A Study on Information Technology Development
in African Developing Countries
through System Dynamics Approach
r
by
Toussea Qulal Alphonse
at the
Faculty of Science and Technology
of Keio University
September 1991

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AbstJ!'act
This thf:sis examines how African developing countries (ADC) can absorb and de-
velop infommation technology (IT) to significantly improve productivity in their orga-
nizations.
Before making propos~ls to the managers in the information technology sector of
these counhries, vve consider some ·relevant background studies. First, the literature
about the wationale of technology development is reviewed.
It appears that the de-
velopment of any technology moves through three stages: i~~~.tion, iD..,ItQY9,,tion, and
di~ion. The main factors which stimulate or retard the development in these three
phases, whOCh are frequently characterized in research lite~ature as "supply-push" and
"demand-pwll" forces, are analyzed: all the researchers lay stress on the influence or
regulatory role of institutions (state agencies, financial institutions, et.c.). Second, us-
ing our pmfussionel experience, literature review, and the "case study on the transfer
of on-line network epidemic diseases surveillance system from Japan to Cote d'Ivoire"
we investigated and summarized all the problems which restrain the invention, innova-
tion, and dliffusion of information technology in African developing countries. Social,
economic, cultural, ergonomic, and organizational problems are registered. Third, a
survey of tle national strategies to stimulat.e information technology invention, innova-
tion, and dilffusion in USA, Japan, France, Great Britain, Germany, and India is made.
The role of government institutions in conducting informat.ion technology development
appears to be the most important.
From am: analysis of the roles and economic int.erest.s of institutions which act for
t.he development of information technology in African developing countries,
an Insti-
tutIonal fromework is proposed to coordinate the actions of these Institutions at country
level.
This institutional framework consists of an information technology development
council and a bank for information technology development. Basically, the information
technology Development Council will address critical mat.ters of national importance
related to «pulling" the demand and "pushing" the supply of information technology
products according to thp current balance between demand and supply. Concret.ely it
has to design., and execute information technology development policies and scenarios
for the coumt.ry.
A policy domain (a set of information technology development ac-
tions) whIch might be undertaken by the Institutional framework is constructed.
The
National Bank for information technology dew]opment is destined to finance the inFJle-

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mentation of the information technology development policies designed by the council.
This bank has to mobilize and centralize all the resources (members' contributions,
foreign loans and donations) providcd to this cnd.
But how can this institutional framcwork evaluate and selcct amongst different
policies?
For example, how many computer educated students have to graduate in
order to meet the 'year by year computerization needs of the country?
How much,
and when to invest for the development. of compu t.er installations, data transmission
network, education and training infrast.ructure and facilities in the country?
To sup-
port the institutional framework in its investment decision making process, a model
based on system dynamics approach is constructed.
This model serves as a tool for
a better control of the information technology sector by simulating the relationships
between computer personnel, comput.er installations, and data transmission network
sub-sectors. This model shows the impact of investment policies on the different fi..xed
assets of information technology and national production sectors. In addition it out-
lines the advantages and drawbacks of these policies.
The principle of this model is based on the consideration t.hat any information
technology development investment must not be made blindly as it has been done un-
til now, but, according to the computerization needs of the country. Unemployment
problems as well as lack of computer personnel, due to overinvestment or insufficiency
of investment in computer education, han to be avoided. Investment must be done
proportionally to the needs in order to avoid unnecessary infrastructure and facilities
or insufficiency of equipment. Also the amount of this investment must be sufficient to
guarantee the qualit.y of facilities and maintain a high technical lnel of educated and
trained people.
This model is used to simulate some selected inv~stment. policies. For a given ob-
jective 1n national develvpment, scenario comparative analysis can also be made. An
example of such an analysis is presented: six scenarios are const.ructed to increase the
consumption per capita of the country by up to S2S00 for year 2000.
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 defines the main concepts of the
t.hesis, presents the method?logy and the contribution of the research. Chapter :2 dis-
cusses the rationale of techn'ology dne!opmenL Chapter 3 describes the current status
of information techno!og:\\' ih African d~\\'~loping countries. Chapter: presents an in-
stitutional l~iune\\\\'ork ana poJir::\\' ,je))"·)?::' fc)[ information technolo,;\\ de\\'eloprn'~nt In
11

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African developing countries. Chapter 5 describes a system dynamics model for infor-
~
-_._._--~-~
mation technology development in African developing countries. Simulation results of
some selected policies and scenarios are presented in chapter 6. Chapter 7 stat.es the
conclusions of the research and proposes themes which need future study.
111

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A la memoire de man pere et de ma mere,
a man epouse Henriette Toussea,
a, nos enfants Tina, Valerie, Laurent et Christelle
1\\'

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Aclrnowledgements
This iksis marks the end of a period and the begining of an ot.her period in my
life. I thamJk everyone involved on my life up until now, who in one sense, has made
some formGJf contribution to me and therefore to my thesis. Especially thanks are due
to:
:tvfy sUPJervisor Professor Shoji Ura, without whose unwavering int.erest in my future
I would newer have completed this wor k.
ProfesSMs Hiroshi Yanai, Yoshikazu Yamamoto, Hiroyuki Kosaka and Hidenori
Morimura ler their patience and their suggestions.
Dr. KoOChi Kubota and Tadashi Iijima. to whom I owe all my concrete knowledge
about the sy.stem dynamic model contained in this thesis.
The resd of the members of Professor Ura laboratory for their support and patience.
My wif-e Henriette Toussea who took scrupulous care of our children and parents
during the iye years I spent in Japan.
Tadashi a:nd Mari atsuka, Shigeru and Rie Matsunaga who were invaluable in my
every day Me, Naotoshi and Mizuyo atsubo who greet me in their house during my
last three }<:ars in ] apan.
The M~istry of education of Japan, Hitachi Foundation, San-Ai corporation for
their financial support, the Ministry of Health of Japan who was willing to reveal me
the information related to the epidemic diseases surveillance system of Japan and aki
Electric InJastry Corporation which loans me a personnel computer for the e).-perimen-
tal study ':oTil:tained in t.his thesis.

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Contents
1
Introduction
1
1.1
Definitions
'2
1.2
Research 'Method
4
1.3
Contribution of the Research.
6
1.4
Structure of the Thesis . . . .
2
The Rationale of Technology Development
9
2.1
Invention, Innovation, and Diffusion of New Technologies
9
2.2
Innovation
.
10
2.3
Diffusion of Production.
12
2.4
Diffusion of Use . . . . .
13
? -
~.o
Supply-Push and Demand-Pull 'Models
16
3
The Era of Information Technology and African developing countries 19
3.1
Utility of Information Technology in African developing countries
19
.~-:~
3.1.1
Complexity of Societal Probl~BsAF'~/~4/'I~'
.
19
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P
d
t"
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" 1'.
21
. . ~
ro uc 1~,] y
f:"\\/~1
).\\\\.
3.1.3
AutomatiOn
'~0" .. '~'t' .. ,'"
21
G"
Z-'
3.1.4
Education.
. '~-;;"
_.)
:,.
?
"-
.S'
, /
3.1.5
Management and Monitortng?,of'P-l.an.ning~<
23
·
d C ., l.f
~rnenlsupe{\\I::
3.1.6
DIsaster an
nSlS J\\ anagement~= . . .
24
3.1. 7
Rural Development . . . . . . . . . . .
24
3.1.8
Information Technology and the Other Disciplines
3.2
State of Information Technology Development
26
3.2.1
Computer Installations.
26
3.2.2
Computer Manpower . .
3.2.3
Computer Applications.
28
3.2.4
Data Transmission Network
29
3.:2.5
Computer Education and Training
29
VI

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3:~2~6
Consultancy Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30
3.3 Barriers to Information Technology Development in J.frican Developing
~ountrics . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
31
3,.3:1
Basic Infrastructure . .
31
3~3:2
1Iyt.hs Associated wit.h Comput.er Installations.
32
Jt3'~3'
Organizational Problems . . .
3.3
J~3:ll4';
Technology Supply Problems.
34
J~3;5:
Ed ucation Problems
34
J;3':6:
Awareness Factor .
37
~3\\:;:
Economic Fadors .
37
Zt~3;;8
Microergonomic Factors
38
J,3;9'
Cultural Factors. . . . .
39
3.4 3eeondary Effects of Information Technology on' African Society
40
J\\'4H\\
National Balances of Payment.s
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
31:.4,:2'
Mass Employment
41
J!i4L3J
Economical and Polit.ical Dependence on the Multinational Com-
puter Manufacturers and Service Companies
41
lt4t4J
Indi\\~dual Priva.cy
42
:A4~5,
Computer as a Status Symbol . .
42
a·K6
Computer and Technocratic Rule
42
X~.7
Computer Crimes. . . . . . . . .
43
4
An :!fu:s.titutional Framework and Possible Information Technology De-
velop1llent Actions
45
4.1
:mrvey of National Strategies in Information Technology
. . . . . . .
46
4.2
"Ressons from Survey of National Strategies in Information Technology
49
4.3
~ Institut.ional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
~3.1
The Rationale of th.e In~titutional Framework
54
4.4
1fussible institutional actions
58
4l4d
Knowledge Building
59
4\\.4.2
Population Mobilization
60
4.1.4::3
Basic Infrastructure Development
62
4-4.4
Knowledge and Skill Deployment
62
.:
4'>.4;;5
Su bsidy
. . . . . . .
6.3
4.4::6
Standard Setting
. .
6.)
Inno\\'ation Directive
67

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5
A System: Dynamics Model for information technology Policy Analy-
sis in )"~frican developing countries
69
5.1
SJrstem Dynamics Methodology
. .
69
5.Ii.ll
System Dynanucs Philosophy
69
5_1.2.
Stages in the Modelling Process
71
5.2
The: Purpose of the Model . . . . . . .
72
5.3
JRscription of the Model . . . . . . . .
74
5..11i
General Structure of the l\\fodel
74
5..12)
A Fundamental Concept: Requirement of the count.ry for infor-
mation technology
. . . . . . .
75
5.3.3';
Causal Structure of the !\\fodel
76
5.3A,
Specificat.ion of the Model
80
6
Expermental Study
105
6.1
Pclmy Definition
.
10.5
6.2
P_~~ Experiment
.
109,
6.:2.1i
Reference Policy(A) Simulat.ion
110
6.~ Test to build confidence in the model
112
6.!.J
Informat.ion technology development policies
116
6.24:
Scenario Comparisons
. . . . .
121
6.3
CO:lll<Llusions of the experimental study
127
6.4
Limts of the model . . . . . . . . . . .
129
7
COnclW;YOll
131
A The list IlIIf dynamo program
143
Ylll

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rII
,
I
Chap~ter 1
Intro;duction
The chilenge present.ed by informat.ion technology to the world is considerable. In-
creasinglymformat.ion technology is being heralded as t.h.e pervasive "heartland tech-
nology" OImotor of a.long term world economic upswing [Lan90]. Authoritative voices
confirm tm'catalystic role of information technology in modern nat.ions' development
process, !Ii:l the USA, Senator Gore (who is one of the instigat.ors of the so called
Gore Bill) in· a senate speech said, "The nat.ion which most. completely assimilates
high-perfcmnance computing into it.s economy will very likely emerge as the dominant
intellectulM, economic and technological force in t.he next century",
When w;e' take into account these authoritative voices, t,he quest.ion for African de-
veioping cmntries is to wonder whether or not they ca.n turn their back on the use of
informati01l t'echnology products. This option is moreover difficult. t.o reconcile with the
imperious llIeeds to build a prosperous and competitive economy. Using information
technology becomes an imperative for African developing count.ries not only in hopes
of narrowID.:g' the economic gap between them and t.he developed countries, but simply
surviving aIirough the laws of worldwide market economy. So, the spotlights have t.o
focus the lYUestion of how best to absorb and implement informat.ion technology prod-
ucts t.o sigmificantly improve producti"ity in orga.nizations, and to add value to goods
by developiiIlg.specialized applications and sen'ices. How to respond to the challenge of
the new ~'and the opportunities offered by information technology? In other words
how t.o bernme creative users like the Japanese who, aHer lea.rning imported technol-
ogy by usimg~ it, create by theinselves extremely compet.it.i,·e products and mast.er t.he
int.ernatioml'market.
To help managers of African developing count.ries face t.he information t.echnol-
ogy challenge we propose an instituiional framework at country le\\:el, an information
technology dC\\'e]opment policy domain (a :'Oer of possible informaiion technology de-
1
','
. -, -
. ,~\\~,.

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velopment act.ions), and a model for invest.ment. and educat.ion policy and scenario
analysis. But before dealing wit.h the heart of this :;ubjeet, in t.his chapter 1 we define
the key concept.s involved, present the met.hodology and contribut.ion of the research,
and describe t.he structure of this t.hesis.
1.1
Definitions
The words technology and know-how have often as many meanings as their users.
So it is necessary, at first, to define in what sense we use them in this work.
From Charles H. Smith,III in his book entitled (The Japanese Technology Transfer
to Brazil'
in its broadest sense, technology is the knowledge that man possesses that, in turn en-
ables him to perform a particular task {SmiBlj.
With technology being the knowledge
of a particular process, design, or technique, know-how is man's ability to utilize this
technology. That is, it is the skill and capability to convert technological knowledge into
an economic reality {SmiBl}.
From the Oxford English Dictionary (edit.ion 1978)
technology is a discourse or treatise on a art or arts; the scientific study of the practical
or industrial arts.
For the above definitions technology is a knowledge only. The skill dimension is
not included. The Grand Dietionnaire Encyclopedique Larousse (edition 1985) gives a
more complete definition which takes into account of this skill dimension.
Technology is a study of tools, machines, procedures, and methods used in the di-
verse branches of the industry; it is also a coherent set of knowledge and practices based
on scientific principles in a specific domain.
Elsewhere from the Oxford English Dictionary "
engineer is one who contrives, designs, or invents; an a~thor, designer,' also an inven-
tor, a plotle';", a layer of snares; engineering is the action of the verb engineer,' the (J.lorl·
')

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done by, or the profession of an engineer; the art or science of the engineer's profession.
By building upon the above definitions of technology and know-how we define
technology as being a coherent and systematic set of knowledge and know-how related
to a service or object to be created, the creation process itsc(f, and the tools and all of
the system (often social system) which contributes to this creation; and the know-how
as the skill or the ability of a person to execute the creation or the management pro-
cesses, in other terms, to convert the technological knowledge in producing optimally
the se7'vice or product.
Technology is the result of the engineering activity which syst.ematizes it by using
the 'asset of, t.he scientific knowledge. :hnow-how is grasped by t.he body of the technol-
ogy receiver neither by reading nor by only listening to an expert, but essentiaIly by
t.he praet.ice.
For the purpose of this work
in.formation technology is the knowledge and the skill necessary for the production and
the use of the tools and methodologies for the analysis, design and management of the
information systems.
We distinguish information technology from computer technol-
ogy, which is the knowledge necessary for the production of the hardware devices and
basic software as industrial products.
Here we think that it would be better, for t.he African developing countries which
still do not. overst.ep the basic level of informatics development, t.o postpone the man-
ufacturing of hardware devices, and focus instead on the mastery and development.
of information processing technology. This mast.ery added t.o a decrease in the hard-
ware cost can lead them to dr,aw the maximum of benefits from computing while t.hey
progressively acquire the means to develop at a later time, the hardware devices pro-
duction industry_
By information t.echnolog:-, transfer we mean
I
the process of introducing, mr.ste~ing, and developing an existing instance where it has
not previous!!! been conceived anH/or irnplenu:nted.
3

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InstaHe includcs software tools and techniques, syst.cm dcvclopment methodolo-
gies, scimtific concepts, etc..
Tl-.e success of the process dcpcnds on the degree of
assimilation of t.he cmbodied knowledge and know-how by t.he receiver technologist.
\\Ve disti!I!lgp ish t.wo di mensions of in forma t.ion processi ng tcch nology t.ra I1sfer: t.he Yer-
tical one which means the transfer from research lahoratory t.o information system
deYelopeiIS, and users, and the horizont.al onc which is the transfcr from one use to
anot.her. Of most concern here is the horizontal dimcnsion.
Intennationally, technology is tr,ansferred via, two modes: intentional and non inten-
tional. Inttentional mode is t.hat is est.ablished and used by organizat.ions and states for
diffusing~he use of t.echnology. Non int.entional mode is when the technology is diffused
purely by (hance occurrence. There are many cases of non intent.ional transfer. But
they are ootside of t.he planning sphere because they are impossible to be controlled.
Intentional mode is the one with which plans can be made.
The tElrnn of "information technology development" has not been defined in the
lit.erature, However by building upon some of the definitions of technology development
we define Dmlformation technology development as being:
the inven'i£em, innovation and diffusion of new intellectual issues or products in the field.
1.2
Research Method
Given dIe short history of information technology in African developing countries,
its limited applications, and more fundament.ally t.he absence of reliable data, there
is litt.le eSiahlished t.heoretical or empirical mat.erial to provide a guideline for t.his
research. l\\~oreover, since the int.e.ntion of the research is to review the wide range
of issues which are t.hought to affect the i nforma tion technology development process,
there is noone particular research method which addresses all these conditions. There-
fore, the research method used was a combination of two surveys and one case study:
I
1. First, the literature about the dlionale of technology development is reviewed.
The purpose of this re\\iew W.l.'3 ~o grasp the acquired knowledge about the de-
velopment process of the technok,g.\\·.
E:densi\\'e siud\\' by eCOnOlTIlC historiitns,

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sociNogist.s, public policy experts has been done.
It appears that the dc\\'cl-
op~nt of any technology movcs through three stages: invention, innovation,
anm diffusion. The main factors which stimulate or retard t.he development of
the!l?,j,JHee phases and which are frequently characterized in research literature as
"sUjjJply.-push" and "demand-pull" forces, are analyzed: all researchers lay stress
on tie inOuence or regulat.ory role of institutions (st.ate agcncies, financial insti-
tu tims', et.c.).
2. Secand'~ using the "case studY"on the t.ransfer of on-line network epidemic diseases
sur~ilance system from Japan t.o Cote d'Ivoire" we in\\'estigat.ed and summarized
all tR:e pwblems which rest.rain the invention, innovation, and diffusion of iufor-
matm. technology in African developing countries .• This system aims to collect
the Eibrmation about t.he spread of the infectious diseases, in a minimum time,
from all the localities of the country, process and report them to the competent
autlrmities in order to take the proper measures for treatment and prevention.
The JJapanese system had been studied. The experience had been transferred.
But itFte implementation is still only partial. The central comput.er and 7 of the 23
minia:omputers of the network are installed and operational. Only 6 diseases are
dealt with for the moment. But the statistic generation delays are reduced from
2 yea!lS to 3 weeks for the covered areas. During the transfer of this system social,
econnmic, cultural, ergonomic, and organizational problems have been regist.ered.
3. Third. a survey of the nat.ional strategies to stimulate information technology
invention, innovation, and diffusion in USA, Japan, France, Great Britain, Ger-
ma.ny~ and India is done. The purpose of this survey was t.o draw our guidance
from line experience of other countries, developed as well as de\\'eloping count.ries.
The uit.ical role of government. institut.ions in conducting information technology
devclilJPment appears to be the most critical. The government. of each of these
countries int.ervenes to promote the produet.ion and diffus!on of information t.ech-
nology;
Sur\\'eJS are considered to be good for collecting informatio::. quickly from a large
numb.er of people and case study captures and communicat.es the reaJity of a part.icular
em'ironmernt at a point in time. They provides insight into the process of evolution of
activities WIthin an organization [l\\1um8S].
5

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1.3
C'ontribution of the Research
There aIle et number of contributions this research makcs to the field of information
technology in African developing countrics. They inclnde thc following:
1. This Ilesearch analyzes the current situation of information technology devclop-
ment in. African developing countries.
2. This r:esearch summarizes the key factors which restrain the invention, innova-
tion, amd diffusion of information technology in African developing countries from
case ol])servation.
3. This research points out the critical role that institutions can play in conducting
information technology development process in African developing countries.
4. This research proposes an institutional framework at count.ry level to coordinate
the actions of the different information technology development institutions.
S. This £esea[ch sets up a policy domain (a set of informat.ion technology devel-
opment actions) which might be undertaken by the institutional framework to
stimulate the invention, innovation, and diffusion of information technology prod-
ucts illt African developing countries.
6. This research constructs a model based on a system dynamics approa.ch to sup-
port the institutional framework in its investment and education decision making
process.
The conclusions we draw from this research show more clearly than before what
the situation of information technology development is in Afric;:.n developing countries.
j
Although this is addressed to African developing countries in' par\\ticular, it can be of
help to developing countries elsewhere.
6

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1.4
Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters.
1. This chapter 1 defines the maIn concepts involved in the t.hesis, presents the
met.hodology and the contribution of the research. It also presents the struct.ure
of this thesis.
2. Chapt.er 2 discusses the rationale of technology development. It analyzes the fac-
tors which critically affect the invention, innovation, and diffusion (of product.ion
and use) of t.echnology, in general.
3. Chapt.er 3 describes the current. st.at.us of information t.echnology in African de-
veloping countries.
It shows in which activity sectors information technology
should be used with more benefits t.o African developing countries than present
policies, describes the state-of -the art of this technology, presents the barriers
which restrain the invention, innovation and diffusion. It also analyzes the sec-
ondary effects of information technology on African societ.y.
4. Chapter 4 presents an institutional framework and policy domain (a set of pos-
sible instit.ut.ional adions) for informat.ion technology development in African
denloping countries. It describes the role and demonst.rat.es t.he rationale of the
proposed inst.itutional framework.
It also analyzes different. t.ypes of proposed
institutional actions.
0.
Chapter 5 describes a system dynamics model for information t.echnology devel-
opment in African developing countries.
It presents the philosophy of syst.em
dynamics approach and the specifiCi'l.tion of the model.
6. Chapter 6 defines the t.erms policy and scenario. Simulation results of some se-
lected policies and scenarios are presented.
I.
Chapter I" states the conclusions of tlle research and proposes themes which need
fut ur,: ;:lllCh·.

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In the next chapter, we discuss the rationale of technology development.
8

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Chapter 2
The Rationale of Technology
DeveJopment
Despite th.e agreed-on importance of technology develo~ment to economic well being,
the subject of technology development is by no means well understood. Extensive study
by econornm( historians, sociologists, public policy experts, and management scientists
has moved the field forward, but many questions remain. Nonetheless, a synthesis of
key fado~ affecting technology development can be drawn from the literature. In this
chapter we will set the stage for our subsequent discussion by reviewing the base of
work on tell:hnology development relevant to our questions.
2.1
Invention, Innovation, and Diffusion of New
Technologies
The development of a technology moves through three stages: im"ention, inno\\"atiol1,
and diffusion. These stages are not always clearly distinct and often overlap, but this
framework has served as of much discussion of the process of technology development
[Eno.sS]. An invention is a new idea or product which mayor may not have any eco-
nomic value. The innovation process includes ·:hose activities necessary to get an idea
~from the innovator's mind int.o a tangible and usable form that can be distributed to
others. Enos in [En058] estimated the time int.ervals between invention and inno\\"ation
for a number of technologies, and found a range fre'll one year (refrigerants) to 79
years (fluorescent lamp). An innovation may Le embodied in either a product, such as
a computer, fa.\\: machine, or in a process, such as Istructured programming techniques.
,
'fhe innovation can be applied to either a con~lmier product, an intermediate product
or a capital good(comput.er-assisted design).
The nature of the innontion a.nd the
location of its application wiJ) h;:,yt, a :::igniGcallt impact on its eventual production and
9

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use. In tPJeory, an innovation in a capital good must meet. the crit.eria of reducing t hc
cost of p!0duction or improving the quality of a good or service sufficiently to justify
investmemti. Consumer goods must bc ahle t.o generate sufficient. sales in the highly
unpredidl.a:blc retail market t.o just.ify production.
The 1ifr;m "diffusion" can apply t.o the spread of either production or use of a new
technology fhroughout a population of possible users of t.hat technology, In thc casc of
productillTl~ t.he diffusion issue is the nat.ure and speed of the spread of the technology
t.o compe1ltors who will try to emulate the innovation so they can sell it. In the case
of use, dni"usion refers to the spread of a technology among those who will take the
innovat.iom and use it in their ongoing production a.etivities or in t.heir personal Ii"es
[Gea80] [he-agO] [Yin81]. In this work we use the t.erm broadly, t.o apply to both pro-
duction amrl'use, However, most of t.he literat.ure under the diffusion label deals wit.h
use of innlD\\ration
2.2
lmrrirovation
l\\luch of the ea.rly economic: literature addressing innovation concentrated on pro-
duct.ion ofmrlo"ations, mainly because innO\\'ations have been seen as a key to national
economic ~o\\\\"t.h. Maix (1867) was' one of t.he serious students of the subject, and
argued that innovation created markets, thereby spawning the essent.ial mechanism of
economic ~o\\\\'th [1\\1ar67] [Ros76]. I\\uznets, in [Euz30], argued t.hat. product innova-
tion plays major role in long run economic grow!h:,.\\ana~:t'~~t. growth itself would be
signaled bJ" cont.inuous shifts in produet/industr{~iX.-Sch.u~~,eter, with whom most.
'-,
.
\\ . ;\\
contempor.EliY st.udents of economics and inno.,:a.tlon start,,:.sa\\\\\\ su'Gcessful innO\\'ation as
•
; "
I
(
c:.
IV\\ C
i
,', 1J
special form of social leadership, crit.ical to \\~_0n:~rrii~s~~[.Schu39]. Technologi-
cal innO\\'a:iion was the sources of disconiinuit.l\\~~in.~q,u.dilf?ilmof production and
.
.
.
~('/)
'_f\\\\~v~
. , '
'h
consumptJm that produced his legendary ('gales'\\,;~~::~e1ff8estructlOn' whlc
were
the moti ve force of economic advancement. In a detailed historical fashion, the mate-
rial progrei'5 of Western Europe compared to the rest of the world in the eight.eenth
and early mneteenth centuries has been tied to the production and use of innO\\'at.ions
[Lans69]. 1l11at the production of innovation is indispensable to economic progress is
nearly axiQIDaJic in t.he modern economic and development. discourse.
The qu=c;tion of why innovations are produced when and where they are is a subject.
of great an~ntion by economic historians and si \\Iclents of science and technolog'·. In
10

---

many cases~ these st.udies focus on the social and inst.itutional factors that provide an
environmC!i.lt conducive to innO\\·at.ion. For example, in his landmark book [Lans69],
Landes atftributed \\Vestern European economic growt.h primarily to innovative polit.i-
cal, legal, cmd inst.it.utional developments that provided a basis for operation of privat.e
economic mterprise. Toget.her wit h t.he suppression of superst.it.ion and magic, t.hese
pro\\'ided asafe haven for material innovations that would arise in a culture that placed
high value am rat.ional manipulation of t.he em'ironment, the adapt.ation of means t.o
ends.
Such Tm50ning is easily accepted, but the quest.ion of causalit.y for specific ad-
vancements often remain unanswered.
Even a seemingly obvious causal factor such
as scientifi( and t.echn0logical knowledge plays a mixed role wit.h respect to specific
innovations.
For example, Musson and Robinson claim 1.0 demonst.rate a tight link
between Sc:D€TIce and technology output.s on one hand and innovation; an infrastructure
of facts to build on [Mur85]. In their view, which is commonly espoused in arguments
for government. spending on scientific research, the outputs of science are necessary in-
puts to inncvation. On the other hand, it has been a.rgued t.hat. t.he specific knowledge
out.puts of SG:ience and technology, while important in the innovation process, are far
less signifiC2ll1t than the values of procedure and reliance on experiment and observed
fact embodied in scientific enterprise [Mat72]. Gillespie goes furt.her, claiming science
owes more to manufacture and industrializat.ion than the other way around [GileS7].
Similar disput.es about the subtle meanings of causal fadors arise in the context of
economic explanations for innovation, and again, no simple answers are apparent. For
example, c{Jl!lyentional economic wisdom says innovations are naturally directed to re-
ducing use of, factors that are becoming more expensive [Hic32].
This view is used
to justify Hne "labor-saving bias" attributed to West.ern t.echnological development. in
which the fador rates for labor were const.antly raising relative to factor rat.es for other
inputs [Sal5{)}.
Habakkuk's important comparative study of indust.rialization irt the
UK and the US showed that, at best, such bias was contingent on local conditions
of relative 5lCarcit.y in factors which were often quit.e different [Hab62]. David further
showed that fador prices do affect initial choices among inno\\'ation possibilities, but
that subseqUl1ent innovation choices were heavily det.ermined by vectors set by the initial
choices [DaT"75J. Initial choice of an innovation affects what one subsequently learns
about bot.h the innovation and the tasks to which it is applied. Choice of technique
influences future t.echnological knowledge, creating a damper on forward looking capa-
bilities of optimizing investors.
11

---

These complicated findings about such fundamental notions as relative faet.or prices
have required a reassessment of the often static views of the economics of innova!ion.
The issue is not advantage gained from investment in particular inno\\Oation, per se,
but from the ad\\'antage that accumulates from the growth in the ability to make efTl-
cient choices among alternati\\'e paths ofinno\\'ation as new opportunit.ies arise [Ruh71].
SchmookJer's study of innovat.ion in D.S. rail roads in t.he second half of the nineteent.h
century reinforced this notion by demonstrating that. major spurts of innovation fol-
lowed major increases in consumption of the commodities and products toward which
the innovation were targeted [Schn~76]. Beniger similarly found t.hat. growth in indus-
trial a.ctivit.y stimulated innovation in process and technique required to control and
manage the resulting enterprises [Ben8G]. From an opt.imizing perspective, this view
suggests t.hat increased sales port.end growing demand, which in t.urn influences the
perception of an increase in the size of the market, stimu~at.ing an investment. of inno-
vat.i ve effort.
The lesson t.o be learned from these studies is that t.he creat.ion of innovative prod-
uct.s and processes ia not as simple as conventional wisdom somet.imes suggests. At
minimum, innovation proceeds from a complex int.erplay of precursing economic and
social conditions, the perceptions and decisions of entrepreneurs, and the ongoing re-
finement and improvement of the innovat.ion as expertise is gained in their manufacture
and production. As Rosenberg notes, the traditional economic approa.ch of focusing
on the outcomes of innovation production(i.e., the innovations themselves) in t.erms of
factor prices places the actual process of innovat.ion in a black box; an intellectual ma-
neuver that make sense only if the environment is one of the certainty and equilibrium.
In fact, he argues, t.he process of inno\\'ation production is an area of economic behavior
in which the uncertainty and complexity are central characterist.ics of the environment.;
a view consi:-tent with findings from classic st udies of organizat.ional behavior [Pfs7S].
He call for abandoning the tradition of focusing on innO\\'ational outputs at different
points in time, in favor ofi-racing the information flows and beha\\iors that are respon-
sible for the productions of innovations over time [Ros82].
2.3
Diffusion of Production
It. is often the case that.'.he;innovator of a new product. or process will not be the one
to successfully produce and rnarket the product or process. Ibm did not creat.e the first
digital computer, but its 360 model C"nl': to domin"t.e t.he mMket for mainu"mes for
12

---

almost JlIJ). years. In terms of the devclopmen I. and diffusion of vaJ uable technologies t.o
benefitl'Umankir.d, it. may not. be import.ant. who actually sells t.he products and makes
the prdflts, but. from the point. of view of individual firms, count.ries or regions, it. may
be crit.i.raJ.. These distinct.ions have become acute in recent years as foreign firms have
taken iB'lovations developed in U.S., learned how t.o produce t.hem better or cheaper,
and t.hem tClken over the V.S. market. from American producers.
It is tine question of who produces the goods embodying t.he innovations, more
than wM/actually develops the or}ginal innovat.ions, which is at the crux of the debat.e
about US; indust.rial policy or lack t.hereof. The Japanese and ot.her East Asian coun-
tries ham:r gained acces to product innovations developed in t.he V.S. and then applied
inno\\'ati\\loe. manufacturing processes and management techniques which enabled their
corporafuns t.o out.compete t.heir American count.erparts in one sector after the ot.her
[Ams89J- ]h- the ca$e of Japan, Mansfield found t.hat firms t.ake 2,5% less time a.nd spend
50% lessImoney t.o carry out an innovat.ion ba$ed on ext.ernal t.echnology than one based
on intermIHechnology, suggest.ing that] apanese companies are more effective commer-
cializing fihe innovations of others than those they develop themselves [Man68]. Such a
finding bnmgs int.o question the supposed economic advant.age accruing to innovators.
African ll!ir.veloping countries should begin the product.ion of information technology
products &3' doing like] apanes that is commercializing the products of other countries.
2.4
Diffusion of Use
The \\\\~mlespread use of an innovat.ion is important t.o it.s economic impact, since the
produeti:cit~·effects will only accrue if the innovation is used in the appropriat.e places,
DitTusion is one of most actively studied of all aspects of inno\\'(lt.ion [Rog83] [Ros'G].
Ir, generaJ, studi('" of diffusion of use have concentrated on t.wo factors. One is personal
transfer ~r which knowledge of inno\\'ations and ways to use t.hem move with people
who kno~ [HaIG/] [GiI63] [Le085]. The other factors are instit.utional, inc1l1ding ac-
tions by itEade a$sociations, professional groups, iTJdustry consortia, and governments
[Eea8/]. m t'he past three decades, t.he latter factors have received considerably more
attention fib-an the former.
Rosenine-r-g [Ros/2] notes that the diffusion of use depends on several things. First,
there musri be a stream of new improvement in performance characteristics of t.he inno-
\\'ctiion. Tr.is is necessctry to mctke the inno\\'cttion more competitive with other mectns
13

---

of doing .ngs, which in addition to being established in practice, arc often impro\\"(~d
upon unen pres~lIr~ from ~he new innovation. Second, inno\\'ations must undergo pro-
gressive nodification and adaptation t.hat permit applicat.ion t.o new domains of u!'e.
1\\fost inIlIi!l'ations when first introduced are limited in t.heir scope of applicat.ion. To
survive _ : prosper in use, t.hey must be altered to fit the special needs of different
users. Fimilly, innovations will not succeed in new applications unless the complemen-
tary inpuils necessary to achieve payoffs from use are present.. For an absurdly simple
example, iit makes little sense for a remote t.own to inst.all a traffic light until there is
regular elmt'rical service available. These characterist.ics of t.he innovation process can
be seen ~cially in the capit.al goods sector [Ros63a] [Ros63b], w hich include~ com-
puters and!. telecommunication equipment as capi t.al goods of service industries. They
also corre~nd t.o· t.he findings of ot.her st udents of innovation processes [Tor83].
In a mmner similar to that shown above in innovation production, the actual pro-
cesses of diEfusion of use are complex. Diffusion of use is not an eit.her/or phenomenon
of adoptiam by given firm or industry, but a cumulat.ive process successively tran-
scending tEesholds where new adopt.ers are willing to st.ep in [RogS3]. The growt.h in
the effecti~ness of given innovations is essent.ial in this process, since different pot.en-
tial adopt,ffIS will have different utility fUIlctions governing t.heir willingness to adopt..
Unless the productivi.ty improving pot.ent ial of the innovation cont.inues to increase,
diffusion siiclls and potent.ial for displacement by anot.her t.echnology or innovat.ion in-
creases.
IIl!l?rovements are required not only in the core features of the inno\\-at.ion,
but. in t.ho~features that affect its impJemema.biJit.y and sustainability. Perhaps most
important,511ccessful innovations are surrounded by a social process of improvement
wherein prooucers of innovative products 'learn by doing" as they build and impro\\'e
the produc:rts, and users of those products "learn by using" t.he critical knowledge nec-
essary to l.t'e the products effectively [RosS2]). The importance of this slow accretion
of capabili1y is important not only in the diffusion process, but it is extremely impor-
tant in thel!}verall productivity of the inno\\'ation use. A number of studies of different
innovations have shown the cumulati"e economic effects of small improvements can
far outweigfu t.he effects of the initial introduction of the technology over time [£no.58]
[Ho16S] [I\\ni6.7].
Diffusio~ is not a linear process invoh-ing the adoption t.rajectory·:ll jl)st one inno-
I
\\·ation. Darid: argues that t.echnology adoption choices are made in a .:)(\\t:h-dependelli.
manner in whjch choices are made in "nei\\\\'ork context" in which the operation of net-
work struct~,es inJluence the historic,,1 p;:-.:rl:-' taken in th·" illnoqtion process [DclI·8,S].
14

---

Few inno\\'a~ions st and alone. Thcy rcquire complemcntary inputs of other tcchnolo-
gies and tC'lthniqncs. Innovations arc also frcqucntly substit\\\\able in some degrec for
one c\\nothes:, making any givcn inno\\'ation nl!nerablc to replaccmcnt by anot.hcr in-
novation. '1l'his is incrcasingly truc over timc, because tcchnological change expands
the range of substitutability among factors as wcIl as reducing inputs nccessary per
unit out.pu~, The "t.rigger funct.ions" that. can be assumed t.o signal when a given or-
ganization or indust.ry will adopt an innovation are difficult t.o ident.ify because each
innovation carries a peculiar mix of complementarit.ies and substit.utabilities with it,
and each a.dopting organization or indust.ry evaluat.es t.hat mix differently. At best, we
can say that progress toward widespread diffusion takes place in a. broad ecology of
ot.her comp~ementary and substituting factors [Ros7G] [Tor83].
The complexity of the process of innovat.iordiffusion· as observed empirically is
understandabl'e when it underst.ood that innovation is heavily influenced by the ex-
pectations of potential adopters, Self-interested actors who might eventually adopt a
t.echnology wony not only about t.he current performance of an available inno\\'ation,
but on the future change in performance,
This underst.anding was clear in Schum-
peter's view of capitalistic development as an equilibrium cycle involving producers
and suppliers, in which innovation was a destabilizing factur (a shift in the production
function) calBSing changes in expectations_ In his model, inno\\'ation is followed by t.wo
successive spurt.s of demand on capital markets: one from ent.repreneurs seeking capit.al
to exploit the profit potential seen in the innovat.ion; the second from the industry as
a whole in allIticipation of further expansion_
Inevitabl~', the actual results of t.he entreprcneur's action are impossible to predict,
so rat.ionality in such inst.ances is difficult and further hampered by prospects of fu-
t.ure changes in technological performance [Ros76]. Thus the wcll-known "first mover
ad\\-antage" lhat. seems ob\\ious from Schumpeter's model is cleaTly highly risky; a fact
weIl u)1derstood by Marx. Apprehension to move too quickly - what Fellner called "an-
ticipatory reLardation" in the diffusion of an innovation - affects not. only the producer
of the innovation but the first user of the innovation [FeI51]. }'lansfield, in studying t.he
diffusion of twelve innovations, finds that the probability that a firm wiIl introduce a
new t.pchnique is an increasing function of t.he size of the invest.ment. required [ManG8]_
This :>uggests t.hat firms prefer to t.ake a wait-and-see posture and let others t.est t.he
!
profit:.bility of a new technique, especially if implementation requires a large invest.-
ment. Thus Da\\-id points out that the diffusion of IT into the economy is a contingent,
path-depend-:'D' process whose speed may Gisappoint those expecting the (information
lS

---

revolution" to have immediate, dramatic effects on economic productivity [Dav89].
The key discovery from these many streams of inquiry is the fact that inevitably
it is individuals aet.ing in institutional and economic circumstances that ma.ke the
decisions about whether to exploit innovation in production or use [Rog83] [LeoS.5].
The relevant quest.ion from a policy perspective, assl:ming one is int.erested in seeing
useful technologies diffuse rapidly, is whet.her anything can be done to affect the rate
of diffusion. This question is usually addressed in the cont.ext. of public policy opt.ions,
but the broad question is institutional: what active role might institutions, including
government.s, take to st.imulate adoption of pot.entially useful t.echnologies?
Before
addressing t.his question, we will describe all important "framing" perspect.ive: the
supply-push and demand-pull models of innovat.ion.
2.5
Supply-Push and Demand-Pull Models
The broad causal parameters of innoYation - the basic "drivers" of change that might.
be affected by institutional intervention - have frequently been characterized in research
lit.erature as "supply-push" and "demand-pull" forces [Ros76].
Supply-push assumes that the major mot.ivat.ing force for innovat.ion comes from
the production of t.he innovation product or process itself. There can be no diffusion of
innovation without an innovation to adopt, and the innovation itself is created by sup-
plier factors. This view has found expression not. only as a starting point for studying
the diffusion of innovation, but for broader inquiry about the nature of economic and
social change. For example, anthropologist Leslie White has written that innovation
precedes and lays the groundwork for all subsequent. commercial and social growth;
a concept called technological determinism [Whi49].
On the other hand, it is quite
clear that no innO\\:ation will survive, despite any amount of "pushing", unless there is
some genuine need for it the world. l\\foreover, it Seems highly likely that enterprising
innovators will choose to work first on problems that correspond to existing needs:
thereby increasing the likelihood that t.heir innovations will be adopted and used. In
this model, t he expressed needs of society, as articulat.ed through the mechanism of the
market, create a "demand-pull" incent.ive for innO\\"ation. By t.he mid-1970's the view
had emerged that demand-pull forces were dominantin ihe innovation process [Utt74].
The question of whet.her the "supply-push" or "demand-pull" forces dominate in
the innO\\'alion process is important for In-: ?."sessment of institutional options for ?f-
16

---

fecting diffusion of production and use of inno,oations.
Each present.s "ery different
targets for inter.'ention, and each produces different ideolcgical issues for the would-be
interventionist. If innovation is basically driven by supply forces, intervention mllst
concentrat.e on the production of innovations_ This will ent.ail stimulating the produc-
tion and applicat.ion of factors that go into innovating. These mi5ht include a growing
supply of scientific and technical knowledge, provision d capital for experimentation
and development of prototypes, and support for getting innovat.ive products and pro-
cesses ready for the market.place, and so on.
On the other hand, if the process is
mainly driven by demand forces, intervention would req\\lire focusing demand on po-
tent.ial sources of supply to stimulate them into action, mobilizing the bias of potential
buyers to invest in the innovations, and support of c:;ufficient capital for acquisition of
the innovat.ions by the consuming organizations.
In recent years studies have reassessed the drift t.oward the "clema.nd-pull" VIew,
and have reopened the question of which force dominates.
~vfowery and Rosenberg
note in their careful review of the su ~ject that the verdict. is by no means in on the
question [1\\'10\\\\'79].
They crit.icize the claim for dominance of t.he demand-pull view
on several grounds.
For one, the obsen-able demand of the market is by no means
equi,oalent to human needs, broadly considered. Aside from the ob,-ious problems of
market failures, any picture of human needs drawn from the market is modified by
market mechanisms, and thereby distorted. Thus, it is not clear how broad claims of
the demand-pull proponents could be su bstantiated. :t\\Jore significantly, in the rigorous
studies said to support this hypothesis, those industries that exhibited the fastest rates
of growth, including the high-tech industries of computers and consumer electronics,
did not appear to be stimulated by demand. At best, one can conclude that the verdict
still is not in on the dominance of one set of forces over the ot.her.
It appears from the historical studies of innovations that bot h supply and demand
forces are operating at all times in the inno"ation proce:::s [Dav7S].
Moreover, the
dynamic of the interaction between the forces themselves change depending on circum-
stances, including the relative state of technical knowledge, the availa.bil.ity of com-
plementary and substitutive factors, the character of the needs of society at anyone
time, the effectiveness of the market at translating needs into clear demands, and so
on.
These factors are seen in long-view assessments of ti;chrological change within
global regions [Lans69], between countries [Hab6::!], across .:lo';lains of knowledge and
in\\"Cntion, across industries [BenSG].

---

Again, ......e see from the research on inno\\'ation that there are no clear answers. In-
novation ]llloduction and diffusion of use is alwilYs a complex interplay of economic,
technical, $Ocial, and political fadors that does not lend itself to immediate apprehen-
sion and .1llrtderstanding. This naturally complicates the options available for institu-
tional inte<I\\'ention in the technology developmcnt. process, and makes t.he formulation
of prescri~i\\'e policy very difficult. Before proposing some inst.itut.ional policy issues
for informafrion t.echnology development. in African dcveloping countries, in the next
chapter, we present the current st.atus of this technology in the African continent.
18

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Chapter 3
'The Era of Inforlnation Technology
and African developing cOlilltries
In this chapter we present an overview of information techn'ology development in the
African continent. \\Ve successively establish the utilit.y of information technology in
African developing countries, present its development state, the barriers which restrain
this development, and its secondary effects on African society.
3.1
Utility of Information Technology in African
developing countries
The computer today is not only a machine for computation but also a communi-
cation device. It is becoming a key t.o effective and efficient communications. It can
not only transmit, store, and retrieve data, but can simulate complex realities. It adds
\\'alue to dat a and information, thereby pro\\-iding flexible tools for looking at and find-
ing likely solutions to a variety of problems. The information generated should enahle
countries to make better decisions and more effective planning, to remedy problems of
low producti\\lty and poor quality, and to pro\\'ide better information to their citizens
while lc.0king after their welfare. Some of the fa.ctors which make information technol-
ogy diffusion in African developing countries necessary are discussed in the following
subsection.
3.1.1'
y0111plexity of Societal Proble111s
,
Over' chEf years, there has been a marked shift from an environment in which the
conditions were primarily determined by acts of human beings. Today, the influcnce
of mill1-tllade decisions is pcn"a.si\\"c. This "hi;; 11;:;;; rE'sultecl in incrcCl.,ing the problems
19

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that t.he scmety faces and as a conscquence, social and economic syst.ems have bccome
highly complicat.cd. Some of the problcms thc African dcvcloping countries face arc
the followimg:
• Rel11ll!1<'al of poverty, hungcr and lack of sheltcr,
• Environment development and control of air and water pollut.ion,
• Man~ment of cash resources and revenue collection,
• l\\fan~ment of banking and financial institutions,
• Devehpment of transport, communicat.ion and ot.her infrastructure,
• UrbaiII and rural development,
• Demqwaphic studies and population control,
• Devehpment of viable educational systems,
• Develupment of human resources, manpower plannin'g and training,
• Devel~ment and distribution of national resources,
• DeveltriJj)ment of health care and social security systems,
• Develupment of export strat.egy,
• Techmd!0gy assessment and choice of appropriate ones and determination of re-
search areas,
• others..._
One common feature of these problems is the complexity and t.he number of vari-
ables they nwolve. They do not lend t.hemselves to simple and int.uitive approaches.
\\Vhile compfuxity has become the predominant factor in societal~ocietyand
its leaders ~ll want things to be simple and capable of ~~.{fi~~0dt)~'it.hout
many data, det.ailed analysis and application of thought. (qt ~~\\.~£Je why
people want things to be simple. It is difficult to keep many~rtbi\\ngs in m~lsM~{tlt.ane-
1
._li7, •
t f
. I d '
h
'\\ 1/'<''\\-~ f
7t~'
..:\\' 1/ d cl
ous Y, speclamlY In respec 0 sOCla an
economic areas were t'le w'or-m'a 10R an
ata
•
•
~8""
n\\~'->"
'1 bl
. h
. h r
d
B'd
h
",,-sneme..
. d'
aval a
e arenelt er neat nor stralg tlorwar.
eSI es, t ese areas~sometlmesIn Icat.e
cont.raclictoIJtendencies. We are no longer dealing wit.h physical systems alone. We are
dealing with physical systems in the cont.ext of human syst.ems and social instit.ut.ions.
To look intoJhese problerns, the use of information t.echnology is necessar)'. informa-
tion t.echnolug,y will enable physical realities t.o be taken int.o account by allowing a
number of ~tiernatives and choices t.o be considered. It will also ma.ke it possible t.o
est.imate thewurse of public policy and assess the benefits and drawbacks. In addition
to qualitati\\'"f assessment, wherever possible, it will allow quantit.ative comparison of
20

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the economics, cost-effectiveness, benefits and risks.
Information technology will enrd)1e de"eloping countries t.o make more effective de-
cisions, whethcr thcy are for t.he locat.ion of a powcr plant., thc planning of a transport.
network or the provision of a health care syst.em.
It will provide some measure of
insight into sit.uations where uncert.aint.ics prcvail, value judgmcnt and preferences are
indicated. Unless t.he information technology is uscd to analyze and understand com-
plexities, it will hardly be possible to arrive at. more reliable guides to public policies.
Complex social problems can no longer be resolved through convent.iona.l means; for
la$ting solut.ions, they need ext.ensive use of computers and ot.her tools of information
tech nology.
3.1.2
Productivity
Almost all African developing count ries have productivity problcms.
Productivity
in their manufacturing processes, utilities and services is relatively low. Wastages are
comparati\\'ely high and learning curves are long.
Computerization of processes, utilities and services will bring in substantial increase
in productivity by improving the processing of information. Increase in productivity
will enhance the abilit.y of African developing countries to produce competitively and
effect.ively. It will open new market.s for them.
It will reinforce competitiveness of
small and middle-size organizat.ions and make them more viable (analysis indicat.es
that most of the employment gains will take pla.ce in the small and middle sect.ors). It
will realign and simplify t.he administration and t.he bureaucratic structure by increas-
ing their effectiveness and improving relationships between the administration and the
bureaucra.cyon the one hand and the people whom t.hey are expected to serve, on the
other:
3.1.3
Al,to111atiol1
Ato'omaiion on a selective basis is required in those industries, where a higher level
I
of precision is required, where the processes are dangerous or hazardous to health and
where pr~cise and timely control measures in frClctions of seconds in real-time afe re-
quired. AutonJ(\\lion is also required in ",il\\1(\\lions where not enough skilled people Clfe

---

available for operations. Automation reduces wastages of materials, conserves energy,
obtains greater precision, achieves a high level of productivity and optimizatiJn, elim-
inates hazards and ensures safety in working environment.
Most of the manufacturing industries now encounter factors such as rlslng cost
of raw materials, shortage of skilled labor and consumer demand for products and
sustained quality.
They are also required to ensure bet.ter utilization of production
resources, energy and raw materiaJs, wit hout infringing the cnvironmentaJ protection
regulations.
This has underlined the import.ance of prompt data acquisition, moni-
t.oring and control of processes in a real-time frame.
In addition, since most of the
mamlfaduring processes have beco~lle highly complex and t he need for relia ble opera-
tions has correspondingly increased, it has become necessary t.o aut.omate the processes
to sat.isfy and meetrnost of the above requirements. Aut.omat.ion to the extent. of flex-
ible ma.nufacturing may not be feasible for the African developing countries at this
stage because of capital investment constraints and displacement of labor problems.
However, even in such areas limited selective approach would be necessary to gain ex-
perience to meet the future needs.
3.1.4
Education
Many of the African developing couniries have not been able to provide educat.ion or
even basic literacy to their growing population. There are shortages of schools, teach-
ers and facilit.ies. The African developing count.ries must experiment wit.h computers
and comLlunications to speed up the process of promoting educat.ion and literacy. For
inst.ance, educational programs transmitted through satellit.es could be dubbed in a
number of different languages and could be used t.o supplement t he teachers in far-
f1ur.g areas. Computer-assisted learning can be used to accelerate students' learning
through simulation, thereby enabling them to deal wit.h situations that are closer to
reaJity. Since computers and communication can provide programs covering instruc-
tions in speciaJized areas, they can reduce the shortage of specialized teachers. With
computers and communications, education could be expanded substantially and the
frontiers of learning could be extended.
') ')

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3.1.5
Managelnent and Monitoring of Planning
?vfost of the governments of the African developing countries have Planning Commis-
sions wmch prepare plans for national development. In Cote d'h'oire, the 'Ministere
du Plan et de l'Industrie' is the Chairman of the Planning Commission with many
other Cahinet Ministers as members. Through successive Five Year Plans, the countT)'
has been promoting all round national development.. The Plan is structured to prO\\'ide
momentum to growth of the economy, to enhance productivity, and to generate higher
incomes. it also has its objective directed t.owards eliminat.ion of poverty and illiter-
a.cy, provisi'on of food, clothing and shelter as well as health care t.o the citizens of the
country. Other objectives include:
• increasing productivity and efficiency in the various spheres of national life;
• developing a strong base for providing a central eCQnomy;
• paying attention to high-cost. industry;
• ensuring currency of technology, economy of skills and enhanced competitiveness.
The Plim also provides for increase in employment, for development of small and
marginal agriculture, and lowering of the poverty ratio. A plan of such dimensions re-
quires timely report.s on various individual it.ems including cash requirements, benefits
accruing, .bottlenecks, rate of invest.ment, rate of saving, deficit financing, agricultural
credit, level of su bsidies, export-import performance and a host of ot.her indices. Fur-
thermore, lor a large country like Nigeria, t.here is a considerable interaction bet.ween
the Planning Commission and the various geographical unit.s. To t.hat extent, a decen-
tralization of monitoring and accountability becomes necessary.
Most of the African developing count ries in their planning endeavors in yearly, 5-
yearly and prospective planning need socio-ecoTlOmic management and socio-economic
audi t. They need to measure their performance in terms of the money earned and the
human 'needs satisfied. They have to know whether the well-being of their people has
improved. Historically, it is the symptom that causes a response. In an explosive and
urgent situation something gets done. But these are "band-aid~' solutions. What is
required is con~inuous monitoring and assessment of socio-economic performance. \\Ve
have c, need to find out why people perform as they do and what could be done to
make the~ perform better. It. is a social objective to make people productive and raise
them ai,o'je the poverty level. It is also necessary to do the right job rather than doing
t.he job right, There is a need to identify properly the range of actions in their order
of priorities and decide which sectors should recei"e preferential treatment.. Planning:

---

monitoring, and keeping track of such massive data are virtually impossible without
extensive comp:Iterization and communication network. Without such infrastructure,
analysis and planning can deteriorat.e into inefficient exercises leading to wastage of
the count.ry's resources and t.alents.
3.1.6
Disaster and Crisis Managen1ent
Many African developing countries are crisis-ridden, moving as they do from one
crisis to another. This is bound to happen with countries which have embarked on
programs of accelerated development using the limited resources ava.ilahle at their dis-
posal. If they do not have accelerat.ed deYelopment, they will never catch up with their
objectives of removing poverty, modernizing their industry and promoting their public
weal. The crises they face are usually financial and physj~al. If adequate information
is available on the various fadors, it would be possible for them t.o avoid many of t.he
crises by uncovering problems and solving t.hem before they turn into crises.
With
the availahility of timely information, even crises which are wholly unexpected and
which require immediate and prompt action can be effectively dealt with. Frequently,
administrat.ion limits its efforts to addressing superficial operat.ing weakness and fails
to get the root of the problem. The causes are usually deep and involve several areas
of operation. In addition, most of the sit.uations are complex and there are layers of
inter-relat.ionships between events. For attending to pot.ent.ial crises with systematic
analysis and in a purposeful manner, it is necessary to have t.he required informat.ion
and capability to simulat.e various situations.
3.1. 7
Rural Developlllent
In most African developing countries, 80% of the population li\\'e in villages. Many
of the urban proSlems are the direct resul t of the inadequacy in rural planning. Ru-
ral development and planning in a country like Cote d'Ivoire receive a high priority.
There is also high priorit.y for bringing technology into rural areas. In addition, other
social actions such as crea ting more employment and providing education, entertain-
ment, recreation and communication facilities at rural centers have to be realized. The
farmers, to mul::ply agricultural producti\\ity, will need tools to sample soil, det.ermine
I
moisture content, obt.ain information on \\'arious inputs and weather conditions.
As
these are situatici1s :wit.h multiple variables and considerable complexity, these will re-
quire the use of computers and information technology.

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3.1.8
Inforn1ation Technology and the Other Disciplines
As withscientiflc knowledge, information tcchnology has relationships with many ref-
erence disciplines. With mathematics, they have a common conccrn with formalisms,
symbolic structures, and their properties. Both put emphasis on general methods and
problem-solving tools that are us~d in a great variety of situat.ions. The theories of
formal languages , the theories of computation, the analysis of aJgorithms, etc. make a
link between info!"mation technology and computer science. The orientation of informa-
tion technology these ten last years, which consists of developing information systems
more and more "intelligent" such <\\.'3 expert systems, creates a common interest with
the cognitive psychology. Also the information systems are destined to individuals and
organizations to perform their information processing tasks. To be efficient, they must
integrate, the most smoothly possible, their environment (from the point of view of
information processing rules, economic considerations as well as interrelationships with
working people). So, in the design of these information systems, their impacts on the
individual, organization, and society as well as the management considerations must
be taken into account. This makes a bond between information systems and some
sciences like management science, behavior science and social science.
Since information technology is growing more rapidly than these classical disciplines
which seem to have attained a certain stabilit.y, its new developments can cause percep-
tible progress in them. Information t.echnology and all these disciplines put t.ogether
their different and valuable assets t.o make up all kinds of information processing tools
and systems which are used in almost all the domains of human activities. It has been
proven in most of the developed count.ries, that these applications, designed by taking
into account of the environmental "alues of the organization and the society and effi-
ciently used where they are necessary, improve strongly the productivit.y of the working
people. Thus, through these applications and their impacts, and t.he mutual support
bet.ween information t.echnology and many reference disciplines, t.he former contributes
to the global development of societ.y.
Almost all the African developing count.ries know today t.hat, by the development
,
"
of information syst.ems, information technology can be an important. stimulus for their
development processes. It is why they set their hopes on and continue to import. and
develop it. But what. is the result of t his thirty year effort? In t he next section we de-
scribe the current slatus of information technology development in African de .. ,::loping

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count.ries.
3.2
State of Information Technology Development
Sub-sectors in t.he informat.ion t.echnology field arc reviewed. They include computer
inst.allat.ions, computer manpower, comput.er applications, dat.a transmission net.work! ';'
comput.er education and t raining, and consult.ancy services. These sub-sectors are not
always clearly dist.inct and often overlap. They have served as basis to take stock of
information technology development. in certain African de\\'eloping countries [ZwaSSJ.
The descript.ion of t.hese su b-sectors gives an exact idea of what. informat.ion technology
is in the area' under consideration.
3.2.1
Con1puter Installations
The first relevant. feature of information technology diffusion process in Africa is its
early start, which occurred before 1970 in more than half of aJ] t.he 46 sub-Saharan
count.ries. l\\lmost all these early comput.er installations were in the headquart.ers of
some ministry (usua]]y the Ministry of Finance), in the Central Statistic Office, or in
some major public utility such as railways, Electricit.y Board. It was not until the lat.e
1970s that the comput.erization process gained "momentum", and not until 1983-84
(with microcomputers) that. observers started talking of a t.rue information technology
"boom" in many countries.
In 1980, Africa represented 0.3% in number and 0.2%
in value of the worldwide stock of general purpose mainframe and mini computers.
Considering the insta1lations in developing countries only, Africa's shares were respec-
tively 5.4% and 4.S%. Bot.h indicators show t.hat, in relative terms, sub-Saharan Africa
was, along with t.he poorest. regions of Asia, t.he least. computerized area of the world.
During the 19805, this relat.ive position has changed only slightly. Computer import
growth rates ha\\'e been relatively high (abO\\'(' t.heClverage for all milchinery imports),
wit.h total purcha;;es increasing, between 1078 and 1986, from 56 millions USS to 220,
in the whole Africa, and from 21 to 107 millions in sub-Saharan Africa only.
These aggregate numbers, however, hide wide differences in information t.echnol-
ogy diffusion amcng African developing countries.
Over t.he period 1981-86, Nigeria
a.lone counted fo; 207c, of all t.he computer import.s in sub-Saharan Africa. Eight coun-
t ries made up ar..,t.h'er 50% of t.ot.al purchases: Cot.e d'hoire( 11:!c,), Zimbabwe(S:!c,),
Cameroon(8~,). Gctbbn(:CXl I\\enya(SCX,j, Senegal(-1.5%). Zaire(3 ..::;:!c.), and Congo(3%).
The remaini;l; ,JO:!c G; tile' market \\,;as ihus split (\\1110n; the other 35 countjies eX-:JucI-
26

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ing Sout.h Africa and Namibia..
The fact. t.hat. Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe
managed t.o keep const.ant or moderat.ely rising comput.er import levels through the
economic deterioration of t.he 1980'5 and Cameroon, Gabon, and Senegal have more
t.han doubled theirs in recent years, SllggCSt.S t.h'd comput.erizat.ion is by now (In es-
t.ablished proce~s in t.hese countries.
Elsewhere, sharp import fluctuat.ions seem 10
indicate t.he opposite. The cross-cOlll1try distribut.ion of multinational comput.er com-
panies' subsidiaries, branch offices, agent.s, etc. corroborat.es this view. The same six
countries above host almost 40% of a sample of 220 such sales installations in Black
Africa; Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe leading the group, wit.h 23 and 20 vendors respec-
tively.
Beyond bare figures, it appears that, despit.e early experiences with computers in
many count.ries, only a few, t.went.y years later, seem t.o have moved t.oward relat.ively
.-
high and steadily increasing levels of information technology adoption. In part.icular,
several Fra.ncophone countries show a distinct predominance in the field, compared to
the Anglophone area. \\\\That these differences actually mean is open to discussion and
interpretation.
High correlation between per-capita income and number of comput-
ers, among countries, has lead some aut.hors t.o relate computerization t.o the lC\\"el of
economic dC\\"elopment. \\Vhile this appears to be a faithful picture of reality, it does
not say much about the origins of this situation, and may lead to the assumptions
that economic growth "per-se" will bring higher levels of computerization or that more
intense use of computers will lead to faster economic growth. Although links between
these two aspects ob\\'iously exist, the nature of cause/effect relationships in such com-
plex processes is far from straight.forward and is also likely t.o change through stages
of socio-econom.ic development.
3.2.2
Con1puter Manpower
There is a serious shortage of trair.ed manpower in all the African developing coun-
tries. This problems is acute in Government estahlishments due to t.he comparatively
low salaries. Government employment is, however, attractive to the recent graduates
because of the opportunities offered for further training. The manpower shortage has
three possible consequences:
1. inadequa t el)' trained personnel wi)] be recrui I ed at all levels
')
less numbers of people will be in\\"o]Yed in dC\\'eJoping larger numbers of systems
resuliing in incomplete or poor qUCllity systems,
' ) -
- I

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3. there will be continual dependence on foreign expert.s.
Broadly~ the ma.npower needed may be divided int.o t.hree levcls. In the first level
we have tM junior trainee type who pcrform the normal day t.o day operations and
programming.
All countries recruit. pre-univcrsity school leavers for these posit.ions.
There is no slwrt.age of these people and sHch are t.hereforc easy t.o fill. But training
them to be d'Feetive and preparing them for the next level is a problem. In the second
level, people are in great.est demand. There people with 3 t.o 7 ycars experience, are
able to supervise, guide and provide on-the-job training t.o first level staff; understand
the weaknes; and st.rong points in computcrs; know how to communicate and dcal
with demanding users; and maintain unhesit.atingly undocumentcd systems left by
others. Such people are hard to come by, and hard to r~tain. These are the people
wit.h extensive or advanced training in computer systems attained t.hrough attending
advanced CO'lHSeS and working under skilled supervisors. Comput.er managers fall into
the third level. The situation there is difficult. Firstly the number of managers required
is smaller than the number required at the first and second levels. Hence there is strong
competition and more able people from second level move int.o the third level. The
other type cl' manpower required is hardware and software support st.aff. Government
does not generally recruit hardware support staff.
Where they exist in the private
sector these positions tend to be filled by locals. In Zimbabwe there is not a single
foreign hard1\\~are support engineer. Foreign experts come in short term contracts with
specific terms of reference. Governments in Africa are now pretty sensitive about the
recruitment of expatriates. It is certainly not a trivial mat ter for an expatriat.e to get
a work permiJt.
3.2.3
C0111puter Applications
It is fa.irl~· common to find that t.he applicat ion 10 be computerized first are the
labor intensive ones. Therefore Government Computer Cenlers ,are usually set up to
run Payrolls and Government accounts. The range and type of applications are on the
increase. Typical application include:
• Financial and Administrati \\'C Systems, Payroll, Pensions, Personn:-I Informa t ion
Systems, Account.s, Fixed Assets Registers, Billing, Debtors and Creditors ete.
.J
• General Ivlanagement Information Systems, Personal Stat.istk, Stock Control,
Airline Passenger Reservations.
• Planning and Development :-'fodeL Population Census, Household Surveys: .1>.gri-
cultural Surv·::,ys, Industria.! Sune\\s. TrClcle ete.

---

• General Office Automation, Word proccssIng, automatic tclcx message routinc
et.c..
In the privatc scctor, accounting type opplications arc thc most important in terms
of number.
Debtors, creditors etc.
are common applications both on minis and on
mlcros.
There are some manufacturing applications.
Thcre are very few dccision
support and modelling applications.
Office automation is starting in earnest in the
largc urban centers. A few companies in Zimba bwe and Kcnya havc produced software
packages for e."port, and are earning foreign currency for their countries.
3.2.4
Dat.a Transn1issi:on Network
Only some African developing countries have a data transmission network: Cote
d'Ivoire(Sytranpac), Ga.bon(Gabonpac), Cameroon(Compa.c), and Zimbabwe(Zimnet).
There are no data lines crossing state borders to neighboring countries. There are how-
ever, da.ta links to Europe and USA.
3.2.5
Conlputer Education and Training
Computer education is offered at three levels of the educat.ion system i.e. at high
schools, technical colleges and universities. A number of African Governments have
formulated policies on computer education in schools.
Zimbabwe and Mauritius are
two notable e.:~:amples. In Zimbabwe's case, the Ministry of Education thinks that with
scare foreign currency, computers can only be introduced in schools if there is local
industry for assembly of microcomputers. Zimbabwe has in fact commenced local as-
sembly of micro-computers from semi-knocked down kits. As a result we expect to see
implementation of this policy in the near future. The drawbacks to full implementation
of the policy are lack of both computer resources and trained teachers. The problems of
shortage of trained teachers also affects the institutions for technical educatiun. These
technical institutions offer undergraduate diploma courses with a good practical ori-
entat.ion. Some of the courses survive through the employment of part-time lecturers
.1.,,_ from industry. These technical institutions also face the problems of lack of adequa· e
':>;hardware and software resources .
..~
Only a few universities offer full graduate courses in compllter SClenct-'.
There
IS
a tendency to offer composite degre'C's consisting of computcr scicnce and SOli:'?
29

---

other subject such as Economics, Accounting, Psychology, :Mathemat.ics dc ..
Post.-
graduat.e degrecs are compilcd to t.he one discipline.
In East and Southern Africa
t.he only univcrsit.ies offering comput.cr studies at degree levcl are t.he univcrsit.ies of
Nairobi and of Zimbabwc. In West. Africa there arc the "Institut National Supcricllr de
I'Enseignement Technique(INSET) de Yamollssoukro" in Cot.e d'Ivoire and the "Inst.i-
t.ut. Africain d'Informat.ique(IAI) de Libreville" in Gabon. On comparing products of
computer courses from universities and t.echnical institutions one finds that, generally,
graduat.es from t.echnical institut.ions t.end to be preferred by employers.
One of the
reasons for this is the academic bias of univ~rsity courses. This is so, despite the fad
that university graduates end up occupying technician-type positions in organizations.
African developing countries offer little employment. potential to the academic gradu-
ates of technology or engineering st.udies. Information technology courses, in general,
are not included in the curricula of the other academic fi~lds. This means that grad-
uates from these fields leave the university without an awareness of the potential of
information technology as a tool for development. Also, at this point in time there is
little research, if any, in information technology field in African developing countries.
3.2.6
Consultancy Services
There is plenty of scope for consultancy services in all the African developing coun-
t.ries. This is all t.he more so in view of the short.age of manpower coupled with rapid
growth in computerization.
The consultancy services are offered by multi-national
companies such as Deloit.ees, Price Wat.erhouse, Art.hur Young, Sinorg, International
Partners etc.. In addition there is a fair number of second and third level people who
are coming onto the market and offering individual consultancy services. Consultants
are usually used for requirement analysis, information system dcvelopment, evaluation
of tenders. Governments use consultancy services for a variety of jobs ranging from
requirements analysis to training.
The current stat.us o[ information technology sector in African developing countries
shows that this sector does not take off.
Why doe..:: it not?
Why does the effort. of
governments of these countries remains in vain and falls shod of their expectation? In
the next section we present t.he problems which lower the invention
innovation
and
,
j '
diffusion of information technology in African developing countries.
30

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3.3
Barriers to Information Technology Develop-
ment in African Developing Countries
The discussion is organized aro,lnd two dimensions of information technology cle\\'c!-
opment barriers. In one dimension there are three phases of the information technology
development. process (invention, innovation, and dilTusion). In the ot.her dimension lies
the origin of the problem. A problem can be a characterist.ic of technology itself or
it can be related t.o the environment which receives the new t.echnology. In the cells
are examples of kinds of specific problems.
The outcome of this array is shown 111
Figure 3.1. Each of these problems can be classified as one of nine general kinds: 1)
basic infrastructures, 2) myths associated with computer installations, 3) organiza-
tional problems, 4) technology supply problems, 5) education and training problems,
6) awareness problems, 7) economic factors, 8) l"nicroergonomic factors, and 9) cultural
factors.
3.3.1
Basic Infrastruct ure
There are presently no reliable data transmission networks in most of the African
countries. Tradit.ional telephone net.works are not designed to carry data. And most
of t.he telephone companies are not experienced in data transmission services. Special
net.works are necessary but do not always exist.
In Cote d'Ivoire, almost all of t.he
towns are linked by a telephone network which can be used for the dat.a transmission
with a throughput of at most 1200bps. Personalized and telex lines, more efficient and
convenient wit.h 2400bps, exist. But there are a lot. of problems on the lines, especially
during the rainy seasons (June-July), which often lead to the inability to utilize t.he
net.work. So, remot.e computing syst.ems cannot work all t.he year. A ISO, insufficiency
of electricit.y net.works must be not.iced. In Abidjan, the capital, up to 1985 there were
about. 3 power cuts of 30 minut.es to over :2 hours per week during t.he rainy seasons.
Even now, in many rural cities the electricity is provided only at fixed periods in the
day (for example from 11:00 to 15:00 and from 17:30 t.o 8:00). So, the computer cannot
be used at all times in these areas. The provision of such infrastructures depends on
t he economic sta te of the country and also takes decades t.o build up. \\Vit.hou t a serious
improvement in t.he economic state, these factors would continue to restrict the rate of
the information technology transfer.
:) 1

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3.3.2
Myths Associated with COlnput.er Installations
Some myt.hs arc t.he causes of many problems t.hat. face comput.ing in African devel-
oping countries:
ComputeT systems create unemployment.
This myt.h is particularly popular in count.ries where t.he low skill level of workers
makes diffi'Cul .. their reconversion into new jobs after t.he int.roduction of the comput.er
installation. So, in Cote d'Ivoire managers face replacement. problems and often post.-
pone the comput.erization project, though commercial actions and public debates show
the utility of t.he comput.er in the organizations. This is particularly t.rue in the Ivorian
pu blic sector where workers' lay-off is almost prohibit.ed. This myt.h is disappearing
progressively with the increase of the worker's technical level.
A computer system consists of sophisticated software and hardware units; the soft-
ware, if needed at all, can be bought as ready-made packages from developed countries
with little adaptation to the environment.
Because sophisticated and high cost, the system must be handled with much
attent.ion. So, local users and often even comput.er staff take it at a distance. They
use it as little as possible to avoid breaking it.
The manipulation of the hardware
devices is t.rusted to foreign assistants who have to provide regularly the output data.
This limits the self-training and thus the acquisition of computer system manipulation
skill by local people.
On the other hand, one thinks that t.he int.roduction of such
a system can resolve easily all the problems of t.he organization (for example billing
can be done rapidly and wit.hout errors, even if the calculation procedures are not yet
syst.ematically defined). It would suffice to just push a button of t.he machine. This
myth also disappears with the progressive replacement of t.he on-st.at.e trained workers
by t.he highly educated young people and with a more exact percept.ion of the computer
based informatio'n syst.em by the managers.
Developing countries must follow the same pattern of application development that
developed countries havt taken (organizations in developing countries have to import
the application ~(Jftware already in use or used and abandoned in developed countries).
This is the point of view of most of the European and American technical ad-
visers of the local otganiza lion managers. They often propose the transfer of syst.ems
or application:" experienced in their pre\\"lOll:" companies or sii1te services t.o lh", ne','"

---

companies \\\\'h~re they work as experts. This often leads to inappropriate comput.ing
devclopment. policics, due t.o developing and develop~d count.ries having different. em·i-
ronments.
Developing countries have to accept secondhand technology and should not dabble
with the later advances in technology.
The product shows often presented in African capitals display product models
int.roduced a long time ago in the capit.aJs of the west.ern world. This myth preva.ils in
developed countries t.hat sell to African users obsolet.e products wit.h numerous maint.e-
nance problems. This also limits the diffusion of the new t.echnology in these developing
countries.
3.3.3
Organizational Problenls
Because nat.ional needs and priorit.ies are not clea.rly defined, many problems
occur:
• Effort of comput.er installations development, comput.er scientists and technolo-
gists education and training, and research is fragmented, dissipated and misused.
• \\Vhile most of the computers are working at 49% of their capacity (mainly in
state services and public organizations) in Cote d'Ivoire (Futuribles, 1984), new
ones are bought. So computing power is not used efficiently.
• Too many different types of computers are used and hardware devices are often
incompatible even in the sa:ne organization.
• No unified policy and strategy to deal with foreign vendors, especially policies
related to the drafting of the contracts.
• The areas in which the utilization of the computer can generate the most impor-
tant and positive impacts in the country are not determined.
• Many organizations work on similar projects.
So, resources (knowledge, skill,
money, et c.) are not evenly distri bu t ed.
All these consequences constitut.e a waste of effort for the development of comput-
ing in African countries.
33

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3.3.4
Technology Supply Problenls
Many hardware and software supply companies draw profit. from t.he lack of expe-
rience of t.heir buyers in African countries wit.h impllnity.
The following practices,
harmful for the comput.ing development effort, are unfortunately very frequent:
• },,10st hardware and software companies do not pu blish their price list.s and so they
arbit.rarily over invoice materials, technical assist.ance, and maint.enance services;
.-
• The accessibility of maintenance facilities is a big problem in many of these lands;
• Manufacturers or consultant companies are reluet.ant t.o est.ablish maintenance
facilit.ies if a sufficient volume of business is not. observed;
• Most manufacturers or companies send junior inexperienced staff to the user
as high caliber expert. This results in poor quality service and often excessIve
elapsed time between the breakdown and t.he recove'ry of a machine;
• Most of software and hardware companies are reluctant to gUClrantee performance
and reliabilit.y of their products;
• Contracts are written unilaterally; generally they stipulate only duties of the
buyer wit.h severe payments condit.ions and not those of suppliers.
Finally the hardware devices, software and services received from developed coun-
tries suppliers, generally very expensive, are not always appropriate, efficient and ef-
fecti\\'e in the host environment.
Also the lack of contacts between developing and
developed countries' users makes it hard to compare the sen'ices they are getting with
those offered in developed countries.
3.3.5
Education Problenls
The general education level is still low in most of the African developing count.ries.
The average illiterate rates in 198·3 were: 58.74% for Africa, 4G.·09% for the Middle
Ea."t, 31.37% for Asia, and 16.12% for Latin America versus, for example, 1.2% for
France, 0.0 for Japan [Bri86]. This is an important. handicap to information technol-
ogy introduction in African developing count.ries.
It is not enol1gh to p:ck up some
high school graduates and teach them informat.ion technology tosuccess the transfer.
They could become skilled. But the quality of an information system!does not depend
on the skill of the technologists only. The users who participate t6 thr development of
the system, by defining t.heir needs, must know what is an information system. Ho\\'."
necessary and useful an i. information syS(,:? Il1 'i It i~ impo~sible for the illilcr;:tte workers
34

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(the majority of the manpower) to access to this knowledge.
Also the educat.ion curricula, generally imported from c!eye]oped countries, are not
always adapted t.o local needs. The curriculum of t.he "Insl.itut Supcrieur d'Informaliqlle"
3.5

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IT
IT ENVlRONl\\IENT in ADC
7 ECONOl\\IlC FACTORS
7 ECONOMIC FACTORS
R&D activities too expensive
no funds for R&D
5 EDUCATION PROBLEMS
thcre are not ·yct. IT R&D
programs in most universities
1 BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES
1 BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES
dat.a transmission network
elcctric supply power
2 11YTHS RELATED TO CS
'2 lvfYTHS RELATED TO Cl
CS is t.oo sophist.icated
Cl creates unemployment
4 TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY
6 AVlARENESS FACTORS
low quality of products
most managers and administrators are
not. aware of necessit.y of innovation
-
7 ECONOMIC FACTORS
7 ECONOMIC FACTORS
IT is expensive
local organiza tions ca n not
face innovation expenditures
1 BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES
1 BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES
7 ECONOMIC FACTORS
7 ECONOMIC FACTORS
IT is expensive
IT expensive for local organizations
8 MICROERGONOMIC FACTORS
8 MICRO ERGONOMIC FACTORS
IT is not. designed for ADC
IT do not fit in
the every day life of ADC
4 TECHKOLOGY SUPPLY
5 EDUCATION PROBLEMS
bad consul t.i ng services
few training programs
:2 MYTHS RELATED TO CS
3 ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
lack of global strat.egy
9 CULTURAL FACTORS
attit.ude towards IT: maintenance
engineer is considered as laborer
Figure 3.1 IT Development Barriers
(ISI) of Abidjan is not cent.ered on t.raining st.udent.s in various methodologies and
tools for informCliion system development and maintenClnce (the current needs of t.he
mClrket) but on scientific dCltrt processing. So. college grClduCltes need Cl lot. of trrtining

---

before becoming skilled. In Cot.e d'I\\,oire t.he curricula of the undergraduate schools
must. be conformed t.o those of France. This is generally the condit.ion for the student.s
to be accepted in graduate schools in France. Also, the multiplicity of languages in
one country (about. 60 dialects in Cot.e d'Ivoire) makes it difficult to translate technical
lit.erat.ure for larger diffusion and bet.ter understanding for local people. In addition,
the local people generally do not. speak the language of the foreign assistant. All this
severely limit.s the assilrjlation of information technology related knowledge and skill.
3.3.6
Awareness Factor
In most African developing countries only the people of educational and research
instit.utions realize t.he potential of the information technology. In addition to them,
,
afew in business and government had recognized the needs for computers in meeting
their urgent or large volume processing requirements. The majority of the people know
nothing about computer and informat.ion technology. Government officials often fail
to appreciate the financial costs and human efforts that must accompany any success-
ful information technology transfer program.
There have been many cases in Cote
d'Ivoire, where organization managers regret buying computers because they cannot
support the subsequent expendit.ures (software costs, etc.). Therefore, they usually do
not pay the price and effort necessary. This is an important barrier to the diffusion
of the technology in all the human activities sectors. Important effort must be done
for the awareness of political leaders and administrators of the role of the informa-
t.ion technology in the societ.y. The awareness of t.his population is a prerequisite for
comput.erizat.ion. They could encourage the lise of the technology in the organizations.
Computer awareness must start early in the life of children and students, as they should
be equipped to participate in the t.echnology in their careers.
3.3.7
Economic Factors
The gross nat.ional product of African countries is very low.
This makes e\\ident.
the necessit.y of information technology importat.ion to give a st.imulus to the economic
growt.h, and at the same time the impossibility to pay the necessary price to acquire
this technology.
Therefore, these count.ries ~orrow money from abroad, a sit.uation
which involves commercial risks for themselves and also for the suppliers. The devel-
opment of informat.ion technology is an expensive business, involving much investment
in educat.ion, research, and development. some of which take many years of toil (lnd
... -
JI

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risk before any fruit.ful results are realized. Developed countries arc not so charit.able
missionaries that they are ready to give out mere on what they have spent so much to
acquire wit.hout t.he hope of any ret.urns.
3,.3.8
Microerg0110111ic Factors
:Microergonomics is focused at the human-hardware level and concerned with t.he
design of t.he individual controls, displays and workstat.ions.
It includes studies of
cognitive capahility, human decision making, information processing, etc.
In others
terms it a.ddresses the relations bet.ween t.he medium of t.he t.echnology (hardware de-
vices, technical literat.ure, and human specialist.s who possess the knowledge) and the
receiver of t.he knowledge in the transfer process.
To what ext.ent can the receiver
.
use the imported system and draw the maximum amount of knowledge from the t.ech-
nological medium? How does one design the technological medium or represent the
knowledge? \\\\That human qualities must the receiving people develop to facilitat.e an
effective transfer? These problems and many others have to be dealt. with.
In the engineering field the physical characteristics of instruments <'-re decisive.
Equipment must fit the user needs. Abeysekera has shown that. even an adjust.ahle
safety helmet designed in Europe cannot be fitted properly to 40% of Sri Lankans
[Abe85]. When applying American ant.hropometric design standards to other people
of the world, they fit nearly 90% of all Germans, but only 80% of all Frenchmen,
65% of all Indian, and only 45% of all Japanese [hen75]. Likewise in the information
technology field, the instruments such as displays, print.ers, t.ape readers, disc packs,
etc.
which make up the workstation that are produced in the developed countries,
do not fit int.o the everyday environment of the African people. They are still totally
foreign to many countries. Therefore these people are not in the habit of manipulat.ing
them. \\\\Then they begin to use these hardware deYices, they are crit.ically tactless. Also,
they fear the penalties that they may receive for breaking the machine due to their lack
of expertise. It takes a great deal of time to grasp the operating skill and become adept.
Perceptual-motor skills and other psychological chaL.eteristics also play an impor-
~
tant role in the success of the technology transfe~. For example the relationship among
control mo\\"ement., the resulting machine response an:d its demonstration on the display,
and the display-control compatibili ty affects the '~ffi~iency and safety of the opera tion
of human-machine systems.
This relationship is ~so a population-dependent \\"ari-
able pvres8S]. This is very important in ,=omputcr centers of most African developing
38

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count.ries where, by insufficiency of percept ual-mot.or skills, the int.eractions with t.he
operating syst.ems arc not often mast.crcrl., Icading t.o a poor usc of the comput.cr in-
sta.llations.
We reca]) the computer installations are used at. less t.han 50% of their
capabilities in most African countries [Fut.84].
3.3.9
Cultural Factors
Culture, according to anthropologists, is the way of life of people; the sum of t.heir
learned behavior patt.crns, attitudes, customs, and mat.erial things.
However, cul-
ture could operat.iona.lly be defined ac:; the ({collective ment.al programming of peoples'
minds" [HofSO]). In t.he t.echnology transfer process, the cu\\t.ural values appear in the
att.itudes of the people towards the type of the new technology, in their cognitive com-
plexit)" cognit.ive st.yle and decision st.yle, working h.abit.s ~nd achievement motivat.ion.
Attitude towards Technology: Unt.il recent years African French-speaking people
considered engineering as a low-status occupation. So, most of the students chose
literary fields for administrative careers. The rat.io of graduation in Cote d'lYoire
was less than one science degree per six liberal art.s degrees.
This shows t.he
scarcity of potential technicians. Using a manual tool or an aut.omated machine
is considered to degrade the worker from "craftsman" to "laborer". In the field of
informat.ics, syst.em engineering is much more preferred to hardware maintenance
engineering, because a maintenance engineer looks like a 'hborer". Almost no-
body st.rives for this career. Thus, ent.erprises provide special bonus to make this
job more attractive.
Cognitive Complexity, Cognitive Styles and Decision Styles: Cognitive com-
plexity is defined as the thinking capacity for concret.eness and abstraet.ness.
Cognitive st.yle is defined as the learned t.hinking habit.s and t.he learned way of
thinking, while decision style is the human informat.ion processing behavior (the
manner in which the decision-maker reacts t.oa given situat.ion or the manner of
int.eraction wit.h other people) [Drr]. The decision process t.o a given situation
of African people is very oft.en not enough rigorous. \\Ve observed (in 1985) that
computer operat.ors in many computer installations in Abidjan often did not. re-
spond exactly to error messages on the display but. proceeded cautiously to find a
good response. Some people gave up after a few fails and post.poned the work. So,
the efficiency of the operat.ors was \\'~r:' low. There are many documented studies
39

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on tie significant effects of these faet.ors t.hat part.icularize each individual by
affecting his percept.ual-motor and ment.al t.asks performances [Rob84] [Rom85].
Evi&rnce of differences in these faet.ors due t.o cultural and et.hnic ba.ckgrounds,
albeit not. numerous, is also of special import.ance t.o t.echnology transfer [RomS.S].
Achievem~nt Motivation: In west.ern cult.ures, t.he prot.est.ant. et.hic and social Dar-.'
winism undoubt.edly have fost.ered high achievement orient.ation [Kar74]. Con-
sequently, economic growth, corporate profits and individual remunerations are
regarded as indicators of achievement. and are not sought as an end in themselves.
They merely provide an indicat.ion to the individual, organization, and societ.y
that ~rformance has been good, recognized as such, and rewarded accordingly
[t\\'1e~]. In most of the African count.ries, in cont.r~st, an individual's remuner-
ation is seen as an end in it.self. If one can not work and get remuneration, it
is betfter. So, many people craft with the job by giving fault reasons as pret.ext
(healtB! problems, etc.) where severe and exhaustive measures are not ta.ken. In
the absence of proper motivation, workers are not enthusiastic in matters relat.ing
to tedmol'Ogical development, and not aggressive enough in scrutinizing the in-
formafJion technology media (computer hardware devices and software, technical
literafture, etc.), to conquer the technological knowledge and acquire the skills
needed. This also restrains the mastery of the imported technology.
In spite <Df t he problems reported above, information technology is become a reality
in African de\\"Cloping count.ries too. The introduction of t.he information technology
and especianIy the computer system in the social and economic organization consti-
tutes the roost important innovation of the last 40 years. Any inno\\"at.ion often brings
benefits, blDt also problems. It is necessary to b2 aware of these two aspects in order
to take fuH advantages of the technology. In t.his subsection we int.end to analyze the
impact of tine information technology on the African societ.y.
3.4
Secondary Effects of Information Technology
on African Society
As informat.ion t.echnology develops, new effects will likely become evident. But now,
t.he following issues emerge as the most important.
40

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r
3.4.1
N'ational Balances of Payn1ents
GeneraDj, developing countries do not produce any of the components of their com-
puter inst4'!J.ations. Quite recently, application softwares were in large part developed
by foreign3.lDftware houses. Even now almost everyt.hing is imported (hardware devices,
software elBTIents, printing papers, etc.). So, t.he cost of the computing is very high,
in t.erms ofnelat.ive living costs and have a heavy impact on their nat.ional balances of
payments. We note, for example, that in 1985 the comput.ing cost represents 4% of all
I voria n imjIYDrts.
3.4.2
Mass En1ploYlnent
In developed countries it is asserted that computer sy~tems alter the occupational
st.ructure oHhe employment but do not. always eliminate jobs. General1y they displace
them and creat.e new ones by t.he reduction of production cost., the increase of produc-
tivit.y (by replacing human workers with automatic processors like computers which are
more efficieJmt on dat.a processing tasks), and the production of high quality outputs
whose consm;mption leads to more profits. These profit.s, in t.urn, induce investments
and create job. In African countries thes~ advantages are expected, but still seldoml}'
acquired barause people do not sufficiently mast.er the t.echnology to take full ad"an-
tage of its !resources. The worker generally loses his job, because his education lnel
.....
cannot allov him to face successfully the constraint.s of technological change (training
in using cOJmputer hardware devices, et.c.). This is more frequent in t.he private sector
where persmnel restrictions often occur. Thus, particular at.tention must be paid to
training possibilities before introducing computer syst.ems.
3.4.3
Econon1ical and Political Dependence on the T\\1ultina-
tional Con1puter Manufacturers and Service Conlpa-
mes
A conseqlll'ence of the massive importation of the information technology is an in-
crease of the economico-political dependency on abroad (generally developed countries)
and especially on the multinational suppliers of computing resource~ like IBl\\f, etc ..
The dependency lies in the purchase of a product which is st.rat egic fOF the running
of the count!)" (tools for policies and strategies design and control, e~c.)~ \\Vhile these
problems are not yet dealt with in African countries, certain countries ~\\'ith more re-
sources and bigger internal markets like Brazil, adopt their own information techno)og.\\·
41

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r'
de\\'elopment policy. However many problems have st.ill t.o be solved (international com-
petit.ion, local industry protection, etc.).
3.4.4
Individual Privacy
Computer systems (especially data banks of nat.ional populat.ion, social security, lo-
cal administrat.ion, et.c.)
confer a real social and political power on their managers,
because the)' record and store all kinds of dat.a about citizens. However we think t.hat
the people of dcvcloping countries are less sensitive t.o this threat against their personal
liberties than t.heir European count.erparts. In Cot.e d'Ivoire, people do not yet realize
the extent of this threat. Certain pu blic powers take full advant.age of this ignorance.
They build poplllat.ion dat.a banks and use them for polit.ical pmposes (electoral pro-
.
cesses manipulat.ion, state securit.y, etc.).
Recording dat.a about different aspects of
citizens (i.e., disease surveillance) is, in cert.ain measures, necessary for the definit.ion
of national development strategies. But safeguard measures must be taken to prot.ect
the citizens' rights and keep confident.ial the data related to them.
3.4.5
COlnputer as a Status SYll1bol
In most African countries, the computer still appears as a st.at.us symbol like cert.ain
cars or residential houses. It is a sign for economic wealth for the company which uses
it. It is generally flaunted at official meetings and cocktail part.ies given by execut.i\\·es,
to show t.o other visiting aut.horities. If maximum benefit.s are drawn from its use, this
flaunt.ing is not. a problem. But it is damaging t.o the company when certain execut.ives
buy computers before looking into it.s use. For t.hem perhaps the most. important. t.hing
is t.o just own a comput.er.
3.4.6
C0111puter and Technocratic Rule
Technocraty is defined as government. by technical expert.s. This symbolizes admin-
istration c:; a set. of mechanical, calculating, narrow viewed and unfeeling individuals
w,ho \\\\~ould constrain and dehumanize t.he societ.y. The comput.er is a tool pre-eminently
used ~or this ruling style by its syst.emat ic formalizi\\tion and quantification of all the
faccors related t.o each problem t.o be soh'ed. The solutions of social dominance are
often ~ejected hy t.his approach, beCi\\llSe it is difficult., and sometimes even impossible,
to assess quaTltitati\\'ely and simulate the: -:Tl-:cis.

---

This ruling style is not well accepted by people of developing countries who are at-
tached to and understand the socio-cultural aspects of the development projects better
than the economical ones.
This problem is real and important. We think that the ruling of developing countries
must be more rat.ionalized. It must use technocrat.ic approaches to hope to succeed in
solving most of problems they face.
3.4.7
COlnputer Crilnes
The computer can be used as a tool t.o facilitat.e illegal or questionable activities by
all levels of a computer staff. The victims are generally the banks due t.o the increasing
use of the electronic funds transfer systems. These systems move huge sums of money
.
among financial instit.utions with electronic symbols as the sole record. These systems
replace personnel signatures with electronic authorizat.ion codes. But troubles brew
if the codes fall in the wrong hands. Comput.er crimes also include fictitious claims,
fraudulent loans against customer policies, switching of addresses, and canceling of
policies to gain premium refunds in insurance companies by manipulating programs
and file records.
Also, in inventory systems, falsified computer records can make it
seem that goods were damaged and disposed of, shipped to cust.omer but returned, or
simply missing. Growth of the informat.ion t.heft with the increasing use of the micro
computer is to be noticed. This is often connected to an organization's central com-
puter where value-rich information (for business competit.ors) is stored. In contrast to
the typewrit.er, which does not store information when a report is finished, data st.ays
in the word processor system for fu ture recall. So, this cata can be easily used for
questionable purposes.
These crimes have become more and more frequent in African countries. Since 1982
in Abidjan many cases of file forgery have been recorded. The crimes occur more easily
because computer systems are still regarded as myst.erious machines operated byenig-
matic engineers. Most of the managers do not understand the computer system and
give free reign to their dat.a processing people assumed to be doing good job because
operations proceed faster. Thus, nobody thinks about measures for control and check-
ing of the data processing operations and the relat.ed tran~actions. The poor quality
of output data is deceptively attributed to computer error, inappropriate software, or
hardware breakdown.
43

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1\\lany countries t.hrough t.he world (especially dcveloped count.rics) have already
experienced most. of the problems and secondary cffccts rcgist.ercd ahove. The dcvcl-
opment levels of t.hese countries are very diffcrent with those of African developing
countries.
But the latter can t.ake advant.age of the experiences of t.he former.
In
the next chapt.er, after a survey of nat.ional st.rategies in information t.echnology, we
propose an inst.itutional framework and policy domain (a set of possible information
technology development actions) for information technology dcvclopment in African
developing count.ries.
44
':.' .

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~'.1"" '.
Chapter 4
An Institutional Framework aIld
Possible Informatiol1. Technology
Development Actions
In this chapter we survey national strategies in informat.ion t.echnology. Then, we
draw lessons from this survey. And then, an institut.ional framework and an informa-
tion technology development policy domain are proposed. The inst.itutional framework
is an organizational structure. The policy domain is a set of instit.ut.ional possible ac-
tions. The t.erms st.rategy and policy have not been defined in t.he literature. However,
for the purpose of this work, by informat.ion t.echnology development strategy 'we mean
the approach a country takes to develop its information t.echnology sector. For exam-
ple, the int.ervention of a government in information technology sector and the main
objectives of this intervention are a st.rategy. In a cert.ain sense, an ot.her strategy for a
government should be leaving the development of informat.ion technology in the hands
of private capit.al or free market. By information t.echnology development policy we
mean a set. of actions an organization undertakes t.o stimulat.e the invention, innovation,
and diffusion of information t.echnology in a count.ry. For example, in a 5-year national
development. plan, a country can define its information technology development policy.
That' means t.he set of actions to be undertaken during these.) years. An informat.ion
t.echnology development action is a single and indivisible act an organization under-
takes to develop information technology. Action t.ypes are ,·arious. They include for
example legal actions (restriction on what. equipment to be imported in the count.ry
. and by whom), investment actions.

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4.1
Survey of National Strategies in Information
Technology
Information technology policy can only be coherently made and applied if it is seen as
having a. legitimate role to play. Legit imat.ion mechanisms vary from country to COllJl-
try, but then' is an underlying need t.o creat.e legit.imacy as a ba.c;is for action. St.rategies
must be sufficiently pu blic to be followcd by companies as wcll ac; government. General
knowledge of an agreed strategy makes it easier for bot.h government and indust.ry to
act in a conart.ed manner. The best available model for this is t.he the Japanese 'vision'.
The process of formulating strCtt~gy is crucial.
It helps dctermine whether the
strategy can be implemented and it ca.n permit strategies to be devised which key non-
government actors are willing to implcment. This requires' broad consultation coupled
wit.h a good research base in government which can provide analysis independent of
that undertaken in industry. 'Dirigisme' suppresses market signals, making 'dirigist.e
strategies' potentially irrelevant. Slavishly taking industry's advice makes policy a t.ool
of short-run industrial competitive tactics. Policy-makers need t.o balance consultation
with strong iVldependent analysis of their own.
Economic orthodoxy is that government intervention in the economy is illegit.imate,
since unconstrained market mechanisms will optimize social welfare. Government work
in a political! reality which is generally intolerant of the operations of market meclla-
nisms, which suffer from at least two disadvantages. First, there are slow; second, t.hey
sometimes lead t.o dramat.ic reductions in real wages. Workers in industrial societies
have been h.-nown to feel that this is inappropriat.e, and even to t.ake action against.
governments ""hich appear to condone the process.
Thus there may be social policy reasons (such as a refusal to let the national income
drop t.o the level of Third \\Vorld country) why people do not actually want the market
to work. Dr Stuart L. Sm..ith, Chairman of the Science Council of Canada, argued in
this context:
When we look at the low R8D in Canada, most of the low performance is in our
industrial sector.
That is in my view, b"ecause of the fact that our industrial sector
is not oriented to the marketplace...
A pull is not occurring from the international
marketplace to our industrial sector to kfCep up with competitors and to antic£pate the
market changes ...
IVe have ie plan. TI/et word. of course, driVfS people up the 'lua/!.
46

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Economists flinch when the word 'planning' is mentioned, because there isa b.elief
among a certain school of economists that there is cosmic force known as the market,
and that any attempt to second-guess the market -which works in mysterious lJ)ays -
can only cause wrath on the part of the cosmic force and that, in any event, a bunch
of bureaucrats can never make the right decision {Do084J.
The least ideologically difficult step along the path of int.ervent.ion in the civil in-
formation t.echnology indust.ry invoh'es blanket support for all or most members of
a part.icular industry sector. It is felt that if measures must, reluctantly, be taken,
they must be taken in an even-handed way. In a few cases, it is possible to be both
even-handed and unfair - where there is only one significant national computer man-
ufacturer, there is little difficulty in providing subsidies or other supports because the
firm' survival becomes a strat.egic issue, in bot.h military' and commercial senses. But
where there are several players, it is difficult to justify favoring some and not others.
As a resul t support tends to be offered t.o all comers or, at the very least, all most be
entitled to enter the competition for support. Blanket mea.sures of this nature sup-
press economic signals about firm conduct and performance. The good, the bad and
the downright ugly all receive their share of cake. As a result, the bad survive longer
than they should and the good are underfed. On the posit.ive side, however, smaller,
weaker firms, often innovative and at the early stages of their own industrial growth,
are given assistance in their efforts to break into established oligopolies.
In contrast to blanket-support measures, military funding has t.he advantage from
the point of view of those supplying t.he money (and the few receiving it) that it can
be more selective. Since its ostensible purpose is not economic there are fewer worries
about its effects in distorting competit.ion. As a result, military suppliers a.re nurtured
over long periods of time, nursed from cont.ract to contract and technology to tech-
nology in pursuit of a goal which is above reproach:
national defense.
This is the
American Way.
Traditional Japanese views of the prosper role of the state in the nation-family al-
Iowa much broader range of interventionist measures than American ideology. A key
benefit this brings is the idea that the state can properly be selective in 'Offering sup-
port to industry. Both American and Japanese informat.ion technology policy involves
strategic targeting, not only of specific industries but also of particular firms. They
imply that rat.her than seeing nat.ionaJ suategy as tied up with national actions there
is a need t.o consider the company Jcyel more closely. ESPRIT set out strategies and
47

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r
f
i
announced a competition, which everyone inside the EEC was ent itled to enter. Tllis
contrasts with the Japanese civil policy, and to some degree the A merican military pol-
icy, of deciding that. only cert.ain firms should be allowed to enter t.he compet.ition for
support. Indeed, t.he idea that there should be some form of competit.ion among firms
for access to government support may be inappropriate in so far as some companie:,
are capable of using government resonrces to economic benefit and others plainly not.
Smaller developed countries have often to st.ruggle with the problem that in several
technologies t.hey have only one company worth supporting. The need to strengthen
what is, on the nat.ionallevel, already a monopoly (and therefore a 'bad thing' in con-
vent.ional economic t.erms and in nat.ional ant.i-t.rust law) runs against the grain.
It is difficult also to count.enance t.he idea of naJionaJ'information t.echnology strat-
egy. Yet, even if only at the level that 'our policy is that we do not have a policy', all
government.s have information technology strat.egies. This is true in strong sense where
stat.e aids become involved. Superficially, American information technology strategy
approaches the minimalist position, partly because of the complexities imposed in ex-
ecuting industrial policy via the defense and legal est.ablishments, and partly because
few instrument.s exist for co-ordinating policy.
In addition to an anti-strategic polit.ical climate, Canada a.nd Switzerland have
experienced failure of important attempts t.o int.ervene in electronics: Microsystems
Int.ernational in Canada, and the attempt t.o develop switching t.echnology by t.he
Swiss PTY in collaboration with private industry,
Belgium and Holland are much
more strongly committed to state int.en'ention and the development of strategy: na-
tional industrial policies are announced as being concerned t.o promote restructuring
through high-t.echnology indust.ry, especially electronics. The United I\\ingdom, France,
and Germany have long hist.ories of promot.ing 'national champions' in computers and
other sectors, though with mixed success. While French J:'Jlicy thinking encompasses
a national strategy for electronics, the idea is anathema in Germany and the U ni ted
Kingdom.
Japanese st.rategy formulation is far more self-consciGllsand also more delicat.e.
Relatively lit.tle money is spent on focused actions, but t.he ~rocess of deciding what
the strategic priorities are and how to spend t.he money is enbrmously important. At
its widest, this involves using the proce;:s of formulat.ing "-'isions', 1\\Tore narrowl~', it
iEvolves t.he int.ensiYe consuliations u!\\(];:rtakc[1 before embarking on indi\\'iducd ne\\\\'
48

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policy inifiatives.
In contrast with the United States or t.he 'dirigiste' French approach, Ja.panese pol-
icy formulation involves careful listening to industry and ext.ensive market research.
This means that far less information is suppressed by government. in the process of
taking decisions in Japan than elsewhere. As far oS possible, government tries to hear
what 'the market' has to say. Once consensus is reached, the ad. of publishing policy
itself reduces uncertaint.y in indust.ry: there is agreement about. t.he broad outlines of
the future. Compa.nies can act, knowing that. they act on the best. ayailable informa-
tion and believing t.hat they know the dimensions of the canvas upon which they are
t.o draw. The feeling of stepping into a future t.hat is at least partly known is very im-
portant in permitting research and development resources to be allocat.ed in part.icular
direct.ions and in permitting bold investment.s to be mace. The consensus mechanism
reduces perceived risk, and not necessarily objective risk. As Keynes said, investment
is to do with 'animal spirits' rather than sober calculation of risk [1\\e)'36].
In t.he next section we draw the main lessons of this survey,.
.
4.2
Lessons from Survey of I\\J"ational Strategies III
Information Technology
From the preceding survey we see that social inst.it.ut.ions, particularly government,
play a critical role for information t.echnology development.
The socio--instit.utional
framework "... alwo)'s influences and may somet.imes fa{:ilit.ate and retard processes
of t.echnical and structural change, coordination, and dynamic adjust.ment" [Fre88a].
This capacity to eit.her accelerat.e or ret.ard innovat.ion is critical t.o keep in mind when
analyzing the roles of inst.itut.ions. In fad, it may turn out to be difficult to determine
if an institutional adion is having a positin or negative effect on t.he development or
diffusion of an innovation, since it is difficult. to isolate the effects of one policy from the
numerous other fa{:tors affecting the process of innovation. 'Moreover, a{:celeration and
retardation in these circumstances are not market. imperfections, but are characteris-
tics of the market.s t.hemselves. Markets are socially const.ructed media of informat.ion
sharing and exchange. They reflect as well as influence the social order around them.
Institutions and markets are inseparable from one another.
What: exactly, is meant by instit mion in t his context? \\Ve mean t.he t.erm t.o include
any standing social entity that exerts infiuence and regulatory authority O\\'er socic,J en-
49

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t.ities. "Standing" is embodied in Hughes' definition from more than a half century
ago: an mstitution is a persistent. feature of social life that. out.lasts social part.icipant.s
and surn\\'es upheaval in the social order [Hug39]. The ((influence" of an instit.ut.ion is
the exerting of persuasive control over the practices, rules and belief systems of those
under tMinstit.ut.ion's sway [I\\:im79]. The primary means by which inst.itutions obtain
such inflmence are cont.rol of the education and :-'Kializat.ion process of individuals, the
s)'stemau\\t articulations of particular point.s of view (e.g., propaganda), and provision
of differellllt.ially more resources to those social activities deemed ((appropriate" and
withholding of resources from those deemed ((inappropriat.e". This influence aspect of
institut.iooal int.ervent.ion has been the primary concern of innovation researchers in the
pu blic poicy arena.
The ~egulatory" aspect of institut.ions is t.he direct 'or indirect. intervention in be-
havior ofihose under the institution's influence, with t.he specific objective of modifying
that behaTior through sanction or other affirmat.ive means. As art.iculated by Boyer,
regulation is implemented by any modality wit.h the following properties: the means of
making conflicting' decentralized decisions compatible wit.hout. t.he need for individuals
to bear in mind the logic of the overall system; the ahility to control the prevailing
mode of !reSource accumulat.ion; and the means to reproduce existing social relation-
ships thrOO'gh a syst.em of historically determined instit.utional forms [Boy88b]. This
aspect of institutional intervention has been of central concern to individuals attempt-
ing to shape institutional( especially government) policy for innovation fronl economic
precepts i~ej88].
Our concern in t.he sections that follow centers on the influence and regulat.ion in-
st.it.utions might exert in shaping the development. of information technology in African
developing countries. The immediate form of institut.ion that comes to mind in such
discussions is government, and indeed, government. is a powerful source of instit.utional
influence aDd regulation. However, there are other powerful institutions that can affect
diffusion og iniormat.ion technology. w~ list and describe below t.he institutions that
are referred to in the next sections.
1. Government Authorities. This includes bot.h national government agencies as
well as influent.ial sub-units of government. such as provinces, prefectures, states,
municipalit.ies, et.c.
')
International Agencies.
This includes ma.inly the international "out.reilch"
agencies of developed countries (e.g., US-AID), the mission agencies of broric
int.ernationil] organizations such a.~ the United 1\\'ations (e.g., U!\\'IDO, UNESCO)
50
i
,
l

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the World Bank and the International ?\\lonetary Fund.
3. Professional, Trade, and Industry Associations. There are typically na-
tionalin character, t.hough somc might. be int.ernational in influcnce. They include
scient.ific and technical societies, organizations of professionals such as informati-
cians, trade and industry associations, and labor unions.
4. Higher Education Institutions. While some of t.hese can be seen as inst.ru-
mentalities of government, in most ca$es the research-oriented educational insti-
tutions form a special class of influential organizations.
5. Trend-Setting Corporations. Within any given country, powerful companies
performing import.ant functions can have dramat.ic influence on innovation (e,g.,
IBM in the D.S.).
6. Multi-Nfltional Corporations. These orgilnizat.j~ms have demonstrated im-
portant influence in the movement of technology throughout the world, and might
. in fact constitute a primary institutional mechanism of diffusion of certain high-
technology innovations such as compu ters.
7. Financial Institutions.
These include banks, non-bank lending institutions,
equity markets, venture capital funds and informal financing arrangements. In-
sti tu tions may be domestic or foreign.
8. labor Organizations. labor unions may attempt to prevent the use of technolo-
gies which they feel threaten the job of their members. In some circumstances,
they may play a more positive role if they are convinced that the new technology
will improve working conditions without replacing jobs. In that case, unions may
participate in training programs for workers which allow effective implementation
of a new technology.
9. Religious Institutions. In some cases, a new technology may be seen to raise
moral or ethical question, in which ca$e religious institutions may play an impor-
tant role in determining the rat.e of diffusion of such a technology. The stance of
the Catholic Church against birth control is one e::-:ample.
The lessons drawn from the above survey corroborate the acquired knowledge
pointed out by the study on the rationale of technology development in cha.pter 2.
The two studies emphasize the fact that institutional <:<:~ions, as stimuli to push the
I
supply and pull demand of information technology product~, are necessary. But fun-
damentally, most of the above institutions represent pri\\<1te! or foreign interests which
are not always convergent with those of rhe de\\·eJoping country. For example. while
mult.i-naJional corporations and financi?.l in:"litutions essentiall'\\ ilim ro make monc\\·
51

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as much as possible education institutions have to spend the least money as possible.
Therefore the ~ctions of all these institutions can be contradictory. And the resulting
effect on information technology development and thereby on the development of the
country viewed as a whole can be negative. So, to protect the interests of the develop-
ing country in informat.ion technology sector, an institutional framework is suggested.
This institutional framework is described in the following section.
4.3
An Institutional Framework
The inst.itutional framework have to coordinate the actions of all the institutions
which int.ervene in information technology sector. It will play the role of referee of the
sector, design policies of national importance, develop prog'ressively execution entit.ies
(e.g., education, training, aild research institutions) in proportion as national economic
activities grO\\\\"'. It is a core of two organizations which are:
1. information technology Development Council
2. National Bank for information technology Development
These two organizations constitute the minimum pillars of an evolving structure
for designing, directing, financing, and controlling an overall information technology
development strategy in African developing countries. Figure 4.1 is a simple schematic
model of the relationships between the two proposed organizations.
Nature and Objectives of Information Technology Development Council
"information technology Development Council" should be an independent council,
an agency, or a lvfinistry by itself. So it can have enough aut.hority to guide the direc-
tion of the country in developing its information t.echnology. Basically the information
technology Development Council will address crit.ical matters of national importance
related to "pulling" the demand and "pushing" the supply of information technology
products according to the current balance between demand and supply of the market.
Supported by in-depth task force studies, such a council should progressively L!y a firm
foundation for the mastery, development, and dissemination of information technology
knowledge and know-how in t.he country. Some examples of activities of the proposed
information technology council might be:
• Investigating national needs for info,I1O"tion technology development

---

• Establishing national information technology goals
• Sponsoring detailed and comprehensive studies to plan future direction for infor-
mation technology
• Formulating national information technology policies in coordination with poli-
cies in other related fields
• Ordering priorities
• Designing ways and means to encourage co-operat.ion bet.ween education, train-
ing, and research institutions on one hand and industry, business, and commerce
on the other hand
• Coordinating the actions of all the ot her national, regional, and international
organizations in information technology development
IT Development Council
Bank for IT Development
to negoLlat.e Wltn other
to decide on issues of critical
fi n ancial inst.i t u t.ions
importance in IT field;
I-
for loans, donat.ions;
to foresee problems and ob-
to collect resources from
stades, design policies for
members, helpful
solving such problems;
- organizations, state, etc.;
to decide on priori ties.
to finance and manage projects
decided by IT Development
Council.
Figure 4.1: Schematic Structure of the Framework
National Bank for Information Technology Development in African Devel-
opmg Countries
The National Bank for information technology development. is dest.ined to finance
the implementation of the ~ational policies designed by the information technology
council. This bank has to mobilize and centralize all the resources (members' contri-
but.ions, foreign loans and legs) provided at this end. Individuals, private firms, public
agencies, stat.e or any body who have interest and possesses potential assets for in-
formation technology develcpment might be member of this bank. Some of its basic
functions might be:
I
!
• Entrusted assets are a'.'\\il~ble principally for information technology development
in the country or region. i
• Responding to the request from a c1j:O'I1l: the brtnk helps to identify rele':;:mt
techno]og...· rtnd organize a regional or Eliernrtlional cooperrttion scheme.
53

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.... ..
~
• Accooding t.o the needs of client and also to t.he funding policy and the capacit.y
of the ba:1k, t.he bank provides financial assist.ance t.o t.he projects.
• The bank also provides some t.echnical assistance, part.icularly for management. of
natiomal, regional, and int.ernational cooperat.ion scheme and project execut.ion.
• The bank operates its services by pooling the necessary funds fromassist.ing
government bodies, central or regional bigger banks, aid agencies, philant.hropic
organizat.ions, public and privat.e inst.itutions, etc..
In the following sub-section we discuss the rat.ionale of the proposed iramework.
4.3.1
The Rationale of the Institutiona~Fral11ework
Quite rightly, the reader may quest.ion this framework by posing a number of ques-
tions, including:
• How important is the proposed framework t.o t.he improvement of informat.ion
technology in African developing countries?
• Are there other configurations of institutions which may sat.isfy the development
ob jectives?
• What are the strengths and the weaknesses of the suggest.ed framework?
Clearly, the ext.ent of usefulness and importance to a part.icular count.ry depends on
the stage of information technology development and use in that country. Some coun-
tries have made considerable progress on information technology front, others are still
lagging behind. Also, other configurat.ions of institut.ions are conceivable. How,ever, t.he
suggested framework is based on broadly applicable observat.ions t.hat are likely t.o be of
more interest to those economies at early stage of information technology development.
1. The suggest.ed framework has it.s roots in the principles, procedures and practices
of management control systems. Count.ries with mat.ure organizations for strate-
gic planning, management planning and operation control a.re likely to have a.
-'
more effective information technology structure, use, and applications than coun-
tries not implementing such a planning and cont.rol framework. The expression
'more effectin' is not. meant t.o be a descriptive or general onc. It is a quant.i-
tative measure and indicator of the ~tat\\ls of information tcchnolocYv in a gi\\"(~n
0"
countr\\'. It ::;pecially means:
54

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• Ad\\'anced applicat.ions and use of computers.
• High number of skilled per~onllel.
• High number of softwares developed and implemented.
• Large number of educational, research and training programs in information
technology field at both t.he undergraduat.e and graduat.e levels.
Comparative analysis between advanced economIes and African developing
countries would support this thesis.
Practical experience of the USA, Great
Brit.ain, France on one hand and African de\\'eloping countries on the other would
corroborat.e the above reasoning.
Even bet.ween African developing couniries
themselves one can easily observe significant differences, as in the case of Algeria,
Cameroon 1 Cote d'I voire on one hand and many African developing count.ries
.
on the ot.her hand.
2. The suggested framework has its roots also in the "supply-push" and "demand-
pull" model described in the chapter 3. This framework could be a way of imple-
menting and operating the frequently emphasized issue of 'national information
technology strategy and policies to push the supply and pull the demand of in-
formation technology products in the developing country. In other terms these
strategies and policies will have to stimulate the invention, innovation, and diffu-
sion of information technology products appropriate to local environment. The
experieTlces of some African countries - e.g. Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, and
Cameroon - demonstrates clearly that the concept of 'national computing cen-
ter(s)' as the guardian for information technology development has its limitation.
This institution generally provides only education and training services to tech-
nicians. This just stimulates the diffusion of use, but at very limited scale. More
effecti\\'einformation technology policies, procedures, programs and approaches
could be designed and implemented if there were bodies and organizations simc
ilar to those suggested in the proposed framework.
The absence of the body
having similar functions such as those outlined under the information technology
development council leaves much to be desired. The experience of other develop-
ing countries such as India and Singarpore demonstrates clearly the importanc\\~
of ha\\ing an int.egrated approach to information technology development. Th~
Indian Electronics Commission is a case in point. The experience of south-eas.
Asian count.ries is of particular re]e\\'ance and significance in this regard.
5,s

---

3. TheslIlggested frame .....ork should contribute to satisfying the following needs of
Afrilim de\\'eloping countries:
(a) The need systematically to study problems and opportunities of informa-
inn technology with pa.rticular emphasis on the needs and resources of t.he
ieuntry under considerat.ion. In other t.erms, information technology prod-
i~t supply push and demand pull policies must. be designed systematically
liy taking into account of t.he global economic development of the country.
ibis falls within the domain of information technology development council,
which in this respect, is considered t.o be the 'thin k tank' interested in estab-
1Shing long-term strategies, policies, and priorities. Few African developing
muntries have studied options available to t.hem in t.he a.reas of comput-
irng personnel, data comIT!unicat.ions, education curricula and the like. The
5'lggested information technology development council has a fundament.al
mponsibility in this respect; that is the promotion of knowledge and skill
:DJ information technology and strengthening the role of information t.ech-
!JIi.!'logy in the achievement of national goals. It has a basic responsibility of
~ng the foundations for sharing scarce computing resources among var-
WlIS sectors of the country. To summarize, the information technology
~elopment council in collaboration with the national bank for
motmation technology development, has to guide the direction of
ifi]:e country in developing its information technology sector. It has
t!' identify major national issues, priorities, as well as the careful
esamination of far-reaching long-term issues of fundamental na-
me to the country concerned.
In relation t.o this, the following are some example of strat.egic issues that
mm to be high on the li:";(, of the information technology development coun-
cii's list ,of priorit.ies.
i Development of an information technology market through population
sensitizatio'l programs. This e5sent.ially aims to pull the demand of gen-
eral population and organizations for information technology product.
use.
I! National and regional coor~ration in education, R&:D, and training pro-
gri1.n1S.
.56

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111.
Encouragement through fiscal policies of foreign companies to establish
in African develcping countries. This essentially aims to push the sup-
ply of information technology products in t.he developing country.
IV.
Dcvelopment of national and rcgional ccnters for information t.echnol-
ogy transfer.
\\'. Financial support to local softwa.re industry.
(b) The need to pull t.oget.her badly needed and scarce rf~sources. Co-ordinat.ion
and collaborative efforts, on the basis of a. coherent action program wit.hin an
overall st.rategy, in the areas of education and training, for example, ~'ould
be more productive in contribut.ing to solving the acut.e shortage of skilled
comput.er personnel.
4. Although some African countries have created one form or a.nother of 'Comput.er
Society" such professional societies or associations do not have the necessary
powers and resources significant.ly t.o change the weak syst.ems infrastructure and
computing practices. Some developing count.ries are led to belicve that such com-
puter societ.ies or associations are sufficient t.o mobilize cornputing resources and
contribut.e significantly to improving the st.at.m of informat.ion t.echnology there.
Accordingly, matters are left as they are in the hope that natural evolution of
informat.ion technology events and pract.ices will eventuaJly improve the effective
use of computing resources. This is an ineffect.ive policy that has long-term neg-
at.ive consequences. Therefore, it is important to recognize the implications of
such liauted contribut.ion on the part of professional societies or associations, at
least in the foreseeable future.
o. Unt.il now, governments often pay only lip service t.o the import.ance of informa-
tion t.echnology for nat.ional development. The proposed frar:nework will under-
line the need for serious government support and backing for national information
technology development. Under this framework, the government of the country
is required to do more in the form of budget.s, detailed target.s, necessary funds,
performilnce measurement <cnd accountrtbiliiy control. Advancing the status of
.) I

---

comput.ing practices in a African developing countries can only be achieved in
a structured and coherent overall strategy backed by government support. and
accountabilit.y. Experience indicat.es that t.he actui\\] nat.ional computer cent.ers,
existing in many count.ries, cannot alone carry out such responsibilities.
Fur-
thermore, without sufficient government backing, support., co-ordination, and
planning on t.he basis of reliable manpower st.udies, it would be difficult for edu-
cation and t.raining inst.itutions to meet the real needs of t.he industry for skilled
comput.er personnel. This highlights t.he importance of t.he role played by the
proposed framework.
In view of the abO\\'e discussion the proposed framework is expect.ed to, and should,
play a significant role in st.imulating education, research, 'and training programs wit.hin
the framework of an overall information technology strat.egy. On the basis plan, bud-
get.s, grants, specific and detailed targeted, reviews, and accountability, measurement
of a African developing count.ries' s progress on the information technology front could
be made.
In the next section we present in det.ail possible information t.echnology development
actions for African developing countries t.hat the proposed framework might conduct.
4.4
Possible institutional actions
Having outlined t.he role of inst.it.ut.ions in the informat.ion technology development
process and described the inst.itut.ional framework t.o manage t.his process, we will now
discuss some inst.it.utional action issues. These action issues aim to ensure the balance
between the supply and demand of informat.ion technology products by stimulating ei-
ther. Both, supply and demand can be stimulated in t.he same t.ime "'ben the economic
growth requires it.
The discussion here is organized around t.hree dimensions of pot.ent.ial policy action.
On one dimension are the "supply-push" and "demand-pull" forces that inst.itut.ions
might exert. These forces are divided into forces for invent.ion, innovat.ion, and diffu-
cion. On the ot.her dimension are the two dominant roles of influen'::e apd regulat.ion
I
that institutions can play. Finally, one may look at the focus of such i'ltetventions. An
int.ervention may be directly aimed at the information technology sector: itself(direct)
or it may be directed at affecting the larger environment in which the information tech-
nology sector operrttes(indirect). In the c'.'lIs Me eXrtll1ples of kinds of specific adions
58
I

---

in which imlitutions might engage. The outcome of this array is shown in Figure 4.2.
Eac;l of time actions can be classified as one of seven general kinds: 1) knowledge
building, ~) population mobilizat.ion, 3) basic infrast.ruct.ure dcvelopment, 4) knowl-
edge and s.till deployment, 5) subsidy, G) st.andard setting, and 7) innovation directive.
\\Ve elaboraile each kind of action below, highlight.ing t.he argument.s for/against the
action, and noting the kinds of institutions that. might. be involved.
For each it.cm
list.ed, its plSit.ion in Figure 3.2 is not.ed by presence in one of the cells. The foclls of
such intervmt.ions (direct or indirect) is indicat.ed after each item, not.ed by D, I or D/I
(for actions which may be aimed at eit.her t.he informat.ion t.echnology sector it.self or
at a more ~eral t.arget).
4.4.1
Knowledge Building
Knowledgf building is undert~ken to provide the base of scient.ific and technical
knowledge rBJ.uired to produce and exploit. innovations. An ob\\ious form of knowledge
building is ~nsored research that helps build the base of knowledge an know-how
necessary f[!J! innovation activity. This kind of activit.y is often supported by govern-
ment.s, but. ~vernments are by no means t.he universal or direct. instit.ut.ional sponsors
of such reseHch, and the modes of support vary from count.ry to country. In the U .S.,
t.he governfllItnt role in research support is very large but is supplemented by support.
from other ~st.it.utions such as private institutions or companies. In most large West.-
ern Europe2fil count.ries t.he national government.s support. most basic research.
An
example in Eormation technology is t.he Alvey project. in Great Brit.ain, which focuses
on four are~ of enabling technologies and associated research: software engineering,
man-machin~int.erface, intelligent knowledge-based syst.ems, and very large scale int.e-
gration [BmS:?].
In expelliiive and difficult research areas a solid tradition oLint.ernational coopera-
tion h'as enu'l1ged. The ESPRIT project of the European Economic Corilmunity is an
inst.ance of RJch multinat.ional cooperation in knowledge building in advanced micro-
electronics, 5liJfiware technology, advanced information processing, and document.ation
standards [BLCS3]. In Japan the government. support.s comparatively little of t.he na-
tion's, res'earm. activit.y, but the government plays an import.ant role in mobilizing t.he
very larg~ corporate inYestment in research around part.icular topics of identified na-
tional'imp0rtance. In the Fifth Generation Project, coordinnted by the government.,
researchers cClme from a variet.y of plnces, including eight large companies and t.wo
nntional Icl1)(-iatorj~s [F'Ci,S'1]
In I\\orea th~ go\\'crnmcnl. has annoullced a plan for the
59

---

dcvelopmcnt. of scicnt.ific t.echnology by 2000, wit.h t hc dcvclopment. of VLSI capability
a t.op priority [Jac90]. I":nowledge building can t.akc place t.hrough t.he support. of ba.<:ic
research with limited immediat.e applicat.ion potent ial, or through support. of applied
research t hat. will hopefully yield particular kinds of utilities.
Al.so, inst.it.ut.ions can
have multiple objectives for supporting knowlcdge building activit.ies. The U.S. pro-
grams for development. of nuclcar science and technology wcrc guided by expectations
about payoffs t.o bot.h milit.ary application and power generat.ion, and t.he vast major-
i t.y of research funds in this field were from t.he government. [N eI8S]. The bulk of U .S.
government. funding fOf t.he development. of comput.er technology, however, was aimed
at m.ilit.ary object.ives, while research a.imed at. commercial applicat.ion was left largely
to t.he pri\\'ate sedor [FlaS5] [FlaB!].
Substantial scient.ific and technical knowledge building a.et.ivit.y is necessary for pro-
duction of innovations, but it is not clearly required for diffusion in use. In fact, several
studies of Japa.n's remarkable economic growth, which was highly dependent on adop-
tion and instit.ut.ionalization of innovat.ive industrial practices, suggest that much of
this progress was made possible t.hrough "learning by using" that did not requ.ire sub-
st.ant.ial in-place bodies of scientific and technical know-how [Ros82J. In general, we
conclude t.hat.
institutional intervention to promote I.~Tiowledge building is essential to
sustain production of innovation in the field of information technology, but it is not
absolutely required for successful diffusion in use.
4.4.2
Population 110 bilizat io 11
By sensitizat.ion we mean the encouragement of population and organizations t.o
t.hink in a part.icula.r way with respect to an innovat.ion. By encouraging the positive
view of informat.ion t.echnology, it. will be easier accepted by population at all level
and t.he diffusion in the count.ry and t.he region will be more facilit.at.ed. Mobilization
is a subtle force, powerful and very efficient if well conduced. For example, informa-
tion t.echnology can be introduce': in public educat.ion and t.raining instit.utions as an
ent.ire discipline like mathematics, physics, and ot.hers. The effed will be to familiar-
ize the students and workers wit.h information technology, creat.e the desire to use it,
and give opport.unities to students t.o eventually pursue ;nformation t.echnology career.
Since graduat.ed students from higher education become generally executive in pri-
vate as well as public organizations and state departments, t.heir sensitization could be
an import.ant force in t.he global spread of information technology inno\\'ation capahility.
60

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INFLUENCE ACTIONS
REGULATION ACTIONS
1 KNOWLEDGE BUILDING
7 INNOVATION DIRECTIVE
funding of research projects (D)
requirements for investment in R&D (D)
4 ~\\NOWLEDGE & SKILL
4 KNOWLEDGE &. SI\\:ILL
DEPLOYl\\IENT
DEPLOYMENT
provision of education services (DI)
education and t.raining (DI)
5 SUBSIDY
5 SUBSIDY
provision of t.ax benefits
reduction in general liahilit.ies
for IT innovation/importation (D)
for organizations engaging
in innovative activity (D)
6 STANDARD~
est.ablishment of standards under which
innovativ.e activit.y might be encouraged (D)
2 MOBILIZATION
5 SUBSIDY
programs for sensitization
est.ablishment of standards for products
and promotion (I)
and processes that facilitate innovation (D)
4 KNOWLEDGE & SKILL
6 STANDARDS
DEPLOYMENT
training programs (DI)
require particular products (D)
require conformance with other standards (D)
5 SUBSIDY
7 INNOVATION DIRECTIVE
procurement of innovative
utilization requirement of
products and services (D)
specific products or senices (D)
3 INFRASTRUCTURE BUILDING
data transmission network (D)
electricit.y supply power (I)
Figure 4.2 IT Development Actions
The main instit.utional instruments for this kind of sensitization are promotional and
awareness campaigns. These campaigns include advertising t.o sup:)ort use of informa-
tion technology, organizing of major events (consumer comjJuter shows), and establish-
ment of social traditions (e.g., national information technolo0,Y week). "Les Journees
Africaines de l'Informatique" organized every year in Abidj ..n i~ Cote d'Ivoire is a good
example. The organization of these "journees" must be improhd and extended to the
other African countries
Their conients (ifClde expositions, seminars, publications,
61

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shows, dc.) might concentrate on the strategic importance of information -technol-
ogy for private and public firms, especially in the context of global market.
Highly
successful eXilmples such as information technology \\Veek in Singapore and Annual In-
formation J\\'lonth in Taiwan can be cited. This mobilization effort will remain futile ifit
is isolated. It must be completed by effort in other domains like education, training, dc.
4.4.3
Basic Infrastruct ure Developlnent
Electric power supply, data transmission networks are necessary to set up the com-
puter installations (whose complexity varies from simple system to remote one) and
proyide the decentralization required in most of the applications. Local area as well
as wide area networks have to be provided. Some policy issues that will be faced in
,
promoting networking are as follows:
• Most of ..::ountries have limited communication infrastructure. Does one wait till
the communication system is in place or start gradually as requirement grows,
with limited system?
• What priority to assign to the development of data transmission network com-
pared to the other sub-sectors (population sensitization, personael education and
training, etc.) of information technology?
• Development of data transmission network on ground remains expensive and lim-
ited. Should the country move on the communication through regional satellite
which pro\\--ides higher throughput, band with, reliability, and quality.
• Consideration have to be given to the setting up of a monolithic network for all
actiyities or a set of network each dedicated to specialized requirement such as
for power system, railways, defense etc..
Political decisions must be made for all these issues.
4.4.4
Knowledge and Skill DeploY111ent
As in most technologies, in informat.ion technology human resources are the basic
asset. In most African developing countries there is a shortage of people with needed
skills, knowledge and abilities. The deployment of informat.ion technology consists in
disseminating new knowledge and know-how in the country and region. This is done
by transferring these knowledge and know-how to local people through education and
62

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training. The most. obvious form of knowledge and know-how deployment is the gen-
eral provisiolD of education to the population. The creation of a, literate and educated
population hiJS been shown to be essential to any broad innovation tradition (EasG5]
[:Mat 72]. GClII€ral
education can be mandated to include, along the way, components
of informatiolll technology related education. For example, in Taiwan every vocational
school studena must take at least four courses in computer application and ba~ic in-
format.ion technology [Che90]. Wit.hout the ability on the part of a significant number
of individuals in the population to apprehend innovat.ion pot.ential, or to recognize the
prospects for exploiting an innovat.ion, it is essentially cert.ain the production of inno-
vation and their diffusion in use cannot t.ake place. In other terms without innovative
people there can be no innovation. Favoring informat.ion t.echnology business by pro-
ducing attractive conditions of immigration can let foreign corporations establish in
the country, develop, and diffuse there their asset of knowledge and know-how. This
is an other fom1 of informat~on technology deployment. African developing countries
can follow the experience of Singapore which has established training institut.ions in
several areas of information technology. These instit.utions were created in collabora-
tion with major corporations, including a software development. center with assist.ance
from Japanese corporations informat.ion technology deployment consists also in making
available these knowledge and know-how to anybody in forms of archives and libraries
of scientific and t.echnical fads.
Certain policy act.ions for demand "pulling" have also a, stimulating effect on the
supply. For e..'(ample when information technology deployment. is conducted efficiently,
people become more skilled, develop themselves new products, and so increase the
supply volume.
4.4.5
Subsidy
A subsidy is provided whenever an institution, having resources of its own (from any
source), defrays the otherwise unavoidable costs t.o innovators and users in the pro-
cess of il1no\\Oation and diffusion in use. Subsidies take a variet.y of forms. In a sense,
knowledge building t.hrough inst.itutional grants and the provision of general education
are subsidies for innovation.
But t.he intent of knowledge building and education is
much broader is much broader than to fa.cilit;te innovation, while subsidy is generally
a t.argeted activity to achieve a specific end, such a.s an increase in the indigenous pro-
duction and/oT use of computer systems. Then, we use subsidy to describe institutional
activities designed to produce specific innO\\'ative outcomes.
63

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A good example of subsidy for innovation is the funding of prototype development
and demonstration projects that help to prove concepts and reveal possible improve-
ment(I). Such subsidy is often providecJ. by government, through one means or another,
but this is not always the case. Funding can be provided, as noted under knowledge
building above, by other institut.ional sources. The European Economic Communit.y,
for example has allocated ECD 23 million for pilot projects t.hat demonstrate innovative
new applications of informat.ion technology [.CAC90]. Less direct but. perhaps as potent
as subsidies are the encouragement of capital markets to make funds available for inno-
vative activity and acquisition of innovatin product.s or processes. These mechanisms
are generally tools of government agencies, effected through preferential treatment on
loan guarantees, provision of tax break, and so on, which are usually instrument.alities
of government.s. For example the Singapore government's Small Enterprise Comput-
erization Program encourages small enterprises in Singapore to implement computer
systems by subsidizing the cost of external expertise, and providing low-interest loans
for hardware and software purchase. In Taiwan, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has
similarly pro\\'ided assistance to computerize small and medium sized firms [Che90].
Another powerful form of subsidy is institutional procurement of innovations. This
is a particularly dramatic form of intervention when the institution is a large buyer, as
in the case of military procurements by governments or procuremen,3 of communication
equipments by national telephone companies. By specifying particular requirements,
innova.t.ive developments and production can then be st.imulated. The power of this
instrument is dramatically shown in the case of V.S. government procurements in the
areas of aircraft, spacecraft, electronics, and computers. The effectiveness of t.his in-
strument goes beyond its direct application as a form of influence on demand. It can
also be a mandate t.hat innovative product3 or processes be used as a condition of aid
for support from the institution for any reason. An example would be the required use
of particular accounting innovations for administration of institutionally funded pro-
gram. In this instance, the subsidy is for somethinc; else, but the innovation is required
nonet.heless.
A subtle but often essential kind of subsidy is direct or :ndirect support for provision
of necessary complements t.o be used with innova~ive products or processes. Perhaps
the most obvious two complements related to information t.echnoloCT Y are establishment
:
o.
and maintenance of reliable and continuous elecLical power and telecommunications
services [FlaS.5]. A different kind of subsidy can be prbvided by proscribing or prohibit-
ing the use of subs:itutb for innovation in question.
[xc,mples ar:~ given preference
64

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to domestic products or services, limiting the foreign content of products, or taxing
imported products and services.
Rule5- of Origin are used to determine application
of cust.oms tariffs. For integrated circuits, the EC Commission in 1989 reinterpret.ed
the growing principle as "The operation of cli ffusion .. " which will require diffusion of
integrated circuits t.o be built in the EC countries. Tllis is potent.ia.lly significant. for
GSP countries that export most of t.he integrat.ed circuits assembled in their cOllntries.
The protective tariffs and import restrictions of Brazil, India, and Japan on certain
information technology products and services are also well known. In these cases, the
inst.itutions provides a relat.ive advant.age, and thereby an effective subsidy, by making
the use of alternatives more cost.ly or impossible. This can be an especially import.ant
instrument for forcing out older ways of doing things by specifying t.hat they cannot
be used in work for the instit.ut.ion.
\\Ve believe t.hat
subsidies are crucial instruments oj institutional intervention m
both the production oj innovations and d'iffusion oj use in the area oj injormation tech-'
nology
4.4.6
S tan dard Set t ing
Standard setting is a form of regulation aimed at constraining options of decen-
t.ralized actors and organizations in line wit.h larger social or institutional objectives.
Standards are socially constructed; they (He agreements or "t reaties" among int.erested
parties to describe one way of doing things as "preferahle." They can be completely
voluntary, as many standards promulgated b.y professional and trade associations are,
or they can have the force of law.
Standards appear as components of knowledge
building acti"ities, knowledge deployment, and subsidy instruments. They both derive
from and help direct the course of knowledge building activities, and t.hey significantly
influence t.he codification of knowledge as it. is deployed in the society. Sta.ndards are
an important mechanism for imposing meaning and order on a corpus of knowledge
t.hat ot.h·~rwise prm'ides too ma.ny potential options to be socially applicable.
There are some notable examples of standards setting in the arena which can be
referred by African developing countries. For example, the EC Commission has acted
t.o support standardization in the area of data base a.ccess with respect to harmonizing
procedures for computer networking, formats for dat a transfer, and criteria for descrip-
tion of data bases [CAC90]. The ISO Op·:,n System Interconnect (ISO) standard has
b':'·~n prolllulgilteclto sct standilfcls of lin~iI,g hcterogeneous computer systems [I508-IJ.
6.')

---

~~I,..··~~II;:., " .
<.
And broadly spcaking, the varied efforts to cstablish thc Unix ~pcrating syst.em as a
standard falls wit.hin t.his catcgory. Over t.hc past few years, sevcral mainstream ver-
sions of operating syst.em havc convcrgcd on a fairly well-dcfincd set of features. Since
1988 t.wo st.andard vcrsions have emergcd: the Unix int.crnational vcrsion backed by
AT&T, Sun hlicrosystems and number of othcr firms, and the Opcn Software Founda-
tion version backed by IBM, Digital Equipment, Hewlett-Packard, and five other firms.
Efforts to bring Unix International and OSF t.ogether t.o build the final version of Unix
have thus far failed, but the potential for est.ablishment. of a single st.andard is widely
recognized and awaited [Ec090].
Standards appear as inst.rument.s for instit.utional intervention in inno\\'ation in sev-
eral ways. They can be estahlishEd t.o st.imulate or speed up investment in innovation
production. For example, efforts t.o build data communication controllers (an be st.alled
while different, decentralized a.ctors t.ry t.o figure out the st.ructure of the connectors t.hat
go bet.ween the machines. Setting st.andard for such conneet.ors removes an obstacle to
progress on the the more complex and important problems in developing cont.rollers.
For African developing countries, standards should be established to promote the use
of imported equipments and softwares. Potential adopters are often concerned about
future technical changes, and in particular about t.he residual \\'alue of their investments
and the upgrade pat.h for future procurements. They are reluct.ant to buy innO\\'ations
that are "nof!-standard" because these will be hard to sell subsequently, and because
any additional apparatus or protocols built around the innovation will be rendered
useless in time.
Standards are often called upon to help stabilize t.echnological domains that con-
fuse consumers in the belief that a certain world is preferable to a worrisome, uncert.ain
world, However, premature settling on a standard can have the effect of stifling inno-
\\'ation in the fut.ure by locking innovation product.ion onto a pat.h that subsequently
proves suboptimal. Standards can therefore serve to constrain as well as enhance inno-
vation, V/e believe, therefore, that standards can be an important tool 0] institutional
intervedion in innovation production and diffusion 0] use in the area 0] in]ormation
technology, but standard-setting is a risJ.-y instrumentality that must be used with great
care to avoid counterproductive consequences.
66

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4.4.7
Innovation Directive
The last category of action is the innovation directive: a command to produce inno-
vations or to use t.hem. One form of directivc is for t.he institution \\.0 produce its own
lnnovations and/or use them. This is best seen in t.he instance of a government agency
or industry that is required to dcvelop or use part.icular technologies. Another form of
directive is the requirement that organizations invest given amount.s of their resources
in research and development activit.y presumed to lead to innovat.ion. A third form
of directive is a requirement that organizations use particular products or processes
wherever they can be applied.
In general, however, directive int.erventions have a mixed record in encouraging in-
novation production or diffusion in use. One reason, ,mdpubtedly, is that instit.ut.ions
cannot easily force people to be creat.ive. Invent.ion is a form of human a.ctivity not
well underst.ood.
Like art, it occurs when a complex and fuzzy set of capabilities,
attitudes and incent.ives come together in an individual or, less often, a group. It is es-
sent.ially impossible to "engineer" innovative processes. Another reason why directives
about. innovation do not usually succeed is that, t.o be effective in accomplishment of
objectives, the directives must be t.arget.ed toward achieving specific innovative break-
throughs.
This effectively pla.ces higher-level individuals who know relatively little
about the intimat.e details of the problem in the position of directing lower-level indi-
viduals who do know the det.ails. This produced the dilemma von Hayek characterized
as the local/dist.ant knowledge problem, in which those most. empowered to act know
the least about t.he problem at hand.
We not.e that in some circumst.ances, as In a st.ate of war, condit.ions may require
development. or adoption of certain kinds of innovations if a count.ry is to prevail. This
is a highly unusual circumst.ance, in which many aspects of the social order are ahered.
For one t.hing, in the case of war wilh bread public support, individuals often willingly
sa.crin.ce personal discretion to follow t.he directives of the naiionalleadership. Private
incentive, while necessary in some aspects of wartime activity, is generally reduced.
Shared objectives become powerful motiYators of individual action, and striking re-
sults can be obtained. The technical progress made during the second war in many
areas(aviation, nuclear power) demonst.L.t~ that a kind of directives for innovation can
i
produce dramatic effects. Again, this is c:n exceptional circumstance.
\\Ve belieyc that, other than in the u.ses noted.
there is relatively little potential
for innovai7(7) diTfc!zc;",s cs useful ,:~sf;!u;;~cnn.! ins1rum"'ni.< .fer svpport oj innovation
67

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·"'l-
production tmId diffusion of use in the area of information technology.
In this cllEapter an institutional framework is proposed. It has to guide the direet.ion
of t.he countlly in advancing its infomlation technology sector. The actions that this
framework might. conduct are analyzed. These actions are varions. Certain take the
form of decNe or law, others are investment actions and so on. For the execution of
these actions concrete problems occur, including how many comput.er educated students
have to graduate in order to meet the year by year computerization needs of the
country? How mnch, and when to invest for the development of computer installations,
data transnmssion network, educat.ion and training infrastructure and facilities in the
country? H(IM' much to invest for the sensitization of the population to the advant.ages
.
and drawbads of the information technology? The associated unemployment problems
as well as the lack of computer personnel have to be avoided. Investment must be made
proportionally to the needs in order to avoid unnecessary infrast.ructure and fa.cilities
or insufficiency of equipment. Also t.he amount of this investment must be sufficient
to guarantee the quality of the facilities and a high t.echnical level of the educated and
trained peoplle. To select the optimal policies to resolve these problems a model based
on a system dynamics approach is proposed. It serves as a tool for better control of the
information iechnology sector by simulating the relationships between the computer
personnel, computer installations, and data transmission network sub-sectors.
The
model also shows the impact of the information technology on t.he national production
sector and alIlows for an analysis of various development policies, and outlines their
respective ad,·ant.ages and drawbacks on the effort of matching needs and investments.
In the follo\\\\iilg chapt.er we describe this model.
68

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Chapter 5
A System Dynamics Model for
information technology Policy
Analysis in African developing
countries
In this chapt.er we present briefly t.he syst.em dynamics met.hodology, then t.he pur-
pose and description of the model we constructed for informat.ion t.echnology policy
analysis in African developing countries.
5.1
System Dynamics Methodology
The philosophy of the system dynamics approach and the stages of the modelling
process are presented in the next two subsections.
5.1.1
Systen1 Dynalnics Philosophy
Throughout the chapters 5 and 6 we present the nature and implications of a partic-
ular view of the interactions of information technology and national production sector
that we constructed to understand bett.er the causes and consequences of planning and
investment actions in these two sectors, especially in the information technology sector.
In fad, information technology is included in production sector, but for the circum-
stances, we draw it apa.rt in order to analyze it deeply. No single element of this model
is new to human thought. What is new is the synthesis of many isolated, incomplete
perceptions into a more complet.e picture, an attempt. to comprehend the two sectors
into a whole system rather than just t heir single parts. The formal expression of in-
formation technology effect on the production s~·stem is new too. To manage complex
69

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sociotec·hnic systems effectively, policy makers must bring together a va.riety of men-
tal models, translate them into a common language, and det ermine simultaneously all
their important implications. That process of synthesis requires formal models, that is,
models whose assumptions are stated explicitly so that. they can be widely examined
and discussed. Formal model can be expressed in words, pictures, or other symbols, bllt.
they are probably best stated in mathematical equations, for two reasons: mathemat-
ics is a precise and a neutral language, understood by people from many cultures and
a.cademic fields; and assumptions expressed in mathematical not.ation can be processed
by a computer so that a great amount. of information can be stored and analyzed easily.
The model presented here is an example of a formal, mathemat.ical model of a
complex social system. Like all models, it simplifies the great complexity of the total
socioeconomic system (if it were not simplified, it would be as incomprehensible as the
real system itself). However, it is considerably more complex than any mental model.
Therefore, it is a step in the direction of greater comprehensiveness.
The method we used to s€lect,
translate, and analyze the wide variety of informa-
tion contained in the model is called "system dynamics". It is based on a modelling
paradigm quite different from 'the ones most commonly used in the physical and social
sciences.
The system dynamics approach to complex problems focuses on feedback
processes. It takes the philosophical position that feedback structures are responsible
. for the changes we experience over time. The premise is that dynamic behavior is
a consequence of system structure. As both a cause and a consequence of the
feedback perspective, the system dynamic approach tends to look within a system for
the sources of its problem behavior. Problems are not seen as being caused by external
agents outside the syst.em.
Invent.ories are not assumed t.o oscillat.e merely because
consumers periodically vary their orders. A pendulum does not oscillate merely be-
cause it was displaced from t.he vertical. The system dynamist prefers take the point
of view that these systems behave as they do for reasons ~nternaI to each syst.em. A
pendulum oscillates because there is something about its internal st.ructure that gi\\'es
it the tendency t.o oscillate. In practice, this int.ernal point of view results in models
of feedback systems that bring external agents inside the systeM.
Customer orders
become internal t.o a production system, part of the feedb,1ck structure of the system.
Orders affect production; production affects orders. Part an? parcel with the notion
of feedback. the endogenous point of view helps to characTerize the system dynanucs
3pproach.
Now we present the stages of modcllin,; process in system d:\\namjc mcthoc!o]oc;'·.
,Q

---

5.1.2
Stages in the J\\1odelling Process
1\\faking a formal syst.ems model is a nonlinear process that. in\\'o]ves many experi-
m ents
recrrec;si'ons
and reit.erations.
Nevertheless, t.he T)rocess must c\\'cle throuoh a
,
0
-
I
.
~
0
number of Iogj/(al steps in sequence; each step is dependent on the successful completion
of t.he one before. In constructing t.his model we repeated this sequence many times,
wit.h corrections and revisions being made dming each iteration. There are roughly 7
stages in approaching a problem from t.he system dynamics perspceti\\'e:
1. Problem identificat.ion and deflnit.ion.
2. Syst.em concept.ualization.
3. !llodel formulat.ion.
4. Analysis of model's behavior.
5. Model evaluat.ion.
6. Policy analysis.
7. Model use and implementation.
Policy
implementation
-<- -
{.,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,,\\./ Understanding
of a system
J..
+ 1
I
,
I
.,
Policy
.
Problem
,
,
,
2illalysis
,
definition
,,
(
-
.. -----;-------
Simulation
.
~
.
System
conceptualization
)
Model
formulation
71

---

The process begins and ends with understandings of a system and its problems,
so it forms a loop, not a linear progression.
Figure 5.1 shows these stages and the
likely progression through them, together with some arrows that represent the cycling,
iterative nature of the process. At a number of the stages along the way one's under-
standing of the system and the problem are enhanced by the modelling process, and
that increased understanding further aids the modelling effort.
Figure 5.1 shows that final policy recommendations from system dynamics study
come not merely from manipulations with the formal model but also from the additional
understandings one gains about the real syst.em by iterations at a number of stages in
the modelling process. Done properly, a system dynamics study should produce policy
recommendations that can be presented, explained, and defended without resorting to
the formal model. The model is a means t.o an end, and' that end is understanding.
The chapters 5 and 6 follow an organization similar to the stages described by the dark
path in Figure 5.1. The necessary linear organization of the cha.pters will unfortunately
tend to obscure the iterative, cycling nature that characterizes the system dynamics
modelling approach.
Although the two first steps appear to be simple and obvious, they are without
question the most difficult and important stages of the modelling process. The essence
of modelling is to simplify a system that is t.oo complex to understand in full detail.
This simplification requires the elimination of many real-world observations that are
judged to be irrelevant to the problem being studied. It also calls for the aggregation,
or grouping together, of elements that behave in a similar fashion. The decisions about
which elements to include, which to omit, and which to aggregate are crucial to the
eventual usefulness of the model, and they should be made only with reference to a
carefully defined problem statement.
In the following section we present the purpose of our model.
5.2
The Purpose of the Model
To be useful to policy makers, a model must make some stat.ement about the future,
but information about the future may take several different forms. A model may pro-
vide, for exal~ple:'
1. Absolute, precise predictions. (Exactly when and where will the next solar eclii;se i
be visible?)

---

r
r
2. Conditional, precise predictions. (If the emergency core cooling system fails, what
will be the maximum pressure on t.he nuclear reactor's cont.ainment vessel?)
3. Condit.ional, imprecise projections of dynamic behavior modes. (If corn prices
are stabilized, will hog prices tend to fluctuate more or less strongly?)
4. Summary and communication of current trends, relationships, or constraints that
may influence Jhe future behavior of t.he system. (Where does the town zoning
plan allow commercial construction?)
5. Philosophical exploration of the logical consequences of a set of assumptions,
without any necessary regard for the real-world accuracy or usefulness of those
assumpt.ions. (On a curved surface, which t.heorems of Euclidean geomet.ry still
hold?)
Our model is designed to provide informat.ion of the third sort.. We had to limit
ourselves to conditional and imprecise questions, rather than precise predictions, for two
reasons. First, social systems are by their nature unpredictable in t.he absolute sense.
Since any prediction made about the future of a social system becomes an influence
on social syst.em, the prediction it.self may change the system's behavior.
Second,
the incomplete and inaccurate data available about African developing countries do
not permit precision, even for conditional long term prediction. Thus, the two first
purposes do not appear to be feasible goals for our model.
Concretely the simulation oj our model shows not the exact values but the behavior
modes oj the different fixed assets oj injormation technology and na.tional production
sectors, national income, government expenditures, and per capita consumption over
time when investment actions are made.
The fixed assets of production sector and information technology sector designate
the cumulat.iye amounts of investment in these sectors and determine their development
Ieve!.
The intermediary goal of investment actions is to bridge the gap between the ex-
pected and really existing information processing capabilities(i.e., expected comput.er
installations and existing computer installations) in order to maximize the effect of in-
formation technology on the production sector of the count.ry. That is the permanent
goal of the manager of information technology sector who is the potential user of thj,~;
model. As the levels of these expected capabilities change according the economic and
social adi\\ities of the country, the manager, constantly, must readapt his investment
actions.
Beyond this intermediary goal. what is really aimed --the final goal of the
manager of information technology sector- is to improve the global econonucal and
73

---

social If'vel of the country. This is done, for example, by increasing national income,
national consumption, fixed assets of production sector. And the purpose of the sim-
ulation of this model is t.o detect the combination(s) of investment actions which t.he
best allow the manager to reach not only his intermediary goal but above all the final
goal.
Although precise long-term predictions for social systems do not seem to be at-
tainable, a conditional, imprecise understanding of the global system's dynamic prop-
erties is possible. That level of knowledge is less satisfactory than a perfect, precise
prediction would be, but it is still a significant advance over the level of understanding
permitted by current mental models. It should provide a useful input to the future
policy decisions that will have impa.ct on the African developing countries for many
.
years to come.
5.3
Description of the Model
In the following sub-sections we present t.he general structure, requirement concept,
causal structure, and specification of the model.
5.3.1
General Structure of the Model
The ~elationship between information t.echnology and national economy reflects that
bety.'een information technology and the t.hree production sectors (primary, secondary,
and tertiary sectors) of the country. The main relationship between information tech-
nology and a production sector is that information technology provides information
syst.ems which solve the data collecting, processing, and retrieval problems of the pro-
duction sector. Conversely the production sector provides the national income, part of
which is used to import and develop informat.ion technology. A part of national income
is invested in the asset of the production sector which in turn generates the national
income. In fact information technology is included in the three production sectors.
But we draw it apart for better invest.igation and analysis. Also, the three production
sectors are not detailed in this model because they are not the primary object of in-
vestigation of thi':, work. The general structure of the model is represented in Figure 5.2··
74

---

i lerticry secwr
seconciary seclOr
I
-
qr--cp
prim.oJy sector
0--G)
t
t
infonnation
technology
1 ftxed asset oJ priJTla.ry secto,
2 produCtion oJ priJnD.ry sector
3 na...'1onal incol7lE
4 iru.>escment in prL71.o..ry sector
Figure 5.2: Schematic st.ructure of the model
5.3.2
A Fundmnental Concept: Requiren1ent of the country
for infonnation technology
To simplify our model, the "appropria te levels:: of information processing capa bil-
ities (fixed asset of comput.er installations, number of skilled comput.er personnel, and
fixed assets of basic infrastructures for a given level of economic and social activities)
are set to be proportional to the fixed assets of production sectors. When all the fixed
a..c;set.s of information t.echnology reach ~heir respective appropriate level, informcdion
technology the most increases the productivity in production sectors. The ::appro-
priate levels:' of information processing capabilities increase and decrease when the
fixed assets of production sectors do so, in the same proportions. In fact, they are not
proportional, their relationship takes the form of S-funct.ion as represented in Figure
5.3. \\Ve suppose the fixed assets of African developing countries are greater than Aa
and smaller tha( A,<"
When the fi...\\:ed C'..5sets of production sectors are smaller than
I
Aa the economice',! attivities are consjd~red not enough developed t.o need comput.er
facilities. When tne fhee assets of proGuction sectors are greater t.h"'n .4., the need for
computeriu.:ion reacn'::s its s?(uraiior: )",·"e! AL m -
10

---

AB..(approprlale level 01 IT)
1.
AD
As
A
Fixed asset 01 production
seclor
AI = 0
when
A < AD
= (ALm / (As - AD)) • (A· AD)
when
AD < A < As
= ALm
",.'hen
A> As
Figmre 5.3: Fixed asset of production sector and appropriate IT level
5.3.3
Causal Structure of the Model
Figure 5 t presents the causal loops of the model.
The model contains fi ve level
\\·aria.bles:
1. fixed GSsets of prod uction sector
')
assets of computer installat.ions
3. infr2.S~ruetures and facilities for educat.ion, training, a.nd research
4. asset of data transnussion network
:J.
facili:i,:s for populntion sensiiization
16

---

investmcnt
govcnuncnt
/+
in produc-
cxpenditures
+ / " r - - - - - tion sector +
~
' /
" "
+ national
fixed assd
\\ LI).
national
consumption
of produ~
"--/'
income
tion sectlllri
/
+
output of
~
+
\\~....._----- production
+t
+( I.2'!,
"':r sector
~
investment
'-../'
" /+ L+
~ +
,
compUlIenza- , ,
\\
asset of
+
ln computer
tion nettds
<,' compute~
computer ~installations
'--
( L311
',,,,: installa~on"----
' \\
\\
+
installations
+"---../
I
\\
availability'
+)'
required msour-: ..
:
)~
investment
ces for cQ:Dpute~ "
:
infrastructures' /" in computer
educatio:m
:
" computer:.....-- & facilities
~
education
'-.....
: .
personne~
for education
+
+
\\ L4).
I
-
availability +
/'
~d'
:
:
J8
investment
reqIDIe
resour-
I
I
,
d t
ces for data
:
Q'ata'
asset of d a - .
i l l
a a
.
_ '
~
T
network
network
:,
network...
t2. network
.
: availability
LS
r
T
~
!'0
L."1.vestment in
,
~ sensitization
I
facilities for ~
~ sensitization
sensitization +
facilities
...w--
+
~ availability
required ~ci:-
lilies for
sensitization
~popul2.tion
Figure 5.4: Causal loops of the model
In realit... these quantities are accumulations over time of material, energy, or In-
formation. Im the model they are expressed in \\'alue (dollars). Cumulative quantities
are represenaed In dynamo language by Jenl \\'ariables. The model contains also five
rate \\'ariables:
1. 2.l\\'estl'1R:nt In production sector
')
investmrnt in computer installations
3. investIn:'ni In computer educ?lion ?nc training
{ :
".:~·~':;l~?'~,.~ .~:
.;:~(.~J~:};:~:~,~.~ ~.

---

5. investment in population sensitization
In realits, these quantities are added in the cumulative quantities (the above level
varia.bles) evcry year. The addition of these quantities to the accumulative quantities
translate the policies of the manager into actions alt.ering the state of the system. In
dynamo, rate \\'ariables are used t.o represent this kind of quantities. The other quan-
tities in the model are informations which aid the formulation of the rate variables.
This kind of information is represented in dynamo language by auxiliary variables.
The model contains eight causal loops dividcd into three groups:
1. The positive loop L1 of production sector: it includes fixed assets of production
sector, output of production sector, nCttional income, and investment in produc-
tion sector.
In fact, in the model, there are three loops of this kind for the
primar)" secondary, and tertiary sector. The fixed assets generate the national
production which constitutes a part of national income. The other parts of na-
tional income is foreign aid or loan. A fraction of this national income is invested
again in the fixed assets. The rest serves for government expenditures, national
consumption, investment in information technology development, and repayment
of foreign loans. The more the fixed assets increase the more the national pro-
duction, and thereby the national income increases. The more national income
increases the more direct investment is made in the fixcd assets of production
sectors.
And the cycle rebegins.
This positive loop works even if there is no
information technology in the count ry.
2. The negative loops L2-L4 of requirement: the three loops are functionally sim-
ilar.
Therefore, it is enough to describe only one of them.
For example the
loop L2 includes fixed assets of production sector, comp1lterization needs, com-
puter installation availability, output of production sector, national income, and
il~vestment in production sector. The more the fixed assets increase, the more
the computerizat.ion needs increase and the more the ratio asset of computer
installations to required computer installations decreases and the more the pro-
duction growth rate decreases. It is why this loop is negative. These loops express
the close relat.ionships between the economic activities and the computerizat.ion
;'it: e9s of the country. More important are the economic aeti\\'ities more informa-
I
t;on i technology products are necessary to process the generated informa.tions.
3. 1 heipositive loops 1.:>-L8 of invest ment in information technology: the four loops
are functionally similar. So, it is enou·?h to describe only one of them. For exam-
I
I
1
r --'
' 1
' I '
pe [ne 00;) 1p) InC1UGes natJO"a., !;!-'.:·:,me, in\\'estl11cnl in compl1ter installations,
78

---

assets of computcr installations, computcr imtallation availahilily, output of pro-
duction scctor. The more investmcnt is madc in computcr installat.ions, thc more
the fixed asset.s of computer inst.allations incrcasc and the more the ratio asset. of
computcr inst.allat.ions to requircd computcr inst.allations incrcascs and t.he morc
the produciion incrcases. It is why this loop is positivc.
The specific mca,ning of a sign is almost obvious from t.he context, and t.he simplic-
ity we gain is one of the strengths of these diagrams. Hence, wc define:
+
B
A
A causa] link from A to B is posit.ive (1) if A f\\dds to B , or (2) if a change In A
produces a change in B in the same direction.
B
A
A caus?.llink from A to B is negat.ive (1) if A subt.ra.cts from B, or (2) if a. chwge
in A produces a change in B in t.he opposit.e direction.
To determine the poluit.y (sign) of a proport.ional-t.ype link like the links of Figure
5.4, ask wn2.t happens to B wllen A increases or decreases. If an increase in A results in
an increase in B, the link is positive; if a decrease in B results, then the link is negati\\·e.
Otherwise the existing informat.ion processing capa.bilit.ies of information technol-
ogy, that is the fixed a..c;set of comput.er installations, number of skilled computer per-
sonnel, fixed assets of basic infrastructures, and facilities for population sensitiz;dion
increase and decrease under two effects: recruitment and retirement for the comput.er
personnel, depreciations and investments for the other capabilities. The more impor-
tant are the fixed assets of information t.echnology, the more information technology
provides th e nat.ional economy wi th capabili ties for information coll eci.ing, processing,
and retrieving. In Figure 5.4 computer installation 2\\'aiJability, computer personnel
availability, or,La transmission network ·2Yailabilit.v ?nd sensitizat.ion facilit.y availabil-
-
- )
..'
i,), define :~e g?p be,ween the capahility onered by the dinerent sub-sectors of the
information t-:chnology sector and the "requirement" of t.he prod llcticn sector. The set
Of tl1e~-? ;::.\\"2.i~c.1:;.·.ll·t· J',?~ fl".'e-.· ',' ~ t"nt? ,gl,Ol'\\~_'1 .
:'
r ..
' J
1
. , .
"
i '
. •
-- ,.
-
-.
_.,.
-
_:::
'-'c.
In.luence 01 ~11': Iniormc.LJon lecnno ogy 0" c11,:
19
~~A)~~~~~~::~.:-~,
(~:f,!}:'::·:*(l~~..,:. :

---

~ t.
.. .
production ~tor. In fact, this infiuence is exerted not directly on the production as
reported on figure 5.4 but t.hrough increases or decrea.<;es in the normal fixed asset. -
output ratioQf the production sector. When all the requirements are met the informa-
tion t.echnology increases the fixed asset - output ratio of the production sector. When
information technology is not sufficiently developed (when t.he asset.s of computer in-
stallations, data transmission network, etc. are derisory) it cannot help to sohe the
data processing problems which are a cause of the low level'of t.he fixed asset-output
ratio in the production sector in African developing countries.
5.3.4
Speeification of the Model
The specification is made according t.o the 5 sub-sectors ,of the model: product.ion,
computer instaHations, education a.nd training, data transmission network, and gen-
eral population sensitizat.ion. To st.udy the effect of education and invest.ment policies
on informat.ion technology and national production sectors t.hese five sub-sectors are
enough. They cover the framework of inform,tt.ion technology sect.or used in chapt.er 2
to describe the current status of information technology development in African devel-
oping count.ries.. They are detailed in the model.
A) Production Sub-sector
This sub-section addresses the generic production sub-sector. Figure 5.5 represent.s
the part of t.he causal loop diagram related to t.his su b-sector.
Figure 5.6 represents
the dynamo diagram of Figure 5.5. The fixed assets of t.his sub-sector increase under
the effect of investments.
Investments are made by the government when it is nec-
essary.
These investments take a certain time t.o reach the relat.ed fixed asset.s.
To
simplify the concept.ual loop diagram of the model this t.ime deJel)' does not appears
in Figure S.5, but is represented in Figure .5.6. This time delay.causes change in the
amount of investment made. Therefore, when a amount. INVP is invest.ed, a delayed
amount DINVr, different from INVP, reaches the related fixed asset after the time
delay (tdips'. The fixed assets decrease under effect of depreciation. The depreciation
is not represented in t.he concept.ual causal loop diagram in Figure 05.5, but appears in
the detailed dynamo diagram in Figure 5.6. National income is made up by' the annual
>
product.ion and eventually loan or aid from abroad. Loan and aie· c:ppear only in the
I
dynamo diagram.
I
80
·~',Lfj~~~1(~~t~~·· .
.'·;~~J:Jf~:·.~~...:.

---

investment
government
in produc- _.<-__~
/ expenditures
~~-----tion sector +
~ /
+ national
fued asset
national
consumption
\\ LIJ.
of produc-
'-......./.
income
tion sector
I +
output of
~
+
.
--~/
~.----->'"- production
-.c:;:,( sector \\-
_--
, + L+
+',
,
I
,
,,
~' co~puter
",
,
\\ installation
"
\\,
\\
'
,,
" a vallabili ty
"
I
\\
,
I
\\
,
I
\\
,
I
I
\\
" computer
I
\\
\\ personnel
I
\\
I
\\
availability
I
\\
I
\\
I
\\,
I
I
\\
data
I
I
\\
,
\\
network
,
\\
availability
,,
\\,,
" sensitization
\\
facilities
a v2J.lability
Figure 5.5: Causal loop of the production seet.or
The other fixed assets (education facilities and infrastructures, data transm.ission
network, and population sensiLization) in sub-sectors C, D, and E increase and de-
crease in the same way. Therefore, the explanation of their variation principle will not
be repeated in t.hese sub-sectors. Only t.he mathem<lt.icai expressions of the vari<lbles
of the dyne.mo diagrams are represented.
Below follow the level, rate, and a.uxiliary
e·-::uations related to the variables of the Figure 5.6.
Fixed oss::!S of production sub-sector ?SASS
psass.k = psass.j + dt * (dinvp.jk - dpsa.jk)
(1)
psass = 83/.58 ..,1 x 105 , S4071.6 X 106 , and S19S3.6 x ]06 for respectively primary,
5''<0
dary: ?na tertiary sector for year 19EC'.
81

---

psass
prod uction scc t.or asset.
IpSasS
initiaJ \\'aJuc of asset.
din\\'p
delC\\)'cd investment in prod\\lction scctor
dpsa
deprcciation of production sector C\\!'sct
k
act.u it1 si mu la t.ion ti mc
J
last simulC\\tjon time
dt
simll];dion time(l yeC\\r)
jk
pcriod or-time bet.ween j C\\nd k
We have est.imat.ed the abovc ini{j(\\l '"alues from t.he 5-year nC\\tional devclopment.
plan of Cote d'I\\,oire (1985-90).
requirement
required investment
depreciation
satisfaction
in production sector
rate PSADR
rate FIPSA
asset RIPSA
,
,
.-'" ... -
-
... -......
I
'..l..... Y
delay
production
sector asset
V
PSASS
/ \\ DPSA
foreign aid
r
& loan FAL
depreciation
.--~-.:.f:
nonnal
, production
,
:ratio
\\.
national
,
,
cons\\lillption
,
NPRATIO
,
,
asset
CONS
,
,
,I-'
,
production
,
government
,
IT effect
ra ti 0
-------+--
,
expenditures
,
,
E
PAOUR
,
G'VT
f
./
currency
, '
,
,
'.,
outflow
,
,
{.
,
,
,
" , sensitization
I
,
CO
DTN avai-
I
,
,,
facilities
lability
I
,,
aYall..ability
I,
,
DT!\\A
PSFA
CP Rvai-
Cl availa-
lablli ty
bility CIA
CPA
Figure 5.6: Dynamo di?gr?m of t.he production sector
82

---

Investment in production sector INVP
dinvp.kl = dclay(invp.jk, tdips)
(2)
lnVp
investmcnt in production sector
tdips
time delay between invcstmcnt. and its rcaching in asset
\\Ve have estimated tdips to 2 years from our professional expericnce.
invp.k = ac.k * ripsa.k * fipsa.k
(3)
ae
adjustment coefficient
npsa
required investment in production sector asset
fipsa
satisfaction rate of ripsa
If inv.k < tra.k
ac.k = illv.k/tra.k
(4)
InV
total investment
tra
total resources allocated.
But if inv.k > tra.k we use
ac.k = (inv.k - ittra.k)/pstra.k
(5)
ittra
resources allocated to information technology sector
pstra
resources aJlocated to production sector
tra.k = ~ri.k * fi.k
(6)
n
required investment for sink i
fi
satisfaction rate for sink i
There are eleven sinks where investment is made: computer inst.allations in primary,
secondary, tertiary sector, education facilities and infrastnlctures, professor education,
direct investment in primary, secondary, and tertiary sector, basic infrastructure and
facilities for population sensitization.
Total invEstment INV
inv.k = ni.k - cons.k - gvt.k - co.k
(7)
1lI
national income
cons
national consumption
g\\'t
gO\\'ernmcnt expendit ll[eS
co
currency ou l fio\\,'
83

---

Two policy parameters define the proportions of nat.ional income allocated t.o con-
sumption and government expendit.ures.
co.k = plllsc(col,co2,co3,co4)
(8)
col
currency outflow (amount of repayment. for loan)
co2
number of year where repayment is made
c03
time of the first repayment
c04
int.erval between repayments
National income NI
ni.k = prod.k + fal.k
(9)
prod
national production
fal
foreign aid and loan
fal.k = pulse(fall, fal2, fal3, fal4)
(10)
fall
amount of the aid or/and loan
fal2
number of year where aid or/and loan is allocat.ed
fal3
time of the first aid or/and loan
fal4
interval between aids or/and loans
The country can get aid or loan from abroad. \\Nith the above pulse function, this
aid or loan can be introduced in the model at any moment of simulation time.
dpsa.kl = psass.k * psadr
(11)
psadr
depreciation rate of production asset
Depreciation coefficients of production assets are equal to .1, .07, and .05 for fixed
assets of primary, secondary, and tert.iary sector respectively. That means la, 14, and
20 years for their respective life time. These values have been estimated by Meadow in
[Mea74]. Th~ annual depreciation equals the current level of the fixed asset multiply
by the depreciation coefficient or divided by the average life time of the fixed asset.
Different values of psadr are test.ed because the life times of fixed assets are different
according to the countries. These different values do not affect t.he global behavior of
the model.
84

---

Natio7lal production PRO 0
prod.k = ps<,ss.k * p<lollr.k
(]~)
paour
production asset output ratio
paour.k = npratio.k * E
(13)
E
effect of information tech nology on prod uction sector
npra.t.io
normal output ratio of production asset
Normal production asset output rat.ios are equal to ], .5, and ..1 for primary, sec-
ondary, and t~rtiary sectors respectively. These values have been.estimated by l\\-feado\\\\'
in [J\\1ea74]. Also different values of npratio are tested. They cJo not alter the global
behavior of the model.
x = o. y =0
E = 1.0
x =1. y = 0
E = 1.0
E
x =O. Y = 1
E = 1.0
x = 1. Y = 1
E=Em
Em } - - - - -
-,
I
I
I
I
r-----------------------
I
I
I
I
I "
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
------T-----------------~-
I
I
I
1
I
x
I
I
I
I
x: penetration level
I
I
I
of computer installations
I
i
y : quality dimension of
the penel:ation level
>
Iy
ss
.. ,

---

To build the function expressing the effect E of informiltion technology 011 produc-
tion sect.or we use t he following (\\S~\\Il,1pt ions:
•
informiltion technology effect on production sector depends on the level of
penetTiltion of computer insfallil(iollS
•
The qUillit.y dimension of this penefTiltion depends on
•
Computer Personnel A\\'ailability
•
General Population A\\\\'areness
•
Data Transmission Net.work .'haiJilbilit.y
•
information technology increases producti\\'ity of fixed a.sset of production sec-
t.ors up to a ma...ximum value P
.
According to these assumptions the chancieristics of the E-function are described
In the above Figure 5.7. The exad form of E-funct.ion is represented in Figure 5.8.
£
0.5
?igure 5.8: Form ~.{ the function enect (E)
V/hen the penei'2.tio;1 level of cornDUie, in5i?Jl?\\ions is nl?int<tined to 1 <tno ihe
,.
~
.
1
j':J:-nl c': ; no::
.5.9.
SG

---

1.15-
1.1-
1.05-
---L...--:c:::::::=::;::=::=---....---+-----+----:------+------+l.-2- - r d-
0.6
Figure 5.9: E when :z: = 1
\\Ve use the following classic function y = exp(-(x):2) of Figure 5.10 to compute
E-function.
Trigonometric ?_nd polynom.i?J functions could be used.
But the above
exponential function presents two ?dyant.ages:
• It expresses the saturation feature(aHer a the saturation level of information
technology nxpd asset, more investment. does not incre?.se the enect of information
technology on productivity).
• All dinerential coemcients are 0 when x is equal to O.
In other terms when x is equal to 0 or
the variation of the erred is very small.
"T
0.: T
o. eT
c. ~T
c'::1
::
::
.- j2Ure ,), JD: .,

---

If x and y represent the penetration level of comput.er installations and the quality
dimension of this penet.ration level respectively, the following expression of E-fllnc1 ion
E(x, y) = K * (f(x) * f(y)) + 1
(14)
meets the above assumptions.
Also, as E(x, y) = Em when x = y = 1, equat.ion(14) becomes
Em = K * (f(l) * f(l)) + 1.
(15)
Then we have
V/hen we replace K by its new expression(16), eqllation(14) becomes
f(x) * f(y)
E(x, y) = (Em - 1) * f(l) * f(l) + 1. (17)
As f(x) and f(y) have the forms of equation y = exp( _(x)2) , that is
f(x) = 1 - exp( -nIx2) (18)
f(y) = 1 - exp( -0' 2y 2) (19)
eql\\ation(l7) becomes
(1 - exp(-O'IX 2)) * (1 - exp(-0'2y2))
E( X, )
Y = (Em - 1) *
+ 1 (20)
I
(1 - exp(-oI)) * (1- exp(-0'2))
.
In the model,
88

---

x = cai (21)
y = f( cpa, psfa, cl tna) (22)
where cpa, psfa, and dt.na are supposcd to \\'ar,\\' from 0 to 1. \\Vith thcse assumptions
the relation bet.wcen y and cpa, psfa, and dlna can bc \\l'riUcn as follows:
V/hen \\l'e replace x and y by their expressions(21) and (2.3), t.he expression(20)
becomes
.
1 - exp(-o'1(cia)2)
E(cla,cpa,psfa,dtna) = (Em -1) *
.. (
)
*
1 - exp -0-1
1 - exp( -0-2 (.Blcpa + .B2psfa + .BJdtna)2) + 1. (24)
1 - exp( -0'2)
With
cpa E [0, 1J; psfa E [0,1]: dtna E [0, I}
B) Computer Installation Sub-sector
Figure 5.11 represents the part of th~ c?~s(d loop diagram re]i'l!ed to this sub-sector.
investment
co:npute:izE.-
f....
in computer
t
E.sse
0
~instaJlations
tiOD needs
compute:
computer
"'-----_--;__
~- in
-----
5 talla ti 0 Il
.;.
-,,-'
inst~tions
E. v2..ilabili:y
Figure 5.11: CausaL!e'op of the comput.er inst.allat.ion sub-sector
I
!
,
This part of the causa) ]oop(li?gr?m Ge?]s with the r?tio computer instcdlations to
required comput.er inst.?.11ei.!ons. F'igurc~::? present.s the d.'"n<ll11o diagr2.n1 of Figure
5.11. Be]o\\,. lo])()\\',. t!l::O: !'C·.e): :2.i.·~ 2.'1'~ 2~< .:?;'" eqc.;ations related to the \\"2.r;2.bl::o:s 01
29

---

Figure 5.12.
computer
installation
,""- avallabiUty
;f
CIA
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
depreciation
,
,
rate CIDR
,
,
,
,
,
,
adjustment
,
.. '
,
coeffici en t
..... i. r
, "
delay
AC
computer instal
la ti 0 n a,s set
I--------r:,,--------
ClASS
investment in
depreciation
computer instal-
lations INVCI
Figure 5.12: Dynamo diagram of computer inst.allations sub-sector
ComputeT installation asset CrASS
ciass.k = ciassj + dt * (dinvci.jk - cidjk)
(:2.5)
iciass = S2 x 106 , S~ X 106 , and SI x 106 for comput.er installations In pnmary,
secondary, arid tertiary sector for year 1980.
ClasS
exjsting computer installation asset
IClasS
initial value of asset
dinvci
delayed investment. in computer instcdlations
cid
depreciation of computer installation c.sset
Depreciation factor is equal to .1(the life time of computer instalJation is set to be
10 years in African developing countries).
J71vestmeiii in computeT installations INVCr
dinvci.kl = delay(invci.jk, tdips)
,:,.!
InVCl
investment in computer installations
t.dips
time delay between investment and its rea{:hing in asset
Time de1?,,·(tdi)Js) is ·::;stim2.red to ? :\\',:ars. This includes time (0 develop ilppliu.-
t ions and
90

---

.. ;;;. ~, ' .,."
invci.k = ac.k * rici.k * fici.k
(2'1)
nCl
required investment. in computer insti\\llat.ions
fici
sat.isfaction rale of rici
rici.k = clip(O, clip(rl.k, rm, C1..S, arts.k), aO, aas.k)
(28)
rl.k = (rm/(as - aO) * aas.k - rm * a.O/(as - a.0))
(29)
rm
ma.'\\:imunl value of comput.erization needs
aO
value of production fixed asset under which there is no
com pu t.eri z ation needs
as
\\'alue of production fixed asset after which t.here is Si\\t mat.ion of
computerization needs
Comput.er installations are di\\'ided int.o computer inst.allations for pnmary, sec-
ondary, a.nd tertiary sectors in- the model. But inside one sect.or the different types of
computer systems and applicat.ions are not distinguished.
C) Ed ucatiol1 and Training Sub-sector
This sub-section deals with the education and training sub-sector. Figure 5.13 rep-
resents the part of the causal loop diagrC'.m re] aLed to t.his su b-seetor.
required resour-
invest:nent
ces fo:- compute:::-
infras Lructur es
../ in comuuter
education
compute:::-
& facilities
~
education
............~
,
personnel.
for education
- availability""
Figure .5.13: First level of cC'.usalloop of comput.er eduudion and training
Figure 5.14 shows 2. decomposition of the Figure 5.]3. This decomposition is par-
tial. In fact in the model, resources includes education in fr a...:;truet.ure , facilities and
professors (human resources). This sub-sector is divided into two parts: 1) comp\\.lte~
students and personnel 2) reSCl.lrces for education, training, and research.
91
',;~' :

---

-
computer personnel
required
availability
\\
comp~ter
personnel
-----.. -
+ computer
students
~stud)ing training
conditions
condltions
+~
+r
/
+
requir:d
~
resources
------.....
_ studying & trainlng
resources availability
, -
+~
\\
.,..
investment
existing
in resources
resources
......+
Figure 5.14: Second level of causal loop of comput.er ed ucat.ion a.nd training
1) Computer Students and Personnel
Figure 5.15 presents the dynamo diagram of computer students and personnel.
Computer students and personnel i'.re di\\'ided into engineers, programmers, and con-
sole operators. The personnel like punch operators are not taken into account. Because
this education is pro"ided by computer lTJi'.kers or pri\\'ate schools and generally not con-
trolled by government.
The entra.nce rate of computer studen~s in education institutions is a fraction \\'ary-
ing from 0 to 1 of the diner,:;nce of the required computer personnel and the currently
working personnel.
All the graduate scudents are supposed t.o enter the computer
personnel profession. Infrastructure, facilities, professors aYailabilities and standard of
living of students' fwulies deternur~ the studying condition factor (SCF). In the same
way, infrastructure, facilities, and professor a\\'ailabilities define the training condit.ion
factor (TCF). The two factors
riticaUy influence the graduation rate, the schoollea\\··
ing rate of the st.udents anG ih
profess:c'l lei"\\lng rate of the computer personnel.
92

---

profession
required
>-
computer personnel
leaving cod. POR
computer
a,nUnbllity CPA
personnel
"<:l.
personnel blrlng''
RCP
"
..<::
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - rli£c- h""R - - - - - - - __ :: ' ,
r - - - - ,
r---~~---""
computer
computer
students
personnel
cs
CP
I
scbool entrance
profession
rate SER
" leaving rate
I
I
PLR
""'<:. -
training
condJtlon
factor
TCF
T
;1'
school leaving
,
,
~ \\-', professor
~
J..
rate SLR
,
,
,
,
availability
I
,
\\,
'...
,,'"
I
life standard
',PA
,,'
"
\\
,
,
\\,
,
,
LL
,
,
,
I
~: facility
I
inirast.ructure'
a .. a1lablli ty FA
a n..ilabll1:y lA
Figure 5.15: Dynamo di<3,gram of computer education and training
When se? is equal to or near 0 most of students leave education institutions \\\\"ith-
out having graduat.ed, When it is near 1 (better studjing conditions) more students
graduate every year and enter the comput.er personnel profession; almost nobody leaves
school wit.hout graduating. \\Vhen TCF is equal to or near 0 comput.er personnel leave
the profession afier a short period. The rapid development of informat.ion technology
makes them "obsolete", since they do not train regularly in using the new products.
Figure 5.16 reports the curves of school leaving rat.e(slr)(2), graduat.ion rate (gr)(l)
in function 01 SCF and profession leaving rate(lr)(3) in function of TCF. The numhers
of computer students and personnel are cumulative. So, they are expressed in dynamo
equat.ions by leyel variables. School entrance rate, graduation rate, computer profession
entrance rate, ?.nd school lea\\1ng rate alter every year the numbers of students' and
,"
,'.;

---

t.'
-.tc'~_ ..
personnel. Therefore, in dynamo equations they arc represented by rate \\'ariables.
l.r
4Lr I
'a"
C . I -
0.'
so=
0.2
Figure 5.16: Graduation rate(l), school and profession lea\\'ing rates(2)(3)
cp.k = cp.j + dt * (hr.jk - plr.jk)
(30)
icp = 450
cp
computer personnel
lCP
initial value of computer personnel
hr
computer personnel hiring rate
plr
personnel lea\\ing rate
plr.kl = cp.k * por.k
(31)
\\
cosh(P(hl pa.k + '2 fa .k + '3 ia .k ) - 1)) - 1
por. kl
- = A *
(32)
cosh(p) - 1
-11,/'2,13 designate the proportions of professor a\\·ailabilic\\,. facilities C\\\\·ailabili·\\'.
.",
.',
,
training poLen;i?lity, and infrastrucll.1re ('.·;ailabiliiy in Ter. In (he ;nod-:=!, .45,35,
and .2 have been used fo~ ~11ese propo:tion::. ~\\ designC1"t.es the j:1\\:C'r3~ of lh-:: n12,X.1:11U;-:"!
94
>~
'" ~";' ~~fr~~··~::·.".

---

time a woxier spends in the profession in the case of no training. Tests suggest 5 as
better val~ of J-L.
hr.kl = ps.k * gr.k
(33)
e expresses the limit value of the graduation rat.e. For system engineers e is equal
to .2. That means a maximum of 20% of students graduate every year. a indicates
how quick the graduation rate reades the limit value.
es.k = csj+ dt * (eser.jk - hr.jk - slr.jk)
(35)
ies = 4SS
cs
computer students
lCS
initial value of computer students
cs er
computer student education rate
sir
educat.ion institutions leaving rate
slr.kl = ps.k * lr.k
(36)
/31, ,82, (33, ,B~ designa te the proportions of professor availability, fa.cili ties avail abili ty,
standard of living of students' families, and infrastructure availability in SCF respec-
tively. In the model, .4, .3, .2, and .1 ha\\'e been used respectively for these proportions.
Many \\'alues are tested for n and m, n=m=.5 suit better to the simulation results.
An existing asset can become greater than the required asset. So the related rat.io
becomes superior to 1. But even in this case the effect of this ratio on SCF or TCF
remains the same cos when:t is equal to 1. Therefore, in the equations (2), (4), and (6)
the five ratios ha\\"~ the following expressions.
pa.k = (1 + (pi".k/rpf.k) -11 - (pf.k/rpf.k)I)/2
(38)
fa.k = (1 -7- (f.kjrf.k) - 11 - (f.kjrf.k)f)j2
(19)
ll.k = (1 -7- (hi.kjllhik) -/1 - (hi.k':lhik)l)j2
(.10)
9.5

---

ia.k = (1 + (i.kjri.k) - 11 - (i.kjri.k)l)j2
(·11)
The ctbo\\'e rclcttions are translaled in dynamo expressions by I.lle fol1o\\\\'ing clip fllnc-
Lions.
pa.k = clip((pf.k/rpf.k), 1, rpf.k, pf.k)
(-12)
fa.k = clip((f.kjrf.k), 1, rf.k, Lk)
(,13)
Il.k = clip((hi.k/nhi.k), 1, nhi.k, hi.k)
(-H)
ia.k = clip((i.kjri.k), l,.ri.k, i.k)
(45)
2) Ref-ources for Education and Traini'ng
Figure 5.17 presents the generic cctusctl loop of resources for cc1uccttion, training,
and resear~h. In the model, these resources are di,'ided into education facilities, infras-
tructure, and professors.
reQ.uired
res 0 urc es
--------..:: studying & L-aining
resources availability
.
-~-+~
\\
.,..
investment
existing
in resources
resources
Figure 5.17: Causal loop of education resources
a) Education Facilities
Education fctciJities include computer hardware and software, technical rniews, and
so on. Education facilities are cumulaiive quantities, which increase or decrease every
year under eneet of investment and deprecir.iion. It is thus represented by level "ariable
in dynamo equations.
f.k = f.j + dt * (fir.jk - fd.jk)
(46)
if = S224 x ]0 3

---

f
educa tion facili ties asset
if
in i ti a.l '"a.l ue of asset
fir
delayed investment in facilities
fcl
depreciation of facility assct(.~)
in ell! ty
I
,-r"
availability
:1
/'
FA
,
I
,
,
I
,
t
,
,
i
,
,
i
,
depreciation
,
I
,
rate FDR
,
,
I
,
,
I
,
,
,
,
!.i
adjustment
\\
,
,----.
,
coefficient
' ..... \\ r
dellly
,/ "
-~ y
iI
-~~Ur----I--''_U~~~Y_I E
AC
depreciation
investment in
educatlor. facilities
D\\OVCEF
I'
i
Figure 5.18: Dynamo diagram of t.he educat.ion facilit.ies sub-sector
ii!
fir.kl = delay(invcef.jk, fird)
(47)
invcef
investment in education facilit.ies
ilra
delay time between investment a.nd its reaching in asset
invcef.k = etc.k * rief.k * fief.k
(48)
rief
required investment in education facilit.ies
fief
satisfaction rate of rief
The amount of required facilities is proportioned to the tot.al number of student.s.
rief.k = csefc.k * cs.k
(49)
csefe
facility cost of a st.udent.(800S per st.udent)
The fonowing clip function allows to upda.t.e t.his cost any time during the simula-
tion.
csefc.k = clip( csdc1, csefc2, time.k, cscfct)
(.50)
csefc 1
first va.lue of the indi\\'idu?J cost
csefc:2
s'2cond \\'2Jue of th'2 indi\\·idu?l cost
csefct
I ;
97
I1"

---

b) Education Infra.5t.ructure
Education infrastructures include things like school builcling~.
infrastructure
,"1"
availability
;<
lA
,
,
,
,
-< - - -
,
,
,
,
depreciation
,
RI
,
rate
IDR
,
.
,
I
,
.
I
,
.
,
I
I
adjustment
•
"
------
I
coefficient
" ~ f
delay
" .,'
......
Y
~c-
Dj-
'Iln~,::;uot='
AC
12<
depreciation
investInent in
infrastructure
ID
L"t"VCEI
Figure 5.19: Dynamo diagram of the education infrastructure sub-sector
i. k = i.j -+- cl t * (i ir .j k -- icl .j k)
(51 )
ii = S.336 x 103
educat.ion inf~a.structure asset
II
initial yalue Ol asset
m
delayed investment in infrastructures
id
depreciation of infrastructure asset
iir.kl = dclay(invcei.jk, iircl)
(5:?)
Invcel
in-;estment in education infrast.ructures
iird
delay tim~ between investment and its reaching in asset
invcei.k = ac.k * riei.k:t n.ei.kk
(53)
nel
required investment in educai.ion infrastructures
fiei
satisfaction rate
Requirec. 7'ducation infrastructures are also proportional to the total number of stu-
,
.
cents.

---

rf.k = cscic.k * cs.k
(54)
cselc
infrastructure cost of a s!uclcnt(2.100S per studcnt)
The following clip function allows !o update this cost any lime eluring the simula-
tion.
cscic.k = clip(cseicl, cseic2, time.k, csciet)
(55)
cseicl
first value of the indi"iduaJ cost
cseic2
second value of the individual cost
cseict
time t.o change the infrastruct.ure cost per s!udcnt
Depreciation rat.e of education infrastructure is .0.5 while that of facilities is .2. Fa-
ciliCies(computer) depreciat.e more quickly than infrastructure.
c) Professor Education
According to the number of students the number of required professors is deter-
mined. And the education of these professors is planned and executed a.s far a.s available
resources allow it.
education
computer
cost per
students
,,' professor
- ->-
,
cs
"
ECPF
,., --
,
,
professor
,
,
-~ availability
y
,
;f
PA
,
required
,
,
investment
,
,
in professor
,
,
,
education
,
,
,,
,
,
\\
,
\\
,
\\
,
\\
,
adjust=e::l~
\\
,
, , ' (
)$
,
coefficien~
delay
AC
professors
-ZS\\-----r.--v-I jf--t----I PF
school enL-ance
?FE
_.
~lg'J;:~
ecuca 1.ion Sl: b-sec to~
99
!t'

---

pf.k =wf.j + dt * pfur.jk
(56)
ipf =Z'5
pf
-
professors
ipf
-
initial number of professor
pilu
-
professor hiring rate
The ini&J. value of number of professor is picked up directly from the ((Plan Infor-
matique of COte d'Ivoire (1985-90).
pflu.kl = delay(pfe.jk, pflud)
(57)
pfe
:
professor education rate
pfhrd
:
education time (7 years)
pfe.k =mvpe.k/ecpf.k
(58)
invpe
::
resources allocated for professor education
The follaming clip function allows to update this cost any time during the simula-
tion.
ecpf.k =clip(ecpfl, ecpf2, time.k, ecpft)
(59)
ecpfl
fust value of the professor education cost
ecpf2
:
~cond value of the professor education cost
pfer
:
time to change the professor education cost
rpf.k = (CSo.k/nsp.k
(60)
cs
: O(wmputer students
nsp
:
number of students per professor
nsp.k =dip(nspl, nsp2, time.k, ns-pt)
(60)
nsp1
first value of the number of students per professor
nsp2
second value
nspt
time to change the value during the simulation
100

---

D) Data Tral1srnissio 11 Network Sub-sector
Figure 5.21 prc5cnts t.hc part. of thc cau5alloop diagram rclajcu (0 da(.a. tr(ln5mis-
sion network 511lb-sect.or. Figurc 5.22 rcprcscnt5 t.hc uynilmo c1i;)gr;)m of Figure ;J.21.
investment
required resour-
--.--- in d a t a
ces for data
data
asset of da-
+
network
netwoz-k
network
....; - - - ta network
availability
Figure 5.21: Causal loop of the data transmission net.work sub-sector
The levcl, rat.e, and auxiliary equations relat.ed t.o the \\'ariablcs of Figure 5.22 are
de5cribed ill t.hi5 su b-sedion.
data network
,Y availability
.{
I
DT1\\A
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
depreciatio:l
I
RDT1\\'
I
rate
_A.DT1\\'DR
I
I
\\
,
,
\\
I
I
l
I
I
,
adjustment
•
I
----- ...
I
coefficient
' .... ~ f
I
"
"
Y
,
del2.y
AC
data network
asset
V
-z:.....-.-~-,~- ADT1\\
/ \\
investment in
depreciation
dat..a network
DADTN
Figure 5.2~: D\\'namo diagr,ml of the o2ia t,nmrrus5ion network sub-sector
........
~.
........
adtn.k --= adtn.j -+- dt * (didtn.jk - dacitn.jk)
(62)
iadtn = 82.5 x 106
I
adt n
?~set of dat? network
';adtn
j ni i i?.l va] u e of 2..Sse t
did tn
G"l?':'eo investment in G?\\? n'C,'·',"o:k
dadt:l
c:';=>::'Ci2.tior: er G2i? :1'c:\\"o:~: c-."s·c:(depreci?tion coeSciei1:' eOG?] to .c:.)
101

---

Th~ abo\\'e initial value is picked up diredly from the "Les Transmissions d~ Donnccs
en Cote d'!voire (june, 1975).
didtn.kl::= dclay3(invdtn.k, tdirs)
(G.3)
invdtn.k ::= ac.k * ridtn.k * fidn.k
(G·I)
invdtn
investment in dat? network
tdips
time delay between investment. and its reaching in asset
ridtn
required investment in data network.
fidn
satisfaction rate of rid tn.
rdtn.k = clip(O, clip(r2.k, rdtnm, nass, nas.k), nasO, nns.k)
(65)
r2.k = (rdtnmj(nass - nasO)) * (na.c:..k - n(80)
(GC)
rdtnm
maximum va.lue of needs for data network.
nasO
value of production sector fixed asset under which
there is no needs for data networ k
nass
value of production sector fixed asset after which
t.here is saturation of needs for data network
E) General Population Sensitization Sub~sector
Figure 5.23 presents the part of the causal loop diagram related to general popula-
tion sensitization sub-sector. Figure 5.24 represents the dynamo diagram of Figure 5.2.3.
investment in
~ sensitization
facilities for ~
sensitization
sensitization +
facilities
~
----
+
availability
required faci-
lities for
sensitization
~population
Figure 5.23: Causal loop of the population sensitization su h-sector
The level, rate, and au..xiliary equations related t.ot the variables of Figure 5.23 are
described in this sub-section.
102

---

scnsltlzatlon
cost pc:"
individual
- -:-
SIC
sensitizatloo
facility
,-r'
availability
required
;f
FPSA
required
,
investment
,
,
facilities
10 seosl tlze.-
,
...... - - -
,
for seoslti-
tion
,
,
zation
,
depreciation
. ,,
rate
FPSDR
Rl"PS
,
,
I
,
I
,
,
I
adjustment
,
I
,
I
coefficient
delay
, "
Y
AC
sensltizatlon
facility asset
FPS
investment in
depreciation
seosltlution
IKVPS
Figure 5.24: Dynamo diagram of Population sensil.ization sub-sector
The target population for sensitization includes working and st.udying population.
fps.k = fps.j + dt * (dinfps.jk - dfps.jk)
(67)
ifps = S.l x 106
fps
asset of facilities for popu]?jion sensit.izat.ion
ifps
initial value of facilit.y asset
dinfps
delayed investment in facilities
dfps
depreciation of facility asset
The above initial \\·alue is est.imated from the "La Cote d'Ivoire en chiffre (1987).
dinfps.kl = delay3(invps.k, fpsadl)
(68)
invps
invest.ment in sensitization facilit.ies
I
fpsadl
delay time between investment and its re?ch!ing in asset
rfps
required facilities for popuJaiion sensit.izc·io\\l
invps.k = ack * rifps.k,. fips.k
(G9)
103

---

".,;.""
rfps.k = pop.k * itsc.k * lwpop
(70)
rifps
required investment in population sensitization
fips
satisfaction rate of rifps
pop
national population
lwpop
learning and working population
itsc
individ ual sensi tiza tion cost
itsc.k = clip(itscl, itsc2, time.k, itsct)
(71)
itsc1
first value of individual sensitization cost
itsc2
second value of individual sensitization cost
itset
time to change the individual cost (investigation time)
In the next chapter we use the model described in this chapt.er to simulate various
information technology development policies and scenarios:
104

---

Chapter 6
Experimental Study
.~ ..
The previous chapter has described in detail the assumptions and equations that
comprise the model. The equations were chosen t.o, represent the major interactions
within and among seven important subsectors of the system: primary sector, secondary
sector, tertiary sector, computer installations, computer educat.ion and tra,ining, general
population sensitization, and data transmission net.work. In this chapter a comput.er
is used to simulate t.he behavior of the complete model and to test t.he effects of '-aI-
ious possible policies. After defining the concepts of policy and scenario, we present
successively t.he reference scenario, some sensit.ivity tests, informat.ion technology de-
velopment policies and scenarios and the conclusions of drawn from the experimental
st.udy. For every simulation we present an output plot of the behavior of some or all
of the nine most important variables over t.ime: fixed asset of computer installations,
required computer installations, fixed asset of data t.ransmission net.work, required data
transmission network, fixed asset of facilities for general population sensitizations, re-
quired facilities, computer personnei, required computer personnel, national Income,
government expenditures, and per capit.a consumption.
6.1
Policy Definition
For the purpose of this experimental st udy the national income of the count.ry un-
der consideration is divided into national consumption, government expenditures, and
investment. The three proportions according to which the national income is diyided
defines the nat.ional development poliry_ This is the first and highest. policy level in this
model. The t.ot.al investment is divided into investment in primaT,)', secondary, tertiary
sectors and in the information t.echnology sector. At this second 1e'·el, an invest.ment
policy consists of a set of yalues of thc four proportions of (otrtl inyestment. At this
le,"c] thc priority gl\\'cn to informrttion technology comprtrecl to the direct ilwcsllllenl
10.S

---

in production sector is concretely decided. Investment in inform~tion technology is di-
vided into investment in computer instaJJaJions, d~t~ tr~nsmission network, compn(er
personnel educ~tioJ1 ~nd training, and popul~(ion scnsiti7.~tion.
Q-4 (..;~..)
V · ·
........... !
r2:
8
813 -4 (.~ ::
...........
··········
GEF :. r4 ::
,
············.
0El : r5 .~
...........
.
QPE
:
r6 ::
........
1\\"1
national income
Cl
computer installations
GVT: gO'l"ern.ment e:l...-penditures
DN
data t.r2.nsmissiou network
INV : totalinvest:=ent
PS
population sensitization
CO?'1: national consumption
ET
education & t.ralning
PSI
production sectorl
cn
computer installations in sectorl
PS2
production sector2
C12
computer installation in sector2
PS3
production secto.3
C!3
compu::er installations in sector3
IT
information technology
E?'
education f.a.cWties
El
education inLrastructure
n
reql.lirementfor sink i
PE
: professor education
Figure 6.1: Structure of the investment sink:::
At this third level the distribu tion policy of the resources aJlocated to informa-
tion technology development into its different subsectors is defined.
Investment 111
computer installations is distribut.ed in th<2 three prorluetion sectors.
Investment In
computer personnel education and training is c'istributed into infrastructure, fa~ilities
and scholarships for professor-level educaiionln f<preign count ries. This is the fourth
and lowest level. Priorities of computer insta.lhii6ns in the three production sectors,
education infr?.structure, facilities for popuJ?lion sensitizotion, schol?fshjps for profes-
sOl education in for",jan
' -
\\ : )
couniri""
?re
'--~'
dp",.-
,-~j • ..
•
~n
- , - .
106

---

Figure 6.1 shows the schematic rcprcsentation of distribut.ion of national Income
and especially the distribution of t.he total invcstment..
The allocation of investment to a sinki is not done blindly or arbitr~ry, rather, it
is done according to the investment needs of this sink.
So, if we call ri and d i the
requirement and the satisfaction rate of t.his reqllirement of t.he sinki , we have
r=
d=
respectively, requirement vector and satisfaction rate vector for all the system, with
the condition
In this model n = 11.
The products
107

---

are, respecti"ely, the tot~l a.mount of money t.o be allocated to all the sinks of the
syst.em, the amount of money t.o be allocated to the sinks of information technology
sector, the amount of money to be allocated to the sinks of production sector.
If I :S Jt * r
I
ait = Q'p = ----
d t * r
where ail is the ratio of the amount. of money a\\·a.ilable for information technology
development. to amount of money allocated, and a p is t.he amount of money available
for production sector to amount of money allocafed.
ail = 1.
Here we recall t.he principle of this model, which is to not invest in information
technology sector when it is not necessary, because information technology is consid-
ered as a t.ool. And we buy a t.ool only when we have t.o use it., especially when we
do not have enough money t.o face our other investment. needs. Therefore, we make
direct. investment. in t.he production sector to increase t.he economic activit.ies of the
country, and t.hereby increase the requirements for information technology product. use.
So, t.he investment. a1locat.ed effectively t.o t.he sink; is
'·Q,.d.. *ri_
In t.he experiment.al st.udy any occurrence of the vector cl is an investment
policy. Therefore, a policy is a set. of proportions which define t he satisfaction degree
of the inycs(men; requirements of the sinks we ha\\'C' to Jl]i1nage. Since v;e can change:
108

---

an infinit.e number of ways, the set of values of t.he elements of t.he satisfaction rate
vector, we have an infinite number of policies.
Ot.herwise we call scenario a set of policy combinations created in course
of time to meet a national development objective previonsly defined.
For
the purpose of this experiment.al study the policy combination is done according to t.he
following principle. Given policy A,B,and C defined by
dCn
the combined policy ABC is defined by the following generic element:
V'/e could use the following linear combination of A, B, and C
where AA, '\\B and AC are used to weight the satisfaction degrees of the requi!"ements.
But. we cho05e the former definit.ion because we mean by exec'ution of combinated
policy ABC t.he execution of policy A, policy B, and policy C in the same time and
not a weighted policy.
6.2
Policy Experiment
This model takes into account eleven investment sinks.
So for each of the above
vectors, n = 11. An infinity of pOl;cie~ can be defined by changing the val ues of t.he
I
elements of vector d. But only twel'e policies are dealt with in t.his experiment. st.udy.
Policy A is the current policy in Coteid'hoire.
Each of the ele\\'en other policies is
deduced frolll policy A by increasing by 1, one of the eleven elements of the vector (lA.
For example. policy B is obtained b.\\· incre?_~ing only the element d...;] from .1 to 1. the
109

---

.' [".-
ten other elements of dA remain the same. Policy L is obtained by increasing dAll
from .3 to 1. Figure 6.2 presents t.hese policies.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
I
;'1,
dl
.1
1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
d2
.5
.5
1
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
d3
.5
.5
.5
1
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
d4
.3
.3
.3
.3
1
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
i
d5
.3
.3
.3
.3
.5
1
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
I
d6
.3
.3
.3
.3
.5
.3
1
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
d7
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
.1
1
.1
.1
.1
.1
dS
.0.5
.05
.05
.05
.OS
.0.5
.05
.0.5
1
.0.5
.0.5
.05
d9
.4
.4
.4
.4
.4
.4
.4
.4
.4
1
'.4
.4
dl0
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
1
.3
dll
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
1
A
reference policy(current policy in Cote d'lvoire)
B
primary sector computerization policy
C
secondary sector comput.erizat.ion policy
D
tertiary sector computerization policy
E
education facilities policy
F
education infrastructures policy
G
professor education policy
H
basic infrastructures policy
I
population sensitizat.ion policy
J
primary sector development policy
K
second aTy sector development. policy
L
tertiary sector development policy
Figure 6.2 Policies for IT and production sector development
In the following subsections we present some selected experiment results.
G.2.1
Reference Policy(A) Sinlulation
The reference policy is the current policy in Cote d'Ivoire: nat.ional income is di-
vided into 65% for national consumption, 10% for government expenditures, and 2.5%
for investment; invest ment is used to satisfy 5% of the requirement for population sensi-
lization, 10% of the requirement for data transmission network, 30% of the requirement
for education, RS-.:D, and t[(tining, -')0% of lh·: requirement for computer installations
110

---

In ~econd and t.ertiary ~ector, and 10% oi lhc rcquircment. for comput.er inst.allations
in primary sector. Figure 6.3 and figure 6.4 present the simul;dion results.
Dollars
Required computer
in~tallations
I
~/
6
,
,
Required data
,
,
network
,
5
Required facili\\ies
4
..'
..'
3
2
I , "
Asset of computer
I
~"
, . '
.
. '
installali\\s
.....
",',' J.,... '
·······~I Asset of data
, " " " \\
[......;.....
network
~--r-:
~~., .~,.,
----7-
---:--1------:--...;-=--~I_=----=-__
---.----,----'
i
;':":':-:':-;I~-----II
"'" FaciIilies Jor
I :ensiliz2tion
---.;.;----:-----..:....1--------:.I----~
1980
1990
2000
Figure 6.3: Reference Policy(IT fixed assets)
During the entire simulation time, no fixed asset of information technology sector
10 figure 6.4 was seen to meet the requirement.
They all increase, but the increase is
not enough in regard to the requirement. There is almost no initial "alue for facilities
for popula.tion sensitiLtion. In reality there is almost no case for African developing
countries where actions are made to sensitize the general populat.ion to advantages <'.nd
drawbacks of information technology. So the e:Dsting facilities are derisory in regard
,0 the requirement.
111

---

Figure 6.4 shows the cost and contribution of ill formal ion technology 011 national
production in the reference policy. It appears that benefit in infcrmation technology
use almost. rises after year 1995. This mcans that the country gets its investmcnt hock
almost 15 years later.
Economically tltis is undesirablc. So, nc\\\\' policies should be
adopted to improve the use of information tcchnology ill thc A frican continent. Before
examining these new policies issues we presci1( a consistency tcst.
Dollars
70
.
/
60
,-
IT cldbUl10n/
50
I
to national
prbduction
~""""'"
40
II ,,'
I
I
A,/IT dev'loemenl
,,1
cost
I
30
I
/'
20
V
L1
10
~~/
- ----
I
I
I
I
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
figure 6.4:,,?Leference Policy(IT contribution and cost)
I
\\
6.2.2
T est to b u ilac b11 fi cl e nee in the In 0 cl e1
i
The runs pres'C'n;'C'd in this 5",ction ?re ex?:-:-,::;):,s of model beh?\\·ior when extr'.:me
1 n~~ t~Sl 2.irr..s to ociid O~:
112

---

confidenccin the logical consist.ency of the model. All in\\'cstmenis in informat.ion t.ech-
nology sedor (Ire eCjllal to zero dming t.he entire simulat.ion time.
Dollars
1
2S
20
Required educktion
./
I
infrastructures
•
/
I //I
15
/
/
10
.
d d I
. f ..
Require
e ucatlOn acillties
S
,.'
I
L///··
/
-----r:.:..::-----:::::'-1-
:-.~-.....:.~.~.~.J
Educa !ion infras tru c tu re
~
.....~.... .....
r ------ -- -------r--------- ------I
,
' I
I
1980
1985
i990
1995
2000
Figure 6.5: Confidence test(IT fixed assets)
Figure 6.5 shows the behavior of educat;on facilities and infr?structures assets.
\\VhiJe requirements increase, the two fixed assets themselves decrease. Infrastructure
asset decreases slowl),. It does not reach zero, because the life time of t}>e invested
capit.al is 20 years. Therefore the depreciat.ion of accumulated capital is slo\\\\'. On the
contrary, facilities assets decrea..c;e quickly to become 0 by year 1990, because the life
time of this c?pital (only 10 years) is snOiier than that of infr2.strudure.
113

---

Figure (j.G shows the number of professors. There are 25 professors at the beginning
as well as the cnd of the simulation. This numhcr does not incrcil."e hcciluse investmcnt
is not made for the education of new professors. The numher does not decrease because
each professor works 3.) years before retircmcnt and the simulation lime does not cover
this retirement timc.
Number
I
I
I
:1
500
j
,
,
,
,
,
,
450
I
,
,
,
,
,
,
400
,
,
,
I
...-
,
,
,
350
,
R~Uired
,
,
,
professors
,
,
,
300
I
"-"""',/f
250
,
,
,
,
200
,
,
,
,
,
150
_----'1"
100
,
,
,
, ,
,
Professors
, - --
50
-
\\
-
1980
1985
1990
1 00 -
-~;)
2000
Figure 6.6: Confidence test(professors and required professors)
Figui'e 6.7 shows the graduation rate and the schoolleaying rate without d!pl~ma
of tlIe students. These fates depend on professor, educat.ion facility, ?cnd education:in-
frastructures 2\\i1ilabiLity, ;:md on the c'.\\'er2.ge jj\\'ing sta.ndard of the countr:',
Sihce
tll"f" '1- no 1'''\\" _0
4 ' . 1
1 · . . . . . . ·
·1
"1
h"'"
,. . . ,
d ,)
, ~ -:,
.. ':':O-lmen,))1 Lnese OI1'1,?rCIll 2,,~S':',:3: tn'?"e 2.\\'i11J2. lllt!es O",l!lUSn all
"Hi
114

---

graduation rate decreases while the school Iea\\'ing rate increases.
For this test., and many others which are not reported in Ihi:, thesis, the model
shows a consistent beha\\'ior. However this is not enough to claim the model is logically
consist.ent. but wc become more confident in it; t.his is an import.ant point since there is
nO test to show the logic consistency of the socio-technicrtl models like this onc. There-
fore, we can use it to test informat.ion techn.910gy dcvclopment. policies and scenarios.
Number per student
~
.18
\\1
,
SE graduation rate
i
,
;~
.
I
I·,
.16
\\
I
I
.14
I
1\\
.12
\\
I
1,,,----.... -.. -
I
I
«
( ' \\
.10
(
I
\\
(
(
(
School leaving rate
I
I
(without diploma)
.08
I
I
,
II
\\ II (
.06
I
, ( "
\\:1(I
.04
.~
I
.02
I
l.. ·/
~
-
I
I
1980
1965
1990
1995
2000
.Cigure 6.7: Confidence test(Sfudent.s' graduation rate)
115

---

6.2.3
Infonuation technology developluent policies
Three policic5 are 5imulated: Primary 5ector (primary 5ector) computcrization policy,
basic infrClstructure development policy, population 5cn5iiization policy.
1. Primary sector computerization policy(B)
The policy parameters have the same values as in reference mode.
Dollars
I
ReqUI~rd computer
:
ins allalions
"
6
~/
,
,
Required data
,
,
5
/~~jI:"'"'
,
,
,
4 --;-------+----------!-----....,!-''--+-:-'----7'-~------!-
faCilitie~
Required
"0"
.,.' /
j
"
.'
J
, .. , .. ,
3 _---f_f_o_r_s_en-;-l_i_ti_za_t_io_n+
+..:.'_,'_'--:''-.7'...-;·';.'~',-,-.,;.:_._.'...L"_'_"_'._.,_._.'_"_'_•• __....!.-_
./ .J....:>..<{y.
--;--~.
./I~.
2
-=--"
, _
.. , ._L._
..._.,._.-+/---;-..:.-',_"-;-"'7" +I
~
~_
"""',,, /
I
·······1
""
"
Asset of
·~Assetof data
.' ./,.,. -'1
computerlinstallations
.....,...............
I~ network
_
/..-.__·.'._.·..·:~~=Iu~// J.~~ FadHHe'fo'
1'"'- sensitization
--T~---T-----7-----~---I~
1980
1985
i990
2000
Figure 6.8: Prima.ry sector Computerization policy(IT fixed assets)
Only the pu<'\\meter related to in\\'estm~n( in comput.er insia]]ations in primary
~ecior chang,,:,s from ]0% to 90% of in":' requirement.. \\Vhile the fixed assets of
d''ct2. n"iv:o~k, 2.nd facilities for popu)?ii:lI1 seI1siiizaiior. pre:=:ent the same beh2\\'ioI
116

---

as that in refcrcnce mode, in figure G.8, the fixed asset of COlllp\\Jtcr installations
in primary sector meets the requircmcnt once and o~cillatcs nca, it until the end
of simulation.
These oscillations arc crcated by thc time dclays of investmcnt
actions.
Figure 6.9 shows the cost and cont ribution of information technology on na-
tional produc1.ion of primary sec1.or computerization policy. This policy increases
the national production more than the reference policy. This contribution be-
comes greater thall the policy development cost by 1982; that means only after
2 yea rs.
A HP
100
.
90
~
80
7
IT contribution
to national
I
I
P~Oduction
70
60
/
50
V
, ,
,
,
,
,
,
IT developme nl
~o
/
..
I
,
,
,
cost
I
30
~",,"1"
20
y",'/
10
.,.-/ ~,"'r'
, . , "
~I_'-'
.. --
-----j
I
I
I
I
1980
1985
1990
100-
- - ; )
2000
Figure 6.9: Primary sector computerization policy(IT contrib'J~·Jon'and cost)
')
General population sensitization po~ic.. (I)
In this polic:· inyes:ment 1:3 T-:-:?C-: :.: ~2.~i~f\\· 90~, of lh·~ r'?G~;~;~I~:~r!: In i.~rI~~3
111

---

of facilities for population sensitizaiion.
The other paramclcrs ha\\'e tlte same
\\·zdues as in the refercnce policy. Figurc 6.10 shows thc \\·ariation of facility clH\\'e
around its requircmcnt cun·c. Hcrc also thc oscillations arc duc to thc time or-
dered facilitics take to bc a\\"ailablc.
Dollars
7
1
,
,
Requ;,ed coJPU!ec
,
,
,
installations ~
,
,
6
~:
,
Required data
,
,
,
,
nelwork~
•
,
,
,
5
4
It'--·-·-·~/
IAm!O!
/..
+
1'
data netVlork
--------
I
1980
1995
1985
1990
2000
Figure 6.10: Population sensitization policy(IT fixed assets)
t'igure 6.11 shows the cost and contribut.ion of information technology on na-
tional! production of population sensitizaJion policy. This policy also increa.ses
the n?lion,'.! production more t.han the reference policy. This contribution which
\\\\"25 sm?J!~~ tn?,n the cost in the first ,] ye?rs becomes gre?ler by 1982; th2( means
O-nl\\· -'-':J- .-; '.'~-'-':::
-:-';-'~:"'l-nlo::> '~1~ r ............ ~ ... ~~··
[ .
[ -
~.
..
..... '
1
a '
: . .
c.". .
_ .: _ Cd ,,,
_
cl, , 1. ' . : .
rt: . l. '. _ ',i:: , : • D LIl.] 0 n 0 I I n I 0 l n1Cl 110 n L e'~ n n0 10 0) 0 n
lIS

---

national production is twice greater than the cost.. In comp;Hi~on to the reference
policy, thi~ is, econom.iccJly, a good policy.
Dollars
x le?
I
I
I
120
/1
100
IT conldbulion 101
national production
"-
I • 7
80
I
60
/
, ,
,
, ,
, ,
,,"""IT developmen!
, , ,
I
40
, ,
cosl
~"""""""
20
V"""""'
~ .'"
~-----
,----',-"
1980
1985
1990
2000
Figure 6.11: Population seilsitization policy(IT contribution and cost)
3. Basic infrastructure development policy(H)
In this policy investment is made to satisfy 90% of the requirement in terms of
basic infrastructure development. The other paramet.ers t:::ke the same "alues as
in the reference policy. Figure 6.12 shows the yariaiion of facility curn <,.round
its requirement curve. Here a.!so the oscillations are due to the time delay that
order,:c fa:::ililies take to become a\\"?ila b1e.
119
,
j
\\',' I

---

Dollars
I
Required computer
'
I
'
installations ~
:
6
, ""
1
Required data
5
7T.
,
'
,
.
,
'
network ~
: :
,:'
~I
"
K,'
4
/1
Requ;"d l'dOH.!
"
' "
:
,:..../.,:. /
~:c,
for sensitization I
" "
..;,...-:' ""
I
3 _-'--_ _---:\\
~
___'__,_'_ _.....:._'--,..,-....---o-:.~."--
!
•. r--:-----------"----
\\
j
i
f
, / /
_-_,,_-._~ ~_ -,....~._~-~~-~....,>--;..:...-~~-'~_:_:~-'~"-,: _~.:_:
',1
11
2 ---:---"",.-c:.c••
'-'-' ••_':_"-'-"-;-1'_''-'-;'
...:...:'_
•.•. .._
..._
..._
..._
..._.._ _.!-
----,'Y".-dC-.-"-,._
r
I"," .,.-'
....1" Ass'" 0' a-t- I
;Z I
,,"J ,.'
....~
~~rk'
V·
c: G
Asset 01 compuler
",""~~~.:.~.J:.~.'...................... I nelW/
Iins\\2/1aticns
1
,~'. ' ,.:.:-.,
I
I _--------'---------1 ,00
-- -acilities for
,-'~-"-"=---1
I
I
I sensitiz2.\\ion
I
I
1980
1985
1990
100-
-_:>
2000
Figure 6.12: Basic infr2.struc;ure policy(IT fixed "ssets)
Figure 6.13 shows the cost and contribution of informal'ion technology on nC.-
tiona] production of population sensitizaJion policy. Once "ga.in this policy in-
creases the n"tiona.J production more th".n the reference policy. This contribution
which wC'..s smaller than the cost. in the first 2 ye"rs becomes greatc by ]982; that
means only afler 2 years. And the contribution is t.wice g:r~ater than the cost.
1
i
I
120

---

Dollars
I
I
I
I
100
~
90
IT conttibution
.
I I
10 nallOna
/
80
Pcodut,on '-j
70
/
60
.
I
V
, ,
,
, ,
,
50
I
I
, ,
/
, ,
,
, ,
,
40
, ~
I
~
"IT developh,ent
I
","'j"
cost
I
30
%,//
20
I
V
/""'1'
I
10
,--
~-----
I
... -.-
··---1
I
I
I
I
1980
1925
1990
2000
Figure 6.13: Basic infrastructure policy(IT contribution and cost)
G.2.4
Scenario Con1parisol1s
A nationol objective is planned: it consists of rising the notional consumption per
capit.a of the country up t.o S2800 by the year 2000. The question is what information
techilOlogy development scenario willleaa the national economy t.o meet this objecti ve.
Five scenarios are constructed by combining, at the beginning of each 5-year
,national development pl?n, some of the e!e\\"t~n policies presented at the beginning of
section 1.2 in tnis chc..pter. These policy combinations ue presented in the figure S.H.
1:21

---

1980
1985
1990
1995
scenario1
A
A
A
A
scenario2
BFGI
BEGI
BEFG
BEG
scenario3
C
CD
CDFG
CDEG
scenario4
DFG
DEGI
DEFGH
DEGH
scenarioS
FGI
EGI
BEFG
BEGH
scenario1
reference scenario(current. scenario in Cot.e d'Ivoire)
. ')
scenano_
primary sector computerization and educat.ion
scenari03
t.echnical assist.ance
scenari04
tertiary sector computerization and education
scenarioS
local human resources deveiopment
Figure 6.14: IT development scenarios
Scenario1 executes the reference policy throughout the simulation time without
change.
Scenario2 involves computerizing the primary sector.
In this option local
computer technicians are educated and trained. Scenario3 involves computerizing sec-
ondary and tertiary sector.
This is done by foreign companies which control these
sectors. In this scenario3 education and training of local people is not done. All the
computer personnel come from the developed country.
Scenario4 involves comput-
erizing tertiary sector, essentially government admi nistrat.ion, public insti tu tions and
organizations. ScenarioS involves a voloutarist option for education and training of not
only computer personnel but also the general population.
Figure 6.1.) shows that each of the five scenarios steadily Increase the national
consumption per capita.
But scenario1 and scenari02 do not Increase the national
consumption per capita up to $2800 by year 2000. So, if current investment trend is
followed in Cote d'Ivoire the objective will not met in time. Only scenari03, scenari04
and scenari05 meet the objective. Scenario3 presents the best result because the ob-
jective is met by year 1993, that is seven years before the delay. That is economically
very good. But this scenario presents a catastrophic feature. Suddenly the national
consumption per capita falls down from $3000 to $2200 by year 1995.
The sudden
recall, due to political conflit, of all the technical assistants who come from a devel-
oped country and work in a developing country can be given as a reason. This sudden
lack of skilled workers makes the computer inst.allations unoperational, and thereby af-
fect the global contribution of information t.echnology on t.he national income and the
consumptrion per capita. From 1995 to 2000 there are not enough skilled computer
122

---

per~onnel in the country t.o sufficiently Increase the national consumption per c"pit."
by \\IP t.o $2800 by year 2000.
Dollars
3000
,
,
ScenarioS
0
/:
2800
(education) /:'
0
,
~ /:' I
,
..-....
,
I
,
~... ,'
,
.
/
/.....,,I Sc
I
enario4
(sect or3
co mpu leri:<:a tion)
/;.:
"
,
J~"
I
2600
I
,
"
(technical I
/,-:.'['/
I
,
'
,
0
,/..:.,
, "
.
I, . '
,
,
,','
,
Scenario'3 ~.,.'
/'l'~ "
/~:..
:
,
"
2400
assistanci;
,
,
,
,
r'"
"
'y'
/."
J
I
_ '
,
/~.~:-'
I I I
;
•
'
•
.,
,
../::/ ",'- I; ,.,.,
• "
r ,
o.
2200
,
,
."
[;/\\,
/,!.
, , '
,
"
,
,
. /
"
Scencriol
.
,
.,/ ,,'
I(reference)
,
.....
, ' / 1
.
2000
,
,
,
1800
~
I
.'
,
...····~·~·~"'I'
Scenario2
~y
I (sector1 computerization)
I
I
I
600
,
1980
1985
1990
2000
Figure 6.15: Scenario comparisons(const~mptionper capita)
Figure 6.16 shows that the contribution of information technology to national pro-
duct-ion is greater in scenario3 tha.n in the ot her scenarios until199.S. The high level of
foreign computer personnel and technical assistants cnn be given as the most important
reason. But as in the case of national consumption~}-:r capita this contribution falls
I
down from
6
S100 x 10 to $20 x 106 . Also, we note that the! increase of information tech-
nology cont.ribution although slow at the beginning c.: the simulation becomes f?ster
and faster. The relucL?nce of loca.l people to accept new technology at the beginning
of its introGL:c:ion in the countr'.. CC.I)
t eC!1 n-i C2.1
l 'i"
_.)

---

assistants arc \\'cry skilled the rcluctancc of thc uscrs critically"wcakenthe 'effcct of
computer installations on the globC\\l prodllcti,·ity.
Dollars
xlcP J
160
I
;
I
I
/
I
/t,:'
140
ScenarioS
enario4
-f---l''PC
(education)
or3 computerization)
I
//. (sect
120
./ ;'
/ :
/>o"
//::
I
•
.
100
.
/.:
:L
I
.' 'j
,
I···.:
Scenario3
,
/.o'
:[:5cenario2
:,:
(sect or1 computerization)
(technical
,
assistan~.//·:
I
.
! .
80
,
,
/~: ,
,
,
,
/::
,
,
,
, ./~'
,
,
,
,
;::.
,
, ,
,
./"
,
I
60
,
I;'
,
, ..
..
.'
.
'l
. '
. ..
' /
.'
,
...
.
.'
40
/ .
. . .
/ "
20
A
/'...
I;' .
"
,,-:';.,'
.
-
' .( .
~ .
,
'
. ,.'
""'1v""
1//" .-- .. -
I
~
'/·;·l'---
scenario1 1referenCe)
_~_.".,:,:.o::-----:
,
,
I
I
I
1980
1985
1990
2000
Figure 6.16: Scenario comparison(IT contribution on national production)
Figure 6,17 shows the costs of the five scenarios. Naturally all these costs increase.
Until 1988 the cost of scenari03 is the less high. That is due to the small number of
the t.echnical assist.ants at the beginning of t.he introduction of information technology
in the country. As this number increases the informat.ion technology de\\'elopment cost
does so.
In the case of scenari03 there is no educat.ion cost.
But the salary of the
expatriate workers is so high that the global cost increases rapidly as the number of
these workers rises, From 199.5, when ?Jl the technical assistants ]ea\\'e the developing
conntI:', this le"ter lac,:,s b~g im'esllTl':'nt ::rC'b]':'n~s for intensiv,::, eduC2;ion cnd traiJ:ing
124

---

of local people to replace the foreign technicaJ a$si~tants. Therefore, the cost of in-
formation technology development does not drop from 19!)S (\\~ information technology
cont.ribut.ion and national consumption per capita but confinues fo increase. Only the
increasing rate diminishes.
..r,
Dollars
x Hr
70
Sc~nario3
I
,.'
J
(technicallassistanCe)
1'--..1
.' ,."
.'
,
~.~
60
~II'"/(.(.j-'(sect~~;nca~~;uterizatiol
-I
se.nat
I
.'
/ ,
50 --+---------+----(edue8"on)
..:
. /..~
" .//' "u
40 -----7-------7--------~____,__,:'
-.:::y
..).;.:.c.-'j,.-~---r7L-,,/
-+--/.
.
.;;.
,
Scenano2
I
.,-,Y
,
I
,
..'
"
(sector,1 computerization)
.
30
:/
'
~,' ; (
" /""
.
/
.:f!
.'
.~'..;~:' , .... '
....:; .. '
....
20 ----;--~-,~.,:,_:~_:=';'~
.• I'•. ~~-,;----------;--
/./:..,'." I
Scenario1
~.
,;.
I
10 _--;-
!--_~,(.<"...,·'-,.;..-.:-c...--.2...-----'(.:...;re::..;r-=e.:...:re:..:n,:..:c:..:e:.!.)-----+_-
~
J;~« .
.'.;;~':':';-... ~ t ••
• --.,;....:;
••o=:<'._=-~.._;.,-=-.~.;..'.-.__•._._."_·.......;...1
....:.....
.:..-
--.:_ _
,
I
I
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Figure 6.17: Scenario comparison(IT cost)
Figure 17 compares the two best scenarios, 3 and S. If we consider the absolute
\\'('.lues of informat.ion technology conf.:ibut.ion on national production, scenari03 is bet-
ter than scenarioS. But if we look at the cost/performance ratios of the two scenarios,
scenari03 is bet.ter until 1991, and scenarioS becomes better after 1991 as number of
technical assistants increases. Scenario-3 is 2.1s0 risky. This simulation shows an exam-
ple of a c(t~?s:roDhe ,vhich oft.en occurs V:jJ-=n a count.ry relies on foreign countries 10
': "

---

run its economy. Thc foreign country can, any timc, Llackmail thc dcvcloping country
and put it. in difficult. situation as in thc ab(wc casc. Also, in addition to thc costs of
informat.ion technology products, t.he salary of tcchnical assist.ants is scnt back t.o thcir
count.ries. This const.itutes a great. loss of forcign currcncy. If thc computcr pcrsonncl
wcrc local pcoplc, this foreign currency \\l'ould be savcd in thc country and invcstcd in
an other national dcvelopment. sink.
Dollars
x 10l
160
,
,
,
140 -~-------+-------+-----------;------~T-­
hi :'
ScenarioS
contribution
• ,::
i
120_-+-
_+-------i---------;----~,
_ _---,--_
)..
,
!:
,
,
,
,
,
,
100_--;--
----;-
-;--
--,;-_ _
'
,------
CO::;I;~:
----+-------'-..........
l ""',//,:/
80
:'
..
.
j..
i
'
,/"
"
.
60 - - - ; - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - ' - - - , 7 :''-/.7'
••-._ _-;-.},:-:-:"..o'-'_"'_'- - - 7 /"'-'i-
.,/.,'
:
;
.
V1'
t .
----,,..;-,.~<.-:.~-
cost
40 _--:-
----;-
•.------,/-....-...--::;7-L-!
...".-'-.._./.,.--Scenari05
,//;,.
.
/
, / / / /
/
~/
20 ---;-------~--+.
- .. --r.,""--:·--"7"'s.,."-.·-···-----7-------:------
l -./
"'j
1
._<~.:.,.;::.. .
~ Scenario3 cost
<~.~......·1..··········
I
I
I
I
I
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Figure 6.18: Scenari03 and scenarioS comparison (IT cost)
Finally, in regard t.o many ot.her aspect.s(ccr,lri,but.ion of information t.echnology on
national production, information technology d,;velopment costs, security of the dC\\'el-
oping coun~ry: etc.) scenario.) is better than tL~ o\\her scenarios.
1 ' y
"-0

---

. r '~';'" '/-,-• .' • ' . ' '.
..:, .... r' •
6.3
Conclusions of the experimental study ~"'." :' :..
From this experimental study some conclusions can be drawn [or the ma,nagers of
information technology sectors in African developing count.ries:
1. The current information technology development policy in Cote d'Ivoire increases
the cont.ribution of informat.ion technology on national production. But this con-
tribution is almost always equal to t.he amount of resources invested to develop
information t.echnology. The net benefit is almost equal t.o zero. Therefore, this
policy is not profitable economically.
This is so, because investment effort in
information t.echnology is not enough to match t.he requirements (in terms of
necessary information processing capabilities) of soci ..l and economic activities of
the country. In addit.ion the sinks which receive investment.s are not. judiciously
selected. Investment is done almost by trial and error.
2. In comparison to the reference policy, every single policy improves the contribu-
tion of information technology on national production. The net benefit is greater
than the reference policy case. This is so because in each of these policies more
investment effort is made than in the reference policy.
One of the fi..xed assets
of information t.echnology sector meets its requirement. But the contribution of
information technology on national production in each single policy simulation is
limited.
3. A policy implemented in isolation can have a good effect on information technol-
ogy sub-sectors and national production but a combination of policies in scenario
throughout the simulation time t.o reach a nat.ional development objective shows
better results in t.erms of contribution of informat.ion t.echnology on produet.ion
sector. A judicious policy combinat.ion can be found. The investment in one sub-
sector is made by taking into account the investments in other sub-sectors. In
this case, synergy of informat.ion technology sub-sectors improve the contribut.ion
of information technology on nat.ional production.
4. Technical assistant scenario considerably improves the effect of information tech-
nology on national production. But. care must be taken by people who adopt. it
becau.-:e tn", catastrophe feature which appeared in this simulation can put the

---

f ·
developing country in an economically very difficult situation. It is risky to lay
the economic growth of a country on foreign people. Education and training of
local people appears to be an imperative.
Globally it appears that all the policies increase the cont.ribution of informat.ion
technology on nat.ional production, and thereby increase national income and consump-
tion per capita. Therefore the model can be used to detect what policy or scenario
increase the most t.his contribution. Which policy or scenario costs the least? Which
policy or scenario is risky like scenari03 in the a bove simulation?
The increasing tendency of the variables ( fixed assets, nat.ional income, consump-
tion per capit.a, etc.) are due not to some parameters in the ,model but to its structure.
In fact the model consists of three main types of feedback loops. First, the positive
feedback loops of the production sector. The more the fixed assets of production sec-
tor increase, so do national production, national income and investments in these n.x:ed
assets. Second, the negative feedback loops of requirements. The more the fixed assets
of production sector increase, so do the information technology development needs.
Therefore, the ratios of n.x:ed asset.s of information t.echnology to required n.x:ed assets
diminish. This diminution does not decrease information technology contribution but
weakens its increasing rate. Third, the posit.ive loops of information technology assets.
The more investments are done in fixed assets of information technology, the more the
above ratios increase and so does the contribut.ion of information t.echnology. The result
of the int.eraction of the negative loops and the posit.ive loops of information technology
assets determines the beha\\'ior of the model. It is also true in reality. The balance
between the economic growth which generates the computerizat.ion needs and the in-
vest.ment effort to develop informa.tion t.echnology det.ermines t.he impact of information
technology inthe production sector. If the posi ti ve loops of informa hon technology n.x:ed
assets dominat.e the interac~ion, the cont.ribution of information t.echnology increases
the most. In the contrary, if the negative loops of informa.tion technology fixed assets
dominate the interaction t.he contribut.ion of infor~1ation t.echnology increases the least.
In the next section we examine the limits of the model
128

---

6.4
Limits of the model
The following three assumptions have served as basis to the construction of the fccd-
back loops of the model:
1. The more the fixed assets of production sectors increase, the more the require-
ment for information technology dcvelopment increases
2. Investment in an information technology sub-sector increases the ratio of fixed
asset to required fixed asset of this sub-sector
3. The more the ratios of information technology sub-sectors increase, the more in-
formation technology increases the producti"ity of the production sub-sectors
The above computer simulation ensure that the behavior of the model over time is
a direct consequence of the model's assumptions described in the chapter 5. Therefore,
the model behavior per se should not be disputed. Instead, criticism should be directed
at the assumptions that generate the model behayior. Through the use of computer
simulation one can examine the effects of alternative assumptions on the model's be-
havior. The simulation runs shown in this chapter are accurate predictions of global
deyelopment of information technology and production sectors only if
1. no important assumptions were ontitted from the model, and
')
all t.he included assumptions are completely accurate and will continue to be ac-
curate in the future.
Since neither of these cor:ditions ~an be fully met by any model of social system,
no such model can ever prec1jet the fut ure precisely. Especially since the events such
as wars, diseases, political, sociaJ crisis, ete. are not included in this model it cannot
predict exact Iy the behavior 0' the different. fixed assets of informa lion technology and
production :"ectors. Only their eyolutionary t.endencie:" can be shown. It is also COI1-
ceip,ble (h?; oiher :"ocia!. political, ins;llu;ion;l!, or cat,Lstrophic aspects ofinformCttion
129

---

technology development may be as import.ant as the aspects t.aken int.o account in t.his
model. In our fut.ure research we will examine t.he ext.end t.o which t.he addition of such
factors would alter the model's beha\\'ior.
130

---

Chapter 7
Conclusion
Information t.echnology needs to be developed in African developing countries. These
countries need information technology t.o help them to bett~r manage their scarce re-
sources for the benefit of development. Information generat.ed by efficient computer
installations should enable these countries to make better decisions and more effective
planning, to remedy problems of low productivity and poor quality, and to provide
better information to their citizens while looking after their welfare.
Our purpose in this research was to contribute to the search of ways and means to
stimulate the invention, innovation, and diffusion of information technology in African
developing countries. At this stage of our research we make a number of contributions.
1. \\Ve analyzed the current situation of information technology development in
African developing countries.
The domains of national activities where infor-
mation technology should be useful were analyzed. They include manufacturing,
computer-assisted learning, economic planning, disaster management, research in
agriculture, etc.. The stimulating effect information technology may have on the
other scientific and technical disciplines has also been anaIyzed.
2. From a literature re\\·iew, professional experience, and a case study we summa-
rized the key factors which restrain the invention, innovation, and diffusion of
information technology in African developing countries. Social, economic, cul-
tural, ergonomj~, and organizational problems were regist.ered. \\Ve analyzed the
secondary effects of information technology on African society.
3" A deep iC'\\"iew of the literature abol:: iechnology de\\"elopment leads us to point
]31

---

out the critical role that instit.utions can play in conducting information tech-
nology development process in African developing count.ries. Institutions always
influence and may sometimes facilitate or ret.ard processes of technical and struc-
tural change, coordination, and dynamic adjustment.
4. We proposed an institut.ional framework at country level t.o coordinate the ac-
tions of the c1iff-erent inst.itutions which operate for the development of informa-
tion technology in African developing count.ries.
This instit.utional framework
consists of an information t.echnology development council and a bank for in-
format.ion t.echnology development.
It. has t.o design and execute information
technology deYelopment policies and scenarios t.o st.imulate the invention, inno-
vation and diffusion of information technology in these countries.
5. We set up a policy domain (a set of information technology development actions)
which might be undertaken by the inst.itutional framework t.o stimulate the in-
vention, innovation, and diffusion of information technology products in African
developing countries. Seven general kinds of actions are classified. They include
knowledge building, population sensitization, basic infrastructure development,
knowledge and skill deployment, subsidy, sta:1dard setting, and innovation direc-
tive.
6. \\Ve constructed a model based on system d:ynamics approach to support the insti-
tutional framework in its investment and education decision making process. This
model represents the information technology sector, national production sector
(primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors) and t heir relationships. One of the key
points of this model is the mathematical expressions of the effect of information
technology on the national production sector. Concret.ely t.his model allows the
institutional framework to select better inYestment. and education policies and
scenarios based on
(a) the balance betwer:.f1 requirements of the country in terms of data processing
I
capabilities and exist.ing capabilit.ies,
(b) the impact of information technology on the producti\\·ily of fixed asset.s in
org?n:z<.t.l0ns:
1.32

---

(c) the cost of these policies and scenarios.
This model has been used to simulate some selected investment policies. To
increase the consumption per capita of the country up t.o $2800 for year 2000
six scenarios were constructed and t.est.ed. Although t.his simulat.ion is just an
example of how t.o use t.he model, some general knowledge has been drawn:
(a) A policy implemented in isolation can have good effect on information tech-
nology sub-sectors and nat.ional production but., a combinat.ion of policies in
scenario t.hroughout. t.he entire simulat.ion t.ime ~o reach a national develop-
ment. objective shows better results in t.erms of contribution of informat.ion
t.echnology on production sector.
A judicious policy combination can be
found. The investmellt in one sub-sector is made by taking into account. of
t.he invest.ment.s in ot.her sub-sectors. In this case, synergy of information
technology sub-sectors improves the contribut.ion of informat.ion technology
on nat.ional prod uction.
(b) Technical assist.ance scenario considerably improves t.he effect of informa-
t.ion t.echnology on national production. The t.echnologically high level of
technical assist.ants can be given as t.he most important reason.
But. care
must be taken by people who adopt. this scenario because the cat.astrophe
feature which appeared in t.his simulation can put t.he developing count.ry
in an economically very difficult. sit.uation characterized by sudden decrease
of national production and thereby national income. It is risky to lay t.he
economic growth of a country on foreign people. Education and training of
local people, doubled by sensitization of general population appears to be
the most profitable policies.
(c) Finally it. appears that all the policies increase the cont.ribution of infor-
mation t.echnology on national production, and thereby increase national
income and consumpt.ion per capita. The question becomes what polic)~ or
scenario increase the most. t.his contribution. \\Vhat policy or scenario costs
the least? Also what policy or scenario is risky like scenari03 in the abo\\"C
simulation?
133

---

(d) The more investment is made in information technology sector the more the
ratio fixed asset.s to required fixed a<;set.s of informat.ion t.echnology incrc?,ses
to 1, and t.he more the cont.ribut.ion of information t.echnology on natiolial
production increases. The more investment. is made direct.]y in production
sect.or the more the ratio fixed asset.s t.o required fixed asset.s of information
technology decreases to 0, and t.he less the cont.ribu tion of information t.ech-
nology on national production increases.
(e) The increasing tendency of the variables (fixed asset.s, nat.ional income, con-
sumption per capita, etc.)
are not due to some paramet.ers in the model
but to its feedback structure. The result of the int.eraction of the negative
loops and t.he positive loops of information technology assets determines the
global behavior of the model. It is so in t.he realit.y. The balance between
the economic growth which generates the computerization needs and the
investment effort to develop information technology determines the impact.
'of informat.ion technology on production sector.
The conclusions we draw from this research not only show more clearly than be-
fore what t.he sit.uation of information t.echnology development. is in African developing
countries. Although addressed to African developing countries in particular, they can
be of help to developing countries elsewhere.
Current and fut.ure tasks consist of impro\\ing the model unt.il it can det.ermine the
optimal scenario for institution intervent.ion not only in terms of theoretical constructs
bu t in terms of act.ual demonstrated experience.

---

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142

---

Appendix A
The list of dynamo program
* INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT MODEL
NOTE
NOTE
PRIMARY
SECTOR
NOTE
NOTE
1
aas.k=aas.j+dt*(ia.jk-daas.jk)
agriculture asset
n
aas=iaas
c
iaas=3758.4e6
r
ia.kl=delay3(inva.k,iad)
investment in agriculture
p
iad=2.5
r
daas.kl=aas.k*aasdr
depreciation rate
c
aasdr=.l
a
aout.k=aas.k*apt.k
output of agriculture
a
apt.k=napt.k*itea.k productivity
a
napt.k=clip(naptl,napt2,time.k,naptt)
c
naptl=.5
c
napt2=.3
NOTE c
naptt=2001
c
naptt=1979
143

---

a
acn.k=clip(l,clip(rl.k,rma,al,aas.k) ,aO,aas.k)
a
rl.k=(rma!(al-aO))*(aas.k-aO)
c
aO=3e9
c
al=300e9
c
rrna=300e6
1
aci.k=aci.j+dt*(intaci.jk-daci.jk)
camp. instal.
n
aci=iaci
c
iaci=2eS
NOTE c
iaci=4e6
r
intaci.kl=delay3(invaci.k,iacid)
investment
p
iacid=2
r
daci.kl=aci.k*acidr
depreciation of
camp. inst.
p
acidr=.l
a
rlaas.k=aas.k*rlas.k
a
rlas.k=clip(rlasl,rlas2,time.k,rlast)
p
rlasl=1.01
p
rlas2=1. 01
p
rlast=20
NOTE
%%%%%%Y.%'l.%/.%'l./.%/.%%%%%/.%/.%%%I./././.'l./.'l./././.I././.%/./././././.%/.%/.
NOTE
/././.
SECONDARY
SECTOR
/.%%/.1.%/.1./.1./.1./.1.1.
NOTE
/./.%I././.%/.I. 1.1.1.1. I./.I.I./.I.%/.% I./. I./. I.%/././.I./././././././././././.%/././.I././.
NOTE
1
ias.k=ias.j+dt*(inti.jk-dias.jk)
industry asset
n
ias=iias
c
iicis=4071. 6e6
r
inti.kl=delay3(invi.k,intid)
investment
D
intid=2.5
144

---

r
dias.kl=ias.k*iasdr
depreciation rate
c
iasdr=.07
a
iout.k=ias.k*ipt.k
output of industry
a
ipt.k=nipt.k*itei.k
productivity
a
nipt.k=clip(niptl,nipt2,time.k,niptt)
c . niptl=.3
c
nipt2=.1
NOTE c
niptt=2001
c
niptt=1979
a
itei.k=(O.2*(1-exp(-3*(.5*cpa.k+.3*pa~.k+.2*dtna.k)**2))­
*(1-exp(-3*(icia.k)**2))/((1-exp(-3))**2))+1.0
a
icn.k=clip(1,clip(r2.k,rmi,il,ias.k),iO,ias.k) computerization needs
a
r2.k=(rmi/(il-iO))*(ias.k-iO)
c
iO=4e9
c
il=400e9
c
rmi=600e6
1
ici.k=ici.j+dt*(intici.jk-dici.jk)
camp. instal.
n
ici=iici
NOTE c
iici=8e6
c
iici=4e4
r
intici.kl=delay3(invici.k,iicid)
investment
p
iicid=2
r
dici.kl=ici.k*icidr
depreciation
of camp. inst.
p
icid.:r=.l
a
rlia~.kiias.k*rlis.k
a
rlis.k=~~ip(rlisl,rlis2,time.k,~~ist)
rlisl=1.01.
145

---

p
rlis2=1. 01
p
rlist=20
NOTE
'l.y.'l.i.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.y.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.I.'l.'l.%'l.%'l.'l.I.%I.%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
1.'/.1.
TERTIARY
SECTOR
'l.'l.'l.I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'I.'I.'l.'I.'I.'l.'l.
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.y.r.%~'I.'l.'l.%'l.%'l.%'I.%'l.%'l.'/.'l.'l.'l.'I.'i.'I.'i.y,'I.'i.'l.'i.'i.'I.'i.'i.'l.'i.'i.'l.'l.'l.'i.'I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'i.'l.
NOTE
1
sas.k=sas.j+dt*(is.jk-dsas.jk)
service asset
n
sas=isas
c
isas=1983.6e6
r
is.kl=delay3(invs.k,isd)
investment in service
asset
p
isd=2.5
r
dsas.kl=sas.k*sasdr
depreciation rate of service asset
c
sasdr=.OS
a
sout.k=sas.k*spt.k
output of service
a
spt.k=nspt.k*ites.k
productivity
a
nspt.k=clip(nsptl,nspt2,time.k,nsptt)
c
nsptl=l
c
nspt2=. 8
NOTE c
nsptt=2001
c
nsptt=1979
a
ites.k=(0.2*(1-exp(-3*(.5*cpa.k+.3*pa~.k+.2*dtna.k)**2))­
*(1-exp(-3*(scia.k)**2))/((1-exp(-3))**2))+1.0
a
scn.k=clip(1,cli?(r3.k,rms,sl,sas.k),sO,sas.k) computerization needs
a
r3.k=(rms/(sl-s0))i(sas.k-sO)
c
sO=1.5e9
.
c
sl=150e9
c
rms=200e6
146

---

1
sci.k=sci.j+dt*(intsci.jk-dsci.jk)
camp. instal.
n
sci=isci
NOTE c
isci=2e6
c
isci=le5
r
intsci.kl=delay3Cinvsci.k,iscid)
investment
p
iscid=2
r
dsci.kl=sci.k*scidr
depreciation of
c~mp. inst.
c
scidr=.l
a
rlsas.k=sas.k*rlss.k
a
rlss.k=clip(rlss1,rlss2,time.k,rlsst)
p
rlss 1=1. 01
P
rlss2=1.01
p
rlsst=20
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EFFECT 'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.'l.%%%'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.%%%'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
a
acia.k=smoothCsacia.k,tacia)
a
sacia.k=clipCCaci.k/acn.k),l,acn.k,aci.k)
ci availabil:ty In sect1
c
tacia=l
a
icia.k=smoothCsicia.k,ticia)
a
sicia.k=clip(Cici.k/icn.k),l,icn.k,ici.k)
ci availability in
sect2
c
ticia=l
a
scia.k=smoothCsscia.k,tscia)
a
sscia.k=clipCCsci.k/scn.k),l,scn.k,sci.k)
ci availability in
sect3
c
tscia=l
a
dtna.k=smooth(sdrna.k,tdtna)
147

---

a
sdtna.k=clip«adtn.k/rdtn.k),l,rdtn.k,adtn.k)
dtn availability
c
tdtna=l
a
pa~.k=smooth(spa~.k,tpa~)
a
spa~.k=clip«fps.k/rfps.k),l,rfps.k,fps.k)
pop. a~areness
c
tpa~=l
a
cpa.k=smooth(scpa.k,tcpa)
a
scpa.k=clip«cp.k/rcp.k),l,rcp.k,cp.k)
comp. pers. availability
c
tcpa=l
a
tcn.k=acn.k+icn.k+scn.k
total computerizati~n needs
a
tasci.k=aci.k+ici.k+sci.k
total asset comp. inst.
1
itca.k=itca.j+dt*itcar.jk
IT contribution on production sector
n
itca=iitca
p
iitca=O
r
itcar.kl=aas.k*napt.k*(itea.k-l)
1
itci.k=itci.j+dt*itcir.jk
IT contribution on production sector
n
itci=iitci
P
iitci=O
r
itcir.kl=ias.k*nipt.k*(itei.k-l)
1
itcs.k=itcs.j+dt*itcsr.jk
IT contribution on production sector
n
itcs=iitcs
P
iitcs=O
r
itcsr.kl=sas.k*nspt.k*(ites.k-l)
I
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%
FOREIGN CP POLICY SECTOR
0/0/0/'/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/././././0/0/0/./0/./!
1.1.1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1,1,1.1.1,1,1,1.1,1.1, J.I./ .. /.I. !
NOTE
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF IT
a
itc.k=clip((le-2z(itca.k+itcik~itcsk)~2.4),-
148

---

..~.:-" -.'"
(.5e-2*(itca.k+itci.k+itcs.k)) ,1935,time.k)
NOTE
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
1
ite.k=ite.j+dt*iter.jk
n
ite=iite
p
iite=O
NOTE
ANNUAL EXPENDITURES
r
iter.kl=clip«(aiter.k+fcpc.k)*.004),(.8*aiter.k) ,1995 ,time.k)
a
aiter.k=invdtn.k+invps.k+invaci.k+invici.k+invsci.k+invcei.k+~
invcef.k+invpe.k
a
fcp.k=clip(rcp.k,cp.k,1995,time.k)
foreign computer personnel
1
fcpc.k=fcpc.j+dt*fcpcv.jk
foreign computer personnel cost
n
fcpc=ifcpc
p
ifcpc=O
r
fcpcv.kl=fcp.k*fcps
annual salary of foreign cp
c
fcps=36e3
individual salary
NOTE
1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.%1. END FOREIGN CP POLICY SECTOR 1.1.1.1.1.1.'i.1.1.'l.1.1.'l.'l.'i.'l.'l.
NOTE
NOTE
'i.'l.%%'l.'l.'l.%'l.I.%I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I./.I./.'l. 'l.1. 1.1. I.'l. 'l.1. 'l.'l. 1.1. 'l.1.'l.1.'l.1.'l.1. 1.1.1.1.1.1.
NOTE
1.1.1.1.1.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'lI.'l.1.
NATIONAL INCOME
%1.%%%1.%%%%%1.
NOTE
%1.1.%1. l.'l.I.'l. %'l. I.I./.'l. 1.1. I. 'l.'l.1.1. 1.1. 1.1. 1.1. 1.1. I.'l. I. I. 'l.'l.'l.1. 'l.'l.I.'l.'l.% 'l.'l. 'l.'l. 1.1.'l.'l.I.'l.'l.'l.'l.I.%'l.
NOTE
NOTE
1.1.'l.1.'l.'l.'l.I.'l.'l.'l.%'l.I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
TOTAL VALUES
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.I.I.'l.'l.I.I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'i.1.1.1.
a
nas. k=aas. k+i2.3. k+sas. k
national production asset
a
ni.k=clip«(aout.k+iout.k+sout.k)x(1.12»), CC.8)x-
Caout.k+iout.k+sout.F.)) ,1995,time k)
national income
149

---

a
ittr.k=tcn.k+rfps.k+rdtn.k+rre.k
IT total requirement
a
tri.k=riaas.k+riias.k+risas.k+ridtn.k+rifps.k+riaci.k+riici.k+-
risci.k+ri€i.k+rief.k+ripfe.k
total required investment
a
tra.k=(riaas.k*fiaas.k)+(riias.k*fiias.k)+(risas.k*fisas.k)+-
(ridtn.k*fidn.k)+(rifps.k*fips.k)+(riaci.k*fiaci.k)+-
(riici.k*fiici.k)+(risci.k*fisci.k)+(riei.k*fiei.k)+-
(rief.k*fief.k)+(ripfe.k*fipfe.k)
total resources allocated
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
REQUIRED INVESTMENTS
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
a
riaas.k=clip(l,(rlaas.k-aas.k),aas.k,rlaas.k)
req. invest. in sectl
a
riias.k=clip(l,(rlias.k-ias.k),ias.k,rlias.k)
req. invest. in sect2
a
risas.k=clip(l,(rlsas.k-sas.k),sas.k,rlsas.k)
req. invest. in sect3
a
ridtn.k=clip(l,(rdtn.k-adtn.k),adtn.k,rdtn.k)
req. invest. in dtn
a
rifps.k=clip(l,(rfps.k-fps.k),fps.k,rfps.k)
req. invest. in scnsit.
a
riaci.k=clip(l,(acn.k-aci.k),aci.k,acn.k)
req. invest. in ci of sectl
a
riici.k=clip(l,(icn.k-icl.k),ici.k,icn.k)
req. invest. in ci of sect2
a
risci.k=clip(l,(scn.k-sci.k),sci.k,scn.k)
req. invest. in ci of sect3
a
riei.k=clip(l,(ri.k-i.k),i.k,ri.k)
req. invest. in educ. infrast.
a
rief.k=clip(l, (rf.k-f.k),f.k,rf.k)
req. invest. in educ. facility
a
ripfe.k=clip(l,(rpf.k-pf.k)*ecpf.k,pf.k,rpf.k)
r. inv. In prof educ.
NOTE
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%'l.'l.%'l.'l.%%'l.%%%%%%'l.'l.%%%%%'l.'l.'l.%%%%%'l.'l.'l.%%'l.%
NOTE
%%'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.%%'l.%%'l.%
GOVERNMENT SECTOR
'l.%'l.'l.%%'l.'l.'l.%%%%%'l.'l.'l.%%
NOTE
%%'l.%'l.'l.'l.%'l.%%'l.'l.'l.'l.%%'l.%%'l.'l.%%'l.'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.'l.'l.%'l.%'l.'l.'l.%%'l.'l.%%%'l.%%%'l.%'l.%'l.%%'l.'l.
NOTE
%%'l.'l.%%%'l.'l.%%'l.%%%%'l.'l.
DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME %%%%%%%'l.'l.%'l.'l.
a
ac.k=inv.k/tra.k
adjustment coefficient
a
acO.k=(inv.k-tra.k)/(riaas.k*fia2s.k+riias.k*fiias.k+risas.k*fisas.k)
a
acit.k=clip(l,ac.k,ac.k,l)
a
acp.k=clip(l+acO.k,ac.k,ac.k,l)
1.50

---

NOTE
NATIONAL POLICY
a
cons.k=ni.k*fnic.k
fraction of ni allocated to
consumption
a
fnic.k=clip(fnic1,fnic2,time.k,fnict)
p
fnic1=.65
p
fnic2=.65
p
fnict=20
a
gvt.k=ni.k*fnig.k fraction of ni allocated to gvt expenditure
a
fnig.k=clip(fnig1,fnig2,time.k,fnigt)
p
fnig1=.1
p
fnig2=.1
p
fnigt=20
a
inv.k=ni.k-cons.k-gvt.k fraction of ni allocated to investment
a
cpc.k=cons.k/pop.k
consumption per capita
NOTE
INVESTMENT POLICY
a
inva.k=acp.k*riaas.k*fiaas.k
fraction of inv. allocated to sect1
a
fiaas.k=clip(fiaasl,fiaas2,time.k,fiaast)
p
fiaas1=.4
p
fiaas2=.4
p
fiaast=20
a
invi.k=acp.k*riias.k*fiias.k
fraction of lnv. allocated to sect2
a
fiias.k=clip(fiias1,fiias2,time.k,fiiast)
p
fiiasl=.3
p
fiias2=.3
p
fiiast=20
.J
a
invs.k=acp.k*risas.k*fisas.k
fraction of inv. allocated to skct3
a
fisas.k=clip(fisasl,fisas2,time.k,fisast)
p
fisasl=.3
p
fisas2=.3
151

---

p
fisast=20
NOTE
FRACTION OF INVEST. ALLOCATED TO IT
a
invit.k=invci.k+invce.k+invdtn.k+invps.k
NOTE
IT INVESTMENT POLICY
a
invci.k=invaci.k+invici.k+invsci.k
fraction of invito allocated to Cl
a
invce.k=invcei.k+invcef.k+invpe.k fraction of invito allocated to CE
a
invdtn.k=acit.k*ridtn.k*fidn.k
fraction of inyit.
to DTN
a
fidn.k=clip(fidnl,fidn2,time.k,fidnt)
p
fidnl=.l
p
fidn2=.1
p
fidnt=20
a
invps.k=acit.k*rifps.k*fips.k
fracto of invito
to pop. sensit.
a
fips.k=clip(fipsl,fips2,time.k,fipst)
p
fipsl=.OS
p
fips2=.OS
P
fipst=20
a
rait.k=invci.k+invce.k+invdtn.k+iavps.k
resource allocated to IT
a
rritd.k=acn.k+icn.k+scn.k+rdtn.k+rfps.k+rre.k
required res. for IT
NOTE
COMPUTER INSTALLATION POLICY
a
invaci.k=acit.k*riaci.k*fiaci.k
invest. in
Cl
In
sectl
a
fiaci.k=clip(fiacil,fiaci2,time.k,fiacit)
p
fiacil=.i
p
fjaci2=.1
p
fiaci~=20
a
invici.k=acit.k*riici.kxfiici.k
invest. In
Cl
In
sect2
c
fiici.F.=c~ip(fiicil,fiici2,timek,fiicit)
152

---

P
fiicil=.9
P
fiici2=.9
P
fiicit=20
a
invsci.k=acit.k*risci.k*fisci.k
invest. in
Cl
in sect3
a
fisci.k=clip(fiscil,fisci2,time.k,iiscit)
p
fiscil=.9
p
fisci2=.5
p
fiscit=6
NOTE
COMPUTER EDUCATION POLICY
a
invcei.k=acit.k*riei.k*fiei.k invest. in CE infrast.
NOTE d
fiei.k=clip(fieil,fiei2,time.k~fieit)
NOTE p
fieil=.3
NOTE p
fiei2=.3
NOTE p
fieit=20
NOTE a
fiei.k=clip(.9,clip(.3,clip(.9,clip(.3, .3,time.k,20),-
15,time.k),10,time.k) ,5,time.k)
a
fiei.k=clip(.3,clip(.9, .3,15,time.k),10,time.k)
a
invcef.k=acit.k*rief.k*fief.k
invest. in CE facilities
a
fief.k=clip(fiefl,fief2,time.k,fieft)
p
fiefl=.9
p
fief2=.3
p
fieft=16
a
invpe.k=acit.k*ripfe.k~fipfe.k
invest. in professor education
a
fipfe.k=clip(fipfel,fipfe2,time.k,fipfet)
p
fipfel=.9
p
fipfe2=.3
p
fipfet=l1
NOTE
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%~%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
DATA TRANSMISSION tisTnORK SECTOR
'1.'1.%%%%%%%%
153

---

NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NOTE
a
rdtn.k=clip(1,clip(r4.k,rmdn,nas1,nas.k),nasO,nas.k) required dtn
a
r4.k=(rmdn/(nas1-nasO))*(nas.k-nasO)
c
nasO=8.5e9
c
nas1=850e9
c
rmdn=300e6
1
adtn.k=adtn.j+dt*(idtn.jk-dadtn.jk)
asset of dtn
n
adtn=iadtn
NOTE c
iadtn=2.5e6
c
iadtn=50e3
r
idtn.kl=delay3(invdtn.k,idtnd)
investment in dtn
p
idtnd=2.5
r
dadtn.kl=adtn.k*adtnlt
depreciation of dtn
c
adtnlt=.1
NOTE
%%%%'l.'l.'l.%'l.%%%%%%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%%%%'l.%%'l.'l.%%%%%%'l.'l.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NOTE
%%%
POPULATION SENSITIZATION
SECTOR
%/.%%%%%%/.
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%~%%/.%%'l.'l.%/.%%%%'l.'l.%'l.%%I.I.I.%I.I.I.I.%I.I.%I.I.I.I.%%1.1.1.1.1.I.
NOTE
a
rfps.k=pop.k*itsc.k*lwpop
required facilities for sensitization
c
lwpop=.625
learning and working population
a
itsc.k=clip(itsc1,itsc2,time.k,i~sct)
IT sensitization cost
NOTE p
itscl=.le2
p
itscl=1.6
p
itsc2=1.6
P
itsct=20
15-1

---

1
fps.k=fps.j+dt*(infps.jk-dfps.jk)· faciliti~s for· pop. sensit.
n
fps=ifps
c
ifps=100e3
NOTE c
ifps=100e6
r
infps.kl=delay3(invps.k,ifpsd)
fac. for sensitization
p
ifpsd=2
r
dfps.kl=fps.k*fpslt
depreciation of fac.
c
fpslt=. 2
NOTE
% 'l.'l.'l.'l. 'l.'l. %'l.y.'l. y.'l. y.'l.'l.'l.% 'l.% 'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l. 1.1.1.1.1.1.I.I.1.1. %'l.%'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l. 'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l. 'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
'l.'l.Y.
COMPUTER PERSONNEL EDUCATION SECTOR
I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.Y.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%'l.%'l.'l.%'l.'l.y.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.%
NOTE
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.Y.
SYSTEM ENGINEER Y.1.Y.'l.Y.'l.'l.Y.'l.Y.'l.Y.'l.I.I.'l.I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.Y.'l.'l.'l.'l.Y.
1
se.k=se.j+dt*(sehr.jk-selro.jk)
system engineer
n
se=ise
NOTE P
ise=1135
p
ise-=lOO
r
selro.kl=se.k*seor.k se leaving rate for obsolescence
a
seor.k=.125*(1-(1-(1-(.45*pa.k+.35*fa.k+.2*infa.k))**5)**.2)
NOTE a
seor.k=.125*(1-(1-(1-(tcf.k))**5)**.2)
r
sehr.kl-=ses.k*clip(segr.k,O,segr.k,O)
se hiring rate
a
segr.k=.2 x (1-exp(-3*(.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*11.k+-
.1*infa.k)*x2)/(1-exp(-3»)
NOTE a
segr.k=.2*(1-exp(-3*(scf.k)**2»/(1-exp(-3»
I
!
1
ses.k~ses~+d~x(5eer.jk-sesl.jk-sehr.jk) se students
155

---

n
ses=ises
p
ises=155
NOTE p
ises=1155
r
sesl.kl=ses.k*seslr.k
leaving educ.syst. per year
a
seslr.k=1-(1-(1-(.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*ll.k+.l*infa.k))**5)**.2
NOTE a
seslr.k=1-(1-(1-(scf.k))**5)**.2
NOTE r
seer.kl=seg.k*seat.k
se education rate
r
seer.kl=clip((seg.k*seat.k) ,(100*seat.k),seg.k,101) se educ. rate
a
seat.k=clip(seatl,seat2,time.k,seatt)
se adjustment time
p
seatl=.3
p
seat2=.3
p
seatt=20
a
seg.k=rse.k-se.k
system engineer gap
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
REQUIRED SYSTEM ENGINEERS
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
a
rse.k=clip(l,clip(r5.k,rmse,nasl,nas.k) ,nasO,nas.k) required se
a
r5.k=(rmse/(nasl-nasO))*(nas.k-nasO)
c
rmse=180e3
NOTE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%'l.%%%%%%%%%%
NOTE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
PROGRAMMER
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
1
pg.k=pg.j+dt*(pghr.jk-pglro.jk)
programmer
n
pg=ipg
NOTE P
ipg=1590
P
ipg=150
r
pglro.kl=pg.k*pgor.k pg leaving rate for Gbsolescence
a
pgor.k=.2*(1-(1-(1-(.45*pa.k+.35*fa.k+.2*infa.k))**5)**.2)
NOTE a
pgor.k=.2*(1-(1-(1-(tcf.k))**5)**.2)
r
pghr.kl=pgs.kxclip(pggr.k,O,pggr.k,O)
programmer hiring rate
156
i,
\\
t
:, ,I
:1

---

a
pggr.k=.3*(1-exp(-3*(.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*11.k+-
.1*infa.k)**2))/(1-exp(-3))
NOTE a
pggr.k=.3*(1-exp(-3*(scf.k)**2))/(1-exp(-3))
./././././././././././././././././././././././././././'/'/'/'/'/'/'/~'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/'/././././././
NOTE
1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
1
pgs.k=pgs.j+dt*(pger.jk-pgsl.jk-pghr.jk) programmer student
n
pgs=ipgs
p
ipgs=165
NOTE P
ipgs=1165
r
pgsl.kl=pgs.k*pgslr.k
leaving educ.syst. per year
a
pgslr.k=1-(1-(1-(.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*11.k+.l*infa.k))**5)**.2
NOTE a
pgslr.k=1-(1-(1-(scf.k))**5)**.2
NOTE r
pger.kl=pgg.k*pgat.k
pg education rate
r
pger.kl=clip((pgg.k*pgat.k) , (120 x pgat.k) ,pgg.k,121) pg educ. rate
a
pgat.k=clip(pgatl,pgat2,time.k,pgatt)
pg adjustment time
p
pgatl=.3
p
pgat2=.3
p
pgatt=20
a
pgg.k=rpg.k-pg.k
programmer gap
NOTE
1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
REQUIRED PROGRAMMERS
1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
a
rpg.k=clip(1,clip(r6.k,rmpg,nasl,nas.k) ,nasO,nas.k) required pg
a
r6.k=(rmpg/(nasl-nasO))*(nas.k-nasO)
c
rmpg=200e3
NOTE
I.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.'l.'('l.'l.1.1.1.1.1.1.I.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
NOTE
1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. 'l.'l. 1.1.1.1. % OPERATOR 'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.~;I.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
1
op.k=op.j+dt*(ophr.jk-oplro.jk)
ODerator
157

---

· ~.....~.'
n
op=iop
NOTE p
iop=2180
P
iop=200
r
oplro.kl=op.k*opor.k op leaving rate for obsolescence
a
opor.k=.25*(1-(1-(1-(.45*pa.k+.35*fa.k+.2*infa.k))**5)**.2)
NOTE a
opor.k=.25*(1-(1-(1-(tcf.k))**5)**.2)
r
ophr.kl=ops.k*clip(opgr.k,O,opgr.k,O)
operator hiring rate
a
opgr.k=.5*(1-exp(-3*(.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*11.k+-
.1*infa.k)**2))!(1-exp(-3))
NOTE a
opgr.k=.5*(1-exp(-3*(scf.k)**2))!(1-exp(-3))
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
1
ops.k=ops.j+dt*(oper.jk-opsl.jk-ophr.jk) operator student
n
ops=iops
p
iops=165
NOTE P
iops=1165
r
opsl.kl=ops.k*opslr.k
leaving educ.syst. per year
a
opslr.k=1-(1-(1-(.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*11.k+.l*infa.k))**5)**.2
NOTE a
opsl:.k=1-(1-(1-(scf.k))**5)**.2
NOTE r
oper.kl=opg.k*opat.k
op education rate
r
oper.kl=clip((opg.k*opat.k),(150*opat.k),opg.k,151) op educ. rate
a
opat.k=clip(opatl,opat2,time.k,opatt)
op adjustment time
p
opatl=.3
p
opat2=.3
p
opatt=20
a
opg.k=rop.k-op.k
NOTE
%%%%%%/.%%%%%%/.%
REQUIRED OPERATORS
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
a
rop.k=clip(1,clip(r7.k,rmop,nasl,nas.k) ,nasO,nas.k) required op
a
r7.k=(~,op!(nasl-nasO))*(nas.k-nasO)
158

---

c
rmop=2S0e3
NOTENOTE %1.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
a
hi.k=cons.k/pop.k
household income
1
pop.k=pop.j+dt*Cbth.jk-dth.jk)
population
n
pop=ipop
NOTE c
ipop=8e6
c
ipop=2e6
r
bth.kl=pop.k*fbth
birth rate
p
fbth=.045
r
dth.kl=pop.k*fdth
death rate
p
fdth=.015
a
11.k=smoothCsll.k,tll)
a
sll.k=clipCChi.k/nhi.k),l,nhi.k,hi.k)
life level
c
tll=l
a
nhi.k=clipCnhil,nhi2,nhit,time.k)
normal household income
p
nhil=4e3
p
!'_hi2=4e3
p
nhit=20
NOTE
%%%%Y.%%%%%%%%%
TOTAL VALUES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
a
rcp.k=rse.k+rpg.k+rop.k
required information technologists
a
cs.k=ses.k+pgs_k+ops.k
information technologist students
159

---

a
cp.k=se.k+pg.k+op.k
information technologist
a
rre.k=ri.k+rf.k+rrpfe.k
required resources
for education
a
rcs.k=rse.k+rpg.k+rop.k
required computer students
NOTE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%1.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%'l.
NOTE
NOTE
%'l.%%%NFORMATION TECHNOLOGIST EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE %%%'l.'l.
1
i.k=i.j+dt*Ciir.jk-id.jk)
existing infrastructure
n
i=ii
NOTE P
ii=336e3
p
ii=2e6
riir.kl=delay3Cinvcei.k,iird)
infrastructure invest. rate
NOTE p
iird=.3
infrastructure invest. bUdget time
p
iird=2.5
r ~id.kl=i.k*idr
infrastructure depreciaton rate
p
idr=.05
infrastructure life time
a
ri.k=cpeic.k*cs.k
required infrastructure
a
cpeic.k=clipCcpeicl,cpeic2,time.~,cpeict)
educ. infrastruct. cost
p
cpeic1=2. 4e3
p
cpeic2=2.4e3
p
cpeict=20
a
ip.k=i.k/cp.k
infrastructure-De~ personnel
•
!
,
a
ips.k=i.k/cs.k
infrastructurE per student
a
infa.k=smoothCsinfak,tinfa)
= GO

---

a
sinfa.k=clip«i.k/ri.k) ,1,ri.k,i.k)
c
tinfa=l
NOTE =================
INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY ====================
a
ci.k=i.k/cpeic.k
capacity of existing infrastructure
a
sfc.k=clip«cs.k-ci.k),O,cs.k,ci.k)
students in foreign countries
NOTE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NOTE
NOTE
%%%%%%%%% INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIST EDUCATION FACILITIES %%%%%%%%
1
f.k=f.j+dt*(fir.jk-fd.jk)
existing facilities
n
f=if
NOTE P
if=224e3
p
if=le6
r
fir.kl=delay3(invcef.k,fird)
facilities investment rate
NOTE p
fird=.2
facilities investment budget time
p
fird=2
r
fd.kl=f.k*fdr
facilities depreciaton rate
p
fdr=.2
facilities life time
NOTE %%%%%1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. REQUIRED FACILITIES 1.1.1.1.1.1.1././.%/.%%%/.%/./././.%/././.%%
a
rf.k=cpefc.k*cs.k
required facilities
a
cpefc.k=clip(cpefcl,cpefc2,time.k,cpefct) educ. facilities cost
p
cpefcl=.8e3
p
cpefc2=.8e3
p
cpefct=20
NOTE
1.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.1.1.1.1.
FACILITIES PER
PERSONNEL AND STUDENT 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
a
fp.k=f.k/cp.k
facilities pe~ personnel
161

---

a
fs.k=f.k/C8.k
facilities per student
a
fa.k=smooth(sfa.k,tfa)
a
sfa.k=clip((f.k/rf.k) ,1,rf.k,f.k)
facilities availability
c
tfa=l
NOTE
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
NOTE 'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
PROFESSOR SECTOR
'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.'l.
NOTE
1
pf.k=pf.j+dt*pfhr.jk
professor
n
pf=ipf
p
ipf=25
(485 students, 20 students per professor)
NOTE p
ipf=1742
(1485 students, 20students per professor)
r
pfhr.kl=delay3(pfe.k,pfhrd)
professor hiring rate
p
pfhrd=5
professor education time
a
pfe.k=invpe.k/ecpf.k
professor education rate
a
rpf.k=cs.k/nsp.k
required professors
a
nsp.k=clip(nsp1,nsp2,nspct,time.k)
c
nsp1=60
c
nsp2=60
c
nspct=20
a
rrpfe.k=rpf.k*ecpf.k
required resources for prof. education
a
ecpf.k=clip(ecpfl,ecpf2,time.k,ecpft)
educ. cost per prof. per year
p
ecpfl=3e3
p
ecpf2=3e3
p
ecpft=20
a
pa.k=srnooth(spa.k,tpa)
a
spa.k=psr.kxclip((pf .k/rpf.k) ,:,rpf.k,pf.k)
professor availability
IG2

---

c
tpa=l
a
psr.k=tabhl(tpsr,nsp.k,10,60,10)
t
tpsr=1/1/.9/.6/.55/.5
NOTE
STUDING CONDITIONS FACTOR
a
scf.k=clip((.4*pa.k+.3*fa.k+.2*11.k+.l*infa.k), .9,time.k,scft)
NOTE p
scft=2001
P
scft=1979
NOTE
TRAINING CONDITIONS FACTOR
a
tcf.k=clip((.45*pa.k+.35*fa.k+.2*infa.k), .9,time.k,tcft)
.
NOTE, P
tcft=2001
p
tcft=1979
CONTROL STATEMENTS
SPEC
DT=.1/LENGTH=2000/SAVPER=.5
SAVE SE,SEHR,SES,SEER,RSE,SELRO,PG,PGHR,PGS,PGER,RPG,PGLRO,SFC,FCP,-
FCPC,OP,OPHR,OPS,OPER,ROP,OPLRO,CP,CS,RCP,I,F,IIR,FIR,IDR,FDR,TCN,-
TASCI,RI,RF,CPEIC,CPEFC,PF,RPF,PFE,PFHR,CI,FPS,NAS,IDTN,INFPS,LL,-
APT,IPT,SPT,HI,SEG,PGG,OPG,AAS,IA,AOUT,ACN,INVACI,ACI,IAS,II,INV,-
NHI,POP,DADTN,NVICI,IOUT,ICN,ICI,INTICI,INTACI,INTSCI,SAS,IS,SOUT,-
SCN,SCI,ISCI,RRE,NI,INVSCI,RDTN,ADTN,RFPS,RRE,RAIT,RRITD,INVA,INVI,-
INVS,INVIT,INVDTN,GVT,CONS,ITTR,INVCI,INVCE,INVDTN,INVPS,ACIA,ICIA,-
SCIA,FA,INFA,PA,ACIT,ACP,CPA,DTNA,PA~,FA,INFA,PA{~~~QPGR,­
RLAAS, RLIAS ,RLSAS ,AC, TRA, ACO ,SESLR, PGSLR, OPSLR:rf~oR~ep(j~ SESL, -
j<? I. c
\\ 9~,
PGSL, OPSL, APT, IPT, SPT, ITEA, ITEI, ITES, SCF, TCF, Rysf,cp.c1$J. l2, R3J\\~4, R5, -
R6 ,R7 , ITCA, ITCI , ITCS , nc ,ITE, ITER
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N TIME=1980
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"1.r.:1:et/\\Si,,\\(.I'L:· "
..~-~
163

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