the
district
he
commanded
and
thus
to
make
changes
in
what
his
predecessor had done."

---

NOTES
1. A.N.S.:
lC.
1296.
"RACINE KANE chief of the Irlabe-Aleydi."
2.
I t s tayed
that ..ay
from
1906 on..ard,
despi te
Abdul
Kummaba
Daadaa's
inistent requests for appointment.
Abdul K.D.
was a member of
the
Dimat ruling
family.
His
application was
accompanied by a letter
reminding
the
Governor
of
his
past
services,' his
missions
with
V.
ballot and Pliniere in the 18805 as well as his role in the acquisition
of land for
the
construction of the
Kaedi
fort
( A.N.S.
2D6-5,
Dagana
'Correspondances 1909-1913').
3.
Governor
General
William
Pancy
argued
that
"one
cannot
administer a country without due consideration for local traditions and
customs,"
and seemed critical
of
the
installation as
heads
of certain
provinces
and cantons,
of "chiefs completely foreign
to
the population
living
in
these
territories
and,
often
of
different
religion."
For
details
on
this
issue,
see
A.N.S.,
l3G-75
'Etat
d'esprit
des
populations et circulaires,
1913-1917."
See also,
Ailsa Auchnie. The Commandement Indigene
in Senegal,
op.
cit.,
pp.
16-17; Jean Suret Canale,
in Afrigue Noire:
L'ere Coloniale
op.
cit., p.
110.
4.
They
became
full
civil
servants
with
a
salary,
starting
in
January
1915
(Gubernatorial
Order
of
19
January
1915).
See
A.N.S.
2D6-6 Dagana "Correspondances 1914-1919."
5.
These chiefs were sentenced by
the
tribunal of Dagana to four
months
imprisonment
for,
"abuse
of
authority
and
absolute
lack
of
professional conscientiousness."
(A.N.S:
2D6-6 passim).
6.
Each
of
these
chiefs
had
a
salary
of
1,250
francs.
This
amounted to half the budget that
the 19 January Order provided.
Hence
this conso~idation also helped the administration save money.
7.
A.N.S.,
lC.2582,
"Oumar Kane,
chef du Dimar oriental 1915."
8.
Several
years
later,
Governor
Jules
Carde
blamed
the
instability
of
Dimat on
its
severance
from what
he called
its
region
naturelle.
He
then decided to annex Dimat nomade,
Dimat sedentaire and
Fos-Galojiina
to
the
cercle
of
Dagana.
Dimat
became
once
again
a
single unit under chief Siree Njaay Kan from Penndaaw.
231

---

232
9.
Mus tafa
Kan
sutteeded
to
his
father
Mammadu Daada.
Aamadu
Moktaar
replaced Tamiimu Siley who
resigned
in
late
1902 while
Biram
Sih was
substituted for Ismaayla Joob deposed in 1902.
We will return
to the fierce opposition to Aamadu Moktaar Wan in a following chapter.
10.
For details on administrative
changes
in Tooro see:
A.N.S:
2Dll-13 Cercle de Podor "Organisation Territoriale
1878-1914."
11.
The
three
chiefs
who
were
revoked were Ardo Buubu
(Mbantu),
Ardo Abu
(Edi)
and Bookar Baydi
(Halaybe).
The elimination of Bookar
Baydi helped save
some
9,000
francs,
more
than half the budget of the
cercle of Podor.
The capitals of the new cantons were Podor, Gede,
and
Njum.
12.
A.N.S:
2G13-59 Cercle de Podor:
"Rapports mensue1s 1913."
13.
A.N.F.
O.M.:
Senegal
1:
Dossier 97, A.a.F.
a Ministere des
Colonies,
4e trimestre 1913.
14.
The boundary between the two cantons was
fixed and approved by
the Governor
in April of 1914.
It was a line running from Sincu Maal
(eastern Tooro)
through Njum (1.1. Tooro)
to Jaara northward and finally,
to
the
bend
of
the
river
between Anndo
and Maafu
(A.N.S.:
2D11-13
passim,
Podor a Gouverneur,
6/4/1913).
The
salary
of
the
two
chiefs
was
raised
to
1.+,000
francs
each,
assorted
with
5%
returns
on
taxes
(Gouvern.
a
Commandant
de
Podor,
20/4/1914) .
15.
The
abolition of
"Superior Chiefship"
was
decreed
in 1907
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
of
Senegal
on
grounds
that
"Their
[chefs
superieur]
survival
made
the
natives
believe
that
the
former
ruling
classes
had
maintained,
against
our
will,
their prestige,
influence,
and
authority."
(A.N.S.:
13G-71
"Organisation
Territoriale
1901-1907") .
Nonetheless,
Abdullaay Kan continued enjoying the prestige if not
the perogatives of a chef superieur.
16. The commandant of Salde did mention in the summer of 1915 that
"Arnidou Kane
tries his best
to
free himself from the
influence of his
father.
influence
he
sometimes
feels,
weighs
heavily
on
him
~or,
Abdoulaye Kane has accumulated lasting enemities which as any good old
man
he
would
relish
satiating."
A.N.S.,
2G15-37,
Salde
"Rapports
mensuels 1915"
(8/1915 by Assist. Adm.
Duval).
Haamidu
stepped
down
in
1947
for
health
reasons
and
on his
own
request.
He was
then replaced by his
cousin M.ammadu Lamin Ran Raasin
who ruled until independence in 1960.
(See our interview with Raasllulu
Lih,
Oakar 31 July 1985).
17.
In 1901 Adm. Valzi the Commandant of Podor complained that the
chief comported himself like the pre-colonial chiefs of Fuuta, handling
the province of Laaw as if it were a "conquered land" and resorting to
confiscations.
requisition
of
labour,
fines
all
too
often
dispropor~
I
I

---

233
tionate
to
the
crimes
committed
and
so
on.
As
a
corrective
to
such
situation Podor imposed on him as assistant,
his nephew Aamadu Moxtaar.
Following a
request
for
the
confirmation of
the
latter,
the
Governor
condemned
the
procedu.re
in
May
1903
and
proposed
a
serious
warning
instead (See
A.N.S:
2Dll-3 passim, August 1901).
18.
A.N.S:
2Dll-13 passim.
For details on Aamadu Moxtaar see our
interviews with Urnsr Bah, Siree Buubu Bookum and Rasuulu Lih, passim.
19.
T,Je
were
unable
to
find his personal
file
in the archives and
oral
information
on
him
is
scant:'.
In
1916
the
Lieutenant-Governor
presented him
as
"the
son
of
a
former chief of Niora descending from
one
of
the
best
known
and
respected
families"
(A.N.S.,
13G-70;
"Chefferies et demandes d'emploi de chefs."
1904-1916).
Despite this
testimony Madaani Njaay's claim to
rule was disputed.
People may have
perceived him as
a
"foreigner"
just because he was
from Nooro.
Galoya
~as his original village.
20.
Aamadu Samrnba requested the merging of the Haayre sector with
Laa';oJ after the dismissal of Madaani Njaay.
The request was
turned down
(Amadou
Samba
a
adm.
Nebout.
A.N.S.
2Dll-5
Podor
"Correspondence
1909-1913").
Ibraa Abdd Aziiz '.as
the
son of .Abdul Aziiz,
former
chief
of
Laaw
assassinated
in
March
1900.
Ibraa
A.A.
was
an
Interpreter when he was nominated in 1913.
21.
We
shall
return
to
these
complaints
of
1913-15-19.
In
September
1920
the
Commandant
of
Podor
proposed
the
deposition
of
Aamadu Sammba and
the merging of the
two
cantons under
Ibraa Abdul A.
but
the
L't.
Governor
dismissed
the
proposition.
For
the
proposed
reorganization,
see
A.N.S:
2G20-S
Senegal
"Rapport
annuel
A.a.F.
1920. "
22.
The
administration
resorted
to
"autonomous villages"
because
it could not place at the head of Boosoya "a chief energetic enough and
entirely devoted to our cause "
The
people
of
Boosoya
who
,?erhaps
equated
the
measure
',olith
a
subordination
to
the
long
rejected
Kan-Salde
chiefs,
protested
vehemently
against
the
annexation.
Although
the
administration would
by no means
repeal
the decision,
one can construe the
transfer of the
capital from Sal.de to Jorbuwol,
as a concession.
23.
In late
1912 four villages ';oJere on record for refusing to pay
taxes.
These
were~ ~Guddude-Joobee.
Guddude-Nduyetbe,
Aanarn-Siwol
and
Kobbillo.
As
the Commandant of Matam said,
the administration had "to
operate as one wou1:d
in a barely subjugated land."
For these troubles
see
A.N.S:
2G13-52
Salde-Diorbivol,
"Rappo~ts
mensuels
1913"
(Jan-Feb.):
2G17-31 SALDE:
"Rapports mensuels 1917"
(Fev.).
See
also
2G17-32:
Senegal
"Protectorats;
Rapports
politiques
1907," 32p.
(Cercle de Hatam).
24.
Aamadu H.
Wan
had
applied
for
chiefship
in
Boosoya but,
the
administration did not contemplate appointing a "foreigner"
there.
For

---

234
a
long
time,
the argument was
chat a chief without a
traditional claim
to
power
would have
a
hard
time
ruling
the
Boosoyaabe.
See,
A.N.S.
2Dll-5
Podor:
"Corresp.
1909-1913"
(Amadou
M.
Wane
chef
de
Guede
a
Rene Manetche Commandant de Podor 15/5/1910).
25.
Abdul
Aali
Kan
was
the
son
of Aali
Bookar,
the
brother
and
right
hand
man
of
Abdul
Bookar
Kan
who
'''as
deported
following
his
surrender in 1891,
to Gabon.
All the chiefs attended chat meeting except Ceerno Malle Belli of
Gilon
(3.204
inhab.)
and
Elimaan
Siree
of
Coday
(1,100
inhab.),
according to the administrator for "reasons of hatred and rivalry which
I woudl be
able
co
use
[in due
tirne]
co our own advantage,
by playing
one
against
che
other."
The
face
thac
these
electors
represented
11.563
inhabitants
Eor
a.
cocal
of
18,860
suggests
chat
the
administrati.on
had
co
reckon
',llcn
h~s
popularit~i (
A.N.S:
2G13-S2,
passim,
Janvier-Fevrier-Mars).
26.
For the nomination of Baydi Aali see
A.N.S:
2G154·6 Senegal.
"Rapports
trimestriels 1915" Lt-Gouv.
a Gouv-General A.O.F.,
Aout 1915
p.
20:
and
2G15·37
Salde.
"Rappo~ts trimestriels
1915."
In
February
1917
for
instance
Boosoya l,·.:as
well
behind
its
taxes of
l:he year 1916.
Only
8,000
francs
had
been
paid
~hile
the
province
of
Yirlaabe-
Hebbiyaabe had acquitted its 28,000 f by then.
In four days Baydi Aali
toured the province and managed to collect the remaining 37,154 f.
This
led R.
£loi
the
Commandant of Salde
to conclude:
"i.f Bossea has
paid
i. ts
dues,
one
has
to
commend
Baidi
Aly
who
happens
co
have
an
iron-hand."
(A.N.S:
2G17-31
Cercle
de
Salde
"Rapports
trimestriels
1915."
(Fev.).
27.
His comrnents read as
follo',.,s:
The
Bosseyabe
used not
to
pay
taxes
as
regularly as
the
rrlabe.
Chiefs,
guards
and
political
agents.
Ofi:8n
in
cahoots
had
allm,,'ed
the
Bosseyabe
La
live
t
in
such
indepencence until
1915 when Baidy Aly came.
lntelligent,
quite
energetic,
he
managed
at
the
beginning
to
impose himself
on
the
population under
his
rule.
He made
them pay taxes and managed to set
the
canton
some°,.,hac
in
order.
Carried
away b)..
the
success
he
had
met
within
the
cancan,
Baidy
Aly
departed
gradually
from
the
qualities
that
had
imposed him on the population.
He became accessible
to
the
dishonest
suggestions of his
entourage
and,
in
order
to
procure
the
money
necessary
to
support
his
family and his
large
retinue,
he
resorted
to
the
practices
for
which
one
reproaches
him
today.
In
1916
during
Governor
General
Clozel's
tour
of
the
valley Baidy Aly and his retinue presented the latter
with the
issue of land and related taxes
in a
pretty
distorted
fashion.
Perhaps
surprised,
Mr.
Clozel
made
vague
promises
and
said
precisely
that
the
administration
would
continue
to
show
respect
for
traditions
and
customs.
Baidy seized on
this
reply

---

235
and exaggerated
its ampleness
to assume
on land,
the
rights
that
formerly
constituted
the
exclusivity
of
the Almamis.
For
this
quote
see:
A.N.S:
2G19-23
Salde
"Rapports
politiques
mensuels,
1919"
(Sept.).
28.
It was
tharged
that
IS
villages
had
thanged
thiefs
35
times
and
that candidates had paid up
to
2,485
francs
along with 24 sheep to
bribe
the
chief.
See
A.N.S:
2010-9
CercIes
Matam-Salde,
"Cas
de
detournements 1919-1934."
In
fact,
the
practice
of
gife
gi'Jing ''''as
entrenched
in
Fuutanke
tradition and went back to
the era of the Sat i 121(5)
and was ·,.;idespread
under the Almaami(s).
29.
The chief had declared in his statement that he was the victim
of
a
plot
on
the
part
of Kome
Labuuda,
an
immigrant
from Mbwnmba and
c:.hen
Ceerno
Holle
of
Cilon,
Aarnadu
Bonko,
the
Interpreter
of
che
cercle.
and Jeynaba Faayol.
a woman from Cilon married to Paris Leclerc
the
Commandant of Salde.
He
contended
that
this
quatuor had poisoned
the
mi.nd
of
the
administrator
about
him
by
telling
Leclerc
that.
"I
rank higher than Paris Leclerc.
I have received the
'Legion of Honour'
[medal]
and
I
do
whatever
I
please."
(A.N.S:
2010-19,
CercIes
de
~atam-Salde, passim).
Commandant Leclerc was certainly jealous of the chief's medal for,
in
concluding
his
report
he
·.... rote:
"And
I
should
add
in
conclusion
that.
the chief of Bossea through his
exactions,
his arrogance and his
vanity which have been incredibly blo'~ out of proportion ever since he
'...·as
awarded
the
medal
of
knight
[sic)
of
the
Legion
of
Honor.
has
brought on himself
the
animus of
the
population as
a whole."
(2010-19
passim.
Salde a Gouverneur,
20 Aouc 1919).
30.
Still
justifying
the
chief
J.
Vidal
'.enC
on
saying:
"Such
decision emanating from so high an official could not have on Baidy Aly
Kane.
the
descendant of
the
former
Alamamis
of
Fouta
and too strongly
inclined
to
swanking,
but
the
.....orst
effects.
He
overly
used
the
prerogative
that
was
just
bestowed
upon
him
and
it
was
not
without
difficulty that Mr.
Leclerc prevailed on him to
forego it."
(Commission
Report,
2010-19).
One
should
mention
in
pass i ng
tha t
Haam idu
Kan
the
chief
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
who
thought
that
Baydi
Ali
had
misinterpreted
Governor Clozel's statement,
refrained from assuming any such rights in
his canton.
31.
Commission Report,
op.
cit.
32.
Although he was dismissed as president of the
tribunal of the
province,
he
remained chief of Boosoya
until
1929.
That year.
on the
demand
of
Elimaan Coday,
Ceerno Molle
of Cilon,
Jagodin Sincu-Bummaka
of
the
same
village,
Bummuy
Hoore-Foonde.
Governor
Martial
Merlin
on
tour in the cercle of Matam ordered his dismissal.
Baydi
Aali
Kan
was
replaced
in
1929
by
Abdullaay
Raasin Kan
of
Salde
who,
following
difficulties
was,
in
turn,
replaced
in
1942
by

---

236
Ceerno Saydu Kan, a member of the Kan-Daabiya family.
The
latter
ruled
the
province
of
Boosoya
until
independence
in
1960.
Tradition
contends
that
Baydi
Aali
had
reduced
the
rights
and
privilege.s
of
most
villagE.
chiefs
to
a
considerable
extent.
Their
demand is
therefore no surprise
(see our interview witn Faatmata Raasin
Bah
of
Hoore-Foonde
and
~ammadu Jen
of
Woolum-Neere:
Nouackchott.
Mauritania 13 April 1985).
For
details
on
the
crisis
in
Boosoya,
see
also:
A.N.S:
2G18-28
Sa1de:
"Rapports
mensue1s
1918" ;
2G21-8
Senegal
"Rapports
trimestrie1s
1921"
(2e
trimestre).:
2621-26
Cercle
Matam,
"Rapports
trimestriels 1921."
33.
A.N.S.:
2D10-19, op. cit.
34.
A.N.S.:
2G3-63
Cerc1e
Matam,
"Rapports
mensue1s
1903."
(Jui11et-Octobre).
Moreover,
Aamadu Ibraa
took
the
liberty
of embezzling
the
sum of
2,597
francs
representing
the
1903
taxes
of
w.
Feria.
For
the
complaints
against
the
four
chiefs
see
also
A.N.S:
2G3-7,
Senegal:
"Rapport po1itique general 1903."
2e semestre,
58 p.
35.
The
people
of
Ferlo
resented
the
measure
and some
threate~ed
to
emigrate.
The
administration went
to
great
length
to
con'Jince
them
that
the
decision was
prompted by
the
lack
of
an
"appropriate"
heir,
(Elim.
Bookar's
brother
'.... as
too
old,
the
son
of
-.:::he
late
chief was
a
teenager
then
schooling at
Matam.
-,.:hile Aamadu
Ibraa,
the
nephew,
had
already proven his worth in the eyes of the administration).
For
the
installation of Abdul
Salaam and Hamadi Alfaa Bah and the
resistance
of
the
people
of
Ferlo,
see:
A.N.S:
3D10-3
"Annexion
du
Ferlo aux cantons de Matam et du Damga").
36.
His
new
func tions
earned
Elfekki
Aamadu
Baylaa
a
monthly
salary of
50
francs.
This
was
a courteous way of dismissing the chief
of Ngenaar.
The
"Aan"
family
regarded the
replacement of Elf.
Aamadu
Baylaa,
perhaps
wrongly,
as
an usurpation on
[he
part
of chief Hamadi
A1faa.
For
this,
see
A.N.M:
El-98 "Dossiers
individue1s de chefs"
(Ma1al Buubu Siree E1fekki, chef de Magama).
See
also
A.N.S:
2G7-32
Senegal,
"Protectorats:
Rapports
po1itiques 1907"; 32 p,
(pp.
7-8).
37.
Sammba Elfekki died in office in 1927.
Hamadi Alfaa in 1935,
and Abdu1 Salaam Kan in 1955.
No
territorial chang~~took place until
1958.
38.
Ma r tin
Kle in,
I,"s"-"-l",a"m,-",a~n",d,--...P",o,,,l~i,,t~l=.· c=s_,"i"n~",S",e",n",e",g..a,"l,-,-:_---'S"'",,·n",e"'-.-",S"a"l",u""m
1847-1887.
Stanford University Press, 1963.
; :..~ .. '
~ :

---

AHISTORY OF FUUTA TOORO,
18905-19205 :SENEGAL UNDER COLONIAL
RULE. THE PROTECTORATE
By
Mouhamed Moustapha KANE
VOLUME 2
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHYLOSOPHY
..~ __c - .--•.• --- -•.
! CON5EIl A:=RiCAIN ET MALGACH::
I f'OUrl. l'EN5ElGNEMENT 5UPER!EU~
\\ c. A. M. E. 5. -
OU1~UGOU .
Arrivee .. l.2.NOV,.1
.. " .. :
Enregistre sous n° .# 0· 2' 0' -9.. 2' I
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY-_·-=:_~~=--
- - -
1987

---

CONTENTS
Page
AC~IOWLEDG~~ENTS
.
.
1ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.
.
_._. _._
vi
LIST OF TABLES
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _.... xii
LIST OF MAPS
xiii
LIST OF APPENDICES
.
.
_
xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
.
.
, _ . . X'J
PREFACE
A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
1
THE SECONDARY LITTE~~TURE
1
THE STUDY PROPER
7
A_~CHIVAL AND ORAL SOURCES
12
NOTES
.
20
?ART ONE: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1:
FUUTA TOORO AROUND 1850
23
A.
THE lAND AND THE MODES OF LIVELIHOOD
.
23
~
8.
THE PEOPLE OF FUUTA TOORO
30
C.
THE FUUTANKE STATE........................
.
35
NOTES ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
40
l
PART TWO: THE nu::NCH AND FUUTA TOORO.
~ AND DIPLOMACY, 1850-1890
C~~PTER 2:
FRENCH INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA
48
I
A.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STAKES
,
48
B.
CHANGING CONDITIONS ~ND SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICy
50
C.
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS THE DIFFERENT REGIONS
OF FUUTA
53
I
1.
The French and Dimat
_
_...
.
_
53
2.
The French and Damga
_...
57
I
vi
I
I
I

---

CONTENTS
Page
ACKNO\\.iLEDCEHENTS
, ,
i i i
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..
I
.
_
vi
I
I
LIST OF TABLES.".
.
xi i
..
xiii
I
LI ST OF MAPS
.
LIST OF APPENDICES
,
. . . . . . . . . _
xiv
I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
,
.
.
xv
!,
PREFACE
iI
A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
,
,
' . '
,
1
I
THE SECONDARY LITTERATURE
'
'
'
'
,1
!
THE STUDY PROPER
,
,
7
I
ARCHIVAL AND ORAL SOURCES.,
,
12
NOTES
'
'
20
fI,
~ART ONE:
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1:
FUUTA TOORO AROUND 1850
,..
., .. ,23
A,
TllE LAND AND THE MODES OF LIVELIHOOD
23
l
B.
THE PEOPLE OF FUUTA TOORO
,
30
C.
THE F1JUTANKE STATE
,., . . "
35
NOTES
,
,
'
40
I
PART NO: TIlE FRENCH AND FUUTA TOORO.
POWER AND DIPLOMACY, 1850-1890
I
CHAPTER 2:
FRENCH INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA ... 48
A.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ST~~ES
,., .48
B,
CHANGING CONDITIONS ~~D SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICy
, .50
I
C,
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS THE DIFFERENT REGIONS
OF F1JUTA
,.,.,
,..
, .. ' .. 53
1.
The French and Dirnat
53
2.
I
The French and Damga...
, . ' . . . . . . . . .
' .. , .. 57
vi
I
I
I

---

3.
The French and Tooro
_ . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
.62
4.
The French and Central Fuuta...........
.67
al
The Bones of Contention
67
bl
The Franco-~an Alliance and the Laav and Yirlaabe
Protectorates of 1877
.
. ... 69
NOTES.............
.
.
. . . . . . . . . ..
74
CP~PTER 3: THE FINAL MOVE AGAINST FU~TA TOORO:
DODDS'
CA.~P".IGN AGAINST ABDUL BOOK,>.R KA-~,
l890-1891.
81
A.
EVENTS PREPARA70RY TO THE FINAL CONQUEST IN 1890
81
1.
The Fall of Segu.. . . . ..
. . . . ..
.
8L
2.
Sarnmba Jaadana and. the Insurrecti.on in Laa\\J.
.
82
3
Alburi's Exile in Fuuta Tooro:
1890..
.
84
4,
The Assassination of Commandant Abel Jeandet
86
5.
The Assassination of Sheh Mammadu ~aamudu_
_
88
B.
THE DODDS COLUMN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1890-1891
90
1.
The Preparations of the Co lUIDn. . ..
.. _ . . . . . .
.
90
2.
Military Operations and Political Results of the
Column. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
92
CONCLUSION OF PART TWO
97
NOTES. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
99
PART THREE: TIlE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUlNIAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER 4:
FRENCH POLICY VIS A VIS FORMER "DISSIDENTS"
AND HEASURES ACAINST TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
103
A.
POLICY VIS A VIS FORMER "DISSIDENTS"
,
103
1.
The Return of Former nDissidents~ and the
Implementation of French Policy....
~
104
2.
Moves against Abdul Bookar's Relatives and Former
Al1ie5
LIO
B.
TERRITORIAL C!l~GES AND SELECTION OF RELIABLE
CHIEFS . . . . , . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .. 1l4
'Jestern Fuutd. and Laa'''''
,
.115
I
1.
al
D i m a t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.ll;
bl
7ooro and Halaybe...... . . . . .
.lL6
,
cl
La.a\\J~........................
.
L20
2
Central Fuuta...
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
..122
al
Yic1aabe-Hebbiyaabe..............
..
.
122
,
bl
Bo0500ya..
.
124
3.
Eastern Fuuta:
')alDga and Ngenaar
_.
.
125
a! . The Modification of L893
L26
The ModificBcion of 1898 and the Nomination of
,
bl
AbduL Salaam Kan
'"
. .. .
.
128
cl
The Nomination of Hammadi Alfaa Bah in Ngenaar
129
C.
THE CHECKS ON TRADITIONAL AVTHORITY
130
,
1.
The Aboli cion of Land Rlght5.
.
130
2.
Containment Policy vis a vis Slavery and
Monitoring oE Chiefs..
.
i33
,
vi i
,,

---

I
III
NOTES ..
.
138
I
CHAPTER 5:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAk RULE IN
~~URITANIA ~~D ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR FU~TA TOORO:
1904-1920
147
I
A.
THE MOORS AND FUt:fA TOORO:
1890 -1904
147
I
,
S.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRENCH RULE ON THE NORTH BANK:
I
1904 to 1913...................
.
153
1.
Dimat
155
2.
Tooro
l57
3.
Halaybe and Laa"'
159
al
Halaybe
159
bl
La a'"
160
4.
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe, Neere, Kaedi,and Maqama
161
al
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
161
bl
Neere
162
cl
Kaedi
163
dl
Maqama-Litama
164
C.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CR~~TION OF MAURITANIA
165
1.
Emigration to the North bank
166
2.
Rivalries among local Chiefs
171
3.
Inter-Community Land Disputes
173
al
Tukuloor-Moor Disputes
174
(1) Sheh Sidiya Baba versus Hbooyo
174
(2) The Alayidi-Ideylik Dispute
177
bl
Intra-Tukuloor Land Disputes
178
(1)
Land Issues in Laaw
179
(a) Chief Aamadu Sammba's Claims in 1906
179
(b) The Conflict among Amrenaabe
180
(2) Conflicts in Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
183
(a) The Conflict among the Alayidi: 1908-1919
183
(3)
Land Disputes in Damga
189
(a) Aali Sammba Jom versus Sule S. Jom: 1907-1917
189
(b) The Nja'" Land Issue: Padalal versus Waali,1907-1914 .. 191
(c) Abdul Salaam Kan versus Maqama-Litama: 1912-1918
193
CONCLUSION OF PART THREE
196
NOTES
204
PART FOUR: COlITlNUING CHANGE ON TIlE SmITH BANK
CHAPTER 6:
ADMINIST~;TIVE CHANGES ON THE SOUTH BANK:
1904-1920
217
A.
CHANGES IN WESTERI, FUUTA
217
1.
Dimat
217
2.
Tooro
221
B.
CHANGES IN CENT~L FUUTA
222
1.
Laaw........
.
223
2.
Boosoya...
.
224
C.
CHANGES IN EASTERN FUUTA
228
viii
I
I
r

---

CONCLUSION OF PART FOUR
230
NOTES.
.
231
PART FIVE: DiE F1JNCTIONING OF DiE CO!1lNIAL SYSTEM
C~~PTER 7:
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS fu~D
COLONIAL CONTROL.
237
A.
THE FRENCH LEVEL.....................
.
238
1.
The Governor and Commiss ioner
238
2.
Commandants and Residents
239
B.
THE AFRICfuN LEVEL
244
1.
Canton Chiefs
244
2.
Village C h i e f s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
249
3.
Interpreters
253
4.
Cercle Guards
254
NOTES
256
CHAPTER 8:
TAXATION, INDIGENAT, FORCED LABOu~,
CONSCRIPTION
,
263
A.
TAXATION:
EVOLUTION fuND CONSEqUENCES
263
1.
From Payment in Kind to Payment in Cash
264
2.
Evolution of Tax Rates and Consequences
266
B.
INDIGENAT fuND FORCED LABOUR
273
1.
Indigenat
273
2.
Forced Labour
277
al
Telegraph Maintenance
279
bl
Hauling
280
cl
Porterage and Requisition
281
dl
Road Construction and Maintenance
282
C.
CONSCRIPTION
283
CONCLUSION OF PART FIVE
287
NOTES
302
PART SIX: FUTITANKE RESPONSE TO CO!1lNIAL RULE
CHAPTER 9:
THE POPULAR RESPONSE
317
A.
THE REACTION TO THE IMPOSITION OF CHIEFS AND
TERRITORIAL MODIFICATIONS
319
1.
The Example of Boosoya:
1891
320
2.
The Example'of Halaybe:
1988-1902
321
3.
The Opposition of Gede to "Exogenous Chiefs:"
1901-1913
324
4.
The Opposition to Raasin Kan in Dimat:
1903-1904
327
S.
Reaction to Territorial Readjustments
329
B.
REACTION TO LfuND CONFISCATION AND DONATIONS
:,331
C.
REACTION TO T~~TION.
FORCED LABOUR fuND CONSCRIPTION. 335
1.
Reaction to Taxation
335
2.
Reaction to Forced Labour and Requisition
337
3.
Reaction to Conscription for the Military
339
ix

---

D.
CULTURAL RESISTfu~CE
342
1.
Islam...
.
342
ai
The Revolt of Aamadu Alfaa mlJ1JSA: 1894-1895
343
b/
The "Mahdist" Revolt of Aali Yero Joob 1906-1908
346
cl
The Passive Reaction of Islam
, .. 350
2.
OTHER FORMS OF REACTION TO COLONIAL RULE
353
a/
Popular Attitudes Toward "French School".
.
353
b/
Cultural Reaction: Slandering and folklore as
weapons
_...
. .358
CONCLUS ION OF PART SIX
.
.
360
NOTES
.
.
370
PART SEVEN:
FUUTA TOORO AND IIORLD liAR I:
CONTRIBUTION AND CONSEQUENCES
CHAPTER 10:
HUMAN fu~D ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION..
.
379
A.
HUi't"N CONTRI BUTION
379
1.
Organisation
379
2.
Evolution of Conscription.......
.
381
a/
Among the Masses
381
b/
Among the Loyal Leading Families
386
3.
The Pressure on the North Bank
389
4.
Popular Attitudes against War·Time Conscription
393
I
B.
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
398
1.
Financial:
Taxes and Special Contributions
398
2.
Supply of Grain ~nd Cattle
: .. 403
I
NOTES. . . . .
.
405
CHAPTER 11:
CONSEQUENCES OF IIORLD WAR 1 IN FUUTA TOORO .. 412
r
A.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
412
1.
Drain on Resources
412
2.
Economic Crises
415
B.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
416
I
1.
Famines and Food Shortages
416
2.
Emigration and Other Social Effects
422
3.
Impairment of Education,
Trade and Other
r
A c t i v i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
425
C.
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
426
1.
Spirit of Disobedience among the People
426
2.
Spirit of Rebellion among War Veterans.....
.
428
I
a/
The General Context of the Incidents
430
b/
Incidents Following the Discharge of
Tirailleurs
434
I
(1) Baydel Sammba Affair in Laaw 1919
435
(2) Crises at Mbaan: 1919-1920
435
(3) Crises in FerIa: 1919-1921
437
I
(a) Yero Makam Affair
437
(b) The Ceerno Lamin Affair...................
..
438
I
I
I
I
I

---

D.
LESSONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND REASSERTION OF
FRENCH COLONIAL AUTHORITY ...
..
439
CONCLUSION OF PART SEVEN ..
..
443
NOTES
.
..
449
SUMMARY AND GL~ERAL CONCLUSIONS
A.
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY FUUTA TOORO ?~D FRENCH
EXPANS ION
456
B.
ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF FRENCH COLONIAL
RULE
458
C.
THE DIRECT IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE AND FU~T.~~KE
RESPONSE TO IT
462
D.
WORLD WAR 1 AND ITS IMPACT ON FU~TA TOORO
473
E.
A BAUU~CE SHEET OF COLONISATION DURING THE
PROTECTORATE
478
1.
Society
478
2.
Economy
484
3.
Infrastructure
487
NOTES..............................
.
491
REFERENCES.........................
.
493
I.
BIBIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES
493
IT.
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
493
A.
ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION
493
1.
Archives Nationales de la France: S. Outre-Mer
493
2.
Archives Nationales de Mauritanie
_
494
3.
Archives Nationales du Senegal
495
B.
ORAL TRADITION
508
1.
Fonds James P. Johnson: I.F.A.N.-Dakar
508
2.
Fonds David 11. Robinson: 1. F. A. N. - Dakar
508
3.
Field Interviews Conducted BY Moustapha Kane
in Senegal and Mauritania
509
C.
UNPUBLISHED THESES:
511
1.
Doccoral Disserto.cions
_
511
2
Master's Theses
512
I l l .
PUBLISHED SOURCES
513
1.
Journals and Periodicals
513
2.
Nineteenth Century Sources
514
3.
Twentieth Century Sources
514
xi

---

LIST OF TABLES
Table l.
Wolof and Tuk~loQr Troops taking part in the
Oodds Campaign of 1890-1891.................
. .. 91
Table 2.
Nominations of Chiefs in Tooro 1890-1903..
.
117
Table 3.
Abdullaay Kan's Career to 1893
123
Table I..
Evolution of Oimat from 1890 to 1928......
.
220
Table 5.
Administrative Tours of Duty in Fuuta Districts
242
Table 6.
Indigenous Personnel
in service at Kaedi in
June 1903....................................
.
21.9
Table 7.
Conscription in Fuuta Tooro 1890-1913
286
Table 8.
"Political Gifts"
in Support of Fuuta Chiefs,
1905-1913
291
Table 9.
Social Composition of the Student Population at
Hatam in 1917...
.355
Table 10. Recruitment in the Districts of the South Bank,
1915
383
Table 11. Recruitment in the Discricts of the North Bank
in 1915..
.
381.
Table 12. Recruitment on the South Bank, 1917.........
.
385
Table 13. Recruitment in Fuuta Tooro, 1918
386
Table 11.. Recapitulation of Conscription Statistics,
1914 to 1918
389
Table 15. Cattle Sales from the South Bank 1914-1917
1.00
Table 16. Evolution of Hillet Prices per 100 klg from
Producers
414
Table 17. Escale of Pador:
Evolution of Prices of Imported
Goods from 1911. to 1917
416
Table 18. Evolution of Population (South Bank) 1911.-1918
423
Table 19. Demographic Evolution on the South Bank:
1914-1916
421.
xii

---

LIST OF MAPS
1.
Traditional Fuuta Tooro,
(Both Banks) ...
... 131
2.
"Senegalese Fuuta"
or South Bank.
. . . . . . . . . 137
3.
Cercle of Matam (1906)
154
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
1.
Meeting between Colonel Frey and Abdou Boubakar 1886
73
xiii

---

APPENDIXES
1.
Administrative Changes in Tooro:
The "Jeander Constitution"
of 1888 ....
. .. 521
2.
The Alayidi North-South Confiicts:
Lar.d Disputes and Settlement of January 1911 ..
.
522
3.
IDceccogation of Yoco Kodel
(Age 35),
taken pcisoDec
aftec the debacle of Dagana (1908)
523
4.
Intelligence Report on a Marabout Considered "Reliable" ... 524
5.
Intelligence Daca on a Cleric Considered "Dangerous"
526
6.
Paccial Wac Effoct iD che Ceccle of Podoc (1915)
528
xiv

---

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INSTITUTIONS:
A.C.C.T. :
Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique.
A.S. C. :
African Studies Center.
A.N.F.O.M. :
Archives Nationales de la France (Section Outre- Mer).
A.N.M. :
Archives Nationales de Mauritanie.
A.N.S. :
Archives Nationales du Senegal.
C.R.A. :
Centre de Recherches Africaines.
(Univ. Sorbonne).
1.F.A.N. :
Institut
Fondamental
d'Afrique
Noire.
(Now
called,
Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire--Cheikh Anta Diop).
M.A.S. :
Mission d'Amenagement du Senegal.
O.M.V.S. :
Organisation Pour 1.a Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal.
O.R.S.T.O.M.: Office
de
la
Recherche
Scientifique
et
Technique
d'Outre-Her.
(French).
TITLES:
D.A.P. :
Directeur des Affaires Politiques.
D.P.A. :
Director of Political Affairs.
D.A.1. :
Directeur des Affaires Indigenes.
T .C.M.:
Territoire Civil de Mauritanie.
DOCUMENTS:
B.C.E.H.S.A.O.F.:
Bulletin du Comite d'Etudes Historiques et
Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise.
B.I.F.A.N.:
Bulletin de l'lnstitut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire.
C.E.A.:
Cahier d'Etudes AFricaines.
C.O.R.S.T.O.M.:
Cahier
de
l'Office
de
la
Recherche
Scientifique
et
Technique d'Outre Mer.
C.J .M.V.:
Cahier de Jussieux,
Le Mal de Voir.
C.J.A.S.:
Canadian Journal of African Studies.
H.A. :
History in Africa.
I.J.A.H.S.:
International Journal of African Historical Studies.
J.A.H.:
Journal of African History.
J .0.:
Journal Officiel.
(Senegal et Dependances).
M.S.D.:
Moniteur du Senegal et Dependances.
N.A.-1.F.A· .•N.:Notes Africaines --1.F.A.N .. /.
N.E.A.:
Nouvelles Editions Africaines.
R.C.E.A.:
Revue Canadienne d'Etudes Africaines. Also (C.J.A.S.).
R.F.H.O.M.:
Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer.
R.S.H.:
Revue Senegalaise d'Histoire.
xv

---

i
I
iI
,
,
PART FIVE:
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COLONIAL SYST&~:
1891-1920
Although Dimat, Tooro and Damga had been annexed to the
colony of
Senegal ever since
the mid p 19th century.
Laaw and Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
had
become
protectorates
as
early
as
1878,
Fuuta Tooro
was
to
fully
experience colonial
rule only starting
in
1891,
following
the defeat
of Abdul Bookar Kan.
From then on, words like Governor,
Commandant and
Chef,
assumed a more concrete meaning and resonance
for
the people of
Fuu:::a.
Canton
Chiefs,
Village
Chiefs
and
Interpreters
became
the
instruments
of
the
coloniser
while
the
rigour
of
taxation,
colonial
J
arbitrary or
Indigenat,
forced labour and conscription made
themselves
gradually felt
throughout the land.
CHAPTER 7:
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS AND COLONIAL CONTROL
Too much has already been written on the topic for this chapter to
develop
a
detailed history and characteristics
of
the
French colonial
system l .
1;..le
shall
rather
concern
ourselves
....... ith
looking
at
the
relation of the administration to the people of
Fuuta Tooro.
We shall
also
try
to
look closely at
the
indigenous
component of the colonial
structure,
the
Canton
and
Village
cht~fs,
Interpreters
and
Guards.
r
i~.
often referred to as "collaborators."
I
237

---

238
A.
THE FRENCH SIDE
1.
THE GOVE~~OR ~BD THE COMMISSIONER
This was
the highest official in the colony from the 19th century
up
to the early 19005. 2
As Iba Der Thiam picturesquely pue it,
"there
·...ras
one
cap
in
the
co lany,
the
Governor
was
the
one
'.... ha
'...rore
it."
These
powers
increased
when
the
Decree
of
16
June
1895
created
the
GO',,'ernment
General
of
French west
Africa
and allowed
the
Governor
of
Senegal
to
cumulate
both
functions
until
1902.
The
vast majority (If
Fuutankoobe
referred
to
the
Governor
as
Borom
Ndar 3
(Lit:
Master
of
Ndar),
and
regarded him
as
the
center of
the
political world,
both
real
and
imaginary.
with
the
creation of Mauritania
in 1904,
Fuuta
was divided along the
river into north and south.
From this point on
part of
the
people
found
themselves
placed under
the jurisdiction of
another
Borom
Ndar,
the
Commissioner
of
the
Government
General
for
Mauritania. 4
This
Commissioner
was
alT...rays
a
military
officer.
For
a
long
time
Mauritania
was
considered
a
:rerritoire
Civile
instead of a
"colony. "
The Commissioner was
answerable
to
the
Governor General
of
French west Africa but
he enjoyed a
special
status,
had full
powers
'...ri thin
the
T. C. M..
and
was
often
favoured
in
relation
to
the
Lt.
Governor
of
Senegal
with
regard
to
settlements
between
the
tWO
territories.
Both
maintained
to
a
certain
degree
the
same
relations
co
tfie
people of Fuuta.
Their orders and decisions were
transmitted
through
Commandants
or
"Administrateurs
Superieurs"
and
Residents,
to
local
Chiefs.
The French tradition of central command and strict respect for
administrative
hierarchy,
generally
prevented
the
Chiefs
from
I
I
I

---

239
corresponding
directly
with
the
Governor
or
his
cabinet.
The
rare
violations of such a
rule were always perceived by Administrators as a
Lese-Majeste,
disdain
fo:-
hierarchy,
administrative
indiscipline
and
were denounced most vehemently in various reports. S
Contrary
to
19th
century
Governors
who,
for
military
and
di?loma~ic reasons, had to frequently visit the Valley,6 Gove~nors and
Commissioners
of
the
lace
19th and early 20th
centuries
rarely
toured
Fuuta.
This
of
course
contributed
to
reinforcing
for
a
while
the
image of the Governor as a "Super Ruler" located in
the remote city of
Ndar,
beyond
the
pale
of
the
average
Fuutanke's
political
vision.
Beginning
with
the
war
years,
the
situation
changed
in
this
regard.
Even Governor-Generals started visiting the region. 7
The Commandant of
Matam gives
an
idea of people's
sentiment when he
reported,
after one
Governor-General's visit that:
no Chief of the colony had ever come over and showed
them so much sollicitude and so much consideration. 8
2.
CO~~DA~TS and RESIDENTS
Below
the
Lt.
Governor
of
Senegal
and
the
Commissioner
of
Mauritania were
the
Commandants
de
Cercles
These Officers
created
by Gov.
Faidherbe
in the
1860s
replaced local
rulers as heads
of the
Cercles
(the
largest
uni1..:s
beside
the
Arrondissements),
and
replaced
definitively the former Commandants
d'Arrondissements as the principal
ter~itorial representatives of French authority.9
In general che role
and prerogatives
of the CJmmandanc were
defined by the Order of 9 ~dY
1895.
It
stipulated that this Officer was in charge of:

---

i
I
240
I
I
The political leadership of the Cercle,
The
control
of
the
government
of
local
rulers
in
accord
with
existing protectorate treaties,
The monitoring of all civil and financial services,
- The management of the regional budget of the Cercle according to
ohe Decree of 23 Sept.
1887 and Order of 31 Dec.
1891,
The
settling
of differences
bet~een the
indige~ous people and
the
people
of
the
Escales
! trading posts I on the one hand, and ohe
neighbouring Koorish populations on the other. 10
The
Commandant
also
presided
over
the
Administrative
Council
and
the
local
"Provident Society, It
collected
taxes,
perfor-med
police
and
intelligence gathering duties and
so many others
that
he appeared as
the
"Jack-of-all
trades"
of
the
colonial
administratio:l.
He
'Was
the
one who,
as Hubert Deschamps aptly put
it,
"had to see all,
rule all,
conceive all,
accomplish all."ll
The Commandant was assisted by an accountant and a clerk.
He had
a
seven
to
fifteen men police
force at his disposal.
In
the Cercles
of
the
north bank which were
not only large enough
but also housed a
sizeable
Moorish
population,
Commandants
were
seconded
by
other
military
officers
acting as
Residents.
Residents
were
stationed
at
Boggee
(cercle
of
Aleg)
and
Kbuun
(cercle
of Gorgol). 12
Because
of
frequent
troubl~s among the
Halaybe,
a
Resident
and
a
garrison were
stationed at Demet from
1901 to 1903.
Whether
civilian
or
military,
Cercle Administrators
had
limited
control over local conditions,
this
for various reasons.
Distance was
an
important obstacle at
a
time
when horses
and boats were almost the

---

241
only means of conveyance.
In the Cercle of Pador for
instance, Mbummba
che capital of Laaw
was 200 kms
from the Chief to'-o of the Cercle. Ac
that
time
i t
took
the
Commandant
a good month
(
round-trip)
to visit
with
the
Province
Chief.
In
the
CercIe of Gorgol communication with
Magaama
(easternmost
Canton).
""as
easy
only
by
the
river.
The
area
around
Mbuun
posed
the
same
kind
of
problems.
And,
difficulcies
of
communication between the Resident and Kaedi may ha~e accounted,
among
other
factors.
for
the
creation
of
the
the new Cercle
of Gidimaxa
Ln
1913 .
The
Commandant of Matam experienced
similar
difficulties
with
ferla,
a vast and remote province of his circumscription.
In
general
the
contact
between
administrators
and
administered
was
poor.
This
tended
to
free
some
Chiefs
from
the
control
(If
Corrunandants.
This
is why Lt.
Gov.
Henri F.
Cor
issued
on 20 ~ay 1911
an Orcer exhorting Adrninistracors
to regularly
tour
their Cercles
for
a
minimum of
10 days
a
month during the
"normal"
season,
and 12 days
every two months during the rainy season.
The Order advised them to do
it on
their
own,
without
the Canton Chief,
so as
co allow the
people
to freely air their
grievances.
Finally,
Corrunandants were required to
give
detailed
reports
of
these
tours,
along ·,.,rith maps
of
the
regions
visited and a
particular reference
to
the
distances covered.
To stress
the
importance of such instructions,
the Lt-Gov.
went on to insist:
I
shall
take
the
greatest
account,
in
the
confidential grading [of Commandants],
of the way you
carry out these
instructions. 13
Despite this exhortation and the emphasis Lt.
Gov.
Cor lay
on his
instructions,
the contact between Corrunandants and people
remained,
even
I
I
I

---

I
I
242
I
during
the
war
years,
relatively
infrequent
and
irregular.
For
the
Cercles of the Valley the follo"'ing table on the situation in 1916 is
quite suggestive:
TABLE 5:
Administrative Tours of Duty in Fuuta Districts
Cercles:Month:Period
:Itinerary
:Kms
:Rail·r:River :Road
--_._------------------------------------------------------------
Dagana :May
: 9 to 16
: Dag- -R-Toll--
:1.145:
:1,145
:Njaago-Ndir-R.T:
200:
200
:May
:19--23
: Tau·..;ey + Dimat
210:
210
:June
:20-25
:Dag-Mederd-Dag
100:
100
TOTAL
:1,555:
Podor
: Feb.
8-12
: Pador- -Mbantu
60:
60
:May
: 18 - 19
:Podor--Mbooyo
10:
10
:June
3-8
:Villages/senegal
400:
400
:June
: 11- 15
:Villages/Du",e
170:
170
TOTAL
640:
Hatam
:Jan.
: 1--28
:Riv-front--Bakel
400:
400
:Feb.
:15--28
:Riv-front-Kaedi:
100:
100
:May
8-18
:Dieri(Kundel--
100:
100
:Boki-Ja",e/Kaa",el
:June
:27-30
:Janjooli- -Oogo-:
210 :
210
:--Kanel
TOTOAL
810:
500
310
Salde
18:
18
Source:
A.N.S:
13G-75 "Ecat d'esprit des populacions et Circulaires sur
la
politique
indigene
1913-1917."
(Tournees
accomplies
par
les
administrateurs et les chefs de subdivision,
le semestre de 1916).
In light of this
table a fe'" remarks suggest themselves:
The overland
distances
covered
by
the
administrators
of
the
Valley
appear
insignificant;
three
hundred
and
ten
for
the
Cerele
of
Matam,
a
hundred for Dagana and,
nothing at all for Podor.
These figures
are
negligable in comparison with the 6,478 kms registered
during the same
period
for
the
cercle
of
Siin-Saalum
where
the
railroad and a better
communication
system made
it.
a
loc
easier
for
administrators.
I t
is
I
I
I

---

243
also
striking
to
notice
that
the
lOOkms covered by the
Commandant of
Dagana
in
June,
consisted
only
of
a
round
trip
to
Mederdra.
This
imbalance between overland and river trips,
especially in such a cercle
as
Matam,
then
and
still
the
largest
in
Senegal,
shows
t.hat
in
t.he
main,
the
populations
of
the
Jeeri
(highland),
remained
most
of
the
time out of the reach of their administrators.
wnile touring riverine
vi llages
by
boat
or
canoe
posed
no
maj or
prob lern,
trave lling
inland
proved sometimes extremely difficult.
In the absence of
automobiles,
Administrators,
Canton
Chi~fs, and Guards resorted
mainly
to horses.
This
required
regular
maintenance
of
horses
at
the
posts
and
residences,
along with a contingent of care takers.
A horse trip from
Matam or Podor to remote corners of the cercles
was almost impossible
without mobilising donkeys,
transport oxen,
or porters.
The logistics
of
such
tours,
coupled
wi th
the
physical
hardships
they
entailed,
discouraged more
than one
Commandant
to
undertake
the
inspec tion
of
distant cantons.
One way
administrators used
to
remedy
this
situation was
to have
individuals
provide
intelligence
on
Chiefs
and
people
of
distant
cantons,
or get Chiefs to watch one another.
In 1894, Raasin Kan,
then
chief of the Yirlaabe-Alayidi, wrote
to D.P.A Martial Merlin reporting
on Owlad Eli Moors'
attacks on the villages of Farykol
(Yirlaabe),
and
Doondu
(Ngenaar).
Hi!:
requested
the
D.P.A to
swnmon a
meeting of the
various Chiefs of Fuuta and their Qadis (judges) in order to,
Admonish
them on the
way
they
~ule and unmercifully
inflict heavy
fines
upon poor people.,.
despite
the
famine and cattle epidemics of this year.

---

244
Then,
Raasin Kan concluded:
From now on my dear Mr.
Merlin,
any time you need to
get
secret
information
[sic]
from
me,
please
just
send me a ~ord through my brother Abdoulaye Kane.
As
for
me,
~henever I
~ish
to
inform you,
I
shall
do
like~ise.14
Evidence
also
suggests
that
Abdullaay
Kan
Chef
Superieur
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe, ~as very ~atchful of Laaw and its Chiefs.
In the
words of Victor Allys,
the Commandant of Podor,
Abdoulaye
Kane
not
only
renders
invaluable
services
within
his
own
canton
but,
also
in
relation
to
neighbouriDg
terr.itories
(Lao)
where
he keeps
vigil
and
silently
makes
sure
our
authority
is
maintained. lS
Despite the paucity of evidence it is safe to conclude,
predicated
upon
the
ambitions
of
most
chiefs
and
their
fierce
rivalries
that,
spying
across
the
canton
boundaries
was
more
of
a
rule
than
an
exception.
B.
THE AFRICAN LEVEL
1.
CANTON CHIEFS
Until
mid-nineteenth
century,
the
French
administered
through
small
cercles
grouped together into provinces under an
"Administrateur
des
Colonies." 16
By virtue of the Order of 9 May 1895,
they created
the
"Canton't
as
the
smallest unit,
while
reserving
::he
term
nCercle"
for
the
province
level.
In Fuuta,
Provinces
and Cantons were created
in
1890-1891.
Their
Chiefs
were
selected
according
to
some
basic
principles
such as family background,
education,
ethnicity and service

---

245
to
the
French. 17
But,
some
factors
proved more
important
in
Fuuta,
For
instance,
the
French
were
hes i Cant
about
impos ing
non
Tukuloor
Chiefs
in Fuuta.
Even in Dimat which had many ~olof people,
the rule
of
Wolor
chiefs
was
always
difficult.
This
is
why
the
province
was
finally
divided
into
cantons
along
ethnic
lines.
As
for
wes tern
education,
it proved no major criterion as non-literate Chiefs
formed
the
majority
until
after
1907,
particularly
in
Boosoya,
Damga
and
Laa·......
Finally,
the
French paid particular attention in Fuuta
to
social
status.
They were
careful
not
to
appoint
people
from "Castes"
other
than
the
leadi ng Toorobbe
and Fulbe.
Most chiefs at
the
turn of
the
century,
however,
were
imposed by
the
French.
Very
few got nominated
through
regular
consultation
of village
Chiefs
and
notables,
even
if
they belonged to the appropriate lineages.
These Chiefs were
as
J. S.
Canale
calls
them,
"agents
of colonial
despotism,
the all-round men of the administration," policemen,
judges,
census
takers,
tax
collectors,
agricultural
agents,
public
works
I
agents. 19
Aside from
these fundamental
tasks,
Chiefs were,
as Kalidou
Diallo picturesquely put it,
I
invested with particular charges;
now the repairing
I
of
a
camp,
now
the
hosting
of
a
vaccinacor;
The
search
for
a
witness
in
connection
with
a
trivial
judicial
matter
here,
and
the
sending
of 'q
chicken
there. 20
I
Whether they were traditional rulers or imposed on an area, Chiefs
I
in Fuuta always sought to conform to traditional style and standard of
I
life
of
the
Laambe
(rulers)
of
yesteryear.
Most
of
them
allowed
I
I
r

---

246
themselves
to
be
surrounded
by
crowds
of
retainers
(Watulaabe). 21
Every Chief needed a
council
to help him deal with the affairs of the
kingdom or province.
He needed those called in traditional Fuuta Jagge
(Assistants), often a Chief or notable from each village.
In addition,
the
various
castes
were
represented
at
the
court.
These
~ ar:d
watulaabe played the
role of
intermediaries bet~een the
ruler
and the
people.
They
helped
collect
taxes.
They
indulged
in spying for
the
Chief throughout the province.
In a word,
they were the
"eyes and ears
and hands" of the ruler. 22
Another
feature
of
the
lifestyle
of
traditional
rulers
was
the
maintenance
of
several
wives.
A ruler
always needed as wide
a
range
of political allies,
friends and relatives,
as possible.
And this was
accomplished
in
great
part
by
marriage
alliances
as
elsewhere
in
Senegambia. 23
Also,
a
ruler
when
he
was
not himself a
learned man,
tended
to
keep in close
touch with a renowned cleric,
in order to be "armed" with
amulets
and
blessings
against
all
sorts
of
odds. 24
Chiefs
believed
very much
they were
easy
targets
for
the
subjects,
rival Chiefs,
or
unfriendly
Commandants
and
Interpreters.
In
order
to
enjoy
a
reputation
of
lIinvincibilityll
from
their
enemies
and
find
favour
in
various administrators'
eyes,
they often befriended clerics. 25
Domestic slaves constituted another set of dependents
surrounding
the local Chief.
Some ch·lefs had acquired many more of these slave, in
the
aftermath
of
French
campaigns
against
Abdul
Bookar
and
the
"Umarians,"
as
allies
were
rewarded
a
good
number
of
the
enemy's
dependents. 26

---

I ..
II
247
Finally,
che
Chief had
to give accomodation and
food on a
royal
scale
and
free
of
charge
to
emissaries
or
representatives
of
the
administration
on
tour.
He
had
to entertain
the
age:1ts
of
the Chief
town
of
the
Cere le
who
had
been
sent
to
deli\\'er
the
orders
of
the
Commandant,
and to "pay all ~ducated secretary and maintain a large bJdy
of la~ enforcement agents. 1127
wnether
they
lived
at
the
court
or
outside
of
i t ,
most
of
retainers and their dependents counted on the Chief
to make a
living.
In
other
words,
the
structures
of
Fuuta
Tooro
remained
as
in
the
pre-colonial days,
complemented by the essentially
redistributive type
of
economy
inherent
in
Senegarnbian
polities.
In
this
system,
goods
·....ere
funnelled
to·,..lard
the
top by
one
network
(tribute
from vassals)
and
redistributed
outward
and
downward
by
another
(maintenance
of
retainers,
gifts
and
rewards
to
loyal
friends
and followers).
In a
A
society
that
held generosity
as
the
raison d1etre
of
the wealthy and
his
wealth,
a chief enjoyed social prestige
and admiration only in as
much as he was willing to redistribute.
While the redistribution network had survived colonial
conquest--
the
Chiefs
maintaining
their
crowds--the
accumulation
network
had
suffered
from
various
attacks
on
the
part of
the
Coloniser:
Chie fs
could no longer benefit from
regular and steady tributes.
Raiding and
~ar as sources of booty and
occasional revenue had been abolished.
So
were--to a
great
extent--inaugural gifts from village Chiefs and la~d
rights,
the
1/10
of
property
and
goods
of
any
heirless
deceased,
revenue
from
judicial
fines,
and
a
proportion
of
compensatory
"blood
tax".
"rights"
regarded by
the
French
- -and rightly
so- -as symbols of
I
I

---

248
traditional
political
structures
and
relations.
Thus,
the
only
official source of revenue for the Chief was the meagre monthly
salary
complemented by occasional
tax
rebates.
For
ehe
Chiefs of
the north
bank who
for
a long time had no salary,
the situation was
even worse. 29
When
they
enjoyed salaries,
Chiefs
rarely
benefited
from
regular and
timely
promotions.
The
salary
of
Aamadu
Sammba
\\.Ian,
the
Chief
of
La a''''' ,
senior
officer
and bes t
paid
among
Fuutanke
Chiefs
until
his
retirement I
passed
between
1912
and
1920
only
from
6,000
to
9,000
F~ANCS.
That
of
Aamadu
Koxtar
\\.Ian
passed
only
from
2,000
to
3,000
during
the
same
span
of
time.
Under
these
cirCLHilstances,
it
is
no
~onder that even
senior Chiefs
found
it
difficult to make ends meet.
In
his
request
to
ehe
D.P.A
for
an
advance
payment,
the
Chief
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe said that he had to
Support
my
large
family
as
",,'ell
as
my
retinue,
let
alone
whae
I
have
to
do
for
the
people
of
my
province.
I
would therefore greatly appreciate it if
the
D.P.A
would
accord me
an advance
uneil
my
1901
tax
returns
come
in.
I
can no
longer benefit
from
1900 rebates and the 1901 taxes will not be collected
uneil about nexe April. 30
The imbalance between accumulation and redistribution left
many a
Chief with no ocher alternative than to disregard colonial
regulations
and
indulge
in
collecting
traditional
taxes
and
accepeing
gifes,
embezzling the very funds
that were destined for the colonial treasury,
or
borrowing heavily
from
the
nearby
traitants.
This
disregard
for
French
instructions
applied
not
simply
to
the
more
"traditionally
oriented"
like
Ceerno
Molle,
Aamadu
Sammba
and
others,
but
also
to
chiefs generally considered most compliane. 3l
The number of Chiefs who

---

249
were
dismissed or
suspended
for
embezzlement or extortion
is
indeed
suggestive
of
how
widespread
the
phenomenon
was. 32
As
for
indebtedness,
i t
applied
to
both
young
and
old,
relatively
well
and
poorly paid chiefs. 33
TABLE 6:
Indigenous personnel in service at Kaedi in June 1903
AGENT
: POSITION
: RES IOE,ICE
:SAURY;Francs
Ceerno Bookar Bah: Qadi Superieur
Kaedi
2,600.00
Wahaabu Lih
Qadi
Cilon
1,800.00
Umar Ceerno
Qadi
Hoore-Foonde
600.00
Kolaado Bah
Canton chief
Rinnjaw
4,983.50
Bummuy
Aamadu H. : Canton chief
Hoore-Foonde
4,717.00
Bookar Abdul Kan
Canton chief
Oaabiya-W.
4,952.50
Biri Jagana
Chief& Collector: Gataaga(Kaedi):
1,109.50
Bees Aamadu
Chief of Tulde
Tulde (Kaedi)
l,101.50
Ayniina Sekk
Interpreter
Kaedi.
2,600.00
Biraam Njaay
School teacher
Kaedi
2,000.00
Muusaa Susoko
District Guard
Kaedi
1,244.00
Mammadu Bah
Guard (2e class):
Kaedi
l,064.00
Muusaa Jaxatee
Guard (2e class):
Kaedi
992.00
Oemmba Maabo
Guard (2e class):
Kaedi
992.00
Source:
A.N.S.:
2010-13:
Folios
3-4
Kaedi-Matam.
"Etat
des
notes
semestrielles des
Interpretes et Alcalis,"
par le Capitaine Debuisson,
Commandant Cercle.)
2.
VILLAGE CHIEFS
The
heads
of
the
lowest
policical
units
rarely
appear
in
the
colonial
administrative
picture.
So
far,
historians
have
primarily
focused on Canton Chiefs and Interpreters,
the so-called "Kings of the
bush,"
at
the
expense
of
those
sometimes
disdainfully
referred
to
as
"local petty potentates. "J4
The first Order defining the conditions of nomination of
Village
Chiefs in what was
then the colony of Senegal,
appeared
in the 1860s.

---

250
Signed
by
Gov.
Faidherbe,
it
stipulated
that
they
were
to
be
"nominated directly by
the
Governor."
Later on,
the
Order of 3 May
1889
modified
it,
perhaps
to
best
suit
the
situation
of
the
Protectorates,
and
provided
that
Village
Chiefs
would be
"nominated
from
a
list
of
two
candidates
designatec
by an assembly of notables
held
in
the
presence of the Administrator.,,35 The responsibilities
of
the Village Chiefs, were defined as
follows:
The
Village
Chief
must
execute
immediately
the
orders
of
the
Governor
[as transmitted through the chain of command].
He exercises authority over all the habitants of the village.
He
must
maintain
among
these
habitants
the
peace
and
mutual
underscanding which
he
is
accountable
for'
in
the
eyes _ of
the
Canton
Chief. who regularly informs
the Governor on his attitude.
He
must
settle
every
affair,
every
dispute
according
to
tradition,
or appeal to the Canton Chief when needed.
He must arrest any desertor,
wrong doer or trouble maker.
~ny conflict between him and the Canton Chief should be put to
the arbitration of the Commandant de Cercle. 36
In
terms
of
revenue,
the
Village
Chief
enjoyed
no
emolument
in
specie.
He only had a revenue
in kind,
one-twentieth of
agricultural
produce from communal
land,
far less than the Canton
Chief's own share
(half the produce above mentioned).
The fo~mer
received no returns on
taxes
either
until
1906
when
they
were
granted
a
1/24
return
as
a
I
compensation for the loss of land rights
(see Chapter 4).
On the north
I
bank Village Chiefs
remained
for
a
long
time at as much disadvantage
I
vis
a vis
their
Canton
Chiefs
as
they
were
relative
to
their
south
I
I
I

---

251
bank counterparts.
In 1909 Village Chiefs in Kaedi were still waiting
for the long promised 5% tax rebates.
As a result, many Village Chiefs
were
destitute
and
resorted
to
embezzlement,
false
census
taking
and
other illicit practices. 38
Contrary to the theory enunciated,
the Governor did not
intervene
directly
in the nomination of Village
Chiefs
and,
only
exceptionally
would
these
deal
directly
with
the
Commandant. 39
Administrators
were
often
advised
not
to
violate
the
age
old
principle
concerning
the
institution.
When
in
1914
the
Commandant
of
Matam
requested
permission to substitute
"strangers ll
for Ceerno Malle of Ci10n and the
Bwnmuy
of
Hoore-Foonde,
the
Governor
General
warned
him
that
Village
Chiefs were
much harder to impose than Province Chiefs,
that Chiefs in
Fuuta had maintained their function since time immemorial and that
such measures would be profoundly resented throughout
Fouta
and could but so~ the seeds of disaffection in
a country that has today frankly [sic]
accepted us. 40
In fact Village Chiefs remained dependent on Canton and
Province
Chiefs
~ho
most
often
continued
to
assume
the
right
to
appoint,
directly
or
indirectly,
the lower
level
Chiefs
and
receive
inaugural
gifLs
from
the
latter. 41
In
league
wi th
the
Province
Chief
the
Village
Chief
could
sometimes
confuse
the
Administrator
on
tax
matters.,
or
indulge
in
any
other
fraudulent
practice
without
great
risk.
But,
if the village chief fell out with the head of the canton,
he
might
lose
his
job.
One
former
canton
chief
described
the
association and the stakes very well when he said the following:

---

252
'Jhen
they
are
no
longer
in
agreement,
the
Canton
Chief sees to it that the Village Chief is deposed by
his
constituents.
The
Canton
Chief
has
his
own
people
in every
village
who
can
depose
the
Village
Chief according to his wishes. 42
Bue,
the
Viliage
Chief was
the
authority closest
to
the
people.
The
reach of
che colonial administration was
contingent upon his
col-
laboration as much as
the Canton chief's.
An example of this occurred
in Damga in 1912, when the Commandant of Matam acknowledged his inabil-
icy
to
inform higher authority on the province,
and related it
to
the
fact
that
"v illage chiefs were
loath
to
travel
to Matarn and inform the
administrator
of
the
situation of
their
territory. It
A month
later,
the same Administrator complained that some province Chiefs showed can-
tempt
for
Village
Chiefs
and
regarded
the
latter
as
"no
cog
in
our
administrative
apparatus. 11
He proposed as
a
remedy
for
their sulking
attitude,
that the administration put faith in them,
insisting that
Only
the
day
they
will
recover
their
long
lost
prestige would order be
restored to
the villages now
troubled,
to the benefit of the people. 43
Furthermore,
cases
of
embezzlemen~ were
more
frequent
among
Village
Chiefs
than
among
Canton
Chiefs.
Not
only
'.... ere
the
latter
better
off
but
also,
they
r..:ere
more
consc ious
and
fearful
of
the
consequences of such a '!felony."
This led to a change of policy on the
eve
of
the
war.
The
administration
involved
them
more
and
more,
allowing them to collect taxes and take them directly to the chief town
of the cercle, after a routine check with the canton chief. 44
Finally,
this
closeness
to
their
people
placed Village
Chie fs,
perhaps
more
than anyone else,
between two
stools.
More
than Canton

---

253
chiefs,
they were caught
in a bind between
the compulsion
to carry out
'"upopular orders, and the urge to take the interests of their
constituents
in
to consideration.
3.
INTERPRETERS
:he
emergence
of
Interpreters
in
Fuuta
Tooro
goes
back
to
the
18505
and
60s.
and
cbe
initiatives
of
Governor's
Faidherbe
and
Jaureguiberry.45
t10st
Interpreters
in
Fuuta
were
sons
of
the
ruling
families
brought
up
in
the
"S.S.C.I"
at
St.
Louis.
The
early
Interpreters
·..... ere
often
fluenc
in
several
languages.
It
was
reported
that Elimaam Abu "was able to read and write French well;
speaks Arabic
and
all
Idioms
[sic I
of
Senegal. ,,46
They
played
an
important
role
during
the
conquest
of
Fuuta
and
the
Upper Valley.47
They
re tained
some influence in the post-conquest era.
They were regarded by many as
the
"Commandants!
eyes,
his
ears,
his
mouth. ,,48
Under
particular
circumstances they
even became acting commandants Which,
beside adding
to
their
pres tige,
often
annoyed
some
adminiscra tors.
In
this
vein,
Sheex
Fadel
Kan,then
Interpreter
at
Dagana,temporarily
filled
the
position of Co~mandant in. the
fall
of 1920.
This apparently won
him
some prestige and caused the new Administrator to complain
that
Ever
since
he
assured
the
interim
after
Mr.
Lahongrais I
departure,
he
has
been
attributing
to
himself
in
the
eyes of the natives,
importance
that
he in fact never had. 49
The position of an Interpreter was very strategic.
The Commandant
could
not
do
without
him
in
conducting day
to
day
business with
the
people.
Moreover,
the
Interpreter was so
close
to he Commandant that

---

254
the latter
tended to regard him with some mistrust.
Not only could he
denounce the Administrator,
but also he was at times able to poison the
mind of
the people about the superior.
In this event,
the Interpreter
would eventually help draft a petition against him. 50
The
Commandant
was
not
the
only
one
who
harboured
mistrust
concerning
the
Interpreter.
Canton Chiefs were
always
on their guard
as
well.
Interpreters
often aspired
to
their poses.
Once bribed by
the people,
they were often ready
to petition against Chiefs. 51
This
influence
of
the
Interpreter
and
his
ability
to
tlravel
and
unravel
affairs
at
will, I1
forced
many
to
seek
to
get
into
his
good
hooks I
through friendship,
gift biving and other
means.
4.
THE CERCLE GUARDS
The Gardes de Cercle as
they were called,
also played a
role as
part
of
the
indigenous
branch
of
the
colonial
apparatus.
They
accomplished such missions as police tasks,
transmission of orders from
administrators.
escorting
of
administrat.ors
and
convoys
and.
in
the
event
of
civil
disobedience,
the
protection
of
Europeans
and
assimilated
citizens.
During
the
conquest
and
a,fter,
the
administration
employed
many
Tukuloor
as
Soldiers
and
Guards.
This
caused many
problems.
In
1890-1891
the
Fuutanke
Tirailleurs
of
the
Kaedi
post
were
so
moved
by
che
propaganda
of
the
agents
of
Abdul
Bookar,
that some deserted and joined the resistance.
In January 1899
a
2d
Class
Guard
from
Mbwnrnba
managed
to
let
a
prisoner
escape.
Following the incident,
V.
Allys the Commandant of Podor sentenced him
to
eight
days
imprisonment
and
threatened
to
dismiss
him
should
he

---

255
repeat the
offense.
Most
importantly, Allys ~ent on to criticize the
I
employment of Tukuloor Guards ~ithin Fuuta TODro and suggested a change
I
in policy. 53
Apparently,
higher authority did pay
attention to such
I
I
concerns.
Payrolls
sho~ed from
1900
on,
names
of obvious Manndinka
resonance,
which
suggests
that
more
and
more
Guards
originated
from
I
II
the
Soninke
and
Banunbara
areas
to
the
eas t
and
south. 54
This
may
I
,
i
explain
why
oral
tradition
almost
always
refer
to
Mannde
speaking
i
I
,
Guards as brutal agents of colonial opp~ession_
In TODrD
(north bank)
I
I
for
instance,
the
name
of
Sancu
Baarel,
a
"Masalanke"
(t.e:
one
I
associated with
the Masasi
Bammbara
~egime of Kaarta, by extension an
I
easterner)
is ofcen t~e first to come to the mind of informants, when
I
asked about arbitrary and other manifestations of colonial rule. 55
r
I
II•
I
I
I
I,

---

NOTES
1.
Among
other
sources
dealing "ith
the
topic,
see:
William B.
Cohen, Rulers of Empi~e: The French Colonial Service in Africa.
Hoover
Institute
Press,
Stanford
University,
California,
1971,
279p.
(Hereafter,
Rulers.)
Jean
Suret-Canale,
Afrigue
Noire
pre-Coloniale
et
Coloniale.
Editions Sociales,
Service de Vente 24,
rue Racine,
Paris
(6) 1961.
2v,
636p.
(Hereafter, Afrique Noire.)
Iba
Der
Thian,
"Evolution
Politique
et
Syndicale
du
Senegal
Colonial
de
1840
a
1936."
These
de
Doctorat
d'Etat
es
Lettres,
Sorbonne,
annee
universitaire
1982-1983,
4v.
4000p.
(Hereafter,
"Evolution Policique et Syndicale.")
Henri
Brunschwig,
Blanes
et
Noirs
dans
I' Afrique
Noire
Francaise
ou
Comment
le
Colonise
devient
Colonisateur:1870-1814.
Flarnrnarion,
Paris 1983.
(Hereafter,
Blancs et Noirs.)
2.
The
official
text
that
defined
the
powers
of' the Governor of
Senegal was
the
"Royal
Ordinance of 7 Sept.
1840."
It consecrated "a
concentration
of
power,authority
and
means"
in
the
hands
of
this
official.
Eighteen
pages
of
fifty
eight
articles
defined
his
prerogatives
"hile
only
t"o
pages
of
six
articles
dealt
"ith
his
duties.
(See Iba Der,
"Evolution Politique," op.cit., p.
554).
3.
The
"ay
Wolof
people
(Senegal),
the
first
to
experience
colonisation,
referred
to
the
Governor
~ho
resided
at
St.
Louis.
(Literally,
"proprietor
of
Ndar, 11
Ndar
being
the
local
name
for
St.
Louis.)
4.
From
the
death
of
Coppolani
(1905)
to
1927 "hen Mauritania
officially
became
a
"Colony,"
several
army
Colonels
succeeded
to
one
another
as
Commissioners'
Montane
Cap
de
Base,
Gouraud,
Mouret
and
Gaden.
5. ~e shall return to the case in point, Abdullaay Ran's violation
of, or exception to the rule.
6.
Governors
Schmaltz
during
the
teens,
Protet,
Faidherbe
and
Jaureguiberry during
the
50s
and 60s,
Briere
de
L'Isle during the 70s
and Lamothe during the late 80s and early 90s.
7.
Governor
General Clozel
visited
Fuuta
in early
1917.
I t
was
after
his
passage
that
some
Chiefs
began
to
systematically
collec t
formerly abolished taxes.
(See section on Boosoya,
Chapter 6).
256

---

257
8. A.N.S.:
2G20-20 Matam,
"Rapports mensuels 1920"
(June).
9. w.B.
Cohen, Rulers,
op.cit.,
pp.
9-12.
10. A.N.F.O.M.:
Senegal IV,Dossier 128,
r'Organisation
administrative
et
cerri tDriale
1895. If
See also,
A.N.S:
lDl-l passim,
Order of 9 May 1895.
11.
Hubert
Deschamps presents
the Commandant as one whose
role was
totalitarian,
Responsible
for
order,
head
of
the
militia,
judge,
census
taker,
tax collector,
book keeper,
supervisor
of labour,
constructor of roads and buildings,
urban
planner,
nursery
man
,in
charge
of
the
progress
of
the
economy
and
of
public
health,
protector
of
the
forests,
inspector
of
Education,
Chief
of
the
Europeans,
Representative
of
the
native
collectivities [sic].
("French
Colonial
Policy
in
Tropical
Africa
between
the
two
world
'..Jars,"
in France and Britain
in Africa:
Imperial Rivalry and Colonial
Rule.
Edited
by
Professors.
Gifford
and
w.M.
Roger
Louis,
Yale
University Press,
New Haven and London,
1971, pp.
543-569).
(Herafter,
French Colonial Policy.)
12.
Later
on
Mbuun
became
the
Chief Town of
the
Cercle
of Asaba
(districts of Mbuun and Kiifa).
(A.N.S:
9G-30,
"Organisation politique
et administrative 1913."
13.
For these instructions see,
A.N.S:13G-7l,
"Organisation
territoriale 1901-1907."
(Lt. Gouverneur if Commandants,
Note 20/5/
1911). N.B:
This may be a case of misclassification of document.
14.
A.N.S:
2Dll-l
PODOR;
"Correspondances
1838-1893."
(Racine,
fi 1s de Alpha Cire a son jeune frere Abdoulaye Kane, 4/1/1894).
I
15.
A.N.S:
lC.1674,
"Abdoulaye
Kane
Chef
Superieur
des
Irlabe.
(Confidential Report,
25/5/1900).
16. The word Canton appeared in 1863 when Gov.
Faidherbe's Order of
16 July transformed \\.laalo's administrative units then called HCercles,n
into
Cantons.
The
Chef
de
Cercles
(native
rulers)
became
Chefs
de
Cantons.
(A.N.S:1Dl-l
"L'Historique
de
l'organisation administrative
d •. la colonie du Senegal 1840-1911.")
17.
Ai lsa
Auchnie
presents
these
four
principles
as
the
maj or
factors
in
the
selection
of
Chiefs.
(The
Commandement
Indigene,
op.cit., Chapter 2.)
18. A rare example was "Elfekki" Hammadi Yero (Ceddo)
whom Co lone 1
Dodds appointed in 1891.
He did not stay long in office.
In 1916 a retired army Adjutant (Class 11 warrant Officer) Aamadu
Aysata from the village of Njurn (Tooro),
applied for Canton Chiefship.
l
l

---

258
But,
Gov.
General G.
Angoulvant turned down his application on grounds
that,
As
a
result
of
an
inquiry
conducted
by
Mr,
Cor
(administrator of the cercle of Thies) Amadou Aissata
is not from a family with a historic right to command
in
Senegal...
Consequently,
his
application
is
not
acceptable,
See, A,N,S:
l3G-70,
"Chefferie:
Emploi et demandes 1904-1906"
(Service des Affaires Civiles ~ General Commandant en Chef des
Troupes,
8/7/1916),
19. Jean Suret-Canale, Afrigue Noire,
op.eit.,
p.
106.
20,
Kalidou Diallo,
"Les Chefs de Canton," op,cit"
p,
77,
21.
In his
life
time
Ibraa Almaami
the
Chief of Laaw 'Was reported
to
have
a
retinue
of
forty
eight
Jagge
from
every
corner
of
his
province.
For
the
names
of
these
retainers
see,
Fonds
Robinson,
Thierno Saydu Kan on "The history of the Wan"
(Matam,
2-07-1971),
According to Sheex Yaaya Kan,
former Canton Chief,
it was not rare
to see a Chief chat had thirty horses
(30 mounted retainers).
One of our informants, Rasuulu Lih,
also gives a list of Abdullaay
Kan's retainers,
(See interview,
Dakar,
31/7/1985,)
22.
Of
all
the
retainers
the
Jaa'Wanbe
(see
Introduction)
<..;ere
reputedly
the
most
influential
ones.
The
Jaawando
was
almost
ahlays
the "right hand" man and each Chief had his own:
Abdul Salaam Kan had
Siik Hammadi Nalli
as chief counsellor
in Kanel;
in Salde,
Abdullaay
Kan
had Yero
Manooru
from
Pete;
and Aamadu
Sammba had
Buubu
Kummba
Bookum in Mbummba,
23.
Lucie G.
Colvin touches on this issue in her article,
"International
Relations
in
Pre-colonial
Senegambia"
in
Presence
Africaine (?) pp, 215-230,
We
shall return to matrimonial
relations as means of reproduction
of power further down,
24.
Some
Chiefs
were
reported
to
be
very
knowledgeable
and
even
capable
of
performing
miraculous
oracles.
See
interview
with
Siree
Buuhu Bookum,
passim.
25.
In 1895 Edouard Hostain
the Co~~andant of Matam,
reported
r
that one Chief in Damga had,
Visited with a
sarakole
[Soninke]
cleric Mahdi Koule
in
order
to
obtain
Edouard
Hostain IS
departure
and
the nomination as Chief of Damga by his successor.
See, A.N.S:
13G-47
r'Chefs indigenes; Nomination et notation
1892-1898, "
Clerics also had interest in collaborating with Chiefs,
This is expressed in a local saying:
Buri bonde e Seerembe ko jahoo~o e Laambe~
Buri moyyude e Laambe ko jahoo~o e Seerembe.

---

259
Li terally-
"The
most
redoubtable
cleric
is
that
one
..... ho
befriends
rulers.
The
nicest
ruler
is
that
one who
deals
with
clerics.'1
(See
our interview with Mammadu Jen,
Nouackchott,
passim).
26.
Before
local
armies
got
disbanded
in
the
mid-1890s,
Ibraa
Almaarni
had
several
hundred
slave-soldiers.
(See,
Notes
on
the
Introduction. )
For the seizure of slaves and cattle from "Umarians"
see
~he chapter on French policies vis a vis "dissidents."
27. Jean Suret-Canale,
French Colonialism in Trooical Africa
1900-1945.
(Translated from the French by Till Gotcheiner,
C.
Hurst & Company, London 1971, pp.
80-Bl.)
In
Oct.
1911
Residenc
Mere
(Boggee)
could
not
help
Criticizing
Governor General's Circular Letters of May and September urging Chiefs
to
maintain
educated
Secretaries.
Those
of
Mauritania
'....·ere,
in
his
opinion,
too destitute to comply with such orders.
28.
See
Lucie
G.
Colvin,
"International Relat:ions,"
op.cit.
p.
221.
A good analysis of t~e perception of both wealth and the
l"iealthy
is,
Fatou
Sow
Diagne:
"Femmes,
Socialite
et
Valeurs
Africaines."
in,
N.A.I.F.A.N.,
Publication Trimestrielle,
168, Octobre 1980.
i
29.
This
accounted
for
repeated administrators r
requests
that
the
!.
status of south bank chiefs
be
applied
them.
For
this
see,
Residence
de
Boghe:
"Rapports
Politiques
1908-1917"
op.cit.;
Resident
Mere
~
Commancant d'Aleg, Octbre 1911.
30.
A.N.S
2011-3
Podor,
"Correspondances
1899-1901"
(Abdoulaye
Kane Chef Superieur des Irlabe a O.A.P., 2/11/1900).
31.
El imaan
Abu
Kan
(former
Chief
of
Seeloobe),
~,bdullaay Kan
(Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe),
Baydi
Aal i
Kan
(Boosoya)
and
Abdul
Salaam Kan
pamga) .
32.
At
least
twelve
Chiefs
incurred
suspension,
imprisonment
or
dismissal
for
embezzlement
or
extorcion,
between
1897
and
1912:
Ismaayla
Joob
(Seeloobe)
in
1902;
Aamadu
lbraa
(Fedo)
in
1901,;
Raasin
Kan
(Dimat)
in
1906;
Bookar
Abdul
(Eastern
Boosoya)
and
B.
Aamadu
Hamjatu
(Western
Boosoya)
in
1907;
Jibi
Amnata
(Halaybe)
in
1912;
Abdul S.Kan (Oamga)
in 1912; The Chief of Fanay and the Ardo of
I
Oimat Nomade (Oimat)
in 1913; "Bookar Baydi
(Halaybe) in 1913;
Umar Kan
(Oimat)
in
1915;
Elfekki
Hamadi
Yero
(Oamga)
in
1897;
Madaani
Njaay
(Haayre-Laaw) in 1912; Mustafa Kan (Podor-Gede)
in 1913.
I
33. Captain Steffe the CO~TIandant of Gorgol complained in 1913 that
the Chief of Magaama was
"overwhelmed with debts,
indulges
in usurious
borrowings
and
his creditors,
often spurred by his
adversaries harass
I
him
constantly,
which
rend.ars
his
predicament
more
delicate.
(A.N.M:
El-98 passim.)
I
I
I

---

260
Senior and relatively well paid Chiefs were often nO exception.
In
1915 the Chief of Laaw was so heavily indebted to the Podor
traitant Oldani that Savoureux,
the Commandant, had to visit with
him,
with the resolve to collect them personally or impound the
Chief's property.
34.
The expression is
from Henri Brunschwig who,
in his chapter on
Black
personnel,
made
no
room
for
village
Chiefs,
justifying
his
omission
by
the
confusion
inherent
in
the
colonial
literature
in
respect of this category.
No major source deals
specifically with Village Chiers.
that it is the result of a colonial bias.
35.
For both Orders see,
A.N.S,
ID1-l passim.
36. A.N.S:
13G-43 "Chefferie indigene;
Nomination de chefs
de village et de canton."
(Decret de Juin 1882.)
37. A.N.M:
El-48 "Gorgol: Rapports politiques 1906-1918."
(Capi t.
Malafosse,
COITunandant
de
Kaedi
a Commissaire du Gouvernement,
Janvier 1909.)
38.
They
too
had
obligations
to
meet.
They were
expected
to
be
generous
and
maintain
loyal
friends
for
political
purposes.
Further-
more,
they
au toma tically
hos ted
any
gues t
who
came
by
the
village,
official or otherwise.
Many
Village
Chiefs
got
dismissed
for
embez.zlement,
failure
to
present the administrator with the right lists,
or abuse of authority.
39.
In any of these coses,
Dimat (before 1890 and 1905-1915), D.mga
(1894-1897),
Kaedi
(1906-1912)
and
Boosoya
(1907-1913),
the
adminis-
trarion found it 50 unworkable an arrangement that,
it had to appoint a
Canton Chief.
40.
A.N.F.O.M:
SENEGAL
I,
Dossier
97,
passim.
A.O.F cl Hinistre
des Colonies,
4e trimestre,
rapport du 3/3/1914.
(7p).
41.
Aamadu
Sa~mba
Chief
of
Laaw
and
Baydi
Aali
of
Boosoya,
considered it a birth right.
But, others like Abdul Salaam Kan
and Abdullaay Kan too exercised such prerogative.
42.
Sheex Yaaya Kan,
former
Canton Chief of Mbaan.
(The
Colonial
history
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
(north
bank).
Nouackchott, , 30
March
1985, sec tion 12.)
Misunderstanding
could
sometimes
plague
the
relationship
between
Canton
and
Village
Chiefs
as
was
the
case
in
Damga
(1912-1914)
and
Boosoya (1917-1919).
43.
For
these
conunents
of
the
Commandant
of
Matam
see,
A.N.S;
2G12-58 Matam "Rapports mensuels 1912"
(Juin et Fevrier).

---

261
6.4.
Procedure
that
often paid off at
least
for
a while
if one may
consider the
following report from one Commandant of Pador:
One
hundred
and
twenty
thousand
francs
have
already
been collected in spite of the famine
that prevails.
In
less
than
two months'
time
all
the
taxes
will be
collected.
The reorganization of the methods of tax
collection has been salutary.
The Village Chief who
has been made to feel accountable
[to the CommandantJ
delivers
the
maximum,
is
prompt
to
denounce
the
cheaters
or
the
ill-will
of
those
formerly exempted
by Canton Chiefs ...
(A. Cl. S:
2Dll-lO
PODOR
"Nission
et
rapports
de
tourn~e 1893-1914."
Rapport de
l'Administrateur Dat,
en tournee dans
le cercle,
Mars-Avril
1914.
lOp.
45.
Faidherbe
founded
the
"School
of Hostages"
that
later
became
the "S.S.C.I."
The Corps of "Interpreters of Tribunals of Senegal"
was created
in 1860 and later developed and extended by Jaureguiberry in 1862.
For the first Interpreters of the St. Louis Islamic community,
see
David Robinson's Chiefs and Clerics,
op.cit., pp.
105-108.
See also, H.
Brunschwig, Blancs et Noirs,
op.cit,
p.
108.
46.
A.N.S:
13G-46
Pod or
"Chefs
indig~nes; Notes
individuelles."
(Comment by Commandant Allys,
9/5/1896.)
47.
"Abdoulaye
[Kan]
is the real representative of France in Fouta.
Perfect Interpreter,
he
is
completely devoted to our interests.
Night
and
day he
is on the watch
for
information.
He
is
the person on the
column
who
had
the
most
to
do,
taking
care
of
trivial
as
well
as
important
questions ... "
(D.
Robinson,
Chiefs
and
Clerics,
quoting
Voyron,
Commander of the 1883 Column;
op.cit., p.
108.)
48.
Attributes
an
Interpreter,
Racoutie
applied
himself.
(H.
Brunschwig,
quoting Hampaate Bah in Blancs et Noirs,
op.cit.,
p.
107.)
49.
A.N.S:
2D6-7 Da,;ma "Correspondances 1920-1927"
(Commandar.t a
Lt. Gouverneur,
18/10/1920).
50.
In
the
18705
for
instance
when
he
was
Interpreter at
Salde,
Abdullaay Kan once denounced a Commandant,
whom he had seen load boxes
full of money and other things on a boat.
The measure of caution about
this Interpreter may have been the untold reason why Commandant Molleur
used all his influence to get his application for the Podor post turned
down in 1892.
51,
Interpreters
used
to
fill
vacancies
in case
of
dismissals
or
administrative changes.
For an example of an Interpreter involved in a plot against
a Chief, see note 31 of chapter 6 on the crisis in Boosoya.
For examples of feuds between Interpreters and Chiefs,
I
I

---

262
Interpreters and Commanda":-.ts,
or among Interpreters themselves,
see our
interview with Umar Bah, Nouackchott, 17 March 1985.
52.
For
details
on
the
constitution
and
development
of
a
native
Police Force, see H. Brunschwig, B1ancs et Noirs, op.cit., pp.
135-147.
53.
A.N.S:
2Dll-14
Cerc1e Podor,
"Emigration 1895-1903," ;-laine a
Commandant Al1ys, 5/1/1899.
54.
Kamara,
Sidibe,
Jakate,
SU50ko,
and Key ta,
few
of whom
were
former slaves.
ss.
Interview with Ami and Tijjaan Maam Njaak, ~ouackchott, passim.

---

CHAPTER 8: T~XATION, INDIGENAT,
FORCED LABOUR,
CONSCRIPTION
A.
THE T~X SYSTL~:
EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES
The final
conquest of Fuuta Tooro occurred during the
last
phase
of
extension
of
the
French
Empire.
For
decades
already,
colonial
treasuries had been saddled with an increasing
proportion of expenses,
because
of
the
Mecropole's
resolve
to
pay
only
·""hat
it
considered
"expense.s
of
sovereignty"
(i. e. :
salary
of
the
administrative
personne 1) .1
Mose
people
in
Fuuta
Tooro
believe
that
they started
paying
taxes
in
February
1891
·.ith
the
tribute
imposed
on
them by
Colonel
Dodds
and,
often
referred
to
as
Alamaan Dodds
(see note
35,
Chapter 3).
In fact,
it really
started with the Decree of 13 December
1891 establishing
"Regional BUdgets"
in the protectorates of Senegal.
This
decree
aimed
at
having
all
fiscal
revenues
based
first
and
foremost
on per capita
taxes
and,
only 5ubsidiarily on
import-export
customs
duties. 2
The
theory,
which
goes
back
to
Gallieni
in
the
1880s,
lent
taxes social and educational value.
Taxes were--so
it was
said- -intended
to
force
the
natives
to
seek
employment
or
cultivate
crops for a commercial market.]
There were
two kinds of taxes:
Per capita tax and property
tax.
The
former
was
the
most
important.
The
decree
above
mention~d
rendered the
per capita
t3X mandatory and fixed
it ac
a
uniform rate,
wichout regard to the resources of chose involved.
263

---

I
r
264
It
affected
all
adults
without
distinction
of sex.
Only mothers
of
particularly
large
families
were
sometimes
exempted. 4
In
Fuuta Tooro
evidence suggests that even handicapped people were subjected to it. S
1.
FROM PAYMENT IN KIND TO PAYMENT IN CASH
The
people
of
Fuuta
started
by
paying
taxes
in
corn
and
millec
according
to
regions
and perhaps,
the
season of
the year. 6
Money was
not easily obtainable or preferably used in exchange
operations.
And,
the administration needed grain
to
feed both
the urban population and
the African element of the colonial
army.
Gum was
also used in the payment of taxes.
This came about
with
the
proposition
of
the
Commandant
at
Matam
in
1897,
that
Gum
be
accepted
for
the
Fulbe
of
Ferlo.
District
officer
Pinel
saw
C''';O
advantages
in
it:
The
rekindling of
the trade at the escale,
and the
encouragement of the Fulbe to gather a product that
abounded in their
region.
This proposition was
finally
accepted and applied
to all the
districts
of
the
Valley.7
I t
was
often
be lieved
tha t
the
produc t
gathered
in the Sanre
(Ferlo)
was
of
much better quality and of more
beautiful texture than the Mauritanian gum. 8
In
fact,
there
were
other
reasons
for
the
administration
to
encourage
payment
in gum.
The
late 1890s coincided with the
British
offensive
against
the Mahdists
in
the
Sudan.
As a result
of the ~war,
Europe
was
bereft
of
the
abundant
and
good
quality
Kordofan
gum. 9
Under these circumstances,
it made perfect sense
for
the administation
to
try
and
stimulate
the
production
and
trade
of
gum
on a
larger
scale.
In
addition,
the
"FerIo
gwn"
was
relatively cheaper
than the

---

II
265
Ii
"Mauritanian gum."
It was gathered
and loaded on donkey-back over to
the
escales,
without
considerable
investm~nt or heavy customs on the
part of the administration. IO
Finally,
by
encouraging
the
Fulbe
to
pay
taxes
in
gum,
the
administration
probably
intended
to
~rest
these
aloof
and
elusive
nomads
from
their
patent
indifference
for
administrative
affairs.
It
',""as
eas ier
co have
them come
to
the
escale,
se 11 and buy some
goods
(sugar,
tea,
etc.)
than
to
get
them walk long distances
for
the sole
purpose of paying taxes or responding to the administrator 1 s call. l l
The use of gum in
tax payment did not last long however.
By the
I
early
1900s
the
glut
of
foreign
gum
on
the
European
market
forced
I
I
prices
down
along
the
S~negal
River.
The
colony' 5
exports
of
gum
started
falling.
This
new
situation
caused
the
interest
of
the
lii,
administration to abate gradually until 1915.
And,
as it took more and
more
gum to
procure money and goods,
producers
lost for some time
the
II,
incentive of earlier years. 12
II
Before
the
late
18905
taxes
were
paid
essentially
in
Guinee,
a
Ii
I
blue,
or sometimes black cloth imported from Europe or India and widely
used
as
currency
in
19th
century
Senegambia.
The
guinee
cloth
II,
succesfully competed with cotton fabrics
produced by local weavers and
was
prized
for
clothing,
matrimonial
exchanges
and cermonial
gifts. 13
It
was
a
narrow
strip
of
cloth
of
about
fifteen
metres
long.
Depending
on
the
location
of
an
escale,
the
m...unber
of
traders,
the
I
season of the year and
the availability of millet and gwn,
as well as
I
the quality of
guinees,
the value of the latter oscillated between 10
I
and 15 francs. 14
I
I

---

l.
266
In
1895
the
Director
of
Political
Affairs
demanded
that
the
administrato~ of
Matam
shift
from
payment
in
kind
to
payment
in
specie.
Collecting taxes
in guinee presented,
according to the
D.P.A,
a
nwnber
of
drawbacks.
First
of
all,
the
rating
of
the
"guinee ll
material by
the
administration had caused protest on
the
part of the
merchant
communi ty.
Second,
the
handling
and
storing of
the
cloth
often occasioned considerahle damage,
waste and extra expenses.
Thizd,
it had the
disadvantage of saddling the
administration with stocks not
easily
di.sposable.
Finally,
it
made
the
natives
pay
taxes
grossly
inflated
1.n
comparison
'~ith official
rates,
because
of
discrepancies
between market prices and the official rating of the "guinee.,,15
There
is
certainly no
denying
that
the
guinee
posed a
series
of
problems for both the administration and the tax payer.
But,
creating
the conditions
for business
to run smoothly and forcing
the people to
participate
in
the
circulation of money was
also
incumbent upon t,e
administation.
This
is
T..,rhy
pressure
was
gradually
brought
to
bear
upon the
few traders who were
reluctant
to comply.16
Thi.s is also why
the Matam Commandant's
request
that payment
in guinee
or cash be made
optional,
was not well recelved,17
2.
EVOLUTION OF TAX RATES fu~D CONSEQUENCES
An
examination
of
the
evolution
of
tax
rat.es
in
the
colony
of
Senegal
suggests
three
remarks:
First,
:rom 1891
onward,
the Valley
·..,ras
subjecte.d
to
slightly
lower
per
capita
rates,
relative
to
other
regions,
particularly
those referred to as "Direct Rule Areas."18
The
people of Fuuta often pai.d 0.50
to 1 franc
less than elsewhere. 19
The

---

267
administrative
status
may
have been
less
critical
than
the
objective
conditions of Fuuta Tooro at the
time.
While west-central Senegal was
experiencing
a
boom
in
peanut
cultivation
and
trade,
the Valley was
confronted
with
a
series
of
of
difficulties:
its
agriculture
was
plagued
every
other
year
with
na.tural
hazards
of
all
sorts
(flood,
locusts swarms,
predatory birds,
etc.).
Its g~~ based activity was on
the
wane.
In
addition.
French control
was
recent
and the possibility
of revolts was still a cause for concern.
Second,
within
Fuuta
Tooro
itself,
the
people
of
the
referred
to
as
escales,
i. e. :
Podor,
Boggee,
Salde,
Kaedi,
Matam)
and considered
"Territoires
d'Administration Direcce"r
were subjected
to
slightly
higher
rates.
The
distinction
ben.reen
an
escale
and
surrounding
villages
was
based
on
administrative
and
socio-economic
considerations.
The
escale
usually
housed
a
small
administrative
apparatus
(i.e:
Commandant,
Province Chief,
etc.)
and,
half a
dozen to
a score of
traders with their dependants.
Some habitants
lived around
the
escales
and
enj oyed
few
advantages
by
virtue
of
such
proximi ty:
direct
protection
of
the
French
post,
substantial
benefits
from
the
trade
and,
every
once
in
a
while,
medical
care
from
the
nearby
dispensary. 19
Because
of
these
advantages
the
administration
Eel t
justified to
make ~hem pay a bit more.
But,
these advantages were not
always
obvious,
especially at
a
time ~h~n the thriving trade and the
constant pillaging of the ~oors had partly become history.
Furthermor~,
because
they could not sell
their grain elsewhere,
the people of these
escales were often exploited by the traders.
For
these
reasons
the
difference
of
tax
rates
was
hardly

---

268
justified.
Salde offers
an
interesting example.
In 1914,
the
people
of this escale paid 5.50 francs as opposed to 4 f
in the
pro~ectorate.
By
1910
the
administrative
head-quarters
had
been
transferred
to
Jorbuwol and the
traders had followed suit.
This
created a situation
such
that,
in
1914
the
Cummandant
of
Salde
could not avoid requesti'.:'1.g
the "change of class of the escale
whose status as
territory of direct
administration
is
no
longer jt..:.stified."
The
district officer went on
to express his
fear of seeing Salde deserted,
should the situation not
change. 21
Apparently no such change had
taken place by 1916 for,
the
district officer continued to complain that,
Salde was che only village of the cercle classed as a
territory
of
direct
adminis~ration, and
it
had
no
importance that could justify a distinction which the
habitants are in no way proud of. 22
There is reason to believe that the status of bo~h Salde and ~he
other
Fuutanke
escales
remained
unchanged
until
the
decree
of
1920
abolishing what Surec-Canale called--somewhat rightly--the "fiction of
protectorates. 1r
The last remark is
the upward movement of tax curbs.
In
Fuuta as
elsewhere,
taxes
were
constantly raised regardless
of
the
conditions
of
the
people,
of whether
the
year was
good or
bad.
The
first
tax
raise
"""as
proposed
by
the
district
officer
at
Kaedi
in
1898.
The.
I
proposed raise was,
in his own words,
intended,
I
to
operate
a
bit
of
pressure
on
the
upward
and
progressive
movement
of
the
native's
individual
activity...
So
that
the
administration
can recover
part of the expenses
it has saddled itself with,
for
I
the
development
of agriculture
and
the
smoothing of
business transactions. 23
I
I
r

---

269
The
district
officer's
argumentation was
based on
the
fact
that
1898
was
a
good
year
and
that
1899
was
a
promising
one.
Second,
he
believed that
the exploitation of the
people by
their chiefs was
the
major
obstacle
to
increasing
taxes.
Consequently,
the
officer
proposed
the
abolition of traditional
rights and
the establishment of
monthly
fixed
salaries
for
local
chiefs. 24
Follm,,'ing
these
propositions,
taxes
were
raised
from
1.50
to
2
francs,
with
1/5
accruing
to
canton
chief~ ·....hose advantages
in
relation
to
fines
aid
rent rights were officially abolished.
In December of
the same year,
the chiefs
of Laa·.... and Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
requesced,
in order
co see
their
revenue
swell,
that
the
measure
he
applied
their
districts. 25
The administration, which needed no persuasion on the matter, willingly
granted the request and extended the raise to all the
districts of the
middle valley by 1899.
Later,
a
ne',;,7
increase
was
initiated
in
the
district
of
Dagana,
allegedly as a result of "the development of Lower Senegal Districts."
Shortly after,
the same article of a fiscal law applied the increase to
the districts of Podor and Kaedi where taxes passed from 2 to 3 frs per
individual
payer. 26
This
sudden
increase was all
the more unwelcome
because 1902 had been a bad
year for the districts of Kaedi and Matam.
Food shortages had forced some people away.
By December,
the canton of
Ngenaar
still owed 16,399 frs of its 1903 total.
The chief of Ngenaar
had
to
warn
the
district officer
that
the
people
who had
emigrated
because of previous year's
food shortages had not
come back yet,
and
chat he could in no way figure out where
they were. 27
To make matters
I

---

l
rii
270
worse,
traders
at
the
escale,
refused
to
pay
grain with
cash
money.
This in turn resulted in a
cash shortage
that further complicated
the
~
situation
of
tax
payers
(see
note
16).
People
·,..rere
in
so
bad
a
IIi
predicament
that
the
adminis trator
proposed
"to
subs t i Cute
for
a
i
I,
personal contribution applying to everyone without distinction,
a
tax
policy based on approximate revenues and fortunes of the people.
He
proposed
that
taxes
be
levied
on men
from
15
to
60
years of age,
huts, cattle and farmed property.
He went on to conclude that,
such
a
measure
'Jouid
be
'Ne learned
by
the
population
who
would
surely
perceive
the
spirit
of
equity
inherent in the new mode of tax collection. 28
Needless
to
say,
such
a cry remained unheeded particularly since
St.
Louis
was
plannin~
and
scheming
the
all
out
invasion
('If
Mauritania. 29
Two
years
later,
the
decree
of
18
December
1905
established the same 3 frs per capita tax for the people of the
north
bank, hitherto free from taxation.
I
Between
1905
and
1914
no
tax
increase
was
imposed,
perhaps
I
because the cost of military operations
in Mauritania were
thought to
be,
from then on,
incumbent upon the very people of the north bank.
In
I
late
1914,
following
the
outbreak
of
the
war
in
Europe,
taxes
rose
I
again from 3 to 4 frs in the "Protectorates ll and,
from 4 to 5.50 frs in
the "Territories under Direct Administration.~~
I
From this cursory review of the evolution of tax payment in
Fuuta
Tooro,
a
few
generalisations
can
be
attempted.
The
dis tinc t ion
j
between
"Protectorates"
and
"Direct Rule Territories"
wi th regard to
I
I
I '
I
taxes was,
in Fuuta Tooro,
unwarranted to say
the
least.
There was no
I
I
I
.;:.-
I
I

---

271
major difference
in earnings or
Living among the
indigenous habitants,
that justified such distinction.
This was evidenced by the persistent
resentment against
such a
policy
in
the
escale of Salde on the eve of
and during the war.
Second,
with
the
exception of
the
1903 and 1914 measures
which,
from
all
appearance
related
to
what
one
might
call
situations
of
"na:ional emergency,"
propositions to raise taxes
came
basically from
individual
district
officers.
And,
once
accepted
for
one
district
they became
"applicable l1
and were
often
applied
to others
along the
valley,
...... ithout
due
consideration
for
local
conditions
and
specificities.
Understandably,
this
aroused
in
some
instances
the
I
scepticism
of
officers,
often
more
concerned
about
delays
and
tax
evasion in
their districts
than about
the
real wisdom of the measures
or the material situation of the administered. 30
One
cannot
close
this
section on
taxes
without
mentioning
such
propery
taxes
as
the
shot
gun
tax,
and
alluding
to
the
abuses
some
administrators committed at the expense of the
people.
Along with the
per
capita
tax
the
administration
imposed
under
the
cloak of
"permit
for
carrying
arms,"
a
special
tax on
shot guns.
This measure which
aimed,
among other things,
at
disarming the people
in the aftermath of
the· conquest, ended up
arousing a general discontent,
as taxes weighed
heavier.
Thus,
by
1905,
despite
the
particular
need
of
guns
for
protec~ion against
plunderers
and
·.... ild
beasts
in
the
farms,
people
started disposing of
their
arms
as
a
result of the special tax.
This
led
Michelangeli,
the
Commandant
of Matam,
to
request
the
repeal
of
the
Order
concerning
shot
guns,
"inasmuch as
the
raised per
capita

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272
fee
is
heavy
enough
for
a
population
composed
exclusively
of
farmers. ,,3l
Taxes were also
levied on cattle and other
categories of
herds.
',hile
ordinary subjects
generally paid them
in full,
becau.;e
of the
relatively faithfu1
census operated,
rich
people often managed
to elude
them,
in cahoots with the chief or
his assistants.
Finally,
the administration,
whether by
the
lack of
coordination
inherent
in
the
system
ar
by
blatant
abuse,
frequently
subjected
people
to
double
taxation,
as
they
crossed
borders
back
and
forth.
Among
the
people most victimized by
such administrative blunders were
Fulbe
pastoralists
and
petty
traders,
whose
mode
of
livelihood
required
endless
commuting.
The
Julaa
(petty
traders),
crossing
the
river,
were
for
instance subjected to what the administration referred
to as "political customs."
They had to pay for a licence,
a travelli!1g
permit as well as acquit a "kola nut custom.,,32
As
for
the Fulbe pastoralists,
each individual intent on
crossing
the
river
was,
for
some
time,
required
to
pay
to
both
the
administrations of Mauritania and Senegal,
heavy passage
rights
( see
chapc.5).
Other categories of people were
concerned
as well.
For a
long time the policy on the north bank was
to
require that "any person
IoIho
has
stayed
on
the
righ c bank
for
some
time,
pay
taxes
to
the
Mauritanian administration even if he or she had been paying to Senegal
all along. ,,33
Temporary emigrants
to IoIestern Senegal
(Balolol,
Kajoor,Saalum)
who
went
to work or sell goods
for
the purpose of raising tax monies, were
not
immune
from double
taxation either.
Many had to pay in the
"rai.l
way districts"
prior to
their departure and pay again upon arrival if,

---

273
for
some
reason or other,
they could not show a tax receipt. 34
Thus,
double taxation
as a flaw in the system, proved for many years a major
problem
for
the
people
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
The
imposition
of
these
numerous
taxes
had
also
consequences
that
will
be
dealt
with
in
the
conclusion of this section.
B.
INDIGSNAT AND FORCED LABOUR
1.
INDIGENAT
The word
designates
the
judiciary-disciplinary system
devised by
French colonial
authority
through
the
decree
of 30
September
1887
to
help keep
the colonised under the strictest control possible.
As such
one
may
call
it
llNative
intended
disciplinary
code."
Just
like
its
sister
institutions
in
French
Black
Africa,
this
code
was
borrowed
from Algerian legislation of
which a decree of 1874 allowed the police
court Magistrates,
to punish certain acts that did not properly qualify
as
contraventions
of
the
penal
code. 36
The
essence
of
the
Indigenat
Code was,
to punish very swiftly a certain set of offenses,
mostly of
political and administrative nature, without having any recourse to any
court.
of
law. 37
Three
of
the
twenty
six
infractions
defined
by
Governor Ponty's decree of september 1907 in Senegal, were:
1.
The
refusal
to
pay taxes
or fines,
or reimburse to
the
full,
sums due
to
the
colony or,
to render statute la..bour
in
kind.
Negli-
gence in making such payment and in the execution of
statute labour.
2.
Any
disrespectful
act
or
offensive
proposal
vis
a
vis
a
representative or agent of authority.
3.
Speech
or
remarks
made
in
public
intended
to
weaken
French

---

274
authority or its officials, songs,
false rumours and the like. 38
In Fuuta Tooro where one might say that a
ITsulking"
attitude pre-
vailed
throughout
the
period
under
study- - if not
the
entire
colonial
era--the
application of these
three articles to individuals and groups
became almost an endless routine.
Many fell prey to t~e dispositions of
ar~icle
8
(1.e:
second
offense
above)
particularly
in
Tooro
and
Halaybe.
The
first
spectacular
resort
co
the
Indigenat
Code
occurred
in
autumn
1890
when
the
Director of
Political Affairs Tautain,
following
the assassination of Commandant Abel Jeandet,
ordered the summary exe-
cution of both the assassin and the presumed accomplices (Chapter 4).
In
l895
Mr.
Allys,
district
officer
at
Podor,
imposed
on
three
villages
of
the
canton of Edi
(Tooro),
a 500
frs'
fine
for fleeing to
the bush and refusing to provide him hospitality.
Shortly after~ard,
he
put
a
young
man
in jail
for
"encouraging the
population
to
rebel
against
French authority"
(Chapter 4).
Disobedience to local chief w"
also
severely
dealt
with.
When
the
Halaybe
rose
up
agains t
their
chief,
Elimaan
Abu
Kan
in
the
spring
of
1900,
three
of
the
most
influential notables
were
sentenced to
10
to
15 days
imprisonment and
fined 20 to 50 frs
each. Two years later, a conflict broke out between
the
vi llages
of
Ceene 1
and
Dernet
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
very
garrison installed at Demet in 1900
to help maintain law and order. 39
Following
several
incidents
the district officer at
Pador ordered six
notables
arrested and deported.
He
also fined
the t~o villages a sum
of
10,000
frs,
due
and
payable
within
a
week
from
the
date
of
imposition. 40

---

275
Frequent
refusals
to
execute
forced
labour
also
occasioned
the
application
of
the
code.
In august 1899
Podor ordered the
chief of
Halaybe
to
fine
a Woman named Habsa Faatmata 200 frs,
for fail ing to
pay
taxes,
and
100
frs
for
attempting
to
elude
the
poll.
A man,
Sammba Binea was
fined 100 frs
for participating
in the census
fraud.
A month later the same villages
(Demet and Ceenel),
were levied another
10,000
frs'
fine
for
having
constantly
cheated
over
the
years
in
macters
of
tax
payment.
Likewise,
in
1907
the
district
officer at
~1atam reported
that
several
thousand
people
were
missing
from
the
polls and that he
had "to inflict many fines on the indigenous people
to obtain correct information from chem.,,41
l,.,Then
refusal
to
pay
taxes
was
coupled
with
"disrespectful
or
offensive
acts,"
punishment
became
even harsher.
In early
1897
the
village
of Jallube
(Damga)
refused
to
clear
the
undergrowth
around
telegraph poles
in defiance of the chief's
orders.
Administrator Pinel
sentenced
the
village
chief
and
one
influential
notable
to
8
days'
imprisonment
for
lIhaving
been
violent
vis
a
vis
Abdul
Karim
[canton
chief] . ,,42
I
Even
harsher
....... as
the
punishment
inflicted
upon
the
village
of
I
Doondu
(Ngenaar).
The man accused of
initiating the refusal
to help
fight
the
locusts and challenging the district guard ....... as
sentenced to
I
30 days'
imprisonment (15 for agitacion and IS for'.ebellion against a
I
la .......
enforcement
agent).
Ten
other
notables
summoned
to
Matam
....... ere
fined
300
frs
and 75 strips of guinee
cloth (50 for
the district and
I
25 to be divided bet .......een the canton
and village chiefs. 43
A disposition that ....... as also frequently implemented in Fuuta
Tooro
I
I
I
i

---

276
was
the
article
9
regarding
speech,
false
rumours
and
the
like.
Several
times
the
administration moved
to seize
c landes tine
le tec"cs
said to emanate from Mecca or from some
obscure Islamic authority and,
designed
to
warn
the
Fuutankoobe
about
possible
calamities
in
punishment
for
II co ll us ion
with
infidels."
Each
time
the
bearers
of
such
letters,
often
clerics,
were
arrested
and
put
in
jail
for
"circulating anti-French propaganda material.,,44
The
study
of
Indigenat
reveals
a
few
aspects
of
the
institution
that
historians
often
tended
to
overlook
or
minimise.
Many
echo
the
French administration's claim that
the code was essentially devised to
provide disciplinary solutions
to disciplinary problems.
In doing so,
they
overstress
the
punitive
nature
of
the
institution paying
little
attention--if
any--to
its
"milch
cow"
nature.
ln
the
history
of
Indigenat
sentencing
in Fuuta Tooro,
cases abound
thac
show
the
money
making
character of the institution.
First
of
all,
while
individuals
or
groups
were
sometimes
fined
'".rihoUi:
being
imprisoned,
rarely
were
there
cases
of
imprisorunent
without
fine.
Secondly
fines
were
not
always
commensurate
with
1
offenses.
Both in the case of tne woman and
the villages cited above,
the
fines
represented
several
times
as
much as
the
taxes
due. 46
The
reasons
invoked
for
the
application
of
the
law
were
another
interesting
indication.
Sometimes
they
had
bare ly
any
thing
to
do
~ith infraction of discipline or law. Such was the case in January 1898
when
the
administrator
3t
Matam
dismissed
the
chief
of
Loobc~ali
(Damga),
and fined five notables 100 frs for:

---

I!
277
ii)
refusing
to
accept
a
community
canoe,
graciously
offered
(by
the
administration]
to
help
people
and
animals
cross
to
the
right
bank,
where
most
of
the
farm land is located. 47
Apparently,
the only ciferlse
then.
was
to refuse a gift.
As a
money-
making institution,
the Indigenat Code did present some real advantages
for
the
administration.
Taxes
were
levied
only
once
a
year.
They
appli~d to a definite age bracket,
children and old people being oft~n
exempted.
Chiefs,
administrative
agents
and
their
cependancs
were
immune
from
taxation
as
·Jell.
Conversely,
indigenat
guaranteed
a
steady flow of revenue
through fines.
Both canton and village chiefs
were
fined
heavily whenever an administrator deemed
it
necessary.
Of
the
eighteen people
of Loobaali
sentenced
to
imprisonment
and
heavy
fines
in 1898.
one
Demmba Nalla was
finally
"spared the
prison term,
because he
is
too
old and could die of it."
Thus,
one could be
too
old to go
to
prison,
but never
too
old or
too
poor
to help
swell
the
colonial treasury through fines.
2.
FORCED L~BOUR
This
institution operated alongside
Lhe Indigenat and was cialec·
tically linked to it.
Indigenat empowered an administrator
to require
services
from
the
colonised
people
under
the
penalty
of
fines,
imprisop~ent,
or
both.
Because
disciplinary .powers
<"'ere
always
invoked under the circumstances, one can agree with
this definition of
forced labour by Lhe International Labour Organisation:
I

---

I
I,,
278
!
All work or service which
is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty or for which the said
person
has
not
offered
himself
[or
herself]
voluntarily.48
As
has
often been suggested,
the
colonisers
depended on
the
use
of
forced
labour
because
they
lacked
the
funds
to
pay
for
voluntary
49
labour and,
because
there was a frequent shortage of the
latter.
In
West
Africa
the
French
overcame
the
difficulty
by
es cablishing
a
labour tax in kind called,
Prestation,
for all able·bodied male natives
from 15
to 60 years of age. 50
The purposes for which labour was to be
emp loyed,
according
to
the
various
Orders
of
1912,
1917
and
1918,
were:
The
construction
of
roads,
bridges,
the
installation
of
telegraph lines and the regular maintenance of these communications.
As Simon Ekanza pointedly remarked for Ivory Coast,
forced
labour
already
existed
it'l.
Fuuca
Tooro
during
the
period under
study
(i. e:
1890-1920),
contrary
to
traditional claim which dates
it back only
to
the
19305
when
the
first
related
legislation
',.,:ras
enacted. 51
Never-
theless,
there
were
no
large
scale
plantations
in
Fuuta,
as was
the
case in forest-zone
French West Africa.
Nor were
there mining or rail
way
construction
sites.
Even road construction was
limited co~pared
with
the boom that
took place in
the wake of World War I,
as a result
of
the
introduction of
the
automobile.
Such
a situation limited
the
purposes
for which
labour was
employed basically to hauling along
the
river,
porterage,
and
the
construction
and
maintenance
of
telegraph
lines.
i
I

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279
<a) TELEC~~PH MAINTENANCE
For a
long time,
the
administration relied on
the
telegraph
line
as one of the basic means of communication particularly with
the Upper
Senegal
river.
After
the
conque s t,
the
securi ey
0 E
the
1 ine
was
no
longer
a
problem.
But,
i t
needed constant
maintenance.
The
lush
grass
around
the poles had to be
cleared on a regular basis.
Old or
thunder~stricken poles
had
to
be
replaced
every
once
in
a
.....hile.
Because
the
line
stretched
south
of
Fuuta,
sometimes
far across
the
Jeeri,
the
transport
of
poles
and
wire
.....as
assured by
hwnan
labour
force _
Between
1890
and
1899
the
administration
called
essentially
upon conscript labour to perform those
tasks.
At the end of the rainy
season
each village community was
assigned a
specific number of poles
on
a
specific
distance.
The
task
was
mandatory
and
failure
to
execute
it was
considered a
serious offense.
The work was not as easy
as
it
appears
to
be.
The
"white
man's
rope,,52
as
the
telegraph
was
locally referred to,
was tor many a village synonymous with
"distant"
locale,
where
heat
and
lack
of
water
were
very
difficul t
to
stand.
Labour conscripts
felled
trees,
cut
them
into
poles,
carried
them
to
the
site
and
installed
them.
Starting
in
1899,
because
of
the July
circular
referred
to
earlier
<note
51
),
the
administration
begun
with the help of local authoritLes to hire natives to provide timber. 53
Later,
it gradually abandoned these hiring arrang~men[s and reverted to
the
former
practice
of
forced
labour
disguised
under
the
cloak
of
orestation (i.e:
labour tax ).
I
I
I

---

I
I
I
280
(b)
HAULING
Hauling was another major
form of forced
labour in Fuuta
Tooro,
particularly
during
the
dry
seaSOn.
By
that
time
the
waters
had
receded
and,
the
shallowness
of
sections
of
the
river
rendered
navigation quite :ricky above Pador.
To prevent the isolation of Matarn
and the Upper Senegal,
the administration resorted :0 smaller boats and
canoes
in place of bigger steamers.
Consequently,
district officers at
Matam often conscripted gangs
of fishermen
(Subalbe
)
Co relay goods,
conscruction ware and mail up-river,
with their (Subalbe's)
flocilla of
canoes. 54
In
the
districts
of
Matam
and
Salde,
the
administrat:on
also
routinely
organised
"drudgery
hauling"
to
help
military
convoys
en
route
to
western
Sudan,
or
even
private
traders'
chalands
(goods'
boats) .
Every
single
river
front
village
had
to
provide
a
gang
of
seven
to
ten strong
men.
These
would walk on
the bank,
pulling
the
chaland with big strong ropes until they reached the next village.
And
on i t went,
until the convoy reached its final des~ination.
As Babacar
Fall remarked,
"t.he natives'
testimony is unequivocal;
they received no
pay
for
it."
As
a
result,
desertion of villages
became routine every
time a convoy was sighted do'~-stream.55
St..
Louis
sometimes
insisted
that
haulers
be
paid
or,
at
the
least,
supplied
with
rations
prior
to
being
conscripted.
But,
defiance
of
these orders
and use
of
forced
labour went on unpunished
throughout the period under study.56
I

---

281
(c)
PORTERAGE AND REQUISITION
Porterage
was
in
we:=.c
Africa
the
oldest
form
of
labour
imposed
upon
the
people by
the
coloniser.
The
whole history of exploration,
trade and colonisation is replete with examples of people carrying men
and goods for several hundred miles.
Fuuta Tooro and the district of
Hatam
in
particular,
...... as
one
or the regions chat experienced this
prac=ice the most.
The lack of adequate means of communication as well
as
the
distances
involved,
·....ere
often
quoted as
che main
factors
for
resorting to porcerage.
Porterage was so common in Fuuta that,
today,
it
stands
out
as
the
one
practice
most
illustrative
of
colonial
despotism.
Tradition
refers
to
i t
as
Bilanka
and
describes
i t
as
fo llows ;
There
were
other
forced
drudger-les
called
Bilanka.
Wherever
they
[officials]
had
to
go,
if
it
was
a
place that one could not reach by canoe or by boat,
it
was
the
people
themselves
who
carried
them.
Mostly,
strong young men.
Each
village
(Dimat
for
ins tance)
would
provide
the
number
of
men
needed,
each household [in turn)
would provide one...
Once
a suffLcient number was provided the European and his
luggage
were
carried.
Upon
arrival
at
Ceelooji
[adminLstrative
unit
in
Tooro},
ot.her
people
would
relay the porters,
And so it went until t.hey got out
of Ceelooji [further east] .59
Tremendous administ.rat.ive pressure was generally brought to
bear
on village chiefs and notables.
According t.o the same
informant. when
a
young
conscript
failed
to
appear.
his
own
father
was
conscripted,
and the tactic proved more than efficient. The French administrator was
not the only one entitled to
porterage.
Virtually all agents enjoyed
these
arrangements,
lithe
district
guard,
the
civil
servant,
the
veterinarian,
whoever
passed
by, 11
as
Siree
Buubu
pointedly
said.
l
I

---

282
Neit.her was
porterage
the
sole misfortune associated with
the
passage
of
Government
agents.
It
was
most
often
coupled
with
expropriation
and abuse of people's hospitality.
An informant mentioned that,
I
I
your horse was not your own.
The sheep you raised to
!
be
slaughtered on the day of the
feast
of sacrifice
was
not
your
own
either.
Every
time
a
commandant
arrived people would say:
'50 and so has got a sheep'
I
and,
it
was
brought over and slaughtered...
Whoever
came
by,
used
to
have
your
sheep
for
dinner,
ride
II
your hor~e and have you carry his sui~ case the next
I
morning.o O
I
This
account
may
reflect
some
exaggeration.
Nonetheless,
it
I
suggest.s
that
these
forms
of exploitation accompanying porterage were
i
I
indeed
part
of
life
under
colonial
rule.
This
is
supported
i
by
,
I
frequent citation in interviews throughout Fuuta Tooro.
!
i
\\
(d) ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
Finally.
forced
labour
was
also
applied
to
road
construction.
I;
The
first
roads
were
built
to
link
the
district
capitals
and
their
periphery.
Both
Podor and Matam were
located on the river and became
isolated from their hinterland by the yearly flood.
The first road was
built in 1897 to link Matam and Wuro-Soogi.
Later,
in 1899 two others
were completed to connect this same village with Damga on the one hand,
and
the
remo te
villages of Ferlo on the
other.
The
construction of
, both
sections
occasioned
labour
mobilisation.
According
to
the
district
officer,
"all
the
villages
along
the
roads
have
provided
labourers ... 61
A year later,
the route connecting Podor and Gi'aa was
completed.
And a road crossing
the province of Tooro
linkec
Aanam-Toowngel with
l
I

---

283
Edi.
As
in Matam,
the
administration
relied
heavily on conscripted
labour,
more
so.
because
of
the
budget
difficulties
besetting
the
district at that time. 62
C.
CONSCRIPTION
One of the most important elements
in the contribution of Africans
to French expansion was
the military
force
of Tirailleurs.
Ever since
che eac1y 19ch cencury che French had been using African concingencs. 63
These were elemental in the
various campaigns against the Wolof states
and the Islamic
reformers.
The presence of Fuutanke soldiers in these
contingents
remained
someT....-hat
limited
until
the
18905.
Despi Ce
che
contribut.ions
of
some
members
of
the
Tooranke
aristocracy,
fugitives
made up the bulk of llvolunteers"
from Fuuta.
Mose upper class elements
in Fuuta
loached to volunteer and go
to
forieign countries.
Moreover,
the
Umarian
propaganda
was
s t i l l
strong
enough
to
deter
many
from
direct military collaboration,
and to
attract many to the east,
Also,
the
Tukuloor
was
al ..... ays
described
as,
n a
soldier
by
vocation
who,
unfortunately
does
not
always
submit
co our discip1ine.· 64
Finally,
convincing
people
to
join
the
colonial
army
at
a
time
when most
of
Fuuta was
in
practical
terms,
free
from
French control,
was quite
a
tricky
business.
For these reasons,
the only form of Fuutanke
participation
in
French
expansion
consisted
for
a '~ong
time
of
occasional
tactical
support
from
chiefs
interested
in
booty,
consolidation of power or political prestige. 65
Scarting
in
1890-1891
che
sicuacion
changed.
Fuuta
Tooro
'..was
brought:
under
complete
control.
The
Umarian
state
collapsed
and
I
I

---

284
thousands
of
Fuutankoobe
headed home.
A military
reorganisation
had
taken
place
shortly
before,
to
meet
the
ever
growing
French
involvement
in
the
scramble
for
territory,
to
mat-ch
what
Obichere
.
h
f
F
h f'
. "
Af'
,,66
called
"the astronomlC grove
0
renc
lre power
In west
rlca,
and enforce the newly formulated indigenat code.
For
all
these
reasons
from
1891
onward,
French
administration
gradually pressed upon the people of Fuuta to serve in colonial armies,
calling upon
them
as
crises
accwnulated
in
the
empire
and demand for
soldiers became more and more pressing.
This
is why major recruitment
drives coincided with years of crises or major reforms in French Black
Africa.
Between 1890 and the First World War,
six major recruitments
took
place in Fuuta.
During the Dahomey war,
the administration sent
the 6th company of the Regiment de tirailleurs senegalais to
reinforce
French garrisons
there.
In 1890,
to
compensate
for
the ensuing loss
of
cadres
and
indegenous
troops,
Colonel
Badens
the
Commandant
in
chief advised the Governor
to
levy
fresh
contingents.
This
led co a
recruitment in the districts of
Dimat,
Tooro,
and Laaw during the fall
of
the
same
year. 67
No
figures
are
available
for
this
particular
mission,
But
it
is
safe
to
asswne
that
the
recruitment was
not very
important
since
a~
that
very
time
the
French
were
mobilising
their
western
Fuutanke
allies
for
a
final
show do'WTI in
central
and eastern
Fuuta
(Chapter
2).
By
1892
recruitment
extended to
Boosoya and
the
other
provinces.
Between
1890
and
1892,
some
230
people joined
the
regiment
of
tirailleurs.
Many
of
these
took part
in
the
campaign of
Dahomey and later,
in the Malagasy campaign.
The conquest of Malagasy was followed by a long period of struggle

---

285
during
which
the
large
island had
to
be
occupied.
This
led General
Gallieni to ask for a second regiment recruited in Senegal.
Sudan, and
Dahomey.69
These
demands
caused a
new recruitment
in Fuuta
in 1899-
1900.
The
first
year
six
of
the
provinces
provided more
than
eight
hundred men. 70
Starting in
1904
a
decree
instituted
recruitment by
means of
volunteer commitment and renewed contract except in the four
communes.
The
same
year.
the
conquest
of
Mauritania
got
underr..;ay,
involving
many
people
of
the
north
bank. 71
By
early
1912
French
control over Mauritania ~as still marred by raids and revolts.
Trouble
in
the
northern
pan:
enhanced
the
need
for
stationing more
and more
troops
in
Morrocan
garrisons.
Moreover,
the
decree
of
1904 was
not
providing Fuutanke volunteers. 72
These elements,
among others,
led the administration to issue the
decree of 7 February 1912 establishing compulsory military
service in
French
West
Africa.
The
immediate
effect
of
this
dec ree
~as
particularly
bad
for
the
north
bank.
A circular
issued by
Colonel
Mouret,
the Commission~r of Mauritania,
required the districts of the
south (Brakna and Gorgol)
to
provide each 35% of the contingent,
while
Gidimaxa and Trarza,
were assigned 25%
and 5%
respectively.7}
By the
end of 1912 the
levies had already had their toll on the north bank, 4
per one
thousand habitants,
as against the official one and two maxima
prescribed by
the
various
decrees.
The
Commissioner' pf
Mauritania
himself
gives
an
idea
of
the
damage
when
he
concludes
his
report
saying,
commandants
and
residents
all
object
to
the
abnormally high number of conscripts imposed on their
districts
and
propose
that
conscription be
applied,
to the extent possible, only once a year. 74
•
I

---

286
On the basis of scattered figures one can reconstruct the
following table of conscripts for the period 1890-1913:
TABLE 7:
Conscription in Fuuta Tooro, 1890-1913
District-Territory:
Year or period
: Number of recruits
~. -- - -- -- - - - - -- - -.: - .-- -- - _.- - - -- - - -- -: - - .-- - - - -.- -.- - -.- -.-
Dimat-Laaw-Tooro
1890
200
Fuuta
1891·1892
230
Damga
Jan. 1899
200
Yirlaabe-Hebbiya
Jan. 1899
150
Laaw
Jan. 1899
200
Halaybe
Jan. 1899
75
Boosoya
Jan. 1899
260
Ngenaar
Jan. 1899
40
Podor
1900
20
Matam
1900
37
Mauritania(Fuuta)
1908
200
Macam
1911
120
North bank
1912
25
North bank
1913
8
The
table
indicates
a
total
of
1,765
conscripts
for
the
period.
Taking
figures
of
the rni~sing years
into account,
the
total would ~e
obviously much higher.
It also appears that 1890-1892, 1898-1900, 1902
and 1908 were peak years in the history
of conscription before World
War I.
What seems to be a lull
between 1908 and 1912 may well relate
to the weariness and
growing discontent.
particularly among
the youth
'(see
note
73).
Cons idering
the
lean
years,
the
total
number
or
conscripts may revolve around 2,500 men.

---

287
CONCLUSION OF PART FIVE
From
1891
on~ard
the
people
of
Fuuta
~ere
to
fully
acquaint
themselves ~ith the institutions of colonial rule.
A whole
structure
of
administration
with
higher
French
and
lower
African
levels
was
established.
At
its
top,
the
Lt.
Governor
of
Senegal
and
the
Comrniss ioner of Mauri tania
ruled
through
Gommandan cs,
and Residents.
Previous
to
the
War
both
kept
a
relatively
low level
of contact with
the people.
Commandants and Residents as
Tl men
on the spot,"
retained a
great
deal of authority over
people and affairs.
The empire of these
officers over
their districts has earned them such names as,
"kings of
the bush,"
"gods of the bush"
and few others.
Some
historians contend
that,
"Outside of the cities where a good proportion of Europeans live,
nothing
sobers
up
his
sense
of
exaltation
and
personal
power." 75
Although such insistence on
their power is generally founded,
it tends
to
blind one
to
the
specificity
of
situations
and periods.
In
the
Fuuta of the early colonial period,
circumstances sometimes contributed
to limit the
arbitrariness of such power.
In the fall of 1890,
following
the assassination of Abel
Jeandet
(see
Chapter
3),
a
district
officer
requested
a
gunboat
retaliatory
I
strike
against
alleged
rebellious
villages.
Despite
the
5 trengh
of
I
the case in favour of action,
the request was
turned down immediately.
The officer could but find it:
I
regrettable
that the Governor did not deem it fit
to
approve
the
measures
I
proposed.
The
circumstances
I
were favourable and one would have pre-empted any new
subversive
move.
Later,
it
will
be
too
late,
the
indigenous people ~ill no longer learn the lesson. 76
I
I
I
I

---

288
The Governor's rejection of
such a proposition clearly
shows his
anxiety and concern that retaliation might produce
adverse effect, and
fuel
the
fire
of discont~nt then prevalent in the district of rooro.
Similarly,
in
1908,
after
the
crushing
of
the
revolt
led by alleged
"Mahdi,,77 Aali Yero Joob,
a cleric
from Dimat.
interim Governor Henri
Cor opposed categorically any
retaliation.
He
argued
that
clemency
should be
the response
to
such
"sudden and
irrational bursts· making
it clear that,
I
shall
neither
impose
collective fines,
nor resort
to
political
deportations;
Nor shall
I
take
any
of
the survivors to local or European courts.
Therefore,
while
I
advise
the
administrator
at
Dagana
to
closely monitor
the
developments
[of
the
crisis],
I
urge him to avoid any move that could be perceived as
a
desire
for
retaliation
on
our
part,
or
loss
of
confidence in the population. 78
Here
too,
besides
the
risk
of
sowing
the
seeds
of
martyrdom
mentioned by
C.
Coulon,79
it
was
felt
that
lack of moderation would
have aggravated an already tense situation.
Talking
about
the
application
of
indigenat
sentences
to
the
colonised
J.
Suret
Canale
noted
that
district
officers
used
to
put
people
in
jail
and
report
their
decision
to
the
Governor
only
afterwards.
He insists,
there
is
hardly
any
single
instance
where
the
Governor
disapproved of
the
punishment.
Sometimes,
neither
the
decision,
nor
the
prisoner's
name
......as
entered on the register of the commitals to gaol. 80
In the case of Fuuta Tooro,
evidence sometimes goes against
such
generalisations.
In
1910,
the
Commandant at Podor
sentenced three
I
I

---

289
notables
from
Mbooyo
(Tooro)
to
a
100
francs'
fine
and
15
days
imprisonment
for
leading
~hat
the
chief
termed
"a
subversive
emigration
to the
right bank, I1
The officer pleaded
for confirmation
of
his
decision
in
the
most
serious
tone. 81
A fe .....·
days
later,
St.
Louis
rej ec ted
toe
sentence.
The
Lt.
Governor
argued
that
administrative
imprisonment
was
acceptable
only
in
case
of
serious
offence,
that
violence
was
not
the
best
YJay
to
deter
people
from
crossing
to
the
north
bank
and
that,
after
all,
"both
banks
were
French."
Thereupon,
the
prisoners
were
ordered
released
without
delay.82
District officers often met disapproval of higher
authority when
they expressed the desire to
introduce territorial changes, punish,
or
depose
chiefs
(see
Chapter
7).
Replies
from
St.
Louis
generally
reflected
a
concern
for
Tukuloor
sensitivity
to
arbitrary moves
and
attacks
on
traditions
(see
village
chiefs,
Chapter
7).
Thus,
in
evaluating the power of district officers,
their ability to get higher
authority support
their views,
one
should always
cake
account of time
and space. According to periods, regions and people, colonial authority
sometimes
comported
itself
more
soberly
than
one
is
ususlly
made
to
believe.
As
for
the
African
elements
of
the
administration,
the i r
importance
varied
according
to
their
position
in
the
hi~rarchy.
Interpreters proved influential in as much as communication between the
administrator
and
the
masses
hinged
upon
their
disposition.
Cohabitation with the administrator
placed limits on their freedom of
movement as
well as
opporunities.
And,
given the power and prestige

---

290
attached
to canton chiefship,
most interpreters yearned for
che
latter
post.B 3
District guards had certainly much less prestige than Interpreters
and
Chiefs.
Al though
they
had
no
power
as
such,
they
also
took
advantage
of their function and enjoyed
hospitality and gifts of all
kinds
·,.;hile
on
tour
through
district.s.
So much ~as
associated ~ith
the uniform that individuals
did not
hesitate
to
disguise
themselves
as guards,
travel around,
and exploit the naivete of the people. 84
Of all the African au~iliaries, Canton Chiefs occupied undoubtedly
che
most
critical
position
within
the
hierarchy.
Coming
from
former
leading families most chiefs felt
compelled to comport
themselves
like
the
rulers
of
yesceryear.
They
tried
their
best
to
stick
to
old
chiefly ways of life at a
time when the administration had decided for
political and economic
purposes,
to reduce
the aristocracy's means of
reproduction. This engendered a contradiction that most chiefs tried to
circumvent
by
collecting
gifts
and
rights,
in
utter
disregard
for
colonial
~ecommendations. or
embezzling
fu~ds.
In
the
end,
this
attitude
imposed
itself
as
the
only
viable
answer
to
the
chiefs'
predicament.
By 1911 land rights were re-established (see Chapter 4).
What
is
more,
the
administration
grew
more
tolerant
vis
a
vis
embezzlers.
Addressing
the
issue
of
embezzlement,
the
secretary
general.?f the Government General went so far as
to mencion:
The
fact
that
tax
monies
are
not
flowing
into
the
treasury
is
obviously
a
nuisance
but,
one
that
is
unavoidable.
Chiefs are obliged to indulge in lavish
expendi tures,
the
only way
for
them
to
uphold
their
prestige.
Their authority
is
often contingent
upon
generosity vis a vis cheir subjects and the subsidies

---

291
they receive from the administration have never been
sufficient enough to sustain their life style. 86
This same awareness of the difficulties that beset Canton
Chiefs,
caused
the
French
administration
to
draw
on
the
"secret
funds rr86
to
come
to
their
aid.
Hence,between 1905
and 1913
the
adrninis tr a tion
meted out "political gifts" to the following
chiefs:
TABLE 8: "Po li tical Gifts" in Support of Fuuta Chiefs, 1905 -1913
Chief
: District:
Year
: Gift/kind:
Money
Aamadu Sammba
Laaw
: .1905
1 gown
worth 50 f
Abdul S. Kan
Damga
1905
100 f
Abdullaay Kan
Yir13-
1912
100 f
Aamadu S. Wan
Laaw
1913
50 f
Ibraa A. A. Wan
Haayre.
1913
50 f
Birom Sih
Seelo-
1913
50 f
Aamadu M. Wan
Mbantu
1913
50 f
Mustafa Kan
Podor
1913
50 f
Elim. B. Hawa Kan
Podor(t): 1913
50 f
A. N . S:
17 G 24, 0>,.
c it., pp.
70 - 73 .
Not only was this aid din~.cted at a minority, it represented but a drop
in
the
chiefs'
sea
of
needs
and
sollicitations.
Moreover,
the
insignificance
of
the
assistance
point
to
the
limited
import
the
administration accorded the chiefs of Fuuta Tooro.
In the attempt to face up with their social responsibilities many
chiefs
grew
more
and
more
explOitative,
corrupt,
and,
sometimes,
opportunistic.
This
has
showered
upo~
the
whole
co~ps
criticism,
abusive
generalisations
and cliches
that,
we
believe,
call
for
some
re-evaluation.
Colonial
historiograhpy
often
depic ts
chiefs
as
overzealous,
vindictive and mean to
their people. S7
Indeed
there was

---

292
sometimes
a
difference
in
attitude
bet'....een
"endogenous"
and
"exogenous" chiefs,
those who had
traditional claim to their district
and those who had none
whatsoever.
In general,
the latter category of
chiefs
who had no affective bond with the people,
tended to administer
much more
severely.
Chiefs
ruling
their own area more
often comported
themselves
relatively well.
Njaay Kan,
a chief who administered
his
native Dimat on the
north bank
for
t'.enty years
(1904-1924),
appeared
in both written sources and oral traditions as a good
chief.
Nowhere
is
there
any
mention
of his
extorting or
repressing
the
people.
In
this particular case
it seems
that
the
affective
ties wi:h the people
as
well
as
the
economic
situation
of
the chief--he was
an
important
land o'~er--made for a peaceful relationship.
Equally
interesting
was
the
case
of
Koolaado
Bah,
chief
of
western Boosoya
from
1897
to
1907.
Sources
generally agree
that
he
never
indulged in
the
exploitation or oppression of his
subjects and
that his
relation
to his
canton almost
amounted
to a
"love story."BB
In
an
1898
report,
the
administrator
of
Kaedi
wrote
of
him
the
following:
Kolado
Ba
makes
an
exaggerated cult of Bossea whose
every
smallest
piece
seems
to
hang
to
one
fibre
of
his heart. 89
Another
report
described his
relation
to his
people,
saying
that
he
was:
rich
on
his
own and more
scrupulous
than
the
other
indigenous chiefs.
He gives liberally to his Village
chiefs ... Poised,
having
very
little
needs,
he
never
brutalises
them
[the
people]
and
never
abuses
his
authority to fleece them.
!
I
I

---

293
He was no despot in his administration.
Reports mention
that he
always
consulted
with
the
notables
prior
to
taking
decisions.
In
addition,
chief Koolaado Bah seemed very jealo~s
of the integrity and
pride of his
territory_
In
~his wise one
administrator acknowledged
in 1900 that:
we can obtain anything ~e want from him. provided we
do
not
belittle
his
Bossea
and,
",·;e
do
not
impose
Abdoulaye Kane [chief of Yirlaabe] on him. 90
KOD laado
Bah
was
indeed
held
in
high
esteem
by
his
people.
Administrators
never
had
a
major
complaint
about
him
either.
This
explains why the
chief remained
in office until
1907,
despi ce claims
starting in 1902 presenting him as
"worn by age W and too much inclined
to
"exaggerated religious
practices: 11
despite
also
insistent requests
from several district officers that he be deposed. 9l
Later,
in
1913
Abdul
Aali
Kan
posed
similar
problems
to
the
administration,
as
chief
of
Boosoya.
He
persistently
refused
to
alienate
his
people.
This
attitude
cost him dismissals
in
1915 and
1921 (see Chapter 6).
Further east
Hammadi Alfaa,
the
chief of Ngenaar,
earned
also a
good reputation.
Because
he
had
no
traditional
claim
to
his
canton
and
·....as
seen
by
the
Aan
of
Gaawol
and
J allo
of
\\.,Iura· Soogi
as
a
"stranger"
to
the
throne,
he
was
disliked
in
some
placEis
at
the
beginning.
Despite
this
animus
from
former
ruling
familie"s,
Hammadi
Alfaa
is
today
remembered
as
a
righteous
chief.
French
sources
mention
tha t
he
·....as
in
good
terms
with
his
administered,
that
"he
adopts,
on
the
advice
of
the
administration,
a
less haughty and more
I
I

---

II
294
!i·
frank
attitude.,,92
Several
traditional
accounts
concur that
the chief
of
Ngenaar
never
extorted
anything
from
anyone.
One
informant
mentioned that I
~hen he went on tour through his canton, he used to
have
a
camp
ins taIled.
The
tradi tion
was
then
to
install
a
a
camp
for
a
visiting
chief.
He used
to
stay
there,
some
distance
away
from
the
vi.llage.
Ee
used
to
have his own provisions.
Even when someone
brought him
a
chicken as
a
token of hospitality,
he
would ask him:
'How much do you 'iNant for it?'
If the
ans·.....er was:
'No,
it
is
my
gift to you, I
he would
then
say:
'Take
your
chicken back.
I
do
not ",ant
i t . '
He was
not
in
the business
of taking
even a
little
penny
from
anyone.
This
is
precisely what
enhanced his
prestige
throughout
the
land.
This
is
preciselY
what
earned
him
pre-eminence
in
this
country.93
One administrator argued by way of explanation that,
the
chief's
attitude was based on his
realization that,
"a province
chief was no
more than an interraediary" and that,
"the
administrator was no Bourba
[king]
accessible
to
him
alone
but,
on
the
contrary,
a
man
one
can
always
see
and talk
to. ,,94
If
this
were
a
sufficient deterrent,
then
many
chiefs
would
have
adopted
a
different
attitude
toward
the
administered.
The truth
is that Hammadi Alfaa had been Quarter Master
in
the
colonial
navy
(1883-1887),
Supervisor
of Military
bakeries
(1887-1890) ,
and trader
(1891-1902).
By the time he was nominated in
1902
he
had
accumulated
wealth
sufficient
enough
to
restrain
from
inaulging in corruption.
Second,
this
chief
did
not--like
his
very
many
colleagues--
maintain a
sizeable
retinue.
Hence,
he did not have a
great need of
wealth to
lavish on such a crowd.
Thirdly,
in a
canton where
former
ruling lineages were
contesting his
legitimacy,
any wrong
move could

---

295
have served the
interests of his adversaries and
perhaps resulted in
his dismissal.
Finally,
in one particular occasion he rendered a useful
service
to his people and many others.
In 1907, he proposed for
his district
a
tax
on
cattle
that,
for
the
first
time
freed
children,
old,
and
disabled
people
from
taxatLon.
His
proposition
was
so
interesting
that
immediately
after
the
district
officer
relayed
it
to
higher
authori ty,
the Governor General ordered it implemented '.L thout further
due and "extended to all
the
districts of the colony which
it has not
been already applied to.,,95
In other respects,
it
should be emphasized that attitudes
among
chiefs were not always uniformly unpopular.
Particular
circumstances
often
occasioned
shifts
in
attitude.
Chiefs
deemed
too
strict
with
their
subjects
at one place,
sometimes
softened
up when
transferred
to
another.
This was
especially true of
those appointed on the north
bank who
had ser~ed on the south.
In the
same wise,
others
grew over
the
years,
tired
of
carrying
out
unpopular
administrative
orders.
Elimaan
Abbaas
Ac,
chief
of
Neere
was
fired
for
his
"spirit
of
independence,
his
false
census
reports,
and
his
obstructing
of
conscription operations.,,96
In the district of Pador,
district officer
Lignieres once
bitterly complained about
the
tlinactivityll
of Aamadu
Sammba IJan
the
chief of Laaw.
In
the
dis trict
officer's"' own words,
"Aamadu
Sarrunba
waS
reluctant
to
act
because
he
did
not
want
to
displease the
population. ,,97
Even Aamacu Moktaar Wan,
long time chief
of
Tooro and constantly praised as a lI mo del chief,'l ended up
chilling
his zeal for a while.
This caused an administrator to,
i
I
I

---

296
lament
the
apathy
of
the
chief
of
'.l. Toro
Amadou
Mac tar Wane
who,
despi te
the
long experience
of his
functions and the necessary authority that his family
background
provides
him,
does
not
assure
the
direction
of
the
sub-district
entrusted
to
him with
all the care
expec ted." 98
T~~ examples cited here are not meant to whitewash chiefs or find
excuses for the abuses,
exploitation and oppression that inhered in the
colonial system which they represented.
There is no deny~ng such facts
even in the mind of
the chiefs
involved 99
Rather,
these remarks aim
at
stressing
the
necessity
to
pay
attention ~he~ dealing ·..1ich
the
personnel
of
the
colonial
administration,
to
variations
of
attitudes
through time and
space.
Village chiefs
in Fuuta Tooro found
themselves
in an
even worse
predicament
than
canton
chiefs.
Beset
with
the
same
sort
of
obligations, social and political,
they had less
opportunities to make
u?
for
their
generosi ey.
Only
a
minority
of courageous
ones
would
dare,
often in collusion with canton
chiefs,
embezzle funds or indulge
in
corruption.
In
these
rare
instances
they
~ere
automatically
dismissed. lOO
Some resorted to
other tricks.
In August of 1911, the
chief
of
Sii",e
(north
bank
Ngenaar),
was
fined
and
dismissed
for
"abuse of
authority.1I
Ever since 1906 he had been receiving 29 frs
for
every ",edding
that took place in his village as
an alleged right
granted him by the administration. lDI
This being said, one has to recognize that village chiefs
were an
interesting group in terms of identification with the people and their
interests.
They
participated
in
the
passive
resistance
of
their
communities.
In the
realm of taxation,
they often cheat.ed to protect

---

297
them.
When assistant administrator Pierron toured the province of Laaw
in 1899, he discovered that by the fault of some chiefs, more than 1500
people
were
missing
from
tax
rolls.
Others
made
it
a
point
to
constantly
provide
false
information.
In
1904,
the
administration
discovered
that
Ardo
Mbantu
had
taken
no
census
of
his
village
ever-since
1901.
He
simply kept
collecting
taxes on the basis of the
same old poll,
without due
regard for
population increase. 102
Many a
time
village chiefs were accused of a "natural inclination to oppose
under
any
circumstance
the
most
absolute
inertia"
in
carrying
out
orders
or,
of
being
guilty
of
"most
unpleasant
negligence"
in
the
collection of taxes.
In some cases village chiefs did not hesitate to join their people
in refusing
to
perform
tax
labour
(see
section
on
Indigenat above).
They
even
tried
to
protect
them
from
conscription.
One
Commandan t
reported for example that,
village chiefs have come and entreated me not to send
their people
to countries so
far away.
"How could
you expect us"--they say--"to subjugate these peoples
\\>Ihen the French themselves could not?,,103
The cheating
in census
taking was
also aimed at hiding the number of
young
men
susceptible
to
join
the
military.
Whenever.
the
adrninis-
tration moved to directly take carry on the census, chiefs often tried
I
to
obstruct
it by creating maximum discomfort
for
the people on the
I
mission.
In
December
1894,
clerk
Pelissier
reported
to
I
administrator the chief of Garli's ill \\>Iill and refusal to provide hay
for their horses, as well as water and milk for himself. 104
There were
I
many more examples of the sort.
I
I
I

---

298
Three
main
reasons
explain why
village
chiefs
acted
as
"men of
the
people."
They
had
more
legitimacy
than
many.
They
generally
belonged
to
the
lineage
that had founded
the village
and established
wich the others over decades--somecimes centuries--relations of blood,
affection,
and solidarity.
In a
word,
the village chief lived amidst
his kit~ and kin. Therefore,
no chief wished to go down in history as
the one who,
for personal
gain,
had sacrified these age old relations
on
the
altar
of
some
outsider's
interests. 105
Second,
and
relacedly.
the village chief was
alone in his
"corner,",
far away from the chief
to\\offi
of
the
distric t,
'Wi thout
g~ards or
pro tee tion.
He
could
be
easily
overwhelmed in case of
trouble.
For this,
he had every reason
to be conciliatory.
Finally,
the village chief had,
economically, much
less to gain in carrying out orders.
By identifying with his people he
stood to gain much more from their solidarity and
their connivance in
regard to
the pay:nent of
those
rights
theore tically abolished by the
administration.
The people of Fuuta began bearing
the brunt of colonial
rule as
early as
1890.
From
then on,
taxation,
iodigenat,
forced
labour and
conscription became gradually part of their daily
lire.
Because
the
administration needed
gum and millet,
taxes
'Were
first
paid
in kind.
As the necessity to create conditions for the establishment of a "trade
economt' arose,
money 'Was
subs ti tuted for produc ts.
This shi ft had a
series of
consequences
some of 'Which have often been referred to in
the
hiscoriography
of colonial Africa.
The need of cash money com-
pe lIed farmers to sell more and more grain to the greedy traders.
One
administrator
summarized
the
situation
quite
'Well
'When
he
reported

---

IIIIi
299
I
that,
"the traders have bought all the millet. This iso-by the way--the
reason why the indigenous people have
none. 1T Food shortages almost a1-
ways ensued,
alloweng the traders to sell back to the farmer,
at 25 or
I
1
1
f. l06
30 f,
a barrel of millet (50 kgs) bought earlier at
ess than
0
Emigration was
another consequence
of taxation.
To
raise
money,
the
people
of
Fuuta,
the
young
en
partecular,
had
to
go
and
seek
employment
in
the
cities
of
the
west,
at
railway
construction sites
!
or,
in
the
"peanut
basin
areas. 11
This
bnd
of
emigration yielded
i
considerable sums of money for the
administration.
In thes line,
the
district
officer at
Matam had
the
following
to
say,
abou: monies
sent
I
from western Senegal:
I
It
suffices
to
l.ook at
the
accounting books
of
the
post office for
the month of January,
to realize how
I
much
the
payment of taxes
can add new and unexoected
i
[sic]
revenues to the resources of the colony.1D7
This
same
report mentions
that bet~een October and December 1911
iI
many
people
from
the
destrict
of
Matam
had
taken
more
than
1,000
\\
I
cattle
to
Dakar
and
other
coastal
cities
in
order
to
sell
it
and
procure
the
cash
necessary
for
the
acquittal
of
poll
taxes.
This
applied to most districts of Fuuta Tooro because of the bad harvests of
that same year.
Indigenat and
forced
Libour functioned both as
disciplining
and
money making institutions.
Indigenat served as a useful
comple~ent to
taxation.
It proved as useful
as
the
latter
institution because of
the
discretionary
powers of district officers
and
the regularity with
which
sentences
were
meted
out.
Forced
labour
in
Fuuta
Tooco
was
limited
in
scope.
In
the
absence
of
big
plantations,
railway

---

300
cons true tion
si tes.
and
mines.
it
was
res tric ted
to
maintenance
of
telegaph lines, the hauling of boats, and porterage. lOB
Conscri.ption for military purposes also took its toll after
the
final
conquest.
Any
cry
for
reinforcements
within
the
empire
was
echoed in Fuuta by a
recruiment campaign.
But,
j aining the colonial
army remained optional for a long time,
and social upper strata mostly
refrained from doing it.
Two reasons were
often invoked for avoiding
conscription:
The long voyage across the
sea--especially to Dahomey
and Malagasy--often associated with the trade in slaves and the risk of
death.
As
a
resul t,
upper
class
elements
generally
resorted
to
substitutes
for
their
own
sons.
Slaves
were
sent
sometimes
in
exchange
for
manumission.
Thus,
on
a
total
of
twenty
so
called
volunteers
conscripted
a~
Pador
in
August
1900,
thirteen
were
slaves .109
As
the
need
for
more
and
more
conscripts
arose,
the
administration
instituted
mandatory
service
in
1912.
Nevertheless,
reluctance continued to prevail among the
"free" elements.
On the eve
of
the
war,
the
administration
was
still
trying
to
encourage
the
nobility to
accept military service.
At a 1913 palaver Mr. Faiys, the
district
officer
at
Jorbuwol,
went
to
great
length
to
coax
the
aristocracy into sending their own sons
instead of slaves.
He alluded
to state land grants as possible forms of reward,
and insisted that,
it is also from among them [noble ve terans I that we
shall
from
now
on,
appoint
our chiefs,
in
the
same
way
Almamis
of
yesteryear
used
to
recompense
their
warriors .110
In
invoking
the
Almamis'
military
policies,
the
administration
intended to insist on the natural character of military service and, at
I
I
I

---

301
the
same
time,
remind
the
leading groups
of the
price
to be paid for
political
pre4eminence.
By
the
outbreak
of
the
"Great
liar"
the
aristocracy
had
began
to
learn
the
lesson,
and
moved
to
consider
military service for their sons.
,
I
i,
I
I
I
I
Ii
I
I

---

NOTES
1.
Back in the
l820s
the
treasury of each colony used to pay its
expense~ from
local
taxes
and
customs
revenues,
while
the
Metropole
paid
tr.
difference
in
case
of
need.
But,
after
mid-century,
the
latter
became
more
and more
reluctant
to
contribute.
This
reluctance
was
translated
into
the
"Financial
Act
of
13
April
1900"
which
established
that
"all
civil
expenditures
and
the
upkeep
of
the
gendarmerie were to be covered by the colonial budgets, I!
This colonial
budget
originated
:rorn
t'Wo
basic
sources:
Customs
dues,
and
Poll
taxes.
See
among
others:
W. B.
Cohen,
Rulers
op. ci t. ,
pp.
69- 73;
J. S.
Canale,
French
Cclonialism,
op.cit.,
pp.
341-349;
Iba
Oer
Thiam,
Evolution Politique, op.cit., pp.
662-667.
2.
Iba O. Thiam, op.eit., p.
665.
3.
A long held view among
the colonizers depicted the African as
lazy,
naturally
"repugnant to work."
Joseph Gallieni who
theorized on
the so-called educational value of taxation once said:
the people of the
Upper Senegal-Niger
are certainly
lazy otherwise,
they would not he negroes.
Quoted
by
Mouhamed
M.
Kane,
in
"French
Officers'
perceptions
of
Africans from 1850 to 1900s," p.
12, 1982. Unpublished.
4.
For
five
years
however,
the
people
of
the
north
bank were
exempted
from
paying
the
per
capita
tax.
The
administration
of
Mauritania used this as a means to attr3ct people.
See Chapter 5.
5.
Unless
the chief proved willing
to
turn a blind eye on them.
Administrator Repiquet who noticed a
discrepancy of 347
names between
census
figures,
explained
that
it
had
to
do
with
Abdullaay
Kan's
exemption of indigent handieaped people.
A.N S : 2011-10 Podor,
"Tour
reports"
op.eit.,
J.
Repiquet's
report
on
Irlabe-EbLabe
Aug.-Sept.
1904, IIp.
Evidence
suggests
that
taxation of handicaped people went
on for
quite some time.
In 1912 a man named Manunadu Lih from the village of
Calaaga (Tooro), complained to the Governor that he had been bound hand
and
foot,
exposed
to
the hot
sun and
then
imprisoned,
for not having
paid taxes.
He
told the Governor that he was
a. person destitute and
living
only
on
public
charity.
He
requested
tax
exemption
and
protection of
the Governor
against such abuses.
We found no reply to
thLs
request.
A.N.S
2011-5
Podor,
"Correspondances
1909-
1913."
(Mamadou de Thialaga, a Gouverneur 25/3/1912).
302

---

303
6.
One informant from Boggee mentioned corn.
This suggests
that
riverine villages,
which during the
dry season indulged in the culti-
vation of their Pale (river front farms) paid in corn, while the people
of the Jeeri (highland) gave what they had most in store, millet.
7. A.N.S
2Gl-14l Matam,
"Rapports mensuels 1897."
(Janvier).
This
is
why
Haayre-Laaw
(Podor)
a
village
close
to
the
Sanre,
(name
of
the
steppe
in
the
FerIa
semi-desert)
became for
a while,
an
important gum trading center.
8.
One administrator mentioned that,
contrary
to
practice
among
the
Maures
of
the
right
bank
who
content
themselves
with
spontaneously
gathering
the
balls
[
of
gum
]
generated
by
the
acacia verick,
the Peulhs
: Fulbe
1 of the left bank
lavish care on the tree and resort to procedures that
almost amount to cultivation:
Plotting,
fencing with
dry
and
thorny
branches,
cutting
and
barking
the
trees which facilitates
secretion.
Upon the blowing
of
the
firs teas terly winds,
the
sap,
thanks
to
the
purposely
designed
outlets,
surfaces
all
the
more
vigourously,
forming
voluminous
pure
balls
of
far
better quality
than
those
of the moorish land often
small
and
irregular
because
they
are
picked as
the
tree
naturally secretes
them.
Cultivated gum is,
on
the contrary, very
pure and its quality is very much
prized by traders.
A. N. S
2G3 - 7
I'Rapports
semes triels
du
Bas
Senegal
dis tric ts
1903".
1 sem.
58p.
pp. 44-45
This ferlo gum was so much prized that many Moors used to emigrate
to
the jeeri of
the
south bank to collect it.
It occasioned frequent
conflicts between them and the Fulbe.
For detail on these conflicts,
see:
A.N.S:
2G16-5 Senegal,
"Rapports politiques 1916." Senegal a A.a.F,
1 trimestre,
30p.
9.
During
the
18805
long
before
the
british
offensive,
the
Mahdists had embarked on discouraging capitalist entrepreneurship
and trade with Europeans.
The effect of these policies was
to
cut back the production and sale of many items.
This may be the reason
why Samir Amin situates
the heyday of
the gum trade along the Senegal
River,
between
1885
and
1900.
See
Samir
Amin,
Le Monde
des Affaires
Senegalais.
(Edi tions
de
Minui:,
7,
Rue
Bernard
Palissy,
Paris
6e,
1969,
205 p).
10.
The
Sanre
(note
7),
is dry most of
the year.
Gum collectets
relied
solely
on
ponds
that
resulted
from
the June-Sept.
rains.
By
march
these
ponds
often
dried
up.
This
caused the
traders
at
Fodor I
Matam,
and
Salde
to
constantly
pressure
the
administration
for
the
drilling
of wells which
they
regarded
as
a
sine
gua non
for
a
large
scale
gum
production
in
the
jeeri.
In
the
spring of
1901 Oldani,
a
trader
at
Podor
was
granted
such
request.
(A.N.S
2Gl-160,
Podor
"Rapports de 1901."
(Mai).

---

304
In
the
main
however,
the
administration
did
not
satisfy
such
demands
for,
as of 1918
the Commandant of Salde was still maintaining
in order
for
the gum to be
efficiently exploited the native had to be
able
stay
in the jeeri until
the month of April and
that
this
"will
remain impossible as long as ...... ells are not bored in this region."
I
A.N.S:
2G18-40 Salde "Rapports commerciaux 1918."
i
Ever since the 18505, St. Louis had been paying customs to moorish
I
chiefs on gum that was gathered on,
or crossed their territories.
This
i
continued
until
1903
when
Coppolani
abolished
the
customs
paid
to
I
I
Idaw' arohief Bakkar wol s",eyd Ahmed.
Conversely,
the administration
I
always
~~nt a deaf ear to the constant requests of Tooro canton chiefs,
for an "asaka on the gum that was gathered in the cantons of toro,"
I
For these requests of the canton chiefs, see,
A.N.S:
2Dl1-1 Podor
i
"Correspond.
1838-1893"
(Fador
to
Direct.
of
Polit.
Affairs,
29-4-1893) .
11.
Fulbe
nomads
posed many problems
to
the
administration for
a
long
time.
Between Sept.
and Oct.
1913,
Savoureux the dist.
off.
at
Pador had
to
tour
the jeeri of Laaw and Tooro.
The stated agenda for
this tour was to study the ways and means to regroup them,
in order
to stop once and for all,
the wandering of these groups by
confining them to reserve-like settlements with surrounding
water spots near by during the dry season.
To allow for the gathering of gum susceptible to guarantee
the native better means to acquit the poll tax without using
their grain reserves
To stop the temporary flight every year,
of tax payers to
walo, Toro, Lao under the pretext of pasture land search.
A.N.S:
2DII-IO Podor,
"Rapports de tournee," op.cit.,
1913.
12.
wi t;h
the
Anglo -Egyptian
reconques t
of
the
Sudan,
gwn
flooded
European markets again.
This caused a sharp fall of prices.
1897 ·--·-·--·-----··-----·-1,20 frs/kg
1902 -·-·-·-·-·-····--·-·-·-0,50 frs/kg
1912 --.------·----·-·-·----0,60
"
"
This in turn,
affected exports of gwn from the colony of Senegal.
Year
Tons'
1902 --- ... -.-----
-.--.-- 1,458
1903 . - - - - - - .. - .. -
- - - - . - .
870
1911 ---.---------------- .. -
220
1912 ---.-- .. -.-----.----.-.
476
N.B:
The total exports for the year 1912
represented half the amount
exported from the
sole escale of Salde
(Podor)
in 1902.
See A.N.S :
2G2-47, op.cit.
"Rapport commerical."
13.
Daniel
Delauney,
De
la
Captivite
a
l'Exil:
Histoire
et
Demographie
des
Migrations
Paysannes
dans
la Movenne Vallee du Fleuve
Senegal.
(Travaux
de
l'
O.R.S.T.O.M,#
174,
Paris
1984,
p.
52).
(Hereafter,
De la Captivite a I ' Exil.)

---

}05
14.
At the escales of the river,
the equivalence between guinee
and gum was as follows:
ESCALE:
YEAR
GUM IN KGS
:STRIPS OF GUINEE
-------.--.-------------------.-------------.--.--.-----.
SALDE
1880
15
1 bolt Hutton g. cl
18
1 " of guinee mill
20
1 " be1gian guinee
188}
40
1 "permentier guin
}O
1 " guinee mill
25
1 " english guinee
PODOR
1895
20
1 " Guinee mill
25
1 "chandora guinee
KAEDI
1895
15 to 20
1 " heavy guinee
20 to }O
1 " light guinee
N.B:
Sources- A.N.S: 13G-151 and 152;
2Gl-92;
2Gl-155.
1 strip of guinee equalled 1 sheep,
at the esca1e of
Kaedi in 1895.
15.
A.N.S
13G-
162
Matam
."Corresp.
1888-1898."
(D.A.P.
a
Administrateur Matam,
16-}-1695, p.
13).
16. "The dist.
off.
at Matam brought to the attention of the
D.P.A.
that
"the
traitants
[traders]
persist
in exchanging for
guinee
s~rips in spite of the desiderata of the administration who wants taxes
in
specie
instead
of
guinees."
(A.N.S:
2Gl-139
Matam
"Rapports
agricoles et commerciaux 1895. 11 )
-To a local trader guinees had more exchange value than money.
-Later,
in 1897 Adm.
E.
Aubert mentioned that his predecessor had
collected
64,000
frs
of
tax
money
in
1696
whLch
suggests
that
some
traders had been made
to comply by the end of 1895.
But,
Ln the maLn
this reluctance persLsted until
the early 19005,
forcing the people of
Matam to
go
all
the way to
Podor
and Dagana
to
sell
graLn for cash.
(A.N.S:
2G3-63 Matam "Rapports mensue1s Juillet-~ecembre 1903.")
17.
Under the pressLng need of cash for tax payment,
the people of
Damga (Matam) went all the way to Bakel and Kayes
(east) to sell grain
at
extremely
cheap
prices.
Due
to
this
grain
transfer
from
his
district
and
the
consequent
famine,
the
Commandant
of
Matam
felt
obliged
to
blow
the
whis t1e
in
j u1y
1896.
(A. N. S
; 2G1-142
Kaedi
IrRapports poli tique,
agri ..::ole et commerciaux l896 11 • July.)
Another
indicati(~m that
St.
Louis
was
less
concerned
with
the
underhanded tricks
of the
traders was
the
fact
that district officers
continued to denounce· the latter until
the 1920s.
Also,
when in 1895
Siree
Dii' e
the
chief
of
Padalal
complained
about
disputes
between
traders and farmers who,
proposed respectively,
1 guinee for 60 moules
of millet
and
1
for
30,
Commandan~ Allys "cautious not to interfere"
advised
Barka
Jam,
the
chief
of
Matam,
to
settle
the
difference
by
fixing
the
price
at
45
moules/l
guinee.
(A.N.S:
13G-162,
op.eit.,
folio 42.)

---

306
18.
Until
1920
the
colony of Senegal was divided according to the
decree of
11 May
1895
i.nto
"territories of direct
administration"
and
I'protectorates",
the
latter being,
in
theory,
placed under the direct
control
of native chiefs,
checked by distric officers and subdivision
chiefs.
The protectorates
themselves Were classed into
"protectorates
by right of conquest ll and "protectorates by treaty.1I
Iba
Der Thiam
seems
to
date
the
difference
of
rates between
the
t~o
categories
of
territory
back
to
the
decree
of
14
Feb.
1906
(EvoluJ~:i-on Politigue, op.c.it., p. 656).
In actuality,
i t
goes back to
the ec.
.y 1890s, as the follo~ing table indicates:
PERIOD
7ERRITORIEs OF D.~DM
:
DIST.OF THE VALLEY:
- - - - - - - - - - - - . - - : -_._------------------~.. ---------.------------:
1891-1896
1. 50 frs
1 fr
1896 -1898
2 frs
1. 50 frs
1898-1903
2.50
frs
2 frs
1906-1914
4.50
frs
3 frs
19.
For the definition of these
territories,
see J .S.
Canale
~friaue Noire, vol. 2, op.cit., pp. 97-98.
20.
Sometimes an escale had its own chief.
In Matarn,
the family of
Hammadi ~lfaa Bah grew too po~erful in the eyes of the administration
because
of
the double control over both
the
escale
and the protector·
ate.
This is ~hy the Commandant encouraged the appointment of Gelaajo
Bookar
(of
a
rival
chiefly
family)
as
chief
of
ohe
escale
in
1914.
(A.N.S:
2G14-40 Senegal: Territoires dladminis~ration directe, 4e trim.
Matam. )
21.
In 1915 tax polls sho~ed a decrease of 1,340 tax payers which
the
administrator
related
to
an
"exodus
to
Mauritania."
A.N.S:
2G14-40, op.cit., # 9 Salde.
22.
A.N.S:
2G16-25 Ser.egal
"Territoire d'Administration Directe tl
1916. # 8 Salde. 4th quarter.
For the effect of the transfer of the administration to Jorbuwol,
see ~.N.S: 2G13-52
"Salde-Diorbivol 1913" (March report).
Nothing
in
the
sources
indicates
that
Abdullaay
Kan
or
his
son
Haamidu were supportive of the change of status
requested by the dist.
officer.
Although no evidence allows it, one is inclined to think that
the Kan-Salde
regarded this
status
of
"direct rule
" as
the last mark
of prestige in a province that had become an ordinary canton.
23. A.N.S:
2Gl-95 Kaedi,
op.cit., Oct.report.

---

307
24. The sources of income the dist.
officer ~anted abolished, were:
1- Asaka, some 10,000 frs a year in good years.
2- All fines inflicted by the canton chief himself.
3- Half the fines imposed by the Qadi (judge).
4- Half the 1/10 of inheritance from the heirless deceased.
5- Inaugural gifts (not less than 2,000 frs for an Ardo).
I
6- Rents on bayti-land (public domain).
7 -
A
share
of
Iddi' a
(compensatory
blood
fine)
often
i
substantial.
I
- Other sorts of fines
(Tiwaande)
and taxes.
A.N.S: 2Gl-96 Kaedi "Rapports trimestriels 1898," 4e trimestre.
N.B:
These estimations are the district officer's own.
I
25.
Abdul Aziz and Abdullaay Kan proposed the increase to clerk E.
Pierron, arguing that,
"starting this year,
the people of Bosseya have
to
pay
2 frs.
The
dieri
ljeeri]
harvest
sl1rpassing
those
of
past
I
years.
this
would
cause
no
maj or
difficul ty. IT
A. N . S:
2Dll-12
Pador
"Recensement 1891-1898."
(Carnet de route, Lao 1898, p.
2).
I
26. A.N.S: 2G3- 63 op.cit., Nov.-Decemb. 1903 report.
I
27. A.N.S: 2G3-63 op.cit.
l
28.
For
this
and
the
preceding
quotations,
see:
A.N.S:
2G3-63
I
op.eit.
Although
t.he
dist.
officer
gave
no
decail
of
how
the
proposed
I
policy would alleviate the tax burden for the masses,
one can speculate
that
it would have
eliminated children and
old people
from the polls,
laid
the
weight
of
taxation
on
those
who
were
richer
had
larger
\\
I
families,
landed property and
larger herds.
With such
a policy the
poor and the disabled would probably have fared better.
t
[
29.
Since
the
conquest of Maurirania was presented,
in part,
as a
way
to
stop
Moorish
harassment,
and
provide
the
peace
and
security
I
needed on
the north bank,
the
administration thought
that Fuuta should
bear part of the cost of these operations.
30.
To
some extent distric officers
too ~ere caught in a bind.
On
the
one
hand
their
overzeal
and
need
of
promotion
required
them
to
constantly
max~m~ze
the
exploitation
of
the
people
(some
would
not
hesitate to inflate census figures to that effect).
On the other hand,
they were fearful
that any delay in payments or serious ill-will on the
part of their adminr~tered might be interpreted as a sign of their own
apat.hy
and
incapacity
to
handle
the
natives
and
therefore,
result
in
damaging their administrative file.
31. A.N.S: 2G5-8 Senegal "Rapports mensue1s 1905."
Lt.
Gouverneur
du Senegal a Gouv. General A.O.F, Avril 1905.
32.
It
should be
noted
that
the
"kola
nut
tax"
was
applied
in
forest
zone
countries
where
it
was
produced,
rather
than
in
the
savannah which imported it essentially.

---

308
In his Jan.
1909 report
the Resident of Boggee listed revenues of
such kind as follows:
Patentes de Dioulas-----------------532.40 frs
Droits sur les Kolas----------------60.30
"
Permis de circulation----------·----77.10
see:
Boghe: "Rapports politiques 1908-1917 " op.cit., Jan.1909.
33. Boghe, "Rapports," op.cit., Jan. 1909.
Each officer on both banks frequently reported that the other owed
so me
in taxes collected from taxpayers of one side or the other.
34.
The
administration
in
...... es't.ern
Senegal
failed
very
ofcen
to
provide
tax
receipts
to
those
seasonal
migrants.
This,
the
district
officers of the valley frequently complained about.
In
1912
for
e"amp!.e,
a receipt was delivered
to a man who came
back to
Sincu
CPodor)
showing that he had paid 30 frs before leaving
the district of J010f.
The disc. officer at Pador denounced it as,
an
irregular
and
abusive
collection ... contrary
to
regulations
and,
inconsistent
with
the
instructions
~relative to per capita taxes.
A.N.S:
2Dll-10 Podor. op.cit., June 1913.
35. When suffixed to a name the ending "at ll generally refers to an
institution
Ce. g:
secretariat)
hence
"indigenat"
is
an
institution
des igned for indigenous people.
36. Jean Suret Cana1e, French Co!.onia1ism, op.cit., p. 331.
For
a detailed study of
the
institution,
see:
A.I.
Asiwaju "Control
through
coercion,
a
study
of
the
indigenat
regime
in
French
West
Africa,1887-1914." in B.I.F.A.N, T 41, # 1, Jan. 1979, pp,
34-71.
Simon Pierre Ekanza "L'Oppression Administrative en Cote d'Ivoire"
in B.I.F.A.N, T 37, serB,# 3, 1975, pp.
667-684.
37.
"Control through coercion" op.cit. I
p.
42.
38. J.S.Canale, French Colonialism, op.cit., p. 332.
The
number
of
offenses
varied
from
one
colony
to
another
and,
within the same colony,
from one period to another.
39,
Tension ",as permanent bet-.een the soldiers and the villagers ..
The conflict broke out when three women refused to sell their goods to
the
soldiers,
at
prices
set by Goehring,
the officer
commanding
the
garrison,
and beat a soldier badly with the help of a
man.
A.N.S:
2Dll-23 Podor "Dossiers divers 1893-1912."
(Dossier 8 Trouble
a Thienel 1901-1902).
40.
A.N.S:
2D11-23 op.cit.,
dist.
off.
Valzi to Dir.
of pol. aff.
30-01-1902.
It was decided that four notables,
Saajo Hammaat, Saalif Hammaat,
Hamedin Jibi and Bees Bookar Baaba should be deported to Luga and, two
others Bees Njaay and Demrnba Cil1el,
imprisoned at Podor.
In February,
30 cows and 326 sheep were sent to Podor for auction
I

---

309
sale and payment of the fine.
By Feb.12 the Halaybe had sold for 3,479
frs,
amount
deemed
sufficient
by
the
Dir.of
Indigenous
Affairs.
(2Dll-23
op.cH.,
"Proces
verbal
de
la
vente
aux encheres,
nO 45
du
16/3/1903").
St. Louis rejected the deportation as a solution.
41.
For
both
cases
in
Halalybe,
see:
A.N.S:
2G7-32
Senegal
"Protectorats;
Rapports
politiques
1907."
32p.
(Matam,
pp.
7-8).
2Dll-14
Podor
1895-1903.
op.cH.,
(Halaybe
1898-1899,
Avril
1899).
42. A.N
2Gl-93 Kaedi
"Bulletins 1897" Jan. Rapport du
Capitai~~ Gustave Magnin au Gouverneur General de l'A.O.F.
43. A.N.S:
2Gl·144 Matam "Rapport du 4e trim.189S"
90ctobre).
44. This happened several times bet~een 1894 and 1912.
45. The la~ ~as promulgated in
1887 supposedly, because of
"difficulties that the administration encounters, difficulties
stemming
from
the
fact
that
the
representatives
of
metropolitan
authority have no disciplinary po~er against the non-French natives."
See,
Babacar
Fall
"Le Travail
Force
en A.O.F.
1900·1945."
These
doctorat de troisieme cycle, Dakar 1984, p. 33.
46.
The
woman was
fined
200
frs
for
attempt at misleading census
takers.
Even ~ith a
large
family of ten duely registered,
she ~ould
have to pay perhaps 1/10 of this amount only.
The 10,000 frs imposed on Demet and Ceenel
exceeded the total tax
amount for the ~hole district of Halaybe.
47.
A.N.S:
2Gl-93 Kaedi,
op.cit.
ShortlY afte~ard, ten notables
were sentenced to 8 days'imprisonment and a 100 francs'
fine each.
Fe~
days
later,
five
others
were
sentenced
to
15
days I
imprisonment
and
another
100
francs'
each,
for
refusing
to
go
to
Matam
as
the
administrator
had
ordereo.
Finally,
the
"hole village
"as
fined
30
strips of guinee cloth.
48.
Internat.ional
Labour
Organisation,
convention
of
June
1930.
Jonathan Derrick,
Africa's Slaves Todav,
Schocken Books-Ne~ York,
1975
200 Madison Av. N.Y 10016,
241p.
(Hereafter, Africa's Slaves).
49.The
French
had
already
tried
in
West
Africa
the
system
of
"temporary
hiring"
(engages
a
temps)
and
"Freedom villages"
but
both
had
failed
to
pr9vide
a
voluntary
labour
force.
See:
Francois
Zucarelli "Le Regime des Engages a Temps au Senegal" (C.E.A # 7, vol.II
1962) .
~lso,
Denise
Bouche
Les
Villages
de
Liberte
en
Afrique
Noire
Francaise 1887-1910.
Paris, Mouton and Co.
1968, 276p.
50. With the exception of members of military forces,
local police,
natives
in
permanent
Government
employ
and
traditional
chiefs
recognized by the administration.
Forced Labour
lnt. Org. of Labour,
Report
and Draft Ques tionnaire.
Item I II
on
the
agenda,
12 th session
I

---

310
Geneva 1929, p. 170.
Commutation
of
forced
labour
for
cash
was
accorded
only
to
habitants of cities specified by the Lt. Gov.
51.
Simon P.
Ekanza "L\\Oppression Administrative" op.cit.,
p.
676.
According to Babacar Fall this bias relates to the fact that until
1925
there
was
a
system
of
direct
intervention
and
negotiation
with
native chiefs of contractual ~orks for pre-arranged periods and wages.
This s"stem was recommended to colonial administrators by the July 1899
circ\\..· :. See: "Le Travail Force" op.cit., pp. 23-24.
52.
IIBoggol Tuubaak lT
lit- "Rope of the white rr:.an. lI
53. In 1901 the district officer at Podor complained that the chief
of Laaw had misappropriated the sum given him by Majaan Wadd manager of
the
Salde
post
office,
to
pay
the
people
who
provided
timber
for
telegraph poles. A.N.S: 2011-13 Podor op.cit., Comm. Valzi a Gouv. Gen,
2-10-1901.
54. A.N.S:
2Gll-7 Senegal "Rapports trimestriels 1911" (2d quart).
See
also,
Babacar
Fall
"Le
Travail
Force
au
Senegal"
Memoire
de
Maitrise,
Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Hurnaines Universite de Dakar,
Annee 1976-1977, 128p (pp. 50-51).
55.
In Feb.
1894 Capt.
Gubian,
while
leading a convoy to Western
Sudan,
complained
that
he
could
not
find
haulers
at
the
village
of
Garli
(Damga) despite the canton chief's genuine efforts. The district
officer
at
Matarn
mentioned
that
the
captain
had some
1,600
stips
of
guinee cloth for payment of haulers,
but deliberately refused to use
them.
A.N.S:
2010-25 Matam
"Dossiers divers 1894-1912" (Matam a Dir.
Affaires Indigenes, 28-02-t894).
56. According to Babacar Fall forced hauling remained common
practice until after World War II.
("Le Travail Force au Senegal"
op.cit., p. 53).
57.
Along with
Siin-Saalum,
Senegal Oriental and Upper Casamance
regions.
58.
Bilanka 0,
or ka ).
(pl- Bilankaaj i
di)
is a loan word from
Mannde
(Bilaa ka).
The word refers to the transport of mail or loads
from
one
village
to
another,
as well as
the
load itself.
See,
Oumar
Bah,
Le
Fouta
Toro
au
Carrefour
des
Cultures,
Librairie-Editions
L'Harmattan, 18 Rue des Quatre Vents 75006, Paris, 1971, p. 406.
59.
Tijjaani Maam Njaak,
interview in Nouackchott,
passim.
section
3.
In Fuuta Government agents were rarely carried on hammocks as was
the rule in forest zone colonies where horses were rare.
People
carried mostty the luggage of officials while the latter rode horses.
60. Siree Buubu Bookum, Dakar, passim.
!
I
!
i
I
I
I

---

311
61. A total of thirty villages for the two sections of road.
A.N.S:
2D10-9 Matam "Rapports de Tournee 1894-1917" 2Gl-141 op.cit.
62. A.N.S:
2Gl-159 Podor,
le Semestre 1900.
63.
Most
people
trace
the
use
of
Africans
in
colonial
armies
to
faidherbe
(1857)
because
he
was
the
one
who
rendered
such
use
systematic.
But,
as early 1803 Gov.
B1anchot had recuited Africans to
compensate for the high mortality rate among European soldiers.
f..
a
history
of
the
African
contingents
in
french
colonial
Africa,
see:
Charles Mangin,
La
Force Noire,
Lib.
Hachette
et
Cie
79 Boulevard St Germain, Paris 1910,
365 p.
64.
Sy
Harnat
quoting
capt.
Marceau:
"Les
Mauritaniens
dans
la
premiere
guerre
mondiale"
Memoire
de
MaLtrise,
Ecole
Nor:nale
Superieure, Nouackch.
1980, p.
26.
(Hereafter,
"Les Mauritaniens.")
65.
The
Lamtooro(s)
of
Gede
supported
the
french
against
the
Maadiyankoobe.
lbraa Almaami
took
part
in
all
French
expeditio:ls
in
fuuta
and
lent his
SU?port against Jolof.
Even Abdu1
Bookar
gave a
hand against Mammadu Lamin in Upper Senegal.
66.
Boniface
I.
Obichere,
"The African Factor
in the Establishment
of French Authority in West Africa 1880-1900."
in France and Britain
in Africa,
op.cit., p. 460.
(Hereafter,
"The African Factor").
67.
This
time
the
recruitment
concerned
mostly
western
Fuuta
because
the
French
were
at
loggerheads
·.... ith Abdul
Bookar
and much of
central
and
eastern Fuuta.
For
this
recruitment
campaign
see,
A.N.S
4D-29
"Recrutement
de
Tirai11eurs
1859-1900"
(Mission
du
Lieutenant
Pe11etier au Fouta; Commandant en Chef Badens a Gouverneur, 27/8/1890).
68.
A.N.S:
l3G-47"
Chefs
Indigenes:
Nominations
et
Notation,
1892 -1898."
(Capi taine
Commandant de
Kaedi a 0 ir.
Affaires
Indigenes,
7-7-1892).
69.
Charles Mangin,
La Force Noire,
op.cit., pp. 201-202.
70.
A.N,S;
2Gl-145,
op,cit,
(Recrutement au Damga 1899).
2011-14,
op,cit (Rapport de tournee,
V, A11ys Jan.1899).
Damga;
200;
Laaw;
200;
Boosoya:
260;
Ngenaar:
40; Ha1aybe:
75:
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe: 150.
Dimat and Tooro .. may have been spared this
time for having provided
many in the past years.
71,
Bay1aa Biraan,
chief of Laaw
(north bank)
led a contingent of
100
1aawankoobe
during
the
"Gouraud
Campaign"
in
the
Adrar.
Abdu1
Elimaan,
son
of
Elim.
Abu
Kan
(chief
of
Tooro)
and
Mammadu
Bah,
Interpreter,
tookd also part in the campaign.
It is diffficu1t to know
how
many peope
participated
in
these
operations
because
the
names
of
many
have
disappeared
from
the
archives
of
the
Na tiona1
Office
of
Mauritanian War Veterans.
I
I

---

312
Evidence
suggests
that
the
number
was
high
for,
according
to
Mangin,
1000
indigenous soldiers participated in the Gouraud Campaign.
(La Force Noire, op.cit., p. 207.)
72.
In Sept. 1909 the district officer was instructed to tour Dimat
and
talk young men and retirees
into joining the army.
But, he was
to
express his disappointment saying:
I
must
admit
that,
just
as
the
indigenous
chiefs
I
could not find a single volunteer.
A.N.S:
2D6-12
Dagana,
"Rapports
de
tournee
1900-1915."
(Reynaud,
Tournee dans le Dimat du 7 au 22 Octobre 1909,
19p.)
73.
A.N.S:
4D-34
"Recrutement
parmis
les
Indigenes
1912-1914,"
folio 93.
For reasons that we shall explain later,
the administration levied
conscripts only among the Black people,
in Mauritania.
74.
A.N.S:
4D-34 op.cit.,
(Rapport sur le
recrutement pendant le
2e semestre, fol:o 94).
75. J.S.Canale quoting Cosnier, Afrigue Noire, vol.
2, p.
95.
See
also,
Hubert
Deschamps,
(op.cit.)
and
W.B.Cohen,
Rulers,
op.cit.
76.
A.N.S:
13G-135
Podor,
"Assassinat de
Jeandet
1890."
(folio
28) .
77.
Mahdi
:
from Arabic
"He who
is guided aright,"
spiritual and
temporal
leader expected by
the Muslims
to appear
in the latter days,
to
restore
right over wrong,
good over evil,
and punish
the
infidel.
Many
alleged
Mahdis
appeared
in
Fuuta
during
the
19th
and
20
th
centuries.
~e shall return to this particular case later.
78.
A.N.F-O.M.:
Senegal
IV
dossier
132
"Affaires politiques,
Dagana,
incidents
de
1908,"
(Secret.Gen
Henri
Cor,
int.Lt
Gov,
to
Gov.Gen, 16 March 1908).
79. Christian Caulon,
"Pouvoir Marab6utique et Pouvoir Politique au
Senegal," These de Doctorat d'
Etat en Sciences Humaines, Universite de
Paris I,
Institut d'
Etudes Politiques.
2 vol.,
(vol.
1 p.
201).
80. J.S.Canale French Colonialism,
op.cit., pp.
332-333.
81.
A.N.S.:
2Dll-5
Podor,
op.cit.,
Adm.
Manetche
a
Lt-Gouv.
28-12-1910.
The
three
notables were,
Elim.
Habii,
Jaagaraaf Abdul and Aamadu
Tafsiiru.
All
had
oeen
previously
jailed
repeatedly
for
alleged
subversion, disobedience and incitation to rebellion.
82.
He
was
deposed
during
the
War
for
obstructing conscription.
A.N.M ; El-98, op.cit.

---

II
313
i
83.
In
1920
the
district
officer
at
Dagana,
angry
at
his
I~terpreter, complained that the latter,
aspired only to become chief in one of the districts
of
the
valley
and
will
do
every
thing possible
to
succeed.
Having
obtained
a
three
month' 5
leave.
he
went
to Matam with
the
sole purpose
of provoking
the
dismissal of a canton chief in the district of Macam
or Podor.
I know that,
recently, he went to see Mr de
la Rocca
to
tell him,
he knew that one
of his chiefs
was
about
to be discharged and entreated him
to
get
appointed as a replacement.
(A.N.S.:
2D6-7 Dagana, op.cit.).
84. The most famous of such stories is that of Yellee Baylo
Mboh,
a blacksmith
from Waasa Kodde
Mbayla.
In
the early 1900s,
this
individual dressed like a district guard with the uniform and the cap,
and went around
inspiring fear
and exploiting people.
He was finally
caught
and
severely
punished.
The
story
generated
the
dictum,
Tuubakaagal Yellee Baylo meaning "false European" or "Black skin, white
mask."
(Demmba Jaawando Bookum,
Dakar,
passim.)
85.
A.N.S.:
13G-75 "Politique
Indigene
1913,"
op.cit.
(Secretaire
Dagenes a Lt-Gouverneur du Senegal, 4/8/1916.)
86.
The "Secret Funds" constituted a special fund with three
items:
1)
Funds
destined
to
special
surveillance
for
general
security
purposes,
2)
funds reserved for
the running of intelligence operations
in response to political necessities,
and 3) funds meant to provide aid
to persons worthy
of
attention,
whose
social
status
is
such
that
it is
not
advisable
to
divulge
their
names.
A.N.S.:
17G-24
"Secret
Funds"
Principes
et Gouvernement General 1900-1919.
(Ministere des Colonies a
Governeurs Generaux et Arnninistrateur de St-Miquelon,
Paris 2 May 1913,
p.
7.)
87.
For examples of harsh ctltlcism of chiefs,
see Etienne Mveng
Evina,
"Les Collaboraceurs Indigenes de l'Adminiscracion au Cameroun de
1916
a
1945."
These de Doctorat de
3e cycle en Histoire,
E.H.E.S.S.,
l
Paris 1981, 308p.
See also Henri Brunschwig,
Noirs et Blancs, op.cit.
I
88.
For this and the following,
see A.N.S.:
lC.1660
"Co llado Ba,
chef de 1'lrnangue Bosea 1897."
89.
Ironically,
the
chief's
first
name
Koolaado
(pI:
Hoolaabe),
I
means "the trustworthy."
90.
At Kaedi,
Capt. Dean (1901-1903), Capt.E. Honq (1903-1904) and
I
at Matam, Commd. Michelangeli (1905-1907).
lC.1660 op.tit.
I
91.
A.N.S
2G8-46
Matam
"Rapport
Annuel
1908,"
24
p.
(Appreciation de chefs, pp. 13-14 ).
I
I
I

---

I
I
\\
314
92. Malal Seribaa Cubbu,
interv.
at Matam,
passim,
sect.
5.
For a simila= account, see,Demmba Jaawando Bookum, passim, sect.
S.
93. A.N.S.:
2G8-48,
op.cit., p. 14.
94. A.N.F.O.M.:
Senegal I, dossier 97,
4e trimestre 1907,
(A.O.F a
Ministere des Colonies,
Dakar,
Fevrier 1908, p. 4).
95. Sy Hamat,
"Les MaurLtaniens" op.cit., p.
66.
96. A.N.S.:
2G15-43 Podor "Rapports mensuels 1915" (Nov.).
97. A.N.S.:
2Gl-8 Senegal "Rapports trimestriels 1921" (4e
trimestre,
Podor).
98.
One
former
canton
chief
acknowledged
that,
retainers,
chiefs
and district guardS
on
tour
through
the district,
all would once in a
while have a bite Qut of peo?lels goods.
99.
In
March
1899
the
chiefs
of
Cempen
and
Garli
(Damga)
were
accused
by
their
people
of
"using
the
as aka
[alms]
for
personal
purposes in lieu of following commandant Vergely's advice and using it
to provide hospitality to guests and help
the poor and disabled."
By
April, both chiefs were deposed and replaced follOWing elections.
See, A.N.S.:
2Gl-146 Matam, le trimestre 1899.
100.
A.N.M.:
El-48
Gorgol
"Rapports
politiques,"
op.cit.
(Jui11et
1911. )
101.
A.N.S.:
2Dl1-4
Podor,
"Correspodances
1902-1905."
(Adm.
Molleur a Secretaire General du Gouvernment,
31/3/1904.)
102.
A.N.S.:
13G-47,
o?cit.,
Laborie
a
Direct.
AfE.
Polit.,
7 Jui11et
1892,
p.
17.
There
will be
even more
cheating during
the
War, on the part of village chiefs.
(2DlO-13 Kaedi-Hatam,
passim).
103. A.N.S.:
2DIO-9 Hatam,
op.cit.,
folio 1.
Offering
water
and
especially
milk
is
one
the
supreme
signs
of
hospitality
in
Fuuta
Tooro.
Milk
is
the
symbol
of
peace
and
has
a
particular
significance
among
the
largely
agro-pastoralist
people
of
the region.
In 1865 for
instance,
then Almaami Ceerno Demmba reminded
the people that Al Hajji Umar rqal had recommended them,
to break all relations with the
infidels
[French]
to
deny them any help and,
not
to give
chem water,
let
alone
milk.
'Whoever
failed
to
comply
with
these
prescriptions,
should know that he does not belong to
us.
Oumar
Dioum
"Penetration
:::oloniale:
La
resistance
de
Abdul
Bookar
Kan,"
(Memoire
de
Maitrise,
Eeole
Normale
Superieure
Nouackehott,
1984) .
The
author vas
quoting Almaami
Ceerno
D.
It.
is
possible
that
people
st.ill
remembered
these
prescript.ions
under
colonial
rule
for

---

315
administrators
constantly
complained
that
they
were
denied
mil~
in
villages.
104. People assumed that under any circumstance, their village chief
would stand by their interests.
And,
the moment he showed overzeal or
failed to abide by general interest, he was often deposed.
In 1895
the
people
of Ndenndoori
(Oamga)
moved
to depose
their
chief
who
had
been
too
strict
on
matters
of
tax
payment.
A.N.S.:
2Gl-139, op.cit.,
April i895.
Also
in may
1912
the
chief
of Gaawol
(Ngenaar),
faced
so many
difficulties
that
the
administration
had
to
intervene.
An
investigation revealed
that
the difficulties
related
to
t.he
fact
that
the chief had denounced 110 people who, for years, had been
evading taxation.
In the word of the Commandant,
The
heads
of
the
households
concerned
could
not
forgive his betrayal.
(A.N.S.: 2010-9, op.cit., fol. 7).
105.
For
details
on
unequal
exchange
and
its
consequences I
see,
A.N.S.: 2Gl-93, op.cit.; 2Gl-139; 2Gl-140- 143 etc.
In 1896 :1r Pinel,
COlIlIllandant at Matam,
was
so dissatisfied with
the traders'
attitude that he sent a gang of Lawbe (mule owners)
to the
ferlo.
These Lawbe brought back large quantities of millet that were
sold at 12 to 15 frsfbarrel. ··The O.P.A. immediately warned him that he
business
community
might
file
a
a
protest,
and
advised
him
not
to
interfere again. A.N.S.: 2Gl-140, op.cit. (July).
106.
A.N.S.:
2Gll-39
Matam.
"Rapports
mensuels
1911,11
j anvier.
p.
31.
107. However, Forced Labour was here relatively milder than
in the forest zone where mining, plantation and porterage were
rife, although there were few cases of brutality here and there.
One reknowned district guard at Fodor, a Mannde speaker
and probably,
former slave relished to flog young people who belonged
to the aristocracy.
Some informants mention:
People
have
it
that
he.
Sancu
Baarel.
was
wont
to
beat nobles particularly.
When a person was said to
be of noble parentage, he insisted that he be part of
the
gang.
He would make him lie down and whip him
almost to death.
(Ami M. Njaak, passim).
I
I
I
I

---

316
108.
"Nominative
list of voluntary
conscripts for t1alagasy 1900."
Dossier 7.
Name of conscript.
: Provenance:
Status
: Observations
Siidi Naataago
Cede
free
Samrnba Soxna
Cede
free
Aarnadu Baaba
Gamaaj i
slave
:prov.by Demmba Nan
Hbaarik
Gede
slave
Elim. Ibraahiima
Saara Baaba
Haayre
slave
.. Farba Waalalde
Aamadu Samrnba
Kasga
free
Hammadi Aali
Demet
free
Coyeeri Raki
Camaaj i
free
Maamudu Marnmadu
Abdalla
slave
Ceekora Farba
Waalalde
slave
Farba 'waalalde
t1uusa Kaalidu
t1adiina. Nj
slave
" 3aydi Poolel
t1ammadu Aa li
Cede
slave
I!
Ardo Gede
Xammadu Dem:nba
Cede
slave
Ardo Hbantu
Muusa Kone
Waalalde
slave
Farba Waalalde
Jeeri Hammadi
Kasga
free
t1alal Jaaltaabe
Koylel
slave
Jaaltaabe Aali
Baydi J oob
Ceelaaw
free
"
Kaba J allo
Gede
slave
Baydi Kajjata
Barka Sammba
Camaaj i
slave
" ,jam Gamaaji
Faduwa Daraabo
Meri
slave
" Ardo Meri
N.B:
All
the slaves bear mannde Dames,
followed by that of the master.
t10st of the latter bear titles of local chiefs (Ardo, Elimaan, Farba).
109. A.N.S.:
2C15-52 Salde "Rapports mensuels 1913"
(Oct.).

---

PART SIX: FUUTANKE RESPONSE TO COLONIAL RULE
CHAPTER 9:
THE POPULAR RESPONSE
In
contrast
to
the
resistance
l:~at
:he
various
states
and
aristocracies
opposed to
19th century European Imperialism in
Africa,
the
daily
responses
of
peoples
to
t.i:e
administrat.ive
oppression,
economic
exploitation,
and
cultural
repression
that
define
colo;lial
rule, remain a relatively neglected :heme ~ithin
the historiography of
Africa.
For
a
long
time
res is tanee
has
been
equa ted wi ch
mi 1 i tary
struggle,
deemed more active and
systematic a form of resistance than
:he
ofcen spontaneous and
disorganized civil disobedience
to colonial
authority.
Such an
approach is
fraught with danger.
It suggests that
the
res is tanee
of African people ended ~ith colonial conquest.
But,
T..rhenever
oppression
exists,
resistance
to
this
opression
exists
as
',re 11 ,
and
colonialism
was
no
excepcion
to
this
rule.
And,
the
resistance of African people,
as Basil Davidson put Lt,
"can change its
character and forms but it never ceases."l
The acceptation of colonial
rule by African peoples should not be misinterpreted for,
the dialectic
between '!accomodation"
and
"resistance'! is a complex one,
one in which
the
for)l\\er
often
embraces
::.he
lac:c:er.
In
the
days
of
plantation
slave ry . on
the.
American
continent,
day
to
day
resistance
involved
actions
ranging
from
outright physical and mi1it.3ry resistance,
co
stealing,
lying,
dissembling,
shirking;
murder,
suicide,
arson,
and a
317

---

318
variety of other responses 2
Similarly,
in the early days of colonial
rule
people
responded
to
oppression
and
exploitacion
in
lJays
that
varied
Y,olit..h
the
conditions
of
time
and
place,
according
to
~he
determination
and
wherewithals
of
groups
involved.
Co lonia 1
rule
being--as
slavery--a
power
relationship
of
a
sore,
one
should
not
disqualify these as
insignificant
responses but rather,
pay them all
the attention that is their due.
For Lhes€
reactlons to colonial rule,
as
Christopher
iJondj i
said
of
"Popular Resistance, ,,3
have
their
olJn
traits
and.
"can be
defined
positively
in
relation
to
their
forms,
i
I
Rmpleness,
duration
and status.
within
the
historiography. ,,4
For any
II
full
picture
of
the
colonial
situation
one
needs
to
look
thoroughly
into
the
response
of
the
people.
In
Fuuta
Tooro
as
elsewhere,
I
colonisers
and
their
collaborators
did
not
dominate
all
aspec:::s
of
I
life, nor did chey enjoy the complete cooperation of the
people.
The
French were
che
first
to recognize
chat,
"the
populations
fear us
II
but,
above all,
hatp us"
(see note 18,
Chapter 5).
.<\\nocher adminis-
I
cracor expressed this lack of cooperation qui~e well when he remarked,
\\
there is much more resignation than intelligent (sic]
assimilation.
The Blacks ... still influenced by the
intelligen~ and astute clerics,
obey oreers
because
we have force on our side,
but withouc the slighcesc
en::hus iasm. 5
Each arbitrary decis1.an af the co.lonial administratiun met with a
particular reaction on the part of the" Fuutankoobe.
To
the impositio~
of
"exogenous
chiefs"
and territorial changes
the people responded by
obstructing
administrati~e
procedures,
sending
petitions
to
the
Government General,
and lobbying in colo~ial capitals lJith the help of
•

---

319
influential relatives and friends
from among the Merchant Community and
the
African
level
of
the
administration.
To
heavy
taxation
they
opposed
refusal
to
cooperate
with
census
agents,
provided
false
information, or simply tampered with tax rolls.
Many had also recourse
to
desertion,
flight
to
the. bush
and in some case armed uprising,
in
reaction
to
the conscription for
both
forced labour and
the military.
The
Islamic
leadership
did
not
remain
inactive
either.
On
several
occasions,
clerics used Islam as a
catalyst in order
to sensitize the
people
against
colonial
oppression.
In
one
case
at
least,
this
resulted
in a
pitched battle with colonial
forces,
while most often,
the religious
reaction took on a
passive form.
As for
the
introduction
of "French School," the bulk of the Fuutankoobe simply shied away from
the
institution
of
quite
a
long
time.
Other
forms
of
cultural
resistance
encompassed
the
circulation
of
subversive
propaganda
material,
the slandering of colonial authority and sometimes
its
local
representatives.
through
songs
and
proverbs,
and
finally
an
I
isolationist attitude vis a vis
the coloniser.
A.
REACTION TO IMPOSITION OF CHIEFS AND TERRITORIAL
MODIFICATIONS
The French had started interfering with Fuutanke politics.
well
before the 1890s.
What used to be a cautious and diplomatic
~anoeuvre
earlier on,
became from the final
conquest onward,
a
policy of direct
and sometimes brutal imposition.
Those who were considered
" goo d" and
"reliable"
chiefs
in
the
eyes
of
the
Fren.ch,
did
not
always
have
a
traditional
claim
to
rule
their
circumscriptions
and
therefore,
were
not always welcomed by the populations.
I

---

I
320
1. THE EXAMPLE OF BOOSOYA:
1891
The
first
people
to
reject
the
appointment
of a
chief were
the
Boosoyaabe.
Following the defeat of Central Fuuta in 1891,
the French
expressed
the
desire
to
appoint
Abdullaay
Kan,
chief
of
Boosoya.
Several elements militated
against such nomination.
The candidate was
an
Interpreter
who
had
partaken
almost:
all
French
campaigns
against
Fuuta
including
chat of
1890.
Because of
this
he
appeared
to be,
in
the eyes of the people,
a collaborator.
Also,
he was from Yirlaabe, a
nearby
province
formerly
of relatively
lower
status
than
Boosoya,
and
had no traditional claim to rule in Boosoya.
Thus,
wten administrator
\\
P~ard made the announcement,
insisting thac by proposing
Abdullaay Kan
\\I
the
French
intended
to
pay
due
regard
to
tradition
and
custom,
the
i
I
people
requested a
meeting of their o·~.
This
is how one
informant
I
i
recounted the event:
i
I
The
Boosoyaabe
requested
to
be
allowed
to
consult
I
among
themselves
and
came
up
with
a
trick.
They
i
designated
a
Cubballo
[fisherman]
named Malleen
'Kan
I
,
as
their
spokesman and
told him:
'We
are
go ing
to
proceed the following way:
We will tell the European
that,
if
they
really
mean
to
respect our
traditions
and
customs,
we
do not want Abdullaay Kan
as
chief.
If however they want
to
impose him on us,
we can but
accept
their
will.
Should
this
drive
the
European
irate,
we
would
say
that
this
was
only
fisherman's
talk;
that
fishermen
are
generally
simple
minded
(sic].
If on the contrary the
European agreed with
every thing we said,
so much the better. r6
\\ii th
French
soldiers
all around and arms bristling all over
Ceneral
and
Eastern
Fuuta,
a
trick was
probably
the
only option
left
to
the
Boosoyaabe.
Nevertheless,
because
Boosoya
hac
proved
the
most
difficult
province
to
subdue,
and
because
the
appointment
of
a

---

l
r,,
321
i
i
Girlaajo would have
bee~ at odds with the very traditions and customs
the
administration
had
vowed
not
to
upset,
the
Boosoyaabe
ultimately
won
the i r
case.
The
French
ended
up
applying
a
solution
much
more
consonant
with
tradition
and
custom,
that
is,
dividing
the
province
into three smaller units,
each under
its
traditional
local
leader
(see
Chapter 3).
2.
THE EXfu'lPLE OF HAL'.YBE:
1899-1902
Judging
from
the
political
turmoil
generated,
the
ampleness
and
duration
of
the
opposition,
and
the
involvement
of
the
people,
the
Halaybe
case
proved perhaps
the
most
important of all.
The
Halaybe
constituted
even
under
the
previous
regimes--of
Sacigi(s)
a~d
Almaami(s)--a
sort
of
"State
within
the
State,"
Unlike
others
Ln
fuuta,
they obeyed no
regional
leader.
Instead,
they followed ad-hoc
·.ar
leaders
called
Bees
who "'ere
often discharged
as quickly
as
they
were
elected.
The
spirit
of
independence had caused
them
to reject
the paramountcy of the nearby Lamtooro(s)
whom the french always
tried
to impose on them ever since the 1870s. 7
Starting
in
1891,
Governor
Lamothe
detached
Halaybe
from
Tooro
Protectorate and placed it under the authortty of canton
chief Mammadu
Daadaa Kan.
from Dimat.
This decision
to
let
the
Halaybe
live
in a
separate
canton, did
not alter
their
spirit: very
much,
however.
As
early
as
1893
the
administra'Cor
at
Podor
had
to
ackr'.owledge
that,
"Mammadu Daada has no authority over his
administered. who do not care
a straw about him and simply make a fool of him."S
Bearing in mind the
difficulties
former
Lamtooro(s)
experienced
with
them
and
showing
I

---

323
went
on
ex.pressing
in various
ways
their
discomfort
at
remaining,
as
one Commandant said,
"the long time victims of exocic appointments. I1 In
a le~ter to the Commandant the Halaybe stated unequivocally,
We
are
willing
to
accept
and
subnlt
loyally
to
the
French,
we shall obey them in every way;
but,
as
for
Elimaan Abu,
no
human power
on
earth '.... i l l
ever make
us bow to his authority,12
Because
of
such
determination and
the
fact
that
administrative
business
had almost
ground to
a standstill,
Commandant Valzi himself
had to admit
that,
"in the
interest of
the cou~try [sic]
and in order
to
complete
the
results
already
obtained,
there
is
only
one
possible
solution,
the
resignation
of
Elimane
Abou. Ir
Shortly aftenJards,
the
ad~inistration prevailed
on Elimaan Abu
to resign.
On Feb.
1902
the
Halaybe
met
at
Demet
and
elected
Elimaan
Moxtaar
and
Alfaa
Seydi
respectively,
canton
chief
and
judge.
In addition,
a Resident was
stationed at Demet
to closely monitor the situation in the district.
For
the
first
time
in decades
the Halaybe were allowed to
elect
their
own
chief
from
among
themselves.
When
Elimaan
Moxtaar
proved
incapable of handling the duties and reSigned in November 1902,
another
member of the community was chosen as replacement .13
Like·...lise,
at the
creation
of
Mauritania
8
fe'"
years
later,
the
same
"protectorate
principle" was applied to the north bank where two Halaybe chiefs ruled
consecutively until 1912 (see Chapter 5 ).
The Halaybe had fought out
and won che right to choose their own canton chiefs and their precedent
was
follOwed throughout western Fuut8.
I
I
I

---

324
3.
THE OPPOSITION OF GEDE TO "EXOGENOUS CHIEFS": 1901-1913
In
the
province
of
Tooro
there
was
a
decade
long
history
of
discontent
at
French
administrative
measu~es,
(See
Jeandet
affair
Chapter
3).
Gede
and
the
royal
family
had
hardly
accustomed
themselves
to the dismembering of their province when the
French moved
to dismiss Lamtooro Siidi Abdul and replace him by
Ta~iimu Siley Lih,
from
Salde
(Yirlaabe -Hebbiyaabe) .
As
early
as
June
1900
the
chief
complained
about
the
lack
of cooperation
on
the
part
of
the
former
Lamtooro(s) Hammadi Moyyo and Gelaajo.
within the same
report, chief
Tamiimu
Lih
mentioned
that
former
Jaagaraaf(s)
or
(tax
collectors)
persistently
refused
to
carry
out
his
orders.
The
memory
of
the
spectacular
1890
execution
of
Tooranke
princes
(see
Chapter
3),
deterred people
from voicing their
resentment
un~il 1901.
From this
year on,
influenced by the Halaybe precedent,
they began agitating.
In
October
of
1901
Commandant
Valzi,
administrator
at
Fodor,
reported
tha~ half the population of Gede was in rebellion against their chief,
at
the
ins tigation
of
Bookar
Naataago,
Mammadu
Gelaaj 0
and
Hammadi
Nji'aa,
all
members
of
the former
ruling lineage.
In the
report
it
was specified that,
Following
the
example
of
Thienel
Sakobe
[Halaybe]
they
have
started collecting
contributions
in order
to t~avel to Saint-Louis and request the dismissal of
Tamimou,
and the nomination of one of the sons of the
Gede dynas ty. 14
As
agitation
mounted,
Tamiimu
Siley
Lih
finally
resigned
in
November
1902.
A
few
months
later
on
8
Feb.
1903,
after
having
rejected
the
candidacy of Raasin Kan
(Salde)
and Mammadu De~mba Tooli
I
I
I

---

325
of the Lameaoro family,lS
the administration
appointed Aamadu Moxtaar
~an, Interpreter and son of Ibraa
Almaami
former chief of Laaw.
From
this date on, troubles escalated. On 6 March, on the eve of the chief's
inauguration
thirty
two
notables
went
to
St.
Louis
and
addressed
a
petition
to
the
Governor
General
complaining
about
the
nomination.
They
insisted
that
Tacro
was
the
first
pCQvince
to
ally
•.... ith
the
French and reminded the Governor General of all
the services
rencered
to
che
French,
of all
the
thirteen Tooranke
princes who died fighting
in the
name of
France .16
In concluding
the letter
they insisted they
could
not
accept
as
chief,
a
man
whose
father
sided
with
the
~aadiyankoobe and caused the death of many of their relatives.
They
war:led
that
"a
chief
chosen
from
elsewhere
would
be
too
harsh
i.n
dealing with them"
and threatened to elnigra:e en masse to Dimat,
should
the
Gov.
General
lend
a
deaf
ear
to
their
grievances.
Thereaf:er,
thirty ewo families totalling seventy people,
emigrated to Dimat. 17
As
the
new
chief
resorted
to
harsh
treatment
to
curb
the
subversive attitude and command respect,
petitions agains: him
multi-
plied.
On three consecutive occasions--24 April,
26 May and 10 August
1903- -people
sent
letters
to
St.
Louis
denouncing
the
chief
and
his
methods
of administration.
In
the August
letter Gede
launched a
last
pathetic appeal to the Gov.
General saying:
Tell
[us]
what
ic
is
thac
the people
of Cede did
to
the
French.
Ibraa Almaami
once
did
you wrong but,
you
(Frenchl
always
reward him instead for,
only one
single chief is ruling
[the province of]
Lao.
Abdul
Bookar
used
to
destroy
all
the
canoes
and
boats,
pillage all goods but,
this did not bar his son from
being
appointed
chief.
Alburi
too
did
the
same
things between Leybar and Boudi.
Nonetheless his son
I

---

326
is
today
chief
of
Jolof.
Silmakha
Diop
[Lat
Joor
J oob J likewise.
His SOIl is a chief [in Kajoor].
Once
again
the
administration
thre.atened the
signatories
of
ehe
letter and imposed fines
on them.
?eople solemnly declared
that they
would
rather
die
than
pay
fines
and
have
to
submit
to
their
chief.
They
requested
permissior.
to
emigrate
co
the
neighbouring
canton
of
~bantu.
In the end the administration succeeded through repression and
threa:s
to
impose
the chief on the canton.
The opposition now became
passive.
Action
ycelded
to
inertia
and
ill-will.
According
to
tradition,
slaves
and people
of caste
who were
traditionally attached
I
to
the
rulers
and
co~stituted the
"natural
retinue"
shunned
the
chief
t
altogether.
Ij
The
transfer
of Aarnadu Moxtaar
and nomination of
Elirnaan Muscafs
j
Kan as
chief of Podor-Gede
in c911
(see Chapter 6) did not end Gede's
c;uiec challenge
to
"exogenous
chiefs,,,lS
According
1:.0
one
informant
Elimaan
Kustafa
went
through
the
same
discomfort.
He
was
denied
the
right ~o ex?loit the size~ble farm traditionally assigned to the ruling
,
Lamtooro and otherwise know'TI as the
HKing' 5 farm. 1\\19
1:1
short,
Cede
never
resigned
itself
to
accepting
chiefs
from
else·...rhere.
And w"hen Aamadu Moxtaar,
for
reasons
stated earlier
came
back
as
chief
of
western Tooro
in
1913,
he
had
to
substitute
the
carrot
for
the
stick.
He
asked
for
and
was
gl'Je'n
Aysa:a
Booli,
a
daughter of the Sal
family,
in marriage.
This
improved
considerably
the
relacions with Cede
and ended years
of animus
between the people
and their chief. 20
t

---

327
4.
7HE OPPOSITION TO RAASIN KAN IN DIMAT: 1903-1904
Shortly after Raasin Kan was turned down as candidate to chiefship
at
Gede,
a
new
situation was
created in Dimat by
the
sudden death of
chief Sammba Camka Naam.
Because of its inability to find a man of the
defunct chief's
calibre,
the administra:ion opted for
the division of
t~e province into ~wo smaller units:
Eastern Dirnat and Western Dirnat.
The first uni~ was entrusted to Raasin Kan,
from Salde,
and the second
!
,,
to
the
son of r.he defunct chief.
While the second appointment passed
i
uncontested,
the first generated stiff opposition.
Even though Raasin
I
I
Kan was somewhat related to the people of Dimat 21 he was percieved as
II
a
"stranger"
without
traditional
claim
to
rule. 22
Furthermore,
the
II
Halaybe had won the right to choose their own chiefs,
and the people of
\\
Cede 'Were ·... orking in the same
direction.
Therefore the nomiLation of
Raasin Kan in May 1903
met with a strong resentment,
particularly on
the part of Dimat,
the power base of the former ruling fa~ily, where
the new chief had transferred his headqu o rters. 23
On
26
May
1903
the
population
of
Dimat
under
the
lead
of
the
seven
most
infLuential
notables
sent
a
petition
to
interim-Governor
Charles Rognon, warning that they would never accept the new chief, and
requesting that Elirnaan Mammadu Daada Kan, one of their sons then chief
at
Podor,
be
appointed ~n his stead. 24
ShortlY afterward,
a delega-
tion left
for
St.
Louis
to protest against
the
nomination,
with money
to buy support from the merchant community.25
In June the protest ~'e:lt
a step further.
At
the instigation of the same r.otables many refused
to
pay
taxeS
to
the
chief,
arguing
that
they would
rather hand
them
over to the Commandant of Dagano or his d~strict guard.
Shortly after
I
I

---

328
this
incident,
the
leaders
of
the
pro res t
were
summoned to Dagana and
pue in jail pending instructions
from
the Gov.
General.
Subsequently,
six
of
them were
deported
to
Boggal
(Upper
Casamance).26
The
others
'Nere
sentenced
to
fift.een
days
imprisonmer.t
and
reminded tha.t
they
1
should
accept
the
chief
just
as
tr.ey
once
did with
Samrnba Cam\\<a who,
after all,
was
not
even a
Tukuloor.
In addition,
Gov.
General Roume
:ined
che
whole
village
of
uimat
five
hundred
francs
for
rebelling
against adminis:rative authority.
In July,
an Inspector of Indigenous
Affairs
went
on
mission
to
Dimat
to
help
defuse
the
crisis.
The
protest subsided but,
only for a few months.
In November
the
protest
regair.ed momentum.
People
refused
not
only
to
pay
the
fine
imposed
by
the
Gov.
General
but
also
to
remit
taxes
and yield information
fo~ the census,
This led
the
Commandant
of Dagana
to visit
the village of Langoobe where the
people of Dimat,
Jaanum and Daara-Salaam used
to
spend
the
rainy
season.
This
is how
commandant Manetche described the meeting
that was held at Langoobe:
One
is
led
to
believe
that,
despite
the
measures
taken
against
them,
tr.e
people
of
Dialmatch
(Oimat]
have not changed their sentiment towards tr.eir chief;
Their
animosity has,
on
the
con:.rary,
increased and
~he
administrator's
words
are
met
with
noise
of
protest.
wnenever
tr.e
administrator
mentions
the
name of Rasi~e K~~e, men shout and gesticulate utter-
ing
menaces
·..;rhile
women and
children whoop.
This
noise is horrible
[sic]
to the ears of a European. 27
In face of such hostility a~d defiance,
the administrator who had
exhaus ced
all
poss ible
arguments
returned
to
Nj aayeen,
threatening
that consequences of furthe= rebellion could be most devastating.
This
apparently gave
the people food for
thought and,
on the
following day,

---

329
they informed Commandant Manetche that "they are busy finding the money
to pay,
as
soon as possLble,
both taxes
and fine."
By March 1904
t:,e
threat
of
severe
repression
along
with
solemn
warnings
to
Elimaan
~ammadu Daadaa brought the
situation back to normal.
And, Raasin Kan
could write to the Governor General saying:
At
present,
the
rebels
[sLc]
of
DLmar
have
sur-
rendered thanks to the measures you ordered taken and
I
am
happy
to
inform
you
that
perfect
t~anquLllicy
prevails in the province. 28
Once
again
the
hopes
of
getting
a
son
of
Dirnat
appointed chief
·...,ere
cashed.
The
people
had
to
accept a man
imposed from else·..;here.
9.aasin. Kan '.,]ouid rule witllout major difficulty until
1906.
But,
this
did not spell che end of discontent.
Two years
later,
agitation would
resume,
this
time with Islam as
an
ideological
framework
(ef:
further
5.
REACTION TO TERRITORIAL READJUSTMENTS
Just as
they rejected chiefs imposed upon them by the administra·
tion,
the people of Fuuta Tooro sometimes expressed loudly enough their
resentment
at
territorial-administrative
changes.
The
example
of
Galoya
and
Mboolo-Alkaa-ci
border
Villages
beC'.>leen
Boosoya
and
Yir·
1aabe-Hebbiyaabe,
illustrates the point.
As was mentioned earlier,
che
treaties of 1891
provided that no chief of any province would thence-
forth hold
rights on villages situated on neighbou~ing territory.
In
the
treaty
with
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
the
sixth
article
stipulated
that,
I

---

330
As
a
compensation
[for
the
loss
of
the
above
mentioned right]
the
French Government recognizes
as
a dependence of Ebiabe,
the village
of Mbolo-Alcaty
previously annexed to Bossea and,
as part of Irlabe-
Pete,
the village of Galoya. 29
A
few
years
later,
following
the
annexation
0: Boosoya and
Yirlaabe
to
the
distr:'cts
of
Matam
and
Pador
respectively,
the
C'...ro
villages started a protest.
On 17 December 1893 the
leaders of Galoya
and Mboolo sent a petition to the Governor,
requesting their annexation
back to worgo Boosoya (i.e; Hoore Foonde) and the district of Matam. 30
To support the request it was argued that both Yirlaabe and Hebbiyaabe
came into Fuuta well after the t~o Villages settled and this explained
vJhy:
the
habitants
of Pete
[Yirlaabe]
own no
land.
All
they do is farm land that belongs to Ardo Galoya. The
Village
of Nguy
is also
located on
the
territory of
Galoya
and,
as
of no\\ol,
\\.le bave
alvays
been
levying
asakal [alms] and land fees.
But, despite the determination of the villages and the validity 0:
their arguments,
St.
Louis
refused to
accede
to their
request.
The
,
i
administration invoked the allegedly transtory
nature of the situation
I
to quiet them.
'In addition,
the
Commandant of Matam was instructed to
\\
explain
ro
the
two
villages
that
the
division
into
districts
was
iiI
simply administrative and in
no way meant
to estrange, them from each
I
I
other 31
I
I
The second case of resentment due to territorial readjustment was
the borcer dispute between Boosoya and Ngenaar. In this particular case
two things were at
issue.
First,
this very border isolated farm land
that various
cOIl'lTIunities used
to exploit on either
side.
And,
w'hile
I

---

331
the
people
of Ngenaar
continued
to
farm
land
located
in Boosoya
and
paid
related
taxes
to
their
own village
chiefs,
most
Boosoyaabe
were
discouraged from doing likewise.
Those few who managed co retain land,
were rorced to pay taxes to the chief of Ngenaar.
Second,
Ceerno Malle
Maamudu,
the chief of Boosoya, 'was in favour of the
limit recognized by
the
1891
treaty,
which
had
basically
confirmed
the
traditional
baun-
caries of eastern Boosoya.
Starting in 1896
therefore,
the new chief
of Boosoya pressed hard for
the reconfirmation of the status quo ante,
and he succeeded.
Under pressure from both Ceerno Malle and the people
of
Boosoya,
the
administration
conceded
chat
article
8
of
the
treaty
with
Boosoya
concerned political
not
property
rights
in
neighbouring
circumscriptions.
Under
these circumstances,
the administration moved
quickly
to
redress
the
situation
in
favour
of
the
Boosoyaabe.
The
plainciffs
won
their
case
apparently
for
several
reasons.
First,
to
tolerate
inequities of this kind would have run counter to a principle
the
administration held dear,
the purely artificial nature of district
borders.
Second, Elfekki Hammadi Yero,
the chief of Ngenaar who caused
a
great
deal
of
the
confusion,
was
not
in
the
administration! s
good
books.
Finally,
if not solved,
these difficulties were bound to linger
and
serve
as
pretext
for
the
re.putedly
recalcitrant
Boosoyaabe
to
threaten che so called adlninistrative peace and tranquillity.
B.
REACTION 70 LAND CONFISCATION fu~D DONATIONS
In chapter
four
we have
already
touched upon
the
policy of
land
confiscation that
the
French applied throughout Fuuta rooro during and
I
after
the
final
conquest.
By
seizing
land
from
people
labelled
I
I
I

---

332
"dissidents"
and
giving
it
to
allies
as
recompense,
the
French
trig·
gered resentment ~hLch, despLte the dread LnspLred by the repressLon of
the hour ~as not slow to translate into active reaction.
The reaction
to
land
policies
took on
['.NO
forms:
refusal
to
implement the policy
against Naoro and Kaarta retur~ees for one
thing,
opposition to
those
in ~hose hands confiscated property fell,
for another.
While
in some
cases landless or land greedy people
took advantage of the policy,
in
most others, communities yielded co the superior values of
kinship and
solidarity,
and cended to act more responsibly.
Even
in Halaybe where
retllrnees
were
legion,
the
policy met
with
little
cooperation from a
community
thac
likes
to
t:hink
of
its
members
as,
"meshes
of
a
single
net. 33 "
According
to
traditions
in
Halaybe,
when
the
administration
suggested the
policy
in 1890-1891 a
man named Demmba Hammadi Jah came
out publicly against it:
This
man
[D.H.J)
was
among
those
who
gave
the
land
back.
He was
the one who first volunteered.
Bookar
Baydi was hi!": cousin.
When i t was
said that Colonel
ArchLnard
[Dodds
Ln
fact]
had
declared
chat
no
recurnee f~om the east was to own any thing a~y more,
he
stood
up,
came
forward
and
said:
'As
for
me,
whatever
I
am
not
to
share
with
Bookar Aamadu,
let
God take it away from me until
the day of reckoning.
i
t
, I
Then,
every other Kalajjo
[pl: Halaybe]
stood up and
saLd the same,
Thus,
every body found his share and
cook
it back.
No
sin~ke person lost property (as a
result of the policy].
In
Tooro,
especiall:1
among
the
Seeloobe,
there
were
cases
of
tensior.s between individual returnees and people who had recei'led
land
(see Chapte~ 4).
The lack of evidence both written and oral
regarding
local dispu~es suggests that elsewhere in Fuuta
communities were also
I
most reluctant
to
take advantage of the policy.
I
I
I

---

333
Conversely,
almost
everywhere
else
canton
chiefs
seized
on
the
Lamoche-Dodds decree to confiscate land.
In Halaybe,
as was
mentioned
earlier,
this
was
to
some
extent
the
origin
of
difficulties
between
El imaan
Abu
and
che
people,
espec ia lly
prominent
land
ovmers.
In
Boosoya some
people
filed similar
complaints against Ceerno Kolle
in
1891.
Likewise,
che
adminiscracor of Matam reported in May 1894 chac,
'I the
paramount
chie:
in
Damga
(Ibraa Abdul]
wants
to
take
good
land
a~ay from
the Kartanke and Nioranke and give it to his own friends a~d
I
relatives.,,35
A year
later,
the
same
paramount chief was
accused
of
!
,
i
misappropriacing
slaves,
caule
and
horses
under
the
cloak
of
che
I
aforementioned decree.
BUl,
in chis case,
che whole affair
backfired
\\
on Ibraa Abdul.
Admi~istrator Edouard Hostains who
seemed
to nurture
i
I,
personal animus
:or him,
used it as a ploy to
build up a case against
iI,
the chief and precipitate his do'~ fall.
I
Also
in
Damga
the
administration
granted
large
tracts
of
land
\\
belonging co former followers of Abdul Bookar and Aamadu Sayku co Abdul
Salaam Kan,
Siree Diiye
Bah and ochers.
Much of the sti:f opposition
co
Abdul
Salaam and
Buubu Diiye- - che
successor
co
Siree- -has
already
been dealc
with
(see
Chapcers
4-5,
and notes
lD4
and
105
of Chapter
I
5).
I
Similar problems picched che villages of fanay,
Lobbudu and Jalmac
against Elirnaan Mammadu Daacaa and, the village of Daara-Salaam. 36
When
I
he
returned from his Gabon exile 'Elimaan
Mammadu was appointed chief
of Dimac in 1883.
Because of his
troubled past the people of Jalmacc
I
could
not
stand his
residing
at
the
traditional
cap:'tal
(see
Chapter
I
2).
Therefore,
then
Governor Servatius g~anted him land on the river
I,

---

334
some
fifceen
kilomecres
away
from Fanay where he
founded che village
of Oaara-Salaam.
This was officially in regard co his ·past
services·
and his
pledge
co
bar
che
Moors
from
roaming around and pillaging on
che norch bank. 3 ?
By January 1901
che population of Daara
had grown
from
44
in
1883,
co
more
than
2,000
habitants.
Because
of
this
demographic
pr.-essure
it
began
to
infringe
on
the
land
of
the
other
villages.
Since
the
19th century donation concerned
mostly uncleared
land,
the
administration
opted
for
the
status
quo:
Daara maintained
ownership
over
whatever
land
it
had
already
cleared
while
Fanay,
Jalmacc,
and
Lobbudu
remained
proprietor
of
their
entire
farm
land.
Although che solution did
not suit Elimaan Mammadu Daada, who wished a
continued
expansion,
it '\\Jas
thought
"to
be
the
most equitable
of all
Ln~as~muc~ as
wastela~d in indigenous countries traditionally belongs
co first occupants."
In July
1909,
following
several
frustrated
appeals,
and
Elimaan
Mammadu's death,
the sons
of the
defunct chief obtained a release
from
the
limitations
of
the
1901
decision.
La ter
in
1911,
when
Cenant
farmers
refused
to
pay
fees
on
the
land.
St.
Loui.s,
reasserting
the
alleged rights of the Kan :emily,
instrucced the Commandant of Dagana
to
allow
them
to
levy
taxes
and
rei.nstate
these
rights
for
good. 38
The administration ulti~acely sided with che chiefly family.
But,
the
very recurrence of disputes proved that
the population
was Oetermi~ed
not to abide by a decision which they deemed
arbitrary.
Elsewhere,
in Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
two
other communities Jaananko·
I
obe
and
Funeebe
were
also
at
loggerheads
over
the
"waa10
jaan l1
land
I
that Governor Lamothe donated to Almaami
Mammadu Lih, by virtue of the
I
I
\\
I

---

335
1894 Order.
Despite repeated appeals,
the Jaanankoobe finally recove-
red their rights. 39
C.
REACTION TO TAXATION, FORCED L~BOUR AND CONSCRIPTION
1.
REACTION TO T,~~TION
Taxation was
one
of
the
most
obvious
features
of colonial
rule.
It
'..... as
not
merely
a
major
source
of
revenue
for
the
admi.nistration.
It
·..... a5
also
considered
as
the
very
gage
of
the
"submission
of
the
people
to established authority and
their sincere attachment
to French
father lan~ [sic]."
Failure
to pay
it
therefore,
was
tantamount
to a
crime
tJorthy
of
the
most
serious
punishment,
"more
so
as
making an
examp le
0 f
an
0 ffende r
was
the
best
way
to
discourage
possible
recalcitrants from following suie [i.e:
evading taxation] .40
Desp i te
the
importance
attached
to
the
institution,
people
resorted to various stratagems
to alleviate the effects of
taxation on
their lives and properties.
In some cases,
villages
opposed outright
refusal
to
cooperace
with
chiefs
in
matters
of
tax collection.
F,Jr
example,
in !1arch
1893
the
village
of
Teekaan
on north-bank
Dirnat,
refused point blank to remit taxes
to chief Sammba ~amka Naam, cicing
the disputes bet~een the areas
of WaaLo and Brakna a prop~ the status
of their territory.
Follo~ing the incident, the administrator at Dagana
requested and
obtained permission to cross
the river to Teekaan for a
sho'. of
force.
On 5 11arch,
the
French
flag was
hois ted
over
the
village and the commandant wrote:
I
It
is
a fait
accompli.
Our
colours
are
now
floating
over
Thiekane.
It
has
been
agreed
between
the
I
habttants
and Samba Thiamka that
[from now on),
they
will belong to Dimar just as
the people of the left
I
I
I

---

336
bank,
that ·they .,111 submit entirely to the authority
of Samba Thiamka who should tall upon them when and
as necessity arises. 41
On
this
same
day,
in
a
bid
to
placate
che
vill.:tgers,
French
authority
had
seventy
children
vaccinated by
a
medical
doctor.
This
show
of
good
will
notwithstanding,
the
people
continued
to
pro tes t
until September of 1893.
On
the
29th of
this
same month the chief was
authorized
to
come
down
hard
on
the
rebellion.
The chief of Teekaan
'..J'as
summoned
to
Dagana,
sentenced
to
fifteen
days'
imprisonment,
a
hundred francs'
fine and discharged.
Before
1914
canton
chiefs
were
primarily
responsible
for
both
census
taking
and
tax
collection.
Since
they had a share of
1/6 of
L.dXeS
collected,
they
tended
to
be
rat~er strict on the
counting of
both people and property.
Rich cattle owners and
influential notables
sought
private
arrangements with
the
chiefs.
But,
some
chiefs,
under
pressure
from
cheie
people,
often
ir.dulged
in
deflating
census
figures.
In 1895 Ceerno
Hadiya,
then chief
of
the
small
canton of
Seeno-Paalel,
was
accused by the
administrator at Matarn of protecting
half
the
population of his
own
village,
Sincu-Bamarrunbe.
This
col-
lusion
between
chiefs
and
villagers
to
avoid
heavy
taxation,
was
common throughout Fuuta
Tooro.
Insensitivity to people's concerns
in
this
regard often earned a
chief ani~osity and hard feelings.
In some
cases
people
moved
to
depose
uncoope:,ative
chiefs
(see
note
105,
Chapter 8).
Indeed one of the reasons for Halaybe opposition to chief
Elimaan Abu Kan was his
alleged strictness on matters
of tax
payment.
i-
Commandant Valzl was ?artly right when he said that,
I
I
I
I

---

337
Aleybe
are
furious
against
Elimane
Abou
because
the
latter
has
conducted the
cens~s in the mDS: serious
manner,
conformably to orders,
and in marked contrast
to Amadou Dada who had very little authority.42
In point of fact,
the new chief came up wich 8,000 habitants
on
his rolls while his predecessor had counted only 5,200.
This figure of
8,000 did not include
five other viLlages.
It was
estima~ed that the
total in Halaybe was a little over 12,000
habitants.
The total ta~.s
for such a figure came to some 12,000 francs,
twice as much as what the
HaLaybe had been paying
sence 1892.
All thengs considered,
they had
deprived
the
regional
bUdget
of
some
42,000
francs
over
the
six
to
seven
years'
period.
Therefore,
as
one
would naturally
expect,
the
Commandant
came
down
hard
on
the
canton,
imposing
on
the
Halaybe
a
10,000
francs'
fine.
This
in no way stopped people
from defying
the
law
and
responding
in
their
ot..'TI
ways
to
heavy
taxation.
On
30th July
1901 two
indiveduals,
Saajo Hammaat and Elimaan
Yaaba.
broke ento the
home
of
one
of
the
chiefls
agents
and
stole
hes
books.
They
then
falsified
figures,
erasing
many
names
and
adding
many
others. 43
Similarly,
Kersaint
Gilly,
the
administrator
at M.atam,
discovered
in
1908 six new Villages weth a
total of 4,000 habitants and large cattle
herds that had never appeared on tax ro1ls. 44
2.
REACTION TO FORCED LABOUR ~~D,REQUISITION
In
the
realm
of
forced
labour
and
requisicion
one
has
to proceed
from
the premise enunciated by Captain Steffe
the Corrunandant of Kaedi,
I
that,
"the
Blacks
obey
orders
because
power
lies
with
us,
bue ;.;ithc'..It
I
any good will.!1
I
I

---

338
:ndeed
the
people
of
Fuuta
showed
reluctance
to
provide
labour
and
necessities
free
of
charge.
almost
all
along.
This
re luc Canee
''''ent
back
to
the
1890
assassination
of
Commandant
Abel
Jeandet.
Whether
this
was
or
not
a
conspiracy
on
the
part
of
the
Cede
royal
family,
all
sources
written
and
oral,
converge
at
least
on
this
one
point:
It was not the
two male cows'
fine
that wounded the assassin's
pride but indeed,
the commandant's decision to have him walk throughout
the campaign as his porteur de bagages.
According to one tradition,
the
European
told him'
I Tomorrow,
I
shall
load
you
jus t
as
one
loads a
donkey.'
Thereupon,
he
I Baydi
Kacce]
resolved to assassinate
the commandant. 4 )
Unwillingness
to cooperate went on.
Both village communities and
indi.vidua1s
shied
aC
exe,:uting work
ordered
by colonial
authorities.
The examples of Loobaali and Jallube mentioned in the preceding chapter
are cases
in point.
Along
the
river where populations were constantly
and consistently called upon to haul boats,
desertion of villages ~as a
fact
of
life.
So
strong
was
the
resistance
to
hauling
that
it
accounted
for
much
of
the
emigration
to
the
other
side
of
the
river.
Even
5 t.
Louis
had
sometimes
to
reckon
with
this
dissatisfaction of
riverine populations.
T~is was the reason for issuing in 1894 an o~der
temporarily banning
forced
tauling
throughout
the
district
of
Matam.
For a ~hile, milirarj convoys were instructed to utilise t~oops to haui~
their o'~ boats.
At
times,
people
reacted
to
requisition and forced
labour
in
an
I
even more
radical way.
On 10 December 1904, a man named Aadama Bonnje
I
from
Bito
(Laaw)
threatened
to
assassinate
his
canton
chief
at
I,
I

---

339
Juude -J aab i.
~he man had lent his horse
to the
administration during
the
"Campaign
of
Mauritania ll
l.n
1903.
The
horse
died
during
the
campaign
and
the
man
never
received
compensation
for
ie,
despite
earlier promises.
Tired of it, he
loaded his gun and menaced to shooe
che
chief.
He was
later
arrested by
the
Commandant of Podor,
sen-
tenced
to
one
year' 5
imprisonment and
twenty years of exile
to
Fooni
(Upper
Casamance).
3.
REACTION TO CONSCRIPTION FOR THE KILITARY
Earlier
we
mentioned
that
the
aristocracy
proved
generally
un'.... illing
to
serve
in
the
colonial
arr:J.y
and
widely
resorted
to
sub-
scitution.
The
masses
who
lacked
boeb
slaves
and money
to
buy, sub-
stituL:es
remained
fair
game
for
French
drafters.
Conscious
of
its
predicament,
the
people
used
various
techniques
to
evace
conscripcion
such
as
flights
co
che
bush,
conscientious
objection,
and even arrr.ed
rebellion.
As
early
as
1892
people
started
deserting
villages
on
announcement of
the draft
commission.
During
thac yearls
recruitment
for
the
French
conques t
of
Dahomey,
Ceerno
Molle
Maamudu
wrote
to
Captain Laborie, Commandant of Kaedi,
advising him of che innumerable
difficulties he met in obtaining soldiers.
In these letters the
chief
complained
that
in
his
entire
district
"from
Hoore
Foonde
down
to
30ki-Jawe,
no single person is Willing to join in this expedition. It
He
further
requested
permission
to
use
force.
Confronted wi th
such a
I
reality
and haVing
to
show tact
in this
second year of colonial
rule,
I
the Co~~andanc backed off.
He
wrote a
lette= to the Governor mention-
ing that he had discouraged all chiefs from using force to obcain from.
I
t
I

---

340
very
recently
subjugated
people
an
assiscance
chat
they would
lend only unwillingly.
Fouta has already
provided
230
recruits.
This,
for
our
concern,
is
much
more
valuable
than
all
the
free
mer"!.
whom
we
would have to wrest from their families, and who feel
45
lost the moment their village slips out of sight.
The year 1899 wa~ one dcring which the administration
experienced
all :orms of resistance.
Many cantons were
asked to
provide hundrerl
of
recruits
for
the Malagasy campaign.
In
the
cere le
of Matam
the
administrator
summoned
all
chiefs
to
his
headquarters
and
relayed
to
them
the
orders
received
from
St.
Louis.
In face
of general
reluc-
cance,
the Interpreter was sent to hol~ special sessions on the matter.
'.J'hen this failed to
produce the desired effect,
the Commandant himself
went to each
of the chief towns of his ~c?ntons and talked to more than
five
hundred influential notables, once again to no avail
Only af~er
having
fined
fifteen
villages
and
threatened
the
people,
did
he
finally obtain the
240 men required for
the districts of Ngenaar
and
Darnga.
In the province of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe the chief encountered
the
same difficulties aggravated by conscentious objection on the
part of
Muusa
Sammba
Sekk,
a
trader
established
at Galoya.
On
the
day of
palaver,
in
full
view
of
chief
Abdullaa:;,
Kan
he
declared
that
the
French
Were
lying
to
the
youth
and
had
planned
to
send
them
to
Halagasy
ins tead- ..of stattoning them '..;i thin the colony. 47
Such
rumours
I
spread as
far
as
Laa·.J '....here
chief Abdul
Aziiz Wan
complained about
desertions
to
Boosoya
and
Damga.
Thereupon,
administrator
Allys
ordered
the
families
of
:he deserters
arrested,
until
they decide
to
I
surrender.
He also notified his
colleagues at Kaedi and Matam.
f
I

---

341
wnen they could not avoid sending young men for the visit, people
often
took
to
sending
the
weakes t
and
mos t
inap t
who
were
then
discharged as unfit.
Unsurprisingly,
Halaybe went a seep further.
In April
1899 they
orchestrated
a
huge
conscen::ious
objection
campaign
from
the
leading
';illages
of
Ceenel
and
Demet.
The
two
villages
formed
a
committee
charged of organizing an armed
resistance
to
~he draft commission l~d
by
administrator
Pierron,
should
it
try
to
cross
::he
river
to
Ceenel
(clOrth bank).
Thanks
to
the early warning given them by some Subalbe
(fishermen),
the members of the commission wisely continued on to Laa~
Later on,
twelve
leaders were arrestee,
and severely dealt with. 48
As
alluded to
in the previous chapter,
the difficulties
thus
encountered
caused the French to moderate their demands until 1905-1906.
The cycle went on,
each demand breeding resistance,
more
so after
che establishment of mandatory service in 1912.
From
1911 to 1913 all
administrators
at
Kaedi,
Matam,
and
Podor
continued
to
lament
mass
flights
of
villagers
and
acknowledged
that
consc:iption
operations
encountered stiff resistance. 49
These difficulties
in turn,
inspired a
series
of
lessons
that
led
to
ne',..,. propositions
and policy
shifts
on
the eve of the First World War.
(
I
I
I

---

342
D.
CULTURP.L RESISTANCE
1.
ISlA'I
By the time of final French conquest,
Islam was
firmly rooted in
hearts
and minds of the people.
The
respect
for
their
faith
'.as
of
essence
to
many
Fuutankoobe.
Sheex
Mammadu
Kan
one
of
the
early
collaborators is said to have agreed to signi~g a treaty
only wnen the
Europeans pledged that,
French
civilisation
would
not
undermine
::he i r
religion
and
would
leave
intact
their
mosques
both
small and large. 50
Indeed
'C.he
French
.....·ere
careful
to
explicicace
and
reaffirm
thi.s
posicion
in
all
the
treaties
of
1891.
Having des~royed the
:TIyth of
Lnvincibility
of
the
Umarian
empire,
visited severe
punishment
UP(Jn
N
Naoro returnees,
the French had no difficulty
winning the
cooperation
of
some
members
of
the
Fuutanke
Islamic
leadership.
Those
one
informanc referred
to as
"Suufiyankoo£e"
(s~:i) ~ere quickly won over
through
official
appointments,
land
granes
and
pledges
of
good
treat-
menl. Sl
Many
were
appointed Qadi(s)
or
judges
in
the
various
cir-
i
cumscrLpt.ions.
Others
became
advisers
on w:-tom both
local
authority
I,
,I
I
and
adminis trators
leaned
for
advice. 52
Some
important
personnages
I
~ere either sent. by the French on the prestigious pilgrimage to Mecca
I
I
(Ibraa
Almaami
for
example)
or
allowed
to
go
on
their
own.
In
the
I
I
I
I
meantime
the
administration
moved
to
limit
the
roles' of
most
Tijani
I
I
!
clerics.
Orders
~ere circulated preventing clerics
f~om indulging in
I
dispensing
jus tice
under
penal ty
of
severe
punisr,ment.
With
those
I
most
likely
to
trigger
social
unrest
on
its
side
the
administ::ration
I
1
I
\\
I

---

343
thought
i t
ha.d
put
"militant
Islam"
to
rest.
The
recession was only
temporary however.
The very fact
that
"Militant Islam'· fed itself on
both
spiritual
drive
a~d political
oppression allowed for
its
resur-
gence
under colonial
rule,
especially ~hen and where
conditions were
propitious
enough
to
trigger
action.
Islamic
movements
took,
or were
ahout.
to
take
on
a
military
character:
The
"mahdist"
movement
of
Aamadu Alfaa
Muusa of Galoya.
and chat of Aali Yero Joob of Fanay.
a/
THE REVOLT Of AP~ADU ALFAA MVUS~:
L894-L895
Ceerno
Aarnadu
Alfaa
was
born
in
Galoya
in
the
sub-province
of
Galojaabe
(canton of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe).
in around 1B72.
Through his
paternal and maternal lines he was related to the Kah of Siwol
(Boosoy~
"1
a) ,
the Lih of Jaaba
(Hebbiyaabe)
and
t.he
ACl.W
0 f
Pe Le
(Yldaabe) )~
Under
the
supervision
of
his
father
he
completed
a
distingL:.ished
Islamic education at a very young age.
At about age t~e~ty one in 1893
he ~egan, according to traditions,
acting in a strange ¥Jay,
attracting
crowds
and
constructing huts.
His
father,
who
seemed
to
be
aware of
his
intentions,
restrained
him
considerably
by
dispersing
the
people
and ordering his huts destroyed.
Two
years
later,
follo~ing
his
father's
death,
Aamadu
ALfaa
proclaimed
himself
"Mahdi"
(see
note
78
0: Chapter 8), and began
"4
preaching a holy war against the "infidels"
(French colonisers).)
He
soon
impressed his
country men
through
dreams.
His disciples claimed
to have seen him in dreams as the "triumphant Mahdi riding a tall white
horse."
They
also
claimed
to
ha~e received territorial commands from
him.
Emissaries
and
disciples
flocked
to
Galoya
from
Damga,
Boosoya

---

322
concer:l
for
stable
,qnd
lJorkable
administrative
relations,
che
Commandant
of
Fador asked
St.
Louis
to
treat
the
Halaybe ,.... ich extreme
tact a:ld eventually move
to appoint a chief from among them. 9
As
the
administration lent a deaf ear
to
such
suggestions,
people
continued
to harass the canton chief, beating and injuring him
twice in 1896 and
1898.
Following these troubles,
the
administration decided to replace
Elimaan Mammadu Daada by che former chief of Seeloobe, Elimaan Abu Kan.
The nonination of Elimaan Abu,
a man
ho
T....
had earned a reputation as a
se'Jere
chief,
did nothing but add
fue 1 co the fire of instabi:ity in
Halaybe.
From
1899
to
1902
che
Hacaybe
indulged
in
an
open
rebellion
disobeying
and
rnenac ing
lheir
chief
daily,
almost
paralyzing
administrative busin2ss in the district. 10
In~oking alleged abcses on
the part of the chief,
the Halaybe wrote
and sent several petitions :0
the Co~~andant of Podor.
Because local administrators were supportive
of
the
chief,
n,ice
in
1900
and
1901
a
collection
w,qs
t,qken
and
delegations
sent
to
St.
Louis
in
order
to
buy
the
support
of
influential notables and obtain the dismissal of Elimaan Abu. ll
By way
of compromise some Halaybe
wen~ so far as to request the nomination of
Hammee Biti,
the son
of former Lamtooro Muulee.
Others,
led by Saajo
Hammaat and Amar
Ayse negociated with the erstwhile Moorish enemy,
the
king
of
Brakna
,;hmed
f,Jol
Siidi
Eli,
the'~relocation of the
Halaybe
across the river in Brakna territory.
In spite of multiple arrests and
imprisonments--four
in May 1900,
sixteen in December 1901 and
sixty in
November
1901- -agitation
continued
both
against
the
chief
and
the
military concinge!\\t
stationed
at
Ceene1
to
chec~
the Halaybe.
People

---

344
and Tooro.
Soon the cleric ordered hundreds of guns manufactu:::-ed along
w1 ch huge
wa r
drums.
He
was
planning to
attack
the
trading posts
of
Tantaaj i-Caloya
and
Ndulajam
when
Abdullaay
Kan
had
him
arrested
at
Cilon on 2 March 1895.
Declaring that God would liberate him "jlJst as
he had liberated Joseph from Pharoah's
prisons,"
he
escaped a few days
later,
further
:-mpressi:1g
the
people
and
causing
agii:.:ition
to
mour:t
• S
more
than ever before.~~
o~ 14 March 1895 Abdullaay Kan arresced him
a:1d
took
him
to
the
chief
to'....rtl
of
the
province
w':"th
over
a hundrec.
~arriors.
Aarnadu Alfaa Jah cold the chief,
I have come to respond to your call because you are a
ser~Jant of
God.
I
have
come
to
recruit
you
as
my
follower, 56
This
time he
was
sent
to
c .
"L.
Louis on a steamer and deported first
to
Gabon,
then
to
the
Congo for
nine
long years. j7
Shortly afterwards
the notables of Galoya fearful of French
retaliation moved to disband
the
cro ..... d.
Io:ith
the
exception
of Christian Coulon
(see
note
51)
and
Paul
Harty
almost
no
one
has
directed
scholarly
attention
to
this
episode.
For
this,
both authors
deserve
credit.
Ho ..... ever,
a
closer
look into these studies
reveals
that they do not set
the
event in its
proper historical context.
The revolt of Aamadu
Alfaa emerged agai~st
a background of critical political and
socia-economic events.
Caloya
wh~re :he movement started, had
been resentful
of
the
disappearance,
if ,not assassination of,
its
chief Ardo Abdu1 Soh since 1891.
In the
mind
of
every
Galoyaajo young and old,
it ·"as
Colonel
Dodds
who had
him assassinated
(see note 24,
Chapter 3).
Hardly had
this resentment
subsided when
the
administration decided
in 1893
to
appoint Abdullaay

---

345
Kan
chief
of
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe,
confirming
once
and
for
all
the
dependence
of
Galoya on
Salde.
This
led
the
people
to petition for
t':-le
annexation of
the village
back
to
Boosoya,
(see
section 5 above).
The
early
18905 also proved bad
for
Fuuta
TooTo as a
whole.
Cattle
epidemic
struck from 1892
to
1894.
A
combination of low rainfall and
locusts swarms compromised most
seriously the crops. and famine ensued
in
1891,
1894,
and
1895.
It should also
be
remembered
that by
1894,
the inception of the
movement, discontent had not yet dissipated anlong
the many
Umarian returnees who were still being bullied in Tooro,
Laaw
and
Damga
by
the
French
administration
and
its
allies.
Some
were
even
trying
to
join
the
a~mies of Samory Tuure,
to carry on with
the
resistance.
This
discontent
and
Alfaa
Muusa's
blood
relations
throughout
Fuuta
accounLed
for
his
sudden
success
among
the
upper
classes.
The
bulk
of
his
followers
ho ....ever,
came
from
among
the
commoners
especially
the
neighbouring
Subalbe
and
the
Sebbe.
This
popular character of the movement suggests
that
it could have develop-
ped into a social revolution had i t
been allowed to evolve on its own.
As for
the causes of Aamadu Alfaa's failure,
they were logistical,
psychological and political.
In
1894 the French
~ere still working--
successfully--on disarming the people through both heavy
taxes on fire
arms and seizure of weapons.
Even
though there was no official order
or decree
in thLs line,
the
Franch probably applied a de facto ~mbargo
on arms'
sale along
the river . . Although arms could still be obtained,
most people
found i t hard--if not
irnpossible--to raise enough money
to
procure
some.
This
is
certainly
why
the
cleric
resorted
to
manufacturing (tafde) arms on his own.
Second, Aamadu Alfaa was as m~ch

---

347
Kan
chief
of
t~e
eastern
section
(see
above) .
This
same
year
a
drought
compromised crops
and caused
widespread
famine
in both
Dimat
and
the
neighbouring
circumscription of Galojiina_
In
a
correspon-
dence
to
the
Governor,
Administrator
Rene Manetche
reported
that
all
provisions had been used up and that,
the
i~digenous people are now compelled to collect the fruit
called Guidjile (in Ouolof- Ndiandam)
to lnake caus-caus,
as a
substitute
for
millet
and rice.
The
fruit
grows
abundantly
in eastern Dimar but,
it,.. is
going to
run out gi';en the daily
needs of the population.o l
In such a conte:<t,
no wonder
the opposition
to Raasin Kan took
on the
form
of
refusal
(.0
pay
taxes.
In
sum,
the
political-administra::i'Je
waters
in Diloac were
troubled
enough
for
Aali
Yero Joob
to sense
chat
he
could
fish
successfully.
The
cleric
',",as
not
slo'''''
in
agitating
against French authority and establishing a
~eputation of a man endowed
with preternatural
powers.
As
the
size of his
following swelled and
his charisma reverberated
throughout Dimat from his north bank base of
Teekan
(the
rebel
village
of 1893),
the
administrator
of
Dagana
gre'.
concerned.
In
February
1906
the
cleric
was
arrested and deported to
Ndutt
in
the
district of Tiwaawoon
(western Senegal).
A month later,
he
escaped from prison and fled to Mauritania claiming,
as the cleric
of Galoya,
that
he
did
so
,.. ith
the help
of God and his
angels.
In
1908,
as
if determilled never
to
miss
opportunities
for
agitation,
he
came
back
to
Fanay
at
a
time
when
locusts
swarms
had again
wrought
havoc on the districts of the Lower Senegal.
causing food shortages in
Dimat and Tooro. 62 Soon he staged one of the most serious challenges to
French authority since the revolt of Sammba Jaadana Njaac (1890-1891).
I
I
I

---

348
In
early
1908
Aali
Yero
sent
word
thro~ghout ~estern
FL:uta
inviting
the
people
to
join
him
in
a
holy
.......ar
against
the
French I
labelled "infidels."
Many
from
the Senegalese side
crossed to nortr,
bank Fanay electrified as
they were hy his propaganda and prestige.63
In
tne
village
of
Fanay
(south
bank)
only
nine
Qut
of
a
hundred
and
scventee~ families remalned. 64 2eople came also from several ocher
vLllag'2:s,
Daara,
Salr'.de,
JaLrnac,
Le:1u·Aali,
and
Tee<aan.
They
came
essen:.ially
from
lower walks
0: socie:.y and comprised men and ·,.,omen,
young
and
old
After both the Reside:'1t of Mederdra and the chief of
Teekaan avowed their incapacity :0 3rrRst the cleric,
the Commandant of
Dagana
SC:lt
an
ult.imatu.rn
on
12
~arch 1908
to
the
people
of
Fanay,
Canngaay and
~~e rest.
He wa::-ned them
that Aali T..,Ias but an
l'imposcor
likely. to
lead
straight
to
disaster.!1
he
urgec
them
::0
deliver
the
cleric
a-:'1d
go
home
peacef'.11ly.
Finally,
the
Comm~ndan[ warned that
~hoever
did not go home by March 14,
would be considered a rebel and
dealt
wi::r.
accordingly.
This
ultim?twn
and
the
several
messages
relayed
to
the
cleric
by
SalI'Jnba
Yomb
Mbooc
the
chief
of Galoj iina,
Interpreter Samrnba Fay,
and Elim~an Fanay Mam~adu, all fell
onto deaf
ears.
In a
defiant
move Aali ga'Je one of the messe:1gers "some po .....·der
and a bul1it ~rapped up in a piece of his robe.
l
He ordered the march
, 0:1 Dagana. On the morning of the confrontation at Dagana (15 March)
:he Commanda:1~. ~ho disposed of only ni:1e guns anc eighty
cartridges,
, tried for the last time to negociate with the marabout and his people.
, This cirne the ulitimatumwas Aali's. He sent word thaG.
,
The
admiIlistrator
should
come
in
front
of
r.im.
He
wou~d then cue hjs hair, have him make salam.
Should
,
he
r~fuse,
he and the
French
~ould be kill~d., along
,
•

---

349
~ith the guards
and the village would be set on fire
6
and plundered. 6
w"hen
the
commandant
refused,
Aali
ordered his
followers
to
open
fire.
The
guards
responded.
Contrary
to
Aali \\ s
promises
tha t
the
guns
of
the
Europeans
,.... ouid
not
fir~ a
shot,
that
the
ange;"s
\\tI'ould
cause
them
to
jam,
the
fire
proved
deadly.67
Less
than
two
hours
Lacer,
~ali ~as lying dead along with thirty of his foclowers. 68
The
rest fled.
Several fugitives were arrested
and interrogated including
Aa1i
Yero' 5
mother
(see
appendix
3).
The
administrat.or
of
Dagana
-2x?ressed :he
desire
to
retaliate but
the
Governor
rejected the
plan
(q ,::,'\\i-...
(see
conclusion
of part
five).
One
has
for
che causes
of Aall
Yero's
failure
in
the
neutral,
not
hostile,
attitude
or
the
::raditional
elite
i:1
Dimat,
the
position of
the
province
vis
a. vis
FreIlc:"l head-
quarte:-s,
and
the
reluc~ane2 of many
to
joi~ in the movement,
relue-
canee due
in many respects to the
fear of French retaliation.
The
incident
had
farM reaching
consequences.
The
failure
and
dea.th
at
the
cleric
had
the
most
serious
impact
on
the
Fuutankoobe.
The
Islamic
leadership
condemned Aali
and his
so
called
adventurist
scheme.
Some viewed his failure as
"the
proof of his weakness and the
contempt of God."
Under
the
influe~ce of such a negative propaganda,
the contempt
for
the
"infidel" and opposition
to
colonial rule yielded
for
some
t irne
to
accommodation
and
resignation.
From
this
failure
many
learnt
that
not every cleric
should be
trusted when
it came
to
assaulting
the
colonial
citadel. 69
The
incide:1t
of
Dagana
wen: down
in the history of Fuuta as the last active and military
kind that
I
I

---

350
caused most serious concern for French and local
authority alike.
Its
repression sounded
the
knell
of
"Mi.litant
Islam!'
in
Fuuta Tooro
for
the rest of our period,
if not the entire colonial era.
cl
THE PASSIVE REACTION OF ISLP~
Rai:her
than
join
in
open
revolt,
most
Fuutan:<oobe
sho ..... ed
a
pa~tern of passive Islamic resistance.
It ~as made up of
initiatives
on
the part of
individual clerics.
Even
though some were more
active
(agitat~on versus
alms
giving)
they
often
share
some
fundamental
I
features:
Clandestine
and
subversive
propaganda
material,
the
perce?cion
of
the
colonisers
as
infidels,"
the
t1
insistance
0:1
good
~orks
as
a
tem?orary
solution
pending
the
alleged
acvent
or the
"Mahdi,"
and
the
absence
of explicit all~sions to violent means.
This
forln of Islamic reaction developed in the early 1890s: On 28 April 1894
the administrator
of Matam arrested and sent to p~ison a Pullo cleric
·,..:ho
had
been
preaching
and
distribu:::.ing
papers
allegedly
emanating
from ~ecca, throughout the province of Goy.lO
This cleric's arrival at
Matarn
caused some sLirring among his colleag~es vho took to paying htm
visits,
recopying
the
letter,
and
disseminating
the
copies
thus
obtained.
The
translations done of
the
letters proved,
in the
eyes of
the administration,
to be offensive of ar:icle 8 abour
sedition in the
indigenat code,
(article on incitation to
rebellion, "t;hrough speeches,
songs and propaganda material).
Anot~er such case occurred on 22 November 1900 ~hen Valantin.
the
Commandant
of
Podor I
seized
a
letter
in Arabic
from
a
cleric
named
Saydu Ceerno Njaay,
from
the
village
of Wudduru
(Matam).
This
cleric
I
I
I

---

351
was,
in
the
words
of
c"::e
commandanc:,
"roaming
around
the
cercle,
announcing everywhere the coming of the ~ntechrist
and advising every
good
Muslim
t.o
stand
ready
for
his
welcome
and
defence
against
the
infide 1s. ,,71
In
the
sununer
of
1910,
the
Lieuter.an~ Resident
of
Kaedi
used
sever-e
chreacs
to
obtain
another
such
let.ter
and
sent
it.
to
the
Governor.
The
lett.er
was
said
eo
emanate
from
Mecca
and
Sharif
, 1
0 _
HaS8n,
che
custodian
of
c.he
prophet' 5
shrine.
It
warned
against
upcoming
natural
calamities,
namely
an
exceptionally severe drought
and
the appearance of two comets as
che sign of "Allah's wrath."
The
lec::er
'.....as
concluded
with
an
appeal
for
collective
alms
giving.
le
was circulated from one village
to another. 72
Poems
const.it.uted
anot.her
form
of
Islamic
defLance.
In
1912
Yusuf Hanunadu,
a cleric fro:n Sillaanaabc
(eastern 50050:,a),
had a bone
to
pick
...... ith
the
administ.ration
of
Kaedi.
He
was
...... ont
to
compose
poems that were sung in public ~y many Tukuloor and
Moorish disciples.
Disturbed by
tile
subversive character of
these
poems,
the
conuna:l.dant
of Kaedi arrested him and sentenced him to six months
imprisonment. 73
Sharif
Y~nus
of
Casarnance
used
to
send
letters
frequently
to
Islam:c
leaders
in
Fuuta
Toorc
from
1911
onward.
The
sharif
',·;as
a
relative of Seh Sa'ad BU~" a prestigious religious figure from Maurita-
nia
and
a
good
friend
of
the
administration.
Far
from being subver-
sive,
these
flyers
often insisted on
the necessity to restore jusci-:i.i',
love
and
compassion
in
the
land,
and
to
observe
the
canonical
pillars
of
Islam.
In
the
13
January
1913
lett:er
for
example,
he
declared
I
havi.ng dreamed of the founder of the Qadrva sect.,
Shaykh Abdul Qadir Ai
I
I
I

---

352
Ji1aoi who had allegedly complained
about
the
rtffiOunt
of
injustice nnd
adultery
and
other
sorts
of
sln5 74 .
The
letter
wanled
against
an
ill-wind bearing the cholera virus that would blow and kill
700 men,700
women and just as many in ca~tle and sheep,
every day.
To prevent this
calamity,
the author recommended that every man and woman give one CO~
and one horse
to
the poor,
and that chiefs
and rich people
distribute
garments
to
the needy.
It further prescribed thac
women nourish their
husbands and that childrell nourish their
faehers.
Finally,
the letter
urged
the
people
to
recite
se".'en
times
the
verse
of
the
throvn
and
twelve
times
chat of the
unicity of God.
According to administLative
reporcs many complied with these orders.
Finally,
;:her~
appearcd
another
pacifist
and
rather
moralizing
A.ttitude
incarnated
by
Aamadu
Tij.ani
I....;oon,
a
cleric
and
trader
at:
Kaedi.
He was
a
nephew of
the
reformist Al
Hajji
Umar Taal
and was
initiated
::0
the
Tijaniya
doctrine
by
the
Qadi
of
Boggee,
Aamadu
Koxtaar Saaxo.
Over the years he had remained
in close
touch with his
cousin
Alfaa
Haasimiyyu.
established
at
flecca. 75
In
1913
the
ad·
r:linistrator
at
Kaedi
complained
that
Ceerno
Aamadu
Tijjaani
\\.loon
hosted systematically all
important clerics
"both good and bad
Isic)"
on
their way
through
Kaedi.
The
cleric ~as also said to denounce
the
abuses and extravagance of his
fellow country men,
their over consump-
tion
and
other
vices.
He
regularly
redistributed
to
the
poor
and
needy
the
1/10
of
his
yearly
profits.
as
directed
by
the
Coran.
Administrators
complained more
than once,
that
this
lavishness
caused
I
too
many
people
to
flock
to
Kaedi
from
all
parts
of
Fuuta
Tooro.
Arter
1913 the administration forced Aamadu Tijjaani Woon to cut do'~
I
I
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I

---

353
on the lavishness of his
receptions.
2.
OTHER FOfu~S OF REACTION TO COLONIAL RULE
d/ POPUlAR ATTITUDES TO\\.i.-\\..t<D "F?ENCH SCHOOL"
There ~ere other forms of cultural reaction to colonialism. French
school
-;.,;as
intended
:::0
achie'l€:
what
weapons
could
not,
that
is,
the
canauete
morale
of
the
various
peoples
of
Wes::
Africa. 76
In
:l1uta
Tooro
the
".
.
:enc:-}
regarded
the
schoo 1
as
a
mea':15
of
competing
-;..rich
Islamic
education
,,,,hich
they
considered
coo
per'lBs i'JP.
The
French
thought
of
it
as
"an
excellent
way
:or
us
to
counterpoise
the
io.-
fluence
of
clerics
::umerous
in
Lac
and eve:1 more
numercus
in Toro. ,,77
The
firs::
schools
were
ope:1ed
at
a
time
of
what
one
may
call
che
f
78
"School
boom"
in
the
colony
0
Senegal.
They
'..:e:,e
opened
ac
the
major centres
of French
influence,
the
district
chief
towns,
and at
the villages of
chose
considered most
reliable allies.
The school of
Fador,
closed
for
a
long
time.
was
reopened
in
1393.
Subsequently.
others
were
builr
ar
Mbwnmba
(1893),
and
Salde
(April
189~),
the
strongholds
of
Toraa
Almaami
and Abdullaaj Kan.
Matam and Kaedi sa~
their
first schools respectively
in April and December 1897.
Finally,
a
generation of
Ecoles
Rurales
appeared,
as
a
result of
the
Order of
24
November
1903,
at
Kanel
in
November
L909,
and
Boggee
in
April
1912. 78
Dimat for
its pare dep~nded on Dagana where a school
existed
already,
The
evolution of
the
institution shows
that
the
masses
in
Fuuta
I
adopted
a
generally
negative
attitude
for
quite
a
long
time.
While
I
Canton
Chiefs
and
Interpreters
·...ranted
to
send
their
chi.ldren
to
I
I
I

---

354
school,
the
common man proved very
reluctant
to
do
so.
In 1897.
at
I
the opening of the school at Kaedi,
Boosoya
refused
to send children.
,
i
The Commandant was not slow in
regarding
this attitude as a matifesta-
tion of what
r.c called, "the
real
sentiments of
the Tukulor
towards
US"r
and
used force
to get
some
to reverse
their decision.
Elset.;here
the
administration
resorted
to
more
subtle
methods.
In
Hatam
for
instance the
administrator
':':1 order
to foster a
favourable
sentiment
J
'J1S
.
.
a
vis
the
institution,
moved
co exempt
parents
from
paying ~ead
taxes
for
those
young men '..;rho were
sent
to school,
.~_lso,
in
patent
contradiction to the stated objectives,
the administratIon
combined in
all
schools,
the
teaching of
French with
that of
Arabic
and Islamic
education.
A French
teacher
and
an
Arabic
in5truc~or worked side by
side,
the rationale being to,
draw
inspiration
from
the
Algerian
experiment
and
avoid
caDs ing conee rn
among
the all
too
mistrustful
Muslim populations.18~·
In addition,
every Commandant disposed 0: special funds
desti:1ed
to lavish gifts on students on occasion of Tahaski and Kori holidays.8l
furthermore,
the
administration
provided
students
from
villages
neighbouring the school
to~~ ~ith grants to help host families defray
the cost of their living.
Despite
all
this
coaxing
and
sedLcing,
the
chillY
attitude
towards
"French
School"
lingered.
This
trans lated
i_nto
a
stud.ent
population
which,
judging
from
its
size,
class
composition
and
attendance,
did not live up to
the expectations
and high hopes of the
administration.
Nearly a
decade after
their creation
the schools of
: ...

---

355
Podor,
Mbummba
and
Salde had no
more
than
twenty
to
thirty
sL:udents
eac~.
These
numbers
were
deemed
so
low
tha t
Admi nis era tor
Vie tor
Valantin proposed in June 1900 to Ilforce the people to provide twice as
many.,,82
Likewise,
the
regional
school
of Matam counted only
thirc:l
students
in
1920.
In
addition,
stude:l.ts
did
not
attend
classes
as
i
;,
regularly as
the
administration wished.
School statistics at
Mbummba
show that,
for the year 1895.
only 11 out of the 22
enrolled showed up
fairly
regularly.
And,
out
of
those
11,
only
4
proved really
as-
siduous.
At Podor, by March 1900, only 6 out of
39 attended school on
a
regular
basis.
At Matam,
attendance
was
also anything but steady,
dropping in 1905 from 61 in November-December,
to 51 in June,
and 40 in
July.83
FinaLy,
the
class
composi cion
of
the
s tud~nt
population
seemed
indicative
of
the
popular
reaction
to
sc~ool as well_
In 1917
statistics at Matam
showed the following:
TA8LE 9:
SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE STUDENT
POPULATION AT MAT~~ IN 1917
Profession of parents
: Number of students
farmers
8
province chiefs
5
village chiefs
1
traders
(traitants)
7
shop keepers
2
carpenters
1
clerics
2
griots
1
district guards
2
police officers
2
gardener
1
herders
1
sailors
3

---

356
Although the number of students belonging to the farmer group a~e
the majority compared with the rest,
one is struck by its small number
in
a
country
that
is
made
of
farmers
essentially.
The
figure
for
herders
is
even
more
telling,
let
alone
the
absence
of students
from
Subballo
(fisherman)
background in a
town where
they form undoubtedly
the.
gre.at
majority.
At Boggee,
only the sons
of traders
and chiefs
ac::ended
the
school,
and
ie
'..Jas
thetr
families
that
pressed
for
its
reopening a:ter the War.
In
trying
to
explain
the
at:titude
or most Fuutankoobe to'....arc
school, Administrators often pointed at the question of
acco~~odation,
the competition of Coranie shools, and the alleged
conservative nature
of
t~e masses.
In
1900
one
administrator
claimed
that
the
lack
anc
poor quality of food,
was the main obstacle to attendanc~.
Another a:
Kaedi blamed the reluctance of parents
to send [heir children to school
0:1
"unawareness
of
the
utility
of
the
superior
French
civilization".
3ecause
these
views
were
widely
shared,
the
administration
moved
to
multiply
grants and eventually open boarding schools,
in the hope that
this
would
solve
the
probleln.
In
actualicy,
people
loathed
to
send
thei~ children for a host of other reasons,
cultural.
ideological
and
practical.
As
Mus 1ims,
many
suspec ted
tha t
"French
schoo 1"
was
a
means
of
assimilation
and
feared
their
children
•.... ould
become
II in·
fidels.~84 This belief was often reinforced by
widespread propaganda
on
the
,part
of
clerics
most
determined
to
resist
French
cultural
agression,
There was
also a
fear that
students would in the end show
the
Frenc~ more
allegiance
than
the i r
own
pa ren ts .
This
too
was
reinforced by the adage:
"Adoptive parents have a bigger share
(0£ the
I
I
I

---

357
child]
than biological parents. ,,85
Prac::ical
or
economic
reasons
played
a
major
role
in
pa rents'
reluctance.
Among
both
pastorali.sts
and
fa:-mers,
a
child
was
a
productive force.
He
could
herd
cacLle,
Ear-tU,
or
fish.
Sending him
or
her
to
school
therefore
amounted
to
depriving
the
family
as
a
productive
unit,
of one critical
element,
especially
if--as
'.... a5
often
the
case--the child happened
to be
~n adolescenc.
The
level of absen-
teism
'Nas
ah..ays
higher
during
periods
of
intensive
farming:
Early
cultivation,
protection
of
fields
against
?redators,
and
harvest
times.
The emigration of herders
and fishermen often wrested the few
peasant-students f:-om school.
Parents'
reluctance to send children to
school became
even more acute after
~he Government restored the head
ta:..; for students,
This prompted many parents to make a cosc-beneflt
analysis and disco~rage children from attending shool. 86
1
The
students
themselves
were
part of the
puzzle although
they
i,
are
very
rarely
referred
to
as
such.
The
Commandant
of
Kaedi
d'd
!
I
I
mention
once
that
"school
is
going
fine.
Students
attend
it
but,
I
wi::hout
great
motivation and seize every opportunity
to
run
a'..,;ay. ,,87
I
This Commandant did not address
himself to the question why this was
!I
I
so.
In fact,
students
lacked interest in school for a long time and
I
I,
for several
reasons.
The French system of education was at odds Nith
I
their
repre~entation of what school
and edu~ation were about.
Tradi-
tional school was not
the
tiny piece of space but,
the whole universe
I
around
the
village,
farms,
forests,
rivers
and
the
like.
Education
I
consisted of both games, labour, religion,
and moral.
It was directly
I
related to
life.
Conve:-sely,
at least in the
mind of the young men,
I
I
I

---

358
French school did not allow
them ~o even
breathe normally.
And,
the
subs tanee
of
the
educa tion
dispensed
therein
seemed
artificial
and
removed from daily existence.
Second,
it was communicated throegh the
medium
of
a
language
completely
foreign
to
the
African
milieu.
Finally.
any time spent in a classroom ~as considered waste in terms of
opporcunities to play, socialize or ~ork wi~h one's peers,
par~icularly
for children who ~ere not subjected to daily
lectures Dn the allegedly
immense
benefits
of
school.
One
final
element
that
may
well
h.:lve
impacted on
the
general
attitude was
the
aristocracy.
The latter had
abJays
controlled
the
reproduction
of
knowledge
through
Islamic
education
supervised by
clerics.
This,
among other
things,
helped it
secure its po~er_ Gradually.
some of the aristocracy realized that the
French
school
·.....as
a
shortcut
to
power
and prestige.
under
the
ne'""
colonial
order, and they sought to monopolize it for themselves.
They
did little
to encourage a positive attitude areong :he masses. BO
Often
times.
they
quietly
sent
their
Sons
co
the
'Jillage,
and
t~en to
the
I
regional school,
and finally on to higher
ins:itu~ions in the capital
city.
I
b/
CULTU~;L REACTION: S~~DERING AND FOL~LORE,
AS wEAPONS
I
There are other ways in which the people of Fuuta Tooro
expressed
I
their
feelings
about
colonial
rule.
These
often
consisted of cir·
cumstancial
slandering,
or mocking directed at
those
considered most
I
visible
representatives
of
colonialism,
:::he
Comrnanda~ts.
wnen
an
administrator was not very popular,
people
would take advantage of a
I
public function and lavish praise on
the local chiefs surrounding him,
I
I
I
I

---

359
thereby expressing their discontent. 89
People also
resorted
to
songs and dances
to convey
their
senti·
rnents,
in
direct
violation
of
the
"Indigenac
Code."
One
tradition
recounts an instance when a Commandant,
on tour in
Toaro,
ordered t.h.Jt
women organize a dance and sing in his honour.
~nile he ~as ~atching
them dance,
the young women sang the falIoNing:
We
lament
the
action of
Commandant,
the
man ,.... ith
a
big
belly.
The
Christian
who
has
ruined
this
coun try. The man fond of bread and liquor .. 90
II
I
This
use of folklore
to e:<press displeasu-::-e ·... i-ch French authority
I
sho'.... ed clearly
c.hat "French peace" ·...l<lS merely an expression of silence
iI
and
impotence,
that
"the
real
sentiments
of
the
populations
'..re re
\\
engulfed
in
the
very
depth
of
popular
songs
or
the
folklore,
often
inaccessible to the coloniser.,,91
One could also
find
in the
language,
words
or designations
that
I
conveyed bo~h conp~empt Eor the coloniser and illusion of
superiority
over
him.
The
'Hord Tuubakel
(lit- little
European)
applied to
the
I
Commandant was one of those.
It certainly brings
to mind the image of
a ~hite official stranded on an island
surrounded by a sea of African
subj ccts.
But,
ie
also connotes
the Fuutanke's bid to belittle the
I
po~er and might of the Commandant and assert the power and strength of
I
his
tradition.
history,
and
'c.ulture,
despite
the
status
of
being
\\
colonised. 92
Finally.
in contrast.
to
t.he
people
of ...... estern
Senegal,
I
St.
Louis
in particular,
the Fuutankoobe
int.ermarried with
the
French
II
very
rarely.
Mixed marriages were
indeed
exceptional
a~d
sometimes
caused the people to cast aspersion on the women who accepted them. 93
I
I
I
I
I
I

---

360
CONCLUSION OF PAR, SIX
A proverb
in
Fuuta
Tooeo
says
that,
"in
desperation,
even
the
she-goat does bite."94
The imposition of foreign rule and the oppres-
sion
that
define
it,
bred indeed among the masses of Fuuta an inclina-
tion to resist in different ways,
the variety of measures and policies.
As one of
the most drastic changes forced upon the people,
the ioposi-
tion
of
chiefs
·,.:ithout
traditional
claim
to
rule
in
some
areas,
met
with the utmost resista~ce.
~~ile the colonial ~uthority ~as prepared
to
yield
in
t:'1€
early
years,
(e.g'
Boosoya
in
1891)
to
people's
requests,
it
sho ...... ed
willingness
to
stick
to
its
own
plans
later
on.
Thus,
from
IB98
to
1902
Halaybe
opposition
was
met
wi.th firmness
and
serict application of colonial
law
But,
because of their
de:::ermina-
tion,
the
near-paralysis
that
thrca::cned
adminis~rative
business
in
;:he
district,
the
support:
they
enjoyed
in Si:.
Louis.
and
the
assas-
sination
plot
against
the
contested
chief,
the
Halaybe
ultimately
carrried
che
day.
A
few
years
lai::er,
Elimaan Abu,
then
chief
of
Tooro,
restored
good
neighbourly
relations
'..J~th
them
by
giving
his
daughter
in marriage
to
Hanunadi Bookar,
son of Bookar
Baydi and newly
appointed chief of north bank Halaybe.
In
contrast
to
Halaybe,
both
Cede
and
Dirnat
failed
to
get
the
administration
to reverse
its decision concerning the
new
appointees.
This was due essentially to
the
troubled
relations bet~een the
French
and
the
two
ruling
dynasties
in
Tooro
and
Dirnat.
Ever
since
the
I
rebellions of Elimaan Dimat Saydu Kan and
the assassination of Elinaan
I
Abdu1
Boo1i
Kan
(late
18505),
che
rebellion
of
Elimaan
Jaalo
Kan
(eady
18605),
and
the
assassination
of
Commandant
Abel
Jeandec
I
I
I
I

---

361
(1890),
the
F"ench
had
learned
to
mistrust
the
Kan of Dimat
and
the
Sal
of Cede.
The
administration had always made
i t a
poin:
to scrip
the
c'''''O
ruling
families
of any
local
power,
by appointing outsiders.
Ai though
"exogenous
chiefs"
'.... ere
maintained,
the
people
continued
to
express their dicomfort through civil disobedience.
songs and
rumours.
They often accused imposed chiefs of being "birds of ill-omen"
(hiica·
abe)
and blamed on
them any cala:nity
(locust s'...rarms.
famine.
drought,
or cattle epidemic).95
In most cases such chiefs tried to remedy ~heir
estrangement
by
caking
wives
from
the
prominent
lineages
of
their
districts.
Even when the chief was not imposed,
people some:imes
resorted to
magico· reI igious
means
co
avoid
being
harassed
by
administ::-ative
aUl:hority.
Some
villages
were
known
for
being
dangerous
for
ad-
miniscrators,
guards,
chiefs
and other Government
agents,
because of
tal ismans
bur ied undergrol..lnd.
Even if admi~istrators did not believe
in the efficacy of the charms,
most chiefs and African agents did caka
them seriously.96
As
for
the
opposition
to
territorial
changes,
the
people
had
limited success.
Galoya
and ~Doolo-Alkaati never obtained re-annexa-
tion
to
Boosoya.
Nor
did
Boosoya
succeed
in getting
the border with
Ngenaar re-drawn,
eventhough its
farming
rights
were
restored.
Only
the
peo?le of Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe who,
displeased
at their annexation
to
Mauritania
in
1904
clashed
with
those
of
the
north
bank,
were
finally
placated
through
the
creation
in
1906.
of
the
separate
I
district of Sald •.
Even in this case,
administrative concer~ may have
~eighed considerably.
I
I
I
I

---

362
In matters of land confiscation and donation people did not remain
passive either.
Right
from the beginning they opposed the
implementa-
cion of the decree.
Many rejected the idea of depriving their brethren
of
what
they
deeply
believed
was
theirs,
juSI.
because
it
was
t.he
administration's
will.
Along
these
same
lines
they
contested
the
acquisition of land by acministrative
fiat and refused
to pay
rents to
the
alleged
proprietors.
This
kind
of
opposit:'on
often
bore
fruit.
When
the
administration
gre'....
tit'ed
of
land
related
troubles,
it
pre'lai led on
the
beneficiar:"es
of
t~ese donations
to
relinquish
some
of
their
"rights."
The
reaction
of
the
people
to
land-related deci-
sians
had
€ ' l e n
:nore
far
reaching effects.
It
rendered
the
colonial
aucho:icy
cauCious
enough
to
avoid
a~y hint
of
alienability
in
the
texts def~ning future donations.
For instance,
when it came
to grant·
ing
larld
co
Boghe
judge Aamadu Moxtaar
Saaxo
in 1912,
Colonel Patey,
che
Commissioner
of
M.aurit.ania,
made
i t clear
that
it was
rather
a
case of
"use
rights"
racher
than domanial
concession
in the sense of
the decree
of 23 October 1904.
The
administration stipulated equally
clearly
thac
the
land
thus
donated
'.... as
inalienable. 97
In
the
same
wise,
the administration
ascertained tnat any land granted veterans in
the
'.ake
0 f
the
War,
\\"as
:nostly
bavci
(Le:
state
land)
witl':out
claima:lt.
As,
the
most
visible
manifestation
of
colonial
oppression,
taxation,
forced
labour and conscription aroused the same
frustrations
and
reae t ions_
In
chei
bid
to
evade
taxation,
the
Fuutankoobe
I
resorted
to
almost
all
tricks
possible.
They
'.i the ld
information
during
census
taking
operations.
tampered
with
tax
I
rolls,
and
I
I
I

---

363
r.hreatened
chiefs
who
showed
reluctance
CD
help
them
cheat.
Fulbe
pastoralists
sometimes
took advantage of
their
migrations
co
declare
less
cattle
or
escape
app:rcaching
tax
collectors.
So
did
riverine
populations
despite
the
tough
legislation ·,.;orked Qut by
administr.l·
cions on both banks.
At
times people invoked virtually eve~y drought,
famine or bad
harvest in orde~ to dodge taxation.
The administration
ofte~
refused to view any reluctance
to cooperate
i~ tax matters as a
deliberate move on the part of the people.
Instead ie perceived
it as
the
result
of
poor
information
and
lack
of
understanding
of
the
institution.
Therefore,
Commandants
~ere
advised
to
tour
their
distrLccs and
inform amply on
the
s?iric of taxation and
the so·called
good uses
to which
tax monies -"'ere put
(roads,
schools,
telegraph and
the Hke).
Forced
laoour
and
requisition generated
resistance
as ""ell
both
on an
individual and collective
level.
Riverine
villages
;.;hich '.... e:-e
f;"/ir
game
for
hauling,
bore
che brunt of
forced
labo~r and responded
accordingly,
forcing chc adrninistration- -at times- -to show fleXibility,
Other groups
and village~ won
no~oriety for
their
opposition
to both
institutions,
among them the
now familiar
Halaybe.
Conscript:ion
posed
as
many
problems
as
the
other
institutions.
The year 1899 witnessed most: unrest in t:erms of opposition to conscrip-
I
tion
in
the
period
preceding
t:he· .War.
Communities
resisced
it
in
various ways throughout: Fuuta Tooro. 'fulbe pastoralists were constantly
I
denounced
by
administ:rators
and canton
chiefs
for
their
reluctance
to
I
comply with
prescriptions
regarding the
recruitment of soldiers.
The
Halaybe once again,
came in for
the
administration's
ire,
by
rising up
I
I
I
I

---

364
in
arms
agains t
the
recruitment
corruniss ion.
In
addition,
the
year
1899
saw
for
the
first
time
the
rise
of
co~scientious objection. This
and the many difficulties
chat plagued conscription
campaigns were
so
serious
chat
on
the
eve
of
the
War
s~'.reral
administrators
proposed
·..,rays
and
means
to
deal
..... ith
the
f)henomenon
more
effectively.
In
Oc~ober 1913.
the Commandant of Macarn·-allegedly echoing the request of
his o'..,rn canton chiefs- -proposed a mo::"e adeq\\.:ate pun~shment for desert-
ers.
He
also
proposed
a
2S
francs r
re',.;ard
to
any
person who
.....·culd
help arrest
or provide
information for
the arrest of such delinquents.
Finally,
Eugene Nicholas ~uggested that any head of household ~ho W~lS
involved in facilitating desertion receive some form of sentence.
This
same
month
Lhe
Commandant
of
Podor,
beset
with
similar
problems,
advised
that
lists
of
prospective
conscripts
be
set
separacely
.:It
times of census operations and
that a dra~ing take
place ~o designate
ahead of
time,
two young men
for every village
of 500 habitants.
In
relation
to
the
so
called
invasion
of
his
cere le
by
unkno'...rrl
and
"people
wi thour
pass"
the
Commandant
advised
the
reinforcement
of
dispositions
relative
to
travel
permits.
Most of
chese
propositions
~ere accepted by higher
authoricy.
i
In
che
religious
realm,
in
spite of
the defeat and harsh
ment
of
the
Umarians,
and
the
cooperation
of
p;:,ominent
religious
I
figures,
Islam
remained
for
some
time,
a
powe~ful
vehic le
ana
a
catalyst of
social
discontent.
Ac
Galoya
and
Dimat
where
objective
I
and
subjective
conditions were propicious
Islam
expressed
the senti-
I
rnen~s of
the
people
in
a
more
active
way.
In
the
first
instance,
Ceerno
Aamadu
Alfaa Jah
succeeded
in
mobilizing masses
of commoners
I
I
I
I

---

365
along
wi ch
few
upper
class
elements
(many pLcferred
to wait
and
see
the
direction
of
events)
but
failec
ultimately
because
of
prompt
administ~ative response.
In the
second case,
Aali Yero Joob was able
to
take advantage
of
the
several crises
that affected
the province of
Dimat
in
the
late
19005.
Ee
mobilized
some
of
his
desperate
and
resentful
country
men
against
the
colonial
system.
More
than
the
,rMahdi"
of Galoya. Aali Yero mobilized a cross-generational and cross-
sexual crowd.
BLIt,
he too failed.
One importa~t reason was
certainly
the attitude of the aristocracy of Dimat,
particularly of Fanay his OW~
village.
Important
reI i.giou5
figures
such
as
Ceer:lO
Alfaa
Muusa,
Ceerno Usmaan Sih.
and Elimaan Fanay neither
supported him.
nor showed
benevolent neutrality.
By presenting
Aali as a
"fanatic"
and· ~'adven-
curist,"
they discouraged some from
joining in the movement right from
the start.
They did it in
part out of fear for French retaliation but
also
out
0 f
contempt
fol':'
a
man
who
had
barely
graduated
when
he
proclaimed himself
"Mahdi."
One tradition mentions that,
Aali wanted co
find his own feet amidst the Kan,
Lih,
and Sih (aristocratic families].
He intended to take
charge,
as
a
Joob . . The
attempt
cost
him
his
life .. 98
Second,
the movement was headqua~tered on the north bank,
a lmos t half
I
way between
Dagana
and Mederdra,
two
French
strongholds.
Therefore.
people
could
easily
imagine
ho'.ol
swift
French
response
would
be.
I
Third.
!leither Aali
himself nor
the
authority allowed
the
movement
co
I
reach the maturity needed in
similar ci~curnstances.
As Buubu Sal put
it very nicely,
I
I
I
.
I··
.
.~
\\
. "'-
~'':..,;~. ~ .-
. -

---

366
He
[Aali]
made
a
big
mistake
for
he
should
ha'le
"""'aited
for
the
abscess
to
come
to
a
head.
But.
he
lanced
i t
prematurely and,
instead of pus,
blood was
the only ohing he could let ouo. 99
Finally,
as
in Galoyaabe
in
1895,
scep~ics were legion.
On
the
very
morning
of
the
skirmish
the
Commandant
of
Dagana,
i~formed by Sarnmba
Yommb t·tbooj
mentioned
that
the Fulbe
of boc:, Galoj iina
and Dimat were
ready to join the movement had Aali noe been defeated by the Commandant
and
his
gc.ards
Many
horseme.n
roamed
around
;:he
town rnorne~t5 before
the skirmish and disp@rsed only
after they heard of Aali Yero's death.
As
for
the people
of
Dagana
(town),
their attitude ',.;as rather,
one of
WLrh the exception of a
few
indi'/iduals,
they neitheT rallied
round the cleric nor sided ~ith the French. 100
Both
:he
movements
of
1895
ane.
1908
have. by
and
large
["eceived
unfair
treatmer,t
from
scholars,
who
essentially
relied
on
adminis-
i:rators'
biased inte.rpre tat.ions.
Because. of the mil:enarian claims of
the
leader
and
the
social
status
of
the
participants.
colonial
ad-
ministratoys
tended invariably to depict both cle=ics as "fanatics"
and
their movement as socially
insignificant.
In his attempt to play down
the
inciden: of
Dagana one
commandant. said that.,
"wit.h the exception
of the
chief of Fanay whose
face
is energetic,
tough,
and intelligent,
all
the
others
looked
miserable lO :.
They
were
certainly
h~~ble
people."
Both~Coulon and Marty mairltained that the two movements were
only incidently anti-colonial,
that they were essentially against local
representatives
of colonialism.
Such
an
interpretation was
based
on
administrators I
contention
that
Aamadu
Alfaa
promised
to
"cut
the
throat
of
any
local
chief who
showed hostility. ,,102
Firs t
of
all ,

---

367
this
promise
even
if
i t ioIere
true,
·.... as
contingent
upon
the
chief's
show
of
hostility.
Second,
this
contention
is clearly
a t odds '"i th
the facts.
No oral source suggests that the "Mahdi"
contemplated such
actior..
What
sources
indicate
is
[hac
he
firmly
believed
he
could
con'Jett
chief
Abdullaay
Kan
1:1CO
a
faithful
follower.
The
seco:ld
reason
for
the
fai-lure
to
set
the
movements
in
a
proper
historical
context,
is
the
reliance
of
traditional
explanations
of
"Mahdism"
~n
fuuta
Too ro.
These
explanations
ofcen
ove r - emphas ize
ideo logica 1
factors and insist
that,
Religious exaltation,
:he
spirit of proselytism,
the
pride
of
race
(sic]
chat
characterize
the
Tukulor
together
with
real
qualities
of
intelligence
and
energy explain why from
the very beginning,
and even
be.fore
an'!
success,
any
mahdi
generally
attracts
hordes of ~ell determined fanatics. IQ3
The
end
result of
these
episodes,
from whatever
angle
one
looks
at
chem,
was
the widely shared
realization that
any open
rebellion no
matter its philosophical grounds,
was doomed to failure.
From then on,
passive
forms
of
Islamic
resistance
gained
momentum.
Arms
and
inflamatory predications yielded to
pamphlets,
poems,
moral statements
I
and· good
works.
It
is
our
belief
that,
despite
the
di.versity
of
responses
described
above,
this phase
represented a
tactical
retreat
I
from
"Militant
Islam."
In
face
of
the
impossibility
to
oppose
colonialism through
violent means,
Islam called for a sustained effort
I
to
rekindle
the
fire
of
the
faith
in
the
hearts
and
minds
of
the
I
masses,
to
help
them
uphold
t.he
spirit
of
the:"r
martyrs
under
the
characteristically secular rule of the French.
I
I
I
I

---

368
finally,
another effect of these
"Mahdist"
attempts was
to
place
the administration on permanent high alert vis A vis Islamic authority.
Intelligence
gathering
on
clerics - -some'Limes
even
the
roos thumb le
ones--became part of every single
administrator's daily duty (appendix
4-5).
This helped establish the
fear of
Pan-Islamism among
the entire
F~ench administration. 104
The
perception of French school and
the
general
attitude
towards
it,
was
another
facet
of
cultural
response
to
colonialism
in
Fuuta
Toceo.
A close
look
at
the
evolution
of
the
institution
in
r'uuta
sho·.... s
a
constant.
negativf:
attitude
on
the
part of
the
broad masses.
Three
elements
mad~ up
this
attitude:
The
size
of
the
student
population and
its
evolution I
the
social background of students,
and
the
rate
of
attenda~ce
and
graduation.
Propaganda
and
vario1.ls
incenti'Jes
not
..... ithstanding,
the
masses
remained
reluctant
to
send
cheir
children.
The
administration was
wont
to blame
this
on
the
so
called
reactionary attitude of the people.
But,
clearly,
i t had to do
with
cultural
self-preservation,
parents
fearing
an
eventual
"brain
washing"
of
their
children,
the
status
of
children
as
p roauc t i 'Je
furces more
needed on
farms
and pasture land,
the
children's own lack
uf motivation and,
subsidiarily,
the
indifferencp of the aristocracy.
I
The french school had to gradually adapt
to
the
realities of
the
I
fuucankoobe.
Although
the
administration
rejected
the
well
argued
proposition of one !1atam Commandant to use Pulaar as medium of instPlc-
I
tion during the first years at school,
it had to
make room for African
realities
in
the
curriculum.
By
1912
in
most schools
students
were
I
brought to
recite
poetry com?osed by
school masters and based On the
I
I
I
I

---

369
"daily
facts
of
life
in
the
village. It
Reports
indicate
that
"they
understand and manage [0 recite ~ith particular relish.'llOS
To come ~o
grips with
absente ism and desertion,
Commandants
at Kaedi
started by
1912 to
give one month'
vaca~ion for students to help their families,
then one other month for
the
surveillance of farms.
In the end,
the
educational board moved to purely and simply adjust the
school year co
the
agricult~ral calendar
by
establishi~g a
three
months'
summer
'Jacacion.
As for girls,
they remained oUl:si..de the
classroom for quite
a long time.
The
people
also
used
folklore
to
express
their
sentiments
and
attenuate their f~ustration.
The forms of
response of the Fuutankoobe
I
to colonial institutions were indeed
varied. They were both individual
ii
and collective,
passive
and
active,
localized
in
time
and space,
but
I
also sometimes
~idespread and persistant.
II!i!I
I
\\iii!i
I
l
I
I
I

---

NOTES
1.
Davidson,
A.
Basil,
"African Resistance and Rebellion against
the
Im~osition of Colonial Rule,"
in,
Ranger Terence.
0 edit,
Emerging
Themes
of African History.
Heinemann
Educational
Books,
London,
1968.
(pp.
177-188).
2.
Genovese,
Eugene
D.
Jordan,
Roll:
The world
the Slaves
I
Roll,
Made.
First Vintage Book Edition,
February 1976.
(pp.
585-658).
3.
Among studies devoted to
this category of resistance see,
Jean
Suret Canale:
"Resistance e~ Collaboracion en Afrique Noire coloniale"
in,
Etudes Africaines
(Offertes a Henri Brunschwig),
Edition de l'Ecole
des
Hautes
Etudes
en
Sciences
Sociales,
Se
partie,
1982,
pp.
319-345.
(Hereafter,
"Resistance.")
Christophe Wondji:
"Quelqu€s
caracteres des
resistances populaires en Afrique Noire 1900-1931"
Etudes Africaines,
op.cit, 4e partie,
pp.
335-345.
(Hereafter,
nQuelques caracteres. n )
4.
C.\\londji, op.cit.,
p.
334.
5.
Capt.
Steffe,
Commandant
of
Kaedi.
A.N.M:
El--48
Gorgol:
Rapports op.cit., 4e Trimestre 1912.
6. Umar Bah,
Interview passim,
section 1.
7.
Halaybe
resistance
took
on
military
form
and
peaked
in
the
18805 in the conflict with Lamtooro Sidiki.
8.
A N.S:
2D10--ll:
Podor,
op.cit.
"Rapport
de
tournee
du
Lieutenant Vincent,
24 Jan-8 Fevrier 1893"
9. The conclusion of the report on Halaybe read as follows:
Although these people are as stubborn as mules and
terribly turbulent,
they constitute a real fo~ce upon
which one can count,
and which we must handle carefully.
Naturally independent,
they would never refuse
to obey
our order~ should they be placed under the command of
their
own 'chiefs.
(A.N.S:
2Dll--l,
Podor
op.dt.,
Podor
a
Directeur des Affai~es Politiques, 11 Jan.1893).
10.
For
the
grievances
against
the
chief
of Halaybe
see,
A,N.S:
2Dll--23
Podor
"Dossiers
divers
1893-1912,"
(doss.
8
Trouble
a
Thienel) ,
I
370
I
I
I

---

371
11.
Commandant
Valzi
was
very
much
supportive
of
Elirnaan
Abu
and
praised
him
in
all
his
reports
as
a
good
and
loyal
chief
""'ho
has
committed no abuse of power,
no fault whatsoever because in my aponian
whatever his past errors,
it would be impolitic to sacrifice him to the
demands
of
H.
Oeves
and company."
A.N.S:
2011--14,
op.cit,
Corrunandt
Valzi a O.P.A 17 Nov.
1901.
In
late
1900
a
delegation
of
sixteen
notables
was
sent
[ 0
the
capital in order to lobby for the chief's dismissal.
12.
A.N.S:
2011--23 op.cit,
Podor a
O.A.P,
6 Fevrier 1902.
2G2--47
Pador,
"Rapports mensuels 1902"
(Fevrier).
13.
From June 1901 on,
the Village of Ceenel (north bank) elected a
Bees
(war
leader)
and
embarked
on
subversive
actiVities
under
the
pretense
that
their
chief
was
not
being nice
with
the
coranic
school
students
whom
he
accused
of
sowing disorder.
Two
of
the
leaders
of
this
revolt,
Saajo
Hasan and Saajo Harrunaat \\IIere
deported
respecti'Jely
to ~allaa (Yirlaabe) and Hburrunba (Laa",).
Bookar
Baydi
ruled Ha1aybe
until
1913
(see chap.6)
",hen
the
ad-
ministration discharged him for embezzlement.
A Kala;jo,
(Pl:
Halaybe)
named
Aadama
Sammba
'.... as
proposed
as
replacement
but,
he
was
rich
in
cattle
and
slaves
and
people
talked
him
out
of
it,
arguing
th;tt
chiefship was not the right thing for a rich man.
He therefore declined.
A.N.S:
2011--4,
Resident du Lao Lestre de Rey a
Adm. Pador,
30
Juin
1902
and,
Comm.
Lejeune
a
Directeur
des
Affaires
Indigenes,
19/7/1902.
14. A.N.S:
2011--3 Podor,
"Correspondances 1899-1901," Corr.mandant a
O.A.I.,
24/10/1901.
15.
Raasin Kan ~as proposed by Commandant Rocache but,
the Director
of
Pol.
Aff.
Decazes
turned
the
proposition
do'.JT1 on
ground
that
the
l
candidate's
father
was
already
chief of Yirlaabe,
and his
uncle
judge
at
Matam.
Decazes
warned
that
appointing
the
then
young
man
',Jould
amount
to
"p lac i ng
the
bulk
0 f
the
Tukulor
country
under
one
single
I
family. "
As for Ma~nadu D. To01i he was not likely to be appointed,
for the
administration
was
already
mad
at
his
family
because
of
the
trouble
c rea ted.
16.
They
mentioned
that
"TOOIO
had
taken
part
in
all
French
campaigns against Aamadu Seyku (1869-1975):
At Peten, Mbayar, and Njur
Kaaye under
the command of Lamtooro Sammba;
Lamt"O.oro Aamadu Abdul led
the
'telegraph
brigade'
from
Njaayeen
to
Salde;
Two
princes
of
Cede,
I
the
sons
of
Gelaajo
Siree
and
Marrunadu
Jibi
died
at
the
battle
of
Dirmboyaa;
Tuuban
and
Gelaajo
died
at ,.)aaynga
while
accompanying
Jaureguiberry;
Lamtooro
Muule
died
at
Aanam Toowngel
against
Aamadu
I
Seyku;
Gelaajo,
Sarrunba,
Siree
Oecce,
Sarrunba Buubu
Cene,
Sarrunba Aliu
and Siidi Hammet died in the name of France;
Siree Baydi also;
Buubakar
died while attempting to block Sarrunba Ngu~~a's
emigration.
I
In
lBB1
i t
"'as
the
labourers
from
Gede
"'ho
performed
telegraph
construction."
(A.N.S:
2011--14 op.cit.)
I
I•

---

372
43.
Commandant
Valzi
then
wrote
to
the
Director
of
Political
Affairs,
warning him that the Ha1aybe might send a letter to St.
Louis.
For other individual cheatings in tax matters,
see Chapter 8.
44.
A.N.S:
2G8--10 Senegal "Rapporc Annue1 1908": Lc·Gouv.
a
Gouverneur General A.O.F.,
22/5/1908
(19p),
p.
8.
45.
Interview,
Maam Njaak family,
passim.
Hamedin Kan.
Buubu Sal
passim.
(A.N.S:
13G-·135 op.dt.)
I
46.
A.N.S:
2D10--13
Kaedi~Mata:n; Commandant
LaborLe
a
D.A.p
I
7/7/1892, p.17.
I
47.
A.N.S:
2Dll--14
op.eit.,
Victor
.-\\llys
on
district
tour,
Ja>1.
1899.
Ally. proposed
to
the
D.P.A.
that he be
imprisoned
if he ever
repeaced such 0 ffence.
The
trader was
a
lie it izen"
from St.
Louis and
the Commandant could not apply him his discretionary powers.
48.
They
were
imprisoned
at
Podor
from
3 July
co
18
July
1899.
They were all from Ceene1 and Demet.
(A.N.S:
2D11-14,
op.cit.
"Regis-
i
tre de la prison de Pedor 1899.")
i
,,
6.9.
For
reports
on
conscription
related
difficulties,
see:
A.N.S:
2G6--J
Senegal "Rapport General a A.O.F.,
1906";
2G6--J9 Podor 1911;
2G6·-41
Salde-Diorbivo1
19L1
(July);
2G6 . . 51
Matam
"Rapports Mensue1s
1913"
(Octobre);
2G6·-52 Sa1de
1913
(Octobre);
2G6--59
Podor "Rapports
Mensue1s
1913"
(Aout-Sept-Oct);
A.N.M:
El-·48
Gorgo1
"Rapports
Po1itiques 1906-1908"
(Ra?port annue1 1912),
50. See our interview ~ith Demmba J. Bookum,
passim,
section 1.
51.
See interview with Abubakri Qaalid,
passim.
52.
Aamadu M.
Saaxo
was
appointed
Judge
at
Boggee,
Ceerno
Usmaan
Si.h Qadi
of
Dimat,
Ceerno Aamadu
Moxtaar
of
Laaw,
A1maami Mammadu L.
Lih of Yirlaabe·Hebbiyaab~, to mention just a few.
53.
For the
relations between the 'Jah of Ga10ya and other Toorodo
families
of
Fuuta,
see
our
intervie...,
with
the
sons
of A1faa Muusa at
Ga10ya on 26/7/1985.
It proVided also details on the cleric's studies,
arrest and deportation to the Congo and his liVing conditions there,
as
well as the miracles he
is reported to have performed.
For another
tradition on Aamadu Alfaa,
see our
interview with Abu
Ja110,
Dakar 4/8/1985, and Rasuu1u Lih,
passim,
section 14.
I
54.
For
the
archival
material
see:
A.N.S:
1JG--67
"Po1itique
Is1mique
1906- 1917",
p.
27;
lJG--69 "Renseignements sur 1es Marabouts
1912·1913."
For
the
secondary
sources,
see:
Paul
Marty:
Etudes
sur
l'Islam
au
Senegal
Tome
I:
Les
Personnes.
Paris,
Ernest
Leroux
I
Editeur,
28
rue
Bonaparte,
412
pages
(1917).
pp.
102-10J.
(Hereafter,
Etudes.)
Chritian Cou10n:
Pouvoir Maraboutigue, op.cit"
p.
95.
I
I,

---

373
55. Traditions contend that he was
put
in a
"well cell"
at Tebegut
and
that
"every
morning
people
were
amazed
at
seeing him out
of
the
well."
Although
they
do
not
confirm
such
contention,
French
sour,::es
acknowledge that the cleric escaped rather strangely.
56.
"'.N S:
13G--67 op.cit., p.
27.
57.
He '.....as
deported along with
the
renowned founder
of i:he "Murid
Brotherhood" Ahmadu Barrunba Mbakkc.
This shared predicament. fostered an
enduring
relationship
that
traditions
still
recount.
Ceerno
Aarnadu
Alfaa got married in the Congo and had
two daughters.
He was pardoned
and
brought
back
in
1903
and
died
in
1949
as
one
administrator
des~
cribed him,
a
"peaceful farmer and Coranic School
teacher"
(see note
50)
58.
For details
on
these calamities of L~e early 18905,
see A.N.S:
2Gl--55:
91:
92
:
93 and 94;
2D10--8:
2D11-12 on Salde.
Kaedi,
Podor
and Matam.
The
situation
'.... a5
so
bad
that,
at
the
request
of
:braa Almaami
chief of La a''''' ,
the
Commandant
of
Podor
i:ook upon
himself,
despite
the
disapproval of D.P.A Merli~, co exempt children from the head tax.
It
~as
the
sane
year
189]-1894
that
the
administration
imposed
the
"Provident
Societies"
throughout
Fuu::.a
Tooro.
A.N.S:
2011·2
PoJor
"Correspondance 1894-1898";
Podor a Gouverneu:,
Janvier 1894.
59.
Interview with the Jah passim.
60.
For
the
life
of A.a1i
Yero Joob see our
interviews with Buubu
Sal,
passim;
Ocmmba J.
Bookwn passim;
Uncaped interview with Ceerno Aamadu Sih a~ Fanay (Dimat) on
20/7/1985,
section 2.
See
also:
A.N.S:
2G6--3
Senegal
"Rapports
Trimestriels
1906,"
le
trimestre;
A.N.F--O.M:
Senegal
IV,
dossier
132
""'ffaires
Politiques:
L'
Incident de Oagana de 1908."
I
61.
See,
A.N.S:
2D11--23
op.cit.,
dossier
9,
Dagana
a
Gouverneur
I
General, 4/7/1903.
I
I
62.
Serious
food
shortages
ensued
in
the
districts
of
Oagana
and
!
Podor.
By late 1908
the Commandant of Matam referred
to a shortage of
I
millec.
and
an
invasion
of
his
district
by
traders
from
the
Lower
I
Senegal districts.
i
This
led the administrator of Dagana
to ask the Governor for sone
I
2,470
(70T)
sacks
of
rice
for
eastern
Dimat,
to
be
reimbursed at
the
i
nexC harvest.
Meanwhile,
the Governor gave orders banning the sale of
grain to the Moors along the river.
I,
As a consequence of the food shortages,
the price of millet jumped
I
from
8
Frs/lOO
kgs
to
15-20
Frs/lOO
kilgrammes.
This
intensive
commercial activity in turn earned the administration important amounts
of
tax
money.
A.N.S:
2Dl1--23
District
of
Podor;
"Dossiers
Divers
I
1893-1912."
(Dossier
9:
'Famine
dans
le
cercle
de
Podor
et
dans
la
Val1ee:
Rapport
sur
la
penurie
de
grains
dans
le
Dimar
et
le
Galod·
I
I
I

---

374
jina.'
Dagana a Gouverneur General,
4/7/1903).
For the
information on Matam see; A.N.S:
2G8--46
Matarn;
"Rapport
Annuel 1908" 24p. pp. 19-20.
63.
He
is
also
said to
have
performed
a
series
of miracles
(see
Buubu Sal, passim).
64.
Among
these
families
was
that
of
Alfaa
Muusaa
Sih,
Aali' s
former teacher and prestigious figure who tried vainly to convince him
to drop his
plan of attacking
the
French.
Another one was
the family
of Elimaan Fanay an important notable.
65. A.N.F--O.M:
Senegal IV, dossier 132 op.cit. "Oiaire."
p. 6, op. c it.
66.
Aali
wanted
to
force
the
Commandant
to
convert
to
Islam.
According to traditions he had also vo~ed to get him circumcised.
(Demmba J. Bookum, Bu~bu Sal, passim).
67.
The
followers
arrested
and
interrogated
later
confirmed
that
the cleric had made
this promise.
(See appendix 5).
68.
A pregnant woman who had almost reached her time was so sca~ed
that
she
s·,.;am across
the
river.
[....nen she gave
birth
thereafter,
the
boy was named Kumaa
(shortening of Kumaandan)
in memory of
the debacle
caused by the Commandant of Dagana.
This
same
boy,
seventy
seven
years'
old
at
the
time
of
our
int:ervie......
is
Bookar
Joob.
most:
',Jidely
known
as,
Kumaa.
(See
untaped
interview with Ceerno Aamadu 5ih Fanay,
passim.)
Another
informant's
father-in-law
who
survived
the
skirmish
fled
and was hidden in a granary for
three months,
before he left the canton
to establish at Daara Jolof ('Nest central Senegal),
as a trader.
69. A.NS:
2C8--46 op.cit.
70. A.N.S:
2Cl--90 Matam "Rapport Mensuels 1894"
(Matam a Co~ver­
neur, 28/4/189 1,),
71.
A.N.S:
2Dll--14
op.cit.
(Administrateur
Podor
a
O.A,I.,
22/11/1900) ,
72.
The
Lieutenant-Resident had
to
launch an explanation campaign
to
reassure
the
populati<?n
::hat
the
French
had
"no
intention
to
interfere with the practice of their faith" but,
to 'Narn people against
"fanatic rumours anc quackery al~ays aimed at taking advantage of their
credulity (sic]."
A.N.M:
Corgol, "Rapports Politiques" op. cit., Juin
1910,
73.
A.N.S:
13C--67 op.cit., p.
113.
I
I

---

375
74.
A.N.S:
2DI0--9;
Matam,
Rapports de Tournee 1894-1917.
(Folio
6,
District
tour,
20-28
Jan.
1913.);
2Gll--41
Diorbivol
"Rapports Mensuels 1911."
(Aout).
75.
For
information
on
Aarnadu T.
Wo on see,
A.~.S.13G--67 op.eit.
Alfaa Hachmi,
as
he
is
referred
to
in French sources,
led
the
remants
of
the
Umarian
community
through
Nigeria
on
to
Saudi
Arabia
in 1904 I
following
the
death
of
Aamadu
Seyku
and
the
capture
of
Basiiru
by
British authority.
See,
A.N.S:
13G--67 op.cit.,
(Note de Gaden,
13/6/1911).
See also
David '.J.
Robinson
"The
Umarian
Emigration
of
the
late
19th
century,"
paper presented at
the Norch
Ease African Studies Conference,
Michigan
State University,
Feb.
1986.
76.
See,
Denise Bouche;
"Autrefois natre pays
s'appelait la Gaule:
Remarques
sur
l'adaptation
de
I' Enseignement
au
Senegal
de
1917
a
1960".
In Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,
vol.
Ill,
1968,
pp.111-122.
(p 1161.
(Hereafter,
"Notre pays _ .. 11)
77.
A.N.S:
2Dll--l
Podor;
"Correspondance
1838-1893"
(Louis
Vincent,
Administrateur,
a D.A.P.,
14/3/1893).
78.
According
to
Denise
Bouche,
the
French administration
opened
fourty shoals
in
the
"Protectorates"
of Senegal just between 1892 and
1898.
See.
Deni-se
Bouche;
ilL' Ecole
Francaise
et
les
Musulmans
au
Senegal 1850-1920" in Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre Mer, Tome LXI,
numero 223,
2e trimestre 1974,
p.
226.
79.
A.N.S:
2Gl--41
Matam
1897;
2Gl--95
Kaedi
1897,
4th
quarter;
2Dll--1,
op.cit.
See
aJ.so,
D.
Bouche,
"L'Eco1e
Rurale
en
Afrique
Occidenta1e
Francaise
de
1903
a 1956",
in
Etudes
Africaines,
Editions
de L'Eco1e des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales,
pp.
273-295.
80. A.N.S:
2Dll--1 op.cit.
This was stated when the administrati-
on
was
trying
to
encourage
Ibraa
Almaami
to
help
build
a
school
at
Mbummba.
81.
Tabaski
and. Kori
are
wolof
words
for
the
Islamic
"Feast
of
Sacrifice"
('Id-UI-Adha)
and
"Feast
of
Fast
breaking"
('Id-UI-Fitr),
respectively.
82.
A.N.S:
2G1--lS9 Podor;
"Rapports Tournee,
1 Sem.
1900"
(June).
The school had even in 1919 only 30 students.
Still in 1919 "the school
of Dagana counted only 10 students from Fuuta among whom 1 from nearby
Dimat.
See,
A.N.S:
J
29
Statistiques
Scolaires
au Senegal.
(Dagana
1904-1920).
83.
In
some
years
it
was
relatively
better
in
some
cases
but
overall,
the
attendance
rate
was
not
encouraging.
For
details,
see:
A.N.S:
2DII--I0
Podor
"Tour
reports,"
op.cit.
(Jean
pradelle;
"District
tour
28
March
to
8
April
1895")
2Dl1--14
op.cit .•
Podor
l
(Enseignement);
J
31
Senegal:
Statistiques
Scol.
1903-1920,
Matam
I
I
I

---

376
1904-1919 and 1905-1906.
84.
In
1844
some
25
children were
baptized
at
the
school
of
the
Ploermel Brothe,s,
without the consent of their parents.
This prompted
a
strong
reaction
and
the
opening
of
"Lay
schools"
under
Governor
Faidherbe in 1857.
See,
Bouche "L'Ecole Francaise" op.cit., p.
219.
In
addi'tion,
some
of
the
first
teachers
did
not have command of
the
French
language
and
tended
to
speak Wolof
to
the children,
which
angered more
than one
parent.
In 1900
for
instance,
Abdul Aziiz \\.,lan,
the
chief
of
Mbummba,
refused
to
send
his
child because
the
teacher.
suleymaan Faal,
always spoke Wolof in the class room.
(A.N.S:
2D11--l0
op.cit. )
For the perception of French education among the a~istocracy.
see
the celebrated novel Ambiguous Adventure by Cheikh Hamidou
Kane.
85.
In
Pulaar.
"Nehdo
moniima Jibindo."
(Interview with
Mammadu
Jen of Woolum-Neere, passim.)
86.
On
the
eve
of
the War,
the
school director at Dagana reported
that,
t'~any parents have
taken
their
children
away
from
school
under
the
preteKt
that
they
pay
head
taKes
for
the
youngsters
whereas
the
latter,
as
full
time
students,
are
in
no
position
to
provide .1abour
compensatory of the tax sums.
A.N.S: J
29 op.cit.,
1913).
87. A.N.M:
El--48 Gorgol op.cit,
4:h quarter 1911.
88. The aristocracy encouraged a shift in attitude only much later.
This
is
why
chiefs
like
Abdul
Sala.am
Kan
are
credi:ed
for
having
encouraged
education in
their circumscription "towards
the end"
of the
colonial era.
(Malal Seribaa Cubbu,
passim,
sec:ion 6)
89.
Buubu Sal,
interview at Podor in July 1985,
passim.
I
90.
In Pulaar,
"En ngoyrli kumaa mawna deeral
An Nasaar bonnii Wuro
Worde mo mburuuji e sanngara ... "
I
Untaped interview weth Ame Maam Njaak.
Nouackchott 21/3/1985.
91.
Jean Suret Canale:
"Resistance ... ", op_eit.,
p.
32l~.
I
This
idea
tallies with Jean Louis Calvet's
remark
that,
La Langue est
le
maquis
du peucle
(language
is
the
guerilla
ground of
the
people).
Linguistique et Coloniali~me, Editions de Minuit,
1971.
I
92.
Tuubaak 0 (The European).
The prefix EL has
the same function
as
the
Spanish
ito,
the
German
ein,
and ,designates
the "little." But,
here it does not have t.he "endearing"
content.
I
Strikingly,
Fuutankoobe
used
to
speak
the
same
way
about
other
groups
that constantly harassed
them,
the Moors
(Capatel as opposed to
Capaato) and (Pulel Jeeri as opposed to Pullo Jeeri).
I
93.
See
interviews
with
Maam
Njaak
family
and
Umar
Bah,
passim.
I
I
I

---

377
Most
of
the
time
these
women
belonged
to
lower
social
strata.
A
Resident got angry once because a chief had brought him a woman of low
social status and cold him,
in the
face that he would never bring him a
Kan,
Wan,
or Lih.
(Umar Bah,
passim)
94.
In Pulaar,
"Hay Mbe.ewa,
so carnpii tan, Na::ac."
95.
The
people
of
Tooro
used
to
praise
the
Lamtooro(s)
and
the
alleged
luck
that
stamp~d their
cerms
in
office.
Their
rule
~~s
associated
with
good
rainfall,
river
flood
and
abundance
of
millet,
melons,
and
multiplication
of
cattle,
as
opposed
to
the
reign
of
foreigners.
(See intervie~ ~ith Harnedin Kan,
sect.lO,
passim.)
96.
Among
places
reportedly
dangerous
to
government
agents
in
uniform
Baroobe-Jakkel
(Salde),
Beeli-Nayde
(Ngenaar),
Sillaanaabe
(80050ya).
In
some
villages,
some
quarters
or
households
were
con-
sidered dangerous as well:
Baroobe in the village of Jaaba;
Wiinnde-
Mbaan in Mbaan; Hebbiya in Mboolo Birran_
According to oral
traditions.
Yaaya Kan ruled at Mbaan for
thirty
year
but
never
entered
\\.liinnde-Mbaan.
Like'.... ise,
Abdullaay
Kan
once
encered
Baroobe-...iakkel
on a
mission.
Although he
cried out loud
that
he did not mean to defy
the
tradition,
he died with a lightly tvisted
neck.
Finally
chief Hammadi
Alfaa
Bah,
reportedly,
never
ventured
to
Beeli-Nayde.
There
is farm
land
in
Boosoya called Kofel.
Government
age~ts ~ere not supposed to feed their horses with hay taken from the
place.
In general
these myths ~ere part of "conventional wisdom"
that
no chief wou:d challenge.
97.
This
piece
of
land was
called
"Krowlat."
In
1934
after
the
death
of
judge
Aamadu
M.
Saaxo,
his
son
Moxtaar
requested a
written
confirmation
of
the
grant
on
his
behalf.
Mr.
Bruno
the
lieutenant-
governor
of
Mauritania
acceded
to
the
r-equest
by Order
of
25
April
1935.
But,
Mr.
E.
Lecorvaisier,
Estate Registrar
at Dakar,
refused to
deliver
a
land
'\\oIarrant
(titre
foncier)
arguing
that,
" Moktar
being
unable to evoke rights other than those of the original grantee, he can
not require
a properey right
(from
the administration]."
A.N.M:
0 1
"Concessions
a
titre
Precaire
1913-1936".
(
E.
Lecorvaisier
a
Lieu-
tenant-Gouverneur de Mauritanie,
2/7/1935).
98.
For. the propositions
from Matam and Podor see,
A.N.S:
2G13--51
:1atam
"Rapports
Mensue1s
1913"
(Octobre);
2G13--59
Podor
IlRapports
Kensue1s 1913"
(Octobre).
I
99.
Obviously the aris~ocracy was not directly responsible for his
death.
This
is
simply
a
way
of
stressing
the
lack
of
solidarity.
(Interview with Buubu Sal, sect.
3, passim).
This contempt transpires
from interviews
in the area,
particularly
I
with members of the aristocracy.
100. A.N.F--O.M: Senegal IV op.cit.,
p.
13.
I
I
1
I

---

378
101.
A.N.M:
E 1--6
"Relations entre
le
Gouvernenent du Senegal et
le
Gouve rnemen t
de
Maur i tanie.
1905 - 1911 . l1
(Commissa i re
du Gouve rne·
ment a Gouverneur General,
20/3/1908).
102.
A.N.S:
13G- ·67
op.eit.
"Les
Groupements
Omariens
au
Fouta."
par Mr.
Olivier, Agent du Gouvernement General de l'A,O,F.,
27 p,
103,
13G··67 op.dt.,
"Islam au Senegal;
Doctrines et: Morale Relig-
ieuse."
(p.
28).
104,
For
details on these orders
see,
D.
Bouche's
"L'Ecole
Franc-
aise .. ,"
op,elc"
pp,
222·223.
See
also,
Martin
Klein' 5
Islam
and
Imperialism,
op,cit., pp,
219·222,
105.
For
the
proposition of Matam
to
temporarily substitute
Pulaar
for French,
see A,N.S:
J
31 Matam 1904·1919,
T',.,o
years
later,
an
anthology
of
school
songs
with
"African
cultural
content"
was
introduced.
(A.N.S:
J
21
"Organisa~ion et
Fonctionnement de l'Enseignement en A..a.f ..
1915-1919.")
l
I
I
\\
I

---

PART SEVEN:
FUUTA TOORO AND WORLD "~R I:
CONTRIBUTION ~~D CONSEQUENCES
CHAPTER 10:
HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
A. HUMAN CONTRIBU,ION
1. ORGANISATION
l".Then
the
war
bro~e out
:'0
Europe,
the
law
of
7
February
1912
establishing compulsory
service
in Wesc Africa was
already
t~o
years
old.
Many had gro~~ acquainted with the idea and principle
of serving
in colonial arrries,
both within and outside of the
colonies of Senegal
and Mauritania.
This
decree
required
e:very
young male
of
twenty
to
c....... enty-eight
years
of
age,
to
serve
for
two
yea:-s
wi ch
an
average
annual
salary
of eighty
to
one
hundred and sixty francs.
A provision
in this
decree empowered
the
Governor General
to define
conditions of
recrui tmen t
through
executive
orders_
This
led
to
che
order
of
25
October
(of
the same year)
setting the number
of recrui:able people to
tlJO
per
1,000
inhabi tants. 1
Shortly
after
the
outbreak
of
the
War,
ano:her decree,
that of 10 October 1914,
authorized former
~irailleurs
and
non-reservists
to
volunteer
for
the
duration
of
the
war,
in
exchange for a forty francs semestrial premium.
As
the war went on,
conscription became a more
rigid
institution.
The
administration
conducted
recruitments
on
a
semestrial
instead of
annual
bas is.
Twice
a
year,
in
November-December
and
June-July,
conscription
took
place
almost
...... ith
the
regularity
of
a
pendulum.
379

---

380
Hence,
the masses
integrated
the event
to
their calendar as
"the month
of the doctor"
(Lewru doktoor).2
The "Mobile Draft Board" contained up
to sixteen men.
With the war and because of
the routine status of the
event,
it
shrunk
to
a
much
smaller
size,
comprising
mostly
the
administrator of the cercle,
a European officer,
a military
doctor, a
European non-commissioned officer acting as clerk,
and an I~terpreter.
The procedure was always the same.
Each canton chief was assigned
figures
according
to
the
size
of
his
circumscription
and
that
of
contingents previously levied therein and, albeit rarely,
the nature of
his constituency.
In the cercle of Boggee for
example,
the canCon of
Yirlaa6e-Hebbiyaabe
(Mbaan),
generally
provided
half
the
number
of
recruits,
~hile Laaw and Tooro-Halaybe divided up the other half. 4
I~·
general,
(he
commission
started by drafting all
the men labelled bons
absents
that
is,
previous draft
dodgers who were
therefore
automati-
cally
considered "fit"
for
military
duty.
Then came
those Yha,
for
one
reason
or
another,
had
been declared
unfit before.
Once
these
two
categories were
treated,
the
commission would peruse
the
lisc of
all young men deemed draftable and draw lots
in orde~ to determine who
should come
before
the
medical
officer. 5
Exemption
from
service
was
t
rare
and
concerned
esserxially
the
physically
handicapped
and
those
generally
referred
to
as
"social
cases,"
that
is,
orphans,
bread
I
winners,
heads of unusually large families and unique sons.
These were
often provided with an exemption card which--in
the
eve~t of a trip--
I
they could show to the authorities of a given locale.
I
Starting
in
1915,
recruitment
operations
took
on
the
form
of
I
funerals.
Squating the conscription of their
sons with a great loss,
I,
I

---

381
and
the ir
expa tria t ion
wi ch
a
one -way
trip,
'Nomen
took
to
lamenting
bitterly
and
loudly,
in
full
vie ....·
of
the
commission.
The
following
description by the Commandant of Matarn tallies with oral
traditions on
that mat:ter:
Then,
things
turned
into
a
show
that
I
have
never
'..,itnessed
anywhere
else
than
Matam;
The
young men
were
taken
to
the
residence
by
the
women
of
the
village who were crying,
shouting,
gesticulating and,
making
so
much
noise
chat
I
had
to
order
the
resi-
dence
evacuated ...
The
following
day,
the
young men
were brought before
the commission;
women,
gathered
in nearby households,
struck up dirges each time one
of their kinsmen was declared Eit for service. 6
Scenes
like
this
were
to
become
integral
part
of
recruitment
operations,
especially as demands
in "cannon fodder"
....'eighed heavier on
the masses.
2.
EVOLUTION 0, CONSCRIPTION
a/
fu~ONG THE MASSES
Between 1914 and 1918 France was
also concerned by the.
political
situation
in
southern
M.orocco
and
northern
Mauritania
where
nomadic
I
warrior
tribes
were
in
intermittent
rebellion.
The
need for
soldiers
for both
the European front
and
the north African garrisons
caused the
I
f'rench
to
draw
constantly
from
the
west
African
reservoir
throughout
I
the
war.
The
first ~recruitment in 1914 did not
concern Fuuta
Tooro.
The
famine
stricken
districts
of
the
valley,
along
with
Luga
aCId
I
Naani-Uuli,
were
spared
during
the
first
months.
By
late
1914,
conscription was
extended
to
both
banks
of Senegal
River,
I
The north
I
bank (Boghe,
Kaedi and Mederdra)
provided
two hundred and twelve men,
I
I

---

382
while
Matam and Salde gave one hundred and forty.
The
second
important
recrcitment
took place
in 1915.
The metro-
pole,
unsatisfied with the numbers,
issced the decree of 9 October 1915
requiring French ~est Africa to provide an additional 50,000 men (7,500
from
Senegal).
For
the
same
reason,
this
decree
widened
the
age
bracket
for
service
to
bec',oJeen
eighteen
and
thirty-five
years,
and
increa.sed the
percentage
~o be levied ae three per 1,000 inhabitants.?
wnat
is
more,
the
decree
fixed
the
period to
the duration of
the war
plus
5 ix
months.
period deemed necessary
for
repatriation procedures.
Finally.
the decree established a 200 francs'
premium for enlistment
to
give
to
needy
families
of Tirailleurs
and
a
15
frs
monthly allo .....·ance
for
the
family
of
every
dead
soldier.
As
French
authority
realised
that despite
these alleged advantages volunteers ""ere hard
to
fi:1d,
it
soon applied administrative pressure
on
the
people.
During
the
first
recruitment
of
Febr'Jary-April
1915,
the
districts
of Matam and
Salde
~ere
granted respite.
Podor and Dagana provided a
total of a hundred
and fifty or.e recruits.

---

383
TABLE 10: Recruitment in the Districts of the South Bank,
1915.
District of Podor:
Laaw
18
Haayre -laa'"
16
Eas tern-Tooro
32
Western-Tooro
55
TeLal:
121
At
the
end of
the
year,
in December
1915,
new
levies
were
imposed on
the whole south bank,
showing:
District of Matam:
Ngenaar
130
Damga
130
Ferlo
38
.'1atam- town
10
Total
308
For 250 initially required.
District of Salde:
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe
40
Boosoya
90
Total
130
Out of 35,000 inhabitants which amounts to almost one recruit for every
300.
District of Podor:
250
District of Dagana:
150
On the basis of 35,000 inhabitants,
this amounts to almost one
recruit for every 300.
Source:
A.N.S.:
2G14-43
These recruicrnents
triggered an emigration to the north bank where
the
administration
had
suspended
such
activities.
Following
repeated
complaints
on
the
part
of
administrators
of
the
Valley,
Governor
General
Glazel
requested
authorization
to
begin
conscription
in
Mauritania,
in order
to
insure
that
tIthe sedentary populations
are no
longer tempted to emigrate. IIB
When permission was granted,
Lt.
Colonel
I

---

384
Obissier,
the
Commiss ioner
of
the
cerri tcry,
ins true ted his Residents
to levy some eight hundred men.
He insisted that they should,
-Encourage
enlistment among the people and concentrate
the
levies
at one time.
-Make the best of the influence of well known clerics and person-
nages)
who would then be recompensed ~ith political funds.
-Hold
a
palaver
at
every
town
and
explain
to
the
people,
the
considerable pecuniary advantages
[sic]
that would accrue to
them.
-Explain
to
chiefs
and
notables
the
mechanism
of
recom?ense
destined to stimulate and acknowledge their zeal.
-Pay the conscripts their allowances on the spot.
-Have the new recruits put on their uniform immediately.9
!,Jith
all
this
propaganda
and
activity
on
the
part
of
the
ad-
ministration,
the districts of southern Mauricania provided 1,157 men.
TABLE 11: Recruitment in the Districcs of che Norch Bank,
1915
Territoire civile de Mauritanie: Dec. 1915-Jan.1916
Gorgol (district)
639
Brakna
402
Trarza
114
St. Louis (city)
2
Total:
1,157
I
Sources:
A.N.S:
4D-56 op.cit.;
A.N.M:
El-87 "Rapport d'ensemble 1905·1919"
I
I
This
figure
was
too
heavy a
strain on
the
population of
Mauritania.
According to Lt-Colonel Obissier,
the Commissioner,
ir. represented over
I
15
per
1,000
inhabitants,
a
figure
five
times
as
high
as
that
of
I
I
I

---

385
neighbouring Senegal.
The third campaign started in 1916 and was conducted on the
south
bank between November 1916 and April 1917.
It provided 333 conscripts,
almost 19 per cent of the 1,783 required for the whole colony.
,ABLE 12:
Recruitment on the South Bank,
1917
~atam:
150
Salde:
53
(Yil.
20;
Boos.
33)
?odor:
130
To
these
three hundred
and
thirty
three of
the
south bank,
one
should add
the
two hundred levied on the north bank
in 1917.
Last,
but
not the least.
the recruitment drive of 1918 took also
its toll on both
banks.
It
followed
the
decision
of
the
French
Government
to
levy
another
fifty
thousand
troops
in west
Africa.
In
order
to
defuse
the
discontent such new demands were bound to foster,
new "advantages" were
added
to
che
prerniwns
and
allowances
destined
to
families
of
con-
scripts.
In December 1917 a circular from the Under Secretary for the
Interior
instructed
the
colonies
to,
-Exempt
the
father:
mother,
wife
and,
at
least,
two
children
of
any recruit.
-Exempt from labour tax (Prestation)
the father,
mother of/and the
conscript himself. lO
Furthermore,
Mr.
Blaise Diagne,
the Representative of Senegal,
toured
west
Africa,
arousing enthusiasm
for conscription everywhere .11
This
I
r

---

386
time
the
south
bank
yielded
eight
hundred,
while
the
north
provided
over four hundred men.
TABLE 13:
Recruitment in Fuuta Tooro,
1918
Campaign of 1918:
Matam
340 (300 in the dist;
40 from others).
Sa1de
150
Podor
370
Total
860 ( No figure for Oagana was found).
North bank
479
Source: A.N.S:
4D-76 "Recrutement de 1918,"
bl
AHONG THE "LOYAL"
LEADING
FA!llLlES
To
this
large
number of conscripts
from
the
lower walks of
life,
one should add
the
minority of volunteers
from
the
top of
traditional
Fuutanke
society.
As
we mentioned earlier
(in
the
conclusion of part
three),
the administration had rea111y touched a chord when it pointed
out
to
the
aristcracy
the
medium term political
advantages
of sending
its
own
sons
to
the
colonial
army.
As
a
result,
most
chiefs
made a
point to provide one or several conscripts from their own families.
In
1918,
E1imaan Abu Kan,
the
chief of Tooro
(north bank),
sent
four of
his sons before the draft board.
Three of them were drafted,
Fo11ow-
I
fog this example,
the chief of Mbaan.
Yaaya Kan,
presented his son and
nephew.
In
Ngenaar
(south
bank),
Hamadi
Alfaa Bah sent 'B
son and
t~o
I
nephews.
Three chiefs set the example by volunteering for
the duration
of
the
\\ol'ar:
Abdu1
Salaam K"n ",ho
enlisted
in 1916
remained at
che
I
disposal of military authority for the rest of the year.
His son Abdul
I
Wahaab
Kan
died
at
the
front.
Aamadu Moxtaar Wan,
chief
of
wester~
I,
I

---

387
Tooro,
volunteered and was
sent
to
the
front
in May 1918.
His cousin
Baylaa Birann Wan, chief of Halaybe-Laaw finished the war as a Non-Com-
missioned
Officer.
The
aristocracy
of
Fuuta
Tooro
made
indeed
a
significant contribution to
the war.
To
this extent,
Marc Michel does
not do i t justice when he presents only two chiefs of western
Senegal
as examples of loyalist attitude during the war.
In fact,
Lt.
Governor
Anconetti seemed co speak of Fuucanke chiefs when he pointed out co the
Governor General
that,
"They have given us without hesitation all they
,,13
have
got
in
terms
of
force
and
influence
in the country ..
Indeed
most
Fuucanke
chiefs
surpassed
themselves
in
their
bid
to
meet
the
human and material needs of the administration.
Many
toured regularly
their
circumscriptions
to
bring
in
recruits,
rather .~han relying on
their
Village
chiefs,
They often resorted to what the Commandant
of
Matam rightly
re:erred to as a veritable chasse a
l'homme.
Else .....here,
some
chiefs
indulged in a practice
all
too reminiscent
of the era of
the
trade
in slaves.
According to
traditions
in
western Tooro,
chief
Aamadu M.
Y'an,
had
a
tall
horse
called
Diis
[dix
or
ten,
in
French I 14
For
twenty
four
hours
he
was
on
horse
back,
organiZing
the
man
hunt
through' the
Kolangal
[flooded farm land],
and across rivers and ponds.
He
was always after some men to send to the front. 15
Most other
chiefs
on both banks
showed a
constant and
similarly
I
active support and thus wo~ praise throughout this
regrettable test of
loyalty.
I
Support did not come from
the secular section of
the elite only.
I
The Islamic leadership had its share of loyal comportment and contribu-
I,
I

---

388
tion,
one
that
was
not
negligible,
given
the
history
of anti-French
sentiments and posture that long characterized
Fuutanke Islam.
On the
first
Friday
of
January
1917,
Sheex
Haamidu
Kan,
the
head
of
the
Islamic
tribunal
at
Matam
(grandfather
of
the
author),
led
a
Grand
Salam
(prayer)
at
the
mosque
of Sincu-Bamarrunbe,
(Damga),
in
order
"to
implore
the Almighty and pray
for
the viccory of our troops." 16 Three
months
later.
Ceerno Yero Baal,
the Grand Marahout of
Ngijilon,
a man
rarely mentioned in official reports,
came to the district chief-town,
To
inquire about the progress of our troops.
He was
provided
information on all
operations as summarized
in
the
'Havas
telegra~~es.'
At
the administrator's
request,
the cleric declared thac since he
'.... as
too
old
to
bear arms,
"he ·..,zill use all
his
authority
to
usefully
assist the administration.,,17
Other prestigious leaders such as Aamadu
Moktaar Saaxo and Sheex Kuusaa Kamara.
also took to organizing similar
public prayers.
It
is
also very
likely
that
their own sons enlisted.
A total of sixty chiefs,
Tukuloor and Soninke of both banks,
joined the
army
between
1914
and 1918.
With
the
exception of Abdul Salaam Kan
who '!Jorked with
the "Mobile Draft Board,"
all the others actually were
involved in comb~t situations. 18
,
I

---

389
TABLE 14: Recapitulation of conscription statistics. 1914-1918
- . - - . - - . - -
-~._----_._----_._------------~-------------------
Districts:
1914:
1915
1916
1917
: 1918
Total
Pador
121
250
130
407
908
Dagana
30:
130
150
80
92
482
Matam
100:
308
150
150
3/,0
1,048
Salde
40:
130
?
53
150
373
Gorgol
539
639
Brakna
402
402
Trarza
114
48
162
S 'C - Louis
2
2
N.bank
200
200
N.bank
479
479
Toea1s
170
689
1,407
613
1,037:~3,)86
-.-.--.--------------------.-._------_.-._ .. _--------.--------
3. THE PRESSURE ON THE NORTH BANK
One
cannot
close
this
section
·..I~t.hout point.ing at
the
extreme
victimization
of
the
north
bank,
or
the
regions
referred
to
as
"Souchern Disuiccs"
and inhabiced by che Haal-pulaar'en, or Tukuloor,
the Soninke,
and Wolof populations.
A decade back,
during the conquest
of
Kauricania,
Colonel
Xavier
Coppolani
had
signed
an
agreement
'fII1th
the
Zwaya
tribes
(clerics).
pledging
never
to
recruit
soldiers
among
them,
in
excha71ge
for
the
acceptance of
the
protectorate
prtnciple.
At
the outbreak of
the war,
Moorish
leadership wrested this document
from
the
dus c
of
t.heir
archives
and
presented
it.
to
che
colonial
I
authority,
who stood by the agreement throughout the war.
I
During t.he recruit.ment. campaign of 1916,
some "W1'.ite Moors"
from
Trarza
cut
their
hair
short.
in 'order
to
t.rick
the
draft
board
and
enl is t..
When chief Brahim Wol Seh al Hasan complained about che the
I
fact,
invoking the above mentioned agreement,
Lt. Colonel Obissier, the
I
Commissioner of Mauritania, ordered the Moors released ~ithout further
I
due.
In his
reply to Captain Va11ee,
the Commandanc of Trarza dis-
I
I
I

---

390
triet,
he
insisted
that
the
denouement
of
this
particular
case was
in
and
of
itself,
tangible
evidence
of
French
trustworthiness.
The
Commissioner told his subordinate
the following:
We have
thus manifested our intention to remain true
to
the deal we
struck at
the
time
of occupation and,
you
could
po in t
out
ch is
examp le
to
a 11
those
who J
like Cheikh Ould Hassan,
would seem to doubt it. 19
Thus,
the
idea
gained
currency
that
"!"'11ite
Moors"
were
only
required to provide moral and material support,
in the
form of finan-
cial
contributions,
cattle,
and sheep
for
che provision of
troops
and
sometimes,
millet
for
the
feeding of horses.
This is ~hy the Comman-
dant
of Trarza,
calking about
a
prestigious
2waya
chief,
mentioned
in
October 1915 the following:
Cheikh Sidya has
told me
that,
since
they cannot save
Fr ance
"" i th
the i r
O\\o1TI
bad ie s ,
the
peop le
0 f
the
country will
do
everything
possible
to
assist
those
who are suffering in the name of the common cause. 20
Evidence suggests that exemption from recruitment extended also to
the
"Black
Moors"
or
Ha~atln (then
slaves).
During
the
recruitment
operations
of
1915
fe'..;
such
element:s
...... ere
brought:
before
the
draft
I
board.
On a
total
of seventy men led before
the
commission,
only
two
~ere declared apt to serve and ~ere inducted in the army.
Haratin ~ere
I
spared for several
reasons.
Many within
the administration,
i~C'lL:.ding
Commissioner Henri Caden,
contended
that
the Moors had proven to be de
I
detestables
tirailleurs,
because
of
their
terrible
physical
condi-
I
tion. 21
Second.
these
Moors
~ere
reputedly
prone
to
desert
shortly
I
after
their
induction.
This
may
have
had
to
do
with
the
fact
that
(
I
r

---

J91
desertion
meant,
in many
instances,
freedom.
Finally,
conscious
that
recruitment of their slaves amounted to no less than loss of productive
forces,
White
masters
in
Brakna
district
came
to
envisage
sending
to
the
Semama
farms
(along
the
river),
only
t.hose
unlikely
to
be
con-
scripted,
and keeping the very physically fit
~or military duty,
away
from riverine areas throughout the dry season.
In order to prevent the
serious
consequences
such
a
decision "",as
likely
to have
on agric '..l1·
cural production in
the Semama
the administration of Brakna quickly
moved to "inform neig~bouring districts, and help dissipate fears among
the bosses of the Haratines farming in the chemama.,,22
Exemption from
serfice
was
not
the
only
advantage
Moors
enjoyed.
By
mid-l9l7,
requisi~ion Yas abolished among them.
As
if
to juscify the reluctance
to recruit Moors,
the
administra-
I
tion
wen::
to
great
lengt:--t
to
establish
the
cliche
of
the
so-called
"natural
unfi tness"
of
the
Moor
for
service,
because
of
his
alleged
"inherent physical weakness."
Ironically,
this same cliche was appli~d
-·among the Fuutankoobe--to Fulbe nomad pastoralists.
Such a prejudice
cannot
stand
scrutiny.
In
point
of
fact,
the
Arabo·Berbers
of
North
Africa were
of
the
same
racial
and physical constitution as
the Moors
and
yet,
they
often
won
praise
as
fighting
men
in
all
regiments.
Second,
the
equation
of
"fitness
for
service"
with
physical
strength
and
muscle
was
a
gross
mistake on the part of the
French
for,
nomads
have
proven- -t.hroughout
history· -t.o
be
excellent
warriors
and
empire
builders.
The
only consequence
of
this prejudice
was,
as M.J.
Echen~
berg rightly noticed,
to
put
to
disadvantage
the mass
of strong young
I
farmers.
at
the
benefit of urban
populations.
But,
the truth behind
I
l
I

---

392
this
prejudice
was
that
the
administration
placed
very
little
con-
fidence
on
elements
who,
they
thought,
could
become
fair
prey
to
Ottoman· Islamic
propaganda 23
Last,
but
not
the
least,
the
fear
of
Moorish
dissidence
always
haunted
French
mind,
especially
during
the
war years.
This is why throughout the conflict,
the administration did
its
utmost
to
avoid
applying
pressure
of
any
sort
on
the
Moorish
population of Mauritania.
Commissioner Gaden had this
in mind when he
strongly
discouraged any recruLtment among both masters and slaves and
added rather straightforwardly that,
I
would
rather
send
to
the
supreme
command
one
company
and
a
half,
than
undertake
in Mauritania
a
draft
chat
could,
at
the most.
give an equal number
of men,
at the price of inevitable trouble and likely
serious consequences. 24
The
end
result
of
French conscription policies
in Mauritania was
thus.
an
unequal
share
of
the
burden
at
the
expense
of
the
Negro -
African
section
of
the
people.
This
was
in
di.rect
contradiction
to
Governor
General
Ponty's
recommendation
of
1914. 25
All
in
all,
the
districts
of
the south paid a heavy price,
Tukuloor and Fulbe formed
85%
of
the
total
people
conscripted,
Soninke
roughly 10%
Wolof 3%
and Haratin only 2%.
On
the north bank,
instead of the 0,96% advanced
by Marc Hichel and based on
the
total
population
(Blacks and Whites),
some
3.5~~ were
caken
between
1914
and
1918.
Further
corroboration
comes
from
a
testimony
from
Doctor
Jardon
who
did
examination
from
Gidimaxa
all
the
way
to
St.
Louis.
He
declared
in
1917
that,
"all
valid men have undergone pre-service examination"
and that,
"there are
simply no more draftable people,"
The reality of this situation of the

---

393
north
bank
was
only
one
of
the
numerous
reasons
for
the
frustrations
that prevailed in Fuuta Tooro throughout the
war.
4. POPULAR ATTITUDE AGAINST WAR TIME CONSCRIPTION
The
reaction
of
the
Fuutankoobe
to
conscription
has
partly been
dealt with i~ the preceding chapter.
wnat this one purports to actcress
therefore,
is
the
relatively
specific
problems
related
to
.....ar
time:
conscription
and
the
consequent
new
attitudes
of
the
masses.
In
general,
both
the
abuses
of adrninistra<:ion
and
the
frustration of the
people were at their highest pitch.
The
very
procedures
used
in conscription operations '...ere
fraught
with inequity.
At the beginning of the war, birth records were rare in
the colonies.
Canton chiefs
were
responsible
for
both
providing bona
fide
lists
of
draftable
men
and
seeing
to
it
that
these
be
brought
before
the
recruitment commission. 26
These same
local
chiefs had the
possibility
of
exempting
their
relatives
and
Eriends
from
service.
With such powers,
few
chiefs
could
resist
the
myriad opportunit.ies
to
play favourites,
especially when i t meant gifts
in
the
form of cattle,
money,
jewelry and other things. 27
Even when orders were carried
out
and lottery drawn,
as ~as recommended by the administratio~, the system
remained
largely
liable
to
abuse
and
irregularities.
It
often
can-
sisted in drawing numbers or marked str'aws a~d those who drew unlucky
ones
were
inducted
automatically.
Underhand
tricks
were
used
to
incorporate
some
and save
others.
Chie fs
sometimes
took advantage
of
it
to send recalcitrancs or sons of poLitical enernies. 28
Conscription procedures
themselves
entailed
for
the conscripts,
,
I

---

394
frustrations
of a
sort
that
French citizens would not have
tolerated.
With perhaps the exception of chiefs and their close relatives,
medical
exams
prior
to
induction
took
place
in
public,
with
the
men
often
completely nude.
Frustrations
did not
end with
the
induction
into
the
army.
Once
on
the
front,
soldiers
experienced,
in addition to hard·
ships
inherent
in
military
campaigns,
homesickness
and
complete
isolation.
Letters
sent
from
Europe
or
North
Africa
did
not
always
reach
addressees.
The
main
explanation
put
forth
was
the
lack
of
I
precise
information
to
forward
the
mail.
This prob lem was
serious
I
p.nough to cause the Ministry of war to issue on 16 April
1916 instruc-
\\
tions
urging
the
supreme
command
to
sensitize
the
Goverr.ment
Genera.l
i
about the matter. 29
A third source of frustration Nas
the lot of many
Ii
wives
left behind.
At
the beginning of the war the administration had
II
given
orders
at
all
levels
of
the
hierarchy,
formally
interdicting
i
!
local authorities
to pron:unce divorce
in any case
involving a Tirail-
leur. 30
But many district
tribunals
disregarded such
instructions and
IIi
pronounced
divorce
on
many
occasions,
undp.r
the
pretense
that
the
I
j
Tirailleur was
dead,
or
that no news had been received either from,
or
of him.
So
much
so
that Governor General
G.
Angoulvant had
to
issue
the circular of 27 April 1918,
To
remind
the
indigenous
population
that
we
shall
severely punish all those,
men or ~omen, who would be
caught violating the rules set up by the department.
Judiciary repression will also befall any
family or
notable who would pariticipate
in
the celebration of
such marriages [of wives of tirailleursJ .31
Families
of
Tirailleurs
had
their
share
of
frustration
and
anxie ty.
As of September 1915 Governor Gor had to acknowledge
that.

---

395
"with the exception of tirailleurs brought home
to their families
for
reasons
of
illness or wound,
no healthy man has come back ...
The only
things
parents
have
received
so
far.
are
death
certificates,
empty
wallets,
medals,
sometimes a
small
amount of money.l,32
Even the rare
news
that" some
received
regarding
the
death
of
Tirailleurs
was
sub-
jected
to
censorship
after
local
administrators
expressed
the
fear
that,
"this
news,
spread
around
and
exaggerated
somewhat
on
purpose
[s ic I
should cause us difficulties when the time comes to conduct new
recruitment operations."
The Lt.
Governor simply advised the Governor
General to stop any such news until
the end of the war. 33
The anxiety
of
families
redoubled
as
a
result
of
this
censorship
and
became
so
~idespread as co cause the Director of Military Service in French ~lack
Africa
to
insist
in
1917
that
Tirailleurs
be
repatriated
immediately
after the war,
in order to "destroy che myth of one-'."Jay trips. ,,34
As
a
result
of
these
problems,
reactions
took
form
among
the
people
that--in
many
ways- -contrast
sharply
with
the
often
praised
loyalist attitude of the
traditional elite.
Reactions
ranged from the
ordinary
crossing
to
the
north
bank
and
flight
to
the
bush,
to
long
range
emigration
to
both
the
cities
and
British
territories,
self
mutilation,
and outright desertion.
The first
form one hardly needs to
emphasize.
Suffice
it
to
mention
that
it
increased
in number,
spread
widely
i.n coverage,
and
gained
i:1
sophistication.
Prior
Co
the
war,
the young men who refused to appear before the draft board often did so
on their own and were responsible
for
their escape.
During the war it
became
a
matter
of
public
concern.
Whole
villages,
men
and
......omen
alike,
got
involved
in
the
planning
and
scheming
of
desertions.

---

396
Corroborative
of
this
fact
is
the
following quote
from
Paln;ide
de
Raffin, the commandant of Matam who said:
In
Damga,
chief
Abdul
Salam
Kane
did
not
encounter
the
same
difficulties
as his
colleague of
Ngenaar.
The population [in this canton]. simply vanished: All
young
men
fled
to
the
bush
far
from
the
villages,
where
they were supplied with provisions.35
Under these circumstarces,
the administr3tion was
to
resort to
the
kind of "man hunt« already mentioned abo~t western Tooro. The war years
witnessed also a long range type of emigration. By late 1915-early 1916
conscription was extended to
the north bank,
hitherto a safe haven for
draft
dodgers.
Consequent
on
this
new
5 i tuation - -long
awa i ted
by
administrators
as
a
key
corrective
to
emigration- -people
from
both
I
I
banks started pouring into the cities.
In 1916 over 3,000 men had fled
I
from
the
rural
areas
to
the
cities,
according
to
the
Lt.
Governor of
!
Senegal.
With
the
extension of
the draft
to
"areas of direct rule,"
i
many
turned
to
British
and
Portuguese
colonies
(The
Gambia,
Guinea
I
Bissau and
Sierra-Leone).
The
British,
who
held a different view
on
I
African participation to the war and were perhaps interested
in a flow
I.
of cheap
labour,
did not discourage
this emigration.
To the reques ts
I
of French adminis~rators, the gritish always lent deaf ears. 36
Self maiming ,,,as another
techique
many
resorted
to,
in
order
to
I
be declared
"unfft."
The
general
report of 1916
in Senegal mentioned
eight
such
cases
in
the
cercle
of
Matam.
Traditions
also
refer
to
cases
of
self
induced
blindness.
Some
would-be
conscripts
often
injected the sap of Calotropis Procera 37 into their eyes.
The luckiest
ones ended up catching conjunctivitis while others went blind.
Another

---

397
draft dodging
technique consisted in
injecting into
the penis by means
of
a
straw,
several
drops
of
milk.
This
caused
the medical examiner
to
construe
the
trickling
down
of
milk as
a sign of venereal
disease
and reject the man automatically.
There were such other techniques as,
playing
deaf,
mute,
or
mentally
ill.
Sometimes,
when.
these
tricks
failed
to
work,
ne'.oI
conscripts
"desertent
en
masse IP
and,
as
the
Commandant of Matam complained,
"every mail delivery brings me a search
warrant concerning twenty or thirty desertors.,·38
Given the number of casualties,
many were highly pessimistic ab'Jut
chances
to
survive
the
war
and
they
equated
the
departure
of
con-
scripts with bereavement
Ironically,
much of the blame was
often put
on
the
local chief.
Thus,
in
1915
village
chiefs
in
the canton of
Laa~ refused to provide recruits unless the chief himself sent his own
son.
Commandant
Ligneres
the
administrator
of
Podor
had to
make
a
I
I
quick
trip
to Kasga and convene a
general
palaver to cause the people
to change
their mind.
In addition,
he moved
to
rei~state the chief of
Kasga I
previously
discharged by his canton
chief I
perhaps
for
leading
the
revolt 39
In E.
Tooro,
the
same
ill-will prevailed.
In a
letter
to
the administrator of Fodor,
chief
Birom 5ih
reported that with
the
exception
of
two,
none
of
the
village
chiefs
bothered
bringing
con-
scripts,
as
previously promised to
the
Comrna~dant.
More serious
even,
on
23
February
1915,
some
fifty
young
men
f.<:om
Jomanndu,
armed with
guns,
spears,
clubs,
swords I
and
knives I
rushed
to
the
chief to!JT1 of
Njum where they liberated all of the men locked up by the chief,
though
only
two
were
from
their village.
And,
they
threatened
to
kill
the
canton chief.
During
this
incident,
the
small band wounded some
of

---

398
the
chief' 5
retainers.
Farther
eas t,
Hamrnadi
Alfaa.
the
chief
of
Ngenaar,
experienced
similar
difficulties.
particularly
with
che
villages
of Gaawol
and
Kaawel.
In the
first
case
people
refused
to
provide
recruits.
For
three
days,
the
chief
received
only
three:
a
lame man,
someone with one eye,
and a kid,
whom the commandant reject-
ed.
At
Kaawel
......here
the
slogan preceded
the chief
women armed with
I
pestles
fell
on
the
chief's
retainers
and
injured
many
of
them.
According
to
the
Commandant,
"it.
.....·as
everywhere
the
same
response,
outright
refusal
to provide soldiers."
On the north bank where desertion was routine,
almost no
related
open
rebellion
',Jas
ever
rep0::'ted.
Odd
as
it
may
seem,
i t
was
the
canton
chiefs
·,..rha
often came
in
for
the
administration's
wrath,
anc.
fell victim to dismissals. 40
B.
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
1.
FIN"'-''lCIAL:
T~XES AND SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
To
the
extent
that
taxation
was
no
novelty
during
the
....... ar,
it
could be argued that tax payments did not constitute a contribution per
se.
Ho .......eve r,
the
increase
of
tax
rates
and
the
pressure
brought
co
bear
on
the
people
for
their
paynent,
and
che
conditions
in
which
people hustled
to
pay
require
treatment.
In
order
to understand how
heavily
taxation may have
weighed on
the
masses,
one has
to
remember
the conditions
that prevailed on the eve and after the .......ar.
From
1912
forward.
the
districts
of
the
valley
in
general.
experienced
frequently
the
effects
of
such
compounded calamities
as,
locust swarms,
drought,
grain
and
cattle
diseases,
to
mention, just a
' (

---

399
few. 41
Consequently,
food
shortages
and
famines
became
routine,
reaching
dreadful
proportions
in
1914-1915
and
1916-1917.
To
make
matters worse,
cattle epidemics struck several
times between
1912 and
1918.
Deprivation ~as such ~hat the Government General
had to launch
a
reI teE programme
of
:ood aid
payable
after
each
harvest.
At
the
local
level,
the
perception of and
lessons
from
these
difficulties
varied
from
one
administrator
to another.
7Jhile the Resident of Boghe
made
i t a duty
to
"moderate the zeal of some Province Chiefs who have
started impounding and selling the
cattle and estates of the miserable
debitors,"
the
Commandant of Pador
discouraged any effort on the
part
of
the
adrninistr:ation
~o
lower
tax
rates
or
distribute
grain.
w
..e
contended
that,
"ie
is
better
(sic]
to
let
the population make
every
effort
co carry on with
life,
and
insure
the payment of taxes",42
As
these hard times required more and more 11 ass istance,"
they broughc
i~to
the
picture
the
question of
reimbursement
of provisions
loaned
to
the
people, which rendered the paJ~ent of taxes all the more difficult.
,
I
One
of
the
immediate
administrative
effects
of
the
outbreak
of
j
the
war
in
Europe,
was
the
increase
of
tax
rates
in
the
colonies.
I
iI
These
passed
quickly
from
3
to
4
francs
in the
l'Protectoratcs,': and
I
~rom 4 to 5.5 in the "Terl~itories of direct administration."
In 1917,
I
despite
one
of
the
worst
cattle
epidemics
that
Fuuta
Tooro
ever
I
I
experienced,
along vith
the
havoc
caused
by
grain
disease,
a
50%
tax
I
increase
was
imposed.
Taxes
passed
from
4
to
6
in
the
"protec-
I
tora tes, 11 and from 5.5 to 7.5 francs
in the escales
(in Fuuta the chief
I
towns) .
Though
this
increase
was
accepted
....... ithout
fuming,"
the
Commandant of Salde proved closer and more sensitive
to
the
situation

---

400
than his
colleague at Matam,
when he recognized
that
the new tax quota
seemed
to be
the
"extreme
limit of
the
financial capacity of the
tax
payer,
judging from the paucity of ressources
the country offers.,,43
As much as the sourc~s reveal, no new increase was enacted
before
the end of the war.
But,
the ever
increasing
reimbursements of food
relief filled that gap,
as
it were.
These
reimbursements were
in and
of themselves,
another form of tax payment.
Sometimes,
they became the
object
of
separate
books
and
their
payment
bred
the
same
kind
and
amount
of
administrative
pressure
as
that
of
regular
taxes.
As
the
administration needed more and more financial ressources,
people had to
sell whatever grain they had in store,
every
time
local administracors
deemed the harvest slightly good or even promising.44
Because
the meat factory at Linnjaan
(Kaolack)
started running ac
its
full
capacity45
in 1915,
the
administration pressured
the
popula-
cion
co
sell
caccle
and
sheep
as
anocher
major
'Jay
of
raising
tax
money.
Starting
in
1916
some
adminiscrators
goaded
the
people
into
selling their cattle by
threacening to
impose a
"special
tax"
on every
single
"non-productive"
animal.
meaning
essencially
oxen
and
rams.
I
These
figures
concerning
cattle
sales
from
three
districts I
bet.T.oleen
1915 and 1917.
give idea of what it was like. 46
I
I
TABLE 15:
Cattle ?ales on the South Bank 1914-1917
Districts
1914
1916
1917
I
Podor
260
1,400
1,400
Matam
4,000
4,000
1,373
Salde
500
444
500
I
I
t
t
I

---

401
A
third
'.Jay
of
rais ing
tax
money
was
emigration
to
the
more
prosperous
western section of
the
country,
at
the railway construction
sites
and
in
the
"peanut
basin. to
In March
1915,
after
the people of
Damga
showed
their
inability
to
pay
taxes
for
the
previous
year,
the
Commandant of Matam sent many notables
to jail and,
shortly after,
in
the ~ords of the administrator,
The
remedy
proved
effective.
Work
teams
for
the
Thies-Kayes
[rail
way
line]
that
were
extremely
difficult to form [in ordinary times] ''''ere set up. As
of
this
moment,
thirty
six
teams
to~alling
seven
hundred and fif::." .six men have lefe.
Many others
left
thereafter.
for
the districts
of Lower
Senegal.
Most
of
these
groups
were
made
of youngsters
of
fourteen
to fifteen
years,
This suggests that the administration had no qualms about using
child
labour
to
recover
past
due
caxes.
The
CaX2S
and
reimbursements
combined resulted in considerable drain of money from Fuuta Tooro.
The
evolution
of
tax
figures
in
two
districts
of
both
banks
well
il-
lustrates
such
drain.
In
Matam
taxes
collected
passed
from
60,871
francs
in
1914
to
126,818.6
in
1915,
and
205,616
in
1916
(i.e:
an
increase of over 78,000 Fs in the last year alone).
In the district or
I
Boghe,
taxes
passed from
57,332
in 1914,
to
58.800 in 1915,
70,000 in
I
1916 and 81,462 francs
in 1918. 47
Star:ing in 1915 the administration
forced
people
:0
reimburse
grain-aid
..... hich
sometimes
reprelaented
a
I
heavy burden for them.
This same year the district of Podor reimbursed
some
61,250 francs
dis tr ibuted as
fa 110'''5 :
Laaw:
19.200
frs;
Haayre-
I
Laaw:
12,250 frs;
E. Tooro:
11,650; and W.
Tooro: 18,150.
I
In addition to taxes and reimbursements,
people were
subjected to
I
\\

---

402
I
special
contributions
referred
to
as
"solidarite"
and
intended
for
assistance
to
Black
troops,
war
orphans,
and
the
"devastated regions
of France.,,48
To these targets of "solidarity" one should add a series
of holidays designed to
honour the military:
"Journee du 75"
in honour
of
the
75rnm
cannon;
"Jounee
du
23
Mai
1915";
"Journee
du
Poilu, n
to
mention
just
a
few.
These
contributions
were
generally
collected by
the
administration
and channel.1ed through by
the army headquarters
or
sent
in care
of various
clubs
(see note
48).
Two modes of
collection
were usually followed.
Sometimes,
Chiefs or Interpreters·~often out of
zeal· -requested
and
obtained
permission
to
raise
funds.
On
14
July
1915 Jibril
Lih,
Interpreter
ae Kaedi,
raised
in fOUT villages of h~s
canton a sum of 280 frs
that was sent
to Batallion Commander Modat.
In
his forwarding
report
the Commandant of Corgol declared that,
"all
the
people have
sho'...rTI generosity,
even
the
most humble
ones. ,,49
wnether
"all the people"
relished to contribute
is,
of course,
a moot question.
Nonetheless
there
is
reason
to
believe
that
the
administration
made
this
"solidarity"
mandatory.
In
late
1915
the
district
of
Podor
contribuced
for
some
1,575
frs
to
the
"Journee
des
orphelins
de
guerre."
Out of forty villages,
thirty had already contributed by the
month
of
Oct·ober. 50
Later,
in
1917,
the
three
districts
of Matam,
Podor and Salde yielded 1.205 frs
( 268, 910.5 and 27.10 respectively).
Judging from one report, Mauritania had given by 1918"
65,156 francs'
contributions,
of
which
some
30,000
probably
came
from
the
north
bank. 51
Finally,
the
participation
of
Fuuta Tooro
involved,
above
all,
grain and cattle,
independent of what was sold to raise tax monies.
I
I
I

---

403
2.
THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN AND CATTLE
During
c.he
war
the
adminiscration
reinforced
the
previous
order
of July 1910 regarding the various forms of contribution
required from
the
inhabitants of west Africa.
Grain
(rice and
millet) ~as high on
the
list
of
products
mentioned.
Millet
~as
prized
not
only
for
feeding
soldiers
and
horses
but,
also
for
sales
and
cash
revenue
as
well
as
the
supply
of
urban
communities
and
"provident
societies."
\\.Jith
its
long
standing
reputation
of
"bread
basket,"
Fuuta
Tooro
provided
a
great
deal
of
the
millet
exported
from
both
Senegal
and
Mauritania.
The
scattered
figures
on
grain
contribution
are
very
limited, but give an indication of its importance.
The cere le of Salde
sent to "Military Authority" at Podor 8,308 kilogrammes of millet to be
for'.arded
to
St.
Louis
22 May 1915.
A fe·.,., months
later,
the district
of
Podor
sent
43,772
kgs
to
the
"Providence
society"
of
Ti~aa~oon,
apologising for being unable
to meet the
50
tons demanded.
The report
made
no
mention of
compensation
for
such provisions.
I f there
'.le re
any
compensation
at
all,
it
would
hardly
be
commensurate
"'i th
the
amounts of grain supplied.
The
importance of grain is
highlighted by
I
the
fact
that
people were authorized,
from 1915
on'.ard,
to pay
taxes
in millet,
a
practice
abandoned ever since
the
1890s.
In 1918,
the
I
north bank provided 3,300
tons
of millet of ~hich 2,400 came from t~e
I
cercle
of
Gorgol
alone.
That
same
year,
considerable
quantities of
grain
were
amassed
in
each
canton,
sent
to
the
closest
river
front
I
villages,
and transported on to St.
Louis by convoys of steamers.
Requisitions applied also
to cattle and some other animals such as
I
horses, camels and sheep.
In 1916,
the cercle of Gorgol provided 5,500
I
I,
I

---

404
head of cattle in the form of "requisition."
The same year Matam gave
4,000
while
Podor
yielded
over
1,000. 54
As
was
the
case
wi th
head
taxes,
a
meticulous
counting
of
he!:'ds
always
took
place.
Although
people
managed
to
trick
census
takers,
the
administration
succeeded
generally
in
imposing
levies
fairly
proportionate
to
herds
in
each
cancon.
For the year 1916 alone,
Fuuta Tooto provided through requisi-
tion and sales,
some 10,000 head of cattle.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

---

NOTES
1.
For
the
decrees
relative
to
recruitment:
and
the
war
in
general,
see:
A.N.S:
40-29;
40-34;
40-55;
40-56;
40-70;
40-71;
40-77;
40-81;
40-83;
40-87.
See
also:
Marc
Michel,
L'Appel
a
l'Afrique,
op.cit.;
Jean
Suret-Canale,
Afriaue
Noire
1900-1945,
op.cit.;
Iba Oer
Thlam,
Evolution
Politique
op.cit.,
Vol.V.;
Myron
J.
Echenberg,
"Paying
the
blood
tax:
Military
conscription
in
French
\\Jest
Africa,
1914-1918"
in,
Re'roe canadienne des Etudes Africaines, Vol.
IX,
2 1975,
pp.
171-192.
(Hereafter,
"Paying the blood tax.");
C.M.Andrew and A.S.
Kanya-Forstner,
"France, Africa and the First 'World !.Jar" in, Journal of
African History, XIX,
I, 1978, pp,
11-23.
For
the
oral
tradit:~ons see:
Mbaare Bah;
Buubu
Sal;
Dahaa Kane;
Demmba
Jaawando
Bookum;
Famille Maam
Njaak
Kan;
Rasuulu
Li':1;
Hamedin
Kan,
Passim.
2.
This,
in reference
to
the medical check up prior to conscrip·
tion.
3.
A.N.S:
2G13-
52 Salde-Jorbuwol,
1913.
Later,
the commis ion
will consist mainly of the canton ch ie f ,
the
doctor,
and the district
guards.
4.
For details on
recruitmen~ procedures,
we
rely on an account
by Sheex Yaaya Kan,
former canton chief at Mbaan (N.B).
5.
Some
resorted
to
what
was
called,
Tobbe
(lit:
dots),
which
consisted
in
counting
and
having
every
fifth
person
go
before
the
commission.
Others
used
straws
(Legkon).
These
were
marked
with
different
signs.
Depending on which
straw a
person drew,
he was
told
to go before the commLssion,
or dismissed.
6.
A.N.S:
40-55
"Recrutement
des
50,000
Indigenes
1915-1916"
(Senegal)
:
Oossier annexe
3,
piece
16;
7p.
"Rapport du 30 Juin 1915:
adm. Matam a Lt.
Couverneur.
7.
These
provisions
.wen~
added
by
the
Lt.
Governor
and
the
Governor General who had
the~discretionary power to define the condi-
tions
of
recruitment
in
the
territories
under
their
jurisdiction.
(A.N.S:
40-55
op.cit.,
piece 11,
Lt.
Gouverneur
a
Gouverneur General
Clozel,
St.
Louis L2 Octobre 1915).
8.
A.N.S:
2G15-16,
Senegal:
"Rapports Trimestriels 1915"
(A.O.F
a Paris, no.
671, 1/6/1915).
I
405
[
I
I

---

406
In the district of Matam,
even the chief of the village of Ja11ube
fled
to
the
north bank to
spare his
children conscription.
In agree-
ment with the Commandant of Gorgol,
the administrator of Matam had him
returned
to
the
south
bank.
(A.N.S:
2G15-35 Matam;
"Rapports
Mensue1s
1915"
(Fevrier).
9.
A.N.S:
40-56
"Recrutement
des
50,000
Indigenes
1915-1916"
(Mauritania,
p.
I-
082-
Lt Colonel Obissier,
Commissaire,
a Gouverneur
General,
St.
Louis 18/11/1915).
10.
A.N.S:
40-81
"Recrutement
et
Dossiers
divers
1918"
(Sous-
Secretaire a L'Interieur aux Prefets,
17/12/1917).
The
exemption
from
taxation
represented for
the administration a
neae loss
of 36
frs
per family of conscript.
As
for the exemption from
labour-tax,
it
represented
the
sacrifice
of
3 hours'
labour
tax
for a
toea1 of 10 days
per year;
each day representing 0.75 frs,
it amounted
to 75 frs per family of recruit.
11.
For
the
role
of
B1aise
Diagne
in
the
1918
recruitment
cam-
paign,
see,
Marc Miche1,
L'Appe1,
op.cit.,
pp.
223-235.
12.
See, Marc Miche1,
L'Apoe1,
op.cit.,
chapter 3, part V,
pp.
57-64.
13.
A.N.S:
40-55 op.cit.,
p.
11.
14.
There
used
to
be
big nails
and blankets '.. it!>
"nwnber 10"
as
brand name.
Since
then,
in the mind of the people the "10" has become
synonymous with large size.
15.
Interview
,.. ith
Hamedin
Kan,
passim,
sect.
2.
Reports
from
Podor seem to correlate with
this
tradition.
In Nov.
1915 commandant
Lignleres had this to say:
These chiefs show,
with the exception of the chief of
western Toro
[Aamadu M.
Wan].
no activity,
no energy
whatsoever:
The chief of Lao
(Amadou Samba)
because
he
does
not
want
to
displease
the
population;
The
other,
the' chief of
Aere
Lao
(Ibra Abdou1),
because
he regards any such activity as unworthy
[sic]
of his
noble
descent;
The
third one,
the
chief of E.. Toro
(Biron Sy), due to his
indolence and the fact that he
considers his current position as one of retirement,
(A.N.S:
2G15-43 Podor "Rapports Mensuels 1915"
(Novembre):,
16.
For Sheex Haamidu Kan's request and conducting of ~uch prayer,
see:
A.N.S:
2G16-33
Matam
"Rapports
Mensue1s
1916"
(December)
and
also,
2G17 - 5 Senegal "Rapport General: Pays de Protectorat 1917" (no 2,
p.
20).
17.
A.N.S:
2G17- 30
Matam "Rapports Mensuels 1917"
(Mars),
I
I
I

---

407
18.
Baylaa BLraan.
the chLef of Halaybe-Laaw.
obtained a Citation
a l'ordre du regiment that read,
Officier
indigene
d'une
rare
valeur
et
d'un
beau
courage,
le
7
octobre
au
moment
de
l'assaut
d'un
village
for Cement
organise,
s'est
precipice
sur
une
mitrailleuse
en
action
qui
genait
la
progression de
sa
compagnie
et
5' en
est
rendu
maitre.
A
sauve
quelques indigenes de sa race.
From
Baylaa
Biraan' 5
papers,
transcribed
by his
son
Hammaac I
Boghe I
pass im.
19.
A.N.M:
El-89 op.dt .. Trarza:
"Rapports Politiques 1905-1916"
(Commandant Trarza a Butilimit. 13/4/ 1916).
Z~aya
Moors'
vocation
was
traditionally
spiritual,
rather
than
temporal as with the Hasan warriors.
20.
A.N.M:
El-89 op.cit.,
"Troisieme trimestre,
2/10/1915."
In October 1916 for example,
the tribes of the Residence of
Butilimit
having heard
about administrative
requests
for
grain,
went
spontaneously to their Resident and offered 33 tons of millet that were
shipped
to
Dagana.
By
mid
1917.
the
Moors had contributed for
aboui:
150 tons.
During
the
4th
quarter
of
1915,
they
sent
to
the
Linnjaan neat
plant some
1,200 head of cattle carrying with
them a message
from Mr.
Vallee,
the Commandant of Trarza,
urging the Director of the factory to
offer them good prices.
By
January
1917.
the
rich
!ioors
had
provided
some
7
to
8,000
francs'
special contributions.
(A.N.M:
El-89 op.cit.
4e trimest.)
21
A.N.S:
40-83 "Recrutenent de 1918; Senegal et Mauritanie"
(Note
sur
les
possibilites
de
recrutement
en
Mauritanie,
par
Henri
Gaden,
Decernbre 1917) .
22.
Boghe:
"Rapports Politiques 1908-1921", op.cit.,
1918.
I
23.
Starting
in
1911,
Germany
began
using
Pan
Islamism
against
French
colonial
interests,
which
generated
a
sort
of
paranoia
among
I
French officials,
vis
a vis
Islam.
For German-Turkish manoeuvres
and
French
attitude
in
Mauritania,
see,
Alioune
Traore,
"LIIslam
en
Mauritanie"
in,
Introduction
a
l'Histoire
de
la
M.auritanie,
EditLon
I
C.N.R.S,
Paris 1979,421 pages
(pp.
156- 166).
(Hereafter,
"L'Islam.")
In June
1916,
the administrator of Katam panicked when some young
men
read
and
circulated
the
May
issue of the
newspaper,
Le Matin,
[n
which a
letter
from
the Ottoman sultan,
called on all Muslims to rise
I
up against
the French "infidels."
Very quickly,
Commandant Palmide de
Raffin had the Qadi Sheex Haamidu Kan convene a general assembly at the
mosque, and settle the matter so that,
I
The
inc ident,
which
could
have
had
very bad
canse-
quences,
remained
harmless;
The
rumour
did
not
spread beyond the escale of Matam.
(A.N.S:
2G16-33).
I
I,
I

---

408
24.
A.N.S:
40-83, Note de Gaden,
op.cit.
25.
In his circular
24
of 9 March 1914,
Governor General William
Ponty had
called on
draft boards
to apply equity
in
its methods.
He
argued that operations should be conducted in a way to help "avoid that
regions
with
traditionally
war-like
people
have
to
bear
alone,
the
brunt
of
recruitment,
which
would
inevitably
lead
to
disastrous
economic consequences."
A.N.M:
0-109 "Dossier du Gouvernement General
1913-1918"
(Annee 1914: Circulaire sur les operations de recrutement).
26.
This was especially valid prior to 1926 '.hen,
according to M.
Echenberg,
Commandants started assuming such reponsibility.
("Paying the blood tax,"
op.cit.,
p.
183.)
27.
In
March
1915,
Administrator
Lignieres,
the
Commandant
of
Podor, bitterly complained that the chiefs of E.
Tooro,
Laaw,
and Haayre-Laaw,
in defiance
of his
repeated orders
and
instructions,
"had not
drawn
a
lottery
to
select conscripts
but,
took by force many
unwealthy
young
men"
(t.hose
whose
parents
were
in
no
pOSition
t.o
bribe].
Lignieres blamed desertions--perhaps wrongly--on the inequity
of local chiefs'
practices.
In Laaw,
investigation revealed that the Watulaabe
(retainers) and
the close entourage of the chief, were mostly responsible for the large
scale corruption.
One chief who proved a real exception on
that matter was,
Haarnidu
Kan,
the
chief of Yirlaabe - Hebbiyaabe.
Written
sources often praised
Haamidu
Kan's
lawful
conduct
in
related matters,
and
tradition
remem-
bers him as an "administratif,"
meaning one who drafted conscentiously,
without
yielding
to
bribery
or
other
sort
of
bias.
(Raasulu
Lih.
passim).
For
irregularities
within
the
conscription
system,
see
for
example:
A.N.S:
2G15-43,
Podor
"Rapports
Mensue1s
1915"
(Octobre);
A.N.M:
El-F,
"Questions de terrain Kaedi-Boghe"
(The case of bribery of
I
the Commandant's cook).
28.
One
such case occurred in 1918 at H.aqaama where,
according to
an
account,
the
chief
refused
to
accept
19
slaves
oEferred by
J aaj e
I
Jegeri
Bah
as
substit:utes
for
his
son
Bookar.
The
chief
saw
in
the
sending of
the
son,
an opportunity
to do harm
to his
deeniyanke
foe.
This did nothing but
precipitate a
family
feud.
(Mbaare Bah and Oahaa
I
Kan,
sect.
5,
passim).
29.
This
led
to Governor General Jost Van Vollenhoven's
circular
I
of 25 'July 1917,
instructing Lt.
Governors and Commissioners to see to
it
thac any such mail entering
their
territories be
transmitted
to the
commander
of
the
mail
storage
at
Oakar,
for
forwarding
to
the
right
administrative authorities.
I
Shortly
after.
the
Cornite
d t Ass is tance
aux.
Troupes
No ires
began
issuing
lists
of
registered
letters
with
names
and
addresses
of
expeditors,
opposite
those
of addressees.
See,
A.N.S:
4D-70
lIRecrute-
I
~ent
et
Etat
d'Esprit
des
Tirailleurs
en
France
1916-1917."
(La
question
de
la
correspondance
entre
les
tirailleurs
sur
le
front
et
t
I

---

409
leurs
familles:
telegramme
du
16/4/1916;
Ministere
de
la
Guerre
au
General Chef d'Etat ~ajor; Brigadier General Coulee, Commandant en Chef
a Gouverneur General,
16/7/1917.)
30.
A.N.S:
4D-71
"Recrutement de 1916-1917 et divers."
(A propos
du
remariage
des
femmes
de
tirailleurs
absents
et
des
veuves:
Lt.
Gouvern.
Antonetti
aux
Presidents
des
Tribunaux,
1
telegrarnme
du
2/11/1915;
and
Gouverneur
General
Clozel
a
Paris,
telegramme
du
10/12/1915.)
31.
A.N.S:
40-71 op.cit,
Gabriel Angoulvant aux Lt.
Gouv.
et Cornmissaires du Gouvernement General,
p.
2.
32.
Marc Michel,
quoting Governor Cor,
L'Appel.
op.cit.,
p.
65.
33.
For
both
complaints
and
the
Lt.
Governor' 5
response,
see,
A.N.S:
2G15-35,
op.cit.,
(Mars).
34.
A. N. S:
4D-70 op.cit.
"Point de vue politique"
par
le Direc-
ceur
Charge
du
Service
Hi licaice
en
Afr Lque
Occidentale
Francaise.
A.Duchene,
Paris 15/5/1915,
(8p).
35.
A. N . S:
4 D- 55
op . c it. ,
piece
16,
Matam
"Rapports
Mensuels"
30/6/1915,
p.
6.
The
villages
of
Aali·1,Iuuri
(Ngenaar)
and JorbulJol
(Boosoya)
had
problems
r..1ith
the
administration
for
indulging
in
similar
activities
(piece 16,
p.
4).
In Halaybe, Bookar Baydi Jah,
a chief deposed in 1913,
is reported
to
have
hidden
desertors
around
the
village
of
Saare·Ndoogu.
(See,
Maarnudu B. Jah,
sect.5,
passim.)
36.
A.N.S:
2G16-5,
Senegal "Rapports Trimestriels 1916"
(Senegal
a A.O.F,
le trimestre,
p. 4).
I
37.
Baawaami in Pulaar.
Its sap is milky and relatively toxic.
For
the correspondance between Pulaar and scientific names of plants,
see;
Fary Silat Ka,
"Kelmeendi
Pudi
e
Pulaar:
Lexique botanique
en poular"
I
document
roneotype,
Universite
de
Dakar,
I.F.A.N,
Departement
de
Linguistique, Juin 1984,
73 pages.
(p.
71).
38.
A.N.S:
2G16-33,
op.cit.,
(March).
According to the Commandant.
of the few unlucky who were found and
I
redirected
to
the
main
conscriptio~n centers,
many
deserted
a
second
time.
I
For
estimations
of
deserters·
in
re la tion
to
total
numbers
in
1915-1916,
in several
colonies,
see:
Ma re
Miche 1,
L'ADoel,
op.cit ..
p.
86.
39.
A.N.S:
2G1S-43,
op.cit., March.
For the folloWing incidents in
I
E.
Tooro,
see:
A.N.S:
4D-55
op.cit.,
"Dossier
Annexe
16,
piece
IS".
(3p).
(Birom
Sih
a
Commandant
de
Podor
23/3/1915:
pp.
1-2.)
For
I
I
I
I

---

410
Ngenaar,
see
the
same
dossier,
piece
3,
Matam
a
Lt.
Governor,
Juin,
30/6/1915,
(p.
4).
40.
E1imaan Abbaas Aac,
chief of the canton of Neere was repeatedly
accused between 1914 and 1918 of "obstructing"
recruitment operations.
He was
finally
fired
in 1918.
The chief of Maqaama Malal Buubu Siree
Aan
incurred a
similar fate
before
the
end of the war.
(A.N.M:
El·98
op.cit. )
41.
See
administrative
reports
starting
in
1912.
We will revert
to these calamities
later.
42.
For
the
quotation
from
the
Resident
of
Boghe,
see:
Boghe,
"Ra?ports" op.cit.,
(1914).
For
that of Commandant Lignieres.
see A.N.S:
2G13-52,
Salde 1913,
(Decembre) .
43.
A.N.S:
2G17·31,
Salde "Rapports Mensuels 1917"
(December).
Contrary to his colleague,
the Co~~andant at Matam viewed this new
tax
increase
as
"a blessing
for
the
country"
that had,
in his
terms,
awaken the
indolent people of his district. by forcing them to emigrate
to
the
western districts
for
jobs.
(A.N.S:
2G17·30 Matarn,
"Rapports
Mensuels 1917,"
(Decembre).
44.
Some
administrators
felt
rarely
disturbed
by
the
fact
that
they
deprlved
people
of
the
grain
they
needed
for
subsistence.
In
fact,
one
amdministrator
ruefully declared
that
the
Paggiri
(sort
of
millet
that
grows
in
the
wild)
"suffit
a
la
nourriture
des
popula·
tions."
(A.N.M:
El·48, Gorgol op.cit., 2e trimestre 1914).
45.
As early as 1915 the factory exploited:
1,248 tons of frozen meat versus 46c in 1914
1,800 kilogrammes of canned meat
I
1,300 kilo
of salted meat
2D,657 kilo
of salted bowels
1,106 tons of hides, versus BOO
in 1914.
23,736 sheep and goat hides.
I
Source:
A.N.S;
2G15·4
Senegal,
"Agriculture
et
Elevage
1915."
22p.
(Herding, pp.
21-22).
l
46.
For this and the quote,
see: A.N.S;
2G15·35, op.cit.,
(Mars).
47.
For tax figures regarding Matam,
see
2G17-35,
Matarn "Rap'ports
Mensuels 1917." For those of Boghe, see "Rapports Politiques 1908:1917"
op.cit.
48.
Various clubs existed that were named after each of these:
-Oeuvres nationales pour les victimes de guerre
-Association pour les orphelins de la guerre
-Foyer du soldat aveugle (club of the blind soldier).
·Associacion de l'Aisne devascee
-Cornite d'assistance aux troupes noires,
etc ...

---

411
See,
Charles
Uyisenga
"La
Participation
du
Senegal
a
l'effort
de
guerre"
Memoire
de
Maitrise,
Departement
d'hiscoire,
Universice
de
Dakar, Octobre 1978, pp.95-101.
(Hereafter,
"La participation")
49.
For
Jibril
Lih's
collection
see,
A.N.M:
El-52
Gorgol,
IlCor-
respondance et rapports 1913-1919" (Commandant Antonin a Commissaire du
Gouvernment, 4 Aout 1915).
See also, A.N.S:
2D-2 "Docwnents relatifs a la Guerre:
Senegal et
Mauritanie." (Jibri1 Lih a Commandant du Gorgo1, 19/7/191j).
50.
A.N.S: 2G15-43, op.cit.,
(Octobre).
At
this
same
period,
Senegal
contributed
52,000
frs
for
the
"Journee
du
75,"
and 150,000
frs
for
the
"Journee des
3 oeuvres"
of 3
October 1915.
(A.N.S: 2G15-30 Senegal "Rapport General 1915", p. 2.
51.
For the contributions of 1917 and 1918, see: Uyisenga Charles,
"La participation", op.cit., p. 101.
See also, Sy Hamat "Les Mauritan-
iens".
op.eic.,
p.
32.
52.
A.N.S: 2G15-37, Sa1de "Rapports Mensue1s 1915"(Juin-Jui11et).
j3.
A.N.S: 2G16-6, Mauritanie; "Rapports po1itiques trimestrie1s
1916," 3e trimestre, Mauritanie a A.a.F, 7p.
54.
Fa r
these
figures,
see:
A.N.S:
2G16-6
Mauritanie
op.eLt.;
2G16-33 Matam op.eit (Juil) 2G16-39 Podor op.cit (Sept); 2G16-35, Sa1de
op. eLl:.
(March-Qct).
l
I
I
I
I
I
I

---

CHAPTER 11: CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR I IN FU~TA TOORO
A. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
1. DRAIN ON RESOURCES
In
Fuuta Tooro
as
elswhere,
the
","'ar
generated the worst
forms of
exploitation of
the
colonised.
Especially.
it occasioned an unprece-
denced drain on resources of all kinds,
money,
grain,
cattle,
as well
as
cattle
produces.
Taxation
and
special
contributions
left people
destitute
of
what
little
amount
of
money
was
available.
Evidence
indicates
that,
when left with
no other alternative,
people often dre~
from
their
own
savings.
For
example,
when
some
villages
in
the
dLstcLct of Matam tefused
to pay taxes Ln 1915,
the Commandant sLmply
threatened
to
levy
the
next
contingent
on
recalcitrant
villages.
Shortly
aftecwatds,
the
money
was
btought
to
hLm,
appacently
fcom
secret reserves
for,
in the words of the administrator,
"the coins bore
:narks
of a
pro longed
5 tay
unde rground. "
This
reinforced
the
Comman-
I
dant's
opinion
that money did exist
in
the country.
and
hat coercion
was the only method needed to get people pay their dues. l
t
It is
true that the administration sometimes provided money in the
I
form of premiums for enlistment.
DurLng the campaLgn of December 1915
for
instance,
it
distributed
61,000
francs
in
the
district
of
Matam
I
alone.
The sale of cattle also brought in apprecLable amounts of cash,
not to mention labour migration.
But,
what the administration gave with
I
412
I
t
I

---

413
one hand,
it took back
with the other. This is borne out by the rueful
remark of the commandant of Matam who said:
I
hope
that,
once
the
contingent
is
gone,
business
will resume its normal course,
and that,
a great deal
of
the
premiums
paid
for
enlistment
will
facilitate
tax collection.
(2G15-35).
In addition,
the cattle sent
to
the
factory at Linnjaan were sold
there
at
extremely
low
prices,
which
led
the
Commandant of Salde
to
express
the
desire
and hope
in
1916
that,
"prices
this
year be
far
more
profitable
than
theJse
of
last
year,
..."..hich
had
caused
serious
disappointment
among
cattle
sellers,l12
Thus,
the
sale
of cattle
did
not
bring
in
proportionate
amOL:nt
of
money,
wnac
is
more,
it
cui:
drastical~y into herds.
Based on
scattered reports,
one can crudely
estimate the number of cattle and sheep-goats exported between 1915 and
1917
at
15,000
and
800
respectively.
Considering
1920
prices
of
animals,
these exports amounted
to some 6,000,000 for cattle,
and some
50,000
francs
for
ovines and caprines.3
These
exports were
forced on
the
Fuutankoobe
at
times
"",hen
epidemics
were
hitting hardest:,
from
1912 forward. 4
It was these combined alarming effects of
exports and
epidemics
that
caused
che
commandant
of
Matam
to
caution
higher
authority
and
spe
to
it
that
"every precaution
is
taken to preserve
male cows for the reproduction of herds."
The same pressing need for cash that generated large scale exports
of
cattle,
caused
the
people
to
resort
to
careless
and
unprofitable
grain transactions.
Starting in 1915,
as a
result of the 1914 famine
and
cash shortages throughout Fuuta Tooro,
the exploitation of farmers
by
local
traitants
reached
sometimes
regrettable
proportions.
From
l

---

414
1915
to
1919,
traders
often
showed unwillingness
to
pay
for grain
in
cash.
When circumstances led them to do S0,
it was generally at prices
far
below average.
In
1915,
at
the
various
escales
along
the
river.
millet ~as bought from farmers at 6 or 11 francs per 100
kilogrammes,
to be sold at St.
Louis or along the rail~ay line at
25 to 30 francs
for
the
same
amount.
The
fo 110~ing comparison of
prices
shows
how
serious the exploitation was during the war
years.
TABLE 16:
Evolution of millet prices per 100 klg from producers.
Districts: 1911:
1912
:1913-14:
1915
1916
: 1917
: 1919
Matarn
:17-25f:
26 f
25f
7.50f:
3-5f
:4-6.50:
Podor
:13-15f:
6.50 :
6f
8f
10f
:10-12
:20-22
Salde
:17-22 : 8 -10 f
: 6.50 f
8-10
6 f
8 f
:
Source:
2G15s and 2G19s.
The prices take account of slight variations related co availabil-
ity of millet as well as naVigability of che river.
The
difference
of
prices
~ith the
north
bank
tradi.ng
posts
i.s
minimal.
In
1917,
prices
plunged
so
10~ at the escale of Macam thac the
Commandant
had
to
buy
grain
for
army
headquarters
at
a
much
better
price
than
local
craitants
offered,
in
order
to prevent
farmers
from
envisaging
a
boycott
on
the
fo11o~ing year.5
A year
later,
at
this
same escale of Matam,
the farthest Fuutanke trading pose upriver, hence
the
locale
where
prices
were
lowest
because
of
transport
costs,
the
Commandant ended up losing patience wich local traders.
By year's end,
I
he adopted a
solution which by French standards, was no less than
revolutionary.
In December,
he
initiated the formation of a
union of
I
local
producers
called
"Ti""aande I"
intended
to
pressure
traitants
to
I
I

---

415
offer better
prices
for
millet.
The
members
of
this
union received
advice from both the Province Chiefs and the "Providence Society. ,,6
On
the advice of the
administration and
in keeping with
the principle of
"best
offer"
farmers
started
selling
almost
exclusively
to
Moorish
caravans,
~hich sometimes offered twice as much as
local
traders
did.
The high cost of imported goods compounded this situation and further
aggravated the economic crisis.
2.
ECONOMIC CRISES
The war period and the years
that
immediately
follo~ed, witnessed
a series of crises that left
the people of fuuta Tooro disoriented and
poorer
than
ever.
Studies
of
the
economic
crises
during
the
war
generally
focus
on
their
effects
on
the
part
of
Senegal
that
cor-
responds
to
the
"Peanut basin."
But,
due
to
a variety of
factors
in
Fuuta Tooro,
it may well be that
its people
faced a worSe predicament
than
those
of
western
Senegal.
In
Fuuta
Tooro
the
situation
was
affected
by
availability
of millet
and
the
speculative
manoeuvres
of
traitants.
The
most
acute
crises
(1914.
1917-1918,
1919-1920)
often
followed food shortages
and famines
and
tax
increases.
One
of
the major
indicators
of
these
crises
was
the rocketing of
prices
and
the
sudden
inaccessibility of products- -foreign and domes-
tic--to
the
common
man.
In marked contrast
to
the
plunge
of millet
prices,
every
thing
imported
became
more
and
more
expensive
for
the
I
people.
The
evolution
of
prices
of
imported
goods
at
the
escale
of
Podor,
the closest to St.
Louis,
attests amply to this fact.
I,

---

416
TABLE 17: Esca1e of Podor:Prices of imported goods, 1914-1917.
Commodities
1914
1915
1917
Rice
Of. BOc(kg
* Of. 90c/kg
lE. BOc(kg
Sugar
Of. BOc/kg
lE.25c/kg
2f/kg
Bread
Of.70c/kg
Of.90c/kg
lE.20c(kg
!
Kitchen Oil
2f.50c/lit
2f. 90/li tre
3f. 30c/lit:
I
Guinee cloth
9f/1 strip
10f/1 strip
* 15f/1 strp:
I
Flour ("'heat)
30f/50kg
35 f/50 kg
* 40f/ 50 kg:
I
*
I
Of.90c/ kg as opposed to Of.32c/ kg in 1911.
* 15f/ 1 strip, as opposed to 7f.BOc/st in 1911.
*
I
40f/50 kg, as opposed to 41 frs/lOO kg in 1911.
!
Sources: A.N.S:
2G1S-43 and 2G17-24.
i
For
the
prices
of
1911,
we
approximated
...... ith
the
situation
at
Boghe, the nearest esca1e up-stream.
(See Boghe 190B-1921,o.c).
iI
The
price
of
millet,
basic
food
stuff
in
Fuuta Tooro,
soared
to
I
2f.SOc per kilogramme in the Yir1aabe-Hebbiyaabe area, in 1919-1920.
II
As
with
the
sale
of
grain
to
the
traitants,
so
also
with
the
I
purchase
of
imported
goods,
farmers
sometimes
did
not
hesitate
to
resort
to
economic
self-defense.
In this ",ise,
the people of
!'la tarn
put
the
1916
cotton harvest
to
good use:
l'The
indigenous
inhabitants
have harvested considerable quantities of cotton, which village weavers
turn into extremely resistant wrappers.,t7
B.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
1.
FAMINES AND FOOD SHORTAGES
CAUSES:
Famines and food shortages constituted another expression
I
of
the
socia-economic debacle
that accompanied
the
war
in
Fuuta Tooro.
I
Starting in 1914, famines and food shortages struck almost at regular
intervals.
Most of
the
reports
from
the
valley characterize
the years
I
between
1911
and
1914
as
"bad,!'
marked by a
series
of natural
catas-
trophes
such
as
locust
."'arms,
drought
(1911-1912-1914),
and
cattle
I
I

---

417
epidemics
(1912~1914).
Later,
in 1915 and 1917,
millet disease and a
new cattle epidemic laid havoc on a number of districts.
But.
serious
as
these
natural
phenomena
were,
they
should
not
blind
one
to
the
equally
serious
human
factors
which,
to
a
great
extent,
resulted from the war itself.
Chief among these
factors were,
taxation,
high
prices,
and
reimbursements
and
contributions
to
the
"Provident
Societies."
we
have
already
sho'.olT1
how
administrative
pressure
for
taKes
forced
the
producer
to
go
through what one Comman-
dant
rightly referred
to as
the
"fourches caudines,,8 of the
trait'lDt.
At the behest of St.
Louis business headquarters,
traitants often made
it
a
point
to
take
the
utmost
advantage
possible
of
hard
times,
by
buying cheap from and selling dear to famine stricken populations.
Local business was not the only group responsible for the fleecing
of producers hovever.
To some
extent,
the
administration
too.
preyed
on
them
by
demanding
cash
reimbursements
of
food
aid
which,
'Jhen
evaluated in millet, represented sometimes five to ten times as much as
the amount initially borrowed. 9
MANIFESTATIONS:
Both oral and \\olritten sources are
replete
with
I
disturbing descriptions of the full effects of famines
during the war.
The dates most remembered in traditions
in this regard are 1914,
1915,
I
and
1916 10
In
1914,
the
shortage
of
millet,
rice,
and
other
food
I
scuffs
was
too
conspicuous
to
elude
the
atten~ion of
several
ad-
ministrators.
Many
boats
(chalands)
were
reported
to
have
sailed
I
upriver,
"loaded with
ground
nuts,
although
these
grains
constituted
food
that
the
people of the valley have hitherto consumed only excep~
I
tionally."
This remark of central authorities was confirmed by Victor
I
l
I

---

418
Antonin,
the
Resident
of
Gorgol
who
reported
that
outside
of
Kaedi
(chief
town),
the
absence
of
rice
and mi.llet
compelled
the
people
to
eat
wi.ld
millet
called
Paggiri. ll
In
Podor,
people
collected
from
swamps
anocher
millet-like
product,
the
fruit
of
the
water
li.lly
locally
known as Ndaayri.
It was
so unusual a substitute for regular
food that Commandant Lignieres could not hide his astonishment.
Traditions
provide
an
e~len
bleaker
picture
of
this
series
of
famines. 12
The
social
disintegration
wrought
by
these
famines
is
reminiscent
of
che
great
Ethiopian
famine
of
1889-1892.
although
the
latter was of much greater magnitude.
Short of cannihalism and murder,
all the "unnatural practices,·13 that accompanied this
disaster emerged
in Fuuta Tooro as well.
Most accounts
insist
that is was quite common
to see people dig holes and dest~oy ant-hills in search of what little
grain
beetles
and
termit2.s
had
stored.
Many
indulged
in eating
the
leaves
of
the
Leptadenia
hastata
(in Pulaar:
Haako
Sapato),
salting
them and eating them
with a relish.
Worst of all, many competed with
predator birds for the flesh of animal carcasses.
CONSEQUENGES:
These
famines
had
the
mos t
devas tat ing
effec ts.
i
First of all,
a
series of epidemics
such
as plague and small pox and
I
Diarrhea,
and related
illnesses
such
as
nephritis,
were
also
common.
Ii
In some areas, people were actually s~elling due to changing diets:
[As]
the
Fuutankoobe
often
say,
when
people
live
[ ..
exclusively on leaves,
in total absence of millet, as
soon
as
it
rains
and
mi llet
grows
abundantly,
and
I
they
eat
it,
they
automatically
start
swelling ... It
is
said
that some
men grew bosoms
the
size of vir-
gins' .14
Needless
to say.
wide spread epidemics
took their toll even where

---

419
documents remain mute on the extent of deaths.
The only way one author
could assess
the extent of deaths was by
quoting Lt. Governor Cor who
mentioned--rather vaguely--"I
could even declare
that,
in some
places,
cases of death have
been reported.»15
Perhaps more
indicative of the
situation is
the
following account from an informant,
who was fourteen
years old
at that time.
According to this account,
The
dead
were
legion.
Sometimes
people
simply
dragged them and took them away from the village, and
they were left to buzzards.
In a
country so
profoundly
religious,
there had
to be
more dead
than
could
be
properly
bur ied,
for
peop le
to
stoop
to
such
negli-
gence. 16
Children may well have represented a good proportion of those
who
died
for,
due
to
cattle
epidemic,
milk was
either
inexistent
or
contaminated.
In
addi tion,
children
were
physically
less
resistant
than adults.
ADMINISTRATIVE REACTION:
Although the administration did not turn
its
back on people
and acknowledged
that the valley was hard hit,
it
tended to down play the phenomena and the extent of
the damage.
Such
an
attitude
finds
resonance
in
the
administration's
insistence
on
defining the famines as minor "food
shortages"
(disettes, or soudure).
I
In
fact,
famines
and
minor
food
shortages
(disettes)
are
different.
I, The latter are generally crises with limited extent and limited
effects,
that call for no more than discipline and rationing.
A famine
on the other hand is usually defined as an extreme and general shortage
of food (Encyclopoedia 3ritannica), a
"Long drawn out calamity in which
supplies
of
food
dwindle
for
months
or
more
from
restriction
to

---

420
scarcity and
in due course
to complete dearth.,·17
Famines generally
cause
distress
and
death
from
starvation
among
the
populations
uE
stricken areas.
The clcmax of suffering and death may last a year or
more.
As for che causes,
famines are often the result of a concatenation
of both natural processes (drought,
flood,
locus"s,
cold and shortened
growing seasons etc.)
and human and
political factors such as peasant
revolts,
wars.
reckless
sales
of
grain
and
other
events.
Thus,
the
second element
that
evidences
the
bid
to
play
the
phenomena down,
was
the
causes
often
put
forth.
Low
rain
fall,
low
level
flooding
and
other
natural
factors,
were
hailed
as
the
prime
causes,
while
no
allusion was made to administrative demands or war related
practices.
This general
tendency to dololI1 play the human factors "'as the best way
for
the administration to avoid taking any
blame.
This may have led
to
the
emphas is
on
non htunan
causes,
as
is
evident
in Trioullier's
study of the 1914 famine in Senegal.
I
Actually,
Fuuta Tooro- -and
the
valley
in general- -",as confronted
during the ~ar with real famines.
When whole regions are affected and
I
political authority is compelled to provide
relief,
food crises cease
I
to
be
mere
food
shortages,
and
become
famines
in
the
real
sense.
In
the
case
of
the
1914
famine,
the
Government
General
had
to
order
I
700,000 tons of rice taken from.
reserves,
and sent to the districts of
the valley.
Following
this
decision,
300,000 francs ",orth' of
rice
I
were distributed, which had to be reimbursed shortly after. 18
This
is
",hy
the
year
1914
is
still
remembered as
the
"year
of
rice.,,19
Despite the response of the administration,
several
elements

---

42t
conspired
to
limit
the efficiency of relief operations.
First
of all,
administrative authority proved slow to take
action.
When it did,
the
steamers
loaded
with
rice
were
slow
to
reach
district
capitals
upriver.
By the time they reached
their destination,
many had died in
the villages.
Second,
rice
relief rarely reached the villages of the
Jeeri
and
remote
places.
This
is
evidenced
by
reports
from
the
Commandant of Gorgol '..Jho ·,T,entioned that.
Beyond Kaedi,
[district capital],
in the villages of
Litama
[easternmost
section]
that
I
visited,
the
situtation
is worse.
Stocks
of rice
and millet have
been exhausted.
Third,
the
fact that the administration sent rice to the
starving
region
did
not
mean
much
since,
many
had
no
money
to
buy
it.
Malal
Seribaa
Cubbu,
one
of our
informants,
summarized
the
difficulties
and
despai~ nicely when he said:
It
was
one
of
the
worst
famines
ever
remembered.
l
There were no automobiles as there are today.
It was
the
"lIani"
[river
courrier)
that
brought
rice
from
Ndar
[St.
Louis],
twice
a
month,
all
the
way
to
Kayes.
As
soon
as
the
"Bani"
was
sighted,
people
I
started running on the bank of
the river from as
far
afield
as
Ngijilon,
heading
to
Matam
[the
river
port].
\\.Then
they arrived,
their money was often not
I
enough,
the
luckiest
obtained
four
to
five
kilo-
grammes
[of rice].
I,
A final
measure
of the
limited success was
the
administration's
attempt
to protect the people from
the usurious
loans of the traders.
Pressed by famine,
people used to resort
to pawning jewelry and other
sorts
of
belongings
for
cash
from
craitants,
which
could
only
be
redeemed
at
prices
well
above
value.
Local
administrators
sometimes

---

422
disseminated
circulars
throughout
their
districts.
urging
people
to
denounce usurers and have recourse to tribunals.
2.
EMIGRATION AND OTHER SOCIAL EFFECTS
In
the absence of tangible quantitatcve evidence,
the fUll
impact
of war and famcne
on
the demography of Fuuta Tooro seems diffccult to
assess.
No
satisfactory
figures
are
available
regarding
the
demo-
graphic drain.
However,
the
insistence of district reports on emigra-
tion,
prove--if needed--that
this phenomenon was
indeed widespread and
consequentcal.
In late 1913 and early 1914, the admLnLstrator of Matam
reported that as a
result of famine,
people swarmed into the residence
and tT.Jenty
to
thirty tra'lel permits were delivered every day to tbose
intent
to
leave
the
home
area
in
search
of jobs
and money
for
the
support of
the
desperate
families.
Soon,
the
fears
expressed by
the
Commandant of Pador
in 1914,
fears
that old men and women would
be the
only
people
left
Ln
vLllages,
became
real.
Emigrat.ion
to
western
Senegal and desertion to other West African colonies,
cut
deeply in to
the
young
and
strong
elements
of
the
populatLon.
This,
Ln
turn,
reduced
agricultural
production
in
a
substantial
way.
The
di lemma
facing local
administration was
expressed
in
vivid
terms
in the
fall
1915,
when
PalmLde
de
Raf Un,
the
Commandant
of
M.atam
asked
higher
authority to,
comb
the beg cctLes,
hunt down all unemployed adults
who do not.carry passes,
and send them back to
their
country
of
origLn
where
they
are
badly
needed
for
agricultural activities. 20
ThLs
dLlemma
lingered
on
after
the
war,
breedcng as
much
anxLety
at
I

---

423
higher levels of the administration. 21
The
situation also had effects of other kinds on
the
population
and
1 i fe
in
Fuut.a
Tooro_
Emigration
and
desertion
of
young
men
impacted on
demographic
evolution.
Departures often ruined marriages
and
disrupted
engagement
relationships,
especially
with
those
whose
whereabouts
remained
unknown
for
several years.
This,
combined with
the
fact
that
emigrants
were
generally
some
of
the
most reproductive,
beside
being
the
most
productive,
and
the
deaths
due
to
epidemics,
contributed to slowing do~ the demographic pace.
The end result of it
all was demographic stagnation and decline.
TABLE 18:
Evolution of Population (South Bank),
1914-1918.
Districts:
19144
191.5
1916
1917
1918
Matam
60,200
60,1,81
56,456
63,450
60,408
Podor
64,252
61,921
61,342
73,015
63,280
Sa1de
36,044
36,256
37,117
37,595
37,500
Dagana
41,667
41,614
40,458
33,617
40,458
Total
:202,163
200,272* : 195,373*
207,677
201,646
Sources:
"G" series;
subseries 22G-29 to 22G-35.
-56,456 for Matam in 1916 instead of 60,408.
-61,342 for Podor in 191.6,
instead of 63,280,
I
-63,450 for Matam in 1917,
instead of 70,000. 22
I
Judging from
this
table,
the
general
trend on the
south bank ..as
to population
stagnation during the
war.
The hollowness of the curve
in 1915 and 1916 seems to
indicate
the
impact of famines and epidemics
~ '.
in
these
years.
As
to 1917,
in the absence of death
and birth
rates
for
this particular year,
one
is
left
to speculate on the sudden rise
of population in the districts of Matam and Podor on the one hand,
and
\\ '
I
,.

---

424
the decline in those of D.~ana and Salde, on the other. 23
In the first
case,
rather than
an "aberration" as one author contended,
the figures
may
either
result
from
a
major
difference
between birth
and
death
rates, or
from administrative forgery aimed at justifying tax rates.
Similarly,
the population decline in the westernmost district may
well
relate
to emigration,
which there,
concerns several socia-professional
categories
(farmers,
traders,
fishermen and sailors). 24
The following
table on birth and death rates
is also
informative about
the evolution
of the population in Fuuta Tooro.
TABLE 19:
Demographic Evolution on the South Bank 1914-1916.
Oiscric Cs
1914
1916
1916
:birth
death :birth
:death
:birth
death
------------.--.--------.--.--.--.-_.-----.--.---
Macam
:1,336
: 1,813
: 1,330
:1,800
:1,387
1,815
Salde
648
955
:
622
:
940
: 651
975
Podor
:2,749
: 1,174
:2,781
: 1,135
:2,930
1,159
Dagana
:2,468
:5,514
:7,928
:5,645
:8,562
5,366
Totals
:7,200
:9,456
:12,661 :9,533
: 13 , 538
9,315
I
This
table suggests
that
in 1914,
a bad year par excellence,
the
I
death
rate
was
higher
than
the
birth rate.
This.
in
absolute
terms
meant
a
decline.
For
the
following
years,
i f
one
sets
this
table
against
the
table
of
the
general
population,
one
obtains
6%
for
I
mortality
and 4%
for
birth
in 1915,
and
6.9%
and
4.7%
in 1916.
This
,
amounts to an average annual negative rate of 2% for 1915
and 1916 and
attests
to a significant decline of population.

---

425
3.
IMPAIRMENT OF EDUCATION, TRADE,
AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
Like any other ordinary realm of life, education too was affected
by the war.
As early as 1916,
the Lt.
Governor of Senegal had written
to
the Governor General of West Africa inqUiring about whether
to shut
the
school
system
down
or
not.
Favouring
such
alternative,
the
Lt.
Governor
marshalled
a
se":ies
of hard facts
to shore
up his
request.
Among other arguments,
he
cited the decline of the student population
of the colony which
had passed from 3,616 in 1913 to 3,552 in 1914 and
by 1916,
to
3,477, at the primary level.
He also cited the casualties
due
to
the
plague,
the
lowering of the maximum age limit to 16 years,
the mobilization of many teachers,
and finally,
the
induction of many
students
deemed
"grands
garcons"
(up
to
half
the
classroom
lists
in
sOme urban centers).25
Contrary
to
some
authors'
contentions,
it
was
not
the
urban
t
centers
that--proportionately--suffered
from
the
shut
down
of
the
school
system
bue
indeed
the
very
rural
areas,
'.Jhere
education
I
was
cons idered
a
lesser
priority.
Out
of
86
primary
schools,
28
were
closed in 1916.
In general all schools on both banks
suffered either
I
a partial, or a complete shut down at one time or another. 26
I
Also,
without
being
completely
ruined,
trade
slowed
down
at
I
several escales along
the river,
because of conscription and espec1al-
,
ly,
the empoverishment of the people.
In this vein,
the
Commandant of
Salde reported a general disappointment among
traders,
and a
tendency
to leave
the escale:
One
of
the
mos t
important
trai cants,
Pathe
Thioup.
has
informed
me
of
his
decision
to
abandon
his

---

426
activity,
effective 1 January 1916.
The ,others will
follow suit in a very short time. 27
A
year
later,
the
adminis tratar
of
Matam
mentioned
that
the
absence of cash money had reduced commercial activity to naught.
Thus,
on the whole,
the already waning river trade
suffered
indeed periodic
disruptions throughout the war.
C.
POLITICAL CONSEQGENCES
1.
THE SPIRIT OF DISOBEDIENCE AMONG THE PEOP~E
~ar time conditions bred in general the most unbearable demands by
French
administration.
(,s
a result,
these
increased pressures helped
establish a rather pervasive spirit of rebellion.
The most
recurrent
leitmotiv
of
district
reports
emanating
from
the
valley,
is
this
blatant show of disobedience
vis a vis authority.
It was expressed in
several
ways,
from
renewed
opposition
to
local
authority,
refusal
to
acquic
caxes
and ocher
financial
burdens,
to
direct
challenge
to
the
authority of Commandants.
Most of the
trouble
generally
took place
in 1915 and 1916,
years
of
nOt
only
intensified
administrative
demands
but
also I
of
acu<:e
economLc crises.
And,
with the exception of Dimat and
Tooro
(n.b) and
Yirlaabe on che (s.b), almost all cantons and their chiefs wenc chro~gh
I, some kind or other political-administrative trouble. Administrators
often shared
two
opinions tolhich.
in a way.
summar ize
the who le si t:.ua-
tion.
One
was
chat
the
Fuutankoobe,
whose
loyalty
had
always
been
suspect but felt
coo weak t.o indulge
in overt action,
"intended to take
advantage
of
the
war
and
activate
opposition,
by
all
means. 11
The

---

427
other,
r...:as
that
"in
many
instances,
the
people
of
Fouta
had
grown
accustomed
to
treating our agents
as
nonentities I"
"""hich
stemmed
from
the
ever
growing zeal
local
chiefs
had shown
in carrying out orders.
Consequently,
people
resorted
to
all
tactics
possible.
Some
often
refused deliberately to show up at
the district
capital when summoned
by
the
Commandant.
lIhen
i:woking famines
and bad harvests fai.led to
produce
the
results expected,
they
procrastinated and used
tricks
to
avoid
paying
taxes.
In
1915,
following
direct
pressure
from
the
Commandant of Matam,
the
people of the district agreed to send migrant
workers to the railway line but. when it came to departing, adult males
substituted
fourteen
year
old
children.
Shortly
afterwards
these
children
deserted construction
sites,
"arguing
that
many
people
were
dying of thirst on
the site,
that
they were
paid only Of.90c per day,
that
food
rations
were
insufficient
and
that,
because
they
were
Tukuloor
no
body wanted
them."
These
rumours
spread rapidly,
causing
the
gangs
en
route
to
the
5 i te,
to
re trace
the i r
5 teps . 28
Likewise,
the
people
of the
district spent 50 much
time gathering
the cattle
to
be sent to Lin~jaan that the dry season advanced and ponds in the Sa9re
dried out, making it too dangerous
to drive them through.
In
1915,
a
more
serious
act
of rebellion
took place
in
FerIo,
a
I
canton
inhabited
by
FuIbe
nomads
and
serving
as
haven
to
numerous
,
"dissidents" of other cercles.
The village of Dunga,
1~4 by its chief
Mammadu Hamrnadi,
refused
to pay taxes and to
send delegates co Matam.
When
the
Commandant sent out his
guards,
the men rose up
in arms
and
fled to
the bush.
It
took
the administration a series of negociations
to
obtain
their
surrender. 29
A year
later,
populations
refused
to

---

428
contribute
to
the
so
called
"solidarite,"
which
they
considered
"an
additional
heavy charge beside the already heavy taxes."
This led the
Commandant
of
Gorgol
to
plead
with
the
Government General
so
that,
given
the
popular
11 ignorance
in
relation
to
the
noble
objectives of
national
solidarity,"
such
contributions
be
"reserved
for
important
[urban] centers with an enlightened (sic]
population.,,30
I
Finally,
for the first time in the history of colonialism in Fuuta
Tooro,
an act
of disobedience
that one might call,"economic
boycott"
took
place
in
the
spring
of
1915.
At
this
date,
the
province
or
I
Ngenaar,
traditionally the number one millet producer
in the district
i
of
Matam,
registered
an
almost
unprecedented
deficit
in
dry
season
I
grain harvest.
In
the
words
of
the
administrator,
11 it
has nothing,"
'....hile
Bo050ya
and Darnga enjoyed
"exceptional harvests."
Finding
this
I
I
difficult
to
believe,
the
Commandant
concluded
they had
deliberately
refused
to
cultivate, ,,31
An
economic
boycott,
even
if
it
was
not
originally
planned,
is
conceivable.
Given
the
praise administrators
constantly
lavished on
the
chief of Ngenaar,
which
suggests
that
the
province was
up
to
date
in
relation
to
tax
payments,
people
may have
grown weary
and decided not
to
produce
a
surplus
that
the administra-
I
tion would appropriate inevitably,
in the form of taxes,
In any event,
I
this
situation ~....as alarnJing enough to set the Commandant on alert for
the next rainy season campaign. 32
t
2.
SPIRIT OF REBELLION fu~ONG WAR VETERA.~S
The
extent
of
subversion
related
to
war
veterans
was
generally
consLdered
10Yrl
in
French
west
Africa.
Both
the Governor General and

---

429
the
Lt-Governors
invariably
denounced
the
exageration
manifeste
des
opinions
emises
oar
certains
administrateurs,
on
the
issue.
The
Governor General even opined that discharged Tirailleurs had readjusted
pretty ",ell
to their former l i f e ] ]
Perhaps
influenced by such vie"'s,
some authors
contend chat in the colony of Senegal,
the potential for
protest on the part of former soldiers was channelled by B1aise Diagne
and his
partisans
through an electoral
process
that ~on
him the post
of Representative.
"On the whole,"
said Marc
Michel,
lIthe return of
tirailleurs
translated
less
into
a protest
against
colonial
authority
than
one
against
their
own
milieu ... 34
Such
claims
are
clearly
at
variance
~ith what the evidence suggests
in
the
case of Fuuta Toora.
There,
Tirailleurs had,
for years,
a bone
to pick "'ith both local and
French colonial authority,
long before the war ended.
The districts of
the
south bank started experiencing
trouble
of
the
sort,
as
early as
1916.
This
is
when administrators
at
Matam,
Podor,
and even Boghe began referring to
t.he
"spiri.t of
i.ndependence"
of tirailleurs.
In February 1916,
events
took
place
in the district
of Matam
that caused a great concern for
the Commandant.
Cohorts of
young conscripts
who
crossed
the
district
on
their
way
to St.
Louis,
I
took to spreading "demoralising rwnours,lI declaring everywhere that,
I
They
",ill
seize
on
the
first
opportunity
to
desert
and,
if they were sent to the front,
they would shoot
at their officers and surrender en masse. JS
This news was relayed to the Commandant from several villages on a
daily basis, 3S
The
Commandant "'as
very dis turbed,
In the summer of
this
same
year,
de
la
Rocca,
the
administrator
at
Podor,
complained

---

43/.
application was
also
turned down,
mainly because
Eli Sih was a
former
HartanL
(Moorish
slave)
and,
according
to
twelve
notables
from
the
45
vLllage of NgijLlon,
the
pLece of land
Ln questLon was not hLs.
It
~as against such background that the
numerous incidents cook place.
bl
INCIDENTS FOLLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF TlRAILLEURS
From
1918
forward,
incLdents
opposing former
tLrailleurs
on
the
one
hand,
and
various
agents
of
the
administration
on
the
other,
multiplied
in
Fuuta
Tooro.
Administrators
on
bOi:h
banks
constant.ly
mentioned
that war veterans disturbed the peace in the
districts on a
daily basis,
"refuse to pay taxes,
brutalize our
agents when these are
sent
on
a
miss ion
to
summon
or
arres t
people
in
the
interior. n
In
July 1920
Hammee Kamara,
a
BrigadLer
District
Guard sent
to
recruit
porters
and
guides
at
the
village
of
SLlbe
(Semama)
was,
at
the
instigation of a former Tirailleur,
insulted and almost beaten by the
whole village.
Similarly,
Ln
May 1921 former Corporal Sammba Huseyni,
from
the
vDlage
of
Juude-Jaabi
(Fodor).
denied
Discrict
Guard Gala
Bah,
,....ho
served
as
porter
t.o
the
chief
of
Veterinary
services
of
Senegal,
the
right
to
stop
and
rest
at
the
village.
The
gua rd was
beaten and French authority ~as insulted publicly.46
Guards
and Policemen ~ere not the only agents ~ho felt the impact
of
former
Tirailleurs'
"indiscipline"
or
"consciousness."
Province
and Canton Chiefs too had their share of ~roubles.
Three cantons were
particularly
affected
for
that
matter:
Laaw,
FerIa,
and
Mbaan
(Yir-
laabe-Mauritania).
I
t

---

430
that
soldiers
on leave
"show before civilian
authority,
a
disdainful
indifference,"
and
cited
cases
where
he
was
personally
offended
in
public, while on tour of duty.
Though
he refrained from punishing the
"delinquants,"
anxious as he was not
to collide with Military Authori·
cy,
the Commandant could not
help injecting a word of caution:
\\Jha t
is
go ing on now
should cause
us
to
dread
those
who
are
now
serving
outside
the
colony.
This
possibity would be all the more deplorable because it
would
seem
to
be
the
result
of
some
influence
acquired within :ur valiant armies. 36
However,
these
troubles
on
the
south
bank
were
little
compared
~ith the rash of incidents that erupted during the two
or three years
that followed the war,
throughout Fuuta Tooro.
To
help understand the
context
in
which
these
incidents
took
place,
We
must
make
a
few
comments on French promises and contradictory statements.
a/
THE CONTEXT OF THESE INCIDENTS
Mobilization of men during
the war was synonymous with a
host of
problems
and
frustrations.
Chief among
those.
was
the
isolation due
to
lack of care
in chanelling correspondance
from
the
front,
and the
distubing issue of conscripts'
wives.
Despite
earnest attempts on the
part
of
the
administration
at
solving
i t
through
legislation,
this
I
latter
problem
lingered on,
sub.J.ecting
many
Tirailleurs
to
sometimes
bitter experiences.
As a matter
of fact,
in 1919, a Sergent from the
I
1st
regiment of
"Tirailleurs Senegalais,"
from
the village of Maqama
I
in
the
district
of
Gorgol,
encouncered one
such difficul ty while he
was held prisoner in a German camp.
The chiefs of waali-Jantag and
I
I
I
I

---

431
Maqama
first
spread
the
rumour
that
the
sergent
had
died,
so
as
to
obtain divorce and have his wife
remarried to
the chief of WaaIi.
They
then wrote
to
the
sergent a
letter,
pretertding that his wife showed no
respect
for
his
parents
and was
at
loggerheads with
them.
\\/hen the
soldier wrote
to his uncle,
allowing him to break
the marriage in case
this were true,
the two village chiefs, who
were in charge of relaying
correpondence
from
the
front,
opened
the
letter,
broke
the
marriage
and
had
the
woman
remarried,
as
initially planned.
r.Jhen he
came
on
furlough
in February 1919,
the
soldier and his wife,
uncovering the
plot,
decided to
reimburse
the dowry and start afresh.
Subsequently,
they ~ere
accused of adultery and sentenced by the
tribunal of Gorgol,
the
first
to one,
and the
second to
two months'
imprisonment. 37 Later.
in July,
following
a
fOLnal
complaint
from
the
sergent,
the
Commis-
sioner
of
Mauritania
ordered
them
released,
on
grounds
that
the
decision
of
the
tribunal
was
not
consonant
with
Islamic
law,
which
requires
that
an act of adultery be established either
by four male
eye witnesses
of exceptional
standing,
or by
pregnancy.
This case--
among others--illustrates the
seriousness of frustrations some service
I
men faced.
I
The second kind of difficulty that awaited discharged
Tirailleurs
t
was
the problem of pension,
and
the painful
bureaucratic process they
I
or their relatives had to go
through before receiving it. 38
The third
problem related to the pledges by the administration before and during
II
the
war.
to
guarantee
the
conscripts
c.he
most.
comfortable
return
I
possible
to
"civilian
life. ll
Most
of
them
were
promised
land.
As
early
as
1916,
Minister
of
Colonies
Gaston
Doumergue,
following
a

---

432
briefing by
his
colleague of Foreign affairs on new laws applied in
New
Zealand
regarding
land
allocation
to
war
veterans.
had
urged
Governor Generals
and Lt.
Governors
to
reflect on ways and means
to
grant
such
advantages
in
the
colonies.
This,
in
accord
...... i th
the
former recruitment law of 21 March 1905 and ministerial circular of 5
March 1906 39
In
addi tion
to
land
and
pens ions,
the
administration
promised
to
give
priroity
to
war
veterans
for
jobs.
A decree
0 f
December 1919 reserved some sixty categories of jobs,
from teachers and
clerks
to
messengers
and unskilled '..lorkers
and
apprentices.
to
these
anciens militaires indiienes. 40
In
the
bid to
encourage enlistments
among the aristocracy,
the
administration
had
also
promised
positions
of
leadership.
The
aristocracy
itself had made promises.
According to oral
traditions,
domestic
slaves
sent
as
substitutes
were
generally promised manumis-
sion, cattle,
and land if they came back alive. 41
Judging from orders sent to local administrators,
higher authority
almost
suggested
t.hat
former
service
men
be
treated
as
a
"special
category" of people,
and ::his is the way these veterans looked at it.
But,
there seemed to be a world of difference between the p~omises
of higher authority and the hopes of Tirailleurs on the
one hand, and
I
the
reality of the
situation on
the other.
For a
number of reasons,
the
good
intentions
of
the
Governor
General
and his Lieutenants did
not sit well with lower level
administrators and local chiefs, mostly
I
jealous of their
powers and very much concerned about the
"tranquil·
I
lity" of their
circumscriptions.
Former soldiers often nursed excessive expectations.
I
They divided
I
I
I

---

433
into two major categories:
the first was mostly depressed and angry at
colonial officials for
not receiving the
same attention and care as
in
Metropoli tan
haspi tals.
In
their
ire
they
often
indulged
in
violent
disputes
with
colonial
civil
servants.
Second,
the
Lib~res (those
discharged
at
the
end
of
the
regular
time
of
service)
proved
in
general
most
tlsubversive tl
and
most
eXigent,
aspiring
very
often
to
social status
and positions
of authority
in a
society ~here many were
former
slaves. 42
Yet,
given objective limitations,
the admin:stration could
simply
not make good on its promise
to provide jobs for everyone.
Appoint-
ment
of
former
Tirailleurs
to
positions
of
leadership
remained
extremely
rare
in
Fuuta
Tooro.
Until
1920,
only one
single example
appears
at
Haayre-~aar (north bank),
where
the
chief
denounced
for
numerous
exactions
by
the
population,
was
finally
replaced
by
an
ancien combattant,
in late 1920. 43
For years,
the
administration-par-
ticularly
on
the
north
bank- -constantly
turned
do-.....r-n
applications
for
jobs.
In
August 1916 Sumaare Siidi,
a former Tirailleur and bearer of
the
French
prestigious
"Military
Medal"
and
"f.Jar
Cross,"
crippled
during
the
recapture
of Fort
Douawnont,
unsuccessfully
applied
for
a
post
of
Messenger.
Commissioner Gaden argued
chat
Mauritania had no
such position available,
and
that
it would not
suit a crippled person
at any rate. 44
Another
Tirailleur.
Sergent
Eli
Sih
of
the
67th
B.T.S
and
war
hero,
who served for
nineteen years
in
the
army,
applied for the post
of
chief
in
Mauritania
and
requested
that
his
land,
allegedly
ex-
proprietated
while
he
was
on
the
front,
be
returned
to
him.
This
I
I

---

435
1)
THE BAYDEL SA~BA AFFAIR IN LAAW: 1919
Baydel Sammba was a man from
the to'~ of Kasga,
in western
Laaw.
Conscripted
in
1915,
he
was
sentenced
to
imprisorunent
in
Dakar
for
having disobeyed his officer and instigated an aborted mass
desertion.
In 1919 he escaped from prison,
and headed home with
guns and ammuni-
tion.
A marksman and we 11 arr.ted,
"he
managed to command respec t
even
from
Amadou
Samba
[chief
of
Law'" ]
who
did
not
bother
attempting
anything against him."
Soon Baydel
became
the
"terror of Lao."
He
controlled movements
in and out
of Kasga,
his home
town,
and confined
the
chief
and his
retainers
to
the capital.
Guards
sent
from
Podor
failed to arrest him
twice.
FinaLLy,
in June 1919,
two other district
guards
came
to
Kasga
under
the
pretense
of
carrying
money
to
the
manager of the
Haayre post office,
and arrested Baydel.
Hand cuffed
and taken
to Pador,
he never came back. 47
Following these events,
the
Commandant of Pador reported that
former ~irai11eurs had grown
wiser,
and
that
the
chief of Laaw was
"delighted to recover some
measure of
authority."
2)
THE CRISIS AT MBAAN:
1919-1920
Mbaan,
the
capitaL
of
Yirlaabe-HeebLyaabe
(north
bank)
was
a
sizeable village
from whLch many conscrLpts
left at
the beginning of
the
war.
On
30 November
1919,
twenty
four
former
tirailleurs
from
both banks,
used dirty language vis a vis
their chief,
and
threatened
to
resort
to
violence
should he
delay
land
allocation
operations
any
longer. 48
As the Resident of Boghe felt impotent
against them because
of the decree of 14 January 1918, which
guaranteed immunity for former

---

I~
436
i
Tirailleurs
and
their
families
against
indigenat
dispositions,
the
crisis
continued.
On
27
May
1920
these
same Tirailleurs
instigated a
fight between the people of Mbaan and a contingent of soldiers passing
by.
A
few
days
later
when
chief
Yaaya
Kan
ordered
a
guest
house
I
bui 1 t
for
administrative
agents
on
tour
they
I
mocked
the
labour
conscripts,
accusing
them
of
being
the
"slaves
of
the
chief,"
and
urging
them
to
stop working.
This same month,
invoking the
promises
of
the
administration,
they refused to
pay
taxes.
On 12
June,
the
Resident
of
Boghe
held a
trial
and went
to
great
length
to
explain
that
the
exemption
measure
·.... as
only
a
temporary
one
and
aimed
at
I
compensating for the reinstallation premiums
the Government owed them.
Complaints on the part of both the
canton chief and the several chiefs
of the sections of Mbaan. multiplied by the day.49
The crisis at Mbaan
proved
the
mDS t
serious
throughout
Fuuta.
Tirailleurs
so shook
the
authority of Yaaya Kan that colonial administration at Aleg considered
at
one
time
founding
a
new
village
for
these
war
veterans.
Boghe
quickly
disavowed
the
scheme
arguing
that
such
a
consecration
of-
ficielle
de
certaines
tendances
separatistes
would
only
caUSe
the
dissolution of the
indigenous
society.
The Resident
declared that
it
would widen the gap between these former soldiers and the mass of those
I
I
they call with disdain [sic1.
"civilians."
He made a strong case about
the urgency to,
I
Let
these good fellows who remind one of the ancient
Gloriosus
Miles
(glorious
soldiers I,
understand
the
I
necessity
to
lay do'~ the armour and revert to their
initial
position,
however
humble,
within
their
own
community.
I
I
I
I

---

437
In
the
same
vein
the
Resident
discouraged
propositions
from
l
higher authority to grant former soldiers land that belonged to
former
Umarians
(see Chapter 5).
In the end,
Boghe's approach
prevailed and
on
19
June
1920,
Mazin
tried
those
of
the
former
Tirailleurs
whose
responsibility
in
the
fight
against
the
contigent
was
firmly
es ~
tablished.
He
sentenced
them
to
three
to
nine months'
impr isonrnent.
This tough stand on the part of local
adffiinistration continued,
along
with
efforts
at
providing
farm
land.
By
1921
tension
had
already
subsided considerably.
3)
CRISES IN FERLO:
1919-1921
(a) The Yero Makam affair
A major crisis broke out in FerIa with the rebellion of Yero Makam
against chief Sammba Elfekki Aan.
Yero Makam was a pullo
slave from
~aala (Ferlo) and a popular dandy who had always
managed to dodge the
draft until
1918,
when Sammba Elfekki sent
him by force
to the army.
From his
camp at RufisqUt Yero
deserted and,
as
the story goes,
went
to
the
"land of Blacks,"
(Leydeele baleebe),
as
the Fuutankoobe often
referred
to
the non·Muslirn regions and countries to
the south and east
(Seereer and Mannde speaking people),
deemed adept at magic.
He stayed
there
for
a
long
time.
arming
himself
with
Qagic,
and
amulets
of
various
kinds.
In utter 9isregard
for
the
search warrant
circulated
against
him,
he
came back, home
in
1920 with
a
terrible
r-esolve
for
revenge on the chief.
Well armed and accompanied by
his friend Koli,
he
roamed
around
FerIo,
harassing
the
chief
and
his
entourage.
He
failed
to
burn
the
chief's
house
down
but
managed
to
kill
Sallllllba

---

438
Jaanga,
one
of
his
retainers
and
wounded
several
others,
\\./hen the
chief reported the
inc ident,
the
Commandant of Matam ordered a
sixty
horsemen contingent
levied
from
Ngenaar
and Damga
and sent
n to
save
Samrnba Elfekki. n
A
formidable man hunt ensued.
They caught up with
Yero
and his
ally at the village of Panceneeje,
near the border with
the
district
of Bakel.
After
Yero
ambushed
and
killed
one
of his
pursuers,
they gunned him down,
finished him with the buts of
their
rifles, and cut off and took his right hand back to the
chief.
Oddly enough,
the
Commandant
DE
Matam
refrained
from
reporting
these
incidents
all
along.
Instead,
he
simply alluded
vaguely
to
"serious
problems"
that
'.Nere
taking
place
in
FerIa
'""ithout
getting
into the specifics of the case. He may have felt that higher authority
would not have approved of his handling of the crisis.
He was probably
criticized,
for he later monitored the developments of the other crisis
in Feria.
(b) The Ceerno Lamin affair
A cleric from the Village of Nammaari,
Ceerno Lamin resented
very
much
his
chief's
zeal
in
carrying
out
orders
and
fulfilling
the
administration' 5
demands
during
the
war.
Earlier,
he had encouraged
people
to
emigrate
to
neighbouring
cantons,
to
avoid
being
drafted.
Whether he
was
"dead set against the chief"
as one Commandant thought,
or was
simply passionacely protecCive
of
his
Ferlanke
countrymen,
he
soon became
the
spearhead of the
opposition to Samrnba Elfekki 51
In
1920, he wrote a petition which notables took to the Governor General
at Dakar.
\\./hen
the
administrator
closed
the
case
on
grounds
that,
I
I
I
I

---

439
"the
inquiry shed
light on the perfectly honourable character of the
ch ie f
and
the
inanity
of
the
slanderous
accusations,"
Ceerno
Lamin
triggered a
massive
emigration
to
Ngenaar
and
Damga,
instigated
the
burning of the chief's residence,
and organized assassination attempts
agains t
him,
On September 1921,
the cleric was arrested,
tried,
and
sentenced
to
five
years r
imprisonment
and
ten
years I
ban
from
the
district of Matam.
Several
other
notables,
one of whom was
the chief
of
Nammaari,
were
put
in
prison. 52
It
is
not
clear
what
role--if
any- - former
Tirailleurs
played
in
this
crisis
but.
the
participants
seemed
to
have
drawn
inspiration
[corn
Yero
Makam.
In addi tion,
the
crisis was
triggered by
resentment at
conscription and other war time
abuses.
All
these
incidents were fraught with lessons from a political-
administrative point of view.
And,
the French amply took advantage of
the sicuation to try and reassert their authority in the region.
D. LESSONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND REASSERT, ON OF
FRENCH AUTHORITY
One of the major consequences of the war was to drive the
people
to
the wall.
Caught in a bind between satisfying the
myriad demands
of
the
coloniser,
and courageously resisting
through various means,
peop le
some times
leaned toward
the second
alternative,
as was sho\\llT1
earlier.
This
solution ''''as
all
the
more tempting because
they were
aware of
the exceptional
situation the French were faced with.
The
administration too had
a clear understanding of the matter and reacted
accordingly.
Starting if. 1916, it launched a campaign of disarmement,
in keeping with Governor General's circular of 11 July 1916. 53
In the
district of Matam the administration confiscated during this year 558

---

",,0
guns of which,
537 were destroyed,
17 kept in safety, and four returned
to their proprietors after permits were displayed
and dues ~ere paid.
At
Pador
17
arms
were
seized in
the
sole
month
of September.
Beside
disarming the people,
the administration,
in line
with the old French
dictum I
"desperate
ills
call
for
desperate
remedies, rr
matched
every
move
with
a
sometimes
disproportionate
punishment,
completely out of
step with the standards set
in the
"indigcnat code."
In a country where
rumours
spread
very
quickly
and
people
were
prompt
to
follow
the
example
of
the
neighbour,
the
administration
was
anxious
to
sec
?recedents
and
made
it
a
point
to
punish
swiftly
and
severely,
especially
in
cases
of
desertion,
refusal
to
pay
taxes,
affense
against local authority,
and embezzlement of colonial funds.
Before
the
war,
the
indigenat
code
allowed
administrators
to
impose
up
to
a
hundred
francs'
fine
and
fifteen days'
imprisoruner.t.
During
the
war,
Commandants
routinely gave
out
sentences
that
ranged
from
6 months
and
500 to 1,000
francs
to
6
years
and
10 years!
ban
from one's
district.
Collective-·as opposed to
individual-·punishment
became frequent.
In one hot day of April 1915,
the Commandant of Matam
jailed a hundred notables
from
the province of Damga for procrastina-
tioD
in the
payment of
taxes.
The
administration proved also
unfor-
giving
to
those
of
its
agents
(village
chiefs,
clerks)
guilty
of
d~solJedience, aiding
and
abetting
of
deserters,
and
embezzlement
of
funds.
In
1915.
the
Commandant
of
Mat:am
t:ried
and
dismissed
four
chiefs
in Ngenaar for opposition to
recruitment and lack of coopera-
tion.
In
November
of
that
same
year.
the
clerk
of
the
district
tribunal at Salde was himself
tried for
breach
of trust,
revoked and
I
I
I
I

---

441
sentenced
to
3 months'
imprisorunent,
200 frs'
fine,
and 5 years'
ban
from
the district.
All
the village chiefs of Podor who were tried in
June
1918
received
sentences
ranging
from
6
months
and
500
to
1,000
frs. 54
The administration moved to dismiss all chiefs deemed
slack or
unreliable.
In many ~ays,
local administrators adopted
the
same
cough
stand
against former tirailleurs
in the aftermath of the war.
Most of them
quickly
came
to
regard
their
attitude
as
"a
symptom
of
a
'Worrisome
spirit of independence," a menace 'Which, according to the Commandant. of
~atam,
would
have
been
a
lesser
cause
of
concern
in another
reil ion
bue,
"should corrunand extreme vigilance
.....·ith the toucouleur,
more prone
than
others
to
rake
over
the
ashes
of the past
[anti-colonialism]."
As a
result,
some
local
administrators did not hesitate
to
ignore the
decree of January
1918 protecting Tirailleurs and their families,
and
deal most strongly 'With trouble makers.
And,
because the power of the
administration hinged upon
the authority of local chiefs,
Commandants
occupied their
time with piecing
together
the
shattered authority of
local
collaborators.
In
addi t ion
to
the
"rescue"
operations
cited
above,
the
administration reinstated
che
chief of Boosoya Baydi Aali
I
Kan,
suspended
in 1919.
Similarly,
in 1923.
Podor repressed Kasga's
attacks
on
the
authority
of
Aamadu
MQxtaar
Wan,
the
ne-w
chief
of
I
Laaw. 55
This
bid
to
preserve
French
control
on
both chiefs
and
people
I
went hand in hand with a dissuasion campaign in which the
Sight of the
I
hydroplane played an important psychological role.
To have an idea of
the effect of these events on the people,
it
would be worth referring
I
I
I
I

---

442
to this lengthy quote from Commandant de
La Rocca:
On 17 April
[1919]
at 4:20 P.M,
two hydroplanes
flew
over
Matam.
One
flolo1TI by
sub-lieutenant Montrolet,
5 topped
for
one
day
and
then
continued
on.
The
other,
flown
by
sub-lieutenant
Lefranc
went
on
to
Bakel...
One
of
the
notables
made
even
a
rather
intelligent
observation
[sic]
saying
that:
'If,
at
the
time
of
the
conquest
the
French
had
had
these
means
at
their
disposal,
it
would
not
have
been
necessary
to
send
as
many
soldiers!.
This
very
evidence
that
we
have
at
our
disposal
new
and
po~erful means,
suffices
to
cause
some
to
abandon
their illusions.
They will now hesitate to adopt the
opinion
of
some
former
tirailleurs
and
soldiers
on
leave.
The
passage
of
the
planes
will
lead
the
,
dangerous
people
!sie)
to
a
better
sense
of
theif
I
rights.
and canton chiefs who are honest enough, will
I
command
more
respec t
than
they
have
done
for
some
I
time,
from
those
who
still
nurse
a
grudge
for
the
I
conscription of a relative. 56
I
The effect of this event so squared with the expectations of
the
!
~rench that Commandant de La Rocca did not hide his
disappointment at
I
the
fact
that
the
airplanes
faBed
to
flyover
much
of
the
Jeeri
I
I
[highland]
f'where
the populations, who saw nothing,
remain sceptical."
At
Podor
where
the
airplanes
arrived
t'",j'O
days
earlier,
the
impact of
I
the demonstration was
the same;
Commandant Kulsh reported that,
n from
a political point of view,
the
effect of such demonstration is
excel·
lent.,,57
At
about
the
same
time,
automobiles
also
fostered
wonder,
while
revolutionizing social control
in districts as large as Mata~.
Podor,
and Gorgol.
The appearance of this instrument led to a
development of
I
road construction on an unprecedented scale, between 1919 and 1924.
On
I
10 March
1919,
a
road was
buBt on
the
north bank connecting Podor,
I
Boghe
and,
Kaedi
over
a
distance
of
some
three
hundred
ki lome tres.
I
I
I

---

443
With
this
road constructed
administrators could
travel
from Podor to
Kaedi
in one day,
for
eight months a year.
In December 1920 another
important
road
.....as
completed
that
linked
St.
Louis,
Dagana,
Pador,
Matam and Bakel.
This main road,
which paralleled the river,
broke down
the isolation of the area
between the main river and the Marigot of
Haayre,
thanks to a ferry established at ~jum.58
Other roads connected
the
districts
of
the
valley
with
those
of
the
railway
line.
par-
ticularly
in
Jolof
(Matam--Yan-¥an;
Podor--Yan-Yan).
Nowhere
in
Senegal
and
Mauritania
had
the
automobile
come
at
a
better
time
for
administrators
than
in
Fuuta
Tocro.
As
the
Lt.
Governor
rightly
reported to the Governor General:
The
road
that
connects
St.
Louis,
Dagana,
Pador,
Salde, Matam and Bakel,
renders the greatest services
to
our
ad.r.tinistrators.
I t
allows
them
to
quickly
tour
their
circumscriptions
·....hile
being
absent
from
their
residence
only
for
a
short
period
of
time.
Vithout this road,
commandants of these cercles would
be
in
no
~osition to
tour,
given
the
shortage
in
personnel. S
The district of Podor gives a measure of such a road construction
fever.
By May 1924 there were some 700 kilometres of newly constructed
or
repaired
roads,
thanks
to
a
readily
available
conscript
labour. 60
I
Because of these roads,
the administration was able,
within five years
I
after the
war,
at a
time
when
it needed
it most,
to
lay
its hand on
the people,
more effectively than ever before. 61
I
I
CO~CLUSION OF PART SEVEN
The
war
of
1914·1918
caused
as
elsewhere
a
drain
on
men
and
I
resources.
On
a
regular
basis
the
mobile
draft
board
roamed
Fuuta
I
I
I

---

444
100ro,
inducting
ineo
the
army
as
many
young
men
as
possible.
No
district,
canton or family,
aristocrat and commoner alike,
could boast
of eluding the scourge of mobilization.
By 1918,
even those referred
to
as
"social
cases, 11
were
i:1discrimately
inducted
into
the
colonial
army.62
Low
as
absolute
numbers
may
appear
to
be,
they
gain
in
significance
when
set
against
the
total
population
of
Fuuta
100ro
during
the
war.
Conscription
was
all
pervasive.
The
degree
of
mobilisation wa such that,
all traditions
throughout Fuuta refer
to
i t
as
"Mobburu Lign-eres"
(literally:
"Ligneres'
gathering":
i.e:
Comman-
dant Ligneres gathered conscripts like one would gather fruits).
As
other
aristocratic
groups
in
the
colonies,
and
perhaps
in
a
more
conspicuous
fashion,
the
nobility
in
Fuuta~ -both
temporal
and
spiritual--lent a very active hand.
Because
of
the
Modus
Vivendi
between
the
French and
the
Moors
regarding conscription,
north bank Fuuta ended up bearing
the brunt of
both
human
and
economic
contr ibution
to
the war
in
Mauritania.
So
much so that,
at times,
the administration of the
territory shied away
from imposing new demands.
Given
the
myriad
problems
associated
vith
conscription,
the
corruption
that
charactized
the
system,
humiliation
and
risks
of
dea ch,
the
peop le grew more
and more
resentful.
This resentment
was
translated into flights
to the bush,
emigration to other
territories,
self maiming and other techniques.
In this
desperate bid to limit the
I
damage,
even village
chiefs
lent
suppoFt,
in utter
disregard for
the
risks involved.
r
I
Equally important was
the economic contribution to
the war.
The
I
I
I

---

445
increase
of head and property
taxes
was
compounded by
reimbursements
and so called "voluntary contributions" on behalf
of the fighting men.
Such
financial
sacrifice
fed
essentially
on
the
sale
of
cattle
and
grain
at
sometimes
extremely
unprofitable
prices.
This
caused
an
unprecedented
drain
on
r~sources,
leaving
people
often
destitute
of
subsistence
neans.
:'raders
cook advantage
of
the
pressing needs for
cash,
to
subject
people
to
a
ruthless
exploitation
and
further
im-
poverishment.
The
sporadic
attempts
on
the
part
of
producers
to
withstand such manoeuvres
did little to help remedy the situation.
As
producers felt more and more compelled to dispose of harvests for petty
cash,
Fuuta Toora experienced troublesome food shortages and famines.
~nere and when desperation attained its highest pitch, people
scooped
to eacing whatever was available,
even the
inedible
carcasses of dead
animals.
Sometimes
they
competed
for
grain
r..;it:h
as
insignificant
animals
as
beetles
and
ants.
As
usual,
malnutrition and
epidemics
that accompany famines
took their toll of the population.
At
first,
the
adminitration
played
down
these
catastrophes.
Gradually,
the
situation
compelled
it
to
intervene
by
voting
upon
emergency
food supplies
levied on general stocks
and reimbursable
at
r..;ha tever
cos t.
Even
so,
administrative
centers
rather
chan
remote
Villages profited from the relief.
Except
in fer..; isolated cases,
the
aeministration
did
little
to
save 'the
poor
f::.-om
the
greed
of
local
agents of St. Louis based trading houses.
Emigration
was
another
war
related
phenomenon
that
did
affect
several spheres of Fuutanke society.
Along with epidemics
and death,
!
i t contributed to a relative decline of the popUlation.
l
I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _L

---

446
Activities
such as education and trade also suffered
impairment.
Schools were shut down,
teachers and students
inducted in the military,
and
the
institut.ion
experienced
near
paralysis.
Shortages
of
cash
money,
and general
impoverishment caused a decline
in commerce,
forcing
some traders out of business.
Political
consequences
were
of
pariticular
significance,
espe·
cially the changing attitude of the masses,
and of former Tirailleurs.
Hardly
any
chief
or
colonial
administrator
escaped
from
the
full
impact of
this
new spirit.
Thoroughout the war,
a
resentful attitude
prevailed
that
was
translated
into
various
forms
of
disobedience.
Most intense and widespread was the
pro~est of former tirailleurs.
It
began during
the war and
reached
its
peak
immediately after~ards, as
both local chiefs and
Commandants found
it
impossible to make good on
che staggering
promises of the higher authorities.
With the exception
of
Elimaan Abu Kan
(Tooro-Halaybe),
Njaay Kan
(Teekaan),
and Haamidu
Kan
(Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe),
almost
all
canton
chiefs
experienced
in
some form or other,
the "discomforting"
presence of former Tirailleurs.
It
was
in Yirlaabe
(north bank),
Ferlo,
and
Laa''',
that
the
polltical
consequences
proved
roughest
for
local
authority.
In
Laaw
this
had
something
to
do with
the
long established grudge western
Laaw always
I
nursed vis a vis the
Wan and the French (especially the 1891 events).
r
In
Ferio
it
related
to
the
overzeal
of
the
chief,
amidst
a
nomadic
population
defined
essentially
by
traditional
aloofness
from,' and
I
indifference
for Central Government and what
it represents.
In Mbaan
it was a question of
intensity of recruitment relative
to
the popula-
I
tion
(cf.p.
2,
Chapter- 10).
In all areas it also had to
do with the
I
I
I
I

---

447
new
aspirations
of
former
Tirailleurs,
most
of
whom
were
former
slaves,
co status and social consideration.
It
is nonetheless
inaccurate
to say~-as some do--that Tirailleurs
rebelled only
against
their
own
society
and· not
against
the
colonial
order as
such.
They did not
rise up
in arms or indulge in a coherent,
~ell conceived and well organized protest against colonial rule.
But,
che
psychological
damage
chey
did was
no
less
opposed
to
colonialism
than
it
Jlas
to
canton chiefs.
In
the
cercle of Fodor the
Commandanc
made
it clear that
these
former
soldiers
al~ays
poke
fun
at
France.
They
show
incr~dible arrogance.
and
relish
telling
stories
in
which
Europeans
always
play
the
most
grotesque and puerile roles. 63
I
..
These
observations were constantly echoed
in reports
from
other
I
districts.
In
some
cases
i t
was
even
"rude
complaints
to
che
ad-
ministration, breaking into our offices,
insults,
threats and sometimes
I
even hlows.· 64
Actually.
Chiefs and District Guards bore the brunt of
che procest
simply because,
beside being ehe
most visible symbols of
I
colonial
oppression,
they were
also
relacively
easy
cargets
comprtred
'''; i th
Europeans.
At
any
rate.
che
procesc
was
noc
in vain.
le won
I
former
Tirailleurs
some
attention.
Before
1920,
some
administrators
I
were
willing
to
accept
their
status
as
r'populacion
speciale,1I
[ 0
I
occupy
their
time
"triggering
public
palavers"
with
war
veterans,
acknowledge
the necessity to "visit ...... ith them a.t home" and,
above all,
I
to constantly use the
"patience of professional experience. ,165
Whether
it
was
caused
by
war
Veterans
or
ordinary
people,
the
I
trouble that erupted during the war and its
aftermath,
reinforced the
I
I
I

---

448
position of advocates
of the
"stick"
policy within the administration.
In
the
far
away
districts
of
Fuuta
Tecro,
Commandants
circumvented
decisions
and
disregarded
the
types
of
punishment
laid
out
in
the
"indigenst code"
and resorted systematically to heavier
forms of civil
repression.
Several
factors
allo..... ed
the
tightening of
the
administra-
tive
grip.
One was
the new engine of social concral,
the automobile,
which extended the reach of the French admini5tratio~ while
enhancing
readiness
and
rapidity
to
deploy
force
'.hen needed.
The automobile
quickly brought within the
fold
the
cantons
hitherto out of effective
reach,
particulary areas
like highland
Tooro
and
Laa.....
(Podor),
FerIa
j
and eastern Damga
(Matam and
Kaedi).
Second,
the
administration made
1
it
a
point
to
restore
the
prestige
of
its
local
representatives.
This,
coupled with
~eariness and the emergence of a new generation of
people,
helped
the
french
to more easily restore
"order."
r
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

---

NOTES
1.
A.Il.S:
2G15·35 Katam,
op.ciL.. Aout 1915.
2.
A.N.S:
2G16·35, op.ciL.,
Septembre.
3.
The
value
of
cattle
herds
in
the
district:
of Matam
for
the
year 1919.
(A.N.S:
2G19-22, Katam "Rapports Mensuels 1919." (Mars).
For
the
prices
of animals
in
1920 see,
A.N.S:
K.A 23
"Le Reseau
routier au Senegal:
Evaluation par cere le 1920-1921"
(Podor 1921).
4.
The
1917
cattle
epidemic
was
one
of
the
most
devastating
in
Fuuta's
modern
history.
In
the
district
DE
Salde
for
example,
ie
"couched
all
but
c'.Jelve
villages."
It
extended
to
all
districts
on
both banks.
The losses
it caused were estimated at 1/3 of herds in the
district
of
Salde,
and 30
co
35%
in
that of Matam.
In this
district
the sole province of Ngenaar lose 500,000 francs worth of cattle.
For details on these losses see,
A.N.S:
2G17-30 and 2G17-31.
5.
A.N.S:
2G16-33 op.ciL.,
(Rapport de lanvier).
6.
Because
of
some
defections
from
the
ranks
of unionists,
and
the
reluctance of higher authority
:0 alienate the merchant community,
this
union
did
not
live
long
enough.
let alone
see
its
replica else·
....... here in the valley.
Neither was
there evidence that the "Agricultural
Society
of
Lower
Senegal"
had
sent
a
representative
to
compete
with
local traders as
the Commandant suggested.
7.
A.N.S:
2G16-33 op.cit.,
(Mars).
8.
A corridor
which
the
Romans
used
to
force
the
vanquished
to
I
walk
through.
A
supreme
humiliation,
it
sealed
both
victory
and
deafeat
just
as
Samori' 5
"Dege,"
which
the
the
conqueror
forced
the
vainquished enemy to drink.
For
the
Commandant's
denunciations
see,
A.N.S:
2G17-24
Senegal
"Territoires d'Administration Directe 1917" (Podor, 4e
trimestre) .
I
9.
In
the
district
of
Matam,
during
the
1912
famine,
people
I
reimbursed
up
to
12
kgs
of millet
per
individual,
to
the
"Providence
Granary"
Besides,
every member of the "Providence Society" was asked a
5 francs'contribution.
(A.N.S:
2G13-51.)
I
I
449
I
I
I

---

450
10.
~e have come across only one study of this 1914 famine in the
valley,
a Master's
thesis by Andr' Triou11ier:
"La Famine au Senegal
en
1913-1914"
Memoire
de Maitrise d'Enseignement d'Histoire,
sld Yves
Person,
Faculte
des
Lettres
et
de
Sciences
Hwnaines,
Paris
I,
1972.
(Hereafter, "La Famine.")
But,
it is entirely based on the Government General's reports and
lacks the specifics of both district reports and oral traditions.
11.
Paggiri (Echinoch10a co10na).
See Fary Ka,
Lexiaue,
op . c it., p.
72.
For this report see. A.N.M:
El-48, Gorgo1 op.cit.
(1914).
For the
previous
quotation
see,
A.N.S:2G14-41
Senegal
"Territoires
d'Ad-
ministration
Direcce."
(Note
sur le Rapport general par le Cornmissaire
Obissier,
2d trim.
8p, pp.
4-5.)
12.
The most
impressi:,e accounts
of
these
famines
were provided by
Buubu
Sal
(Podor),
Hamedin Kan
(Gede)
and,
especially,
Ma1a1
Seribaa
Cubbu (Ma tam) .
13.
These
"unnatural
practices"
included
eating
traditionally
forbidden
food,
the
abandonment or sale of children by
their parents,
suicide.
murder,
search
in
dung hills
and
camel
excrements
for
grain
and consumption of cow hide.
See.
Pankhurst, Richard,
"The Greit Ethiopian Famine of 1889-1892."
in,
American
Association
for
the
Historv of Medicine.
April
1966,
pp.
95-124 ; July 1966, pp.
71-294.
14.
Ma1a1 S.
Cubbu.
passim.
section 7.
15.
Andre Trioullier,
"La Famine" op.cit.,
p.
101.
16.
This brings
to mind only the description of the neighbourhood
of the Umarian capital of Segu.
The
numerous dead
(Jihadists as well
I
as
enemies)
were
left
to
predators
or
thrown
into
mass
graves,
for
perhaps similar reasons.
(Eugene Mage,
Voyage a Segou.
17.
For
this
and the
following
see,
Aykrod,
\\.I.
R.,
The Conquest
I
of Famine.
(Reader's Digest Press,
distributed by E.
P.
Dutton & Co.,
New
York,
1975,
215p).
(pp.
1-10);
Curry,
Bruce
ad
Hugo,
Graeme
(editors),
Famine as a Geographical Pheonomenon.
(D.
Reide1 Publishing
I
Co.,
1984,
202p);
Seavoy,
Rona1d
E ..
Famines
in
Peasant
Societies.
(Greenwood Press, New York,
1986,
478p).
I
18.
The
four
districts
of
the
south
bank borrowed
650
tons
of
rice:
Dagana
lOOt
Podor
17St
I
Sa1de
200t
Matam
175t
Total
6S0t
I
Source:
A.Trioullier,
"La Famine n ,
op.elt. , p.
99.
I
.....
I
I

---

451
19.
Hitaande
maarooj i
gadani,
as
opposed
to
~aarooi i
didabi
(second) of 1934-5.
20.
A.N.S:2G16-33 op.cit.,
Sep~embre.
21.
In
his
annual
report
of
1919,
Z.
Calveau,
chief
of
the
Agricultural
services
of
the
colony,
decried
the
desertion
of
most
districts by able bodied men,
and its role in the cereal deficit of the
colony (190,000t in 1919 versus 380,000 in 191&).
In addition to emigration, Mr Claveau blamed the decline of labour
on
the
contempt of war
veterans
and
elementary
school
graduates,
for
farming
activities.
A.N.S:
2G19-1 Senegal
"Rapport an:1Uel du service
de l'agriculture 1919" par
Mr.
Z.
C1aveau,
28 p.
22.
The
figures
given
by
Charles
Uyisenga,
"La
participation,"
op.cit.,
(p.
159),
seem
to
be
round
figures
picked
from
sythetic
reports.
Conversely,
our figures
are based on the
detailed number of
people per ethnic group.
in each district.
23
On
both
folios
42
D and
58
N on
the
general
statistics
of
1917,
',,;e
found
the
mention,
"Pas
d'eCat
civile
indigene
dans
les
cercles". (A.N.S:
22G-34
"Statistiques
generales 1917" Senegal,
popula-
tion;
Dahomey, population;
Niger,
A.O.F).
24.
A.N.S:
J 21 "Organisation et fonctionnement de l'Enseignemenc
and
A.O.F
1915-1919".
(Rapport
sur
l'Enseigncment
au
Senegal,
Lt.
Gouverneur a Gouverneur General,
26/4/1916).
25.
Functioning schools in Senegal between 1913 and 1917.
1913
94
1914
87
1915
86
1916
58*
1917
63*
Source:
J-21 op.cit., Rapport de 1917.
26.
2G14 -40
Senegal:
"Terri toires d' Administration Directe
1914,"
no 9 Salde, 4e trimestre.
27.
When the Commandant of Matarn inquired with the Director of the
Thies-Kayes.
the latter informed him that,
for five days)
every man was
allowed 5 litres of water per day but,
this had been increased to 10 1.
He added
that
food rations were Of.60c worth
and
that salaries varied
between 0f.60c
and
1
franc.
Finally,
he
expressed his
own surprise
that.
"one beautiful night, under no pretext 'Whatsoever,
my Toucouleurs
left en masse."
See, A.N.S:
2G15-35 op.cit., Avril,
pp.1-2.
28.
A.N.S:
2G1S-35 op.elt., Mai, p.
30.
29. 2G16-6
Mauritanie ~ A.O.F op.cit., 4e trimestre.
It
is
likely
that
the request
was
granted,
for
no such
incident
was ever alluded to in later reports.

---

452
30.
2G15-35 op.cit., Mai,
p.
30.
31.
A similar situation was observed in Pador in 1919.
But,
i t is
not
sure
whether
i t was
a
purposeful
boycott.
Administrator Kulsh on
his November tour noticed that in the area between the
two rivers,
vast
tracts
of
land traditionally cultivated at
that
time
of
the year we~e
lying waste.
His conclusion,
informed by the province chief,
was that,
"people
refused
to
stoop
to
farming,
an activity
that used
to be
the
lot
of
their
slaves."
This
is
a
moot
conclusion
since
at
no
time
during the
19th or the 20th century was
there a
"slave mode of produc-
cion" per se.
32.
A.N.S:
2G20-1 Senegal:
"Rapport Annuel 1920." 8 p,
Lt.
Gouver-
neur
a
Gouverneur
General
Merlin,
on
the
prescriptions
of
the
18 May
1920 eelegrammc.
For
the
previous
quotation
see,
M.
Michel,
quoti~g
Gabriel
Angou1vant in,
L'Appe1,
op.cit.,
p.
144.
33.
These
contentions were Marc Miche1's
own,
(L'r.ppel,
op,clt.,
p.
415).
34.
2G16-33,
Ilatam
op.cit.
(Fehrier).
These
threats
were
translated into acts,
as far as desertion goes,
(Cha?ter 10).
35.
A.N S:
2G16-39,
Podor,
"Rapports Mensuels 1916"
(Juin).
36,
They were
sentenced on grounds
that
the divorce was a
"regu-
lar"
one
(based
on
the
man' 5
own
letter),
that
the
remarriage
too:.c
place
fo11QT.,Jing
the
three
months
required
period
(subsequent
to
the
divorce),
and finrtlly,
the
two were seeing each other with
the view to
forcing
the
chief
to
divorce
the
lady.
(A.N.II:
El-52
Gorgol
"Cor-
respondance
et
Rapports
1913-1919."
Compte
rcndu
du
jugement
du
22
Avril 1919 et telegramme du Commissa ire au Commandant,
22/7/1919).
37.
For details on this see, Marc Michel,
op.cit.,
p.
410.
38.
A.N.M:
"Dossier
du
Gouvernement
General
1913-1918"
(Annee
1916,
Etablissement
des
Soldats
liberes,
Ministere
des
Colonies
aus
Couverneurs Generaux,
Paris,
17/5/1916).
39"
For ohe list of these jobs see, M.
~ichel,
op.cit.,
p.
402.
40.
Demmba Jrtpwando Bookum,
passim,
section 6.
41.
The
third category of Tirailleurs,
allegedly
the
wisest,
was
that
of
"retirees,"
those
who
after
fifteen
years
of
service
often
established at the chief to~ of the cercle and generally lived on good
:erms with the administration.
For
the
categorisation
of veterans see,
A.N.S:
17G-39
"Politique
Indigene;
rappores
et
instructions
1908-1920"
(Etat
d'Esprit
des
Tirailleurs
Liberes,
annexe
au
rapport
de
recrutement
de
l'
A.a.F.,
piece 39,7 p).

---

453
42.
Boghe residence,
"Rapports 1908-1921" o~.cit., 4etrimestre.
43.
5y Hamat,
"Les Mauritaniens",
op.eit.,
p.
131.
44.
A.N.M.:
El-52 op.-:it.,
1919 (General Commissaire des
Troupes a
Commissa ire
pour
la
Mauritanie,
Paris,
24/5/1919
and
Commissaire
de
Mauritanie a General Commissaire des Troupes,
6/12/1919).
A~plications for the posts of secretary of tribunal by Mammadu Kan
t
(brother of the chief of Mbaan) and for that of canton chief in Boosoya
by Ibraa Ceerno Molle in 1919. were all rejected for budget and vacancy
I
reasons,
by the Lt-Govenor and the Commissioner.
(A.N.M:
El-14 "Chemama
Brakna 1919-1921,"
(commandant a
Commissane,
11/11/1919).
Ii
In 1918,
cwenty four Tirailleurs from Halaybe had sent a petition
,
I
to
the
Governor
General
requesting
the
removal
of
Baylaa
Biraan
as
chief of Halaybe and the no~ination of one of their comrades, Corporal
Demmba Mayram Bah,
of the
51st B.T.S.
Commissioner Gaden turned do "Tt
\\
the application,
arguing that Baylaa Biraan was a good and
trustworthy
chief
on
all
counts.
He
further
requested
that
these
soldiers
be
punished
for
having
disregarded
the
hierarchy
and
addressed
their
letter directly to the Governor General.
Ii
45.
This man was later sente:1ced to one year's imprisonment.
I
For
this
and
the
previous
incident
see,
Boghe
op.eit.,
Juillet
1920 and Jui:1 192: .
i
46
We
found
no
mention
of
Baydel
or
the
kind
of
sanction
he
incurred,
in later reports.
Most likely,
he was deported.
For
this
affair
see,
A.N.S:
2G19-25
Podor;
"Rapports
Mensuels
I
1919"
(Juin).
47.
In
line
with
administrative
promises,
land
had already
been
I
granted
to
former
tirailleurs
in
nearby
Halaybe
ever
since
December
1918
(Boghe,
4th
quarter
1918).
This
is
how
the
son
of
the
chief
described the scene:
When they came back [tirailleurs],
they all gathered
at the village,
under the leadership of one
former
officer;
They came
to see him [the province chief]
at
Mbaan and told him:
'We have come to take all the land
back, we are the ones entitled to farm it [for]
only we,
fought this war .. t
Then he replied:
' I f this land were yours or your
fathers',
the:1 you would have the right to take
it
back.
Was
this land you are referring to,yo~rs or your
fathers'?
The tirailleurs answered
How about you? is this land
yours or your father's?
(Sheex Yaaya Kan,
former canton chief,
passim,
section 9).
48.
For
this affair,
we
rely
on
a
long
and detailed account
by
Ibraahiima S.
Cubbu (passim,
sect.ll).
In general we
find this account
directly
received
from
an
eye
witness,
of
'::letter
quality
t.han
those

---

mentioned by Kalidou Diallo in his,
":'es Chefs du Fouta",
op.cit.
There
is
no
mention of
this
incident
in the archives.
We
shall
discuss
the probable reasons for that,
later.
49.
Traditions
contend
that
he
"'as
invulnerable
and
that
the
bullets knocked him down,
breaking his
neck bones but without piercing
his skin.
They had to break his head ",ith gun butts.
50.
Perhaps
in league ",ith neighbourcng chiefs
for,
in March 1917
the
Commandant
of
Matam
complained
that
the
chief
of
Boosoya
t..,'3S
encouraging
immigration
from
FerIa
by
promising
the
Fulbe
a
warm
"'elcome.
(A.N.S:
2G17-30 op.cit.,
March)
51.
Christian Coulon's study leads one to believe that this
movement was an Islamic one.
("Pouvoir maraboutique,"
op.eit.,
p.
104).
The movement of Aali Yero is very different
indeed from
the opposition
of Ceerno Lamin and the FE'rlankoobe _
The
latter was
in no way a
"mahdist"
insurrection.
52.
For details on this opposition and its repression see,
A.CI.S:
2G21-26
Matam
"Rapports
Trimestriels
1921"
2e
trimestre.;
2G21~a
Senegal
"Rapports Tnmestrie1s
1921"
2e
trim).;
2G23~52 Matam
"Rapports
trimestrie1s 1923" le.
pp.
1~2),
53.
The cleric died in prison in November 1921.
Later,
the chief
of Nammaari escaped from prison but
fell
seriously ill.
As
the chief
promised
to bring him back
to prison,
administrator Fran~ois Colombane
pleaded ",ith the Lt. Governor for his pardon,
(A.N.S:
2G23-52 op. cit.)
I.
54.
The Government General issued this circular particularly
I
because
of
the
casamance
region where
the
administration
feared armed
rebellion.
In
1917,
in
the
four
districts
of
Kamobe1,
Ziguinchor,
Binjoona and seeju,
the
administration conficated 5,000 guns.
But,
in
the
dist:rict
of
Matam,
the
commandant
had
seen
the
danger
with
the
rebellion
in
Ferlo,
back
in
1915
(A.N.S:
2G17~5 Senegal;
"Rapport
PoEtique 1917",
(2D:"Protectorats," 28 p).
For the disarmement in the districts of Fuuca see for ~xample,
A.NS:
2G16-33;
Matam op.cit.,
and 2Gt6~39; Podor op.cit.
55.
A.N.S:
2G15~35 Matam, op.cit.; 2G15-37 Salde, op.cit.;
2G18~33 Podor, "Rapports mensuels 1918."
56.
After
the
rejection of propositions
from
Podor
in 1920,
the
Governor General finally agreed to replacing the old chief
in 1923.
For the problems Aamadu Moxtaar encountered in Kasga,
see, A.N.S:
2G23-71,
Podor;
"Rapport politique annuel 1923," 6p.
57.
A,N.S:
2G29-22; Matam "Rapports Mensuels 1919"
(Avril).
59.
A,N.S:
2G19-25;
Podor "Rapports mensuels 1919"
(Avril).
These
planes
landed
at
all
major
administrative
centecs
along
the
river,
from Dagana (",est)
to Bakel (east).
I
I

---

455
60.
It was started on 15 January 1919.
Its construction required
126
days
labour
conscripts
a
day,
with
3
days I
work
each.
(Boghe,
"Rapports" op.cit.,
1919).
61.
A.N.S:2G20-26;
Podor,
"Rapports mensuels 1920"
(Janvier).
62.
A.N.S:
2G20-5; Senegal,
"Rapports trimestriels 1920"
(Lt.
Governor Leveque a Gouverneur General Merlin, le trimestre).
63.
District of Podor:
Total days of labour-tax for construction
and maintenance of roads:
1924
Circumscriptions:
Number of days performed: ~umber needed
Escale of Podor
4,136
517
Western 100IO
24,720
3,090
Eastern TooIo
~25,144
3,143
Haayre - Laa·.....
24,752
3,094
Laaw
42.400
5,300
Yirlaabe-Hebbi.
31,936
3,992
Total
153,088
19,136
----------.-------------.------------._-----_._----------
Source:
K--A 23
Senegal;
"Etat du r~seau routier au Senegal par
;
cere le 1921-1925".
(Conseil des Notables de Podor:
Compte rendu
reunion du 16 April 1921 meeting).
64.
Ironically,
in
the
district
of Matam,
it was
the
people
\\Jho
asked
the
administrator
to order a
car
from
the Government General so
that he could pay
them visits and take care of administrative business
on the spot,
rather than having them go all the way to Macam.
For the reaction of the people at the sight of the first automobl-
le,
see,
A.N.S:
2G19-22 op.cit.,
(Fevrier).
65.
In January 1919,
the first repatriation that took place
concerned,
among other categories
(originaires,
reservists),
bread
winners,
orphans,
and
first
born
sons.
(Marc
Michel,
L'Appel,
op.cit.,
p.
408).
66.
2G20-26 op.cit., Janvier.
(
67.
A.N.S:
17G20-39 op.cit.
68.
A.N.S:
2G20-26 op.cit.
I
l
I
I
I

---

SUMMARY AND GENERAL GONCLUSIONS
A.
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY FUUTA TOORO
A..'1D FRENCH EXPANSION
Fuuta
Tooro
is
a
slender
expanse
of
soil
astride
the
Senegal
River,
on
the
north western edge of Senegambia.
The harsh conditions
of the
sudano-sahelian environment of ~hich it is part are
tempered by
the
annual
floods,
major
reason
for
the
double
cylcle
cultivation and
the
status
as
bread basket
within
the
region.
Land,
agriculture,
and
agricultural
production
constitute
the
axis
upon
which
life
and
livelihood hinged throughout history.
The
strategic
crossroad
position
and
the
prosperity
associated
with the
river have created a
long pattern of immigration
from various
geo-ethnic
horizons , o n e
of
the
most
complex
and
highly
structured
societies
in
Senegarnb ia,
and
a
long
and
eventful
history
that
culminated in the establishment of the Alrnamate.
The
onset of a
steady
French expansion along
the
river coincided
with, a
decline
of
Fuutanke
political
influence
in Senega:T1bia,
and
the
aggravation
of
the
Almamate's'
internal
contradictions,
all
of
which
suited French economic
and
strat~gic needs.
The
French had more
th~n
one reason to ascertain the coope~ation of Fuuta and its Almaami(s);
it
supplied much of
the millet
that
fueled
the
river trade
in gum, "While
I
feeding
the African population of the colonial headquarters
in western
Senegal.
Second,
the region's two hundred and forty mile arc along the
I
456
I
I
I

---

457
river
constituted
a
crucial
artery
of
expansion
eastW'arcts.
Consequently,
the
French
spent
their
time
placating
the
leadership
through various treaties and customs payments.
As Fuuta persisted in thwarting navigation,
the St.
Louis
merchant community found conditions of
trade more and mote unbearable,
and ushere~ in through the appointment of Governor Louis Faidherbe,
the
era of carrot-and-stick policies
that
led
Co
the
dismemberment of the
Alrn;:l.mate.
The
peripheral
provinces
of
Dimat,
Teoro
and
E.
Damga,
frustrated
over
the
pattern
of
rnarginalization,
signed
protectorate
treaties
with
the
French.
Laal,.J
and
Yirlaabe
followed suit
less
than
two
decades
later,
while
Boosoya
and
T,J. Damga
continued
a
lonely
opposition
to
the
French,
providing
moral
support
to
forces
of
resistance within
the protectorates.
As
emigration
to
Naoro
resumed
at"
a
st"rong
pace
and
central
Fuuta chiefs
became
adrtmant
in
their
unwillingness
to
cooperate.
and
as
the eastward expansion
took on a sudden urgency.
the French decided
to remove the last stumbling block in
the middle valley, by neutraliz-
ing central
Fuuta
permanently.
With
the hosting of Alburi Njaay,
the
king of Jolof,
the fall of Segu,
the assassinations of Commandant Abel
Jeandet
in Tooro
and
of
Seh
Mammadu Maamudu
in Damga.
they
found
a
~
series
of
justificat.ions
to
administer
the
COUI}
de
grace.
Colonel
Dodds'
massive
army
marched
through
central
Fuuta,
neutralized
both
Abdul
Bookar
and
the
Umarian
returnees.
and
laid
the
foundations
of
permanent French rule throughout the land.
l
I

---

458
B.
ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF COLONIAL RULE
Once Colonel Dodds·
mission was accomplished,
the French proceeded
to deal firmly with
former
"dissidents,"
in order to
discourage among
them
any
future
temptation
to
cause
trouble.
The
administration
initiated and
encouraged
the
confiscation of land and
its
redistribu-
tion
to
"loyal"
chiefs
and
subjects.
In
some
cases,
the
French
deported former
follo~ers of Abdul Bookar,
demoted
them
as
political
chiefs, or attempted to strip them of some rights, as major lando'~er~.
By the early 1900s some chiefs had amply taken advantage of
these
measures,
and accumulated land where
they previously had
almost none,
and eliminated political
foes
and rivals.
These measures had
largely
had a
deterrent
effect
on
the
people
at whom
they
were
aimed.
But,
this
was
only
at
the
heavy
price
of
intra-community
disputes,
endless
administrative
trouble,
and
fierce
estrangement
between
people
and
their
chiefs.
Ultimately,
local
administrators
had
to
prevail
on
higher
;:Iuthority
to
do
away
with
the
policy.
for
the
sake
of
ad-
rninistrative serenity.
Anxious
as
chey \\Ilere
to establish
a
cradition of deference
and
respect for
their administrative norms,
and devotion to
their
general
goals.
the
French
moved
to
select
chiefs
wi th
sufficiently
proven
reliability,
and
tailor
administrative
units
to
their
own needs.
In
most
instances
they~ appointed
or
promoted
former
graduates
of
the
"School of Sons of Chiefs and Interpreters,"
along ~ith allies in the
long struggle
against Abdul
Bookar and
the
Umarians.
In ~estern and
central
Fuuta
(Dimat,
Tooro,
Yirlaabe,
Boosoya),
~here local
aris-
::.ocracies
were
not
fully
trusted,
cradicional
political
units
were
i
I
I

---

459
divided
into
smaller
pieces.
This
was
expected to
further undermine
such
formerly
important
figures
as
the
Lamtaoro,
Elimaan
Dirnat,
Elimaan Rinnjaw,
~ al.
On the
other hand,
the consolidation of Damga
and Ngenaar
into larger and more viable
units,
favoured
the
emergence
of powerful allies like Abdul Salaam Kan,
and
Hammadi Alfaa Bah.
The
companion
technique
of
"open
letters"
and
"collective
corn·
plaints"
established
and
encouraged
by
French
authori ty,
improved
considerably the control of,
and check on,
local chiefs.
Above all,
i t
helped
purge
the
Commandement
Iodif':cne
of
those
who
were
deemed
"unreliable,"
or
compromised
by
their
authoritarian
attitude
the
Success of the French agenda in Fuuta Tocro.
Still,
in
relation
to
the
panoply
of
measures
designed
to
undermine
the political clout
and economic basis
of
the
aristocracy,
the
administration
set
out
to
abolish
land
rights
en
1899,
and
domestic
slavery
in 1906.
In addition
to .....eakening
the aristocracy,
these
measures
""ere
aimed
at
freeing
the
forces
of
production,
providing
a
larger
basis
for
military
recrui tment
at
times
""hen
traditional elites
loathed to serve in the colonial
army,
eliminating
the aristo~racy as a major competitor
in the
collection of taxes,
and
asserting its control of the land considered henceforth "state domain."
Ho.....ever.
on all che issues referred to above,
the French met
""ith
limited success.
On a
general plane,
i t can be argued
that
for
the
first
three
decades
of
their presence
in Fuuta Tooro,
the
French did
not
resort
to
purely
"direct"
rule.
as
is
usually
asswned.
They
remained
in many ways
observant of
the
"Protectorate
Principle."
In
an era ..... hen the reach and control
of the administration was limited by
I

---

460
Geography and
logistics,
when strongly
tradition~oriented chiefs were
still
in place
in
many a
provi0ce,
the
French could not simply strip
the ir
local
representatives
of
every
prerogative.
Moreover,
they
could
hardly
impose
chiefs
on
a
generation
born
and
raised
in
a
climate
of strong religious and anti-French sentiments and attitudes.
Thus,
in the
selection of chiefs,
they often sought to
"satisfy
the
sentiments of the indigenous people" by appointing only those qualified
by tradition.
In
the
realm of
territorial adjustments,
changes
did not
always
follow
the
"diminution"
pattern
that
distinguished
French
from
the
British
"expansion"
scheme
in
....estern
Yorubaland. 1
Rather,
the
"dismemberment" and diminution policies that prevailed during the first
decade,
quickly yielded to
"consolidation"
into sizeable units between
1900 and 1914.
While
administrators
curbed
the
trade
in
slaves
through
tough
action
bet",een
1890
and
1905,
the
la'"
of
1906
abolishing
domestic
slavery met
with
little
success.
Most
chiefs
retained some
of their
"captifs"
(French term for domestic slaves) as "clients~ and retainers,
in disregard for the 1908 law requiring
. them not
to.
The administra-
tion no longer worried about the
institution,
more so because domestic
slaves
constituted
the
main pool
for
substitutes
in
labour
and con-
scription.
Similarly,
the abolition of land fees,
ultimate expression
of French inroads
on the land tenure system,
was largely ignored.
The
principle "land to those who till it" never got implemented and was,
in
the end,
abandoned.
l
In
the
area
of
control
and
checks.
the
administration
applied
I
I
I

---

461
double
scandards.
to
the
policy of
~irmness in relation to "untrust-
worthy"
local
auxiliaries,
i t
opposed
a
blatant
laisser-faire
in
relation to
the so called "good agents,"
accepting
abuses on the part
of
the
latter.
as
the
price
to
pay
for
"cranquility,
perfect
submis-
sion and timely payment of taxes."
These
setbacks
suggest
that,
in
Fuuta
Tooro
as
elseiJhere,
the
French
did
not
always
base
their
policies
upon
principles
and
objectives they had in mind, but also on the hard facts and
realities
which they faced.
For more
than
a decade,
the
people
of Fuuta remained
hostage
to
French
"appeasement"
policy
vis
a
vis
the
Moorish
neighbours
to
the
north.
Yet,
the conquest of Mauritania and
the
consequent occupation
of
the
north
bank
had
a
mixed
impact on
Fuuta Tooro
and
its
people.
The provisal of vast tracts of good land for agriculture,
the security,
relative
in
the
early
phase,
guaranteed by
French
admi.~istration for
unhindered
life
and
productive
activity,
the
massive
emigration
this
generated,
did
relieve
the
south
bank
from
demographic
pressure,
ensure surplus production,
and increase revenues.
Conversely,
it divided the
region
right down
the
middle,
and set
off rivalry and wars of influence between newly appointed chiefs on the
north bank and those ruling on the south.
The
methods
the administra-
tion of Mauritania
used to
entice
people
to
emigrate
from the
south,
(tax exemptions,
land grants
and worst of all,
the Gouraud decision of
1908
on
"land
mastership"),
fueled
violent
conflicts
between
Corn-
munities on either side of
the
river.
Despite some responsibility on
the part of chiefs who often blew disputes out of proportions for their

---

462
own benefit,
of the people who pushed coo far with decisions
they often
knew wrong.
the
onus
of blame
rests
with
the
administration of Mauri-
tania which
directly upset
the old
social equilibriwn
regarding land
management and relations of production.
Although
the
"military administration"
of Mauritania
experienced
in
general
less
difficulties
with
its
local
agents,
it
got
sometimes
dragged
into
the
disputes
with
the
south,
and
found
itself
pitched
against.
its
":;enegalese"
counterpart.
It was the growing
frustration
over endless conflicts, and the misunderstanding be:ween administrators
on
both
banks I
that
fostered
the
maj or
surveys
of
the
Fuutanke
land
tenure system,
churned out
from 1910
for~ard.
These same difficulties
account
for
the
proposition
in
1911
to
annex
a
ten
kilometre
wide
strip
of
the
north
bank
to
the
colony
of
Senegal,
or
the
projects
schemed by Governors Angoulvant
(1916)
and Clozel
(1917),
to
create a
compact
group
of
French colonies
from western Sahara
to
Gabon.
These
schemes were resuciated several times,
without success,
from 1919 on.
The violent conflicts that opposed Moors and Senegalese farmers
in
the
districts
of Matam
(19705),
and
Podor
(November
1986)
prove,
if
additional
evidence
is
needed,
that
the
Fuuta
Tooro case
was
one of
the worst situations of colonial partition
of ethno-cultural entities
in \\.lest Africa.
I
C.
THE DIRECT IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE AND FUUTANKE
RESPONSE TO IT
I
The major
change
brought
about
in
Fuuta
... as
the
elimination
of
I
the Alrnarnate,
a system of government
that had superseded the
regime of
I
I

---

463
the
Satigi(s)
for
over
a
century.
From
1904.
the
Lt.
Cove rnor
0 f
Senegal.
and
the Commissioner of Mauritania became
the symbol of po~er
~
[,
I
for
the
north
and
south
banks.
Ruling
through
Commmandants
and
I
I
,
Residents,
these
high
officials
remained
essentially
out
of
direct
:
touch with the region,
contrary to nineteenth century Governors.
Local administra.tors as "men on the spot" did retain a great
deal
"
of
aut.hority.
But,
the distance
from
the district capital,
the aura
a~j protection of some chiefs,
and
the
required
tact in
dealing with
populations,
limited until after
the
first Varld War.
the
autocratic
nature of their power,
as well as the carte blanche character of their
mission.
At
times,
their
desire
or
request
to
effect
territorial
changes.
punish or depose
chiefs,
was met with disapproval of higher
authority.
Replies
from
St.
Louis
generally
reflected
concern
for
Fuutanke sensitivity to arbitrary moves and attacks Oil traditions.
The
long hailed
"omnipotence"
of
local administrators
should therefore be
I
nuanced,
in light of conditions of time and place.
The
African
branch
of
the
administration
occupied
rt
crucial
I
position.
Interpreters were influential,
and to some extent,
feared by
both Commandants
and Chiefs.
In general
I
however,
they had lost much
of
the
clout
and
influence
of
the
earlier
period
of
conquest.
to
a
contingent of new chiefs,
most of
whom ......ere graduates
of the "School
I
of
Sons
of
Chiefs
and
Interpreters l'
and
therefore
able
to
do
the
interpreting on their
own.
I
Follo...... ing the conquest and contrary to the
I
reality
in
formerly
"stateless
societies,"
the
Interpreter
....as
not
necessarily
the
"nwnber one" man
in
the
hierarchy of local
represen-
I
tatives
of
the
administration.
Because
of
this,
and
of
the
class
I
I
I

---

/j64
status of Canton Chiefs and che material and moral advantages attached
to
the
function,
Interpreters constantly
aspired
for chiefship.
And
the
many
plots
and
intrigues
they
often
initiated,
in
cahoots
with
individual opponents of
local
chiefs,
should be examined in light of
such aspirations.
Dis tric t
Guards
accomp I ished
pe rhaps
the
dirt ies t
jobs
of
an,
conducting
police
operations,
arresting
and
harassing
the
common
people,
escorting
and
sometimes
serving
as
porter
to
colonial
offi~
cials.
Compared with
the
more
powerful
Interpreters and Chiefs,
they
had
less
opportunities
to
take
advantage
of
bribery.
Furthermore,
since
most
of
them
were
of
commoner--if
not
servile--origin,
and
lacked basic
instruction,
they could not contemplate being promoted to
the
status of chief or
Interpreter.
Finally,
as cases of complacency
multiplied
among
Guards
of
Fuutanke
origin,
the
administration
made
sure more
and more
district guards were brought
from different ethnic
groups
and
re gions.
This
may
have
been
the
origin
of
a
tradition
within French colonial
rule,
that
lingered on
to survive
the
indepen-
dence of West Africa. 2
Canton Chiefs
played
perhaps
the
most. critical
role
among
the
I
African
agents,
and
therefore
experienced
one
of
the
most
ambiguous
I
statuses.
People
regarded
them
as
traditional
rulers,
and
expected
them to comply ..... ith t.raditional chiefly ways of
life,
that is,
indulge
in generous
show and
redistribution of
~ealth and cater to
the
needs
I
of crowds
of
retainers,
entertainers
and collaborators.
The adminis-
I
tration,
on
the
other
hand,
regarded
them
as
appointed
auxiliaries,
required to conform
to French norms
of administration and supposed
to
I
I
I
I

---

465
live
only
on
their
monthly
salaries
and
annual
tax
returns.
Such a
discrepancy between a
traditional
way of life supported by
a variety
of revenues and the new status of civil servant 'otIith
extremely limited
resources,
caused many chiefs
to either disregard colonial legislation
on
traditional
techniques
of
accumulation,
or
indulge
in embezzlemen~
of colonial funds.
Even chiefs often deemed loyal enough and best paid
in
the
corps,
could not help
embezzling and
taking
bribes.
to
make
ends
neet.
Annual
and
semestrial
subsidies
sent
Co
some
chiefs
starting
in
1905,
attest
to
the
reality
of
the
situation,
and
the
Governmentls sensitivity to it.
As
a
result,
the
exploitation
and
corruption
often
assoc iated
with local chiefship in these early years of colonial
rule,
should be
put
in
the
proper
context
of
"accUJnulation"
and
"redistribution."
characteristic of traditional socio-economic
structures of Senegambia.
The process of accwnulation of wealth among local chiefs remained to a
large extent briddled by such a
socio-cultural context.
As a result,
not
every
single
chief
managed
to
retire
or
die
wealthy.
On
the
contrary,
heavy
indebtedness
was
the
lot of many a chief.
And l i t
is
interesting
to
note
that,
when
in
1915
the
Commandant
of
Podor
threatened
to
impound one
of his
chief's property
for
failing
to pay
debts
due to Kr. OldanL, a traitant at Podor,
it was the people of the
p~Qvince who contributed to help pay back, to the great astonishment of
the colonial official. 3
Second.
it
should be
pointed
out
that
on occasion.
some
of
the
corruption
was
initiated by
the
chief's
own
entourage.
as
was
some-
I
times borne out by official reports.
I
I
I

---

466
finally,
attention should be paid to the nuances in attitude among
chiefs,
and
the
variations
through
time
and
space.
The
degree
of
exploitation
and
oppression
depended
on
the
agressiveness
of
the
people,
the watchfulness or permiss iveness
of the administration,
the
relation
of
the
people
to
their
chief,
and
the
wealth
accwnulated
prior to appointment.
Contra~y to Canton Chiefs and Inter?reters, Village
Chiefs rarely
appear
in
the
colonial
administrative
picture.
Formerly
held
in
contempt
by
colonial
officials,
they
have
not
received
so
far,
the
attention
they deserve
Erom historians.
Several elements distinguished
the
status
and
attitude
of Village
Chiefs
from
those
of
Canton
and
Province
Chiefs.
First of all,
as
the
administration quickly
found
out,
they ~ere much harder to
impose
than
the
latter.
As
a
result,
the
responsibility
of
selecting
Village
Chiefs
rested
largely
with
I
local
conununities
and
Canton Chiefs.
Approval by
the
administration
l
remained
mainly
a
formality,
especially
when
those
elected
had
no
record
of open
hostility
to
the
French,
As
an
institution,
Village
1
chiefship
remained an agr-eed-upon monopoly of
the
founding
family
in
every Village,
and devolved orl the elder within the same family.
Such
a mode of devolution of power led Commandants to complain about the 50-
I
called strange
inclination of the
Fuutankoobe
to elect
old and physi-
I
cally
handicapped
men,
allegedly
easy
to
manipulate, 4
!
Second,
in
a
i .
I
colonial context
where they enjoyed little revenue and consideration,
I
I
Village
Chiefs
were,
in
comparison
with
Canton
Chiefs.
at
a
c.lear
I'
i
I
I
disadvantage.
Third,
~hether in geographical or blood terms,
Village
I
I
I
I

---

467
Chiefs
lived
much
closer
to
their
constituencies
than
any
oeher
African auxiliary of the colonial administration.
From
these differences
in status
stemmed differences
in
acticude
in relation to colonial authority
and
interests.
Because
they
gained
most
in
being
popular
within
their
constituencies,
and
least
in
zealously
carrying
out
unpopulac
colonial
orders,
Village
Chiefs
frequently
indulged
in embezzling
funds.
deceiving the
administration
in
matters
of
census I
taxation,
conscription
and
the
like.
One
\\
Commandant
at
Macam,
summarized
most
accurately
Village
Chiefs'
!
inclination
to
identify with
the
interests of
their
constituents when
I
he said:
\\
Related
to
several
families
in
a
village,
he
[the
I
chief]
is
often
cautious
not
to
make
enemies
and
i
I
I
remains apathetic.
His
role,
[in practice]
consists
not
in
keeping
the
administrator
informed,
but,
in
trying
to mislead him by holding back information on
what really goes on. 5
As
a
result,
Village
Chiefs
beca:ne
in
many
instances,
the
pet
aversion
of
Commandants,
fell
victim
to
their
anger,
and
incurred
severe fines and prison sentences.
The
impact
of
colonial
demands
on
the
people,
proved
by
any
account I
a
heavy
one.
Taxation,
forced
labour,
indigenat.
and
con-
scription,
played each
to
the
fullest
extent,
a
role
in the.exploita-
cion and oppression of
the
Fuutankoobe.
At
first,
taxes we~e paid in
kind,
particularly
in
the
prized staples
of
gum
and millet.
Towards
the
close of
the nineteenth century,
as
i t became necessary
to create
the conditions for
business to run smoothly,
and as
the responsibility
I
of reproducing
itself devolved more
and more on the administration
of
I
I
I

---

468
each
colony.
people
......ere
forced
to
acquit
taxes
in
hard
currency.
Taxes
concerned
both
people
and
property.
and
......ere
raised
...... ithout
consideration
for
economic
status,
or
prior
investigation
on
the
viability of increase.
With few exceptions, propositions for increas-
iog
taxes came mostly from Commandants,
and ...... ere promptly accepted and
applied to other districts.
I
I
In
the
beginning,
abuses
in
the
collection
of
taxes
harmed
i
particularly
the
interests
of
temporary
migrants,
ofLen
subjected
to
\\
double payment.
In
a
country
where
money
...... as
not
only
rare,
but
also
not yet
a
I
widely used medium of exchange,
payment in specie allowed local traders
to
abuse
the
l i t t l e
farmer.
The
latter
had
to
draw
on
subsistance
I
I
stocks
and
sell
considerable
quantities
of
grai'i1
for
a
modicum
of
I,
cash.
This
fostered
routine
food
shortages
and
famines,
and
forced
i
people
into
labour
migration
and
sale
of
cattle.
And,
while
a
few
!
Commandants could not help denouncing the usurious manoeuvres of many a
trader,
colonial headquarters
tried at best to avoid ao open collision
with the interests of
the merchant community.
The
long
standing
anti - French
pos ture,
and
the
tradition
of
unwillingness
to
cooperate
fully
with colonial
authority,
made Fuuta
Tooro a
propitious
ground
for
the
application of
the
indigenat
code.
Relentlessly,
administrators applied disciplinary powers to iodividuals
and
groups
who
indulged in rebellion,
dodged
the
draft,
or refused to
pay taxes.
The cursory review of the application of this code in Fuuta
Tooro
warrants
the
conclusion
that
this
institution was
designed
not
only to punish and dissuade,
but,
equally importantly,
to raise
money

---

for the colonial treasury.
Forced
labour
consisted essentially of telegraph
lines and
road
construction and maintenance, hauling of boats,
(official and private),
and porcerage,
Requisition,
expropriation,
and
other forms
of abuses
were
also
conunon.
Canoes.
boats,
horses,
cattle.
and
sheep
'''''ere
commandeered
on
every
occasion,
to
transport
or
feed
officials.
Although
forced
labour
a?peared
mild,
in
comparison
with
other
colonie5
and
situations,
it
is
still
remembered
as
the
inst.it:.ut.ion
most reminiscent of colonial
abuse.
The integration of the expression
Fali Forso,
(from the
French, £pr la force),
into the Pulaar language,
shows
how
indelible
a
mark,
forced
labour
stamped on the
collective
memory.
Conscription for
the military was
another
form
of
exploitation.
Starting
in
the
early
l890s,
any
crisis
in
the French African empire
entailed a
recruitment campaign in Fuuta
Teoro.
Because joining the
army ",as
largely optional
Eor a ",hile
upper class
elements
and well
off
individuals
resorc.ed
frequently
to
substitutes
(mostly
domestic
slaves),
who
were
granted
freedom.
This
spared many of the sons of
the aristocracy,
while putting poor people at a clear disadvantage and
at the mercy
of draft boards.
Despite
the
decree of 1912 establishing
mandatory service in French Black
Africa,
the aristocracy continually
refrained
from
volunteering,
and
changed
its
attit.ude
only
at
the
outbreak
of
the
war
of
1914,
in
response
to
the
administration's
exhortations and fabulous promises.
The differences
in impact on the various regions
is
di fficul t
to
assess
on
a
systematic
basis.
However,
a
few
indications
seem
to

---

470
warrant
some
inferences.
The
impac t
of
forced
labour was
in general
unequally
shared.
Riverine
villages
bore
the
brunt:
of
hauling
drudges,
while
those
of
the Jeeri
(highland)
experienced most of the
telegraph maintenance
tasks.
As
for
the
draft.,
the
agriculturalist
people
of
sedentary
villages
suffered
far
more
t:han
t:he
Fulbe
nomad
pascoraliscs and seasonal migrants, who usually mangaged to dodge
it.
Active
and
military
resistance
against
imperialism
has
often
overshadowed
the
passive
and simmering
resistance
to
colonial
rule.
One particular
form of
reaction
in Fuuta Toara,
was
the rejection of
chiefs imposed from outside.
from the beginning until about world War
1,
communities
expressed
their
resentment
at being
ruled by
so
called
"s~rangers."
wnile
central
and
eastern
Fuuta
experienced
only
such
minor cases,
crises in western Fuuta generated some political
turmoil,
especially among the Halaybe,
who opposed the appointment of successive
chiefs,
the
people
of
Gede
who
resented
the
nomination
of
Aamadu
Moxtaar Wan,
and those of Dimat,
who could not come
to
grips with the
nomination
of
Raasin
Kan.
The
vigor
of
t:he
oppos i t:ion
in
Halaybe
forced
the
administration
to
step
back.
Conversely,
the
Government
General stuck to its decisions in the cases of western Tooro and Dimat,
against whose
ruling
families
the
French had
an old
grudge going back
to
the 18605 and 1890s.
But,
even where
people failed
to get decisions
reversed,
they
forced
tne
chiefs~' through
harassment
to
establish
marriage
cies
and seek
their cooperation.
~ith regard to the opposi-
tion
triggered by
territorial changes,
it proved vain
in many
ins tan-
ces.
A
third
form
of
resistance
concerned
French
policy
of
land

---

471
confiscation and donation.
In addition to opposing the
implementation
of
the
"Lamothe-Dodds; decree"
confiscating
the
propert.y
of
former
~'di5sidentsI" people took to contesting land donated by the administra-
tion
to
individual
chiefs,
notables,
and
communities.
Their outright
refusal
to
acknowledge
and pay ownership
rights
to
those
recipients,
forced
the
administration
to
rescind
some
of
these
rights.
and
avoid
any alienating clause in future
land grant certificates.
Finally,
colonial
demands
generated
the
same
frustration
and
reaction
in many parts of
the
country.
Regarding taxation,
reactions
ranged
from witholding information,
to tampering ~ith
tax
rolls,
and
deposing chiefs
deemed
too
compliant ·.... ith
tax
related
instructions.
In
order
to
avoid
forced
labour,
particularly hauling,
desertion
of
villages became routine
whenever convoys were
sighted.
At times
the
administration had to heed people's grievances and encourage some
form
of
compensation
for
labour
conscripts.
The
draft
was--especially
during
the
~ar--an
institution
the
Fuutankoobe
were
particularly
averse
to.
At
one
palaver at
the village of
Mbumrnba,
notables
told
their Commandant that they would rather
pay 25 francs
(it was 6 then)
per
person.
than have
to
provide
recruits.
All
forms
of resistance
were
resorted
to,
including
armed
upris ing I
to
hamper
conscription
operations.
Consequently,
Commandants
devised
methods
to
ensure
regular provision of
the
quota needed
in each village,
and came
down
hard on deserters and
conscientious objectors.
Resistance
to
colonial
rule
also
expressed
itself
in
cultural
terms.
Shortly after
the defeat of the Tukuloor empire
in the east,
and
despite
the
hard
repression
of
Umarian
returnees.
various
cir·

---

472
curnstances alloyed "Militant Islam"
to resurge in the form of "mahdist"
uprisings,
first
in Galoyaabe
(1894-1895),
and then in the province of
Dimat (1908).
In the first
case,
Ceerno Aamadu Alfaa Jah succeeded in
attracting lower class
elements of the society and organizing an army
of
militants.
But,
the
movement
met
with
swift
administrative
reaction and
qUickly petered Qut.
In
the
second
instance,
Aali
Yore
Joob
took
advantage
of
the
crisis
that
beset his home
province,
and mobilized
people
against
the
co 10nla1
sys tern.
Carried
away
by his
initial
success
and
caught
in
the
bind
bet..... een
an
aristocracy
fearful
of
French
retaliation
and
jealous
of his
aura on
the
one
hand,
and a
colonial
authority deter-
.. mined
to
discourage
any
further
attempt
at
rebellion
on
the
other,
Aa 1 i
re'"rved
up
the
pace
0 f
confrontation
only
to
be
lamentably
crushed.
The more prevalent and passive forms of resistance took precedence
over
violent
forms.
The
Islamic
leadership
continuously
resorted
to
various
means
(poetry.
pamphlets,
moral
statements)
to
uphold
spirit-
uality
and
faith
among the masses.
As Terence
Ranger
argued about
the
revolts
in southern Rhodesia,
what
is
important
about
these
"M.ahdist"
uprisings
in
Fuuta
is
not
their
eventual
failure,
but
the
degree
of
success
r:hey
were
able
to
achieve. 6
No
doubt,
they
proved a
logical
continuation
of
the
past
traditions
of
resistance
and
charismatic
leadership.
In this sense,
the
"M.ahdist"
revolts
provided the French
administration
with
additional
reasons
to
uphold
suspicion
and
grow
even
more
cautious
vis
a
vis
Islam
and
the
Tijaniyya
sect.
It
redoubled
its
vigilance
and
refined
the
surveillance
techniques

---

471
throughout Fuuta Tooro and by extension, West Africa.
It is worth mentioning that this question of Islam in Fuuta
Tooro
during the colonial period has hitherto been addressed only by colonial
administrators
and contemporary political scientists.
Hence,
they are
virtually
always
analyzed
as
isolated
cases
of
futile
subversion,
rather than set in their
proper historical context.
Contrary
to
the
traditional elites,
the
masses
constantly
shied
away from
the
French
school.
Sensitive
to
an eventual
brain washing
and placing more value on the help they needed in
their daily struggle
for
subs is canee.
parents
rema ined
reluc Cant
to
send
their
children,
despite colonial propaganda about the
benefits of school and
the host
of enticing measures designed by
French authority.
This attitude of
the masses
led eventually
to
a
greater
adaptation of the
institution
to the realities of the
environment.
Another
pattern of
reaction was
the
use of songs
and poems,
in
defiance
of
provisions
'Jithin
the
indegenat
code,
the
coining
of
concepts
in
their
own
language
designed
to
dilute
their
status
of
colonized in the pride of a presumed moral and cultural
superiority.
D.
WORLD WAR 1 AND ITS IMPACT ON FUUTA TOORO
The
war
established
more
firmly
than
ever,
the
tradition
of
conscription
for
the
military.
Starting
in
1914,
the
departu~e
of
people for
foreign lands,
in order to fight foreign ~ars,
became more
disheartening for many a
family.
As usual,
the
masses bore the brunt
of recuitment
policies.
But,
this
time,
because
of
the high
stakes
involved,
the
aristocracy
displayed
a
great
deal
of
loyalty.
and

---

474
contributed in men,
time and energy,
to
a degree
?erhaps unmatched in
both Senegal
and Mauritania.
Chiefs
asked for leaves of absence and
volunteered for the front,
sometimes for
the duration of the war.
The
exploitation
of
Fuuta
was
compounded
by
the
fact
that
the
administration
of
Mauritania,
for
historical
and
tactical
reasons,
called
almos t
exclus i ve ly
upon
the
populat ion
of
the
north
bank
to
provide recruits,
grain,
and cattle.
For a
region that during the war
was
still
a
"frontier
zone, 11
the
effects of
such policies were very
great.
Beside causing the drain on the Black people and their resour-
ces,
these
policies
played
a
role
in
reinforcing
Moorish
sense
of
superiority vis a vis
the Negro-African.
They also provided an outlet
for French administrators'
racial attitudes in Mauritania,
establishing
thus a tradition fraught with serious poli~ical consequences.
The
inequi ty
inherent
in
the
recruitment
procedures,
the
frustrations
and
anxiety caused by
lack
of news
from
the
front.
all
led
the:
people
to
reSLSc.
in
whatever
way
they
could,
(desertion,
emigration,
attacks on local chiefs'
emissaries,
and
self~maiming).
Economically,
the
war
effort
ranged
from
payment
of
money.
to
contribution
in
grain,
cattle,
cattle
products
and
other
animals.
This
efforc
got
complicaced by
consecutive
droughcs.
food
shortages.
famines,
epidemics, and other calamities of
various kinds.
Therefore,
throughout
the
war,
people
faced
a
situation
almost
distinctive
to
their region:
They coupled the:
payment of ever
increasing taxes ~ith
the reimbursement
in specie,
of quantities of millet and rice borrowed
from
the
administration,
sometimes
in
usurious
terms.
As
if
these
demands
were not enough,
they were asked to give special contributions

---

475
ironically
labelled
-solidarite."
Beside
the
grain
and
cattle
sold
for purposes of raising tax money,
considerable quantities
of millet,
and
numbers
of
herds.
were
levied
as
the
result
of
requisition
practices.
These so called volunteer contributions were also collected
throughout
the
war
without
regard
for
the
already
heavy
price
being
paid.
On
the Whole.
the
impact
of the war '...... a5 profound.
It caused an
unprecedented drain on resources;
money,
millet,
and herds.
As
people
became hard pressed to
face
the cumulative financial
charges,
traders
indulged
in
a
highly
speculative
exercice.
Using
the
alternate
tactics
of
refusing
to
pay
grain
for
cash and
compelling
farmers
to
sell
cheir
produce
under
cost.
they
triggered
crises
of
ravaging
proportions.
The
concorni tant
effec t
of
chese
manoeuvres
and
the
demands
of
the
administration
turned
routine
shortages
into
serious
famines,
~ith consequences often
more accurately measured through the
touching accounts
of
Fuutanke
informants,
than
the
biased
reports
of
colonial
administrators.
In this particular case of war time
famines,
the situation
attests
to the validity of Jean Copan's suggestion
that
there
is
often
a
political
dimension
involved
in
the
occurrence
of
natural disasters.?
Just as
in central Tanzania
~here the appropria-
tion of staple crops by German and British forces caused the
famines of
1916
and
191B,B
the
combined
effects
of
French
war
time
demands
aggravated food shortages in Fuuta.
In fact,
natural hazards should in
no "ay
blind one
to
the
effects of
relations
of exploitation
in
the
on-start or the
aggravation of natural processes.
Demography too suffered from
the "ar and its cumulative
effects.

---

~76
Conscription for che military,
labour migration,
famines,
all affected
the demographic evolution of Fuues Tooeo
during and immediately after
the war.
Deaths and relatively low
birth rates caused the population
to slightly decllne.
The war
impaired among other
things,
the evolution of
education
and trade.
In distrLcts as distant
from
the colonial
headquarters as
those
of
Fuuea
Tocco I
and
with
a
population
that
never
considered
':French education"
a priority,
the
administration had no
qualms
about
shutting down
the
school
system.
The
several
letters
sent
rrom
the
escales,
reques cing
the
staffing
and
reopening
of
schools,
suggests
t.hat
even
after
t.he
.....ar
ended,
conditions
did
not
allow
for
an
immediate
resumption of education in most of the country.
As for
trade,
it was hampered by the general level of impoverish-
rnenc
fostered
by
the
greed
and
the
speculative
manoeUVres
of
the
agents of colonial
trade.
In a rueful dialectical turn,
the situation
t.raders
had
themseLves
creal:ed
forced
many
of
them
out
of
business,
some two years after the war started.
Politically,
the
most conspicuous consequence of
the
war was
the
reinforcement of resentment for,
and disobedience
to
French rule.
To
the
escalating
exploitation
and
oppression
that
accompanied
the
war,
people
opposed
a correspondingly
intense
and varied measure of
resis~
tance.
Manifestations
of weariness
and
ill-will
started
long before
the
end
of
the
war.
People
used
every
kind
of
trick
against
the
endless
solici ta cions
and
demands
of
the
adminis trat ion.
At
t irnes
violence was a
response
they did not hesitate
to adopt.
And,
for
the
first
time
in
the history of colonial rule
in
Fuuta,
economic boycott
I
I

---

477
was discovered to be a
costly, but efficacious resort.
The striking
feature
of
the
passive
resistance generated by
war
conditions,
was
the
degree
of
cohesion
and
solidarity
that
charac-
terized
its
formulation
and
execution.
Mos t
in tense,
and
directly
associated
with
the
experience
of
fighting
alongside
French
troops,
was
che
protest of Tirailleurs
in
the
wake of
the
war.
As
early as
1915·1916
newly
conscripted
men
often
took
to
defying
local
and
colonial
authority
by
spreading
seditious
rumours.
Later
on,
as
difficulties
and
frustrations
accumulated
against
them,
war veterans
vented their anger on the most visible symbols of colonial oppression,
local chiefs and District Guards.
Most conspicuous were the
incidents
that
took
p lace
in
Laaw,
Yirlaabe(north bank),
and
Ferlo,
between
1919
and
1922.
Chiefs
in
these
provinces.
came
under
the
heat
of
political
subversion.
Local administrators who
found it hard to bear
with
such
recalcitrance,
and
had
sometimes
experienced
it
directly,
quickly stepped in to restore .. la...... and order."
The authority of
some
chiefs
was
reasserted and others,
previously
suspended,
...... ere
brought
back.
In
this
campaign,
many
a
Commandant
often
disregarded
the
bounds of standard disciplinary measures set by the indigenat code,
and
meted out the heaviest fines and prison sentences ever.
This
tightening
of
colonial
control
over
the
people
picked
up
steam with
the
flooding of West Africa by American built automobiles,
the
concorni cant
fever
for
road
cons true cion,
and
the
psychological
effect
of
post-war
air
shows
in
the
districts
of
the
Senegal
river
valley.
·.... '
,
I
..
I

---

478
E.
A BALANCE SHEET OF COLONIALISM UNDER THE PROTECTORATE
1.
SOCIETY
Three
imporLanc
parametres
in
this
domain
are
the
issues
of
"domestic
slavery,"
the
evolution
of
standards
of
living,
and
the
emergence or not of wealthy groups.
Domestic
slavery
was
so
entrenched
an
institution
that
it
bordered
on
a
mode
of
production.
The
issue
of
"domestic
slavery"
had,
in
theory,
been already
solved by
che
dec ree 0 f
1906 alJo lishing
it.
In practice,
the
French
tolerated
i t ,
euphemizing
it
as
a mild
cultural
institution,
and made
the
best
of the
principle of substitu-
tion when it came
to conscription for labour or for
the military.
The
experiment
of
"villages
de
liberte"
in
Fuuta
Tooro
resulted
in
a
lamentable
failure.
The
situation
of
former
slaves,
in
one
Matam
administrator's
own
words,
became
worse,
because
"at
their
masters'
place they ate on a regular basis at least;
no\\o1 they are starving.,,9
In
Fuuta
Tooro,
the
war
did not
allow
former
slaves
to
move
up
the
social
ladder.
The
administration
stepped
in
to
curb
their
aspirations
to
equality
and
fair
share
of
land.
Only
...here
local
authority was understanding enough and where former masters
kept their
promises, did
some former slaves manage to acquire land and farm it on
their own.
Others became si.mply "clients"
to
their former masters and
indulged
in
share
cropping.
As
they
failed
to
fare
be~ter than
before,
others
did not
hesitate
to
emigrate
to
the
cities of western
Senegal
or head home,
thus
continuing a
trend
that went
back
to
the
1890s.
In
1911,
one
Commandant
at
Kaedi
reported
an
emigration
of
former Bammbara
slaves to their homeland in Western Sudan,
as a result
I
I
I

---

479
of
"continuous
uI10asiness
experienced
within
the
Toucouleur
and
Soninke environment 1110
As an institution,
slavery was dying out;
few masters were
able
to
afford
to
maintain
their slaves,
feed
them,
pay
their
taxes.
In
addition,
the abolition of
the
trade
in slaves
and che
end of raiding
and war
as
major
means
of
acquisition of slaves
left
inheritance as
t:he
only
form
of
reproduction.
In
the
end
tllen,
changing
economic
,conditions and modes of livelihood did as much to alter the institution
as
did
French
administrative
fiat.
Even
so,
one
fi.nds
no,.....here--and
•
would
not
for
quite
a
while--the
kind
of
former
slaves
Suret-Canale
presents
as
examples of nouveaux
riches,
in relation to
whom,
"fallen
nables cut sorry figures."ll
As
for
the
commoner
strata
of
Fuutanke
society,
they
also
suffered a
great deal,
subjected as
the:' were,
to
the
triple exploita-
tion of colonial authority,
local chiefdom,
and traders.
Their predica-
ment
was
periodically worsened
by
natural
hazards
•.... hich
often
con-
spired
to
compromise
agricultural production.
Apart
from
the
little
money
earned
through
the
sale
of
cactle
and
used essentially to
pay
taxes,
business
rarely
proved
a
serious
attraction
or
transitional
substitute
for
crippled
agricutural
activity.
It
remained
the
monopoly
of
a
handfull
of
foreign
traders,
'..lorking mostly
for
St.
Louis
based
colonial
companies.
Koreover,
conditions
did
not
seem
propitious enough for people to take to trade:
this activity was based
on gum and '..las
clearly
on
the
wane.
And,
sources
seem
to
indicace
that
colonial
authoriC:y
intended
to
confine
Fuuta
to
agriculture
and
herding.
As early as 1901,
a
report
from Podor denounced the tendency

---

480
among the
Tukuloor to indulge in commercial activity,
as dangerous and
best
restrained.
Talking about the many traders who roamed his cercle
buying cattle and sheep
from
the
indigenous people,
with
the view
to
reselling them,
the Commandant mentioned:
Among
these
traders
are
some
~olof
from
Cayor
(Kajoor}.
and
a
great
many
Tukulor
who
now,
would
rather abandon agriculture and earn their living more
or
less
honescly and easily
[sic].
Each year,
chey
grow
in numbers ... It is high time,
I
think,
that the
government impose heavy taxes on all these people,
in
order to stop a trend, which could cause great damage
Co
che
people
of
che
discricc,
and
Co agriculcural
accivicy.12
What
people
could
not
make
up
through
trade
or
other
economic
activity,
they
did
not
even
try
in
education.
In
rejecting
the
"French school" outright,
they rejected by the same
token,
chances of
promotion
to
positions
of
leadership
or
entrepreneurship,
and
con-
tributed
indirectly,
to
the
reproduction
of
the
aristocracy
as
a
leading class.
The society in Fuuta 100ro underwent,
as other regions
in Africa,
I
another kind of structural change as a result of colonial
rule and the
I
labour
migration
phenomenon,
the
progress
of
indiVidualism
and
au conomy
0 f
che
young,
vis
a
vis
che
elder
and
che
auchoricy of
Che
I
Pater
Famil ias.
In
a
letter
to
t.he
Minister
of
Colonies
in
1920
Merlin,
the Governor General of French West Africa,
reported complaints
I
on the
part of elders
and
notables about "the spirit of independence
I
of
their
sons who
no
longer
bring back to
the
family,
the "'hole of
their
earnings,
and
tend
to
spend
their
monies
in an
irresponsible
I
way."
Governor
General
Merlin
warned
against
the
dispersal
of
I
I
I

---

481
individuals,
and
the ctesagregation of the family,
the village and the
society, and
proposed their
reinforcement as being in the interest of
both the indigenous society and the colonial administration. 13
As
the
saying goes,
one person's boon is another one's bane. When
i~ comes to the fate of the aristocracy it is, at least for a segment
of this class,
a different story. Winners and losers,
rise and decline,
are
categories
that one could apply
to
che
traditional elite in this
early
colonial
period.
The
"winners"
"..rete
undoubtedly
the
families
long allied with the French in
their expansion within Fuuta Tooro and
Senegambia
at
large:
essentially,
the
Wan at Kbumrnba,
Kan at Salde,
Kanel,
and Pado!", Aan in Damga and Bah at Matam and Ganngel.
To these,
one may add a few individuals promoted on the north bank,
following the
establishment
of
colonial
rule
in
Mauritania.
The
losers
were
essen-
tially,
the Kan of Dimat (family of Elimaan Dimac),
of Daabiya (family
of
Abdul
Bookar),
and
the
Sal
of Cede
(family of
che
Lamtooro).
To
these
one
may
add
the
nwnerous
Fulbe
and
Toorobbe
groups
in
Tooro,
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe,
Bo050ya
and
Darnga,
erstwhile
providers
of
Al-
maami(s),
Jaggorde,
and
other
influential
elements
of
pre-colonial
offici.aldom. l4
Consolidation or ascension,
wi~hin the first group, was symbolized
essentially
by
access
to
positions
of
power
and
leadership
(Province
and
canton
chiefs,
interpreters.
judges
and
clerks),
numerous
among
the Wan and Kan-Salde; by education through "French school"
in prepara-
tion for future leadership careers;
upholding land ownership and rights
or
bestowing
such
advantages
upon
new
groups
through
donation;
protection--sometimes
from
che
highest
spheres- -of
the
colonial
I

---

482
administration.
The families who make up this
first. group indeed made the
best of
the
colonial
conquest
and
rule.
They
managed
to
accumulate
cattle,
slaves,
and
land,
at.
t.he
expense
of
the
many
"dissidents."
Their
positions
of
leadership helped
them gradually consolidate
their
gains
and accumulate
property in the
form of cattle,
horses,
land,
and land
related
revenues,
while
"French
Schoo 1"
provided
the
bas is
for
the
reproduction
of
their
political
power.
Given
the
marriage
ties
established with urban
elites,
some
chiefs may well
have
invested in
real
estate
in
some
of
the
major
cities
like
St.
Louis,
Dakar,
and
Rufisque.
Some
categories
of
retainers
(Watulaabe),
also
largely
took
advantage of the situation,
either by playing favourites or by
making
capital
of
the
chiefs'
lavishness.
Stories
are
told
and
retold
throughout
the
land,
about
well kno"lTl
retainers who
thrived
through
promises to intercede with the chief on behalf of
plaintiffs.
The decline of
the
second group
on
the
other hand,
~as initiated
and
sometimes
maintained,
through
a
combination
of
techniques.
The
most obvious method of all,
~as the keeping of families a~ay from the
long held political power,
particularly within traditional strongholds.
Boosoya
proved a
temporary
exception,
(three Kan-Daabiya
ruled
fo:,
a
total of eleven years).
A second method was
the expropriation of slaves
and
land
that
took
place
during
the
conquest.
Third,
in
the
early
years,
the
administration
did
not
hesitate
to
turn down
applications
for
the
admission to the
"School of Sons of Chiefs and Interpreters."
It was often a sign that
the administration was not interested in
the
I
I
I

---

483
reproduction
of
particular
family.
as
office
holder.
When
in
1918
Abdul Aali
Kan,
former
chief of eastern Boosoya.
refused
to send his
son before
the
draft
board,
this
saIJe
son was
expelled from
the
St.
Louis Madrasa,
(French-Arabic school).
Finally,
through the consolida-
tion process
that
the administration completed on
the
eve of the war,
many leading families ended up being confined to subject status.
This
policy would last,
in many cases, until the mid 19205 and early 19305.
In
the
main however,
the
aristocracy--winners
and
losers
alike-·
had
fairly limited opportunities to accumulate capital,
in comparison
with
its
counterparts
in
Siin-Saalwn
and
Kajoor,
which
invested
in
land,
hired
Nawetaan
labourers
(seasonal migrant.s), 15
or
used slaves I
to grow the cash crop of ground nut.
As
far a5 sources indicate,
only
chief 8aylaa Biraan \\lan
(Laaw-Halaybe)
indulged
from
1920 on,
in what
one could call
"Agro-business."
He
grew in his
farm at Tulde-Busoobe
such
exotic
plants
as
apple
trees,
palm
date
trees,
rice,
and
an
American
variety
of
wheat
that
the
people
of
Fuuta
came
to
call
"Bayla's millec"
(Gawri Baylaa).
His farming activities won the chief
che medal
of "Knight of Agricultural Merit.· 16
Abdul
Salaam Kan who
attended
the
1922
Exposition Coloniale
at
I
Paris
and
toured
farms
and
indust.ries
along
with
other
chiefs
of
I
western Senegal,
reportedly encouraged
agricultural
development upon
his
return.
But,
as his
son confirmed
in an
int.erview,
he did not
I
farm on his own like the chief of Laa~.
Most chiefs did collect
grain as
taxes
or
land rights and
could
I
sell it for money to local traders, but no record or testimony indicate
that
this
took place.
Besides,
sources
suggest
that
the
policy,
or
I
I
I
I

---

484
pattern,
that
consisted
in
barring
the
Fuutankoobe
from doing busi-
ness,
applied
to
the
traditional elite as well,
even
if the bulk of
this elite had qualms about combining it with
its power and prestige.
In
1910,
Mr
'Peuvergne,
Commandant
of
Padar,
sent
to
the
Governor
a
petition
signed
by
the
small
traitant
community
at
Pador.
These
traitants complained that
Bookar Baydi Jah,
then chief of Halaybe, was
doing business
and
"competing unfairl y "
with
them by having his
son
run
the
operations
on his
own
behalf
from
a
home
based store.
The
petition went
on
to
mention
that,
"the
chief
is abusing his
position
to
goad people
into
becoming his
clients."
In response
to
that,
St.
Louis ordered an inquiry carried out,
while
instructing the Commandant
to
"take necessarj action to put an
end to
the reported situation and
have
Bookar
Baydi
forego
activities
that
are
incompatible
with
the
dignity and duties
associated with his position."
2.
ECONOMY
The
evolution of
the
economy was
marred by
periodic
hazards.
To
some
extent,
the
administration,
thanks
to
its
capacity
to
mobilize.
I
improved
the
readiness and viability of mass
response
to
invasions
of
predatory birds,
locust swarms,
and wild beasts.
I
The
administration
also
attempted
to
diversify
agricultural
production
by
introducing
new
crops,
such
as
cassava,
an
Anterican
I
variety of
cotton,
castor-oil
plant,
dahlia,
rice,
wheat.
and
several
I
new species of fruit trees.
Some fared well during the first years and
even
generated
c3sh
revenue
for
the
farmers. 17
For
a
series
of
I
reasons,
not
the
least of which
the
sometimes
compulsory character of
I
I
I

---

485
innovations
and
the
waning
interest
of
the
masses,
diversification
schemes ~esulted ultimately in a
failure.
Trade
was
no
longer
thriving
as
i t
did
durin~
the
previous
centuries.
It
was
already
supplanted by
the
ground nuts
as
a
maj or
cash crop in western Senegal,
where the economic cent er of
gravity had
shifted
ever
5 inee
the
nineteenth
century.
Millet,
Fuuta's
maj or
staple crop, was still needed for
the urban
population.
But, agricul-
ture being vulnerable
to natural
hazards,
its production was subject
to constant oscillation,
which in turn resulted in a see-saw movement
of trade.
In the
transactions between the farmer and the trader,
the
former
found
little
advantage
beside
the
availability
of
foreign
goods,
marchandise often received at inflated value.
In general the
Moors
were
the
only
good
customers
of
the
farmers.
They
paid
the
millet
in
hard
currency,
and
at
prices
always
better
than
those
offered by both the traders and the Army Headquarters.
Before 1917
the
principal measure
in
trade was
the Mudd,
local
Islamic measure amounting to between 1.75 and 4 litres of
millet.
In
general,
the value of the ~udd depended on whether a
person was buying
or
selling millet,
whether he was
a
merc~ant,
a
local
farmer,
or
a
Moor.
This confusion was sometimes advantageous,
sometimes detrimental
to the local producer.
In
1917,
the administration, because it stood
I
to lose
in terms of
trade
related taxes,
moved to establish standard
we igh ts
and
measures.
It
installed
in
some
villages
see-saws
and
imposed 5
and 50 lit~es as standard measures. while banning the use of
I
the Mudd.
In
the
realm of
livestock,
efforts were
made
at containing
I
the
I
I
I

---

486
spread of cattle
disease
particularly.
rinderpest and
pasteurellosis
bovis I
the
roDs t
prevalent
epidemics
during
the
period
under
study.
Every time an epidemic hit,the administration took steps to quarantine
contaminated
herds,
establish
sanitary
cordons
and,
above
all,
under-
take prompt vaccination campaigns.
Despite
these positive
i~novations the administration,
one
could
argue,
did
not
seriously
concern
itself
with
promoting
the
real
development
of Fuuta Tooro.
This,
even a
10l;a1
administrator
seemed
to agree ....... ith,
when he referred
to w'hat he
sa ....... as
"paradox,"
the fact
that
considerable
land
lay
~aste
on
the
banks
of
a
great
river.
According to Hr.
Ligneres.
the
Commandant of Pador,
.. the tru th is
tha t
"'e have
been
incapable
of- -or negligent-· [sic]
in
turning. the Senegal
valley into another Nile valley.n18
The
administration
sometimes
procrastinated
in
remedying
the'
frequent phenomenon of plant disease.
From 1914 to 1919, adminitrators
of the
valley
requested
vainly
that
samples
of contaminated
grain
be
collected
and
analyzed
by
the
agricultural
service.
In
1919,
as
a
~'.
result
of
such
neglect,
half
the
crop
in
the
district
of
Salde
was
wasted.
Likewise,
the policy of
disarmament deprived the Fuutankoobe·
,..
I.
of the means
to protect
their
farms
from destruction by wild beasts.
f,.
Until long after
the war, higher authority proved little responsive to
Commandants'
warnings on the ma:ter.
r·
By
levying
highly
selected
cattle
to
satisfy
war
demands
in
;,
provisions,
and doing nothing to
introduce new breeds,
the administra-
tion may well have blocked the qualitative reproduction of livestock.
,
I
..
I
I
I
./
I ~

---

487
3.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Efforts
in
this
domain
were
very
limited.
No
important
tech-
no logical
innovation took place,
Few measures
relaring to
hygene
and
sanitarian
\\oJere
applied,
often
on
an
ad
hoc
basis
in
situations
of
human and cattle epidemics.
A few dispensaries existed in the escales,
but
they
\\oJere
designed
essentially
to
cater
for
the
well
fare
of
Europeans and by extension their immediate auxiliaries.
When possible.
these
serJices
were
extended to
~he indigenous population,
because
it
was realized
that "the disease environment needed to be controlled,
to
protect that of the Europeans and their aides. ,,19
As
regards
communication,
the
administration
took
some
ac tion.
All
along
the
river,
villages
were
provided with
communal
canoes
to
allo'.....
farmers
to
cross
the
river
and
go
work
in
their
fields.
Once
roads ~ere built,
the population tried in some cases to
take advantage
of the situation by using cares for
transportation.
The
administration proved either
incapable or unwilling
to
bore
wells.
In a
country where
herding came
second only to
agriculture,
this remained for a long time a source of constant
worry,
particularly
in
the
many
highland
villages
of
the
south
bank.
In
contras t
to
western
Fuuta,
(Dimat,
Toora,
and
part
of
Laaw) ,
we 11
wa tered
by
marigots,
and much of the north bank which
is close enough to the main
channel,
the
jeeri
of
central
and
eastern
Fuuta
always
experienced
acute
problems
for
much of
the
dry season.
The
repeated promises
by
the administration ever
since
the 1890s \\oJere,
in many cases,
given no
effec t.
At
times
people
expressed
overtly
their
disappointment.
During his
tour
of the district of Matam in 1913, Commandant Ligneres
I

---

488
was made
co
understand
that
people
were
tired of the
administrationls
lies 20
Paris-Leclerc,
t.he
administrator
of
Salde.
'Went
through
a
similar
fire
of
requests
in
1917 and reported in rueful terms thac,
"no
single well exists in the entire cercle of Salde," while
insisting that something be done at the earliest. 21
From all evicence
these
repeated
requests
on the part
of
local
I
administrators brought about no
immediate change.
Even after the ·..rar,
the
Commandant
of
Matam
had
to
remind
St.
Louis
of
something
his
predecessors had b~en stressing ever since 1897,
that
the
Ferla had to
be covered with wells,
if Fulbe pastoralists were to settle and become
loyal
subjects. 22
It
is
safe
to
say
that
until
the
19205
the
ad-
ministration
placed
a
higher
premiwn
on
road
construction
and
main-
I
tenance than on satisfying one of the top priorities of the people,
the
provLsLon
of ~ells and ~ater.
I
On
the
whole
then,
Fuuta Tooro and
Fuutanke
society
undenrlent a
I
series of
transformations
during
the
p~riod under
study,
as a
result
of
French conquest and rule.
Ho~ever,
the
assessment of such trans-
I
formations
calls
for
some circumspection.
~ith respect to the social
fabric,
change affected mainly the top
and bottom strata,
through the
I
ascension of individual
aristocratic families on the ~ne hand, and the
abolition
of
"domescic
slavery"
and
accession
of
former
slaves
to
I
property, on
the other.
As
for
the bulk of the traditional elite and
I
the
broad masses
of commoners,
a concatenation of political,
economic
and
na tural
processes
(exploi ta cion,
repress ion,
famines)
caused
a
I
further
degradation of their condition and standard of living.
In a
country without
"Major Public ~orks", mines,
or
cash crop
production
I
I
I
I

---

489
to
help
face
the
requirements
of
taxation
and money
economy,
peap le
were left with emigration to western Senegal and
abroad as a compell-
iog alternative.
Frequent
food
shortages
and
modern
means
of
con-
veyance
lJould
help
emigration
s i t
\\Jith
the
peap le
0 f
Fuuta
as
it
permanent
trait
of
life.
Finally,
progress
in the
realm of economy
and infrastructure was extremely limited,
if not null.
The
protectorate
period
which
started
in
1890-1891
ended
oUi-
ciaE}
with
the
decree
of
12
January
1920
turning
the
"Terricoire
civile
de
la
Mauritanie"
headed
by
a
commissioner.
into
a
"colony"
headed
by a
Lt.
Governor on
the one hand,
and with
the
decree of
4
November
1920
regroup iog
a 11
"Prot.ec c.orates"
and
"Territories
of
Direct
Administration"
into
the
single
colony
of
Senegal,
on
t.he
other.
On
the
ground,
the end of
the protectorate period was symbol-
ized
by
two
events
in
1924:
The
retirement
of
the
chief
of
Laaw
Aamadu Sarnmba Almaami ~an, and
the death of Elimaan Abu Kan,
the chief
of Tooro (n.b):
These
were the last remnants,
since the retirement of
Yirlaabe chief Abdullaay Kan in 1916,
of what could be
termed the ·old
guard ...
Starting
in
1920,
Fuuta
Tooro
ushered
in
the
era
of
"Direct
I
Administration."
A generation born and
raised under
French
rule
·......as
now
in
place.
It had
not necessarily
assimilated
the
strong
anti-
I
French sentiments of past generations,
and its choice as
to whether to
I
leave
t.he
area
or
submit
to
colonial yoke,
""as
extremely
limited
in
comparison with
the era of the Jihad and
migrations of the nineteenth
I
century.
With
the
society being
forced
by circumstances
to
further
adjust to colonial rule,
and
emigration and other realities sowing the
I
I
I
I

---

"90
seeds of more profound
transformations,
a transition was taking place
that
makes
the
era
of
"Direct
Administration"
an
equally
exciting
period to treat.
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

---

NOTES
1.
Anthony I.
Asiwaju, Western Yorubaland,
op.eit., pp.
81-84.
2.
This
tradition of posting civil servants
in an area foreign to
them,
is
one
of
the
origins
of
Casarnance t 5
resentment
and
bid
for
secession,
that led to the events of late 1983 and late 1986.
3.
A.N.S:
2G15-43,
Podor,
op.eit.; Octobre,
pp.
8-9.
4.
In May 1919 the COlTU11andant of Matam '.rote:
Tukulor
village
chiefs
lack
authority.
Recause
tradition
dictates
that
the
position be held
by
the
elder in the ruling family, he
[the village chiefJ
is
almost
alw<1ys
an
old
man,
often
physically
handi-
capped, hardly--if ever--assisted by his sons.
A.N.S:
2Gl9-22.
Matam,
op.cit.,
(Mai).
5.
A.N.S:
2G19-22, Mai,
op.cit.
6.
Ranger,
rerenee 0.,
Revolts
in Southern Rhodesia
A Studv in
African Resistance
1896-1897,
Northwestern University Press,
Evanston,
1967, 348 p.
7.
Jean Copans,
"D'Un Africanis~e a l'autre"
in,
Journal Canadicn
des Etudes Africaines,
(C.J.AS); vo1.D. op.cit.,
p.
63.
8.
Clarke,
Brooke,
"The Heritage of Famine
in Central Tanzania,"
in Tanzania
Notes
and
Records,
67,
June
1967,
(Published by
Tanzania
Society Dar Es Salam.)
9.
A.N.S:
2DIO-2,
"Matam
1895";
Commandant
a
Directeur
des
Affaires Politiques,
29-7-1895
10.
A.N.M:
Gorgol:
Rapports politiques 1906-1938.
Capitaine
Nicolai,
commandant
Gorgo1,
a
Commissa ire
du
Gouvernement
General,
3/1911.
l
11.
Jean Suret-Canale,
French Colonialism,
op.eit"
p.
81.
12.
A.N.S:
2Gl-160,
Podor; Rapports politiques 1901.
(2/1901).
I
13.
For
instance,
the
thirteen cantons
that
were
merged into
two
provinces
(Damga and Ngenaar)
in eastern Fuuta,
represented as many as
I
491
I
I
I

---

492
thirteen previously important ruling families.
14.
A.N.S:
2G20-S
Senegal
"Rapport
annuel
1920"
(Gouverneur
General Merlin a Ministre des Colonies;
A.O.F; Rapport 3e trim). Merlin
proposed
the
reinforcement
of
structures
like
the
family I
the
village
and the "Provident Society,"
as the major solution to the problem.
As
a
result
of
this
proposition,
"Village
Councils"
were
created
by the Decree of 21 May 1921.
15.
See,
M.artin
Klein,
Islam
and
Imperialism,
op.eit.;
Mohamed
:1bodj,
"Un Exemple d' Economie Coloniale:
Le Sine-SaloWD de 1887 a 1940,
Culture
arachidiere
et
mutations
sociales"
(These
de
Doccorat
de
3e
cycle,
Paris VII,
1978).
Mamadou Diouf,
"Le Kajoor au XIXe siecle,
la
conquete coloniale".
These de 3e cycle,
Paris 1,
1980.
16.
He
incerrupced
these
activities
when
he
°..Jas
transferred
to
Laaw (Senegal)
in 1934 to resume them from his retirement in 1942 until
his death in Occber 1950.
See,
inteniew with Hammaat Baylaa passim;
A.~I.S: 2G22-9,
Senegal
"Rapports Trimestriels 1922,"
Je crimescre.
17.
At Boghe,
the Resident
reported in 1911
the
same success w:'th
castor-oil plant cultivation.
In
August
of
1918,
the
Commandant.
of
Mat.am
reported
a
general
enthusiasm for
the
farming, of castor-oil,the harvest of which,
farmers
so~d for 0,1 francj6 grains.
Commandant De La Rocca acknowledged that
it
was
coo
high
a
price,
but
decided
to
let
it
go
for
the
sake
of
encouraging the development. of t.he crop.
18.
A.N.S:
2G13-S2, op.cit.,
Decembre.
The
whole
idea
of
developping
the
Senegal
River
basin
that
is
still the order of the day, may have pLcked up steam from thence.
19.
W.
B.Cohen,
"Health and Colonialism in French Black
Africa."
In Etudes AFricaines,
1982 op.cit.,
pp.
297-305.
(p.299).
For
this
topic
see
also,
W.B.Cohen,
"Malaria
and
french
Im-
perialism," in J.A.H,
vo1.24,
1,
1983,
pp.
23-36.
Bruno Salleras,
"La
Politique Sanit.aire
de la France a Oakar,
de 1900 a 1920."
Memoire de
Kaitrise,
Universite de Paris X,
1980.
20.
Ligneres expressed his embarrassment at t.he fact,
sayi~g:
"It
is
rat.her embarrassing to hear
people
say
it ...
At
the
important
town
of Semrne,
notables came straight to me and brought to my attenti~n
this
failure
to
keep
to our words.
A bit embarrassed,
I myself promised to
send at least,
a few indigenous well diggers to the Ferlo."
(A.N,S:
2G13-51, Matam; Rapports mensuels 1913.
(2/l913,
p.
7).
21.
2G17-31, op.cit"
7/1917,
pp.
5-6.
22.
2G19-22 op.cir.,
1/1919,
I
I

---

REFERENCES
I.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES
J.
Charpy:
Gouvernement General de l'Afrique Occidentale Francnise.
Reoertoir des Archives.
(Rufisque, Senegal, 1955).
Conseil
International
des
Archives,
U.N.E.S.C.O.:
Sources
de
l'Histoire
de
l'Afrique
au
sud
du
Sahara
dans
les
Archives
et
Bibliotheaues Francaises.
(UN.E.S.C.O., 1971, pp. 590).
Paule Brasseur et Jean Prancois Maurel:
l'Les Sources Bibliographiques
de
l'AFrique
de
l'Ouest
d'Expression
Francaise."
(Dakar,
1967,
document roneote, pp. 40).
Porges
Laurence:
Bibliographie
des
Regions
du Senegal,
des
origines
a
1965.
(Mise a jour 1966-1973, A.~.S., Dakar).
I,..~ane Yaya:
"Etat actuel de
la
documen::atio~ au sujet des Toucouleurs."
(B. I. F.A.N., B, 3-4, 1963).
I
11. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
I
A. ARCHIVAL DOC~ATION:
1.
Archives Nationales de la France:
Section Outre-Mer:
r
SERIE A: CORRESPONDANCE GENERALE: SENEGAL ET DEPEND~~CES
I.
-Dossier BD:
Clement Thomas, 1888-1890.
·Dossier 90:
Septembre 1890.
Fautier,
Gouverneur par Interim:
I
1/ Depeches du GouverneuL.
2/ Depeches du Ministre.
-Dossier 91:
21 Sept".nbre 1890-Juin 1892.
Gouverneur de Lamothe:
1/ Depeches du Gouverneur.
2/ Depeches du Ministre.
-Dossier 92: Roderdeau, Couverneur par Interim.
(1 et 2).
I
-Dossier 93:
Gouverneur de Lamothe,
Decembre IB92-Sept.
1893.
-Dossier 94: Couzinet,
Interimaire, 1893 (1 et 2).
-Dossier 95: Couvcrneur de Lamothe, 1893-1895 (l et 2).
I
SERIE A: CORRESPONDANGE GENERALE: SENEGAL ET DEPENDfu~CES
11.
-Dossier 12:
Liste de Croquis,
levees et plans de diverses regions
et localices du Senegal, 1850.
(Carte du Senegal compris entre le
I
Fleuve Senegal et la Riviere du Saloum).
SERIE A: CORRESPONDANCE GENER~LE:
SENEGAL ET DEPEND~~CES
IV.
-Dossier 69:
1890-1893.
Expansion territoriale et Politique_
Indigene dans le Fouta Senegalais. L'Expedition de 1891.
I
-Dossier 128:
Expansion territoriale et Politique Indigene:
Fleuve, 1895-1904.
-Dossier 132:
Repression du soulevement de Ali Yoro Diaw, 1908.
I
493
I
I
I

---

494
-Dossier 133;
Les Confreries,
1912-1913.
(Tidjane).
SERIE A;
CORRESPONDANCE GENERALE;
SENEGAL ET DEPENDfu~CES
VII.
-Dossier 26;
Proces V,'rbaux du Conseil General,
1891-1897.
SERIE A;
CORRESPONDANCE GENERALE;
SENEGAL ET DEPENDANCES XXIII.
-Dossier 40:
Agriculture,
Commerce et Industrie:
Mil,
Riz,
Sorgho (1815-1895).
SERIE A;
CORRESPONDANCE GENERALE;
SENEGAL ET DEPENDfu~CES
~XIV.
-Dossier 27;
Proces Verbal de la Chambre de St-Louis relative
aux esclaves de case.
(1892-1985).
-Dossier 28:
Recrutement de Senegalais pour les milices du
Congo.
(1899).
ATLAS
DES
CERCLES
DE
L'A.O.F;
Fascicule
VII
pac
le
Secvlce
Geographique
de
l'A.O.F.
1/
Carte
du
Senegal,
adminisccative
et
e thnogcaphique,
eche 11e
1/200. OOOe
(83,
Dagana
et
banlieue
de
St.
Louis;
87,
Matam;
88,
Podoc).
2.
Archives Nationales de Mauritanie:
BOGHE; Rapports Politiques,
1908-1921.
( Resident de Boghe a Commandant
d'Aleg) .
SERIE D;
DOSSIER DU GO~JERN~~ENT
GENERAL 1913-1918.
S ERI E E;
AFFAIRES POLITIQUES:
Sous - ser ies El et E2.
-El-l:
Rapports Politiques d'ensemble sur la Mauritanie.
1906-1926.
-£1-6:
Relations entre
la Mauritanie et
le Gouvernement du
Se:1ef,al,
1905-1911.
-El-7:
Questions de Terrains dans
les cercles de Boghe et de
Kaedi,
1893-1918.
-El-IO:
Projet d'unification des possessions Francaises au
Nord-Quest Africain.
-El-13;
Bcakna.
Rapports politiques
1916-1918
-El-14;
Chemama.
Rappocts politiques 1919-1920.
-El-18:
Internes Politiques en Cote d'Ivoire et au Dahomey.
-El-48;
Gocgol.
Rappocts politiques 1906-1918.
-El-51:
Gorgol.
Correspondance 1919.
-El-52:
Gocgol.
Gorrespondance 1915-1918.
-El-73:
Rive droite du Fleuve;
Liciges entre cultivateurs des deu:<
rives,
1894.
-El-87;
Mauritanie. Rappocts d'ensemble 1917.
-El-89:
Trarza.
Rapport politiques 1905-1918.
-E2-85;
Puits.
1900-1947.
-E2-105;
Ceccle du Gorgol.
Rappocts politiques 1919.
-E2'-108;
Ceccle du Bcakna.
Rapports politiques 1919.
SERIE 0;
DOMAINES ET TE~~INS
DE CULTURE.
-01:
Concessions a titre precaire 1913-1937.
-03;
Tercains de Boghe (rive droite).
-04;
Terrains du Gorgo1.
Affaire Abdoul Salam et
terrains de
Orndolde-Magama.
-05:
Terrains.
Divers.
-06;
Terrains de Boghe.
1920-1934.
I
I
I

---

495
3.
Archives NaLionales du Senegal.
SERIE C:
SENEGAL ANCIEN:
DOSSIERS INDIVIDUELS.
(Chefs de Canton du Fouta Toro),
-lC.I051:
Moustapha Kane,
chef de Podor.
-lC.1296:
Racine Abdoulaye Kan,
chef du Dimar.
-lC.1660:
Collado Ba, chef du Irnangue Bossea.
-lC.1674:
Abdoulaye Kane,
chef superieur du Irlabe-Ebiabe.
-lC.1694:
Cheikh ~~idou Kane,
qadi de Matam.
-lC.2556:
Abdoul Aziz Wane,
chef du LaD.
-lC.2584:
Niaki Mamadou,
chef de Dembancane.
-lC.2683:
Elimane Baba Hawa,
chef de Podor.
-lC.3204:
Amidou Kane,
chef de Orndolde.
-lc.9235:
Ibra Abdou~ Aziz Wane,
chef de Aere-Lao.
SERIE D:
AFFAIRES MILITAIRES:
1763-1920.
(Operations militaires,
Senegal et Dependances).
Sous-serie 10:
1823-1894.
-lD-3:
Expedition sur
le Senegal.
Dagana--Ric~ard-Toll,
Podor- -Bakel,
1831-1839.
-lD- 4:
Expedi tion contre Fanaye 1849.
-lD-7:
Expedition de Podor,
Fevrier-Mars 1854.
(Combat de Dialmatch 1853-1854).
-ID-23:
Expedition du Fouta;
Combat de Loumbel 22 Septembre 1862.
-lD-29:
Expedition d'Auro-Madjou
(Toro)
contre Amadou Chelckou par
le Capitaine de Fregate Valon,
1869.
~lD·35: Colonne d'observation du Fouta;
Journal
de marche de
5riere de l'Isle 1877.
-1D-36:
Colonne
du
Fouta
commandee
par
le
Lieutenant-
Colonel
Reybaud,
1878.
-10-39:
Colonne
Pons dans
le Fouta contre Abdoul
Bokar;
Combat de
Ndiour Badiane 1881-1882.
-lD-45:
Colonne du Fouta du Lt-Colonel Voyron 1883.
-lD-46:
Colonne du Commandant Remy au Djolof,
chez
les
Irlabes et
les Ebiabes.
(Notice sur le Fouta Senegalais par Remy).
1884.
-lD-u7: Colonne du Fouta.
Instructions
du Couverneur au Com~andant
Superieur 1885.
-ID-SS:
Colonne Dodds dans le Fouta contre Abdoul Bokar 1890-1891.
Sous-serie 2D:
1914-1918.
-2D-2:
Documents relatifs a la guerre.
Senegal et Mauritanie,
1914-1916.
-2D-9:
Mesures prises en raison de
l'etat de guerre
en A.O.F,
1914-1916.
SOlis-serie 4D:
Personnel milicar~e 1779-1920.
-4D-1:
Carnisan du Senegal et recrutement des premieres
troupes
noires.
I
-4D-8:
Recrutement.
Application de la 10i du 21 Mars 1905.-
(1905-1910) .
-4D-29:
Recrutement indigene.
Senegalais destines aux milices de
I
Cote d'Ivoire 1859-1900.
-4D-55:
Recrutement indigene de 50.000 hornrnes 1915-1916.
(Senegal) .
I
r
I
I

---

496
-4D-56:
Recrutement indigene de 50.000 hommes 1915-1916.
(Mauritanie) .
-4D-70:
Comportement des tirailleurs en France 1916-1917.
-4D-74:
Opinion dans les colonies en 1917
(1917-1918).
-40-76:
Recrutement
indigene
en 1918.
Rapports
d'ensemble et
s:atistiques.
-4D-81:
Recrutement indigene en 1918.
Fils de chefs.
-40- 83:
Recrutement indigene en 1918.
Senegal- -Mauritanie.
-4D-87:
Recrutement.
Fils de chefs 1918.
-4D-139:
Deces 1915-1916.
SERIE D:
CERCLES DU SENECAL;
ETUDE GENERALE DE L'ADMINISTRATION
GENERALE 1926-1936.
Sous-serie 10:
Affaires militaires et Correspondance.
lDl-l:
Guerre
contre
El-Hadj
Oumar
et
paciflcation
du
Fouta
1854-1890.
-Historique de l'Organisation administrative de
la colonie.
-101-15:
Bakel.
Renseignements
divers
sur
les
provinces et
les
villages,
1903-191l.
-lD2-10:
Kaedi, }1atam,
Podor.
1892-1898.
-102-11:
Kaedi.
Correspondance: Commandant au Gouverneur,
1894.
-102-12:
Mission
Alsace.
Recrutement
de
tirailleurs
pour
la
Guyanne 1894-1895.
-lD2-13:
Cercles de Dakar,
Kaedi,
Matam, Thies
Rapports de 1893
a 1895.
-lD2-16:
Copies
des
journaux
des
pos tes
de
Bake 1
et
d.e
Ma tarn
1905-1906.
~Nomenclature de tournees 1905-1907.
-Copies de journaux.
Dagana et Matam 1906.
-lD2-20:
}1atam.
Rapports de cercle 1911.
-Traveaux
Publics:
Etat
des
puits
existants
(Gouverneur
au
directeur des Traveaux Publics).
-Agriculture:
Correspondance du Gouverneur au~directeur du se~vice
de l'Agricu1rure.
-102-24:
Renseignements mensuels sur 1es cerc1es 1911-1924.
·lD3·2:
Voyage du Gouverneur Roume a Saint-Louis et sur le F1euve
1906.
-lD3-7:
Tournees et rapports dans 1es cerc1es du Senegal.
(1916-1918).
I
-lD3-23:
Tournee du Gouverneur a Matam et a Bakel, Mars 1926.
- 1 D4 - 11 :
Correspondance
du
Gouverneur
cu
Senegal
(Mars
1905-Decembre 1908) .
t
-lD4-12:
Creation
des
cercles
de
Salde
et de
la
Haute-
Gamble
(906).
-lD4-15:
Rapports
mensuels.
Situation
politique
dans
les
differents cercles 1907-1911.
I
-Telegrammes de Kaedi 1903-1905.
-Mauritanie.
Correspondance
du
Commissaire
du
Gouvernement
General en Mauritanie.
I
-lD4-16:
Mauritanie.
Passage des
indigenes d'une rive a l'autre
1907-1920.
(Gouverneur General a Commissaire 1919-1920).
-lD4-18:
Mauritanie.
I
-Affaire Irlabe-Aleydis 1919-1930.
I
I
I

---

497
-Correspondance echangee entre Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Senegal et
Commissaire du Gouvernement General en Mauritanie 1921-1923.
Sous-serie 2D:
Affaires administratives.
20-6:
OAGANA.
-206-1:
Correspondance 1842-1890.
~Division du Dimar en deux cantons distincts (188B).
-206-2:
Correspondance 1891-1897.
~Affaire du paiement de l'impot par le village de Thiecane.
(1893).
-206-3:
Correspondance.
1898-1904.
-206-4:
1905-1908.
-206-5:
1909-1913.
-206-6:
1914-1919.
-206-7:
1920-1927 .
·206-8:
Copies mensuelles du journal de poste.
-206-10:
Proces verbaux et
rapports
de passation de
service.
·206-11:
Rapports po1itiques,
a~rico1es et cornrnerciaux 1889-1899.
·206-12:
Oep1acements et rapports de tournees 1900-1915.
·206-13:
Organisation administrative et territoriale 1895~ 1915.
·206-14:
Finances 1890-1907.
-206-15:
Personnel 1900-1911.
·206-17 :
Justice indigene 1886-1906.
·206-18:
Meurtres et attaques a main armee.
-Attaque
du poste de
Dagana par le marabout Ali Yoro Diaw
(1908) .
·206-19:
Contestations de betail (Oimar).
-206-20:
Affaires de terrains 1891-1920.
-206-24:
Delimitation du cercle de Oagana.
20-10:
AFFAIRES AOMINISTRATIVES.
KAEOI, MAT.~~, SALDE 1884-1934.
-2010-1:
Matarn, Sa1de,
Kaedi.
Correspondance 1884-1890.
-2010-2:
Matarn, Kaedi.
1893-1895.
-2DI0-3:
1896-1907.
-2010-4:
Matarn,
Salde.
Correspondance 1908-1920.
- 2 0 1 0 - 5 : "
" 1 9 2 4 · 1 9 3 4 .
-2010-6:
Kaedi, Marc.m.
Telegrarnmes mensuels 1894-1904.
-2010-7:
Copies
mensue11es
du journal de poste
1891·1B99 et 1902-1906.
-2010-8:
Matam,
Kaedi,
Salde.
Rapports politiques,
agricoles et:.
cornrnerciaux 1885-1894.
-2010-9:
Matam.
Rapports de tournees 1894-1917.
·2010-10:
MaLam.
Notices et Etudes sur le cercle 1917-1920.
-2010-11:
Matarn.
Organisation
administrative
et
territoriale
1891-1934.
-2D10-12:
?races verbaux et passations de service 1917- 1920.
-2010-13:
Personnel.
Corps des Gardes Regionaux 1888-1906.
-2010-14:
Impots.
Roles et rendernents 1898-1914.
-2010-15:
Matarn,
Sa1de.
Finances et recettes 1888-1915.
·2010-16:
Sa1de.
Soldes.
-2010-17:
Matarn, Kaedi,
Salde.
Justice indigene 1888-1934.
-2D10-18:
Matam.
Copies mensuelles du
registre des
reclamations
1894,
1897,
1901.
-2010-19:
Matarn,
Sa1de.
Concussions.
(i.e:
Embezzlement cases).
I
I
I

---

498
-2010-20:
Matam, Sa1de.
Successi.ons 1908-1920.
-2010-21:
Matam.
Contestation de
terrains
1909-1913.
(Affaires
terrains de Abdoul Salam Kane 1913).
-2010-22:
Matam.
Coups.
blessures,
meurtres 1906-1933.
-2D10-23:
Matarn.
Commerce
(Traitants
en
residence
a
~atam
1888-1903) .
- 20l0- 24:
Matam.
Navigation sur le Fleuve.
-2010-25:
Dossiers divers 1894-1912.
20-11:
POOOR.
-2011-1:
Cercle de Podor-Toro.
Correspondance 1838-1893.
-2011-2:
Podor.
Correspondance l894-5-8.
-2011-3:
1899-1901.
-2011-4:
1902-1905.
-2011-5:
1909-1913.
-2011-6:
1914-1915.
-2011-7:
Podor.
Copies des
telegrammes de depart 1893-1901.
-2011-8:
Fador.
Copies mensuelles du journal de poste
-2011-9:
Podor.
Bulletins
et rapports politiques
et cornrnerciaux
1891-1894.
-2D11-10:
Rapporcs de tournees eC de missions 1893-1914.
-2011-11:
Proces verbaux de remise en service 1899-1919.
-2011-12:
Recensement.
1891-1898.
-2011-13:
Fodor.
Organisation territoriale 1878-1914.
-2011-14:
Podor.
Emigration de popu1ations 1878-1914.
-2011-15:
Budget des pays de protector't 1895-1917.
-2011-16:
Podor.
cOmmerce 1894-1895.
-2D11-17:
Domaines:
Contestations de terrains 1905-14.
-20ll-l8:
Personnel 1905-l914.
-201l-19:
1905-l905.
-20ll-20:
Traveaux Publics 1895-1896.
-201l-21:
Justice Indigene: Meurtres 1895-1900.
-201l-23:
Dossiers divers 1893-1912.
SERE E:
CONSEILS ET ASSEHBLEES 18l9-l920.
Sous-serie 3E: Conseil d'Administracion du Senegal.
-3E-41:
Conseil
d'Administration
et
Conseil
Prive
du
Senegal
1847-1902.
-3E-42:
Conseil
d'Administration
et
Conseil
Prive
du
Senegal
1902-1920.
SERIE F:
RELATIONS EXTERIEURES.
SOlis-serie IF:
Relations avec la Cambie.
-IF-9:
Relations avec la Gambie 1895-1904
-IF-I0:
Relations avec la Gambie 1905-1910.
-IF-13:
Relations avec la Gambie 1913-1918.
SERIE G:
AFFArRES POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATION GENERALE.
Sous - ser ie
lG:
Etudes
Generales;
missions.
notices
et
monographies.
-lG-37:
Notice
sur
un
voyage
dans
la
region
du
Fleuve
ecablie
pour
le
Gouverneur
par
Mr.
Duchemin.
(Dagana,
Salde,
Medine.
Fador,
Bakel).
1872.
I
-lG-43:
Mission Jeacquemart dans le Fouta et le Toro 1879- 1880.
-lG-l12:
Resume historique du Fouta de 1856 a l889 par
Roger de Marguerite de Montfort (1889).
I
I
I
I

---

499
-lG-259:
Camille Guy dans le Fleuve 1902.
(Chemise 6).
-lG-26l:
Mission du Capitaine
Valliere
dans
la Mbafar,
Jolof et
Fouta Ferlo 1904.
(Chemise 3).
-lG-292:
Not.ice
sur
le
cercle
de
Matam
par
l'Administrateur
du
cercle 1904.
-lG-294:
1904.
Notice
sur
le
cercle
de
Podor
par
l'Administrateur du cercle.
-lG-330:
Coutumes
du
Senegal.
Droit
civil
et
droit
penal
du
cercle de Podor 1907.
(Chemise 3).
-lG-33l:
1908.
Monographie
du cercle de Kaedi
par le Capitaine
Coup,
Commandant du cercle.
-lG·357:
Missions:
Instructions et liste des missions de
187) a 1913.
Sous-serie
2G:
Rapports
periodiques
mensuels,
trimestriels
et
annuel des Gouverneurs,
Administrateurs et Chefs de Service.
?remiere tranche 1895-1940.
-2Gl-5:
Senegal.
Rapport politique annuel 1898.
(5p) .
. 2Gl- 7:
Rapport annuel des Chefs d'Administration 1898.
-2Gl-39:
Senegal_
Rapport
d'Ensemble:
Situation
politique,
economique et administrative 1900-1902.
-2Gl-42:
Senegal.
Cercle
de
Kaedi:
Bulletins
agricoles,
commerciaux et politiques mensuels.
(Janvier,
Fevrier,
Aoue,
et Octobre
1896 .
-2Gl-43:
Senegal.
Cercle
de
Kaedi:
Rapports
politiques.
commerciaux et agricoles trimestriels 1896.
-2Gl-44:
Kaedi.
Rapports
Mensuels
d'Ensemble.
(Ja"ilvier,
Fevrier, Avril,
AouC,
Oetobre et Novembre 1899).
-2Gl-4S:
Senegal.
Kaedi:
Rapport d'Ensemble Trimestriel.
(1,
2.
3,
4),
9p:
7p:
6p.
-2Gl-90:
Kaedi.
Bulletins
agricoles,
cormnerciaux
et
politiques
mensuels 1893.
-2Gl-9l:
Kaedi.
1894.
-2Gl-92:
Kaedi.
-2Gl-93:
Kaedi.
1897.
-2Gl-94:
Kaedi.
Bulletins Trimestriels
1897.
-2Gl-95:
Kaedi.
Bulletins Mensuels
1898.
-2Gl-96:
Kaedi.
Rapports Trimestriels
1898.
-2Gl-139:
Matam.
Rapports
politiques,
agricoles
et
commerciaux
1895.
- 2Gl- 140:
Ma tarn.
Rapports
po 1 i t iques,
agrico les
et commerciaux I
Novembre-Decembre 1896.
-2Gl-141:
Matam.
Rapports
politiques,
'agricoles
et
commerciaux
1897.
-2Gl-142: Matam.
Rapports Trimestriel d'Ensemble 1897.
-2Gl-143:
•
•
Septembre-Octobre 189B .
-2Gl-144:
1898.
-2Gl-145:
Matam.
Rapports
Mensuels:
Janvier,
Avril,
Juin,
et
Novembre 1899.
-2Gl-146: Matam.
Rapports Trimestriels d'Ensemble 1899.
-2Gl-147:
•
•
Mars a Mai 1901 .
-2Gl-155:
Podor.
Rapports 1895.

---

500
-2Gl-156:
1899.
"
-2Gl-157:
1900
-2Gl-158:
Podor. Rapports 1900.
-2Gl-159:
1900.
"
-2Gl-160:
1901.
"
-2Gl-16l:
1901.
2G2:
Annee 1902.
-2G2-5:
Senegal.
-2G2-47:
Podor.
Rapports
politiques,
agricoles
et
cornmerciau:<.
mcnsuels
(Janvier-Mai et Juillec-Novembre).
Sous-serie 2G3: Annee 1903.
-2G3-6:
Senegal.
-2G3-7:
Senegal.
-2G3-63:
Matam.
Rapports
politiques,
agricoles
et
comrnerciau:{
~ensuels (Juillet a Octobre-Decembre).
2G4:
Annee 1904.
-2G4-21:
Senegal.
Traveaux Publics.
·2G4-21:
Senegal.
Rappor t
Annue 1.
-2G4-23:
Senegal.
Sante:
Rapport Annuel.
- 2G4 - 26 :
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G4-27:
Senegal.
Pays de Protectorat.
2G5:
Annee 1905.
- 2G5 -7:
Senegal.
Rapport d' Ensemble.
-2G5-9:
Mauritanie.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G5-10:
Mauritanie.
Rapports Mensuels.
-2GS-21:
Senegal.
Direction des Traveaux Publics.
-2G5-28:
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
2G6.
A~nee 1906.
- 2G6 -1:
Senegal.
Service de l' Agricul ture.
-2G6-3:
Senegal.
Rapport trimestriel
(1).
-2G6-4:
Senegal.
Rapport trimestriel (2).
-2G6-5:
Mauritanie.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G6-22:
Senegal.
Traveaux P~blics
- 2G6 - 24:
Senegal.
Rappor t d' Ensemble.
-2G6-25:
Senegal.
Pays de Protectorat.
2G7:
Annee 1907.
-2G7-1:
Senegal.
Service de l'Agriculture.
-2G7-2:
Mauritanie.
Situation Politique.
-2G7-7:
A.a.F.
Situation Generale.
-2G7-9:
Senegal.
Rapport Pol~tique.
-2G7-11:
Mauritanie.
Rapport Politique
-2G7-21:
Senegal.
Service de la Sante.
-2G7-30:
Senegal.
Situation Politique.
-2G7-32:
Senegal.
Pays de Protectorat.
-2G7-33"
Senegal.
Contributions
Directes.
-2G7-34:
Senegal.
Rapport economique et commercial.
-2G7-35:
Senegal.
Affaires economiques.
-2G7-37:
Senegal.
Service de l'Enseignement.
-2G7-38:
"
"
-2G7-39:
Senegal.
Postes et Telegraphes.
-2G7-43~
Podar.
Rapports politiques.
2G8:
Annee 1908.

---

501
-2G8-8:
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G8-9:
Senegal.
Rapport d·Ensemble.
-2G8-10:
Senegal.
Rapport pOlitique.
-2G8-11/2G8-12:
Mauricanie.
Rapport politique.
-2G8-25:
Senegal.
Service de Sante.
-2G8-36:
Affaire du Mahdi Ali Yoro Diop.
-2G8-4l.
Podor.
-2G8-46:
Matam.
2G9:
Annee 1909.
-2G9-1:
Senegal.
Agriculture.
-2G9-6:
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G9-7:
"
-2G9-9:
Mauritanie.
Rapport poli"Lique.
-2G9-45:
Podor.
Rapport politique.
-2G9-48:
Matam.
Rapport politique.
-2G9-49:
Podor.
2G10:
Annee 1910.
-2G10-4:
Senegal.
Agriculture.
-2G10-5:
Senegal.
Correspondance.
- 2G10 -12 :
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G10-13:
Senegal.
-2G10-14:
Kauritanie.
-2G10-15:
Kauritanie.
-2G10-24:
Sonegal.
Sante.
-2G10-45:
Matam.
2Gll:
Annee 1911.
- 2G11- 6:
Senegal.
Rapport d' Ensemble.
-2Gll-7:
Senegal.
Rapports trimestriels.
-2Gl1-8:
Kauritanie.
-2Gll-19:
Senegal.
Sante.
-2Gll-23:
Maurit.anie.
-2Gll-24:
Mauritanie.
-2Gl1-34:
A.O.F. en 1911.
-2Gll-39:
Matam.
Rapports mensuels.
- 2Gl1-40:
Podor.
Rapports mensuels.
-2Gll-hl:
Salde.
Rapport. mensuels (J anvier - - Dece:nbre).
-2Gll-51:
Podor.
"
-2Gl1-62:
Matam.
-2Gl1-63:
Katam.
Rapports trimestriels.
-2Gll-68:
Podor.
Rapports trimestriels.
·2Gl1-69:
Salde.
Rapports mensuels.
-2Gll-70:
Salde.
Rapports t.rimestriels.
2G12:
Annee 1912.
-2G12-1:
Senegal.
Agriculture.
-2G12-8:
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G12-9:
Senegal.
Rapport politique.
-2G12-10:
Kauritanie.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G12-11:
Mauritanie.
-2G12-26:
Senegal.
Sante.
-2G12-55:
Senegal.
Service Zootechnique.
-2G12-58:
Matam.
Rapports politiques.
-2G12-59:
Salde.
Rapports politiques.

---

502
2013:
Annee 1913.
-2013-5:
A.O.F.
Sltuation pol1tique.
-2013-7:
Senegal.
Situat10n polit1que.
-2013-8:
Senegal.
Situation politique.
-2G13-9:
Mauritanie.
Situation politique.
-2G13-44:
Senegal.
Territoires d'Administration directe.
-2G13-45:
Senegal.
Pays de Protectorat.
-2G13-48:
"
-2G13-51:
Cere le de Matam.
- 2G13 - 52:
Cercle de Salde.
-2013-59:
Cercle de Podor.
2G14:
Annee 1914.
-2G14-6:
Senegal.
Rapport politique trimestriel.
-2G14-7:
Mauritanie.
Rapport politique trimestriel.
-2014-20:
Senegal.
Service de Sante.
-2G14-40:
Senegal.
Rapports par Cercles: .6 Katam;
~8 Podor;
~9 Salde.
-2014-41:
Senegal.
Territoires d'administ~ation dir~cte.
-2G14-42:
Senegal.
Pays de Protectorat.
-2014-46:
Matam.
-2G14-48:
Salde.
-2G14-52:
Podor.
2G15:
Annee 1915
-2G1S-4:
Senegal.
Agriculture et Elevage.
-2015-6:
Senegal.
Rapport pol1t1que d'Ensemble.
-2015-7:
Mauritanie.
Rapport pol1tique.
-2015-22:
Senegal.
Traveaux Publics.
-2G15-28:
Senegal.
Rapports de Cercles:
~6 Matam;
~7 Podor; #8 Salde.
-2G15-29:
Senegal.
-2G15-30:
Senegal.
-2015-31:
-2015-32:
-2G15-35:
Cercle de Matam.
-2G15-37:
Cercle de Salde .
. 2G15-43:
Cercle de Podor.
2G16:
Annee 1916.
-2G16-5:
Senegal.
Rapport politique trimestriel.
-2016-6:
Mauritanie.
Rapport politique.
-2016-18:
Senegal.
Service de Sante
-2016-25:
Senegal.
"5 Matam;
"6 Podor;
"8 Salde.
-2G16-33:
Cercle de Matam.
-2016-35:
Cercle de Salde.
-2G16-39:
Cercl~ de Podor.
2G17:
Annee 191).
-2017-1:
Senegal.
Agriculture.
-2017-5:
Senegal.
Rapports polit1ques.
-2G17-6:
Senegal.
Rapports politiques.
-2G17-7:
Mauritan1e.
Rapports politiques_
- 2G17 -18:
Senegal.
Rapports poli t1ques.
-2017-19:
"
-2G17-24:
Senegal. Rapports de cercles:
#6 Matam;

---

503
~8 Podor;
#9 Salde.
-2G17-25:
Senegal.
Rapport d'£nsemble.
-2G17-26:
Senegal.
Rapport d'Ensemble.
-2G17-30:
Cercle de Matam.
-2Gi7-31:
Cercie de Saide.
-2G17-35:
Cercle de Podor.
2G18:
Annee 1918.
-2G18-1:
Senegal.
Rapport politique d'Ensemble.
-2G18-2:
Mauritanie.
Rapport politique d'Ensemble.
-2G18-20.
Senegal-Cercles:
#5 Matam;
#6 Podor;
#7 Salde.
-2G18-21/22/23:
Senegal.
Rapports politiques.
-2G18-27:
Cercle de Matam.
-2G18-28:
Cercle de Salde.
-2G18-33:
Cercle de Podor.
-2G18-40:
Cere le de Salde.
-2G18-43:
Cercle de Katam.
2G19:
Annee 1919.
-2G19-1:
Senegal.
Agriculture.
-2G19-12:
Senegal.
Rapports politiques trimestriels.
-2C19-13:
Mauritanie.
Rapports
trimestriels.
-2G19-14:
Mauritanie.
-2G19-22:
Matam.
-2G19-23:
Salde.
-2G19-25:
Podor.
2G20:
Annee 1920.
-2G20·1:
Senegal.
Affaires economiques.
-2G20-3:
Senegal.
Rapport politique annuel.
-2G2D-5:
Senegal.
Rapports politiques trimestriels.
-2G20-6:
Mauritanie.
Rapport politique.
-2G20-9:
Senegal.
Agriculture et Forets.
- 2G20 - 20:
Matam.
-2G20-21:
Salde.
-2G2D-26:
Podor.
-2G20-3l:
Matam.
- 2G20- 32:
Podor.
-2G20-42/ 2G20-43:
Kaur~tanie.
Traveaux Publics.
2G2l:
Annee 1nl.
-2G21-8:
Senegal.
Rapports trimestriels a A.a.F.
-2G21-9:
Mauritanie.
Rapports trimestriels a A.O.F.
-2G21-22:
Mauritanic.
Affaires economiques.
-2G21-25:
Senegal.
Affaires economiques:
#2 Dagana;
~5 Podor;
~6 Matam.
-2G21-26:
Cercle Matam.
Rapports trimestriels.
-2G21-28:
Cercle de Dagana.
Rapports trimestrlels.
2G22:
Annee 1922.
-2G22-9:
Mauritanie.
Rapports trimestriels.
-2G22-10:
Senegal.
Rapports trimestriels.
-2G22-24:
Mauritanie.
Rapport medical annuel.
·2G22-32:
Senegal.
Affaires economiques:
#2 Dagana;
#7 Matam;
#8 Pador.
2G23:
Annee 1923.
-2G23-2:
Senegal.
Affaires economiques
(Rapports mensuels).

---

504
-2G23-12: Senegal.
Rapports politiques mensuels.
-2G23.1~: Mauritanie.
Rapports politiques rnensuels.
-2G23-52: Matam.
Rapport du le trimestre.
-2G23-53: Podor.
Rapport du le trimestre.
-2G23-71: Podor.
Rapport annuel.
2G24:
Annee 1924.
-2G24-4:
Senegal.
Rapport agricole.
-2G24-5:
Mauritanie.
Affaires economiques.
-2G24-15:
Senegal.
Rapports mensuels.
-2G24-16:
Mauritanie.
Rapport politique annuel.
-2G24-27: Kauritanie.
Rapport medical annuel.
2G25:
Annee 1925.
-2G25-2:
Senegal.
Affaires economiques mensuelles.
-2G25-3:
Mauritanie.
Affaires economiques mensuelles.
-2G25-44: Senegal. Note annuelle sur la situation politique.
-2G25 -48. Pador.
Telegrammes mensuels.
-2G25-52: Matam.
Rapports politiques mensuels.
Sous-serie 4G: Missions d'Inspection des Colonies 1874-1919.
-4G-12:
1910-1911
Mission d'inspection Pherivong au Senegal eo
-20
Guinee.
-4G-19:
1916-1917.
Mission
d' inspec cion
Picanon
au
5uj e t
du
::ecrutemenc
des
troupes
indigenes
(1915-6)
et
de
l'alimentation
des
troupes.
Sous-serie 9G:
Affaires politiques. administratives et rnusulrnanes
en Mauritanie 1799-1920.
-9G-16:
1904.
Copies des decisions du Secrecaire du Gouvernemenc
General en mission, delegue du Gouvernement en Pays Maures.
-9G-17/18/19:
1906-1910.
Copies des decisions du CommLssaire du
Gouvernement General en Territoire Civil de ~auricanie.
-9G-20:
1903.
Sicucacion
politique
et
organisation
administrative.
7 pieces
(2 concernant les cercles du Fleuve).
·9G-2t:
1904-5.
Situati.on
politi.que
et
organi.sati.on
adminLstracive.
Piece
12:
Terrains
possedes
par
1es
Toucouleurs
sur
la rive droite.
-9G-22:
1905.
Situation
politique
et
organisation
administrative.
Piece
4:
~ncidents au sujet des
terrains de
culture
en
amont
d'Aleybe
et
du
mouvement
d'emigration
des
Toucouleurs
en
~auritanie.
-9G- 23:
1906.
Situation
politique
et
organisation
administrative.
Piece 4:
Affaires Maures en provenance de Podor.
-9G-28:
1911.
Situtation
politique
et
organisation
admir.istrative.
Piece 6:
Creation des eco1es er. Mauritanie.
-9G-30:
1912.
Situation
politique
et
organisation
administrative.
Modifica~ion de circonscriptions.
-9G-33:
1916.
Piece
1:
Senegal--Mauricanie.
passage
des
indigenes d'une rive a l'autre.
-9G-35:
1918.
Piece l.
Affaire des
terrains de
Louguere et de
Sobal.
-9G-42/43:
191t-1913.
Fiches
de
renseignemer.ts
concernant
les
personnages
importants et 1es marabouts du Gorgol-Kiffa.
Sous-serie 13G: Affaires politiques, administratives et musulmanes
au Senegal, 1782-1919_
I
I

---

505
-13G-4
(bis):
Traites
avec
les
chefs
indigenes
du
Fouta
Toro,
1838-1853.
-13G-5:
Traites conclus avec Etats du Senegal depuis 1854:
Cayor,
Dimar,
Toro,
Fouta Damga,
1854-1877.
- 13G· 9;
Trai tes
cone lus
avec
les
che fs
du
Fleuve;
Dimar.
Fouta,
Toro et Irlabe.
-13G-28:
Suppression
du
'Bureau
des
Affaires
Indigenes'
et
organisation du 'Bureau des Affaires Politiques'
1885-1892.
-13G-29:
1851-1895.
Delimitation
de
circonscriptions
administratives:
Colonies,
cercles.
provinces.
cantons,
pastes.
(Toro,
Dimar,
Lao,
Podor).
-13G-30:
Organisation
de
circonscriptions
administratives
et
accribution
des
Bureaux
du
Gouveroement
et
des
chefs
de
~irconscriptions.
(Cercles et delegations).
1 dossLer.
-13G-33:
1847-1885.
Siruation politique sur le F1euve.
Rapports
et correspondance
(6 chemises).
-lJG-41:
1885-1889.
Emigration
des
Peu1hs
du
Fleu-:e
dans
le
Niora.
-13G-42:
1861-1872.
Che ffer ies
indigenes:
Norninai:.ion de Chefs
ce Villages et de Cantons.
-lJG·43:
1881-1899.
Nomination
de
Chefs
de
Villages
et
de
Cantons:
Notes
et reclamations.
-lJC·45:
Dagana.
Nomination de Chefs.
(Dimar).
-lJG-46:
Fin
du
1ge
siecle.
Chefferies
indigenes:
Bulleti.ns
individuels
cc notes
(Podor).
-lJC-47:
Cheffeties
indigenes:
Bulletins
individuels
de
no tes
(Kaedi).
-13G-48 :
(Matam) .
-13G-63:
1893-1899.
Conflirs.
-lJG·64:
1903.
Actions
des
Maures
sur
le
Senegal:
Actes
de
pillage et hostilite (Dagana,
Bakel, Matam, Kaedi,
Podor,
Demette).
-13G-65:
1904-1906.
Action des Maures
sur
le
Fleu';e Senegal
(2
chemises).
-13G-66:
1908-1911.
Razzias maures.
-lJG·67:
1906-1917.
Politique musulmane:
Action des Marabouts.
-13G-69:
1912-1913.
Fiches
de
renseignernents
sur
les Marabouts
e;;: No tab les
U1a cam,
Bake 1,
Salde,
er Dagana).
-lJG-70:
Chefferies
indigenes.
Demandes
d'emplo~ et candidature
de chefs.
-13G·71:
1901·1907.
Organisation administrative et ter~itoriale.
-lJG-72:
1910-1918.'
Politique indigene:
Affaires diverses.
-13G-75:
1913-1917.
Etat d'esprit des populations.
Instructions,
circulaires
et
correspondance
relatives
a
la
politique
administrative en rnatiere
indigene.
-lJG·1l7:
1839·1854.
Dimar.
Correspondance
du
Commandant
de
l'escale du Coq au Gouverne~r. sur le commerce dans le Dimar.
-13G-119:
1883·1886.
Destitutions et nominations de chefs.
-13G-129:
1880.
Podor:
Correspondance du Commandant de poste.
-13G·lJO:
188l.
-13G-131:
1882-1884.
-13G-132:
1885-1887.
-13G-133:
1889-1899.
Podor:
Affaires politiques civerses.
!
l
l

---

506
-13G-134:
1862-1893,
Podor:
Plaintes, enquetes, conflits,
.13G-135:
1890-1892.
Pador: Meuetee de l'administrateur
Abel Jeandet.
-13G-136:
1852-1866.
Toeo:
Correspondance
(I~ttre rle Faidherbe
au Ministre au sujet de l'~nnexion du Toro).
-13G-137:
1867-1888.
Toro:
Correspondance.
-13G-142:
1880-1883.
Fouta:
Correspondance
avec
les
chefs
I
indigenes.
(Abdoul Bokar).
.
-l3C-143:
1885-1890.
Abdoul Bokar et Cheikh Mamadou.
'
-l3G-144:
1875-1885.
Lao,
Irlabe, Bossea:
Correspondance.
1',1
-13G-145/146:
1866-1886.
Aere:
Correpondance du Chef de poste
au Gouverneur.
-13G-151/2/3/4/:
1880-1889.
Salde:
Correspondance du Commandant
de poste.
-13G-155:
1869-1892.
Kaedi
et
Salde:
Plaintes.
enquetes.
confl i cs.
·13G- 156:
1885 -1898.
Kaedi:
Correspondances diverses.
(Construction
du
poste,
situation
politique
et
economique
du cercle).
Hiscorique du poste de Kaedi par le Lieutenant Parent.
-13G-157/8/9/
et
l3G·160/1/2/:
1857-1898
!'!atam:
Correspondance.
-l3G -163:
1860-1894.
Damga:
Correspondance
avee
les
Chefs
indigenes.
Sous-serie 17G:
Affaires Po1itiques A.a.F.
1895-1920.
-17G-ll:
1895-1902
Arrivee et deees de Gouverneurs Generaux.
-17G-15:
1914-1919.
Deplacements
et activites
de Blaise Diag:1e,
Depuce du Senegal.
·17G-24:
"Fonds Secrets".
-17G-37:
1903-1910.
Politique Indigene.
Situation politique de
l' A.a. F.
-17G-39:
Politiquc Indigene.
Correspondance et
instructions.
(~
4 Suppression de la feodalite indigene).
-17G-59:
1916-1918.
Aspirations de l'A.O.F.
Sous-serie
laG:
A£faires administratives A.a.F.
1893-1920.
-18G-ll:
Delimitations
de
frontieres
entre
la
Mauritanie
et
les
colonies voisines.
( 1904-1913).
Sous-serie 19G:
Affaires musulmanes A.a.F.
1900-1920.
-19G-l:
1906-1915.
Situation de l'Is1am en A.a.F.
·19G-2:
1906·1918.
Questions
musulmanes.
Notes
et
correpondances.
-19G-3:
1905-1915.
Surveillance de l'Islam.
Reglementation des
quetes.
-19G-4:
1906-1917.
Propagande is1amique par image et presse.·'
-19G-7:
1917-1920.
Gommission inter-Ministeriel1e des affaires
musulmanes.
Compte rendu de seances.
I
-19G-8:
1900-1901.
Informations islamiques etrangeres.
Sous-serie 22G:
Statistiques 1818-1920.
-22G-6:
Recensernents
des
populations
de
la
colonie
du
Senegal
I
1847-1884.
.~.
-22G-20:
S tatltlquE.
de
la
popul;ltion
des
colonies
de
l'A.O.F
1905-1908.
-22G-23:
1910.
Statistiques Generales pour l'office colonial.
I
I
I
I

---

507
-22G-26:
1911.
Statistiques Generales pour l'office colonial.
-22G-29:
1914.
"
-22G-30:
1915.
Statistiques Generales:
Population du Senegal.
-22G-31:
1916.
"
-22G-34:
1917.
"
"
Sous-serie 23G:
Etat Civil 1797-1920.
-23G-10:
Avis de deces de l'Hopita1 de Saint-Louis 1895- 1902.
SERIE H:
SENEGAL.
SANTE 1829-1920.
-H16:
1900.
Dix
ans
de
noso10gie
a
l'Hopita1
civil
de
Saint-Louis (1889-1899).
-H19:
Comi~e Superieur et services municipaux d'hygie~e.
Organisation et fonctionnement.
Epidemies 1868-1920.
-H27:
Cholera 1868-1869.
-H29:
Fievre j aune.
Listes et avis de deces
(Fleuve).
-H30:
Fievre jaune.
Podor (1878-1879).
-H36:
Cholera.
Saint-Louis,
Dagana,
Pador, Kaedi,
Matam.
(1893).
-H37:
1886-1894.
Vilriole.
Dagana,
Podor,
Salde.
-H39:
1395-1911.
Epidemies et maladies concagieuses.
-H48--52:
1900-1903.
Fievre Jaune (Rapports).
-H57:
1917-1920.
Peste a Dakar et au Senegal.
SERIE J:
ENSEIGNEMENT;
ORGA.c'HSATION ET Fm;CTIONNEMENT.
al Organisation et Fonctionnement
1831-1920.
-J2:
Ecole des Otages de Saint-Louis 1847-1869.
-J3:
Enseignement laique.
Correspondance et situation.
1867-1871 (Podor).
-J7:
Eco1e des fils de chefs.
Organisation-FonctionnemerlC.
1892-1903.
-JIO:
1904-1910.
Enseignement.
Organisation
et
fonctionnement
en A.a.F.
-J12:
1910-1911.
Rapport sur l'Instruction Publique et
l'Enseignement Musulman en A.a.F.
~J19: Enseignement au Senegal.
Correspondance-Statistiques.
1903-1910.
-J20:
1910-1914.
Organisation
et
fonctionnement
de
l'Enseignement au Senegal.
-J21:
1915-1919.
Organisation
et
fonctionnement
de
l'Enseignemenc au Seoegal.
bl Statistiques Scolaires 1903-1920_
-J29:
Dagana.
Statistiques scolaires des ecoles et
rapports
d'inspection.
-Kanel
1903-1920.
-J31:
Statistiques scolaires et rapports d'iospection.
Matam, Mboumba,
Ndioum).
-J32:
Statitiques sco1aires et rapports ...
(Pador et Salde).
-J49--5~:
1903-1912.
Ecole Norma1e de Saint-Louis.
-J59--61:
1914-1920.
Ecole Norma1e de Goree.
-J62--64:
1903-1920.
Scole Faidherbe.
Ecole Commerciale
et Superieure.
-J66--76:
1905-1920.
Ecole Professionnelle Pinet-Laprade
de Goree.
~"" - .
I

---

508
-J91:
1904-1910.
Enseignemenc
Arabe
eC
Islam.
Organisation et Fonctionnement de la Medersa.
-J92:
1905-1919.
Medersa de Saint-Louis.
Organisation.
Fane tionnernent.
-J93:
1906-1912.
Medersa de Sainc-Louis.
Progranune.
Rapports
personnels.
Eleves.
Bourses.
SERIE K:
ESCLAVAGE ET CAPTIVITE 1807-1915.
-Kll:
1854-1880.
Esclavage eC capcivice.
Abolicion de
l'esclavage et liberation de captifs.
-K12:
1881-1892.
Liberacion d'esclaves.
-K13:
1905.
Conscruccion du Bac de Podor.
-K15:
1900-1903.
Capcivice en A.O.F.
-Traveaux dans le Bossea.
Rattachement du Damga a
Kaedi
-K17/18/19:
1903-1904.
Capcivice en A.O.F.
-K23:
1903-1906.
Tucelle de mineurs delivres de capcivice.
-Etat des
routes
(Dakar;
Matam;
Fador).
-K26:
1907-1915.
Capcivite et repression de la traice en A.O.F.
SERIE 0:
AFFAIRES ECONOMIQUES 1896-1919.
-Q55:
Situation economique en A.O.F 1913-1918.
-Q56:
Hesures economiques en raison de la guerre.
1914-1917
-Q61:
Societes
de
Prevoyance
et
de
Pret
Mutuels.
Creation:
1910-1919.
SE~IE R:
AGRICULTURE.
1857-1919.
-R13:
Rapporcs agricoles de Mr. Yves Henri 1911-1914.
-R15:
Etude agronomique du Senegal (Region du Fleuve).
B.
ORAL TRADITION.
FONOS JA.'1ES P. JOHNSON:
I.F.A.N.-DAKAR (1967-1968)
-
Bah,
Denunba
Donndee.
"The
Secession of Tooro
from
Fuuta
and the relation of Dimar and Tooro to Central Fuuta".
Bah,
Yero Jaw.
"The Assassination of Commandant Jeandet."
eaam,
Aali Gay.
"French Penetration in Tooro."
Kamara,
Buubu.
"Lamtoaro Mammadu Mbowba and the French."
\\.lan,
Biraan
Aamadu
Sanunba.
"The
[..lan
and
the
History
of
Fuuta Tooro."
fONOS DAVID W.
ROBINSON:
!.F.A.N.-DAKAR (1968-1969).
- Aac,
Mammadu Elimaan Rinnj aw.
"The Europeans".
-
Aan,
Baaba HaRmidu.
"The
relations between Elfekki(s)
and
Almaami(s)."
Bah,
AI-Hajji
Konko
Siree.
"Damga
under
Almamal
and
E~ropea(l rules."
Bah,
Aamadu
Bookar
Alfaa
(Ceerno).
"The
reCur"
of
the
Kaartankoobe."
Bah,
Waranka
Barka.
"~atarn and the changes under European
rule .'"
Caam,
Aali Gay.
"The Wan during the Colonial Period. ff
"The Jeandet Affair."
Joob,
Demmba Lobbudu.
"Lamtooro Mammadu Mbowba."
Kamara Buubu.
"The Ardo(s)
and Jom(s)
of Tooro."

---

509
Kan,
Ceerno Saydu.
"Abdul Bookar Kan and Alburi Njaay."
Saam,
Al-Hajj i
Isma'ila.
"Abdul Bookar and Ibraa Abdul S."
Tuure,
Al-Hajji Ibba.
"The Commercial History of Matam and the
Colonial Regime."
- wan,
Bi.raan Aarnadu S.
"Aamadu Sammba and Abdul Aziz."
n ELD INTERVI EWS CONDUCTED BY MOUSTAPHA KANE:
(Senegal and Mauritania,
1984 and 1985).
We have interviewed more than thirty people of both sexes and from
various social backgrounds.
The number of sessions--more than one ~ith
some interviewees--and the variety of topics are such that,
for reasons
of economy,
we prefer not to list them within this appendix.
~e intend
to publish later on a repertory of these
interviews as
"Fonds Moustapha
Kane."
- Bah,
Abubakri Qaalid.
From
the
PuLlo
aristocracy,
in his
late
405.
Professor
of
Arabic
and
Historian.
Institut Mauritanien de
la
Recherche
Scientifique
(I .M.R. S.).
Taped
intervie'"
in
Pulaar,
Nouackchott
(R. I.M.),
18/3/L895.
Bah,
Faatimata
Raasin.
Toorodo
of
the
leading
family
of
Hoore~Foonde
(BaDsaya,
south
bank)
and
descendant
of
Alfaa
Amar.
Housewife.
Untaped interview in Pulaar,
Nouackchotr,
13/4/1985.
Ban,
Mbaare.
Deeniyanke
from
Faduwaa-Boggel
area
(north
bank
Damga).
Grand son of Sammba Jom.
Career Diplomat.
Taped incerJiew in
French,
Nouackchott,
30/3/1985.
Bah,
Umar
(Dr.).
Pullo·Jaananke
from
Mbaan
(north
bank
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe).
Researcher
and
Historian
at
the,
Institut
Mauritanien
des
Langues
Nationales
(I.M.L.N.),
Nouackchott
(R.I.M).
Taped
interview
in
PuLaar
and
French,
Nouackchott
L7/3/l985.
Also.
untaped interview in Nouackchott,
30/4/1895.
- Bookum,
Demmba
Jaawando.
Jaawando
(i.e:
Retainer).
From
Ndulumaaj i-Demrnbe
(Ngenaar).
Hose
show
at
the
Senegalese
National
Radio and Television
(O.R.T.S.),
Oakar.
Two
taped
interviews
in PuLaar
at Geejawaay-Dakar (Senegal).
(25/10/1984 and 2/11/1984).
-
Bookum,
Siree
Buubu.
Jaawando
(cf.
above).
Retired
Extension
Agent
of
the
S.A.E.D.
Native
of
Mbummba
(south
bank
Laaw).
Taped
interview in Pulaar at Waagu-Naay (Dakar-Senegal)
18/20/1985.
- Cubbu,
Ibraahiima Seribaa.
Cubballo (Fisherman), Matam. Retired
School Teacher and Director,
age 70.
Taped interviey in Pulaar,
Matam
29/7/L985.
- Jah,
Bukkari Aamadu.Raasin.
Toorodo and "Elimaan Hartalla"
from
Tulde-Dubaange
(North
bank
Halaybe).
Untaped
interview
in
Pulaar.
Boghe (Mauritania),
25/4/1985.
-Jah,
Aamadu Tijjaani
(Ce~rno) in his late 50s.
Toorooco and son
of Ceerno Aamadu Alfaa Muusaa.
Imam of the Mosque
of Galoya
(Poctor-
Senegal).
Interviewed in Pulaar,
with Al-Hajji Mammadu (A. Muusa's Son
in
law);
Abdul
Quddus
(Cousin
of
Aamadu
Alfaa);
Mohammad- L·Qal i
(Cousin) and Ceerno Su'a'ibu.
Taped interview at Galoya on 26/7/1985.
Jah,
Maamudu
Bookar
Baydi.
Toorodo
from
Boghe
(North
bank
Halaybe).
Age 55.
Taped interview (in Pulaar with his brother Mustafa
Jah)
at Boghe (Mauritanial,
27/4/1985.
- Jah,
Umar Hammadi.
Toorodo and Irnarn of the Mosque of Boggee-Dow
(Boghe,
Mauritania),
80
years.
Taped
interview
in
Pulaar
at
Boghe.
l

---

510
26/4/1985.
- Jah,
Umar Hammadi 11.
Tooroodo from Tulde (Halaybe-North bank).
Early 60s.
Interview in Pulaar at Tulde,
25/4/1985.
- Jallo,
Abu.
56 years.
Ceddo from Galoya and former student of
Ceerno
Aamadu
Alfaa
and
quite
knowledgeable
about
oral
history
of
Galoya.
Taped interview at Caaroy-Minam 11,
(Dakar-Senegal), 4/8/1985.
(Pulaar).
- Jen,
Mammadu.
Cubballo
and
cleric
from
\\Joolum-Neere.
Age
46.
Untaped interview,
in Pulaar,
Nouackchott 13/4/1985.
Jiggo
Aadama
Jeliyaa.
Tooroodo
from
Boghe,
88
years
old.
Untaped interview in Pulaar,
Boggee (Mauritania),
26/4/1985.
Jiggo,
Faatimata.
Age
50.
Tooroodo
from
traditional
ruling
families
of Teekaan
(North bank Dimac).
\\Jell versed
in the history--
pre-colonial
and
colonial--of
Dimat.
Taped
interview
in
Pulaar,
Nouackchott,
15/4/1985.
Kan,
Ami
Maam
Njaak.
50
years
old.
Tooroodo
from
Dar-El-
Barka.
Daughter of Maam Njaak and Grand daughter of Elimaan Abu Kan,
both former Province Chiefs of North bank Tooro.
Interviewed in Pulallr
along with her mother Raki \\Jan 70 years.
Nouackchott,
21/3/1985.
Kan,
Ceerno
Aamadu.
Age
75.
Pullo
der ic
from
Base
(The
Gambia),
now
living
in
Kaolack
(Senegal).
Adoptive
son
and
close
friend of Mammadu Abdul Bookar Kan during the long exile of the latter
in Base.
Taped interview at Kaolack on 10/10/1984.
Interview conducted
in ?ulaar.
- Kan,
Daahaa.
Former diplomat and Grand son of Samrnba Jam on the
maternal side.
Interview in Pulaar,
along with his cousin Mbaare Bah,
Nouackchott 30/3/1985.
Kan,
Hamedin.
Tooroodo
and
descendant
of
the
Lamtooro(s).
Age
56.
Retired lnspecteur de l'Enseignement Primaire.
Author of a play on
the
execution
of Lamtooro Sidiki and collector of numerous
traditions
of
the history of Fuuta.
Interview
in
Pulaar at Gede
(TooIo Senegal),
on 24/7/1985.
-
Kan,
lbraahiima Aali.
Age
75.
Tooroodo descendant of Elimaan
Buubakar
Kan
and
member
of
the
traditional
ruling
family
of
Dimat.
Kno·,.,ledgeable
about
the
history
of
Dimat.
Interview
in
Pulaar,
Nouackchott 24/3/1985.
-Kan,
Saydu
alias
Mustafa
Booli,
39
years.
Grea t
Grand
son
of
Elimaan
Saydu
Buubakar.
Agrege
en
Histoire
and
Sociologist
at
the
I.M.R.S.
of
Nouackchott.
Taped
interview
in
French
and
Pulaar.
Nouackchott 23/3/85.
-
Kan,
Shaykh Yaayaa.
Age
71.
Tooroodo and son of Yaayaa Kan,
former
Canton
Chief
of
Mhaan
(North
bank
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe)
and
himself
former
chief
of
this
same
province.
Retired. Assistant
Administrator
living
now
in
Nouackchott.
Interview
in
French,
Nouackchott 30/3/1985.
-
Kan,
Tijjaani Maam Njaak.
Age
40.
Administrator and Banker.
Son
of
Maam
Njaak
Kan,
former
Chief
of
Tooro-Halaybe
(Mauritania).
I
Inquisitive
in
matters
of
oral
history
and
knowledgeable
about
the
colonial period.
-Kan,
Buuna
Abdul
Salaam.
Age
75.
Tooroodo
and
son
of
Abdul
Salaam
Kan,
former
chief
of
the
province
of
Damga
(south
bank)
from
1898
to
1955,
and
himself
former
Canton
Chief
of
Western
Damga
I
I
I
I

---

511
(1958-1960).
Interview in French along with his younger brother Siik
Abdul Kan,
Dakar, 4/8/1985.
-Lam,
Ceerno
Saada
Baaba.
Tooroodo
in
his
mid-60s,
living
in
Tulde
(North bank Halaybe).
Interview in Pulaar,
at his home in Tulde
on 24/4/1985.
- Lih,
Rasuu Iu.
Age
78.
Tooroodo
from
Salde
(South
bank
Yirlaabe-Hebbiyaabe).
Oral
historian.
Interview
in
Pulaar,
Dakar,
31/7/1985.
- Mbow, Usmaan alias "Delegue."
Mid-40s.
Blacksmith from Maqama.
Untaped conversations
in Pulaar on
the
history
of Maqama and its land
issues.
(March 1985).
- Sal,
Buubu.
85 years old.
Former School Director and renow"'TIed
Traditionalist historian.
Interview at Podor on 23/7/1985.
·5a1,
Ibraahiirna Abu.
Professor
of History
ae
the
Ecole
Normale
Superieure
(E.N.S.)
of
Nouackchott
(Mauritania),
working
on
his
Doctorat
de
3e
Cycle
in
History.
Untaped discussions
in
French
and
Pulaar.
(February-April 1985).
-Sih,
Ceerno Aamadu.
Age
79.
Tooroodo and son of Alfaa Muusaa
Sih,
a
contemporary
of
the
Aali
Vera
Joob' 5
rebellion.
Interview
in
Pulaar at Fanay (Dimat Senegal), on 20/7/1985.
- Soh,
Ardo Sammba Umar.
Age 67.
Pu110 from Galoya (Podor),
and
son
of
Ardo
Abdul
Soh
who
disappeared
with
the
Dodds'
Column.
Interview in Pulaar at Galoya on 26/7/1985.
!.Jan,
Hammaat
Baylaa.
Tooroodo
and
son
of
Baylaa'
Biraan
Wan,
former
Province
Chief
of
Halaybe-Laaw
(Mauritania)
and
of
Laaw
(Senegal).
Former Attache d'Administration at Boghe and keeping still
his
father' 5
personnal
papers,
Hammaat
knows
a
great
deal
about
the
conquest of Mauritania and
the colonial
rule of both banks.
Taped and
un taped interviews in Fre~ch;
Boghe,
25/4/1985.
-
T..l an ,
Ibraa Mammadu.
60 years.
Tooroodo and Grand son of Ibraa
Almaami
Wan.
Retired
District
Officer
living
in
Nouackchott
(Mauritania).
Interviews in French,
24/3/1985.
C _
UNPUBLISHED THESES:
1.
DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS:
Auchnie,
Ailsa.
"The
Commandement
Indigene
in
Senegal,
1919-1947."
Ph.D dissertation, S.O.A.S., University of London,
1977.
Barrows,
Le land
Conley.
"General
Faidherbe,
The
Maurel
and
Prom
Company
and
French
Expansion
in
Senegal."
Ph.D.
dissertation,
University of California Los-Angeles,
1974.
Colvin,
Lucie.
"Kajoor and
its
diplomatic
relations with
Saint~Louis
du Senegal,
1763-1861."
Ph.D dissertation,
University of Columbia,
1972.
Coulon,
Christian.
"Pouvoir
Maraboutique
et
Pouvoir
Politique
au
Senegal."
These
de
Doctorat
dlEtat
en
Sciences
Politiques.
2
volumes.
Published under the title,
Le Prince et le Marabout,
Paris
"E!l.
'-jj'iS-1
Desire-Vuillemin,
Genevieve.
"Essai
sur
le Gommier et
le
Commerce
de
I
la
Gomme
dans
les
Escales
du
Senegal."
These
Secondaire,
Montpellier,
1961.
I
I
I

---

512
I
Fall,
Babacar,
"Le
Travail
Force
en
A.a. F.
1900-1946."
These
de
Doctorat de 3e cycle en Hiscoire.
Universice de Dakar,
1984.
I
Johnson,
James
Philip.
"The
Almamate
of
Futa
Toro
1770-1836.
A
Political
History."
Ph.D
dissertation,
University
of
Wisconsin,
1974.
Kane,
Ahmadou.
"Matam et sa Region".
These de Doctorat de 3e cycle en
Geographie Humaine.
Universite de Dakar,
1977.
I1
!'fuodj i,
Mouhamed.
"Un
Exemp le
cl I Economie
Calonia le,
le
S ioe - Saloum
I
1
(Senegal)
de
1887
a
1940:
Culture
Arachidiere
et
Mutations
Sociales."
These
de
Doctorat
de
3e
cycle,
en Hiscoire,
Universite
de Paris VII,
1978.
Molleur,
Bernard.
"Le
Droit
de
Propriete
sur
le
Sol
Senega1ais:
Analyse
historique
du
XVlle
siecle
a
l'Independance."
These
de
Doctorat de
3e cycle,
Faculte de Sciences Juridiques et Politiques,
Universite de Dijon,
2 vol. 1978.
~veng,
Etienne
Evina.
IILes
Collaborateurs
Indigenes
de
l'
Administration
Francaise
au
Cameroun
de
1916
a
1945."
These
de
Ooctorat de 3e cycle en Histoire,
E.H.E.S.S"
Paris,
1981.
Sal1eras,
Bruno.
"La Po1itique Sanitaire de
la France a Dakar de 1900
a
1920."
These
de
Doc~orat de
3e
cycle,
Universite
de
Paris
X,
1980.
Thiam,
Iba Der.
"L'Evolution Po1itique et Syndicale du Senegal de 1840
a 1936."
These de Doctorat d' Etat es
Lettres et Sciences Humaines,
Universite de Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne,
1983.
2.
MASTER'S THESES:
Oial10,
Kalidou.
"Les
Chefs
de
Canton
et
de
Province
du
Fuuta
Senegalais
de
1860 a
1960."
Mernoire
de Maitrise
d'Enseignement
en
Histoire,
Universite de Dakar,
1985.
Diouf,
Gorgui Alioune.
"Abdoul Salam Kane:
Chef de Canton."
Memoire
de Maitrise d'Enseignement en Histoire,
Universite de Dakar,
1975.
Diown,
Alioune.
"Aroadou
Madiyou
du
Fouta
1860-1875."
Memoire
de
Maitrise d'Enseignernent en Histoire,
Universite de Dakar,
1974.
Dioum,
Ournar.
"Abdoul
Bokar:
La
Penetration Francaise
dans
le
Fuuta
Tooro."
Memoire
de
Fin
d' Etudes,
Eco1e
Normale
Superieure
de
Nouackchott,
1982.
Fall,
Babacar.
"Le
Travail
Force
au
Senegal
1900-19"6."
Memoire
de
Maitrise d'Enseignement en Histoire,
Universite de Dakar,
1977.
Kane,
Mouharned
Moustapha.
"Le
Laa......
et
les
Halaybe:
Institutions
~t
Evolution
au
1ge
siecle
(1810-1890)."
Memoire
de
Maitrise
d'Enseignement en Histoire,
Universite de Dakar,
1975.
50311,
.Ibrahima
Abou.
"Les
Relations
entre
les
Haa1-Pulaar'en
et
1es
Brakha
de
1850
a
1903."
Memoire
de
Maitrise
d' Enseignement
en
Histoire,
Universite de Dakar,
1978.
Sal1eras,
Bruno.
"La Politique Sanitaire de la France a
Dakar de 1900
a 1920." Mernoire de Maitrise, Universite de Paris X,
1980.
Sy,
Hamath.
"La Mauritanie dans la Premiere Guerre Mondia1e."
Memoire
de Fin d'Etudes,
E.N.S.
Nouackchott,
1980.
Toure,
Seydou
Nourou.
"Le
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r
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I

---

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1853·1B91., Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1975.
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In,
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·
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la
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Un
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1967.
·
Doe
Source
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I
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1900-1945.,
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I
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1979.
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Jean.
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I
1972 .
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1970.
I
Les Toucouleurs du Fouta Toro.
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1969,
I
I
I

---

520
I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
r
I
I
I
r

---

APPENDIX 1:
Administrative Changes in Tooro:
The "Jeandet Constitution"
of 1888.
(From Gausseron;
Un Francais au Senegal.,
op.eit.
page 171)
1.
The
former
Lam
Boubacar
Sidikh,
his
men and
domescic
slaves
and
their
properties
will
be
respected_
Within
two
months
he
[Lam!
Nill return everything,
required by the administration.
2.
The
Ndoudi
[land
tax]
,.ill
be
maintained
but,
with
slLght
changes.
In
each
village
the
new
Lam,
along
'",ith
the
chief
and
I
notables,
...... il1 redefine
this right,
following ?ublic discussions and a
consensus.
No matter how large the population of a given village,
this
right
[Ndoudi]
should not exceed 35 bolts of Guinee cloth.
3.
From now
on,
the
Lam has no
right
to dismiss village chiefs.
Only the Governor will enjoy such prerogative.
4.
The
right
to
appoint
chiefs
in Diawara,
Ndioum and
Edy '",ill
no''''
de\\tolve
on
the
notables
of
these
three
villages.
However.
the
Governor
·...·ill
exercise
the
liberty
co
reject
or
confi rm
any
appointment.
5.
At the end of the farming calendar,
Amady Notago
[ne', Lam I and
;:he
chiefs
can,
if
the
Governor
wishes
so.
go
and
pay
allegiance
to
France and receive orders.
Abel Jeandet
to Governor,
Podor 5/1/1888.
521

---

- - - - - -
Appendix 2.
Tile Alayldl Nortll-Soutll COllfllccs:
l.alld Disputes and Settlemcllt of Jallllary
1911 .
. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
: I'nrt i cs
concerned
Matter of diRputc
Mode
of
~ettlcment
: I.
Annhc
la.b.'
VB
l'ennda.Jurnssbe
:Llmit of
U88rol
Alln-nnnbe:
Will
be
Bettled
in
n
''''cck
,
,
-----_.-------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------
;:l.
IJenndn,;urnllllbe
(n.b.)
VB
Alayldi
( s . b . )
:RiglltH
over
Gerel.
'equal
.!ghttt'
("ccognized
lo
:~annere. Salan,
Uarnngcl
oil
pSI"tics cOflcerrled
:Nsl-Ire,
Umdnl1a.
Etae.de,
:SolJale-loteendu
:3.
JsaRnranf
wuldu
UOYBI
(n.b.)
VB
Jaagaraaf:Llm1t
or
farm on
~oljale-: Aamadu Matel
~on the caee
Aamudu Matel
(s.b.}
:Weendu
:--------------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------
: 4.
IInmmadt
Unauuda
of
Jnarangel
18. b, I V8
;Property
rIght
claims
on
:
Farm divided
ill
hnlves
V>
,~
,
Hnmmndll
Lewru
f n. b. )
:Habba
land
,
N
:--------------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------:
:5.
IInmmndi
Lulluy
of
Jaarangel
(s.b.)
vs
:Property
rights
on
8
farm:
Luguy
~on
the
C6He
lIusc,vnu
Ln8an
Jtt.arangel
In.b.)
--------------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------
:6. Jnnltnabe Snmmba Umar of Duunubel ls.b.) :Property rights on 8
falo
divided
irl
11Alves
ve
Jaoltaabe
Sammba
AlJumaa
(n.b.)
:rlver
front
farm
:--------------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------
:7.
IInmp.di
Uemmba
of
Jsaba
(s.b.)
vs
Slimaan
:Property on
4
farms:
:
RightB
to
Hsmmlldl
but
to
sho.re
Yokul
of
Fokol
In.b.)
:Ouungel,
KaYlal.
Lonngere:
with
nlim88n
nnd
the
people
of
:and
I'oolinaabe
:
Yokul
:--------------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------
:8. Huamnta twife of 11. Oemmbal vs Hlimaan
:Farm on
the
le.nd
of
Sadan:
Diviy10n
among
l~nam8ta,
EL i m.
Yokul
In.b.)
and
Ceerno
NJS8Y
:--------------------------------------------:-------------------------:--------------------------------
:9.
Ceerno
S8mmba of
Duunubel
(s.b.)
VB
Bees
:Contradictory claime
on
ZIJ C,
Samrgba;
1/3
Uees
Uemmba
of
Hbaan
(n.b.)
;Juburol
land
Source:
Uoghe,
Political
Reports
19U8-1917.
In. b. )
::
North Hank
(Mauritania)
Is, b. I
:. South
Unnk
(Senega l1 .
~~.-======._000=0.
o. ~_=.o_.._o.=-.:o.o~~~~_~-=-=_.o. ==0_--'--==-======'--
""""

---

APPENDIX 3:
Interrogation of Yoro Kodel
(Age 35),
taken prisoner after the debacle of
Dagana (1908).
Question:
TJhere are you from?
Ans'Net
From Diamatiti [Jalmac]
Question:
'Jhy did you follow Aly?
Answer
I
followed him because he said it was God ~ho ordered us
to
march.
Question:
Didn't you have a gun?
Answer
Yes,
I
did have one.
Question:
Were you not afraid of our guns?
Ans'...'er
No,
Ali
told us
that
the Europeans would not fire
a shot;
That he would order
the administrator
to come out,
and the
latter ~ould do so,
and i t ~ould be over.
Question:
Once he
told you that,
you felt you no longer needed a gU:l?
Ans·,.;er
Aly had
told us
that we could carry our guns if we
wished,
but the ones supposed to wreak havoc on the
Europeans were in Heaven.
Question:
After you saw your comrades
falling,
did you keep trusting
Aly?
Answ'er
I was shot and fell down unconscious.
Question:
How abouc now?
What do you think?
I
realize
thac we were deceived.
Should there be
another one
[Hahdi],
I would never follow him again.
The Administrator In Chief,
Roux,
E.
P.C.C.
Cabinec Chief,
Lean, Jeacques.
523

---

. ,
\\
.,
.1,
APPENDIX 4:
Intelligence Report on a Marabout
Considered "Reliable."
Colonie:
Senegal.
Cercle
Matam.
Canton
Ngenar.
Localice:
Sinthiou.
Fiche Ouverte:
Le 1/4/1913
Nom:
Thierno Ali.
(Fiche 51)
Dace ec Lieu de Naissance:
1870 a S~nthiou Garba.
Residence habituelle:
Sinthiou Garba.
Race:
Toucouleur.
Religion:
Musulman.
Secte:
Tidjiane.
Initiaceur a l'ordre:
Thierno Belli, Amadi Ounare.
Pelerinage a la Mecque:
Non.
Aunornes et cadeaux:
Oui.
Famille-genealogie:
Fils de Samba Amadyi et de Penda Amady.
Situation-fortune:
Cultivateur.
Evenements auxquels a pLI prendre part avant notre arrivee:
Rien.
Difficultes avec administration:
Aucune.
Relations
interieures et.exterieures-influence:
Aucune.
Attitude vis a vis autorLte:
Bonne.
Valeur Intellectuelle:
Tres Intelligent.
Parle-t-il et ecrit-il l'Arabe?
Oui.
[
524
r
I
I

---

525
Connait~il nacre langue?
Non.
Caractere donne
Enseignement Talibes:
Enseigne eoran et Droit
Musulman.
Nombre Talibe.:
10.
Nombre Eleves:
10.
D'Ou viennent Eleves?
Du Village meme.
Se deplace-t-il frequemrnent?
Se deplace dans le cercle.
Relations privees avec cerrains de nos chefs et agents:
Non.
Divers:
Rien de particulier a signaler.

---

APPENDIX 5:
Intelligence Data on a Cleric
Considered "Dangerous"
Colonie:
Senegal.
Cercte:
Salde.
Ca~con
Irlabe-Ebiabe.
Locaiite:
Boke-Dialloube.
i
fiche OUVerte:
Le 26/11/1912.
'I
\\I,11
Nom:
Aly Diallo.
I,
Date et Lieu de Naissance:
t
Boke-Dialloube, vers 1870,
Reside~ce habituelle:
Boke-Dialloube.
Race:
Peulh.
Religion:
l'1usulrnan.
Secte Religieuse:
Tidj iane,
Initiaceur a l'ordre:
Pele~inage a la Mecque:
Pretend y avair sejourne longtemps.
Aumones et cadeaux:
Oui.
ramille4Genealogie:
Appartient famille Saybobe de Boke.
Evenements
avant natre arrivee:
Etait encore
trop
jeune au
moment de la conquete;
Difficultes
avec
administration:
A
ete
arrete
au
Soudan
DU
i1
faisait
passer
pour
un
grand
marabout
et
se
Cherif.
Se
donnait
des
qualites
de
Relacions
et
influence:
JOUle
d'une
mauvaise
reputation.
Ne
possede
aucune influence et a fini par perdre
toute co~sidera~ion
par~ou ou i1 sejourne pour un certain temps.
I
Attitude vis a vis autorite:
Parait neutre.
Valeur Intellectuelle:
Intelligence bornee.
526
I
I
(

---

527
Parle·t-il QU ecrit-il l'Arabe?
Ne parle ni n'ecrit l'Arabe.
Relations avec nos agents QU chefs:
Aucune.
Nombre Eleves:
Ne professe aucun enseignement.
L'lnteresse se deplace-t-il?:
Presque
toujours
a parcDurir
les villages.
Valeur morale:
Mauvaise.
Ce qu'on peut craindre QU attendre de lui:
I1 est a surveiller.
Divers:
Vagabondage
de
1896
a
1911.
Change
de
nom
seIon
les
circons;:ances.
C'est
un
personnage
peu
lnteressant
avant.
souVent
eu
maille a
partir avec
les autorites
et sur
lequel
i1
convient d'exercer
une surveillance
tres etroite.

---

APPENDIX 6:
Partial war Effort in the Carcle of Podor.
(1915)
-----~---_._------------------------------------------
--._---._.
Province:Village
: 1915 taxes:Orphans'day :Cattle (heads):
- _ . - - - - .
-----------_.---
. - - . _ . - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - _ .
_ . - - _ . _ - - - . - - .
Toro
:Diombo (1 herd)
0 f.
0 f.
1
:Mbantou
300 rL.
103 f.
15
:Guede
500 rL.
33 rL.
10
:Agnam Tounge 1
75 f.
0 f.
No herd
: Lerabe
30 f.
75 f.
14
:Ndiown
104 f.
250 f.
24
:Toulde Galle
:vO ..... s
to pay
0 rL.
24
:Thialaga
0 f.
3
Aere
:Aere-Poste
0 f.
0 f.
0
:Coylel
0 f.
25 f.
0
Lao
:Medina Ndiaybe
250 f.
127 f.
0
:Gollere
0 f.
130 rL.
27
:Mery
0 f.
55 f.
cO
:)1e ry Diouyanabe
0 f.
65 f.
8
: Mboumba
0 f.
45 f.
10
:Abdalla
0 f.
17 f.
1
:Souray
0 f.
5 f.
2
:Thioubalel
0 f.
30 f.
8
:Bito
0 f.
39 f.
2
: Fonde Elimane
0 f.
10 f.
4
:Dioude Diabe
0 f.
50 f.
5
:Cas-Cas
0 f.
55 f.
15
Aere
:Oualalde
0 f.
75 rL.
0
:Boki
0 f.
30 f.
0
Toro Ort:Demet
155 f.
75 f.
16
:Oara
0 rL.
0 f.
8
:Sinthiou
0 f.
0 f.
5
:Pate Galo
0 f.
0 f.
16
Toro Occ:Mboyo
76 f.
50 f.
Cattle are
: Donnaye
'4.15 f.
1 f.
ready to be
:Diatal
470 rL.
20 f.
: sent
to market:
Source:
A.N.S.:
Pador.
"Rapports Mensuels 1915."
Octabre.
528

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Document Outline

• CS_02092v1
• CS_02092v2

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