University of California
Los Angeles
THE PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMY OF
NORTHWESTERN IVORY COAST
AND ITS
TRANSFORMATION UNDER FRENCH COLONIALISM
1827-1920
A dissertation submitted in partial
satisfaction of the requirernents for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in History
by
Jeanne Maddox Toungara
1980
@copyright by
Jeanne Maddox Toungara
1980
The dissertation of Jeanne Maddox Toungara is approved
.
Clvùit(~[ht ê;Du-r
Christoph~hret
University of Ca1ifornia, Los Angeles
1980
"
i i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF MAPS . . .
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
vi
VITA.
.
.
.
viii
ABSTRACT . .
ix
NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY
xiii
Chapter
I.
INTRODUCTION/THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
1
Vegetation and Climate.
1
Origins .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4
Social Organization .
• • .
12
Political Structure .
.
.
26
II.
THE ECONOl-1Y.
32
Subsistence Agriculture
• . • . . .
32
Local Industry.
.
• .
• • .
• .
• • • .
36
Exchange and Redistribution .
.
.
.
. .
38
III.
PRE-COLONIAL COMMERCE.
.
. . .
51
Organization of Trade:
The Jula.
53
Markets • .
• • .
• . .
• • .
59
Traditional Units of Exchange .
. .
89
Trade routes.
.
. . . . • . •
95
IV.
COLONIAL RULE.
.
113
ArrivaI of the French in Kabadugu • . .
113
Organization of French Colonial Rule..
121
Collaborators .
.
.
.
. . •
. . . .
143
A New Identity..
• .
. .
148
Population.
.
• .
. . . .
153
V.
LOCAL ECONOMY IN TRANSITION.
163
Colonial Expectations .
. . .
. . •
163
The Head Tax.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
169
iii
--
Local Production.
177
.
Market Expansion .
199
"
VI.
LABOR.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
219
The Emancipation.
219
Forced Labor
.
225
Conscription.
.
.
.
.
.
.
249
Migration .
.
.
.
.
260
The Sarraut Plan.
267
VII.
CONCLUSION .
276
APPENDIX A
Market priees .
288
APPENDIX B
Original Cantons of Odienne Cercle.
295
APPENDIX C
Letter of Moriba Toure.
296
APPENDIX D
Colonial Administrators of Odienne.
299
APPENDIX E
Head Tax Collections 1905 .
.
.
. .
301
APPENDIX F
Oral Interview on Forced Labor.
302
APPENDIX G
Work Song of Malinke Men.
.
308
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .
309
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • . . .
310
iv'
--
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Map 1:
Trade Routes . . . . . . . . . .
97
Map 2:
Original Document Showing Region Sud
119
Map 3 :
Original Cantons of Odienne Cercle .
151
Map 4 :
Projected Railroad Construction.
.
229
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many individuals and organizations provided
ser-
vices and support during the undertaking of this disserta-
tion.
l would like to express my gratitude to several of
them here.
Research abroad was aided by librarians and
archivists wherever l went, especially those in Dakar,
Bamako and Abidjan.
Their patience and experience were
essential during the many hours spent examining dusty,
forgotten documents.
A special thanks is in order for the people of the
Odienne region who provided a wealth of oral data.
After
listening to their experiences l
felt a commitment to them
to complete the project and to give a reliable account of
their history.
Most of the interviews were recorded in
the Malinke language.
It was my good fortune to have
a reliable interpretor, Mr. Thierno Barry.
He willingly
shared his knowledge of the region and never faltered in
his enthusiasm and determination to get the job done
during the many long hours transcribing tapes from Malinke
vi
into French.
l am also thankful to many officials of the
region, including the President of the Economie and Social
Council of the Ivory Coast, Mr. Mamadou Coulibaly, for
their warm reception and for allowing me a free hand in
asking whatever questions l felt necessary.
l would like to thank the Ford Foundation's
Doctoral Fellowship for Black Students for providing five
years of financial support.
l am indebted to many friends and family for their
unfailing encouragement and time spent in editing, proof-
reading, running errands and, generally, giving of them-
selves during this project.
Finally, l wish to thank my husband, Adama, who
never lost hope in this project and who provided both
financial and moral support throughout its completion.
Without his interest, patience and support this disser-
tation could never have been completed.
vii
VITA
January 24, 1950--Born, Los Angeles, California
1969-l970--Education Abroad Program, Bordeaux, France
1971--B.A., History, University of California, Los Angeles
1971--Crossroads to Africa, Ivory Coast
1972--M.A., African Studies, University of California
Los Angeles
1973--Candidate of Philosophy in History, University of
California, Los Angeles
1975--Field Work, Ivory Coast
1976-1977--Teaching Assistant, Department of English,
Universite Nationale de CSte d'Ivoire
1978--Field Work, Ivory Coast
viii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Pre-colonial Economy of
Northwestern Ivory Coast
and its
Transformation Under French Colonialism
1827 - 1920
by
Jeanne Maddox Toungara
Doctor of Philosophy in History
University of California, Los Angeles, 1980
Professor Boniface I. Obichere, Chair
This dissertation will examine economic and
social changes which took place when economic sphere of
Northwestern Ivory Coast shifted from subsistence to
priorities directly administered and controlled by a
foreign power.
Whereas the economic, social, and poli-
tical activities of the pre-colonial community revolved
only around itself and neighboring communities, the
arrival of the French brought the inhabitants into direct
ix
contact with world market demands.
Their stable mixed
economy of subsistence agriculture,
bar ter and long dis-
tance trade was jolted into a new realm based on the needs
of French colonialism.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
region surrounding the town of Odienne, in the north-
western corner of what is known today as the Republic of
Ivory Coast, was a well-integrated link in a chain of
Islamic commercial centers dotting the Western Sudan.
It
was composed mostly of Malinke peoples, whose ancestral
origins lay to the north.
The economic, political, and
cultural orientations of Odienne were toward places found
in present-day Mali and Guinea.
Descriptions by latter
nineteenth century explorers suggest that the region was
in the midst of political expansion and,
thus, could
hardly have been called "underdeveloped."
In fact,
the
kingdom of Kabadugu was an active participant in the trade
and politics of the western Sahel.
The entrenchrnent of French sovereignty throughout
large regions of West Africa had far-reaching implica-
tions for aIl areas which fell under colonial rule.
Of
particular significance was the partitioning of terri-
tories and the imposition of arbitrary boundaries.
An
exarnple of this is the kingdom of Kabadugu which was
attached to the colony of Ivory Coast.
By October 1899,
the kingdom had been dissolved and the colonial adminis-
x
trative center placed at Odienne.
The political
organization of the French West African colonies was
determined by the metropole's weak financial position.
The French administration attempted to govern by using
the existing socio-economic structures.
Wherever
possible they collaborated with local leaders.
Other
collaborators were found among ex-slaves who upon acquir-
ing sorne education joined the ranks of the new salaried
class of civil servants.
The French then proceeded .with the economic
exploitation of the peasants.
The head tax and crop
requisitions were demanded.
The amount of labor and
sacrifice required of the peasants surpassed any efforts
furnished during the pre-colonial period for their own
subsistence.
Yet, the colonial administration often
expressed dismay that the region did not possess more
of the products essential for French industry.
After the abolition of the slave trade and the
freeing of captives, the French became more aware of the
value of the northern cercles to the rest of the colony
and the metropole.
There lay a vast reserve of men who
were sent to forced labor camps in the forest zone.
These men became porters for the colonizers, built roads
linking the north to the south, and supplied the metropole
with soldiers and primary materials during World War I.
- ~he--paci-fication of l-ower Ivory-Coast permitted
xi
French entrepreneurs to play an active role in the
colonizing effort.
Using labor provided by the adminis-
tration, they created extensive cash crop plantations.
The exporting of these crops through southern coastal
ports forced a change in the orientation of traditional
Malinke economic activity.
Realizing that their best
commerical interests lay no longer in the north, many
Malinke integrated effectively into the economic system
of the south as independent traders or planters.
The relationship between the colonized and the
colonizer was totally exploitative and was, consequently,
maintained .by force.
The author concludes that regions
not successfully diverted from their traditional metro-
poles, nor well-integrated into new metropoles during
the colonial period, are still suffering from a lack of
effective economic integration into the present-day
independent nations of which they are a part .
. xii
.'
Note on Orthography
Since the Ivory Coast government has not taken any
moves toward updating French spellings to newer, inter-
nationally acceptable phonetic spellings, the contempor-
ary spellings for places, persons, and peoples appearing
in this dissertation have'oeen maintained.
(e.g. "Toure,"
"Odienne," have not been changed to "Ture," nor "ojéne").
On the other hand, an attempt has been made to give
updated spellings to certain nouns in the Malinke lan-
guage, e.g. jon, and jula.
The spellings of provinces
no longer in existence have been·changed, e.g.·"Kaba-
dougou" appears as "Kabadugu."
Furthermore, in ail African proper narnes the French
"~" is represented as a simple "e" and is pronounced
wherever it appears, e.g. Malinke, Kone, oiabate.
xiii
CHAPTER l
INTRODUCTION:
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
Vegetation and Climate
The kingdom of Kabadugu as i t existed at the turn
of the twentieth century qccupied approximately what is
known today as the prefecture of Odienne.
Named after
the administrative capital of the region, Odienne is
situated in the northwestern corner of Ivory Coast.
It
shares its regional boundaries with the Republic of Mali
to the north, the Republic of Guinea to the west, the
prefecture of Boundiali to the east and the prefecture
of Touba to the south.
Odienne lies between the dense
forest of the southern zones and vast savannah to the
north, making i t the crossroads of two topographical and
economic zones.
The evolution of time has brought the
region physically closer to the north due to the spreading
of drought-affected lands in the Sachel, yet its economic
destiny was to be channeled toward rich cash crop pro-
ducing regions of the south.
Odienne occupies 21,000 square kilometers of the
322,500 square kilometers that compose the total area
of Ivory Coast.
The landscape consists of mountains
and plateaus.
The highest points are located at Mount
l
Tyouli near Seguelon which is 913 meters high,
Gbandikourou 730 meters and Foulakourou 874 meters both
at Bako, Tigoukeli 828 meters and Denguele 813 meters both
near Odienne, and Tietigrou at Goulia reaching 800 meters.
The basically granite plateaus enter Ivory Coast from
Guinea at a height of about 400 meters, and drop gradually
at the northern and southern limits of the region.
Lying in the basin.~f the Niger River, the region
is watered by sorne of its tributaries.
The most important
is the Baoule River.
It flows 330 kilometers from its
source to the Ivory Coast-Mali border.
Other waterways
include the Gbanhala and the Kourikele along the Guinean
border, the Banifing in the north~ast, and the Upper
Sassandra River or Boa, with its affluents the Tiemba,
the Sien and the Banou.
The climate is divided into two seasons, rainy and
dry.
It is hot and dry during the summer, averaging
twenty degrees centigrade fram December to March, rising
to thirty degrees centigrade in April.
During this period,
the harmattan which lasts for three to five months brings
dry warm winds fram the north.
The rainy season lasts
from Mayor June through October or November.
Total
rainfall during those months may range from l2SQmm to
l700mm. 1
Odienne boasts large areas of sparse forests and
savannahs.
The areas of forest were once much denser,
2
but they were changed by the people who lived there,
hunting and cultivating the soil.
Villages are still
located on plateaus and surrounded by thick damp forests.
This protects them from bush fires set by the villagers
as a means of clearing the land for crop production or
as a means of forcing out wild game.
Uncontrolled, the
fires have eliminated bush that protected areas with
poor vegetation and sandy-surfaced, soil.
The soil
.-
has an overabundance of iron oxides and underneath a
layer of gravel that is easily exposed by erosion.
In the driest parts of the savannah one finds the
baobab tree (Adansonia digitat) which yields fruit, and
the acajou tree (~haya senegalensis) the source of the wood
used in local industry.
In spite 'of the bush fires,
other species such as the iroko (Chlorophlora excelsa) ,
the nere (Parkia biglobosa) and the fromager manage
to survive.
The ~ tree grows as high as twenty meters.
Its thick dark green foliage yields long pods which
are exploited as a condiment.
The shea tree, usually
ten to twelve meters high yields a fruit used in the
making of oil, or shea "butter".
The land is especially
responsive to cereals such as bulrush millet, fonio,
and rice, while maize, peanuts and various fruit trees
and tubers made the area attractive to the migrating
Malinke.
The Malinke arrivaI was not only condi tioned by
3
-
the vegetation, but also by its proximity to richer
regions of commercial exploitation in the dense forests
to the south.
The kola nut tree (Cola nitida) grew there
in abundance, but fear of the forest and its inhabitants
held the Malinke adventurers back.
The region of Odienne
was a transit zone through which they conducted their
trade back to their homelands and beyond, making the region
a link in the chain of long distance trade centers dotting
.-
the Western Sudan.
Origins
The Northern Mande fall within the Niger-
Kordofanian family of languages.
Linguists have isolated
the various languages belonging to the Northern Mande.
They include Susu, Yalanka, Hwela, Numu, Ligbi, Vai,
Kono, and Mandekan, and are spoken in regions throughout
West Africa such as Mali, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea,
Ghana, and Ivory Coast.
Mandekan has been subdivided into
two groups which include Xassonke, Maninka, Bambara,
Jula on the one hand, and Wassalunka, Diahanka, Mauka,
and Bo on the other.
The language spoken in Odienne
2
belongs to the former.
Linguists have helped to determine
patterns of migration by making language comparisons.
Malinke migration into the Odienne region began
around the fifteenth century.
Events in the Manding
homeland (Manden, in present day Mali)
forced sorne of
its inhabitants southward, and sorne in other directions
4
-
of the western sudan.
Their arrivaI in Odienne was
graduaI and for the most part, peaceful, although their
increasing numbers slowly pushed the sparse Senufo
settlements further east.
The arrivaI of the first Malinke families in
Odienne has been traced through oral traditions collected
by explorers, colonial administrators and more recently
by academic researchers.
More recent works are most
.-
useful in that they are better documented, more detailed,
and serve to correct sorne of the errors, either in
3
judgement or interpretation, of the pasto
Here the
author will make sorne effort to present a brief overview
of the occupation, because it is directly related to
the events which made Kabadugu the "frontier society,,4
it was upon the arrivaI of the French.
The first arrivaIs were the Doumbia (also called
Kourouma) who trace their origins to the Bambara of
Segu.
They migrated out of the Wasulu just north of
Odienne in southern Mali, to an area in the northern
part of the region called Bodugu (named after a hunter,
Bamboli).
The headquarters of the region were located
at Kimbirila (north).
Later, other members of the
Doumbia family led by Masamba from Bodugu, established
a southern province called Massala.
According to Delafosse,
they were identified as "Toron" and are also responsible
for the occupation of the provinces of Toron
and Tudugu
5
Other families,
such as Fanny and Fondio arrived with
5
them.
The area around the town of Samatiguila was first
settled by a hunter named Tchesen Kone, who went there
after obtaining permission from the chief of Massala.
His son, Ngolojan, was a
renowned elephant hunter.
The name Samatiguila means "land of the elephant hunter"
(or linguistically "the plaee of the master of elephants").
The arrivaI of Muslims in Odienne corresponds
to
h
w at De 1 a f osse caIl s '' a second wave 0 f " "
m~grat~on 6
which consisted of Islamized Malinke.
This expression
leaves a reader open to misinterpretation because i t
implies that aIl of those who came in the "second wave"
were Muslims.
The first Islamic center was established
at Sokoroba.
It was founded by Fere Mamadou Cisse
who migrated from the village of Bakongo in Guinea.
Once Fere Mamadou Cisse settled at Sokoroba, he is
said to have passed political power to a Fulani, Siriki
Sangare, who was the founder of the great market place
at Minignan.
According to Delafosse, the Fulani, coming
directly from Wasulu where they had been culturally
assimilated with the Malinke over a long period of
time, spoke Mande and, for the most part, had Mande
patronyms, but had not been converted to Islam.
Later
under the direction of Silatiguiguian, they moved into
the provinces of Fuladugu and Vadugu,
forcing the chief
6
of the Senufo province of Naoulu to cede vast terri tories
to the advancing Malinke immigrants.
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, there
was a group of twelve pilgrims said to have made the
trip together from Mecca by foot.
They were led by
7
Mosuaren samanssi.
Two of the group, El Hadj Morifere
Kante and El Hadj Vamoussa Bakayoko, went toward the
southern region of Odienne ..-
Kante is the founder of
the village Moriferefougoula (Ferefougoula on today's
map), and is said to have predated the founding of
Tieme by about a half century.8
Bakayoko continued
further south to the northermnost limit of the kola
producing areas lying south of Odi~nne, and established
the commercial town of Koro.
Oral traditions attribute the founding of the
village of Odienne to members of the same group of
pilgrims, El Hadj Kamate and El Hadj Siraffe. Kornara.
According to legend, Mosuaren Samanssi a,nd El Hadj Youssouf
Kamate spent seven years together in Mecca.
At first
they stopped at Logonasso a few kilorneters north of
Odienne.
The region at that time was occupied by Senufo
blacksmiths of the Diomande clan,9 who gave thern sorne
problerns.
When Mosuaren Samanssi left Odienne, Youssouf
Kamate contacted his associate, Komara, who had settled
at Sizani in the province of Segu in Mali, to send help to
drive the Senufo out.
Through his friend, Kamate contacted
7
Kumandri Diarrassouba,
the king of Segu,
to send an army. The
king sent an army led by his two brothers
Sirakoma and
Sirazan. They were accompanied by the Bamba, blacksmiths of
lO
Segu, who made pellets for the rifles
and by another
ll
blacksmith named Kone.
Since settlement by each advancing group appears to
have been made based on ~D agreement with the fist arrivaIs
in the region, when Massamba Kourouma heard that the Diarras-
souba were coming to the aid of the Kamate, he went to meet
them. Together the army chiefs and the chief of Massala decid-
ed upon the southern limit of Massala, leaving the rest for
occupation by the Diarrassouba, in what became the kingdom of
Nafana.
The Senufo were pushed aIl the way to Tote
(Tete on
today's map), and then the Diarrassouba settled, making their
capital at Manuhuna, located at the foot of the Denguele
12
13
mountain.
There were 177 villages ïn the kingdom.
The
1
r
Kone who had accompanied them moved on to Somotou, a village
i
1
!
not far from the market at Minignan.
Yves Person places the
date of settlement at Manuhuna around 1760.
The Kamate, on the other hand, decided to settle
elsewhere, and upon advice given by Miako Cisse, a wise
man who
had just arrived, they chose a place surround-
ed by seven plains, seven hills, and seven ponds which
they called Odienne, meaning "paradise on earth.,,14
50 concludes the story of the arrivaI of the first four
families
(Kamate, Komara,
Diarrassouba, Cisse)
and the
8
settlement of the first four quarters of Odienne.
.'
It appears that Tieme was founded after Odienne .
The Sylla arrived at Tieme by migrating from Mali
through Guinea.
A marabout had advised them to search
for a village located close to a mountain, Tieme was
named after a Senufo man and the land was given to the
Sylla by the Senufo of Naoulu.
15
Nearly a cent ury later,
Samatiguila was founded
.-
by the Diaby.
Their ancestor was Fode Kasamba Diaby,
originally from Dia, in Mali.
His son, Souliman Kasamba,
left Oiaga for Mecca, and upon his return began to search
for a new place to settle.
He went as far as Kafegue,
toward Mankono, and then returned to the Odienne region.
According to one account,
two of Oiaby's sons discovered
a place which looked like the one prescribed by a marabout
(near a river and two lakes)
and found Fodeyahaya Sylla
already living there near the great elephant hunter.
16
Sylla agreed to let the Oiaby settle.
However, another
account says that the Oiaby went to Tieme first, and
then, with the help of the Sylla, asked permission from
the Fanny at Kaniasso to settle.
They were shown
Sarnatiguila and were assisted by the people of Kaniasso
.
.
h
. Il
17
. Il
th' d
t
l.n constructl.ng t
e Vl.
age.
Stl.
a
l.r
accoun
18
says that the land was given by the Kourouma.
Sorne
Sylla and Samessi families settled at Samatiguila with
the Diaby.
9
•
The origins of the Savane family show a complicated
passage out of the Futa Toro through Kankan, and from
Gbaralo to Samatiguila over a period of several
generations.
Karamogho Kanfere, a descendant of Sy
Savane, met Karamoghoba Diaby who asked him to go to
Odienne, the newly established capital of Kabadugu, to
become the imam in the mosque there.
The Savane have
presided over the mosque ~ver since.
By then Samatiguila and Tieme had become the most
weIl known Islamic centers in the western Sudan.
Migra-
tion was invariably linked with long distance trade,
involving the exchange of salt from the north and cola
nuts from the forest zone.
Samat~guila, in particular,
was noted as a large trading center controlled by Muslims
19
who devoted their time to religion and trade with
Jenne.
The origins of the lineage of Toure residing in the
region go back as far as their descent from Timbuktu.
The Toure were Sarakole weavers drawn into the adventures
of the rapidly expanding commercial activity in the Sahel.
Their oldest known ancestor is Siriki, who founded the
town of Sirikila in Guinea, not far from Kankan on the
lower Sarakarani ~iver.
One of his grandsons, Keni-
Brema, eventually left Sirikila and settled at Gbaralo
where he continued to weave.
Finally, one of his
sons, Feremori, who had been schooled in Islam, went
to Samatiguila to study the Koran with Feremori Sylla.
10
When Sylla died, he willed his widow Matye Cisse to his
student.
Later, Feremori decided to leave Gbaralo and
resettle at Mafeleba, whereheset up an Islamic quarter.
The principal activity was weaving.
His son, Matyewa
returned to Samatiguila to join his half-brother Matye-
Karamogho Sylla, and together they practiced long distance
commerce.
Matyewa finally married a Muslim girl from
Kouroukoro, Kaba Saran Kaba.
It is from this marri age
~
that Vakaba, the founder of Kabadugu (also called
Kabasarana after his mother) was born.
Although Vakaba began his military career from
Samatiguila, he established his political capitol at
Odienne on the request of the marabouts of Samatiguila.
(It was the custom not to mix politics and religion.)
But the Toure still greatly depended on the religious
support of Samatiguila.
At their request, the Diaby sent
them someone to preside over the mosque.
Under the hegemony of the Toure family, and in
alliance with the rapidly spreading Jula Empire of Samori,
Kabadugu was at the peak of expansion when the French
began their pursuit of Samori.
In 1895, according to
Captain Comarcy, there were nearly 40 cantons in the
20
kingdom of Kabadugu.
In forming Kabadugu, the Toure
family succeeded in implanting a group of Islamized war
lords who governed vast enclaves of non-Muslim captives.
When the French arrived in Odienne, they observed that
Il
Islam was reserved for the elite.
However, as far back
as 1154 when the Arab chronicler Al-Idrissa wrote that
the king of Ghana and the people were Muslims, it was
in reference to the towns people only.2l
Islam was
then and did remain an urban phenomenon.
Social Organization
Malinke social organization was highly structured.
At the base of its organization was lu or extended family
compound.
The lu included the fa, head of the family,
whose title was lutigi, plus aIl of his younger brothers,
their sons, wives, children and slaves who shared the same
compound.
The fa was responsible for the well-being of
his lu.
He saw to it that the fields were cultivated,
supervised food distribution, managed any monies, and
made decisions regarding the distribution of clothes
and jewelry for ceremonial occasions, tools and any other
items necessary for the well-being of.his lu.
Punishment, as weIl as marriages, had to be
approved by the fa.
His authority. reigned over any
commercial activity within and without the lu.
In
addition to work performed for the good of the collective,
any member could work for his own account to the benefit
of his own wives and children.
Work for the collective
was performed five days a week.
On Sundays and Mondays
individuals worked for themselves.
Understanding the lu system is the key to
12
b
understanding Malinke economy as an institutionalized
process of reciprocity and redistribution.
According to
Polanyi, an institutionalized process is
... a sequence of functional movements that
are embedded in social relations.
The function
of the movements is to supply a group of in-
dividuals with a flow of material goods;
the
social relations in which the process is embedded
invests it with a measure of unity and stability. 22
Regardless of the degree of an individual's success, the
fa still had control over"the distribution of his goods.
If the needs of the collective necessitated intervention
by the fa, the society permitted the individual to be
sacrificed in favor of the collective good.
Through the
lu system, the social and economic aspects of Malinke
society were brought together, gtving it stamiria and
allowing it to survive the upheavals provoked by coloniza-
tion.
As will be shown, throughout the colonial period,
the fa made major decisions on the division of labor,
making it possible to meet the multiple demands of the
colonizers.
Clans are made up of aIl people who can relate
their origins to a common ancestor.
The lineages extend
over vast distances.
In the process of migration, as
single family units broke away from the lu of their
fathers and brothers to begin their own lu elsewhere, the
family names became dispersed throughout the Western Sudan.
In Malinke society, inheritance does not pass from
father to son, but from father to the oldest of his
13
brothers until the father's generation cornes to an end.
Then inheritance falls to the oldest male of the next
generation of patrilineal kin.
If the next person is not
capable of leading the farnily, then authority devolves to
the next in line.
In addition, Malinke society was composed of a
complex mixture of classes and castes.
It included
freemen and slaves, noblei and subservient persons.
First,
freemen were made up of nobles horon and the professional
or occupational castes.
The horon were divided into
several classes.
Mernbership was based on one's ability
to prove his genealogy and, thus, his right to nobility.
The upperrnost class was composed'of the chiefly families;
namely the fama and his descendants, who made up the
political authorities, the religious leaders, and the
military chiefs of the kingdom.
In the next class of
horon were warriors, other religious personalities,
intellectuals, and wealthy persons, who wielded sorne
prestige due to wealth, intelligence, or ability to
defend the kingdom.
The last class of horon consisted
of the rural masses whose only claim to nobility was
their birthright.
They knew, neither fame, nor fortune,
but their pride in being horon lay in their honesty
d th '
. d
d
23
an
e1r 1n epen ence.
Those who displayed exceptional courage in defense
of the kingdom
became tontigiw, mernbers of the aristocracy
14
who acted as advisors to the king.
AlI nobles were
expected to show respect for justice and truth, and to be
loyal and hospitable.
The second group of freemen consisted of
occupational groups, both casted and non-casted.
In
Odienne, the divisions and terminology used for the
occupational groups differ from their Malian
counterparts.
According to most studies, in Mali aIl occupational
.-
groups forro castes and are known as nyamakala, which
means 'garbage'and implies low status in society.
Therefore, blacksmiths, griots, weavers, leather workers,
and carpenters were aIl nyamakala with the exception of
the Bozo and Somono fishermen and the Diawambe courtes ans
,
of Mali.
In Odienne, the term nyamakala and jeli,
meaning griot, are used synonomously.
AlI griots are
nyamakala, but the other occupational groups are saved
from this terminology, except the tanners.~4
Griots are the genealogists, historians! and
musicians of Malinke society.
The relationship between
the griot and the horon is one of an inferior to his
master.
The griot must sing the praises of the horon.
The horon, in turn, are careful never to insult a griot,
because of the harm a griot can inflict on the reputation
of a horon.
If the horon does insult a griot, he must
paya fine, in the forro of a gift, to the injured griot.
The more important horon always had one or more griots
15
b
in his entourage.
The families of griots in the Odienne
region include the Kouyate, Diabate, Keita, and the
Finah (whose family name is Camara).
The Finah and the
Kouyate hold superior status to the other families.
Almami Toure described the manifestation of their
superior status, saying,
AlI
the nyamakala are not the same.
The true nyamakala are the Finah and the
Kouyata.
The Diabate and the Keita or
Bobote are not at tbe same level as the
Finah and the Kouyate.
When there was
news to be announced, the king called 25
the Finah and the Kouyate first.
Although tanners and griots are considered
separately in other areas, there is a direct relationship
between a griot and tanner in Odienne.
Generally, leather
.
' 26
workers were griots and V1ce versa.
Matche Keita,
who lives in a village of.tanners, put it this way,
5mnce
the beginning of the earth, l have
been a leather worker.
l make my living
that way.
l am not a blacksmi~ because
the blacksmith is not a griot.
But27
we are griots.
We are the Keita.
The Finah might be the only exception to the dual role
played by griots and tanners.
Perhaps, due to their
superior status, they are not mentioned in the sarne phrase
with other tanners.
Bokar N'Diaye, in Les castes du
Mali, considers the dual role, but does not list the same
patronyms of griots presented here as leather workers.
He says that the Finah, who sang the praises of Allah and
his prophet, gradually left the Koran to farm and trade,
16
-
but still maintained a widespread reputation as the most
eloquent praise singers.
No mention is made of the Finah
28
as leather workers.
Blacksmiths form a caste apart, and are considered
to be the most important of the occupational castes.
Unlike other areas of Malinke settlement, in northern
Ivory Coast the blacksmiths, ~' are not equated with
nyamakala.
They play a very important role in society by
producing
firearms for the defense of the kingdom, and
tools for cultivation, and cooking utensils.
Wives of
numu are pottery makers.
There are other occupations, however, that do not
form castes.
Anyone can practice weaving, spinning
thread, or hunting, regardless of his social status.
As
is frequently pointed out; even the Toure of Kabadugu
were weavers.
The only real difference between the horon
andmembers
of an occupational caste âs that the latter,
by the nature of their trades, were destined ~o serve
others.
Persons of caste were expected to be loyal and
devoted to the noble classa
Exogamous marriages, however,
were forbidden.
In spite of these rather fixed categories of
social status into which the Malinke were bom; there
did appear to be sorne limited upward mobility through
marriages.
Lower class women could become wives of
upper class men within a given social stratum.
For
17
•
example, an ordinary horon female could marry an upper
.'
class horon male, and a lower class jeli female could
marry an upper class jeli male, but never the reverse.
Social status of the family was based on the male.
Any
man, horon or casted, could take a slave wife.
Other cases of upward mobility are especially
noticeable in the Odienne region, most certainly due to
the nature of settlement and defense in Kabadugu.
The
.-
Diabate family, for instance, came into the region with
the Toure family from Wasulu.
The kabla of the Toure
family, called Vakabala, includes the Diabate family who
are of nyamakala (jeli) origins.
But, the Diabate followed
the Toure into the region as warriors, not as griots.
,
They paid their head tax with the Toure family, and even
today, pay their PDCI membership cards with Vakabala.
Because the Diabate are so closely associated with the
royal family, they tend to see themselves as nobles.
Later migrations of Diabate into Odienne are jeli, do
not belong to Vakabala, and do not have noble status.
The situation is very delicate.
As Almami Toure stated,
"The Diabate are jeli," referring to their profession,
"but they are horon," in reference to their social
status, "since they live with the Toure."
Nevertheless,
he quickly added that the Toure consider them to be
. l'
b
f '
11
d
. Il
29
~,
oth pro ess~ona
y an
soc~a
y.
His attitude
supports B. N'Diaye's conclusion on the subject,
18
... a man of caste even if he does not
practice the caste's occupation, will be
condemned nonetheless to stay in it, and
continue to suffer the outcome reserved to
men of his condition.
Because one can never
leave a caste, once born into one, to rise to
the rank of nobility. 30
Nevertheless, as L. Diabate pointed out and history
substantiates, the Diabate share the patronyrn Doumbia due
to common origins.
Although the Diabate are griots in the
town of Odienne, the Doumbia are kings in Massala and
.-
Bodugu.
The Kone, who are blacksmiths, a casted group
in the town of Odienne, are chiefs in Bako, Tienko, and
Naoulu.
Approval is given for marriages between Toure
females and Doumbia or Kone males in other regions where
they do possess noble status.
At the bottom of the social ladder were those who
~
had been reduced to various states of servitude, jonya
( "
. .'-
)
Jon - a person 1n Jonya •
His dutY was to work and
obey his master, regardless of how l~ly orprestigious
\\
his position.
The jon could be owned by hor~n, casted
groups, or other j6n.
The master was omnipotent, having
\\
rights of life or death over a j~n.
The jon was the
master's property.
The children and any belongings of
the j~n were also the master's property.
Only the master
could inherit from a j~n.
The j~n could present gifts
to his master to gain his favor; and the master could
cffer gifts to his j~n or encourage him by giving him
land
th
k
· 1
.
31
h
.,
or 0
er means to ma e mater1a
ga~ns.
T e Jon
19
>
who belbnged to a rnember of a caste could not hire
hirnself out independently.
His skills belonged to the
master who determined when the skills could be practiced.
Moreover, the master could loan the services of his jan.
The jèn could also be bred to increase the number of
persons in jonya.
If the male and female were of
different masters, the child belonged to the rnother's
rnaster.
.-.
Generally, the fa of each household was responsible
for the slaves in his lu, just as he was responsible for
any other property or persons in the household.
He
~
.'
distributed work to the jon, decided when the Jon could
be used in transactions, and divided jan produ~tion among
the members of the household.
He aiso distributed food
to the j~n.32.
A jbn was an item of prestige and was acquired in
many ways.
He could be bought outright,'exchanged,
transferred as a gift, captured, inherited, .given in
payment of a debt, recompense for a crime, or as part
of the bride priee.
The new owners were free to use the
\\
jon in other transactions.
The way in which a j~n was
acquired sometimes determined his status in j~nya.
The
most common type of jàn was acquired through non-personal
commercial transactions.
The jbn was usually ~xchanged
for prestige items, such as horses, gold or cattle.
His
status can be directly compared to the status of chattel
20
slaves in North America.
He was often integrated into
production as a plantation slave, but was not attached to
the land he worked.
He could be removed at any time to
be traded, or used for sorne other purpose, i.e., porters
for trade caravans, social transactions.
When in the
field he worked right along with the fa and other
members of the lu.
If the master owned large numbers
of plantation slaves, they were kept in slave villages
~.
away from the family.33
The plantation slave worked for
his master everyday until 4:00 P.M. except Fridays and
Mondays.
At his leisure, if given permission, the j~n
cultivated fields of his own.
Although, theoretically,
the produce could be confiscated by the master, the j~n
was usually allowed to trade his surplus production.
According to Boutillier, slaves he Id in distant villages
were only obliged togive one-tenth to one-fifth of their
34
harvests to the master.
Plantation slaves were poorly
dressed.
They cultivated their own food an~ food for
~
their masters.
The jon in distant villages had their own
chief who kept watch over them, while working the fields
along with them.
He could chastise the others, but was
not allowed to punish them.
The mas ter reserved aIl
rights of punishment over his property.
The chi~f was
usually a j6n also, who had gained the master's con-
fidence by being a loyal and trusted servant.
21
The woloso was a jon born of parents in service
to theirmaster.
The master was obliged to nourish,
clothe and house the woloso.
In time, the master also
chose a spouse for the woloso.
In spite of a privileged
status, in comparison to other jon not born in the lu
of their masters, the master still claimed the inheri-
tance of woloso, including their wives and children.
Woloso women could aspire ~o marriage among freemen of
caste or nobility.
Just prior to marriage,
they could be
freed if the husband was Muslim.
The children of such
a marriage were free, but there were differences among
these children and those of free mothers.
When family
arguments provoked children of fr~e mothers, they called
the children of woloso women kolokolo fan kelen madia,
.
mean~ng a k 0 10 k 0 10
t ree that h as a d ry
'd
s~ e. 35
Children of two woloso parents were the second
generation of slaves born in the lu.
Although they were
considered part of the family, they were still not free.
The third generation was considered on the verge of
freedom, and the fourth generation was theoretically
free.
The latter could act as freemen, but since
origins played an important part in social status, the
fact that no one ever forgot who had been a slave was
a technicality making full participation as freemen
questionable.
22
In response to the abolition of the Atlantic
trade by the British and the French, changes took place
in the formation of 19th century kingdoms.
Transforma-
tions in the political structure wrought changes in the
organization of jonya.
Prior to the apogee of Kabadugu,
servile pers ons were few in number throughout the terri-
tory.
Vakaba Toure's ascendance to power resulted in
the capture of thousands,~entire villages falling under
Toure domination.
Many horon were taken into capitivity.
Herein lies the origin of state slaves in Kabadugu.
Expansion of the kingdom reduced regions as far north as
the Wasulu, eastward as far as Tengrela, and southward
into Seguela, to a state of servitude.
Sorne captives
were settled into villages located around the capital.
The foroba j6n 'captives of the community' were actually
the king's share of the booty collected in warfare.
Although they were guarded by scfa or appointed chiefs,
Vakaba held ultimate authority over them.
The entire
Toure dynasty profited from their harvests.
Military slaves were al~o settled into the
villages around the capital.
In fact,
the villages were
called sofadugu.
The sofa
'master of the horse' was
a strategie figure in the expansion of Kabadugu, and most
crucial for the Toure regime.
They trained the horses
for warfare, participated in battles, and protected the
king.
They were rewarded with a share of the booty after
23
victorious battles. When not engaged in warfare,
they
took part in the farming activities of the village.
The prowess of a sofa at warfare sometimes led to
delusions of grandeur.
But regardless of the renown
a sofa gained, he remained subordinate to the horon.
His orders came directly from the king and his generals,
or from officers of the a~y.
While sorne sofa took
advantage of the possibilities for prestige offered by
warfare, others found occasions to escape.
A sofa
could take a female jan acquired by capture, purchase,
or gift as a wife, but could never marry a female of
horon or caste status.
Manumission for j~n was bought or acquired.
Sorne
j~n bought their own freedom.
Under Muslirn law a freed
jÔn became a client of his former rnaster.
But, the full
impact of freedorn was felt only if thé j~n was returned
to his family where an original state of freedorn had
existed.
Associations forro a valuable link between Malinke
social and economic activity.
Age grades,
kari,
performed both an econornic and rnilitary role.
Based
on a seven year cycle in each of seven grades, the fort y
nine years of participation in the
kari
could take
a m
th
h
Il
f l Of
d '
"b'l"
36
an
roug
a
stages 0
1 e an
1tS respons1 1 1t1es.
The mernbers helped their fellow villagers by doing field
work when their help was solicited.
In return for
24
meals and sorne compensation in the form of a cow, goat,
or money, the kari could ready the fields for planting
or help with the harvest.
The youth in the lower levels of the kari rnay
form another group, the tÔn, to organize social
activities for young people.
They have officers and
a treasury through which they finance their activities.
Part of their role is to p.atrol and survey the activi-
ties in the village, and to report any wrong doings.
As age pu shed the young members of the tdn into another
level of the kari where they prepared for military
responsibilities, a new group of t6n was formed.
Women's age groups help one another dur~ng the
harvest and seeding periods.
There is also a girl's
37
section of the tÔn.
The
~was an initiation group which also
followed a seven year cycle.
They gâve moral support
to their mernbers during funerals, and participated as
a group in ceremonies throughout the year.
Teaching
young people to assume responsible positions as adults
was mostly
the raIe of the initation group.
They
assisted in enforcing the practice of customs and
traditions, and took corrective action when these were
broken.
25
Political Organization
The pyramidal political organization was a re-
flection of the social structure.
Prior to the kingdom
of Kabadugu, the region was divided into a series of
kafu, provinces, which had been settled by migrations
of various lineages, as previously discussed.
The
kafu leader was usually a descendant of the founding
family.
The fa, father o~ the founding family was
38
called Mansa.
The Mansa held direct authority over his subjects.
He was assisted by the tuntigi-fa council of eIders,
composed of the" sovereign family lineage, who lived
throughout the region.
There wa~ no inter-reg~onal
division of power.
AlI of the dugutigiw 'village heads,'
were directly responsible to the Mansa.
He visited
each village once a year (ten days after the winter
solstice) to collect his tribute, at whigh time the
fa in each village would present new year's:greetings.
The Mansa was directly responsible to the horon whom he
called together on ceremonial occasions and holidays.
When there were important decisions to be made, the
debate took place among the counselors.
The freemen,
seated in another section of the court, did not speak in
the assernbly, but they let their attitudes be known
through gestures and comments ~ong themselves.
26
The military was normally called upon through
."
the kari after consultation with the Mansa in an
assembly.
If i t was agreed that they should fight,
the Mansa narned keletigi,
'warlords, , to conduct the
battle.
Their power was temporary and dissolved as
soon as combat was over.
The booty was divided by
the Mansa himself, in the presence of the heads of
.-
the lu.
Upon creation of the kingdom of Kabadugu, Vakaba
39
took the title Faarna.
He assumed the title just as
the capital of Kabadugu was being moved to Odienne,
40
around 1848.
Under Vakaba the traditional structure
of the kafu remained, but with a few minor changes.
Instead of a conglomeration of independent self-
sufficient provinces, the various kafu had to recognize
the sovereignty of the Toure, based at.Odienne.
The
Mansa
was eliminated and replaced by dUgukunassigi,
which means, literally,
'the master's man of confidence.'
They were special emissaries from the capital who
defended the interests of the kingdom.
The areas they
guarded were no longer called kafu, but were reduced
to
.
l '
, .
,41
h
k
.
h
t
d'
s~mp e
]arnana,
reg~ons.
T e ~, t
e
ra~-
(
tional base for military organization was overlooked.
Instead, men were divided into bolo,
'groups of 100 men'
and then organized into kele,
'columns' of varying
numbers to defend the strategie points of the kingdom.
27
•
The garrisons protected the main entrances to the kingdom
and controlled the trade routes through the kingdom
between the rich kola producing regions to the south and
42
the trading centers of the north.
The capital, Odienne, was surrounded by two walls.
On the outskirts were seventeen villages of military
and agricultural captives controlled by the warlords
.-
appointed by the Faama.
The Faama organized a court and a council.
The
advisors were his friends who had since become warlords,
and marabouts.
Unlike the pre-Kabadugu period, the
horon were no longer invited to assernblies.
Many of
them had been reduced to a state of captivity on their own
land.
Nevertheless, the political stability and security
on the trade routes brought about by Toure hegemony,
allowed the region to prosper.
The very same socio-
political organization that permitted the Toure to
organize and dorninate Kabadugu aiso helped the French,
upon their arrivaI after the conquest of Samori,
to
instill colonial rule with very littie difficulty.
The
structure was already in place.
(
,
28
Footnotes to Chapter l
ILe milieu naturel de la Cote d'Ivoire,
J. M. Avenard
ORSTOM Paris 1971.
2
.
.
t '
B~mson, Comparat~ve Recons ruct~on, pp.
8-11,
Dalby, Papers, p.
3 Delafosse, Essai.
Bauman &
Westerman, Les peuples, p.
453.
3See Delafosse, Monographie du Cercle de Korhogo
1905 ANCI, O'Sullivan, un~b. disserte UCLA 1976,
Person, Samori p. 168 IFAN,
Derive Chroniques 1976 ILA,
Brimson, Comp. Recon. pp.
278-285.
40 'sullivan, unpub. dissert., UCLA 1976.
5person, samori, p. 168.
6MOnographie de Korhogo.
7 He was called Sani Mosuaren in Derive, ~. cit.,
p.
27.
80 'Sullivan, unpub. disserte p. 74.
9 .
.
26
Der~ve, ~. c~t., p.
.
1°0
.
.
27
er~ve, ~. c~t., p.
.
lI0 'Sullivan, ~. cit., p. 82.
12Manuhuna was named after the chief of the
Diarrassouba.
13 Person, Samori, p. 169, Derive, p. 27.
l4
.
Der~ve, p. 28.
It was called dununya alijene,
;~~rth paradise, see also Delafosse Monographie de
Korhogo, ANCI.
15 Seventy years according to O'Sullivan, ~.cit.,p.76.
29
16Derive, ~. cit., p. 29
170 'Sullivan, ~. cit., p. 76.
18 p
S '
erson,
amorl, p. 168.
19Rene Caille,Journal Vol.
l, p.
465.
20 Map 7G/30-3 AND.
21Levtzion,
"DifferentiaI Impact,"
ICMS 1972 .
.-
22polanyi in Dalton, ed., Primitive, Archaic
and Modern Economies, N.Y.
1968, p.
306.
23The breakdown of class and cast in Malinke
society as explained by Labouret, Delafosse, Person p. 56',
and Baumann and Westermann was c1arified in Les castes
du Mali, N'Diaye, 1970, and supported by field notes.
24Almami Toure, Sananferedougou, 2 April 1978:
"The nyamakala are also those we calI je1i."
Also,
Lamine Diabate, Abidjan, 29 March 1978.
25Alami Toure, Sananferedougou, April 1978.
26Lamine Diabate, Abidjan, i978:
"Families
of 1eather workers include the Diabate, the Kouyate and
aIl others who can be called nyamakala."
27Matche Keita, Kere, April 1978.
28 B. N'Diaye, Les castes, pp. 110-114.
29Almami Toure, Sananferedougou, April, 1978.
30 B. N'Diaye, Les castes, p. 45.
3l J . L. Boutillier, "Les captifs enAOF," IFAN,
B,
30, 1968, p. 526.
30
32E . Pollet and G. Winter, "L'organisation
sociale du travail agricole des Soninke," CEA, VIII,
4,
p. 513.
33 E . Pollet and G. Winter, in their studies
among the Soninke state that men and women slaves did
not work the same field unless the mas ter only had one
of each seXe
The women could work only in the fields
of the master's wife or help the wife with domestic
chores.
"L'organisation sociale . . . ," CEA, p.
513.
Many families in Kabadugu were of Soninke origins, but
sex differentiation in field work appears to be in the
type of work women could pêrforrn, e.g., weeding rather
than tilling soil, than in which plantations women were
allowed to work.
34 J . L. Boutillier,
"Les captifs . . . " p. 523.
35Tchefara Diarrassouba at Samango, April 1978.
36Labouret, Les Manding 1934, pp.
63 ..
37
.
58
Person, Samor~, p.
.
38person points out that terrns such as kafutigi
and
famanati
as titles are creations of the colonial
periode
They are actually descriptiops ..
39The va in his name cornes from fa. according
to Derive, 2E.. cit., p. 2.
In note 105 page 85, Person
QE. cit., says that Fa is an abbreviation of Faama or
Fagaffia; a derivative-rrom fagha meaning power or force.
40Person, 2E. cit. , p. 173.
41Persan, 2E. cit., p. 72.
42 person, 2E. cit. , p. 174.
31
a small white grain found mostly in the upper Niger belt.
Imports of maize, cassava, groundnuts, tobacco,
and sorne fruits, which arrived from South America with
the African slave trade in the fifteenth century, were
also widely cultivated.
Maize grew in two varieties:
one with white grains and the other with yellow and
reddish grains.
Maize, sorghum, and bulrush millet
were also used to make dolo, a ferrnented beverage for
~
non-Muslims.
Legumes and tubers such as beans, yams and
sweet potatoes were important, while fruits and vegetables
such as bananas, papayas, guavas, dates, mangos, oranges,
lemons, okra, peppers, onions, eggplants, tomatoes,
~, and squash supplemented the diet.
Breadfruit and
palm sap were also gathered.
Land was prepared for planting by clearing away the
bushes with a hoe, cuttingdown trees with a hatchet,
and then setting the field afire.
The preparations for
planting began immediately after the first rains of
the .month of Mayor June which announced the beginning
of the rainy season.
Harvesttime, depending on the crop,
fell during the months of September, October or November.
The main instrument used for working the land was the
~, a 'short-handed hoe. 1
Mounds of earth were formed,
in the middle of which were planted either yams or sweet
potatoes.
The mounds allowed water from the rains to
drain and collect around the cultures without eroding
33
l
the soil.
Once crops were harvested, the rnounds were
destroyed and the soil was considered fertile enough to
sow rice or other crops.
Rice was sown by throwing
handfuls to the ground, very close together, but not
in rows, to prevent the rains from washing them away.
At least two times before harvesting, the fields were
weeded.
Early rice was harvested while the fields were
.-
still inundated.
Rice planted later in the season was
not harvested until December or January.2
By rotating
crops and leaving fields to fallow, an effort was made to
promote the best harvest from the land available.
In pre-colonial Kabadugu almost everyone worked the
land, regardless of his position in society.
Since
slavery was an important and profitable institution, those
who were fortunate to have enough slaves left the
cultivation entirely to them.
Otherw~se, most men
cultivated their own fields, surveyed the livestock (sorne
cattle, goats, rams,chickens, maybe 'mules and a few
horses), and performed sorne hunting or fishing.
It should
be noted that cattle were a luxury item.
They were only
'k'111ed and eaten on important ceremonial occasions •..
Otherwise, they were used as items of exchange and payment
for offenses cornmitted against the community.
Wornen, on the other hand, participated only in sowing
or weeding the fields, transporting the harvests, and
preparing them for consurnption, i.e.,husking the rice and
34
corn.
The rest of their time was taken up with the house-
hold duties of watching the children, extracting the shea
oil, spinning thread from cotton, transporting wood
and water to the compound, and preparing meals. 3
In spite of the availability of farmland and
possibilities for hunting and gathering, the people
still fell victim to occasional famines before the
beginning of the next rainy season.
The possibilities
....
of being taken slave if caught wandering about unpro-
tected were too great for them to wander very far from
the village in search of game.
Since most people
cultivated the same crops, food items were not usually
produced in large quantities for sale or export unless
the peasant owned enough slaves to produce a surplus.
Generally, however, scarcity was imminent.
During
famines villages sometimes exchanged or bartered for
food items.
Otherwise, they managed·with what they could
find, supplementing the diet with leaves and okra over
4
cornmeal mush.
During the existence of Kabadugu when large scale
production~was performed by the thousands enslaved, sur-
plus went~to feed sofas in the standing armies that
defended the kingdom.
Cotton and indigo were cultivated for indus trial
or commercial use until after the French had arrived.
Cultivation was based on the evolution of theseasons.
35
The non-Muslims had devised a lunar calendar based on
." religious practices and agricultural activity . The
calendar moved through a series of twelve to thirteen
months and included the appropriate sacrifices and
libations for fertility of the soil, planting and growth
of seeds, harvest, the period of fasting, and clearing
of the land in preparation for another agricultural
calendar year.
The use 9i this calendar was lost with
5
the imposition of the Islamic one.
Local Industry
Long before the arrivaI of Europeans, Malinke arti-
sans were manufacturing goods to meet their local
needs, from the primary sources ~vailable in ~e region.
Such was the case of the blacksmi ths •
The role of the
blacksrnith in Malinke society was important and respected.
From the ferrous rock brought from iron-producing·
regions, they fashioned arms, tools," and utensils on
locally made furnaces.
Forming a caste apart, the
blacksmiths were grouped by families whose skills are
still transmitted through several years of apprentice-
ship from father to son.
To be inducted into their
art, the apprentices must go through a series of pagan
ceremonies and sacred rites.
Blacksmiths also work with
wood to make handles for sorne of their tools, and mortars
and pestles used by wornen in rneal preparation.
Knowledgeable in the use of charcoal, they made
36
gunpowder pounded in mortars by the women in the caste.
The women as weIl made pottery from the red argilaceous
soil
that they dampened, molded, baked and varnished.
Blacksmiths were also responsible for the fabrication of
somee.
Sompe were the flattened entertwined iron bars
that were used as a forro of local money and served as a
primary raw iron source for the manufacture of other
articles.
The forro testified to the purity and pliancy
.-
of the iron.
So valuable were the blacksmiths that in
times of war their lives were spared.
They were often
.
f
6
sent as negot1ators
or peace.
Weaving was quite a profitable profession.
Women
spun thread, while men did the actual weaving.
Weaving
was practiced by families who did everything from the
planting of cotton to processing it into woven bands.
These were sold in rolls and occupied an important
position as an item of trade in pre-colonial Western
Sudan.
Weaving was open to anyone who desired to practice
it.
Socially,Malinkeweavers were horon who worked for
themselves and their immediate families.
During the dry season, however, the most ski~lful
could travel to surro~ding villages to practice their
skills and derive profit from their work.
The weavers
who had been taken into captivity worked only for their
masters.
Their masters could rent out their skills and
usurp the profits of their work.
37
--------------
Tailors and ernbroidery specialists were available
to make local bands and imported cloths into clothing.
Tanners worked leather and animal skins, making sandals,
purses, saddles and harnesses, cases for knives and arrows,
and amulets.
Their wives dyed cloth using blue indigo
7
dye from the plant Lonchocarpus cyanescens.
Extracting
the dye was a complicated process which involved pounding
.....
the leaves until they were sticky and then keeping them
for eighteen months.
Afterwards, the mass was soaked in
water for three days unti~ the impurities could be
washed off, then soaked in alkaline water for another
three days in an earthen pot.
When ordinary water was add-
ed the paste . foamed.
The clo.th was then dipped, and
washed after each Lmmersion, until it attained the
desired depth of blue.
Modes of Production arid Redistribution
There have been several attempts to analyze the
economy of ancient African kingdorns from various perspec-
tives.
One of the most intriguing aspects of Malinke
economy was the process by which resources and gOO~$
changed hands.
Karl Polanyi, attempting to remove
the analysis of primitive economics away from the
traditional framework that permits analysis of indus-
trial societies based purely on market principle, chose to
emphasize the importance of social obligations where
economic actions are concerned.
The exchanges that
38
occur are governed by principles of reciprocity and
redistribution.
Indeed, these principles are present
in the primitive economy of pre-colonial Odienne, illus-
tratedbythe lu system.
Actions were based on kinship,
tribal affiliation, religious obligation and political
8
rule.
In the organization of Kabadugu, thousands of
people were enslaved and forced to labor for the well-
being of the Toure clan ~~d their proteges.
Through
social obligations the goods were redistributed to family
members, associates and religious leaders, particularly
at Samatiguila and Tieme.
In Kabadugu, a kingdom that was based on war and
pillage, it was important to maintain allies.
Vakaba
Toure's method of redistributing the wealth he collected
was essential.
If ever, at any one time all of the
provinces had revolted, his kingdom would have dissolved
much sooner.
As it was, the dUgukunrlasigi who Vakaba
had assigned to each kafu in alliance with him, played
a role comparable to the Mansa of the pasto
He collected
the various revenues and'presented them to the Faama, who
then refunded him one-third of the revenue.
A great deal
of revenue was obtained from various forros of taxation.
There were duties to be paid by the traders at the markets,
logho-usuru, river crossings, and rights of transit
through each region, sira-usuru.
The tax consisted of
10% of the value of the goods, and was usually paid in
39
kind.
This certainly must be the reason that under
Vakaba, the market at Minignan was temporarily suppressed,
9
and the trade redirected through Samatiguila and Odienne.
The dugukunnassigi, in return, guaranteed the caravans
safe passage through their territories.
While Massala,
Toron, Seyla, and Folo
pledged allegiance ta Vakaba, the
provinces of Bodugu, Nafana, Naoulu,
and Fuladugu
became slave reserves for the benefit of the Toure
....
dynasty and their allies.
The slaves were traded for
prestige items like horses, sirnply traded away in exchange
for cloth or kolas, or forced to work the fields, turning
over aIl agricultural surplus to the central power
figure, Vakaba.
He in turn rewarded his loyal followers,
freemen and military leaders, wi th prestigious gifts, so
that their interests were directly linked ta the wealth
and success of Kabadugu.
An annual tax of one-tenth had ~o be paid on any-
thing produced in the region.
The ten percent konyuman,
characteristic of areas under Islamic influence affected
lO
agricultural products as well as manufactured goods.
The Toure·., imposed the tax on everyone except the
inhabitants of the Islamic centers of Samatiguila,
Tieme, Ferefougoula, and Koro.
For livestock, each
village gave one head out of thirty.
Artisans, generally
gave one item out of every forty.
-The tax was justified
by the ability of the Toure regime to maintain peace
40
_.
in the territory.
Through reciprocity - goods in
return for peace - the authorities struck a balance which
was self-supporting.
The tax corresponds to the first
harvests of the season which were sent to Odienne as
tribute.
Furthermore, members of the community were subject
to the mude, a contribution of twelve handfuls of grain
which went to support th~~marabouts settled in each region.
The mude was given each year at the end of Ramadan.
Other
payments, penalties resulting from judicial decisions,
prizes from hunting expeditions, or rewards for the return
of lost livestock or slaves, remained the right of the
individuals involved.
Bohannon and Dalton, in later research than Polanyi' 5
consider markets in their introduction to Markets in
Africa.
They depict three types of societies.
First,
in "market-less societies," interper·sonal exchanges take
place any time and any where.
Individuals may supple-
ment their needs through barter.
In the second, markets
may be present, but individuals are not dependent on them
for subsistence.
The market place and market principle
are of "peripheral" importance to the subsistence needs
and output of its members.
Finally, there is the society
we know today which operates entirely on market principle.
Supply and demand are self-regulating and everyone, buyers
and sellers, are dependent upon it for subsistence and
41
'
I l
pro f lt.
Only the second example applies to pre-colonial
Odienne.
Bohannon and Dalton further qualify the nature of
peripheral market economies, stating that sales within
the market are not the most important source of support.
The small quantities actually exchanged in the market-
place reveal that traders must be making a living from
sorne other non-market acti~ity, and that the traders
12
themselves are only part-time marketers.
Theyalso
note the presence of "target" marketers who may engage
in trade only sporadically to acquire specifie goods.
Furthermore, peripheral markets are subject to fluctations
due to supply and dernand, but the~ are subordinate to
effects caused by traditional relationships of kinship,
religion, or status.
The development of markets in pre-colonial Odienne
does appear to meet the above descriptlon to a certain
extent.
The inhabitants did barter, and most traders
were only engaged as part-time marketers during the dry
season and after the harvests.
However, while their
analysis permits the presence of foreign traders for-whom
the market is not peripheral and, thus, one might infer,
the presence of foreign articles of exchange which were
liked and in demand by the inhabitants, Bohannon and
Dalton hold that these peripheral markets did not
influence production decisions.
But for the Toure
42
dynasty, war had become an essential means of pro-
13
duction.
Waging war was influenced by the necessity
to control the markets and to accumulate slaves.
The
control of markets and slaves increased the Toures'
means to carry on the processes of reciprocity and
redistribution and consequently enhanced their prestige
and authority.
A.G. Hopkins, in An ~conomic History of West Africa,
.
also addresses himself to the analysis of Bohannon and
Dalton, criticizing their assumption that peripheral
markets have no effect on production decisions, and
stating that historical evidence has not proven i t to
be 50.
The extent to which market activity failed
to mobilize the factors of production fully
is better explained in ter.ms of economics
(technological limitations and constraints
on demand)
then in terrns of social controls
based on anti-capitalist values. 14
Hopkins diminishes the importance of reciprocity and
redistribution as criteria for analyzing primitive
economies.
He states that these same principles operate
in industrial societies.
Instead, he examines the
early economies of West Africa, not in a comparative
frarnework with industrial society, but as entities
apart with divergences within, and with internaI factors
affecting their forro of existence.
As for clarity, he
merely distinguishes between local anà long distance
commerce,
43
..• because it draws attention to differences
in degrees of specialization, in types of
commercial institutions, in the composition of
15
goods traded, and in the nature of consumer demand.
But this seems an insufficient basis from which to recon-
struct the motivation for production in pre-colonial
society.
It does not allow enough space to interpret
the variations which arise from contacts between
politically controlled markets and strong influences
....
from the subsistence and redistributive sectors of the
16
°economy.
Other attempts have been made to analyze pre-
colonial systems of production.
Jean Suret-Canale at-
tempted to apply Marxist concepts to ancient African
kingdoms.
The Asiatic mode of production was used to
denqte an evolution in African society through three
stages:
(1) the primitive community,
(2) the tribo-
patriarchal segmentary system,
(3) a çlass society.
Unfortunately, his analysis lacked enough historical
evidence to justify a carry over of Asian concepts to
Africa.
For instance, there were no great work projects
in Africa to inspire feudal aristocracies to extract
labor from peasants as they had done in Asia.
Further-
more, the importance of trade in ancient African kingdoms
17
is largely neglected in Suret-Canale's analysis.
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch has provided the MOSt
original approach to the problem of analyzing African
44
s
.systems of production and distribution by suggesting an
.. African mode of production.
In so doing, she has launched
a new challenge for African economic history to seek wider
interpretations of old terrninology.
Instead of forcing
African societies to fit sterile or irnported models, she
is willing to accept the presence of many, sornetirnes
contradictory forces operating within a single society,
as opposed to viewing evehts as evolutionary or on a
continuum.
More specifically, she no longer considers
exchange and redistribution seperately, but as integrated,
rnutually supportive parts of a rnulticentered society.la
The description of the economy of the kingdom of Kabadugu
appears to closely follow the model of an African mode of
production proposed by Coquery-Vidrovitch which allows
for the presence of contradictions within the socio-
economic structure -
a patriarchal agrarian economy in
coexistence with the ascendance of the Toure dynasty as
the privileged class.
The pre-colonial economy of north-
western Ivory Coast was basically
a
subsistence village
economy, but the actual settlernent of the region was
based on long distance trade.
The events leading up to
the founding of the kingdom of Kabadugu show a de ter-
mination on the part of Vakaba Toure to control the trade
routes.
In so doing, he made allies of sorne Malinke
provinces and then relied on their rnilitary support to
wage war on neighboring, uncooperative regions.
The
45
-
Toure dynasty dominated the provinces without interfering
in local production.
The tributes extracted from them
were largely symbolic.
There is sorne discussion as to the relative impor-
tance of long distance trade and slavery as dominant
modes of production.
While Coquery-Vidrovitch believes
that the importance of slavery was growing but had not
yet dominated production,- Emmanuel Terray believes that
surpluses from slave production surpassed surpluses from
tribute payments.
He minimizes trade to a mere vehicle
for the redistribution of surplus and says i t was not a
19
mode for attaining surplus.
In fact,
slavery was
increasing in its importance to ,the kingdom of Kabadugu,
but l
do not believe i t had become a dominant motive
for the wars that produced them.
In Kabadugu,
the
peasants enslaved on their own land were not forced to
.
produce great surpluses.
Plantation slave labor for the
aristocracy was provided by captives who were taken from
their land and transplanted into the slave villages
round the capital.
The accumulation of slaves was
important to the Toure dynasty as a measure of their
prestige.
Surplus production by slaves was distributed
primarily within the kingdom to maintain the military and
the aristocratie minority.
Although numerous slaves
could be integrated into long distance trade, vast
quantities of surplus crop production could not.
Local
46
produce was not a major factor ln the trade the kingdom
attempted to control.
In addition, slaves were not stagnant in Malinke
society.
Plantation slaves were not tied to the soil they
worked.
They could be exchanged for non-labor producing
commodities.
They could change occupations by acquiring a
skill or rise from a simple field hand to a sofa for in-
stance.
There was more mebility within the slave system
than either Coquery-Vidrovitch's or Terray's analyses
seem to suggest.
There was no particular type of work
uniquely reserved for slaves to provoke massive accummula-
tion of slaves as a mode of production.
The most significant elements of the trade - kola nuts,
gold, cattle, and salt - were found at opposite poles of
the north-south trade routes which crossed the kingdom.
So, the control of trade routes was more feasible than
control of the zones of productions, where enslavement
of foreign peoples for the purpose of production would
have become a necessity.
However, as war throughout the
Western Sudan continued, more slaves were becoming avail-
able to ordinary freemen, who could consider retirement
from their fields to rely completely on slave production.
This evolutionary process was cut short by colonization
and the liberation of slaves.
So, although the slave
mode of production did exist along side the African mode
of production and did increase in importance under the
47
Toure dynasty, it never became a dominant mode.
Trade,
nevertheless, did generate the popular luxury items
and wealth frorn the usuru.
48
Footnotes to Charter II
1;1. J.
Lernment "Note sur la fertilitè naturelle
/
des terres de la vallee du :"loyen tliger" BCEHSAOF 1917,
Vol.
II,
p.
130.
2Jean Vuillet "La culture du
riz dans
la vall~e
du Niger entre Jouroussa et Tombouctou" BCEHSAOF 1920:
?
468.
3Tauxier,
LeNoir au:~oudan, p. 780, App. 25 "Statut
des Femmes. '1
4Siranzi Isiaka,
15 Oct.
1975, Odienne.
5Delafosse "L'Ann~e agricole des soudanais" BCEHSAOF
1921, p.
697.
6person,
Samori,
II: p.
919, also Claude Francis
Boeuf "Industrie Auchtochtone du Fer en A.O.F." BCEHSAOF
1937: p.
403.
7Tauxier, Le noir, App. No.
25 "Industries . . . " p.
779, also r-1onteil,
"Le Coton", BCEHSAOF,
1924, Vol l,
p.
667 1926.
8polanyi in Dalton, ed.,
Primitive, Archaic and
Modern Economies, p.
xVli.
9 Kourouma Mamby, Hemoire, "Samatiguila", UNCI, 1974.
10 Persan, Samori, Vol. II, pp. 875-6.
llBohannon and Dalton, Markets, p. 1.
12Bohannon and Dalton, Markets, p.
7.
130lSullivan, Unpub. dissert. OCLA,
1976.
14 H
k"
op lns, Econ. Hist.,
p.
52.
lS.-{
..
!
OpKlns,
Econ.
Rist.,
p.
53.
49
bz
16ceorge Dalton,
"Comment:
What kind of Trade and
t'-1arkets."
African Economie History,
No.
6,
pp.
134-138.
17 Suret-Canale, "Les societes traditione11es en
Afrique tropicale et le concept de mode de production
asiatique," La Pensée,
117,
1967,
pp.
21-42.
18catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch,"Recherches sur
un mode de production africai~: in La Pens~e, 114,
1969,
pp.
61-73,
also,
"The Political Economy of the
i\\frican Peasantry and Modes of Production, Il in Political
Economy,
Gutkind and Wallerstein, eds., pp.
90-111.
19~
T
1:..
erray,
Review ';f Polit Economy,
in African
Sconomic History,
5,
1978,
?
73.
30
CHAPTER III
PRE-COLONIAL COMMERCE
One of the most interesting aspects of the Odienne
region is its locus on the fringe of the savannah zone,
and its proximity to the kola producing regions of
the forest zone, making i t a region of transit for
the two great items that generated trade:
kola nuts
and salt.
Kola trees
(Cola nitida)
only grow in the
shady humid environment of the forest zone.
During
the ten years a kola tree matures to produce kola nuts,
i t attains ten to twelve meters in height.Some trees
produce up to one hundred kilograms a year in three
or four loads.
Each kilogram contains about one hundred
kola nuts.
The gathering period begins around October
l
or November, conveniently after first crop harvests.
Kola nuts were highly appreciated by the savannah
lnd de3ert inhabitants for its social and ceremonial
importance:
Ail major decisions between two or more
persons being sealed with the sharing or exchange of
~O~a nuts, for its stimulating effect, as kola contains
~. :eine; and for the refreshing taste it gives to
N3~er when chewed prior to drinking. In the forests,
l!1
::-he contrary,
the kola nuts served no significant
51
purpose.
The red co lored liqt:.id rressed from the ka la
nut was used as make up on women and daneers.
Sorne
chewed kola nuts ta aecompany palm wine, while others
may have used them as a stimulant when they felt tired
2
from work in the fields.
Whatever reasons,
the kola
nut was the basis for the trans-saharan trade to the
forest zone.
Immediately following the harvests, the
jula 'traders'
took the tr~de routes ta markets where
kola nuts eould be purchased.
The kola nuts were packed
in baskets and protected by several layers of leaves
which were changed and dampened every five days in
an effort to conserve flavor and to prevent fermentation.
The kola tree fields were a village affair in
the forest zone.
Everyone participated in gathering
the kola nuts.
Since kola were a precious item in
the trade, they were divided among the villagers according
to age, title, and importance of the family in village
3
affairs.
A penalty of death awaited anyone who harmed
~ kola tree.
The nuts were carefully transported from
Jne village to another until the jula caravans were
met.
Kola nuts were then exchanged for salt from the
mines of the Sahara desert.
Other items from the north
4
were traded as weIl, but the primary item was salt.
The priee of kola nuts was largely susceptible
t, '.
the
laws of supply and demand.
When there was a
';:ll:-plus of kola nuts on the market,
the priees lowered.
S2
--
When there were several buyers present for very few
kola nuts,
the priees were higher.
Organization of Trade -
the Jula
Given the basic elements that generated trade,
the next most important aspect in trade is the people
who participated in the transport of goods from the
areas of production to the consumers.
Louis Binger
.
.
If
d
. /
5 .
h
~n Du N~ger au Go
e
e Gu~~ee
c~tes t
e presence
of several categories of traders.
Among them are the
spontaneous traders, who correspond to Bohannon's and
6
Dalton's target marketers,
and who engaged in long
distance trade for a single purpose,
such as the bride
price or the pur chase of slaves for prestige and agri-
cultural needs.
They based their commerce mostly
on those items which brought the largest revenues:
salt, cloth and kola nuts.
Those who became traders
were designated by the head of their lu.
In many cases
two brothers accompanied one another.
The lutigi was
informed of aIl of the details of the trip and ail
?rofits were turned over to him to distribute according
to the needs of the compound.
A group of professional traders also existed.
The koroko,
in spite of belonging to the occupational
~3ste of blacksmiths ln Wasulu,
were
renown
traders
':i1roughout the Sudan.
Sale of their hardware assured
them a revenue in cowries with which they could purchase
53
--
kola nuts, once the kola reached the Sudan.
The kola
Wére exchanged in northern markets and their hardware
7
was transported south.
In a system based on the family,
they developed a web of trading posts which kept them
informed from one voyage to the next on the value of
kola nuts or salt at given periods.
Rarely did the
koroko go very far from home.
He operated through
his chain of relays.
Acco:ding to one informant, the
~oroko played a special role for Samori~ as they had
for many of the great kings of the region.
They travelled
in groups and were protected by armed guards.
They
took slaves and gold as far as Sierra Leone to trade
for guns and gunpowder.
He added that the koroko is
known for his business acumen
and their families have
8
vast fortunes even today.
The koroko were of the
Doumbia and Bakayoko families and were the first to
begin large scale long distance trade~
There were Malinke professional traders,
jula,
who for the major part of the dry season passed up
)"d down the trade routes following the major markets,
often long distances away from home.
They are the
important intermediaries pointed out by Meillassoux
in Trade in West Africa who transformed slaves from
-'ommodi ty into a mode of production by purchasing
',m from local warlords as captives,
and transporting
'.:lè;m
far away from their regions or origin to make
54
them more valuable.
The traders were accompanied by
their wives, other relatives or slaves who prepared
meals for the caravan and helped carry the loads.
One
informant referred to the
julaba, the big merchants
who he said came from Sanhala.
Whenever they approached
a town,
they had big horns which they blew to announce
their arrivaI in the village.
Then their sleeping
quarters were made ready.:
Another informant proclaimed
that the
julaba hailed from Niene,
the province where
Sanhala is located.
They came often into the Odienne
,
d
10
reglon to tra e.
If a young man did not have enough money to begin
his own commerce,
he could hire himself out as a porter.
He was fed by his caravan leader, and received ten
percent of the value of the baggage he carried upon
arrivaI at the given destination.
Eventually, he could
aspire to begin his own commerce, having saved his
l l
profits, made the contacts and learned the trade routes.
Both men and wornen participated in the transport
)E goods.
Person says that one load of merchandise
weighed about fifteen kilograrns in times of war, in
addition to the five to six kilograms of food a porter
had to carry for his round trip journey.12
He adds
. ;'ît for profit seekers the loads were heavier,
sometimes
. ·"".'ot.y-five to thirty kilograrns.
My sources said that
'he
loads were much heavier, thirty-five to fort y
55
kilograms,
and with that load they still travelled
twenty-five to thirty kilometers a day. 13
Rene Cailli~
in 1827 noted that kola loads leaving Tieme were composed
of 3500 kola nuts making up at least thirty-five kilo-
grams,14 whereas Binger in 1887 estimated the loads
15
at twenty-five kilograms consisting of 2500 kola nuts.
Along the trade routes there were recognized rest stops
at villages where the trad~rs and their porters could
find food and shelter.
Going north, the traders paid
regional tariffs and for food in kola nutsi
going south,
they paid in products from the north.
Sometimes a
small load was made up especially for that purpose,
so that the larger loads destined for distant markets
remained untouched.
The traders rarely attended any
16
small local markets en route.
Despite the air of individuality that appeared
to prevail in the quest for profits, tne
jula, in order
to survive the dangers of their profession, were extremely
cohesive.
Their itineraries took them to areas where
'curity was uncertain and where the caravans could
be attacked and merchandise confiscated.
The trader
also risked being taken into captiviity.17
So, whenever
Possible during the pre-colonial period, no one ever
.
:
l'/I~ lIed alone.
It was announced in the village that
1
•
r-ader was forming a caravan and expected to leave
l
~articular day.
Interested parties enrolled by
56
informing the caravan leader of their intention to
travelo
Together, traders were assured of an armed
escort.
The caravan leader took charge by collecting
the duties to be paid along the way.
Hadja Kone made
i t known that gangs of robbers existed.
They were
called gbanan, and they stole men away from the trade
routes, and even took children out of villages after
coaxing them with chunks of salt .
.....
Many of those who were frequent long distance
traders became Muslims.
The religion gave them something
in common and invoked a measure of confidence in their
business dealings.
Settlements or credits were made
in the presence of others and sanctioned
by prayer
and a gift of kola nuts to the witness, usually an
18
elderly person.
When traders reached their destinations, they
were lodged and nourished.
Their
jat.igi
'host'
some-
times played the role of broker.
Having been settled
in the are a , he could arrange for the sale of the trader' s
goods either by purchasing the goods himself, or if
he did not have enough exchangeable merchandise, he
19
would ask his neighbors until a buyer was found.
Through his host as intermediary, the trader was sometimes
able to arrange the sale of his goods without having
te go to the marketplace.
If the jula could not sell aIl of his goods at
57
the price he wanted he sold for less.
Rarely did he
leave his goods with the
iatigi to sell and save the
profit for his next trip.
Here they differed from
the Hausa traders described in P. Hill's,
"Landlords
and Brokers. ,,20
My inforrnants were unanimous in saying
that they never left any of their goods with anyone.
Everything was sold before returning home.
When the trader's mission was over he made a
.....
~ift to his hosto
While researchers in other areas
have claimed that the gift was equal to about ten per
cent of the traders goods or profits, in Odienne this
was not the case.
The informants aIl stated that there
was no certain percentage to be given to the
jatigi.
The relationship was one of friendship, the trader could
stay as long as he wished without being obliged to
pay anything.
At the end of the stay he would give
what he could afford, either cotton thread, kola nuts
or c h '1Ckens 21 or even a l'1tt1e sa l t
or sorne sompe,
t
f '
d
22
a
no
1xe
rate.
The Malinke immigrants in the region of Odienne,
left relatives of the same
jamu 'family name l
or associated
families behind them. Abner Cohen has called the dispersion
of clans "diasporas" which came to serve the purpose
of trade.
In his article,
"Cultural strategies in
the Organization of Trading Diasporas .. 23 , he uses the
eXample of the Hausa trading diasporas in which traders
58
were able to stay with relatives who either stayed
behind or had migrated to new settlements_
The traders
from Odienne do not appear to have maintained this type
of relationship in the pre-colonial and early colonial
periode
Most of the informants said they knew no one
the first time they went to a different village.
As
with any other guest or stranger they went to the village
chief first, who found lodging for them with a host
~
/
family.
Caillie noted the large numbers of Sarakole
merchants
(marka) who streamed through the area.
They
were certainly not staying with relatives, but with local
24
Malinke host families.
The role of
jatigi was an important one in the
Odienne region.
Person attributes the ascendance of
Manignanand Samatiguila, as relay points where goods
changed hands,
to the
j"atigi.
Traders who were not
interested in going too distant from-home stopped there.
The development of the
jatigi in these towns was en-
couraged and indeed necessary for the continuity of the
25
trade.
Sometimes the markets were so heaviIy attended
that sorne traders had to sleep outside in the open. air.
Large caravans had to reserve their accommodations before
reaching the town.
InternaI Markets
The earliest notes on the importance of the kola
j
J
nuts for the area of Odienne are those of Rene Caillie.
59
He came to Odienne from Kankan and stopped at Samatiguila,
a large town where he noticed the passing caravans coming
from the south and on their way to
Jenne.
At the time
there was no
market at Samatiguila.
He continued
to another town, Tieme, where due to several physical
handicaps, a sore on his foot and scurvy, he stayed long
enough to be better informed on the origins of kola nuts
from the south. 26
He was told that carvans went to
Teute
(Tete)
and Cani
(Rani)
fifteen days south of Tieme,
to buy kola nuts from the inhabitants of these villages
and that the kola nuts originated in the country of the
Toma,
just southwest of Beyla, in Guinea towards the
Liberian border. 27
The 3500 kola nuts carried by each
of the porters he witnessed was to be exchanged for enough
salt to buy two slaves once the trader returned to Tieme.
/
Another important fact in Caillie's account is that
Tieme was the location of a large weekly market.
None
of the informants, when asked about Tieme's market had
any memory of its importance.
AlI of those asked merely
referred to the sale of condiments and few items needed
for daily food preparation, which were sold by wom~n at
nine o'clock in the morning and again from four to five
o'clock in the afternoon. 28
But based on certain histor-
ical factors one can make sorne suppositions.
The market
at Samatiguila (actually located at Mamouroula)
was
developed at a later date when Vakaba Toure had begun
60
--
to consolidate this kingdom.
As previously mentioned,
Vakaba had insisted on drawing the traders to Samatiguila
to bring profits to the marabouts.
The existence of two
markets in such close proximity,
2 days walk, could not
last.
So evidently the market at Tieme fell in favor of
the market at Samatiguila (Mamouroula).
How i t fell,
by
force or gradually, is not known.
The rise of the market
at Samatiguila may have a}so contributed to the rise of
Koro as a market town. Koro is situated on a direct vertical
drop into the kola producing region making access to i t
easier than access to Kani, situated further east.
Also the Bakayoko family of Koro were friendly with
29
the administration of Kabadugu.
Markets were founded in the early days when
commercial activity in certain districts encouraged local
authorities to organize and profit from i t .
The founding
of a marketplace was an important affair that demanded the
blessings of Allah.
The marabouts called ail the villagers
together to pray for the prosperity of the market.
They
buried talismans in the ground of the marketplace.
Those
who decided~to create the market chose the logotigi"
'chief of the market' and decided upon its organization.
They chose young men to act as guards and to collect the
market taXe
If anything was stolen, i t was reported to
them. 30
According to Vassali Bakayoko of Koro, as the town
61
grew and prospered, i t was decided during a council meet-
ing that a day should be found to exchange goods.
They
decided upon Thursday, and then inforrned everyone in the
surrounding area.
People came and sold whatever they
could, and returned home on Thursday night.
Vamoridian,
the
jamanatigi was named chief of the market.
Each
market participant paid two sompe to the
jamanatigi.
When an important quantity had been collected, they were
~
redistributed to the villagers.
Later in the interview,
Bakayoko said that Vamoridian went to war with Vakaba's
armies and he even joined Samori.
Therefore, the founding
of the market at Koro is fairly recent, probably in the
latter part of the nineteenth century.
The area probably
began to prosper after the rise of Kabadugu.
The kola exchanged hands in a definite north-south
relay system,3l until they reached the markets at Koro,
Kani or Tete, the more popular of the.southermost limits
of penetration for jula caravans in the pre-colonial
period.
These markets lie in a zone that Person refers
to as the zone courtière 'the brokers zone' where the
intermediari~s between the producers and transporte~s
operated.
Among the forest peoples kola was transported
through ethnie zones.
When they reached the borders of
their ethnie lirnits they traded the goods off to new cus-
tomers in return for Sudanic goods.
In this way, the
roots of the kola trade penetrated deep into the forests
62
so.that the buyers on the fringe really had no idea of
the distance that sorne kola nuts had travelled before
reaching the markets in question.
More specifically, the kola nuts from Worodugu
'land of the kola nuts' in the Seguela region were being
supplied from as far as the Bete region around Daloa.
The
kola nuts originating there passed through a series of
Bete and Gouro merchant women before reaching the jula at
t '
worodugu.
The kola from here were most in demand, because
those originating from the Daloa region, the town of Issia
and the Yokola peoples, could last up to a year without
rotting.
But nuts from Gouro country at Oume, Sinfra,
32
Gagnoa and Zuenoula only lasted a couple of months.•
Among the Bete, the exchange of kola nuts was largely
in the hands of the Zebouo women.
Bete social structure
allowed for men to carry goods only on their shoulders,
not on their heads, and prevented them from participating
in the planting or harvests due to their superior
position in the society.
Their role was limited to one
of noble acts, which included participation in the
rnilitary, sorne rough sports activities to show their
virility, and the on-going responsibilities of village
affairs.
Thus, the kola trade fell into the hands of
two types of women in Bete society: bida the first and
most privileged wife, and the freed youlougou,those who
were no longer responsible to their husbands, having
63
--
been reintegrated into their patrilineal households.
They organized the trade by going to the village producers
of kola with their female porters and companions.
Charming the village nobles with gifts of towels, men's
cache-sex, salt or wooden bowls, the women merchants
had no difficulties being lodged by their hosts.
The
evening of their arrivaI, the men kola pruducers visited
and informed them of the ~antities of kola available for
sale.
The next day, the goods were delivered and the
exchanges agreed upon the day before were made. 33
The exchanges were in the form of goods from the north,
sorne of Gouro origins, others of Sudanic origins.
Sorne imported European items, such as copper bracelets and
ankle rings, were traded to them by the Gouro, having
been traded to the Gouro by the Baoule, with possible
34
sources from the southern Atlantic coast.
There was
.
d
k
35
no organ~ze
mar et.
The Bete women sometimes tradeddirectly with the
nurnerous villages south of Daloa, but there were two
important centers for exchange where kola producers of the
surrounding areas broughttheir kola ta exchange:
Zagoreta and Saioua.
From here the kola nuts were trans-
ported through the Zeble along the route Daloa-Zuenoula,
or Daloa-Vavoua.
The latter is the one that eventually
carried the nuts into Worodugu.
Among the Sete a single towel, yoko, was worth one
64
hundred kola nuts.
Kola nuts 50 Id by handfuls of ten
kola nuts each.
The short Gouro made cloth worn by women
was worth one thousand kola nuts when traded in the Zeble,
but only seven hundred kola nuts at Gouro markets.
The
iron bars, sompe,
traded to the Gouro excelled as a unit
of exchange.
Unlike the kola nuts, they were traded both
north and south between aIl of those people involved in
the trade.
The sompe, cajled bro by the Gouro were sold
in packets of twenty.
One basket of kola nuts sold for
five to ten packets of sompe when traded with Bete women
36
close to the kola producing areas.
The Gouro met their Bete counterparts and continued
to relay the kola nuts northward.
Gouro markets at
Bonoulifla, Vavoua,
Zerefla, Kanzra, Kanzara, Beriaka,
Sehizra, Bouafle and Zuenoula were the locations for
37
exchange.
The Gouro living in the forest region also
gathered kola nuts and exchanged them.
Among the
Gouro, the kola tree belonged to the head of household,
who was the first to cut the underbush around the
trees.
Ownership was proclaimed in this manner.
The
trees were exploited by family heads and their sons.
Women, once again, were responsible for getting the kola
nuts to markets dottina the area between Vavoua and
Zuenoula in the south, and Seguela and Mankono in the
38
north.
The markets at Toubalo, Simberifo, and Tenefo
39
are names of a few.
Once they arrived, the
65
---
men negotiated the exchange with the jula.
The women
had to content thernselves with selling condiments and food
.
40
h
.
~tems,
suc
as yams,
r~ce, sweet potatoes, bananas,
okra, and palm oil, and Gouro woven cloths and pottery.
4l
Jula women sold shea butter, soumbara, rice and fonio.
Slaves were later added to the exchanges, and sold for
five hundred kola nuts or two to four hundred sompe
depending on the quality. ~ During the Samorian wars, the
price for slaves dropped to one hundred sompe or three
42
hundred kola nuts each.
One basket of kola nuts was sold to the jula for as
much as twenty packets of sompe.
The profit margin
attained was one hundred to three hundred percent for
the Gouro traders.
The Gouro needed sompe, since
they were used not only as a unit of exchange, but also
as a primary source for metal.
When kola nuts were finally sold for French money,
they were worth fifteen francs a 1oad.
Severa1 in-
43
formants
said that kola nuts sold for ten francs
per 1000.
Therefore one load must have been only 1500
kola nuts.in this case.
The price rose to thirty francs
per 1000 after WWI.
Gold, ivory and later European cloth
were also exchanged southward, as prestige items for use
in bridaI dowries.
One bar of salt from the north sold
for 2800 kola nuts at Kani and Tete, according to
44
Sundstrom in his Trade of Guinea.
He also states that
66
one bar of salt cost sixtY francs at the kola markets
further south.
Comparing these two figures it would mean
that kola nuts cost twice as much a few days walk further
south.
The figure in francs is more reasonable than the
figure in kola nuts.
If the value of 2800 kola nuts is
28 French francs
(at lOF per 1000) then his figure for
salt is definitely erroneous.
From Worodugu (Seguela) and Koyaradugu (Mankono) at
....
important market towns such as Tete, Kani, Siana, and
45
Sarhalla
the jula caravans carried their precious kola
into the Sahel.
As previously mentioned, with the ascendancy
of Kabadugu
the market at Tieme faded out giving
rise to Koro, in the southernmost province of Kabadugu.
The kola from the Gouro reached Koro through jula
inter.rnediaries.
The village chief, Bakayoko said that
the Gouro,
(also called Los) traders 'never ventured any
further than Dyorole, southwest
of Seguela.
The
inhabitants of Koro and occasionally those from other
parts of the Odienne region went to buy kola nuts 'there,
and somet~es the kola were transported north by the
46
jula who lived at Seguela.
As Adarna Kone of Bako
noted,47 the people in the Odienne region knew that
buying kola nuts from other jula intermediaries brought
them less profit, than buying directly from the kola nut
producers.
sylla 48 bought kola nuts around Odienne
67
and pa id over twice as much,
100 to 200 kola nuts for
five francs, whereas in the forest zone they sold one
hundred kola nuts for one franc.
Nevertheless, Sylla
resold his kola nuts at fifteen for five francs at
Bamako, still making nearly 400% in profit.
The markets of Worodugu and Koyaradugu were not
the only suppliers of kola nuts to Koro.
There were vast
sources of kola nuts comin~ from south of Koro
transiting
through the Mahou (Touba)
region where once again
Malinke brokers were the intermediaries between the
Yacouba (Dans)
producers and the buyers at Koro.
The
main kola markets were located at Gueaso
(Guessesso)
49
Gangouale, Touna, Lantuy and Massala,
There were
other markets at Te, Biankouman, Waninou, and later Danane.
In a monograph on the area, sorne market days are listed.
Waninou
Sunday
Touba
Saturday
Lantuy
Sunday
. 50
Bakayoko of Koro said that sometimes Yacouba traders did
come as far as Koro to exchange their kola nuts.
The kola nuts of the Dan region were a well-protected
species.
The Cola vera was a highly appreciated variety,
-_._-
also growing throughout the Kissi region in Guinea and
Sierra Leone.
Kola nuts from these areas hit the markets
as N' zo, ~'la, and Dioradugu whence they began the long
5l
trek northward.
They aIl passed through the bigger
mark t
'
d
b f
h'
K
52
e s at Wan1nou an
Touba
e ore reac 1ng
oro.
68
·
. .
,)
The Gu~nean or~g~ns of kola nuts referred to by Rene
,
Caillie was confirmed by three informants: the village
chief of Sirana,Adama Kone of Bako, and Ladji Savane in
Dakar.
Sorne traders did leave the region of Odienne to
buy kola nuts at Zerekore, Macenta, and Boola.
Palm oil and Toura captives joined the kola nuts
as items of trade from the forest zone.
The jula fro~
the north came with the usual:
cloth, guns, gunpowder,
~
salt, livestock, slaves, cotton bands to be used as loin
53
cloths.
One kola nut sold for one centime in 1901.
The cost of cloth in the forro of six cotton bands, 0.15m
x 1.50 meters,·sewn together to makeone small pagne
was ten to twenty-five francs.
The larger cloths
worn by chiefs, composed of two large pagnes sold for
54
fifty francs in exchangeable goods.
Two kilograrns
of salt from the north cost five francs in the dry season
and from seven to eight francs in th~winte~.55
Sorne tradersbroughtgroundnuts and calebashes to
exchange.
One calebash could be exchanged for twenty,
56
thirty, or one hundred kola nuts.
Copper bracelets,
machetes, hatchets and glass beads also found ready buyers.
(See Appendix A.)
The goods from the north were prestige
items for the forest people as shown in the composition
of the bride priee.
The bride price among the upper
classes, consisted of seven rifles or their equivalent
which were given to the father,
and six pagnes of cloth
69
and two captives for the mother.
The majority of the merchants from the north -
t~inignan (often spelled Maninian), Bougouni and beyond -
rarely went any further than Koro in the pre-colonial
period.
They exchanged goods with the intermediaries
57
whose contacts assured a continuous supply of kola nuts.
/
/
When Rene Caillie went through Samatiguila, he noted
that the imam had forbidd~ the market that normally took
58
place two tirnes a week.
It was a large town in which
the inhabitants were Muslim and spent most of their tirne
practicing long distance trade.
He did not mention the
town of Mamouroula, which during colonial invasion was
reputed to be the location of the marketplace of
Samatiguila.
The problern was clarified by Ladji
K
. b
59
aranmogo
01a y.
When the people of Kaniasso led the Oiaby to their
settlement at Samatiguila, the town or Mamouroula did
not yet existe
The inhabitants lived together with the
Diaby of Samatiguila until the Mansa of Massala began
to pressure them into establishing a village of their
own for fear that they would one day become slaves of
the Diaby.
No one was able tocitethe origins of these
people.
It is said that they descended from chain in
the skYe But the village itself was founded after the
birth of Vakaba.
In spite of its newly found autonomy, a good rela-
70
tionship prevailed.Each group of townsmen cleaned his
stretch of the road to keep ~ clear passage between the
two towns.
Finally, due to the importance of the commerce
at Samatiguila,
it was decided that the market be trans-
ferred to Mamouroula.
The decision was made before
60
Vakaba became Faama of Kabadugu.
The importance of the market grew and was renowned
throughout the region.
~t, because the traders
spent the night at Samatiguila before and after market
day, and because of the role played by the marabouts of
Sarnatiguila in the founding of the market, i t was always
referred to as the market of Samatiguila.
Based on the
preceding information, one can suppose
that the town was founded sometime at the turn of the
nineteenth century, and the market after 1827, the year
of Caillié's visit, but prior to 1844, the beginning of
6l
Vakaba's wars of expansion.
The market at Marnouroula was mostly known as a slave
market. 62
Diaby said that they would lead the slaves to
the market with cords around their necks, where they would
be exchanged for cloth, cattle, or kola nuts.
At that
time one slave cost 150 francs.
The bride price was
300 francs,
or two slaves with sorne cloth, kola nuts or
~
,
cattle added to it.
Rene Caillie had found that slaves
were worth thirty blocks of salt, each about 10" x 3~" x
2~" (equivalent to about 2~ bars of salt which corresponds
71
dir~ctly with Diaby's figure if one bar of salt was
.
worth 60 francs);
~ one twenty-five pound keg of gun-
powder plus eight measures of brown colored glass beads;
or one gun and two "brasses," about ten feet,of pink
63
taffeta.
According to Hadja Nawourouya Savane, one
slave could cost two cows, and one horse demanded three to
five slaves depending on the condition and size of the
64
horse.
Moreover, Hadja ~one said that just prior to
65
liberation one slave could be bought for 200 francs.
Her figure corresponds to the priees recorded by
Jean-Louis Boutillier for other slave markets in the
Sudanic zone. The priees varied depending on the age,
health and size of the slave.
l strong healthy male
200 -
300 francs
l
lightweight male
150 francs
l
aged male
75 -
100 francs
1 young female
150 -
500 francs
l
female over 25 years
100 -
200 francs
l aged female
50 -
75 francs 66
The market at Samatiguila was widely attended by
the surrounding villages, especially those east and
south of Samatiguila who chose not to leave the socio-
political boundarfes of Kabadugu.
The importance of the
markets at Samatiguila and Minignan
(Maninian)
should
not be underestimated.
AlI of the inhabitants of" the
region were, generally, supplied in kola nuts, salt,
cloth and slaves from these two centers.
The market at Minignan (Maninian)
provided a service
to the surrounding villages, and was at the crossroads
72
of the great trade routes bringing goods from several
directions.
The market was founded around the sixteenth
t
b
s , 'k' 5
M d C '
67
'd 'h
.
cen ury
y
~r~
~
angare.
ama ou
~sse
sa~
e ~s
of the fifteenth generation after the creation of the
market.
The market was named after the boa constrictor
found at the location of the new village.
It was accepted
as a sign from the ancestors and has been a symbol of
protection ever since.
Th~market took place under nine
fromagers.
Under each tree was a different product.
Chicken traders were under one, those who sold goats under
another; gold, hoes and pickaxes, cattle, slaves, salt,
cloth from Mali, and kola nuts aIl found their places
68
under the nine trees.
Traders began to arrive on Friday
or Saturday, but the big day for traders to display their
merchandise was Monday.
On a Monday in 1899, the corn-
mandant of the
*'
Region Sud estimated the presence of ten
.
thousand strangers in Minignan to participate in the
market activities.
He noticed that ev~rything was
selling for kola nuts, even a big cup of water sold for
69
one kola nut.
Those attending the market from neighboring areas
took the local goods they had to trade for the items
available at Minignan.
They exchanged surpluses of
manioc, fonio, groundnuts, and yams for kola nuts, and
then bartered the kola nuts back in their hometowns,
70
sometimes making a small profit.
73
The salt being sold at Minignan was probably
transiting
from the mines at Idjil, through Bamako.
At the wholesale market in Tishit one bar of salt measured
3
1.2 x 0.4 x 0.15 meters.
The bar was split in half
and covered with mud for transport southward.
Because
of absorption of water into the salt, i t weighed a
little more upon arrival at southern markets, usually
twenty- f ·1ve to t h'1rty k '1
1 ograms. 71
h
T e sa l t b ars
....
were divided into twelve exhangeable units of two kilo-
72
grams each, at Minignan.
The kokotla
were small enough
to exchange for small quantities of kola nuts.
One
kokotla sold for about three hundred kola nuts.
The
small blocks made salt transport southward by porters
much easier.
In one year, February 1898 to January 1899,
three thousand of the thirty kilogram salt bars were
counte d as exports f rom Barnak 0 to M"
1n1gnan. 7 3
By 1900 ,
there was sorne European salt imported, probably through
Conakry and Kankan, and i t competed successfully with salt
from the Sahara.
The two kilograrn sacks which imitated
74
Sudanic salt sold for 2.50 francs at Kankan.
Among the European cloth imports, percale sold for
one franc per meter.
They also bought scarves, siliki
(silk scarves apparently), six for four francs.
They
were resold in the villages for one franc each, giving
two francs profit to the trader.
Locally made cloth was
also very popular, especially blankets and pagnes
74
•
f
B
k
.
d
amb
75
rom
ama 0, Nyam~na an
Ban
a.
Sorne long distance merchants did not bother to go
any further than the market at Minignan.
They traded
their salt and livestock for kola nuts and then returned
76
northward.
Until the passage of Samori
into the area there were
very few imports.
Cisse told the story ~f how once his ancestors went
to Kankan and bought chechia and black v~lvet scarves at
the boutiques.
When the items were seen by Samori's
representatives, he reported i t to Samori who was then at
Samatiguila labo ut 1892)
saying that the people of
Minignan were collaborating with the Europeans because
they were wearing European objects.
Sarnori had aIL of the
old men brought to him at Sarnatiguila to have their
throats eut.
But when he found that the goods had been
bought with merchants, they were released.
It was not until Samori deserted Odienne to set up
his eastern empire, taking every able-bodied man with him
that the French arrived at Minignan and began to exploit
its booming trade.
Their efforts resulted in the fall of
the market.
Aeeording to their reports, the market
fell as a result of Sarnori's wars.
But the reason
that the market did not resume its importance until mueh
later was because of the French customs
station at
Minignan.
The traders found themselves too restricted
75
in their commerce.
They had ta pay an usuru (10% tax)
on aIl their merchandise.
When the slave traders arrived,
their slaves were confiscated and made to work for the
Europeans before being liberated.
Cattle, needed ta feed
the military, were confiscated.
The recompense, if any,
did not compare with the traders previous profits.
In
addition, the traders were pa id in French money, which at
the time inspired no conf~dence whatsoever.
Thus,
i t was strictly by choice that the traders began to
desert the market at Minignan.
Better profits and freer
77
trade cou1d be had elsewhere.
By January 1897 twenty-
six postes de perception had been spread throughout
the Sudan, where the French began co1lecting ten per
cent on aIl loads,
imports and exports alike.
From 1893,
they imposed 1icenses and patentes and co1lected the
78
taxes on market stalls.
In reaction to aIl of this, the 'traders transferred
their transàctions to Mamourou1a in 1894, and then 1ater,
in 1897 business moved to Samatigui1a where exchanges
were made from the homes of Koniomanu Keraba and
79
Karanmogo
sylla.
Minignan possessed only thirty~seven
huts in 1897,80 and the Wasulu region which the Minignan
J
market had served as une vaste necropo1e.
A French
lieutenant noticed an exchange of dried fish at Kimbirila
on Mondays.
He wrote that some of the Wasu1u inhabitants
were bringing the fish from the Sankarani River.
By
76
1900 the market seemed to be back in operation.
Traders
were once aga in coming to the center of kola attraction
from Bamako, Siguiri and Segu, bringing salt, livestock,
8l
cloth and other goods.
The people of Minignan disagree
as to whether or not the market has, even today,
regained
.
1
. 1 .
82
~ts pre-co on~a
~mportance.
External Markets
When Ren' Cailli~ followed the caravans out of the
,..
Odienne northward in 1828, the destination was Jenne,
two and a half to three months away.
Jenne was the
final destination for Sarakole traders who went there
to exchange kola nuts collected in the south,
for salt.
At that time the salt was coming from the Taodeni salt
mines of the Sahara and transiting
through Tiffibuktu.
But, the wars of El Hadj Omar and Amadou had disturbed the
trade, and commerce was growing more attractive at
Nyamina, Sansanding, Bamako and Boure.8~
By 1864,
Lieutenant Mage confirmed the exportation of Tishit salt
from Idjil when
he met jula leaving Nioro en route
84
for Boure.
Only two of the informants said anything
about going toward Jenne to sell kola nuts.
Almamy
Toure of Sananferedugu told how he first became involved
in long distance trade, by the temptation to trade in the
salt-carrying mules that came to his village.
He went
south to buy kola nuts and then went to Bamako.
Sorne
of the mules were sold in the villages, others were
77
exchanged for cloth at Bamako.
His group went far into
Mali and Upper Volta passing through Mopti, Segu,
Ouahigouya, and finally purchased mules at "Youba.,,85
Matche Keita sold kola at Bamako, Mopti and Wagadugu,
and returned to Odienne with cloth, srnoked fish,
salt,
and livestock.
The vast majority of those who left the
region at aIl, directed their commerce toward Bamako.
Even the trade in that direction was briefly inter-
"
rupted.
In 1881, with the French in hot pursuit of
Samori, Gallieni found Bamako to be in a big village in
86
ruins, with no serious commercial movement.
But,
generally, wherever Samori's Empire prevailed, trade was
encouraged and protected.
Only the most courageous en-
gaged in long distance trade.
Others contented them-
selves with the local exchanges at Sarnatiguila or
Minignan.
In those times of war, trade was agitated by
the Europeans.
In March of 1891, Colonel Archinard
closed access te the Sudan and, until 1894, threatened
d
th
. 1
1
.
S
. ,
.
87
ea
te any ~
eav~ng
amer~ s Emp~re.
The graduaI approach of the railroad to Bamako also
had an affect.
It becarne a depot both for imports as
88
weIl as experts.
Ta reach the markets to the north the jula crossed
the Wasulu.
One of the big markets they reached was
Ouolosebougou.
In 1887, they were able to exchange
either kola nuts or cowries for the desired goods.
78
(See Appendix A.)Those attending the Ouolosebougou
market were there to sell, not to buy.
The' importance
of ~~e market diminished after occupying French forces
at Bamako left.
In an effort to re-establish the market
at Bamako, Lt. Capt. Loyer decided to forbid the passage
of traders carrying salt to the right bank of the Niger
River,
to important markets
(and river crossings)
at
Sansanding, Nyamina, Koul~koro and Kangaba.
Traders at
Ouolosebougou,
Tenetou, Tengrela, and Faraba were
told of the re-opening of the market at Bamako, and
consequently, the importance of those markets diminished,
since the people coming from the north and those from the
rig~t
89
bank could only meet at Bamako.
There were other efforts to control the commerce in
the Sudan.
Bougouni, according to Capt. Ballieu, imported
the largest amounts of kola nuts in exchange for cattle
90
and salt.
At Koulougou, in the re~ion of Bougouni, the
last remaining market of three in the area after the wars,
an adrninistrator forbade the passage of jula.
His decision
was based on an effort to facilitate the resale of kola
~[:'
nuts collected as taxes for the administration.
A.
r
later administrator found that the town was losing its
r
Commercial activity, and decided to re-establish the
town's relationship with the jula since administrative
kOla nuts could still be sold simply by underselling
the iula. 91
79
L
Sorne marketers did not attend the smaller local
markets in 1-1ali., but took their kola nuts directly to
Bamako, where a higher priee was more certain.
Others
took their kola nuts to Sanhala in the Boundiali region,
to Gbaralo in lower Mali, or Nioro north of Bamako, and
Kalana on the Guinea/Mali border.
Still others took their
loads directly to Kankan or Minignan, stopping only when
92
necessary to exchange for fRod.
In spite of these interferences, basic market
activity remained in control of the participants as they
responded to the forces of supply and demand.
Salt, sold
close to the areas of production, was much cheaper than
when transported and sold further south.
At Nioro, three
bafals (fifteen kilograms)
sold for two guinea cloths or
O.GO francs per kilogram.
One bar could be bought for
93
less than 17 francs.
At Timbuktu, one camel load of
salt (four slabs) bought its weight in gold, selling
for 100-120 mitkales of gold.
One twenty-five to thirty
kilogram slab sold for twenty-five to thirty mitkales
of gold, or three to six thousand cowries, or twenty-
f '
94
~ve francs. ,
At Bamako, one kilogram of salt could be purchased
for two francs while one bar sold for 30.55 francs to
60 francs, showing a mark-up of two to four tirnes as much
from the priees given at Nioro.
Another source showed
salt at Bamako to be GO to 75 francs a bar in 1844, while
80
95
five francs were worth 1500 to 1700 cowries.
~ At Bamako, salt bars were more expensive selling
for 75 francs,96 which approaches the price of 77.50 at
ouolosebougou?7 At Tenetou, one bar was worth 42.50
francs while in the Wasulu one bafal
(five kilograms)
98
could bring two slaves.
At Bougouni one bar was
50 francs,
in 1904.
(See Appendix A.)
The relationship between kola nuts and salt was
a direct one.
In the early stages the salt was exchanged
directly for kola nuts.
When money began to be used,
i t served as an inter.mediary, but did not disturb the
relationship.
In a study by a French administrator
who observed the trade in 1897, i t was found that 25
kilograms of salt were bought at Bamako for 35 francs and
resold at Kissidougou for 150 francs or exchanged for
15,000 to 17,000 kola nuts.
The kola nuts could be
.
99
sold at Bamako for 1,050 to 1,200 francs.
In the kola producing center of Kissidougou (Guineal,
kola nuts sold five to seven hundred for five francs.
They
were thirty francs per thousand at Beyla.
By the time
It they reached Siguiri,one kola nut sold for 0.05 to 0~10
francs.
At Timbuktu and Kayes, kola nuts were from 0.10
~~'.
, .
to 0.25 francs apiece. lOO
Other sources show that one
hUndred kola
t
Id
Il f
2 50 f
t
B
. 101
nu s cou
se
o r .
rancs a
ougoun1.
But in April 1899 they were listed at eighty for five
franc:
102
.
s,
wh1le at Koulougou,
just twenty-three
81
kilometers south of Bougouni, a more active market
103
kola nuts were selling 150 nuts for five francs.
Generally, in the northernmost markets kola nuts sold
for fifteen to twenty-five francs per one hundred.
Among the informants, Adama Kone bought kola nuts
2500 for 25 francs
(10 francs per 1000), and resold
h
'
M l '
.
k 1
f
f'
f
104
t
em 1n
a 1 th1rty
0
a nuts
or
1ve
rancs.
Later, Almamy Toure bought thirty to fifty nuts for
,..
f ;ve
•
francs. 105
He reso ld tllem a t Bamak 0 t went y k 0 1 a
nuts for five francs.
He and his companions were so
ecstatic over their profit that they l i t lamps to enter
the village upon their return home, even though i t was
•
106
daylight.
That year they all took new wives.
Other traders dealt in smaller quantities.
Lamine
Doumbia, for example, bought fifteen francs of kola nuts
in the south and sold them for 100 francs at Bamako.
He
felt he had made a good deal.
The marabout of Kabala
sold a load of kola nuts (approximately 1500 nuts)
for
75 francs.
This figure is entirely too low compared to
other data, but what is significant is that when he bought
his kola nuts in the south, he traded with his own
groundnuts and tobacco.
50 he considered the 75 francs
to be a good deal since he could buy a cow for 25.50 to
75 francs, depending on the size, and resell i t in the
forest region for 125 francs.
He also said that sheep
107
sold from 2.50 to 5.00 francs apiece.
The figure for
82
livestock was confirmed by archivaI data.
Moors brought
salt and sheep to exchange for cloth and cereals.
They
sold sheep for 2.50 to 4 francs apiece, and even dropped
l08
to 1.50 francs at the end of the dry season.
Notice
how these figures differ from Binger's price for sheep at
ouolosebougou in 1897, at 37.50 francs.
(See Appendix A.)
Cattle at Kayes sold for sixty to one hundred francs
each.
By the time they reached Bougouni, they were
h
d f
t
150 f
.
h
d'
109
exc ange
or up
0
rancs ~n merc an ~se.
One
horse could be exchanged for eight slaves at Bamako,110
l l l
while six to ten slaves were needed at Beledougou.
Horses and cattle from Segu were exported and sold at
112
Bamako, Sikasso, and Banamba.
Ladji Gaoussou con-
firmed that aIl of the horses used in Odienne were
113
imported from Segu and Bamako.
In spite of the availability of money,
the following
exchanges continued to take place:
rubber
exchanged for
money
guinea cloth
exchanged for
cereals and salt
livestock
exchanged for
toile or guinea cloth
1 horse
exchanged for
20 pieces of toile
1 cow
exchanged for
7 pieces of toile l14
1 bourricot
exchanged for
3 pieces of toile
..
115
.
According to Sundstrom,
~n French Guinea a pièce
was 5.5 yards then and 12 yards now.
One slave head
could bring twenty piecès of cloth or one hundred francs.
In the Monographie du Cercle de Bamako, one pièce
116
was fifteen meters long.
Charles Monteil quotes an
83
earlier source that one pi~ce of guinea was seven to
eight "aunes" long (each about 1. 20 meters), and one half
117
"aune" wide.
The imported cottons on the market had a variety of
origins and qualities.
European manufactured cloth began
to invade the market around the nineteenth century.
Since they had a greater variety of patterns, were
lighter in weight and cheaper than clothes made from
locally handwoven cotton bands, they becarne extremely
popular.
Those of English origins included the guinea
cloth and other imitation prints, indienne in blue and
white, baft,
lirneneas, osnaburg,
long check, petit
check, adrinople, flannel and madras, both real and
imitation.
Sometimes English manufacturers imitated
118
African motifs.
The French administrators often
noticed the preponderance of English cloth in the markets
concerned in this study, although other goods of Swiss,
German, and French origins were also being imported.
For a while the English and French imported blue indigo
directly from India.
When l
asked one informant if she could tell me
the names of the various types of cloth available,
she
answered negatively, but said that the more attractive
119
the cloth was, the more expensive i t was.
She
added that almost aIl of the imports were generally
referred to as labafani.
Two other informailts said that
84
l'
L
they only purchased white cloth because that is what was
.
th
.
120
worn ln
e reglon.
Another remembered buying percale
and bazin.
One type of bazin was called sotoronba 'the
horse's big leg' because the color was similar to the leg
of a horse.
The light blue cotton was needed to make
12l
men's pants.
The new cottons had no trouble inte-
grating the market and the use of cloth as mediums of
exchange for other goods -
salt, slaves or kola nuts.
Among the cloth traded for at Bamako, black velour was
122
'
popular.
At Nioro, one piece of guinea cloth cost
7.50 francs, while the guinea cloth at Banamba sold three
pieces for thirty francs~23 At Bamako, one piece of white
l th
b
ht f
t
t
t
h .
f
12 4
At
c 0
was
oug
or
wen y
0 t
lrty
rancs .
Tenetou, blue guinea
was available for twenty-four francs
. '
125
per plece.
The most successful traders were known for the black
handbags they bought, called kemeboro '500 franc bags'
126
showing that their commerce had brought large profits.
The informants said that just prior to the arrivaI of
the French, they began to trade at Kankan as weIl.
The
end of the wars in ~~e Western Sudan permitted a wide
range of imported goods to penetrate the market.
iVihile
the imports were available at both Bamako and Kankan, they
stated that imported goods were cheaper at Kankan.
From
aIl appearances, a triangular trade developed, in which
the most industrious traders went from the southern kola
85
markets to Bamako, where they sold their kola nuts for
salt,
cattle or money; to Kankan, where they purchased
imported goods, such as cloth and salt; and then they
returned to exchange these goods for kola nuts.
Although Ren~ Cailli' traveled from Kankan to
Samatiguila in 1827, sorne of the developments of the
nineteenth century discouraged the trade.
The relation-
ship of Kabadugu to the kingdom of Mori Oule Cisse was
not friendly.
And when Samori was in Kabadugu sorne
traders' lines were endangered when they were accused of
c6llaborating with the French because of the foreign
objects they brought back from Kankan.
At Kankan, cloth bought in the shops from Syrians
cost five francs for three pagnes.
The cloth was resold
.
th
d'
.
f'
f
127
ln
e 0 lenne reglon at
lve
rancs per pagne.
The cloth was cheaper at Kankan.
Matche Keita
remembered tllat the cloth he bought was one franc per
128
meter, making one big boubou for men worth three francs.
Otherimports available at Kankan included guns,
gunpowder, bullets in the form of small hard stones from
riverbeds called kerebo,
flint called kabasoli, coral,
glass beads, copper bracelets, glassware and hardware.
Later additions included salt, sugar and women's scarves
(Sorne scarves were called tanka dyala after the money
designs they displayed.) 129
Local products came from
all directions and included food items~ cotton bands,
86
raw cotton,
livestock and gold.
One of the most popular
was the imported salt from Rumania.
It came in two
kilogram sacks, called dikriboro by the traders, named
130
after the person who sold them at Kankan.
The prices
for the salt seem to have varied.
Kanamam remembered a
five kilogram bag being sold at 2.50 francs.
Sundstrom
13l
reports one kilogram at 0.75 francs.
K~ita, on the
other hand said that the salt bought today for 500
West African francs
(five kilograms)
was worth five francs
then, therefore one franc per kilogram.
Almamy Toure said that the imported items were
preferred to local goods.
When loose powder salt was
brought to sell, the rock salt had no buyers.
Imported
cloth was sought over locally woven clotho
When asked
what changes the French had brought into their local
commerce, Kanaman remembered the matches that sold two
for one kopro,
0.10 francs,
and that one cube of sugar
cost one kopro.
Not knowing what i t was to be used for,
the children ate i t like candy.
He also recalled cans of
sardines and boxes of cookies, and added that irnported
goods were h~ghly appreciated.
Whenever a trader came
back to the village with goods from Kankan, he monopolized
the trade.
Another important change cited by Almamy
Toure is that about the same time the Europeans reached
Kankan, they began to weigh
the kola nuts and imposed
traveling papers on the traders.
87
For most of the traders who went to Kankan, rubber became
the item enabling them to obtain the imported goods they
desired.
They began trading rubber in the French shops
for money which was in turn spent on foreign goods.
Their
memories of the rubber trade date from this point.
For the jula, triangular trade was the most profit-
able.
One must not forget that they were a small
minority of the population in the pre-colonial periode
Their beginnings are rooted in the intermediary zone in
which they lived where trade was second to subsistence.
The fearless traded a limited argicultural surplus to the
forest peoples, and in turn carried kola nuts,
the
produce of the forest zone, north to the Moors in
exchange for salt.
Contributions from three zones of
mono-producers initiated the trade. 132
Markets were not always a pre-colonial phenomenon.
After the conquest, the French actively participated
in the creation of markets.
Odienne did not have a
marketplace in the pre-colonial periode
Informants were
unanimous in saying that the Odienne market was created
by the colonial administrator, Le Campion.
Prior to
that, sorne women sold condiments and other items needed
for food preparation everyday from noon to four o'clock
in the afternoon.
Even after the market was established
and shops opened, external commerce continued.
People
onlYbought goods for irnmediate consumption there.
To
88
resell anything was to lose money.
Traditional units of Exchange
."
Cotton bands were an extremely important medium
of exchange in African commerce
as a produet which
could be cultivated, processed and sold by almost anyone
133
living in the savannah.
Cotton was grown locally.
Women spun thread, and the men wove cotton bands.
The measurements hardly varied from one family
to another, or from one region to another.
Cotton
bands came in two widths, of either 80 or 120 threads,
measuring ten to fifteen centimeters in width.
The
Marka sold them in lengths of keme kun, one hundred
cowries laid end to end.
The Bambara used eighty cowries,
and the Malinke only sixty in areas where cowries were
used.
In the Bakel, Nioro, and Medina areas a length
was called a
jara and was measured by a stick of two
elbowlengths. 134
In the Odienne region the lengths of bands were
measured by a stretch of the hand.
According to Hadja
Kone, one hand-stretch was called one sibiri.
To measure,
the bands were folded in two.
Four sibiri of the doubled
cotton bands could he exchanged for one lamb.
One
indigo dyed pagne, twelve to fourteen bands wide and
four sibiri long on a doubled cloth could trade for
one slave.
Sorne slaves were even called sibiri saba or
~biri naani, a slave of three- or four hand-stret.ches,
89
named after the value of the pagne with which he was
purchased.
A young slave cost three sibiri and an
adult cost four sibiri.
Three pagnes of four sibiri each
(doubled cloth) and twelve bands wide made one large
boubou, and could he exchanged for one or two slaves
depending on their sizes.
The small pagne sold to
the forest people was only six bands wide, and 1.50
meters long.
It sold for ten to twenty-five francs.
In the Sudan, cotton bands cost 0.20 to 0.50
francs a meter.
Entire pagnes cost 2.50 to 10 francs depending
135
on the color and quality of the cloth.
In local
language, one single woven band of four sibiri was
worth one tanka, 0.50 francs, and two bands cost one
tama, one franc.
The single bands were used as loin
cloths for the forest people.
Bakayoko of Koro told
how he sold pagnes at Sienko in Guinea, one sibiri for
one tanka, five francs.
Since ten bands could make
one pagne worth twenty francs, there really appears
to he little increase in profits from the savannah
to the fore st zone.
At sorne point in the Sudan, 7.50 meters of cotton
band was called tamma.
The value of this length was
2.50 francs.
The exact relationship between the name
~amma for the bands and tama that denoted one franc
136
i..3Lambj gUous.
_ n
90
Iron bars used during this period came from two
sources, weIl known and differentiated by the informants.
Guinzin (also pronounced gbezen) came from Guinea.
They were made at several places throughout the Toma,
Kissi, and Konian areas and differed only slightly
in size and weight.
They were worth 0.12 to 0.25 francs
in the Guinean forest areas at the turn of the century.
porti~res differentiates between small guinzin produced
around Macenta, and large guinzin made in regions of
137
northern Sierra Leone and Beyla.
The small ones
weighed ten to twenty-five grams and were twenty-five
to fort y centimeters long, while the large ones were
sixty to eighty grams or even 140 grams in weight and
seventy to ninety centimeters long.
Other bars originating from south and east of
Odienne were the already discussed sompe.
They were
originally produced in the Touba and Sanhala regions.
But blacksmiths from the Nafana (towns like Tiekorodougou
Numudara, and Koluba)
learned how to make them when
they took refuge from the Samorian wars in the Mankano
.
138
reg~on.
Bakayoko of Koro said that somesompe were
made not far from Koro at Bokonin (a village named
the muddy pond), but those who made them were from
Falanko in Guinea (toward the sources of the Makona
river in the Kissidougou region).139
The sompe were
abQut~wentY-fGur centimeters long, one side ending
91
in two flattened points and the other side ended in
two flattened pointed ovals.
They were worth 0.05
140
francs at sequela
and 0.075 francs at Touba. 141
The traders used them for what they were, iron
bars, without making any distinction between guinzin and
sompe.
The bars sold seperately and in packs of twenty.
They purchased livestock, kola nuts and other goods
as discussed above.
No indication was found of iron
bars in demand north of the region of Odienne.
It
was the general consensus of the informants that where
cowries were not in use, the iron bars were used.
Cowries came from the Indian Ocean and began
to infiltrate the Western Sudan toward the eleventh
century.
From the sixteenth century the Portuguese
were taking part in the cowry trade and bringing over
enormous quantities.
The value of the cowries seemed
to fluctuate with the supply and demand of food items. 142
Cowries were not used in the Odienne region.
They
were used in the surrounding areas of Boundiali, Mali,
and the northernmost part of Guinea. 143
None of the
informants used them very often in their external trade
except certain of the bigger traders who did not bring
them home, but traded them away before returning.
Even
on the trade routes northward, they always mentioned
giving a little salt or kola nuts in exchange for food,
never cowries.
This is supported by Sundstrom who
92
says that north of this region both cowries and minted
coins were used in the urban districts, but were refused
as paYment for food items in the countryside.14~
Finally, 1 May 1915, the circulation of aIl
indigenous money was banned in Ivory Coast.
The French
administration had even tried to buy back the iron
bars, but found it futile, since the bars had sorne
value as primary material in making agricultural instru-
145
ments.
Before the introduction of the kilogram, market items
were systematically weighed and measured in the Odienne
region.
When the traders took their cereals and groundnuts
to market, they were measured out in little baskets
that corresponded to the exchange of a chicken, a cow,
146
or even two kola nuts.
There was even a sma11 rice
basket that sold for one kola nut.
The baskets took
on the names of their makers.
Exchanges and comparisons
took place using the names of these people.
(Later
Hadja Kone found that sorne of their local baskets were
about the same as one kilogram.)
The baskets were
later replaced with bronze plates about eight inches
in diameter that were used to measure grains for the
French.
At the time, one hundred plates of groundnuts
sold for five francs.
Two plates of rice for 0.50
francs, or twenty plates for five francs. 147
Labouret says tr.3.t measures were by the- handfu-L-
,
&
r
93
l-···.·..\\--
There were denominations of one, two together, and
five handsful.
The mura tala was equal to one half
of a 1.5 to 2.5 kilogram measure.
The mude, twenty
handful, was three to five kilograms.
The mure ba was
six to ten kilograms. 148
As René Cailli~ had noticed back in 1827, black
seeds were used on balances.
He compared them to corossol
seeds, but said that they were slightly heavier.
Two
149
seeds equalled six francs in gold.
During the l840's
it was confirmed by Mungo Park in the Bambouk that
the weights were tamarind seeds, and that six seeds
150
equalled one heavy mitkale of gold.
One mitkale was
equal to 4.5 to 5 grams.
If this is true then the
value of the tamarind seed of Labouret is not valid 15l
where he says that one tali kise is equal to one half
mitkale.
On the other hand, these weights arce aIl
variable and only approximate comparisons can he made.
When French money did arrive, it came with special
names that corresponded to the value of each coin.
5 francs - dorome
0.25 franc - pikini
2 francs - dubale
0.10 franc - kopro
1 franc
- tama
0.05 franc - su
0.50 franc
- tanka
0.01 franc - centime
The tanka later became five West African francs
(5 CFA).
To familiarize them with French money, coins
Were thrown into the crowd by the French in commando
The traders did not have any confidence in it initially,
~ ~ . _ - - -
-
- < - -
but once forced into using it, they admitted that trading
l
94
with French currency did give them a certain liberty
152
in their commercial actions and helped to fix prices.
Trade Routes
The region of Odienne will he used as a point
of departure, in listing the routes followed by the
traders to and from the terminal points of commercial
activity.
An attempt was made to locate the villages
on recent maps.
The more recent spellings are noted
in parentheses.
Routes Leading North
The most frequently followed route leading into
the Wasulu was:
Odienne
Samatiguila
Mafeleba
Gbaralo
153
Tenetou or Bougouni
From Bougouni the jula could continue north to
Bamako.
With time, as in the aftermath of war, the
itineraries of sorne routes changed.
After the passage
of Samori, for instance, the Wasulu was completely
in ruins.
The 0 Id route:
Bougouni
Kotule
(Kokele)
Sido
Soro
(Solo)
Keleya
Niessagebougou
Ouolosj,!?ilugou
Bamako
was changed after 1895 and included a detour through
Faragouaran which could by-pass Ouolosebougou and shorten
95
the route by fort y ki1ometers, if the trader desired.
The new route was:
Bougouni
Tenetou
Faragouaran
Dionka1an
Ourou
Ouo1osebougou
Dia1akoro
Seninkoro (Sanankoro)
Bamako 155
Another possibi1ity was to go west from Bougouni
through the Manding heart1and:
Bougouni
Tenetou
Faragouaran
Kangare
Kangaba 156
Others went eastward from the Wasu1u:
Bougouni
Sikasso
Gbaralo
Bole
Segou
- across the Bani plains
saniJennel57
The more industrious traders went beyond Bamako:
Bamako - Segu - Mopti
Bamako - Tirnbuktu
Bamako - Nioro
158
Bamako - Banarnba
From the port of Gbeleban on the eastern border
of the region the route followed the Sankarani River
to Niger:
Gbeleban
Kalafilila
Manankorobougou (Sanankoro)
Kaba1a (Tabalara)
Sokouraba
96
MAP 1
TRADE ROUTES THROUGH ODIENNE REGION
)
~,
Ti...
/
•
•
.......0
. )
G U I N E E .
(
~
•
A u r E - v O L T
N
o
L
A T
0",_..:50:.::_~'::c:..OO......;'!O~....;;290~--.;I2!O
J.
km
C !
A
- 4....
...,;r!:.-_J..0-=-
'"
---i
_
97
Faraba
Sekoroni
Kourouba
~
Banoujeliba (Niger River crossing)
Samagu'i~~ (Samayana)
Bamako
Another port just south of Gbeleban at Kamandougou
offered the same transport and followed the same
itinerary.
The river transport was only accessible
when the rivers were full, during and just after the
rainy season.
Raft transport could also take traders
to Sidikila, from which the route would be continued
160
by foot, to Bamako.
Those who attended the market at Minignan could
go north by way of the following villages:
Minignan
Sankarani River
KangabGi
Bamako,L6l
or
Minignan
Koulikî~~ (market)
Bamako
A return trip to Minignan prior to the Franco-Samorian
wars sometimes led traders to the Koussou slave market.
By 1895 the route was abandoned in favor of the more
direct route from Bamako.
Bamako
Kossou
Minignan163
or
Tenetou
Kossou
98
Minignan 164
Routes Leading South
The routes leading south from Odienne took traders
to the rich kola producing regions south and east of
Koro:
Koro
Dabara
Kankaran
Kate:> 165
Kanl.
Koro
Dabara
Kankaran
Nianfissa
Oursfuala
Masarî66
Touna
Koro
Guinteguela
Touna/Gouaran167
Koro
Soukourala
Bianko
Lin guekoro 168
Kouroukoro
Koro
Soukourala
Lantuy
Doui (Danduye)
Ti (Te)
Bofesso
Man Guekangoï6JGouekougouine)
Nouantagloin
Koro
Seguela170
Dyorole
Koro
waninou/Touba17l
Te/Biankouman
99
Routes Leading West
Another route took traders direct1y into Guinea
from Sirana:
Odienne
Sirana
Bey1a
Boo la
172
Lo1a/Boucke
From here traders continued direct1y to Kankan:
Bey1a
Kerouane
Bissandougou
Kankan173
In addition to the southern route leading to
Kankan,there was the more popular one linking Kankan
to the market at Minignan:
Minignan
Kalafilila
Ouorocoro
Koma
.
Kankan174
Other routes from Kankan led to Siguiri, Faranah,
and Kouroussa.
From Siguiri the traders could go or
return from Bamako.
The
Bamako
Siguiri
Kankan
Mi nignan
Odienne
route was weIl traveled with the development of the
triangular trade previously explained.
Routes Leading East
None of the traders interviewed in this study
Went eastward.
But based on observations by the French
1·
r
L
100
mi1itary, and on Rene Cai11ie's journey in 1828, the
fo11owing routes had existed:
Odienne
Tieme
Tengre1a
Tio1a 175
Odienne
Tieme
Pingue1es
(Diengu1et)
Seneba
Koguango
Bouandou (Bouandouqou)
Kata1a (Katio1a)176
Odienne
Segue10n
Kani
Diouran (Dawara)
Katio1a177
Odienne
Tiekorodougou
Kani
Dawara
Katio1a178
Odienne
Kaniasso
Koguango
Tromi
Katio1a179
Odienne
Kaniasso
Koguango
Tombougou180
101
Footnotes to Chapter III
1Cheva1ier, BCAF, No. 10, 1899, p. 379; a1so,
Monographie de Segue1a, p. 8 ANCI.
2wondji, "Commerce du Cola et Marchâs Pr~-Co1oniaux
Dans la R~gion de Da1oa," Annales de Univ. d'Abidjan,
pp. 3-61 (1972).
3Cheva1ier, BCAF, p. 21.
4Cheva1ier, op.cit., p. 379.
5Louis Binger, Ou Niger au Golfe de Guin~e, p. 31.
6Bohannon's and Da1ton's, Market, p. 71.
7Jean-LoUp Amse11e, "parent' et commerce chez
les kooroko", in Mei11assoux, ed., Trade, p. 253-.
8When their 1ines of communication assured them
know1edge of Samori's capture, they kept the gold they
had been commissioned to exchange for merchandise.
Cisse at Minignan 1975.
9Almamy Toure at Sanaferedougou, Oct. 1975.
1QLamine Doumbia at Kabangoue, 20 Oct. 1975.
IlPerson, Samori, V.I, p. 114.
12Person, Samori, V.II, p. 969.
13Hadja Nawourouya, Odienne, Oct. 1975, a1so El
Hadj Matie Savane, Dakar, 1 Aug. 1974.
l4C 'Il'
a~
~e, Journal, Vol. II, p. 5.
l5 ,
B~nger, Ou Niger, Vol. l, p. 28.
l6 H d'
a Ja Nawourouya Savane, 1975.
102
17Keita, Kere, 29 Oct., 1975.
18Le Campion, Monos;aphie d' Odienne.
19Bakayoko, Koro, Apr. 1978.
20 CEA VI No. 3 1966 pp. 349-.
21Matche Keita, Kere, 3 Apr. 1978.
22Bakayoko, Koro, 4 Apr. 1978.
23Mei11assoux, ed., op.cit., p. 266-.
24
'11'/
Ca1
1e, J
1
ourna, V
o I
. I l, p. 312 •
25person, Samori, p. 111.
\\
26 He was in Tieme from 3 Jan. 1827 to' 9 Jan. 1828,
Journal, Vol. II, pp. 1-60.
\\
27Map R~gion du Sud, Cercle de Bey1a 1899, AND
7G/30-3.
28The difficu1ty of gathering oral traditions
in Tieme did not permit me to ask the people of Tieme
why the market no longer existed.
29vassa1i Bakayoko: Bako 1978, Vamoridian the
chief of the region fought with Vakaba's armies.
30Ladji Gaoussou, Odienne, 2 Apr. 1978, a1so Bohannon
and Dalton eds., Markets in Africai
See AND
1G229 Coutumes Juridiques 1897 piece 3, Cercle de Kankan
for more on order in the marketp1ace.
31See Bouti11ier in Mei11assoux, ed., Trade.
3?--
d"
l '
41
-Won J1, Anna es, p.
•
33
,
Zunon,"Le Ro1e des Femmes dans le Commerce
Preco1onia1 ~ Da1oa" in Godo Godo, No. 2, 1976, pp. 79-10S.
103
34wondji, Annales, p. 38-39.
Tauxier says these
copper goods were Sudanic items.
Gouro, p. 192, 1924.
350n1y 1ater did markets deve1op.
According to
Wondji they were copied after Gouro markets and on1y
came into existence in the nineteenth century.
Annales,
p. 53.
36Mei11assoux, Anthropologie Economique des Gouro ,p274.
37wondJ"l.", Map, Ann ales ,p. 45 .
38Tauxier, N~greS Gouro, p. 226, 1924.
39Monographie d'Odienne/Segue1a, ANCI •
. 4°Mei11assoux, Anthropologie Economigue des Gouro,
p. 278.
410ege Kone at Segue1on, Oct. 1975.
42Mei11assoux, op.cit., p. 270.
43The Imam of Minignan, 29 Oct. 1975, and Tauxier,
Negres Gouro, p. 151 and Oege Kone of Se gue Ion with refer-
ence to Kani, 1 Nov. 1975.
44sundstr~m, Trade of Guinea, p. 131. A prob1em
with figures from this account is that there are very
few dates given with the prices.
45 B"
l.nger,
"t
op.Cl. ., V 1
o . II ,p. 141 •
46Bakayoko, Koro 4 Apr. 1978.
47Nov. 1975.
48Sy11a, Odienne, Nov. 1975.
49van Cassel "La Haute Cote d'Ivoire Occidentale",
BCAF 1901, p. 102.
-50 --
Monographie de Touba, Odienne, Segue1a, p. 22. ANCI.
104
5lAND lG276
52person, Samori, Vol. I, p. 110.
53van Cassel, op.cit., p. 102, confirmed at Sirana,
where they said they bought ko la nuts in southern markets
500 for five francs, Oct. 1975.
54van Cassel, op.cit., p. 104.
55
.,
,
Sundstrom, Op.C1t., p. 132.
56chief of Sirana, 31 Oct. 1975.
57Bakayoko, Koro, 1978.
58cailli', op.cit., Vol. I, p. 459.
59Samatiguila, 6 April, 1978.
60When l went to Mamouroula in 1978, the people
refused to answer any questions from .anyone.
They
were feuding with the government because they did not
wish to do their official business at the sub-prefecture
of Samatiguila, nor pay their POCI cards with the Secretary
General of the Party there.
These acts would have
been a sign of sul:mission to Samatiguila.
6lAt Samatiguila, although many traders passed
through and even the village people were frequently
absent in pursuit of markets, local informants insisted
that the traders never settled at Samati gui la.
There
was said to be not a single compound where the family
did not pray or where one could say that traders lived
there.
I took this to mean that commerce was subordinate
to their main occupation: prayer.
The elimination
of the market in Caillié's time was probably to serve
that very purpose.
620 "
b
1arrassou a, April 1978.
63C 'Il';
"
1
a1
1e, op. C1t. , Vo . I, p. 466.
lOS
~.L
65Hadja Kone, Abidjan, Feb. 1976.
66Bouti11ier,
"Les Captifs ... " IFAN, 1968.
67M"
3
~n~gnan,
Nov. 1975.
68 I mam 0 f M'
,
~n~gnan,
29 Oct. 1975 .
69"
" .
d
.
"
La Reg~on Sud du Sou an Franca~s
No. 10, Oct.
1899 BCAF).
.:J
70 E1 Hadj Kanamam, Tienko, 34 Oct. 1975.
71
"
Sundstrbm, Trade, p.
108.
72B ·
.
1
312
~nger, op.c~t., Vo .
I, p.
.
73Sundstrom, Trade, p. 136.
74 Kanaman, Tienko, Oct. 1975.
75 AND 048 piece 2.
76AND 048 1897 Economie du Soudan Haut Senega1 et
Moyen Niger, piece 2; a1so AND 2G2-7 Haut Senega1 Moyen
Niger 1902, Rapport Commercial et Agricole, Cercle de
Bougouni.
77cisse, and Imam of Minignan, 3 Nov. 1975.
78 capt • Ba11ieu, "Notice agricole, industrielle
et commerciale sur le Soudan Francais", BCAF 1898, p. 2.
~
79AND 5G41 Ristori, at Bey1a 20 Nov. 1897.
80AND 5G41 Lt. Bomassies, 14 June 1897, Siguiri.
81AND 048 Part 2.
82 The opening of the Ivory Coast border with Guinea
in April 1978 may serve to erase sorne of those doubts.
'.
106
h __
83C '11'/
1
2
a~
~e, Journa , Vol.
II, p.
14.
.'
84Mage , Voyage, p. 120.
85 I was not able to find the exact location of this
village.
86 Capt. Ballieu, op.cit., p. 2.
87person, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 936.
88AND lG299 piece 2 Monographie de Bamako, April
1904, p.
84.
89ANM I04 Letter Lt. Capt. Loyer Commandant du
Cercle de Bamako, 1 May 1887.
90Ballieu, op.cit., p.
4.
9lANM 108 Letter Lt. Dussauls, 9 Sept. 1897.
92El Hadj Kanaman , Tienko, Nov. 1975.
93sundstrërn, Trade, p. 131, Ballieu, op.cit., p. Il.
94
.,
Sundstrorn, op.cit., p. 131.
95AND l5G83 Renseignements sur le Cercle de Bamako.
96 ANM 10-4.
97B,
' t
V I I
27
~nger,
Op.C1 .,
o .
, p .
.
98
d
,.
,
131
Sun strërn, Op.C1t., p.
.
99M~D lG 171, 1897.
lOOAND lG17l, 1897.
101
Il'
,
13
Ba
~eu, op.c~t., p.
.
107
102 ANM IQ8 1899.
103ANM IQ-8.
104Adama Kone, Bako, Nov. 1975.
105Equiva1ent to 10 francs per hundred they were
probab1y bought at the Minignan market, since prior to the
war kola nuts were 10 francs per thousand at the source.
The nuts were ten times higher in price at Minignan.
106A1mamy Toure, Sananferedougou, Oct. 1975.
107Marabout of Kaba1a, 30 Oct. 1975.
108AND 1G 299 1904.
109
Il'
.
12
Ba
1eu, 0p.C1t., p.
•
110 Person, S ·
V
amor1,
1
o . II , p. 942 .
III
..
Sundstrom, Trade.
112AND 1G 320.
1130dienne 2 April 1978.
114AND 1G299 Monographie du Cere1e de Bamako 1904.
115sundstrom, Trade, p. 173.
116AND 1G299 1904, see a1so AND 1G 146 Sikasso
1890.
117Montei1, BCEHSAOF, 1926, p.
621.
118S
d t "
m
d
un s rom,
~ra e,
p. 157.
119Hadja Nawourouya Savane, 16 April 1975, Odienne.
120Kanarnan of Tienko, and Sy~~a of Odienne, 1975
November.
...
108
121Berna Sangare, April 1975.
122Marabout of Kaba1a, Oct. 1975.
123
"
Sundstrorn, Trade, p. 131.
124sy11a, Odienne, 1975.
125AND 1G 199 Mission Binger 1887.
126Marabout of Kaba1a and A1rnamy Toure of Sanan-
feredougou, April 1975.
127Hadja Nawourouya Savane, Odienne 1975.
128Matcbe Keita, Kere, 1975.
129Kanaman, Tienko, 1975.
130A1rnamy Toure, Sananferedougou, Oct. 1975.
131
.•
Sundstrorn, Trade, p. 132.
132See discussion in AND 1G 299.
133See discussion in "The Rural Wolof of the Gambia
by David Ames,
in Bohannon and Dalton, eds., op.cit,
pp.
36-.
1 3 4 ' 1
"
Monte~ ,
BCEHSAOF
Le
coton chez les noirs",
p.
585,
1926.
135B Il'
a
~eu,
AND Q48 part 2, 1900.
136Mamby Sidibe "Cercle de Kita" BCEHSAOF 1932 XV
No.
~P. 129 and Labouret Les manding et leur langue,
tarose, Paris 1934.
The differences in spe11ing
are rny OWn.
137
.....
Af'
Portieres,.Ro1and,
"La monnaie de fer dans l'OueEt
r~can au xxe siec1e " Recherches Africaines, 4(1960);
3-13.
'
109
13 8Anourna ,
ub
th
66
unp
.
eses, p.
.
139 Bakayoko, Koro, April 1978.
140Adama Kone at Bako and JOCI 15 March 1903, p. 9
"Mercuriale locale".
141
"
,
7
Port1eres, Op.C1t., p . .
142person, Samori, Vol. l, p. 94.
143see Marion Johnson "The Cowrie Currencies of West
Africa" JAH,Vol.
2 1970, pp. 17-49.
144
d "
d
108
Sun strom, Tra e, p.
.
145Monographie d'Odienne, ANCI.
146Hadja Kone, 1976 Abidjan.
She added that kola nuts
were very expensive then because there was no access to
the forest.
147L
,
urnb'
Kab
1975
am1ne Do
1a,
angoue,
.
148Labouret, Les Manding" BCEHSAOF, Vol. XVII,
1934, p. 236.
149 C "Il"
a1
~
1e, Journa 1 ,
1
Vo. l , p.
3 9 1
,
'1n t h e Fout a
Dia110n.
150M ,
h
'
561
ar10n Jo nson, Op.C1t., p.
.
151Labouret, BCEHSAOF, p. 236, op.cit.
152H d"
' u r n b '
1975
a Ja Kone 1976, Lam1ne Do
1a
.
153Person, Samori, p. 109.
154AND 15G 94.
155ANM 10-3 '1895.
110
156ANM 1D-3 1895.
157 nLa Rêgion Sud" BCAF No. 10, 1899, a1so Person,
Samori, p. 109.
158BCAF , no. 10 1899, Almamy Toure 1975., AND 5G 41
1897.
159Traore at Gbe1eban, 30 April 1975.
160L d"
a)1 Gaoussou Toure, Od'~enne, 1978 .
161AND 5G 41 1897.
162Chief of Sirana, 1975.
163AND 5G41 1897
164AND 1G 171, 1895-96.
165AND 5G 41-
1661bid•
167ANM ID - 163, 1902.
168Bakayoko, Koro, 1978.
169AND 5G 41.
170Bakayoko, Koro, 1978.
171Person, Samori, p. 109.
172chief of Sirana, 1975 AND 1G 171 1895.
173AND 1G 171 1895.
174M~M ID - 3 1895.
•
175ANM 1D-3 1895, a1so Cai11iè, op.cit., V.2.,
Pp.
60-95.
111
176AND 5G41 1897.
177AND 5G 4l.
178AND 5G 41.
179 Ibid .
180 Ibid •
112
CHAPTER IV
COLONIAL RULE
ArrivaI of the French in Kabadugu
The French reached the Odienne region in 1892.
Led by Colonel Combes, the Senegalese tirailleurs who
composed his troops were steadily in pursuit of Samori.
From the beginning, i t became clear that sides would be
taken either in favor or against the French presence.
Decisions were made based on sentiments of fear and
instincts for self-preservation.
The people of the region tell vivid stories of
their initial contact with the French.
Ahmadou,
(also
called Magbe Mamadou)
a son of Vakaba and then leader
of Kabadugu, had allied his kingdom with Samori.
He
helped Samori to resist the French in the Wasulu and
left with Samori when he fled eastward to establish a
new empire.
They were followed by thousands of sofas
and volunteers.
Those who remained behind were over-
come by fear.
El Hadj Kanaman told how his grandfather
and aIl the villagers in one of the provinces to the
north, Bodug~ followed Samori en route to Samatiguila.
Ali of the villages and fields were burned by Samori's
!.9fas.
- When they reached the Baoule River,
the followers
113
from Bodugu refused to cross saying that many did not
know how to swim.
Samori continued, promising to send
help from Samatiguila.
Kanaman's grandfather called his
people together and told them that their only chance for
survival was to escape, if not they would surely perish
in Samori's wars.
Later, a chief from Mali arrived and
announced that the French were already at Bougouni.
Since the province of Bodugu was no longer in alliance
with Samori, he suggested that they meet the French to-
gether in order to have sorne protection against Samori.
A delegation set out led by Kanaman's uncle.
Before
reaching their destination, many were once again overcome
by fear and refused to continue.
Kanaman's uncle arrived
accompanied only by his Malian counterpart..
He renounced
Samori and pledged his allegiance to the French.
He told
the French in command that the people of Bodugu were
suffering from lack of clothes and food.
He was given
cloth and boxes of sardines topped with a sure promise
that Samori would no longer be a threat to them.
He was
advised to return home, have the people restore their
villages and begin to cultivate.
Their expectations of a peaceful alliance soon
turned bitter.
The French advanced on the region with
many tirailleurs.
In his account, Kanaman states that
the soldiers were aIl black, as if i t were a significant
discovery at the time.
The tirailleurs were overconfident
114
anddisrespectful.
Kanaman described the pandemonium
that occurred .as villagers hidden in their huts were
searched out, heads of households were beaten and screams
were heard aIl around.
Nevertheless, it is recorded that
Colonel Combes avoided aIl possible acts of hostility in
Kabadugu, and even sent delegations to Odienne to purvey
his message that the war was with Samori, not with them. l
But Samori still had allies to the south, west and east
through which his routes of escape were guaranteed.
So,
when Colonel Combes finally reached Odienne, he found
that the village had been burned and the population had
fled.
The parade of French lieutenants and captains, and
Senegalese tirailleurs continued until Samori was caught
in 1898.
In the meantime, the region was under constant
surveillance.
In July 1895, Captain Jacob in command of
the Cercle of Beyla listed Kabadugu as one of the prov-
inces of the cercle.
The activities of the chiefs and
their loyalty to the French cause was his main preoccu-
pation.
Due to the absence of a French resident, the
French were dependent upon local chiefs as allies and
informants. 2
However, it was becoming increasingly
evident, that in spite of an appearance of French loyalty,
the leadership at Odienne remained under the influence of
Samorie
Upon the ·depa-rtur-e--Gf-- Ahma.dou- with Samori,.. -the.
115
l
leadership of the kingdom fell to Moriba Toure, a younger
.
brother of Ahmadou.
His role was to transform the small
kingdom into a buffer state from which to retain the
French.
As Samori fled further into the east, he released
many of the inhabitants of Kabadugu and Worodugu to return
to their homes.
He advised the leaders not to let any of
the refugees cross into French occupied lands, but to have
them grow food that would be needed upon his return to the
regions.
The local leaders were already pillaging the
surrounding areas, taking captives among the returnees and
others who were fleeing the destruction of Samori's armies.
Based on an observation that Samori was still
receiving hors es from Samatiguila, and that his agents
circulated freely in the Odienne region, a French Officer
in command of the R~gion Sud, Captain Conrard, suggested
an immediate occupation. 3
Moriba Toure continued his internal wars to reduce
the recalcitrant cantons of Naoulu and Nafana which tried
to take advantage of the turmoil to break away from Toure
overrule.
In a revolt in 1892, they allied with French
forces under Marchand to drive out Samori's sofas. 4
But
Moriba had no intentions of relinquishing any part of the
kingdom, and sought to use the French to increase his
prestige against Naoulu and Nafana, while making the
French believe that he was a loyal ally.
In August, 1895,
he sent a delegation to meet the French at Bissandugu, and
116
to Captain Jacob at Beyla to assure him that there were
none of Samori's sofas in Kabadugu.
He also sent a letter
to Bougouni (See Appendix C).
In the letter he leaked
information on Samori's whereabouts, offered to hold
Samori's griot Dieli Moussa for them, and appealed for
permission to reopen the lines of trade through Minignan.
It was most clear that he did not want French troops
crossing his territory.
He closed his letter by asking
for a rifle as gift.
Moriba was playing ends against the middle in a
sophisticated game of politics.
He realized that there
were sorne differences in between the various command
posts.
Captain Gouraud at Bougouni was very strict,
while Captain Vuillemot, who was later sent to Beyla,
was easily placated after Moriba's May 1896 invasion of
Sirana, Bougousou, and Gbangnanso by a simple explanation
in Moriba's desire to have his refugees back.
Moriba
perceived the French willingness to cooperate with him
as long as he remained adamant in his renunciations of
Samori.
Finally in May 1896, Moriba himself arrived by
convocation.
He was careful to consult the marabouts of
Samatiguila before going.
Captain Freyss impressed upon
Moriba that the governor of the French Sudan insisted
the raiding around Kabadugu should cease.
Moriba in
.:tur~-~ade--±t understoodthathe woutrrd orrly accepr-periodi-c--
117
visits from the French resident at Bougouni, and sought
permission to suppress aIl of the dissident provinces
that once belonged to Kabadugu.
The visit of another
French officer, Lt. Bonnassies by the end of the month
bearing a refusaI from Governor Trentinian did not change
Moriba's stance.
In a bizarre turn of events, there was
conflict between Moriba and the marabout, Konya Mambi
Dyabi, who was in strong support of Samarie
It is not
clear if Moriba believed the rumors that Samori's sofas
were coming to the aid of the Dyabis, but his reaction
was surprising.
He sent his nephew to seek French
support against the possibility of an attack.
The
political game had come to an end, and Moriba realized
that he did need the French to save him from the
vengeance of Samori and his sofas.
The Chef de Battallion
Bertin ordered Lt. Buck to occupy Odienne, which he did
on 27 July 1897. 5
Lieutenant Le Moal, the first resident administ-
rator, arrived from Kayes on 20 September 1897, to find
Moriba in negotiation with Ristori over the location of
the post.
Moriba had convinced Ristori to locate the
post outside of Odienne.
The decision to build at
Odienne was finally made by Mr. Aud~od the Governor of
the Sudan.
From 1 December 1897 the Odienne region
became a cercle Qf the French Sud~n.~ .
Through oral tradition research, one can fill in
118
T
[ARTE
SCl-ENATi\\l.E
ŒLA
~GiO'& 5.n
N.
t
t-'
t-'
\\0
•a.
LpJ
W06n
MAP 2
REPRODUCTION OF ORIGINAL MAP SHOWING THE REGION SUD 1899
(AND 7G/30-2,
3)
the details often left out by colonial reports.
We
learn that the French officers considered Samatiguila
as a location for the post since it was a greatly
respected center of influence in Kabadugu.
They were
discouraged by the marabouts and advised to move on to
Odienne where the chiefs of the region resided. 7
In spite of the Governor's decision, Moriba still
refused to give permission for the post, vowing that the
post would have to be built on his head.
His mind was
quickly changed by a display of force characteristic of
French colonial rule.
In Moriba's case, he was arrested
and two heavy bricks were placed on his head.
When he
could no longer endure the strain, he gave permission
for the post to be constructed. 8
The post was completed
on 5 February 1898. 9
Thus begins the saga of colonial rule, the inter-
action of the French and its direct effect on the pop-
ulation of the region.
The region had been officially
plugged in to a vast network of French political ideology
and commercial interests that changed the pace of their
daily lives.
While the greater, somewhat disjointed
colonial policy of the French was not communicated to
the people, they immediately grasped the fact that their
destinies were temporarily in the hands of strangers who
did not care for their traditions and customs, especially
when they interfered with economic productivity.
The
L
120 .
ripples of colonial policy determined from afar were
felt in Odienne.
The Organization of French Colonial Rule
The conquest of the French Sudan was weIl underway
under Colonel Archinard, but the French suffered a break-
down of authority between the civil administration of
the metropole and the naval administration in the field.
Lack of funds to finance the conquest was the prirnary
constraint imposed by the French parlement on military
advancement in the Sudan.
So determined were they to
stop giving a freehand to glory-seeking military person-
nel that in 1893, the administration of the Sudan was
relinquished to a civil governor, Albert Grodet.
Colonel
Archinard was later recalled.
In spite of Grodet's at-
ternpts to hold a tight reign over military advances,
Grodet's instructions were sometirnes ignored by ambitious
military leaders.
They often placed the governor before
a
fait accompli,
taking advantage of circumstances
that demanded quick, aggressive moves on behalf of the
military if the French were to maintain a firm hold on
the Sudan. 10
The recurring problern of the objectives of French
irnperialism in the Sudan was masked by rising tides of
nationalism and the enthusiasm for the French mission
~vilisatrice. Thus, long term planning for the new
territories was non-existent and political policies
121
rejected the erratic tendencies of the population.
Even by the time the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 had
been signed, in which the British recognized French West
Africa, the form colonial rule would eventually take had
not been the object of any serious studies.
The de-
velopment of French administration in Africa was the
result of trial and error,
and limited by the need for
financial autonomy in the newly acquired African empire.
The relationship of the metropole to the colonial ad-
ministration changed constantly reflecting the failures
of French colonial rule.
To begin with, the new territories were not
transferred from the Ministry of the Marine to the newly
created Ministry of Colonies until the law of 20 March
1894.
With increasing hostilities building between the
lieutenant governors in charge of the young coastal
colonies, whose extensions of authority into the hinter-
lands had not yet been delineated, the Minister of
Colonies, Chautemps, by a decree of 16 June 1895 created
the Government General of French West Aftica.
From the
moment of the signature the Government General grew in
power and authority.
It began as a combined effort to
administer Senegal, to act as a watchdog against ex-
cessive military expenditures, and to co-ordinate admini-
strative approaches to native rule from St. Louis.
By 1904 new decrees hèd been passed which expressed
122
changing ideas in colonial rule.
Once again the basic
motivation for change was a lack of financial control
over colonial revenues needed to support the Government
General and to pay the expenses made in the general
interest of the colonies.
In the new decrees, the
location of the Government General was moved to Dakar,
and territorial governors were made accountable for
their local budgets based on head tax revenues, to the
Government General.
Governor General Roume in a wide
interpretation of the decrees claimed his authority to
nominate local officiaIs, and to have sole responsibility
for any interior territorial reorganization and any
decisions regarding administrative policies within the
colonies.
The budget of the Government General was no
longer to be included in the budget of Senegambia (newly
named upper Senegal-Niger) with only small contributions
from the territorial governments, but was to be supported
by all trade revenues collected throughout the colonies.
Most importantly, only the Governor General could cor-
respond with the Ministry of Colonies, and, in the op-
posing direction, any observations made by aids of the
Governor General had to be transmitted through him
before being passed on to the colonies. ll
In essence, the roots of "direct rule" were being
struck in these early years of the consolidation of the
Government General.
The format that colonial ru le
123
assumed is greatly due to the roles played by ambitious
and aggressive.men such as Governor GeneraIs Rourne and
William-Ponty, and later Lieutenant Governor Angoulvant
in Ivory Coast.
In a cascade of dècrets, d~cisions,
arr~t's and circulaires from the Ministry of Colonies
to the Government General, from there to the Lieutenant
Governors, and from them to the local administrators,
the desires and demands of the metropole were translated
to the masses of Africans under colonial rule.
The
wishes of the colonized, however, fell on deaf ears.
Power and authority flowed in one direction:
From the
top down, from Paris to Odienne.
The problems of the local administration in the
new terri tories were worked out in a haphazard way.
Where the governor in charge could see that abuses were
taking place, circulars were sent to the administrators
commanding the various subdivisions, and arr~tés were
signed to correct the exaggerations.
One can almost
discern the types of abuses that occurred from the nature
of the governmental decisions that were made.
Never-
theless, the interpretation of power and authority was
le ft to the individual discretion of the administrator.
They were the omnipotent overlords of colonialism. 12
Unfortunately, as Maurice Delafosse pointed out in an
article published in 1909,13 when sorne of the admini-
strators_wereJ.eft ~n thair own in the Africanbush, far
124
--
away from the sanctions of the European community, other-
wise honest men became criminals.
In spite of the r~pid
turn over of administrators,
(See APpendix D for list of
administrators), the people of the region remember the
names of sorne who made themselves known either by their
indulgence or their extreme cruelty.
Commandant Susini,
for example, was known as one of the most brutal of the
administrators.
When he made the rounds of the cantons,
he did not wish to hear the bark of a single dog, the
whimper of a child, nor the thud of a pestle used in
food preparation.
50, dogs were tied in the huts, and
women took small children into the forest to wait until
his departure.
Pounded foods for the guards were
pre-
pared weIl in advance. 14
The visit of an administrator
was announced in advance, so that the trees and huts were
painted white, and aIl the surrounding area was cleaned.
If anything did not please the administrator, the entire
village had to pay a fine.
The co st for such receptions
fell heavily on the population.
The guards took chickens
at will, without reimbursing the owners.
As one in-
formant stated, the day that an administrator gave a
dugutigi ten francs to cover the cost of the reception,
it was a happy moment for the whole village. lS
Another administrator, Le Campion, the author of
an extended monography on the region, was well-remembered.
L~ was- KiîfQ-èri<Yugh--to stop any prestati.ol'ls--e~·ferced·
l2S
labor recruitment for six months during the planting and
harvest seasons so that people could tend their fields.
The informant thought i t fortunate that Le Campion was
present during the World War l military recruitment.
The administrator showed sorne compassion by sparing men
from families in which they were the only son from the
horrors and certain death that the military and forced
labor in the fore st zone could bring. 16
Other administrators were hated for the free reign
given to the gardes cercle who terrorized the population.
They were despised for the injustices liberally metted
out with no recourse for the people.
There are painful
memories of the indig~nat under which villagers could be
punished
(beaten, imprisoned, or fined)
or thrown into
jail endless times because they were a day or two late
returning from Kankan, where they were often sent as
l
porters. ?
Under the indigènat a person could be placed
in jail for a maximum sentence of fifteen days and fined
up to one hundred francs for any arrest, with or without
cause. lB
Even simple things such as not removing a hat
in time, not relinquishing the passage quickly enough,
or tardiness could lead to imprisonment. 19
The plea by
Roberdeau in his circular of 14 September 1900 against
the brutal acts and mistreatment of prisoners by the
guards is indicative of the misuse of power rampant in
the early days of colonial rule.
126
Based on the experience of the first twenty years
of colonial rule, Henri Cosnier was able to make sorne
observations on. the French administration.
First he
criticized the rapid succession of lieutenant governors
and local administrators in the colonies.
Each, he com-
plained, has his own methods and conceptions of coloniza-
tion which hampers the continuity of services and work
projects.
The weight of disorganization was, of course,
carried by the masses.
"All of that," states Cosnier,
"passes before the eyes of the indigenous people like
a kaleidoscope in which each new image is accompanied by
an increase in loads and troubles."20
Moreover, the villagers were never associated with
the plans for productivity nor introduced to new methods
of cultivation.
They were simply told to produce.
Cosnier criticized the lack of agricultural instruction
for the Africans in schools and condemned the fickleness
of administrators who forced the peasants to cultivate
one field after another without having performed any
studies of the possibilities for success; thus, leaving
a sour memory of abandonned administrative fields. 2l
In Odienne the informants were unanimous in stating that
aIl of their fields belonged to the French.
One in-
formant reported that the commandant came to their
village and pointed out the most fertile lands lying
next te the streams that were to be cultivated for the
administration.
,
L
127
Chieftaincy
In brief, the administrator became the chief of
chiefs.
As such, he exercised complete control over the
traditional chiefs in the region, going even so far as
distributing land.
While Louis Binger was Director of
Political Affairs at the Ministry, he advised that the
colonial regime be categorie in its elimination of
chiefs of vast kingdoms, and to protect small states
from being absorbed by larger ones.
He encouraged a
breakdown of authority in favor of smaller units.
It
was not long before the policy toward chiefs began to
change.
In a circular dated 13 September 1900, Governor
Roberdeau made it known to the administrators that direct
rule was being overexercised in sorne areas.
Not only
were the administrators advised to be less partisan in
judging disputes among the villagers, but also to extend
more authority to local chiefs, so that they could be
used to help the colonial regirne. 22
using the expression
of Delavignette, the chiefs were to be made "agents" of
the administration, to act as buffers between the colonial
regime and the masses. 23
Governor General William Ponty,
in turn, was searching for a politique indigène that
would leave legitimate African chiefs in power as long
as they transferred their loyalty to the colonial regime
and did not exploit the masses of people.--'rhe--pl;"oblern of
128
traditional chiefs was really never solved.
As la te as
1917, Van Vollenhoven was still defining the charac-
teristics of traditional chiefs as needed assistants of
the administration, but their ranks were now open to ex-
civil servants (guards, interpretors, etc.) as awards
for faithful service.
Priority was given to those who
understood and had participated in the colonial regime
over those who held traditional rights to power. 24
One
can easily perceive that due to a lack of money, and
European personnel during French involvement in World War
l, the colonial regime had to depend on African collab-
orators to maintain control over the vast regions it
ruled.
The interpretation of politique indigène in Odienne
resulted in the breakdown of the kingdom of Kabadugu
into smaller units.
Very soon after French occupation,
an administrator was to write that with the limitations
in European personnel, direct contact with aIl the
villages was impossible.
Therefore, it was indispensable
that villages be regrouped and cantons created in order
to govern a process which necessitated the creation of
canton chiefs as well. 25
The chiefs were initially
chosen according to tradition, by the council of eIders,
but the French reserved the right to nominate and depose
chiefs as they pleased.
Therefore, the canton chiefs
became direct~y responsible to the administrators.
As a
129
result, the canton chiefs transferred their loyalty from
the people of the regions under their jurisdiction, to
the French administration.
Any chief who refused to co-
operate was eliminated as shown in the initial contacts
of the French with the Odienne region.
Not having fully realized that their sovereignty
had been abrogated, sorne chiefs tried to bypass French
authority.
Moriba Toure, for instance, continued to
behave as if French presence in Odienne was only temporary.
Upon the capture of Samori at Guelemou,
29 September 1898,
Moriba's brother, Ahmadou, was exiled to Timbuktu.
Moriba
chose to ignore the example of punishment that the French
were more than willing to deliver to those who did not
cooperate, and continued to raid the southern cantons and
sell slaves in spite of explicit orders to the contrary.
On 24 March 1899, Moriba was arrested and exiled to
Siguiri. 26
The general impression upon the population
was that Moriba had been deceived by the French.
They
had not come to Odienne to help Moriba after all. 27
In a strategie move, the chiefs of Samatiguila and
Tieme went to the post to show their support for the ad-
ministrations against Moriba.
Their actions might be
better interpreted as a political maneuver to free them-
selves from the hegemony of the Toure dynasty.
In other
words, they, too, attempted to manipulate and profit from
the French presence.
They hoped to be left alon,; after
130
a display of loyalty to the French, and at the same time
be freed of influence from Kabadugu.
The administration
accepted that the chiefs of Tieme and Samatiguila pay
their taxes directly to the post instead of through the
canton chief of Kabadugu. 28
Moriba was succeeded by his younger brother Mody
Souare by general consensus of the nobles.
Of course the
resident administrator present, Captain Conrard did not
agree with the choice, but reached compromise by naming
Ismaila, the oldest of the next generation as an assistant
to Mody Souare.
According to the report, the nobles would
have preferred Ismaila as chief of the canton of Kabadugu,
but the generation of Vakaba's sons had to end before
chiefs could be named among the following generation. 29
Unfortunately, Ismai1a died shortly afterward, leaving
Mody to rule alone.
His reign did not last long, however.
Already in November of 1900 the nobles were asked to choose
another chief.
Under his weak leadership, the French
dismantled other cantons from their dependence on Kabadugu
- Toron, Folo
and Massala - making them direct1y re-
Sponsible to the administration at Odienne.
Mody was
charged with not turning over the head tax co1lected among
the slaves to the administration.
He had co11aborated
with a political agent of the administration, Moro Bamba, te
aVoid giving the entire amount.
Mody c1aimed that money
~
an
131
investigation at the markets proved Mody wrong.
He had
also refused to furnish porters for the administration.
Mody Souare was deposed by the French, and the
community had to choose another chief.
There was no
hesitation over the choice of Lantene Siriki Toure, the
last in the generation of Vakaba's sons.
Mody Souare
was not immediately exiled from the region, and, in spite
of the transfer of authority, he continued to impose
himself, leading to conflicts with his younger brother
and the administration.
In a letter dated 9 February 1901, the adminis-
trator proposed that Mody Souare be sent with his family
and slaves to a restricted residence in another cercle
where he would be given sufficient land to cultivate.
The decision was approved30 and Mody was sent to Seguela.
His exile did not calm the situation for Lantene Siriki.
Moriba Toure was released on Il June 1901.
Upon his
return to Odienne, he began selling captives.
Many of
the royal captives fled into the Seguela region away from
Moriba. 3l
Moreover, he sought to be reinstated of aIl
properties left behind in 1899.
He was able to manipulate
Sergeant Houdusse, who had become administrator in charge
of the Odienne region, to turn over the remaining gold
inheritance of the Toure dynasty, that had somehow fallen
into the hands of the dugutigi of Odienne, as weIl as
someç~aJ?tiv:Jas__I.hat_ ~w~ra~onc..e par±.-~of Moriba'_s-.property __
132
before deportation.
He convinced Captain Lambert, in
command of the Circonscription of Bandama (of which the
Odienne district was a part) to have three men refund him
200 francs apiece for horses that he had left behind.
In
addition, he successfully had Lantene Siriki exiled to
Bandama in June 1902.
According to the report Moriba and
Lantene Siriki were interviewed by Captain Lambert at
Dabakala.
Supposedly, one of Moriba's own sons was
interpretor.
Of course he was not really Moriba's son,
but a slave who had been sent ta school in Kayes.
Every-
one in the region emphatically denied ever having seen a
chief send his son to French schools in the early days
of French occupation.
In the Houdusse report, Lantene
was accused of having sent emmissaries to aIl of the great
marabouts ta work against the Europeans and other Africans
employed by them.
That included Mr. Langr~ne who repre-
sented the Maison Deves et Chaumet at Odienne, Maran Keita,
an ex-tirailleur who represented ta Maison Yaouang from
Kankan, and also Cheikou Sangare, the interpretor sta-
tioned at Odienne.
Langrène had suggested that Lantene
Siriki be deposed for refusing to help Moriba pay his
debts to the boutique.
Houdusse also charged that Lantene
Siriki no longer had any control over the captives nor the
villagers.
The truth, that Lantene Siriki had not been
responsible for any of the charges, was revealed by the
~l.:lef-da-Batt.a.J..J.-.iGn-S-icr-a--ina speci al .r.e.port to the
133
lieutenant governor at Bingerville on 24 May 1903.
Punitive action was taken against Moriba; he was exile~
to Groumania.
Lantene Siriki was permitted to return to
Odienne. 32
But the new chief, Malon Brema, retained his
position until his death in 1934.
Soon after the construction of the post at Odienne,
the French went to Samatiguila.
They had actually been
summoned by sorne of the villagers.
After each prayer,
the Lmam of Samatiguila would invoke the wrath of God
upon the French, and pray that Samori would bring French
presence to an end.
The iman, Karamogo Konya Mambi Diaby,
and three other persons were imprisoned at Nioro.
When
Moriba was arrested later, two other old men were deported
with him to Siguiri. 33
The informant suggested that those
collaborating with the French were often contenders for
religious or secular authority.
In another case in Samatiguila, when Vasoumana's
older brother was dugutigi, there were constant disagree-
rnents with the villagers.
He was dethroned by the French,
and the council of eIders named Vasoumana as the new
dugutigi.
He too had problems with the villagers and
was also deposed.
Finally, Vasoumana's son was chosen.
The informant was adamant in explaining that the eIders
80ught out the French to eliminate the disliked chiefs.
The sources of conflict were often cases of personal
CondlJ,c""" "l..~'
î
h '
'd
,,",Uc:u..
~
u.2spleased- the e ders.
T e ~nCI entg-o.L.~-----
134
Sarnatiguila can be considered as conflicts of secular
versus religious authority as weIl.
The French did not
reconcile the opposing groups, but were a third party to
be convinced, they acted as tie-breakers.
Each party
tried to manipulate the resident officer to decide in
his favor.
One administrator observed that Samatiguila was a
foyer de maraboutisme and that it was up to the French
to fight against the evil influence of the marabouts on
the inhabitants of the village and the chiefs.
He added
that since the village chiefs were younger men, the
marabouts had a great deal of moral influence over them.34
But based on the above example, it appears that the French
officers were more willing to go along with the mood of
the marabouts, until the incident involving Vasoumana's
son and the iman.
In 1923, Marna Sanussi Diaby, iman, was removed
and imprisoned at Bingerville for five years.
He had
emphatically condemned the behavior of the dugutigi,
Vasoumana's son, N'Gouake.
N'Gouake's son (or slave?)
had been to French school, so his father asked him to
write a letter to the administrator at Odienne accusing
the iman of insulting the French.
Wben the iman was
called to Odienne he explained the hostility of the
~ugutigi. The dugutigi had married a girl as his first
wif
~on,
135
he wished to marry one of the widows of the deceased
which would have made her inferior in status to her niece.
Not only did the widow object, but the iman could not
accept the situation.
The French advised the iman to lie
and not to mention those acts again.
Of course, the iman
refused and was later incarcerated.
Furthermore, the man
who did marry the widow, and the widow herself, were both
retained for six months.
Thus, the authority of the
dugutigi and French sovereignty became one.
It was
evident, thereafter, that he who wished to maintain power
was obliged to align himself with the French.
Another version of the same story was told by
another informant. 35
Supposedly, the French wanted to
make N'Gouake a canton chief, but the villagers refused,
with the iman leading the opposition.
In addition,
N'Gouake contravened Islamic law by taking a fifth wife.
Finally, the officer in command intervened on behalf of
N'Gouake and the iman was sent to prision for five years
by the Lieutenant Governor Antoinetti.
The informant
himself, with the help of a Guinean who was a special
agent at Dabakala, negotiated the return of the
and
the other old men from Samatiguila, by writing to the
Governor General at Dakar.
They were aIl released in 1929.
An incident on 10 November 1933, involved the
vicious beating of the village chief, Bakary Diaby, and
, -s-r-amily by other villagers.
Hav~ng been encouraged by
136
........-._--
the ex-canton chief,36 the marabouts had sacrificed a red
bull and were praying for the disappearance of the village
chief.
He had been over zealous in his duties, especially
in the military recruitment, and was in the process of
revealing the whereabouts of the bons absents, those who
were not present in the village, probably hiding to avoid
conscription.
High tempers sparked the brawl in which
many were injured.
In this case, i t was obviously the
village chief, having realized the need to please the
French, who exaggerated his authority in their favor,
and, as a result, completely lostthe respect of the vil-
lagers to the point where they wished his death. 37
The chiefs'
loyalty to the administration had a
lasting effect on the inhabitants of the region.
Most
retained bitter memories.
They said that the continuous
elimination of chiefs led to a total disrespect for
traditional rule.
The French sometimes imposed ex-slaves
who could speak French as chiefs.
When this occurred, the
slaves were aware that they possessed no traditional
authority, and in spite of the administrators demands,
they sought permission and advice from the traditional
chief before executing orders.
Only when the villagers
were convinced that the real chief had been consulted did
they
comply
with the demands. 38
The imposition of
Slaves as chiefs did encourage the chiefly families to
send their sons and younger brothers to school,
so that
137
the chieftaincy could be returned to the original family.
In the meantime, the chefs de paille pointed out by
Delavignette, in Les vrais chefs de l'Empire,39 continued
to wield a false authority over the people.
The association of the two, the chiefs and the
administration,
led to a bitter hatred of both.
The
people resented the demands placed upon them for taxes,
food, and raw materials, and resented the chiefs for
exploiting them further by adding to the quantities
d
d b
th
dm , '
, 4 0
At
t '
th
or ere
y
e a
~n~strat~on.
one
~me
ere were
canton representatives residing in Odienne who transmitted
the administration~orders to the canton chiefs.
They
added to the exactions, and also exploited the system.
The more intermediaries there were, the greater the weight
of demands on the villages supplying the goods.
The role of the representant was multifaceted.
When porters were recruited they were lodged and nourished
by the representative at Odienne until their departure.
In turn, they furnished the command post with food for
workers and prisoners.
They communicated the demands of
the administrator to the canton chiefs.
According to one
informant, the nineteen representatives were rotated
periodically within the cantons.
Every village hoped to
have a representative chosen from among its people.
Having a representative meant protection from the ex-
aggerated demands of the administration and its
138
col1aborators. 41
There were also personal advantages for the rep-
resentative.
As one informant stated, "In those days
you would never have thought that a representative could
become poor.
Often there were one hundred people working
in hisfields.,,42
As expected, the villagers not only
supplied the goods, but the labor as welle
In addition,
they were accused of using the wornen summoned from the
villages as prostitutes, loaning thern out to friends and
accepting payment for the wornen's services at the end of
the month.
In 1925, Administrator Louis Jacotot eliminated
the representatives on the grounds that the chiefs were
losing their authority and were not carrying out aIl of
their responsibilities.
The representatives, on the other
hand, were becoming more powerful due to their close
contacts with the Europeans.
Jacotot saw a need for the
chiefs to get their orders directly from the Adminis-
trator, to restore the authority of the chiefs in the
cantons and to reaffirm the superiority of the adminis-
tration.
But instead of having the chiefs come to Odienne
he still accepted messengers from the chiefs, who came
two tirnes a month, on market day, to report and to receive
orders. 43
The canton chiefs were the object of little, if any
9ympathy.
They were walking a colonial tightrope between
l
139
their subjects and the administration.
On the one hand,
if the chiefs did not submit to French authority, they
would lose the prestige and power associated with chief-
taincy which, in itself, would be a great embarrassment
and lead to disrespect on behalf of the population.
On
the other hand, there were definite advantages to be
gained in remaining chief.
One must also keep in mind
that in addition to the role they played to the adminis-
tration, the chiefs still had an important place in the
daily affairs of the region.
If they stayed in good
rapport ·with the administration, the French were less
likely to intervene in the authority they exercised
locally.
Any man who attempted to complain had to go
through the representative and an interpretor to get a
message to the French in commando
Thus, a villager was
less likely to get through if the canton chief was held
in high esteem by the administration and its collaborators. 44
In return, the agents of the administration were recom-
pensed by the canton chiefs for their cooperation.
Nevertheless, in spite of all efforts to cooperate,
the chiefs were sometimes faced with ambitious agents who
plotted against them.
In one account, an interpretor was
able to unseat the canton chief of Seyla by telling him to
respond positively when the administrator asked who was
having trouble directing his canton, so that the adminis-
...---.~- trator W'ou':"j send tht:guards Le help him.
After t:he first
140
question,
the administrator asked who could put sorne order
in the canton.
WeIl,
the interpretor had already told his
father to answer.
In this way the original chief was
deposed,
and the father of the interpretor was placed as
canton chief.
When events of this type occurred there
were no explanations, and the people rarely protested.
45
They were most often silenced by fear.
While material benefits were positive reinforce-
ment for the canton chiefs,
fear was a negative one.
Fear prevented the canton chiefs from speaking out or
refusing to follow the orders of the French.
Dege Kone,
canton chief of Naoulu, gave the most poignant account of
the difficulties of being canton chief.
He stated that
he was no longer at ease under the orders of the white
men.
Everything he did was controlled by them.
If a
messenger came at night with a convocation for a dugutigi,
he went to search out the village chief immediately.
The orders they received from the whites were sometimes
absurd,
but they had to execute them blindly, and had to
meet the imposed deadlines.
The canton chief became as
feared and despised as the white men.
But, Kone added
that the administration never blamed the people; only the
canton chief was responsible.
During any meeting of canton
chiefs, one could be called forth,
beaten,
and immediately
deposed.
Sorne of the acts committed by the canton chiefs will
141
never be forgotten.
When villagers had difficulty meeting
the head tax, they turned to their village and canton
chiefs for help.
They borrowed money,
food, or other
necessities at exploitive priees.
They even put up their
daughters as collateral for loans.
Sorne of the canton
chiefs did more than have the girls labor in the compound.
They used the girls as concubines and affered them to
friends.
Protests by the parents met with hot reprisaIs
and a suggestion to go complain ta the administrator.
But to communicate with the commandant through the inter~
46
pretor was not always a viable solution.
The attitude
of the administrators did not encourage the villagers to
protest against their chiefs.
Fortunately, the archives
provide written documents which prove sorne,
if not aIl af
the injustices suffered
under colonial rule.
For in-
stance, one administrator stated that the prestige and
authority of a chief could be measured by the number of
complaints brought against him.
The only purpose of the
complaints, according to him, was to have a dynamic chief
replaced by a more permissive one . . . . . . le seul but est
de faire déstituer un chef énergique et le remplacer par
un soliveau qui permettra ~ tous de danser en rond àl'arnbre
du fromager de la paix". 47
As a result,
situations of
abuse went uncontrolled by administrators.
A sub-culture was developing with new rules and
~ral codes, much different from the period when ~eader
-h1p Was directly responsible to the people.
The
W2
aberrations from traditional Malinke society were a direct
result of the suppression of traditional authority and the
infiltration of new elements whose identity with the French
protected them from the sanctions of local customs.
As
one informant stated, "We lived
with our jamanatigu
be-
48
fore and they did not have the means to cheat us then."
Collaborators
The collaborators formed a new salaried class upon
which the colonial administration depended
to run the colo-
nies.
The canton chiefs were paid a percentage of the
head tax.
Others included the tirailleurs, who helped in
the occupation of new terri tories and the suppression of
resistance, the guards, who served to maintain order by
terrorizing the villagers, the interpretors and the politi-
cal agents, who acted as trouble shooters, informants and
messengers.
They performed with a vehemence that surpass-
ed the efforts of any ordinary employee.
Many who turned
to the colonial regime for such jobs were from the lower
classes of society prior to the arrivaI of the French.
Tchefara Diarrassouba, who lived in one of the villages of
ex-sofa said that the French took the sons of slaves to go
l,
t
th
' l ' t
49
n 0
e m~ ~ ary.
As the French became less dependent
on the military these same men were easily converted
into
guards.
Power to these
ex-slaves became an instrument of
vengeance.
They exaggerated the use of it, making an into-
-erable situation for the villagers.
One informant explained
143
the brutality of the guards, saying that many had been mis-
treated as slaves before the French carne.
Being a guard
made i t possible to avenge past suffering.
For sorne the
only way to exercise power and authority was through vio-
lence, terror, and contempt.
This kind of motivation led
guards to unclothe fathers in front of sons and leave
beaten bodies drenched in blood and stretched under the
50
sun.
When infor.mants were questioned about the French
administrator's knowledge of acts of brutality, they aIl
agreed that the administrator knew exactly what was happen-
ing.
They were convinced that the administrator gave the
order and then left the scene, leaving the guards to
execute the order.
As Labouret had stated, the guard knew
that he was indispensable to colonial rule.
"They are the
51
real chiefs of the country," he stated.
They cou Id mete
out justice (or injustice)
as they saw fit.
In close con-
tact with the villagers on the plantations, directing road
work and cleanup crews, gathering military recruits, and
accompanying porters, the guard acted in accordance with
his own ideas and interests.
Curiously, as the people came to realize sorne of
the advantages of being closely associated with the ad-
ministration, Sorne of the young men decided to become a
part
of it, in spite of its low regard by the population.
Amara Traore, for example, who was then the son of the
Village chief at Gbeleban was asked by his father to
144
l .•.~
volunteer for the army during world War I, so that his
task of forcing others to send their sons to war might be
made easier.
When Traore returned from military service,
he became a guard and was assigned to the Seguela district.
To this day the name Traore is despised by the people he
mistreated.
Upon his return to Odienne, however, he suc-
cessfully reintegrated his milieu, and was named village
chief after the death of another eIder who had followed
his father,
thus returning the chieftainship to the
founding family.
For others who were less willing, recruit-
ment for guards was by force.
The canton chiefs were
asked for ten to twenty men.
If they passed the physical,
they were taken.
But whether recruited by force, or taken
voluntarily, once they became guards there was no difference
in their behavior.
They were never assigned to their home
districts.
In the Folon, for instance, most of the guards
52
were from Mali.
For the administration,
the guards were essential
53
to reinforce the authority of local chiefs.
But, as
Traore stated, ,even as a guard one knew one's place.
The
white men gave the orders and they c~rried them out.
The salaries of the guards were attractive, es-
pecially for those who had never worked for themselves.
The yearly salary in 1901 was as follows:
Brigadier chief lst class
720 francs
2nd class
600
l
~···.··.·
145
~. .....
Brigadier
lst class
540
francs
ind class
480
Gardes cercle
lst class
420
2nd class
360
3rd class
300
4th class
240
In addition they were given a daily food allowance of 0.30
to 0.80 francs per day.54
According to Traore after
fifteen years of service, retirement was obligatory
without any pension.
The interpretors were much better paid than the
guards.
An arrete signed in 1896 established the salaries
as follows:
Principal interpretor
lst class
3600 francs
2nd class
2400
Interpretor
lst class
1500
2nd class
1200
3rd class
1000
55
Trainee
600
Interpretor Coulibaly who served in Odienne from the time
of Le Campion had not been to school to learn French, but
was self-taught from the books of a playmate who was at-
tending school in Segu.
He was taken into military
service and sent to Bouake.
Upon his discharge from
service, the French in dire need of interpretors would
not let him return to Segu, but sent him to Odienne
instead.
The political agents who served the administration
were used to fill the gaps that remained.
As sources of
146
information, they reported the traders who were travel-
ling without papers, carried out investigations, helped
to collect taxes, and supplied other miscellaneous in-
formation to the French.
In the growing structure of the
colonial regime, the political agents were able to fill
their pockets as weIl.
In one case, the political agent
who was responsible for collecting the taxes on the
caravans from Samatiguila informed the traders to change
their itinerary because he was no longer at the previous
assignment. 56
The agent, Noubougari, was found to be
selling kola nuts collected as dutY from the caravans,
and forcing the inhabitants of the area to work the
plantations while exempting himself and his family from
the head tax.
In Odienne, another agent, Moro Bamba, was
responsible for collecting the head tax for ten villages
in Kabadugu.
In collaboration with Mody Souare, the
canton chief, he was able to abscond with large SUffiS of
money.
Moro Bamba turned in 850 francs and Mody Souare
only 250 francs.
It was later discovered by the adminis-
trator that one village alone had collected 1350 francs
in taxes.
Moro Bamba purchased a horse from Bamako with
his share.
Further, it was discovered that when the
administrator asked for twenty sheep, actually thirty
were collected. 57
These are only a few examples among
many.
This type of exploitation was widespread, but
rarely came to the attention of the administrator.
147
The effects of colonial ru le on traditional au-
thority were multiple.
New personalities were created,
and changes occurred in old ones.
The availability of
money and new livelihoods gave way to new standards of
wealth, and means of acquiring wealth.
Those who worked
along with the administration were more likely to profit
from colonial rule than those who did note
A New Identity
While the methodology of colonial rule was re-
flected in the organization of the Government General,
its economic motivation was implicit in the reorgan-
ization of the French Sudan.
By a decree of 17 October
1899 presented to the president of France by the Minister
of Colonies, Decrais, the French Sudan was divided among
the coastal colonies.
The bulk of the region went to
Senegal while the rest was divided among Guinea, Dahomey
and Ivory Coast.
The colony of Ivory Coast had been
separated from French Guinea and its dependants on 10
March 1893 and included only the known ports and im-
mediately surrounding bush and was responsible for over-
seeing the protectorates of Kong.
The decree of 1899
stretched its territory to include the Cercles of Odienne,
Kong, and Bouna. 58
The reasons for the dismemberrnent were
many.
One was to suppress military autonomy in the region
in favor of increased authority for the Government General.
As Governor General Chaudi~ remarked in his address to
148
the lieutenant governors of the three colonies concerned,
there would no longer be a separate military budget in
the hands of the military, but funds that would be al-
located by the Governor General based on the defense needs
of each colony.59
Another reason was the French mer-
chants' desires to have the hinterland opened for exploi-
tation.
By dividing the Sudan, raw materials could be
more easily exploited and transported to the rnetropole
through southern ports without the nuisance of customs
paYments in the interior of the same colony.
In their
comments following the reorganization, the merchants
were emphatic in their support, as shown by the statement,
"Le Soudan militaire a vecu, le Soudan des affaires
commence. "60
The Comit~ de l'Afrique Francaise saw the
~
problem differently.
Noting the socio-political aspects
of the problem, they stated that the societies of the
Sudan stood to lose for lack of a general native policy
that would begin by allowing the French Sudan to be ad-
ministered as a whole rather than in several parts
scattered among the colonial governments located on the
coast. 61
The earliest attempt to deal with the problem
of native rule was a circular sent to the administrators
in 1903, asking them to write monographs on the peoples
under their jurisdiction. 62
Moreover, the ensuing servitude of the interests
of the hinterland to those of the forest zone forced i t
149
into an entirely different economic scene.
Regional
disparity in Ivory Coast began here.
The reorganization of 17 October 1899 was the
beginning of a series of changes that the internaI map
of Ivory Coast would undergo in the course of its ex-
istence.
It is to be noted that the district of Odienne
never included the kingdom of Kabadugu in its entirety;
some of the provinces that were once a part of the kingdom
were passed to the surrounding districts of Touba and
Seguela (That included aIl ancient territories south of
the Boa River and east of the Tiemba up to the town of
Dioulatiedugu.)
The canton of Gbato Sud was not passed
to the Cercle of Worodugu until 1913.
The canton of Zona
was attached to Boundiali in 1914. 63
Ambiguous borders were drawn between the colonies
making it obvious that the French administration was not
planning for a day when the colonies would be independent
and new governments would not allow as much flexibility
as during the colonial periode
There were complaints at
Sirana that the French did ask which villages were once
a part of the kingdom and chose the river as border, in
spite of the presence of associated villages on the other
side. 64
Three villages which were once part of Bodugu are
now in Mali:
Solola, Wona, and Manankoro.
When the
local chief complained, he was told that they could still
interact, the only difference being the post at which
150
MAP 3
.. ORIGINAL CANTo.NS OF OOIENNE CERCLE"
,.
,.
MAL 1
,.
,.
Echel"111 000000
10
zp
4,0
s,o
ep
10
,
~o
Ip
'90 km
151
taxes were to be paid.
Those north of the border paid at
65
Bougouni while the others paid at Odienne.
Also in the·
Folo, i t was pointed out that sorne of their fields lie in
66
Guinea to this day.
In sorne cases the divisions made
between cantons and administrative districts separated
families and clans in a haphazard way.67
The rearrangement of cercles, circonscriptions,
and districts was based on the political, administrative
and economic objectives as determined by the lieutenant
68
governor in command.
The following list reflects those
priorities.
The status of the Odienne region was changed
several times.
1897
Establishment of the first post at Odienne.
Région Sud
1898
Circonscription of Odienne, Cercle of Touba,
Région Sud
1900
Circonscription of Odienne by Arrêté 27 July
1900
(Roberdeau)
to include the regions of
Odienne, Touba, and Tombougou.
Cercle of Kong created from the 2èm Ter-
ritoire of the French Sudan by Arr~té 1 June
1900.
(Clozel)
1901
odienne reduced to a simple district in
the Circonscription of Bandama Arrêté 25
January 1901
(Clozel) Cercle of Kong
1902
Became part of Circonscription of Korhogo
by Arrêté 8 August 1902
(Liotard, p.i.)
Cercle of Kong
1903
Arrêté 12 June 1903
(Gov. Genil Roume)
Reorganization of ten Cercles:
District
of Odienne, Circonscription of Korhogo,
Cercle of Korhogo.
152
1905
...
/
Arrete 5 October 1905 (Gov. GenIl Merlin)
District of Odienne, Cercle of Korhogo,
R~gion of Kong
1908
Arrèt~ 18 December 1908 (Angoulvant)
District of Odienne, Cercle of Korhogo
1909
.-\\
/
(
Arrete 21 June 1909
Gov. GenIl Liotard,
p.i.) Cercle of Odienne
1913
Arrêté Il Novernber 1913
Circonscription of Odienne (includes
Boundiali ) \\istrict)
Cercle of Odienne
1920
Cercle of Odienne
In 1931 the colony was again reshuffled and the
number of cercles was reduced from twenty-seven to
eighteen.
Odienne was once again reduced to a simple
subdivision of the Cercle of Korhogo.
The reason ap-
pears to be a general 1ack of French personnel in the
years just prior to World War II, but economic priorities
continued to be the main factor behind the reorganization.
The lieutenant governor felt that sorne regions did not
merit administrative importance that cornes with a cercle
because their economic contributions were negligible when
compared to other areas.
The attitude of the colonial
administration was portentous of the spread in regional
disparity across the colony.
Population
The earliest estimate of population recorded for
the region is found in Samori, Volume III, by Yves Person,
where he reports that Kabasarana held 46,000 people 69
153
scattered over an area of 15,430 square kilometers in 1885
But, i t took many years before the population of the newly
forrned administrative district was properly measured.
The earliest estimates are the most unreliable due to the
transition that the areas lying in the wake of the
Franco-Samorian wars had undergone.
As Sarnori swept
across the Western Sudan he carried the populations with
him.
Perhaps this accounts for the 530,000 inhabitants
plus 70 to 80,000 refugees in the R~gion Sud that the
Bulletin du Comitè de l'Afrique Francaise reported to
its readers in 1899. 70
Of that total, the Cercle of
Touba
(inc1uding Odienne and Tombougou)
contained 150,000
people.
On 1 April 1899, a census was takenwhich reported
a total of 100,000 people in the Region Sud.
The break-
71
down for the Cercle of Touba was as fo11ows:
Odienne
5,000
Sarnatiguila
2,500
Tieme
2,000
Koro
2,000
Kani
1,500
Borotou
1,000
Minignan
1,000
Touba
1,500
How the census was taken is not knowni but the
figures on1y barely correspond to the next census recorded
154
after effective occupation of Odienne had been ac-
complished.
In 1901 Administrator Cornet reported from
the census taken during the months of October, November
and December of 1900 a total population of 18,500 in-
habitants distributed over 104 villages.
The largest
free villages and their populations were:
Tieme
2,600
Odienne
2,720
Samatiguila
3,589
Five other free villages had populations of 150 to 550
people while the number of captives was estimated at
12,000. 72
A later census reported by Delafosse in 1905,73
showed over fifty per cent more people and three tirnes
as many villages in the region th an the 1900 census.
The population was counted by cantons and each village
was accounted for.
Canton
Capitol
No.Villages
Population
Bambala
Dianfarana
9
358
Bodugu
Kemessila
16
578
Falo
Minignan
15
890
Fu1adugu
Kohoro
9
904
Guanangala
Sorodougou
19
1064
t:ùbadugu
Odienne
108
10986
Tieme
Tierne
3
6649
~assala
Kirnbirila
9
1400
155
Canton
Capitol
No.Villages
Population
Vadugu
Ouahire
6
524
Nafana
Dioulatiedugu
16
1135
Naoulu
Seguelon
51
3791
Samatiguila
Samatiguila
3
3516
Sienko
Bako
17
884
Tbron
Kaniasso
9
736
Tudugu
Gbeninian
10
752
Zona
Kebi
8
650
Total
308
29,817
The census recorded in 1914 by Le Campion 74 shows
a general increase in a population spread over 20,000
square kilometers with abnormal rises and declines among
the cantons.
One of the reasons is the liberation of
slaves and their return to their original villages.
Canton
Population
Bambala
940
Bodugu
2240
Folo
2096
Fuladugu
1965
Kabadugu
6488
Massala
1673
Vadugu
1231
Nafana
1872
Naoulu
9000
Samatiguila
917
156
Canton
Population
Tieme
1289
Toron
1393
Toudugu
1686
Guanangala
1688
Total
36,800
The census was used to estab1ish the head tax and
later in the recruitment of military and migrant 1abor.
The numbers were 100sely co11ected, and inc1uded traders,
migrant labor, and sometimes even the dead.
157
Footnotes to Chapter IV
I BCAF p. 43, Feb. 1896,
"À la pursuite de Samori"
la Compagnie de Colonel Combes, Renseignements Coloniaux.
2AND 15G 94 piece 35 Rapport du Capitaine A.E.
Jacob 29 juillet 1895, Beyla.
3AND lSG41 4 August 1895 Projet d'occupation
d' Odienne et de Gbeleban, Captain Conrard.
4person, Samori III. p. 1549.
5The details of French occupation of Odienne
are clearest in Person, Samori III, pp a781, 1837-38, 1841.
6person, Samori III p.
1841.
7E1 Hadj Diaby, Samatiguila, 3 November 1975.
8A1mamy Toure Sananferedugu 22 October 1975,
also Monographie d'Odienne ANCI.
9 Person, Samori III, p. 1869 ftnt. 247.
10person, Samori III, pp. 1489+ for discussion
of mi1itary advancement under Grodet.
11
d'
.
See
~scuss~on, C.W. Newbury,
"The Formation
of the Government General of French West Africa" JAH l,
(1960)
pp. 111-128.
12
. ,
, .
,
141
Cosn~er, L Ouest Afr~ca~n. p. x~v. p.
.
13"Les ~tats d'âme d'un colonial" BCAF May 1909
p.
164.
~..le".'.'c,
158
;;:
14E1 Hadj Gaoussou Toure Odienne 1975, also Oege
Kone, Seguelon, 1 November 1975.
15E1 Hadj Moktar Toure, Odienne:1975.
16
Ladji Gaoussou Tour~ Odienne~1975.
17E1 Hadj Moktar Tour~ Odienne.1975.
18JOCI arrét~ 7 September 1900 Roberdeau.
19Mamadou Tour~ Odienn~October 1975.
20Cosnier L'Ouest Africain, Paris LaRose 1921
p. viii.
21
.
Cosn~er, Op. ci t. p. 146.
22 JOCI Circular 13 Septernber 1900.
230elavignette, Service AfricainlLes vrais chefs
de l'Empire~ Gallimard Paris 1946, p. 121, 131.
24Cornevin, "L'évolution des chefferies"
Recueil Penant, 1961 Nos. 686-688, pp. 235, Amon d'Aby,
La eSte d'Ivoire, p. 35.
25ANCI lEE91 Cercle de Kong 1900.
.
26 By decision No. 325 6 May 1899 Moriba and his
~am~lY were transferred to Bafoulabe where he was given
HOO francs each month for subsistence.
ANCI 2EE7 (6)
e was later moved to Bingerville.
27Matche Keita, Ker~ 29 October 1975.
28 ANCI 2EE-;" (3).
159
29ANcr 2EE7 (3) •
30ANCr 2EE7 (5) .
31ANcr 2EE7 (6) •
32 ANCr 2EE7 (6) .
33 E1 Hadj Diaby, Samatigui1a, 3 November 1975.
34ANcr 1EE91 (x-31-26 1902).
35Yaya Sylla, Dakar, August 1974.
36The incident took place just after the 1932
reorganization of Odienne which reduced the total number
of cantons to four.
37 ANcr EE vi - 17/6 (4077) Rapport Politique
1933 Administrator Pichot.
38Mama d ou C·~sse,
.
.
M~n~gnan, 2 Novemb er 1975 .
39De1avignette, Service Africain, Paris, 1924,
p. 124.
40Moktar Toure, Odienne,
3 November 1975.
41E1 Hadj Sidiki Samake, Secretary General of
the PDCr Odienne, April 1978.
42Moktar Toure, Odienne 3 November 1975.
43 ANcr 1EE92 Rapport trimestriel No. 2, 1925.
44 L
·
am~ne Dourob'~a,
Kamangb
e,O b
cto er 1975 .
160
45 E1 Hadj Ibrahima Cou1iba1y, Odienne,October
1975.
.'
46 L
·
am1ne Doumb'1a, Kamangb e,
27 Octob er 1975 .
47 ANCI 1EE92 Rapport trimestriel No. 2 Jacotot.
48Moktar Toure, 3 November 1975, Odienne.
49Tchefara Diarrassouba,
5 April 1978, Samango.
50Moktar Toure, 3 November 1975, Odienne.
51cornevin,
"L'~vo1ution de la chefferie ... "
p.
386.
52Berna Sangare, 16 October 1975, Odienne.
53ANCI lEE92 Rapports trimestriels 1925 No. 4.
54zinsou, Unpub.
thesis 3rd cycle "Adminis-
tration francaise" 1973, p. 158.
~
55Zinsou, op. cit., p. 152.
56AND 15G171 Captain Benedetti April 1897.
57ANCI lEE7 (3).
58 JOCI arr~té 25 December 1899.
59 BCAF "AOF
la nouvelle organization" Chaudie,
April 1900.
60 BCAF No. la 1899, p.
371.
61 BCAF , op.cit., p.
371.
62 JOCI 29 November 1903.
63 ANCI DD 79.
161
64 Chef de village, Sirana, 31 October 1975.
65 E1 Hadj Kanaman, Tienko 25 October 1975.
66Mamadou Cisse, Minignan October 1975.
67 see ANCI 00 79 Note sur le Cercle de Touba.
68 Angou1vant, La Pacification p. 41.
69person, Samori III, pp 2089-90.
70 BCAF "La Règion Sud" October 1899.
71ANM 50 - 18 Recensement du Soudan.
72ANCI2EE7
(3).
73 ANCI Monographie de Korhogo 1905, Maurice
Oe1afosse.
74ANCI Monographie d'Odienne 1914.
162
CHAPTER V
LOCAL ECONOMY IN TRANSITION
Colonial Expectations
The effort to discuss the transformation of local
African economics under colonial rule is often lost
arnong the harsh criticisrns of French economic policy.
The reasons are many, one being the preeminence of
written documents available from parliarnentary reports
and statistics from which to interpret French motivation
for their economic policiesi another being the lack of
documentation on Africa.
In Odienne, specifically, the
occurrence of two fires in the administration building
affecting the archives during the colonial period has
contributed to the lacuna of information on local pro-
ductivity.
In addition, the unwillingness of the admin-
istrators to give detailed reports, or their limited
familiarity with the region due to very short periods of
service resulted in a poor preservation of specifie data.
:J,!vertheless, it is irnperative that the search for a
more balanced approach continue.
However, since the French were the catalysts for
, :le ensuing transformation in local economies, sorne
l'l(:k.ground on French expectations of their African
Clh: laves
is necessary as a point of departure.
First,
l·~"nch colonial economic policy was not made in West
163
Africa, but in the West Indies and Algeria.
Until 1860,
the French had imposed the Colonial Pact which severely
restricted trading,
50 that French colonies could only
export or import with France.
The v~rious trading posts
and environs were known as comptoirs and colonies de com-
l
merce.
Even though the Anglo-French agreement of 1860
brought an end to the trading monopoly on the colonies,
the results of increased industrial activity encouraged
politicians to seek the use of the colonies as markets
for manufactured goods.
A backlash set in and economic
policy took the form of tariff protection in the place of
trademonopolies as French politicians struggled to main-
tain sorne type of economic control over the products and
markets of the colonies; and popular opinion was fer-
vently opposed to any colonial commitment in the wake of
the fai1ures of imperia1ism during the Second Empire in
the New Wor1d.
Quoting Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, often cal1ed
the godfath~r of the Third Repub1ic, in De la coloni-
sation chez les peuples modernes,
(1874), one can readi1y
3ee that although po1icy had evo1ved from the trade mono-
polies of the pre-1860's the colonies were still to be
used sole1y for the deve10pment of France:
The most usefu1 function which colonies
perform . . . is to supp1y the mother country's
trade with a ready made market, to get its
industry going and maintain it, and to
supp1y the inhabitants of the mother country -
whether as industria1ists, workers, or
164
consumers - with increased profits, wages
or commodities.
The whole world will
benefit from this,
for there is no ques-
tion of going back to the restrictions
2
dating from the days of exclusive trading.
Moreover, while advising that the colonies be used as ap-
pendages to France, Leroy-Beaulieu was mindful to include
sorne comments on how the French should go about their
task.
He severely criticized the attitudes of admin-
istrators, industrialists and colonialists alike, accusing
them of lack of foresight and interference with indi-
vidual liberties.
The main force in the French parliament pushing
for a continuous program of colonization, in spite of
the opposition of popular opinion was Jules Ferry.
His
program was based on the economic benefits for indus-
trialization to be gained by France, while markets founded
in the colonies would be protected for that purpose.
To
Ferry, self-sufficiency and colonization went hand in
hand.
When Ferry first began his uphill fight for colo-
nization in the l880's, he did not emphasize the ex-
traction of raw materials, but was primarily concerned
with the availability of protected markets for French
industry.
(The pressure for raw materials appeared
later when increased industrialization in the United
States and Germany created world shortages.)
He also
appealed to expansionist arguments to rally support for
imperialism saying that i t was a necessity if France was
165
'tz_ _
to develop its position as a world power, especially
3
after the Conference of Berlin 1884-85.
However,
since
the French military in the field was still advancing
despite the ternperarnent of the French parliarnent, by May
1890,
Eug~ne Etienne, Under-Secretary for the Colonies,
was able to announce the consolidation of the French
African empire, making French irnperialism in Africa a
reality, and no longer a debatable issue.
Attention was
then diverted to the means and methods of exploiting
the empire.
Encouraged by a rising tide of nationalism, the
French carne to consider their African enclaves as
colonies d'exploitation: areas from which raw materials
were to be extracted at the expense of the native pop-
4
ulation.
They did not see the necessity of a settler
population.
There was no question that the colonies
were to serve the metropole and that any benefits to the
colonies were subordinate to the advantages for France.
In fact,
i t was believed that anything good for the
colonies was, jnversely, bad for France.
The least the
French wanted was development and eventual competition
f
.
l '
5
rom 1tS co on1es.
Henri Brunschwig in French Colonialism 1871-
1914: Myths and Realities was able to show that pos-
session of colonies was not a viable economic policy
for France.
Colonialism rode in on the coattail of
166
nationalisme
He points out that no one had tried re-
linquishing the colonies in spite of evidence that the
colonies were not providing the lucrative markets the
French had hoped for.
Thus, colonialism couId have never
6
survived an economic justification alone.
Even with the
rigid Méline tariff of 1892 in which colonial produce was
taxed upon entry to France, the colonies were still not
paying off for France.
Trade with the territories was
more profitable for other countries than for France, in
7
spite of the high tariffs.
In a final analysis of the false economic moti-
vations for colonialism, Brunschwig points out that French
industry was incapable of monopolizing trade with the
colonies due to their inability to supply aIl of the
colonies needs.
But, because they were counting on a
profitable future, investments in the infrastructure
needed to maintain the colonies,
(i.e. armed forces,
hospitals, railroads and schools) were supported in the
form of loans from the French government.
The invest-
ments were inadequate, however, and a changing situation
abroad did not permit the French to increase their input
8
to achieve a fruitful end.
The profits of colonialism
went to a small elite composed of French merchants and
their local agents, glory-seeking adventurers and mil-
.
9
~tary personnel, and speculators.
167
Developments in France and the rest of the world
directly affected every individual in the French colonies.
In Odienne subsistence had been the main purpose of agri-
cultural activity for freemen farmers.
Any supplementary
crop production was bartered locally or exchanged sorne
distance away for sorne imported items.
Even among slave
populations, only enough as was necessary for subsistence
and light trading was produced for their owners, 50 that
slaves and freemen alike were left with leisure tirne to
devote to crafts, trade, or individual diversion.
Colo-
nization suppressed individual freedoms.
The quantities
of crops demanded by the administration far exceeded
previous needs.
Therefore, the traditional way of life
in Odienne came into direct conflict with the new ex-
pectations of colonialism.
As one keen observer noted, "The sudanese farmer
is not in the real sense a producer."lO
The French had
to come to grips with the fact that everything that grew
in the area was not exportable.
The surplus of local
crops such as rice, millet, beans, maize, yams, fonio
and groundnuts were not exportable money-making produce. ll
In order for the colonies to serve the metropole, a whole
new agricultural concept had to be developed in which
peasants would produce large quantities of items not
needed for their own use.
The new concepts took the forro
of Supplementary food production needed to maintain the
168
local administration, as weIl as production of the raw
materials needed for French industry.
The head tax
served a double purposein providing a negative motivation
to force peasants into high productivity, and in providing
a financial base for the colonies.
Initially, before the budget was properly estab-
lished, the peasants began paying a tax in the forro of
local produce to help support the military forces oc-
cupying the territory.
In a circular dated 10 July 1891
Governor General Chaudi~ stated that the inhabitants
should paya tax, or prestation.
The circular was not
very precise, and its use was often abused.
It provided
for corn, fonio and ri ce to be transported from ûdienne
northward to Bougouni where the produce was deposited.
El Hadj Kanaman stated that they took the taxes to
B
.
d
.
12
ougoun~
ur~ng seven years.
The Head Tax
The finance law of 13 April 1900 set the pace for
the autonomous,
self-support systems upon which the colo-
nies were to operate.
The most important section for the
masses of African peasants falling under colonial rule
could be found in Article 33 which denoted the colonies·
sole responsibility for aIl expenses incurred by the
metropole within the colonies.
In essence, the African
peasants were to foot the bill for their own oppression.
~t the time, French public opinion was against colonization.
169
After the aggressive period of military expansion,
protest arose against military action on the continent,
in favor of slow, non-violent progress toward western
civilization.
Patience would permit a graduaI trans-
formation of Africa while favoring the development of
trade.
Sorne felt i t necessary to turn the exploitation
of the colonies completely over to private interests; in
that way, the government would have only limited expenses
in the colonies.
They felt certain that revenues would
be superior to the expenses of colonization.
With that
in mind, the French representatives did find a way to
guarantee military support of colonial occupation by con-
veniently listing i t under the budget for national
defense.
Then, after the passage of the finance law in
the arr~té of 24 May 1901, Lt. Governor Clozel officially
instituted the head tax.
According to the arrètè, the head tax was to be
collected on each man, woman and child over ten years
old at a rate of 2.50 francs per month.
The tax roles
were to be prepared each year based on a census, and ap-
proved by the governor and a board of directors of the
colony.
It was to be collected by local chiefs and
turned over to special agents.
In the village the census
13
was taken by a clerk and two soldiers.
At that time,
the tax could be paid in cash or in kind based on the
going rates for gold, ivory, rubber or other exchangeable
170
produce which was later auctioned off by the admin-
istration.
Chiefs were to be rernunerated with 25% of
14
the total amount collected.
The tax ordinance was later amended by arr~t~s
and circulars.
The possibilities for exemption, which
had been granted to only the aged by special request,
was extended in the 20 January 1914 circular of the
Government General to include aIl those in rnilitary
service in the colonies along with their wives and
children, the cercle guards, children under eight years
old (Ivory Coast had been the only colony to previously
exempt children), the aged and the handicapped incapable
of earning a living, and students enrolled in profes-
15
sional and commerce schools.
Mamadou Toure, an ex-
civil servant who actually participated in taking the
census, said that the chiefs had aIl families line up and
enrolled therneither as taxable or tax-exempt.
The latter,
he said, included those under fourteen years of age, old
people, and the handicapped.
Not everyone was honest
during enrollment.
Sorne people lied while others hid
sorne family members to avoid the tax. 16
Later the official tax collectors were remunerated
for their efforts and given five to ten per cent of the
17
:ollection.
On the other hand, the arr~t' of 12 July
I l 04 reduced the percentage payable to the canton chiefs
tram 25% to 10% of the collected taxes. la
171
There was even 1egis1ation to fix the minimum and
maximum head tax rates, to be deterrnined by the agricu1-
tura1 wea1th of the district.
The
'"
J
arrete of 30 December
1908 a110wed for a minimum of 0.50 francs to 4.50 francs
throughout the co1ony.
Inforrnants were unanimous in
saying that the head tax for the inhabitants of Odienne
started at one franc and then went up to 2.50 francs
per persona
By 1908 the Odienne head tax was 3.50
francs,
re1ative1y high considering the poverty of the
area.
In November 1912, William-Ponty signed an arrêt~
raising the minimum/maximum rates to 1.50/5.00 francs
per person and the tax continued to increase unti1 1919
when an effort was made to reduce the maximum in the
colony from 10 francs to 8 francs.
But as Arnon d'Aby
reports in the rich cash crop regions of the southeast
the tax reached as high as 50 francs in 1935 and was
still rising.
However, due to the wea1th of the south,
50 francs may have been easier to pay there than a
1esser surn in the impoverished northern sectors of the
c01ony.19
In Odienne, the Monographie de Touba shows 2.50
francs in 1910 and 5.50 francs in 1911 for the district.
The inforrnants said that taxes began with one franc and
rose steadily: 1.50, 2.50,
3.50, 5.00, 5.50,
8.00, 10.00
and 30.00 francs unti1 the last tax they pa id was the
equivalent of 500 francs in 1946. 20
172
While the tax regime looked well-organized on
paper, the reports did not reflect the chaos i t brought
into the lives of the people who had to provide the
taxes.
They only showed the amounts paid and the suros
given to the canton chiefs.
The chiefs were remunerated
by decision of the lieutenant governor.
In 1905, for
instance, two decisions dated 11 August 1905 and 7
December 1905 provided for the 10% commission paid to
the canton chiefs.
It is evident that sorne chiefs made
enough off the head tax to make aIl the peasants'
ac-
cusations of betrayal worthwhile.
The chiefs had the
final word over tax collection within their cantons.
The individual head of household turned in his share of
the tax to the chief of his clan, who then forwarded the
payment for his clan to the village chief.
The village
chiefs took the collection to the canton chief who made
sure the rolls were complete before sending the tax to
the administrator at Odienne.
By demanding more than
what was due, the village and canton chiefs further ex-
ploited the peasants.
The additional levies were con-
sidered by the chiefs and the peasants as the customary
fees given in hommage to traditional authorities.
The
French ignored the additional levies, once satisfied
21
that their demands had been met.
In fact even after
independence, sorne peasants continued sending a part of
their local produce to °traditional chi~fS, unaware that
173
the custom had long since been abandoned and that
traditional rulers had lost their authority and im-
portance under the laws of the independent government.
(See Appendix E.)
Under colonialism the chiefs were assured a
steady income through the tax commissions.
Their fi-
nancial stability made them most capable of rendering
services to the peasants.
Those who could not afford to
meet their tax payments, for example, turned to tra-
ditional chiefs and wealthy traders for help.
Aid,
however, was not given freely nor without recompense.
Loans of cash were made against the daughters of the
borrowers who served as a guarantee.
They worked in
the compounds of the lenders, and were sometimes taken
as concubines.
Many informants referred to i t as out-
right selling of children, since once in the compound
of the lender, the parents had nothing to sayon the
Use or abuse of their children.
Nevertheless, the
peasants preferred to sacrifice a child rather than to
~uffer the humiliation of imprisonment, torture, and
intimidation.
As one informant stated, "Death was
preferred to shame.,,22
On the other hand, if a head of household could
f'lot pay h;s t
h
h'
f h d h'
h d
•
axes, t
e canton c ~e
a
~m marc e
to
tho post at
d'
,
o ~enne with a cord around h~s neck.
The
Worst was expected from the cercle guards, who often
174
beat their victims pitilessly before taking them to the
prison.
Another punishment consisted of locking the
person in a hut with a fire in which pepper had been
sprinkled.
Others were tied to the ground facing the
blazing sun and left without water, or made to stand
balancing a brick on their head under which the bearer's
ring had been placed.
Sometimes, a victim was saved if
a relative had the means to pay his taxes before he was
23
sent to the post.
Since the tax rolls were not kept up to date, the
suros demanded of each village were paid by those present,
regardless of the nurober of deaths, voluntary departures
in search of work or trade, or absences of those sent to
do forced labor.
For many years sorne villages paid the
same amount.
50 in spite of what appeared on the record,
each peasant was often responsible for more than his
share to make up for the differences in the number of
peasants recorded, and the number actually present at
the time of taxation.
Traders, on the other hand,
just pa$sing through
regions undergoing tax collection, were required to pay
twice the amount if they cou Id not show a receipt of
having already paid.
In Odienne,
for instance, when
24
taxes were 5.00 francs,
transients paid 10.00 francs.
Furthermore, if suggested by the local admin-
istr2tor, the lieutenant governor could decide to raise
175
the taxes by one or two francs to motivate the peasants
to increase their crop yields.
Such added taxes merely
served to increase the burdens of those who remained in
the villages, while the French continued to take the
strongest men to work in the forced labor camps or into
the military.
The women, children, and elderly men left
behind labored excessively to meet the demands of colo-
nialism.
The peasants were desperate and hustled the
tax monies by any means the y could.
Sorne sent their sons
to labor voluntarily in the fore st zone in order to send
back the tax money for the entire family.
Others worked
for a few days for wealthy planters in the region or
as porters for traders.
For five days work an earnest
25
laborer could earn five francs.
Loans of money from
relatives or neighbors occurred frequently, with re-
payment taking the forro of local produce, including
,
gra~ns
eggs, or c h'~c kens. 26
And
f
t
, 0
course, many
urned
to trade as a source of supplementary income.
For the thousands who had been enslaved under the
Toure dynasty, the head tax had a greater significance.
The tax was called nisongo which means 'the price of life.'
For the average peasant, the French liberated them from
slavery, from internecine wars, and undue killings, only
to enslave them again in a different way.
The nisongo
was given in exchange for life, for the protection of
27
their lives by the French regime.
176
Local Production
The pressure of econornic transformation was first
felt through the head taXe
It was made clear to the pea-
sants that supplernentary farming would be needed to make up
the French share of their annual production.
In addition,
the peasants were encouraged to cultivate food items which
served to nourish the agents of the administration.
EVentu-
ally, guards were sent to survey crop production to ensure
a maxl."murn Yl.'eld.28
l n
"t
Spl. e 0 f "l.ncreased prod uc t"l.on, one
administrator cornmented that none of the produce was export-
ed except for a few groundnuts to Daloa and Man.
According
to an informant, the French administrator would map out the
best growing areas, usually around the river beds, and
designate the land areas to be cultivated for each crop.
The rice was sent to the administrator
(it was referred to
as toubabournalo), the groundnuts were fed to the prisoners,
and the corn was supposedly given to the adrninistrator's
chickens.
The harvests remained in the villages until the
canton chiefs requested them to be sent.
Sorne of the rice
was sold by the adrninistrator to European merchants.
Once
the quantity for local consurnption was put away for the
year, there was little left to exchange, 50 sorne vil-
lagers turned to rubber as a rneans of acquiring clothing,
29
additional food items, or irnported goods.
In 1917, the only export products to Europe from
the Odienne region were rubber, wax, shea butter, and
177
,
1
k'
30
an~ma
s ~ns.
Any evolution in agricultural habits
were only in quantity, not in variety or quality.
To
promote change some capital investment was needed.
But,
since the metropole wished to avoid expenses in the colo-
nies, regions like Odienne remained without funds for
development.
The colony paid its administrative personnel
and police force from the head tax revenues, leaving few
funds for agricultural investment, and the role of the
Government General was limited.
Suret-Canal reports that
the Government General invested a meager 700,000 French
francs in aIl of the AOF in 1914 for agricultural
,
31
serv~ces.
Cosnier shows that the 1910 budget for Ivory Coast
only allotted 1.5%
(75,800 francs)
for agricu1tural
32
development.
For lack of money the improvement of
agricultural techniques was neglected.
Cosnier, himself
an agricultural engineer, wrote that "the technical and
scientific personnel of the Agricultural Service, too
small, badly paid, and mistreated, had deserted the
Service leaving behind a poor reputation for the colonial
administration. ,,33
The short-handled hoe remained the most widespread
tool.
In other words, agricultural innovation, for
instance, in the form of the plow, was unknown in Odienne.
Some say this was partly due to the problems of tsetse
fly, but the presence of large populations of cattle in
178
the area belies the supposed futility of this kind of
innovation. 34
Later, however, with increased demands for
rubber, oils, and cotton by the administration, and a
desire for cash, the peasants were forced to produce
higher yields and were, consequently, forced into cor-
d ·
. d
f
f
.
35
p
. l
l
k
f
respon 1ng per10 s 0
am1ne.
oor S01
use,
ac
0
proper ginning processes, and labor shortages agitated
low yields. The colonialists sought unsuccessfully to
find alternative crops and finally abandoned the region
altogether.
In the confusion of paperwork circulating
between ministries, and fueled by a fervent desire to
make the colonies pay off, the administration gave no
attention to the local conditions of climate and soil
before imposing experimental crop schemes upon the
people.
As stated by Cosnier, both governors and admin-
istrators, acting without previous studies, preparation
or consultation, were guilty of forcing planters to grow
new unadaptable crops.
Although they cost nothing to
the colonial budget, their failures co st the peasants
time and lost energy.
Many informants confirmed this
saying that everything had been tried in Odienne from
rubber, coffee and cocoa plantations to palm trees and
kola nuts, but that the region was not the forest zone
36
and there was l i t t le anyone could do against the land.
Finally the French contented themselves with the products
that were indigenous to the region.
179
By 1937, after a particularly good agricultural
year,
the adrninistrator in charge of Odienne reported
the fol1owing sales at various administrative collection
centers:
Quantities
D3.te
Center
Rice
Rubber
Groumnuts
Skins
(tons)
(tons)
(Kilograms )
(tons)
7 Decanber
Odienne
11. 750
4.400
0.600
9
Kirobirila
6.600
0.776
10
KabanJoœ
3.800
0.140
50
11
Minignan
7.540
1.204
10
15
Bako
4.386
0.647
15
16
Sogodugu
1.960
1. 701
17
Sejuebe
5.630
0.784
504
18
Mardinani
4.578
1.250
3662
46.245
10.902
4,241
0.600
37
At the collection centers the villagers were paid 0.70
francs per kilogram for their rice,
3.00 francs per kilo-
gram of rubber, and 0.65 francs for each kilogram of
groundnuts.
The administrator went on to report that two-
thirds of the rice harvest was sent to Kankan and Bourgou-
ni,
the gold mines of those regions.
The surrounding
cercles to the south of Odienne and the Korhogo region
were recipients of three-fourths of the groundnut harvest.
In the southern regions of the colony,
the French
turned their attention to forestry and to cash crops such
as coffee,
cocoa,
and palm nuts.
They were closer to
the port and brought greater revenues. 38
The only items that remained a relatively unin-
terfered with source of revenue for the peasants were
livestock and Kula nuts.
The oxen were often subject
180
to hoof disease epidemics, so close surveillance was kept
ove~ their movement.
The administration included tallies
of livestock in their reports, noting that the livestock
were largely absorbed by the local markets.
In 1921,
33,000 head of cattle, races of N'Dama and Baoule, were
counted in the regions of Korhogo, Bonaukou, and Odienne~9
In 1922, 4,296 oxen,
5887 sheep, and 6089 goats were
reported in the Odienne region alone.
The emphasis in
the 1922 report was on the region of Bouake, which vastly
d d
d '
, .
" f l'
k 40
excee e
0 1enne 1n 1ts quant1t1es 0
1vestoc.
Kola nut exports by sea averaged over 25000 kilo-
grams a year, with an estirnated export toward the Sudan
41
of 3500 to 4000 tons.
In fact, heavy taxes on kola
nut
cargos crossing the border into Mali brought great reve-
nues to the administration.
Yet, the trade continued to
be controlled by the
jula.
The French tried to penetrate
the kola market by starting kola plantations, as was the
case of Pellier at Minignan.
It was even suggested
that the Europeans follow the African example and use kola
t
h d
f
l
'
42
.
f th
rees as s a e
or cocoa p antat1ons.
In sp1te 0
e
efforts of European planters, oxen and kola was still
b
.
h
d
h d
'
.
1
. d 43
e1ng exc ange
as they
a
1n the pre-colon1a
per10 .
In addition to the head tax, other taxes were also
imposed on the peasants which, for the rnost part, had to
be paid in cash.
They included charges for licenses for
commercial activities,
fines,
and penalties.
There were
181
taxes on the market stalls, on firearms,
and kola nuts.
The peasants' cattle were taxed at Bougouni.
But when
peasants began paying at Odienne, the cattle were no
longer taxed.
Instead, the guns were taxed.
For a
while, the gun tax was the same rate as the head taXe
Lamine Doumbia at Kabangoue expressed his des pair saying
44
that the French taxed everything but the chickens.
Rubber exploitation in the Odienne region began
with the arrivaI of the French.
Prior to that the people
of the region were not aware of the value of latex on the
world market probably because of their isolation from
transactions on the coast.
Earlier,
jula caravans from
other areas had sold rubber on the coast, usually at
Sierra Leone, either for their personal profits or for
Samori, until he halted the rubber trade in favor of
45
gold and ivory exports.
As early as 1890, there were
French merchants purchasing rubber in Ivory Coast,46 but
i t was later, towards 1895, that its exploitation as an
exchangeable commodity spread into upper Ivory Coast.
The rubber-producing Landolphia hendelotii vine was found
in abundance throughout Kankan, Siguiri, Kouroussa, Touba,
47
Odienne, Koro Kani, Seguela
Bafeletou, and Tombougou.
It yields eight to ten liters per year during two major
seasons:
(1)
when the trees are flowering from November
to February,
(2) when the fruit is ripe from May through
July. With the arrivaI of the Europeans, rubber extraction
182
was revived first as a means to pay the head tax, and then
as a medium of exchange in the merchants'
boutiques.
So
lucrative was the trade that many, especially in Guinea,
48
abandoned their fields in favor of rubber.
Sorne of
the Odienne inhabitants traded their rubber at Kankan or
49
Beyla, while others waited for buyers to corne to them.
Finally, the attraction of rubber exploitation surged when
commercial houses began paying for the rubber in cash
around1898-99.
The
jula also began to penetrate the
rubber trade, acting as intermediaries between the
50
producers and the boutiques.
During that period the
Cercle of Touba produced three tons, one of which carne
51
from the canton of Naoulu
alone.
To show the peasants how to exploit rubber, sorne
were sent to learn at Kouroussa in the Règion Sud, while
others learned from border guards or tirailleurs who
52
knew how to extract rubber.
The Chef de battaillon,
Donnat, was 50 impressed with the efforts of Daba Kone,
chief of Naoulu
that he set up a school there to
demonstrate rubber extraction.
In his report he boasts
that the school cost nothing for the local administration
because the chief and the students supported thernselves.
The students took care of thernselves during the voyage
to and from Seguelon, while the chief provided room and
board during their twenty-day training session.
At the
end the rubber extracted was either auctioned off to the
183
merchants, or,
if no buyers were present, the adminis~
tration paid two francs per kilogram and later sold ft
for "a profit to the merchants.
The profits of the
rubber sale were then divided, with one-half of i t
going to the chief, Daba Kone, and the other half di-
vided among the students as encouragement, and to show
the advantages of rubber exploitation to fellow vil-
lagers.
The expected yield for the region for 1900
was ten tons. The intention was to force the peasants
to bring their rubber to markets at Koro, Kani, and
53
Minignan.
In the Decision of 3 March 1904, Lieu-
tenant Governor Clozel made the creation of schools
official administrative policy in the region, with the
profits to be divided so that professors would earn
three times as much as the students.
The rubber boom in French West Africa grew
steadily but priees fluctuated on the world market, and
because of poor quality and fraude
The integration of
foreign matter into the rubber by the peasants increased
the weight so that they were pa id more, but i t reduced
the rate paid to rubber merchants.
Fraud was a recurring
problem for rubber merchants.
The administration led a
continuing battle through educational means, as shown in
the establishment of schools, and through legislative
means.
In the beginning the latex was collected and
presented in small balls of about 100 grams each attached
184
on a cord.
One cord of rubber, called mananjoulou, when
fresh sold for almost twice as much as when dry.
The
collectors usually went to market when they had gathered
two to three kilograms of latex. 54
But rubber presented
in this form was sometimes filled with impurities, mud,
and rocks,
up to 25% of its weight. 55
In 1902, Odienne
came under stiff reprimand for having turned in rubber
of poor quality, making i t practically unmarketable.
A circular announced that those convicted of fraud
would be fined three times the value of the rubber for
the first offense and fifteen days to three months
prison for every offense thereafter. 56
Finally, in 1905,
A
/
Governor General Roume in the arrete of 1 February 1905
forbade the circulation of rubber with foreign parti-
cles,
insisted that latex not be prepared with animal
liquids that ferment, and stated guidelines for the
incision of rubber trees.
In spite of the circular, the
commercial houses refused to allow the rubber to be
controlled, going 50 far as to defend their shipments
with arms.
Under these conditions,
the French govern-
ment did not enforce the measures.
Then in 1912 the
government made the processing, sale and circulation
of rubber in any form other than those prescribed by
the government punishable by law.
Other solutions were
proposed such as the use of a machine squeezing out
the latex from hevea and the Landolphia hendelottii
185
vine,
invented by a Belgian named Leopold Valour.
The
French also tried to encourage the planting of funturnia
trees in the forest zone to replace tired and abused
57
trees.
However, the damage had already been done, and the
reputation of West African rubber on the world market was
already low,
forcing rubber manufacturers to look else-
where for rubber sources.
The discovery of rubber in Asia had a decisive
affect on rubber production in West Africa.
While Asian
rubber only supplied 12% of the world market in 1910, by
58
1913 i t dominated one-half of world production.
Ac-
cording to Roberts, the cheaper methods of extraction
and greater labor supply in Indochina and Malaysia gave
59
them the upper hand.
As a result,
the colonies lost
60% of their exports and had to look for new sources of
revenue.
At Conakry, rubber was being exported at the
following rates:
1899
8.50
francs per kilogram
1901
4.40
1903
8.50
1904
9.00
1906
11.00 to 12.00
1907-8 dropped due to worldwide crisis
1909-10
15.00 to 20.00 60
Rubber production was largely the contribution of two
main areas of French West Africa consisting of the
~
.
savannah zones of GU1nea, Sudan,
and Ivory Coast, and
186
61
the forest zone of Ivory Coast.
Total rubber exports
for the colonies follow:
1892
852
tons
1900
2,956
1905
3,662
1909
4,317
1910
4,077
1911
3,537
1912
3,783
62
1913
2,566
The higher the price paid for rubber, the greater the
exportations.
In the first years of colonial rule ex-
portations rose and fell in
conjunction with the as-
pirations of the colonialists, as their hopes floated
on the shifting tide of profits to be gained from rubber.
Just as the rubber prices fluctuated on the world
market, so they oscillated on the local markets as weIl.
The effects touched every individual involved in rubber
extraction.
The price in Kankan was much higher than
at Odienne.
Many informants stated that the y sold to
the merchants in Odienne only what was required of them
by the administration.
Those who could travel went to
Kankan where profits were greater.
Others sold to
jula
interrnediaries.
In 1894 rubber cou Id be exported from
Guinea for 3.75 francs per kg.
By 1897 i t could be
63
bought at Kayes for 4.08 francs.
In the sarne year in
the Région Sud rubber was exchanged for a value of 1.80
187
l
to 2.50 francs, and in 1902 for only 2.00 francs per
64
kilogram.
In 1904, the going rate was 5.00 to 5.50
francs per kilogram at Tombougou, while in the surrounding
bush the villagers were paid only 4.25 francs per kilo-
65
gram.
Later, toward 1906, because of stiff competition
between the French merchants and the
jula intermediaries,
66
the priee rose to 5.00 to 7.00 francs per kilogram.
In 1910 with the 15 francs per kg.
being given at
Conakry, rubber collectors were getting 12 francs in the
. t
.
67
~n
er~or.
By 1915, sorne rubber was still being supplied by
the colonies for the war, but the priee had dropped to
2.50 francs in the interior, if the collectors were paid
68
at all.
As one informant stated, the administration
asked for 50 kilos, 100 kilos, or even 200 kilos of rubber
depending on the size of the village.
All of i t was
taken to the dugutigi who informed the administrator.
He then called the merchants together for the rubber sale.
The rubber was sold at imprecise values, because one in-
formant stated that he often received the same amount for
a bucket full of rubber that his neighbor received for
69
only a handful.
According to one report, in 1917 the
.
. . ,
f
70
c~rconscr~pt~on of Od~enne produced twenty tons 0
rubber,
while the exports for the colony dropped from 1371 tons
71
in 1910 to 13,001 kilos in 1922.
In spite of the drop
in export to the world market, the colonies continued to
188
supply rubber to France; the northern region of Ivory
Coast in particular for lack of any other lucrative re-
placement for rubber exploitation.
In 1924 the admin-
istrator reported that three tons were sold to two
European firms at 5.00 francs per
kg.
at Odienne.
Noting the abundance of rubber trees and accusing the
inhabitants of laziness, the administrator expressed
his dissatisfaction with the quantity produced.
Upon
receipt of the report, the Lt.-Governor promptly re-
commended an increase in the head tax from five francs
to six francs per person as an incentive to collect
72
rubber.
Nevertheless, these are poor estimates of
real production for the region.
The informants and the
reports show that the priees were better at Kankan.
While the merchants at Odienne were paying 5.00 francs per
kg.,
the commercial houses at Kankan were paying 7.50
73
francs per kg.
in 1923.
Hundreds of tons of rubber
produced in Odienne found its way to Kankan raising the
exported tonnage for the colony of Guinea.
The informants remembered the increase in priees
over the periode
In the beginning they cited one franc
per kg.
as an initial priee.
Later, they were given 2.50
to 3.00 francs per kg.
A good priee, according to most
informants, was five francs per kg.
while at times the
priee reached 8.50 and 10.00 francs.
The higher the
priee, the more rubber they collected.
The rubber was
189
mostly sold at Kankan.
According to one informant they
were lodged and nourished by the Syrian they did business
74
with at Kankan.
The
jula then bought goods in the
boutiques at Kankan to resell in Odienne.
The returning
goods were hidden from the administrator, who favored
the purchase of goods in the boutiques installed at
Odienne.
The fervor of rubber production had its problems.
The destruction of rubber plants was one, diminishing
the population of plants.
Furthermore, famine was a
constant menace.
One informant stated that they only
ate sweet potatoes because there was no time to care for
the plantations.
In neighboring Guinea, from 1913 to
1918, rice was being imported for lack of agricultural
75
produce.
The informant further cornrnented on the perils
of rubber collection saying that several people died
either having fallen from the trees or from attacks by
wild animals.
They sometimes spent ten to fifteen days
in the bush to collect rubber for the administrator.
If,
after having braved the challenge of nature itself, the
quantity was not sufficient, the peasants answered to
the cercle guards.
The men were undressed and beaten and
sorne died from the wounds of the whip.
To avoid the
beatings, those who had the means bought rubber at higher
P
•
h
.
h
dm"
t
t '
76
_rlces to meet t
elr quotas to t
e a
lnlS ra lon.
As previously discussed,
the local cotton industry
190
was a well-developed, integrated part of the African
economy.
The cotton was usually spun into thread and
woven into cotton bands to be bartered or fashioned into
clothing.
The incursion of French colonialism caused a
complete shake-up of pre-colonial economic patterns.
The cotton industry was not spared.
The French desired
to turn the savannah zone of upper Ivory Coast and the
western Sudan into a vast cotton plantation to supply the
metropole with the much needed cotton for their growing
textile industry.
France was importing over 250,000 tons
of raw cotton a year and had about 250,000 people ernployed
in the textile industry.
About 66% was imported from the
United States, 18.6% from India,
9.6% from Egypt, and
77
5.8% from other areas.
The French tried to emulate
the British exarnple by atternpting to turn part of their
colonies into another Egypt or India.
The cotton found growing in the colonies was
Gossypium punctatum which had been introduced to Africa
from America at the sarne time as maize, groundnuts, and
78
cassava, du ring the slave trade.
The first atternpts
by the administration to develop cotton production were
made in 1897, when the lieutenant-governor of the French
Sudan sent a
circular advising administrators to begin
experimental projects of cotton.
The administration sup-
plied Sea Island and Georgia cotton seeds.
They expected
ta recuperate the cotton by accepting i t as payment of the
191
79
head tax.
But when the cotton was sold, buyers found
that the peasants had mixed the two, thus lowering the
value of the picked cotton.
That discouraged the
peasants; in addition they found greater profits in
bartering cotton bands than in trading the unprocessed
cotton to the administration.
On 14 January 1903 the Colonial Cotton Association
was formed, composed of a group of industrialists and
cotton importers.
Their goal was to encourage the pro-
duction of American cotton in the colonies, to create
centers for cotton purchasing and processing, and to
lobby for better transportation facilities.
American
cotton was becoming more difficult to import because
industry in the United States was consuming the bulk of
local production.
The results of the early efforts were
almost nil.
According to Yves Henry, in Mati~res
Premi~rs, the price in 1904 was only 0.15 francs per
kilogram for the producers, and the cotton was collected
through local authorities.
It is probable that the
peasants never saw the pittance given to the local chiefs
as payment.
After several unsuccessful trials, in ad-
dition to the problems of drought in 1904 and 1907, the
government intervened and concluded that cotton develop-
ment could not be 1eft to the individual initiative of
the inhabitants, but would have to be supervised by the
80
government.
In other wOLds,
the peasants would be
192
l
forced to cultivate and sell cotton.
In Ivory Coast Lt.-Governor Angoulvant organizèd
cotton production without the help of the Government
General.
He ordered his adrninistrators to have large
fields of cotton planted throughout the northern cercles.
The cotton was then transported to centers for processing
and packing, and then forwarded to the port for evacu-
ation toward France.
He raised the priee from 0.25 to
0.30 francs per kilograrn.
Through his actions, the
government began to play the role of an organizer for
French industry.
Cotton was grown mostly in the subdivisions of
Odienne, Bouake, Dirnbokro, Seguela, Daloa, Bouafle,
Boundiali, and Bondoukou.
By 1925 at Odienne, only 1.50
francs were paid for unprocessed cotton.
The priee
varied depending on the district's proximity to trans-
portation facilities and the competition in the region
among buyers.
At Boundiali, for instance, i t was only
1.00 franc per kilograrn because there were no competing
buyers.
At Bouake and Dirnbokro the priee was 2.25 to
2.75 francs,
at Dabakala 1.50 to 2.00 francs,
at Bondoukou
1.00 to 1.25 francs,
at Korhogo 1.50 francs,
at Zuenoula
1.50 to 2.00 francs and at Man 1.00 francs.
The cotton
81
collected at Odienne was transported to Kankan.
With
the help of the cotton gin, one adrninistrator expected a
production of 200 tons of cotton in 1926. Forced planting
193
under the surveillance of guards was the means by which
high quotas would be reached.
The lack of success of the
cotton plantations was attributed to the reluctance of the
peasants to cooperate.
50, the administration played on
the peasants'
fear of terror and humiliation.
In one vil-
lage an administrator found that sorne peasants,
in their
hurry to clean up the village and surrounding fields before
his arrivaI, accidentally uprooted several cotton trees. 82
French textile industrialists were more interested
in Gossypium hirsutum, more commonly known as Allen
cotton of the American Upland variety, which was first
introduced by the British Cotton Growers Association. 83
They were paying 20.00 francs per kilogram for this brand
of cotton from the United States.
In 1923,
for instance,
the French imported 261,520 tons of cotton, of which
only 2000 tons were supp1ied by French West Africa, and
100 tons from French Equatorial Africa. 84
The Bélime
mission of 1919-1921 was one effort to organize cotton
production on a large sca1e.
The results of the mission
led to the development of the Niger Valley Project.
Its
goal was to deve10p an irrigation system at Segu to bring
under cu1tivation 750,000 hectares of cotton.
An Ameri-
can cotton expert, Dr.
R.H. Forbes, was sent for,
to test
the soil and train the personnel for the project.
Ex-
/
pectations were high and Belime noted that pessimism
expressed in 1918 was no longer justified in 1928. 85
194
The results were not known until much later.
Of the 300,000 tons of cotton they expected within
twenty years, the Niger Office reported only 1876 tons in
1942 of mediocre quality.
By 1951 only 25,000 hectares
h d b
" .
t d 86
h
.
t
t
D"
a
een ~rr~ga e .
Anot er proJec
a
~re,
near
Timbuktu also fell considerably short.
It was started
in 1919 by a group of private investors.
They expected
to cultivate 40,000 hectares of cotton.
By 1935 they had
only planted 600 hectares, and by 1942 had only produced
270 tons of cotton.
The coton du commandant produced
under force had comparable results in Dahomey, Ivory
Coast, and Upper Volta.
In 1939, the export of cotton
87
from French West Africa as a whole was a mere 3,916 tons.
The problems of cotton development in the colonies
were several.
First, the long fiber American and Egyptian
cotton seeds were not as successful as expected and the
local varieties had shorter fibers yielding a lesser
quality of cotton, which was not as popular with the
French textile industry.
Second, the irrigation project
in the Niger Valley failed for lack of proper soil ex-
88
amination and resulted in soil depletion by erosion.
Moreover, the cotton producers were offered very little
remuneration for their cotton.
Only enough for tax
payment was cultivated, and in Odienne only the quantities
àemanded by the administration were sold.
With the rising
cast of imported cloth, many peasants returned to the use
195
'
89
of han d woven c l oth 1ng.
The buyers, on the other
hand, complained about the high cost of processing
equipment and refused to pay more for the cotton.
The
Colonial Cotton Association made sorne efforts in this
direction, assisted by the government.
There were eight
cotton gins distributed between 1909 and 1910 to the
Baoule production centers and to Dabakala.
After several
breakdowns, they were replaced in 1913-14 by another type
90
of gin, but the short fiber cotton was not adaptable.
A 1924 report mentioned that Odienne possessed one press,
one old used gin, and one gin in need of repaire
New
,
d
d
d
.
d 91
. h
h
equ1pment was or ere
an
rece1ve.
Even W1t
t
e
proper processing equipment, evacuation of processed
cotton was still a problem.
When transported by auto-
mobile, the cotton was so dirty upon arrival at the rail-
92
road terminals that i t was practically not usable.
The cotton from Odienne was taken to Kankan 250 Kilo-
meters away.
It was suggested in 1922 that cultivation
of cotton be united to a radius of 100 kilometers around
processing centers and transportation facilities.
In ad-
dition, low population density hampered the mass pro-
duction envisaged by the government.
To conclude, cotton production for the admin-
istration was in direct conflict with African interests.
What the administration did not consider is that the
increased production could be easily absorbed into the
196
local economy, unlike surplus food production, and that
the peasants could also make profits off its production.
Cotton bands were still being traded for Kola nuts and
93
cattle.
Thus, the motivation to deliver cotton to the
administration was nonexistant.
In 1925 another request
was made to raise taxes by one franc per taxable person
h
l
h
·
94
.
f
to encourage t
em to sel
t
e~r cotton.
In sp~te 0
their failure to achieve the high goals they were striving
for,
the overall production had increased.
The expected
tonnage for the Odienne region alone in 1925-26 was to be
100 to 200 tons, much greater than the 5,669 kilos col-
lected in the R~gion Sud in 1899. 95
The peasants were
becoming producers after all.
The failures were largely
a result of French governments inability to provide
adequate means of transportation, and remuneration for
local products.
By 1934 the administration abandoned
its efforts leaving the cotton production in Odienne to
fall back into its earliest role in local commercial
transactions. 96
With the decline of rubber production and the
beginning of World War I, attention turned to products
that would be needed for the war. Oleagenous products
were demanded.
Prior ta 1914, the French colonies were
supplying one-tenth of Europe's ails.
European imports
97
included 300,000 tons of nuts and 200,000 tons of oil.
In sorne parts of the French empire the need for oils was
197
trans1ated into important groundnut projects as in
Senega1 and pa1m oi1 exploitation as in southern Ivory
Coast and Dahomey.
In northern Ivory Coast there was
sorne groundnut cu1tivation for export in the Kong area
close to the rai1road.
In Odienne, the oi1s for export
were extracted from shea berries, castor beans, and the
seeds from the bornbax tree
(Bornbax buonopozense).
One
administrator noted in his report that the industria1ists
were becoming interested in shea butter which cou1d
becorne a resource in regions deprived of exportable
98
products.
One of the prob1erns with the shea tree was
that i t f10wered at the sarne time as the burning of
fields took place prior to the rainy season, affecting
the yie1d of seeds from which the oi1 was to be extracted.
A1though the adrninistrator cornrnents on the large local
consurnption of the oi1, he did not consider the prob1ems
of exporting large arnounts.
In addition, very 1itt1e was
.
pa~ d f '
or ~t; on 1
0
y . 30 f rancs per k'~ 1ograrn at Bound'~al '~. 99
The castor oi1 bean was exported and processed in
Europe for use in aeronautica1 engines.
Export of castor
beans reached 341 tons in 1919, and fe11 to 253 tons in
1920.
By 1921, on1y 4896 ki10grarns were exported.
Un-
fortunate1y,
the 25 francs per 100 ki10grarns offered to
co11ectors upon de1ivery at Bouake discouraged them to
h
100
t
e point of neg1ect.
The bornbax tree not on1y gave seeds for edible
198
oils and soap manufacturing, but also kapok used for
stuffing pillows,
life-saving equipment, etc.
Collection
was highly disliked because the fine fibers often stuck
in the eyes and throats of the collectors.
In addition,
the peasants were once again poorly remunerated for it.
Henry reports 1.20 francs per kilogram was paid by the
buyers in Europe, while in the interior of the colonies,
peasants were given 0.30 to 0.35 francs per kilogram, if
h
. d
11 10 1
f
.
th
d
t
ey were pa1
at a ,
a ter transport1ng
e goo s
to the oil presses located at Bouake some 500 kilometers
away.
Market Expansion
The European merchant was the most visible agent
of economic oppression.
Colonialism had been patterned
after his needs and wants.
The administration was present
for the protection of his markets.
Using both force and
persuasion, the administration ensured the evacuation of
raw materials through European hands and the purchase of
European imports by Africans.
At first there were several independent merchants.
Sorne were later forced out by larger companies such as
Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
(CFAO,
also
J
called "Compagnie"), Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest
Africain
(SCOA), and Compagnie Niger Français
(CNF) .
.J
Others such as Maurel et. Prom, Peyrissac, Dèves et
Chaumet, a:ld Buhan et Tessiere maintained several stores
199
•
throughout the territories during the colonial period.
The independent merchants were less able to withstand
the fluctuation in the world market than the afore-
mentioned companies.
"Compagnie" was one of the preferred companies
among the local people.
They sold at reasonable priees
based on the buying power of their clientele, and pur-
chased local products at a slightly better rate than
102
others.
Nevertheless,
"Compagnie" could still be
accused along with the others, for participating in a
highly exploitative mercantile system.
The priees
African peasants were paid for their raw materials did
not approach the minimum that any European farmer would
have been paid for his labor and limited investment ex-
103
penditures.
50 the African peasant became the pre-
ferential workhorse for the colonial regime.
In addition to purchasing raw materials which were
distributed at great profits to European industrialists,
the companies sold a vast array of imported items from
Europe.
They ranged from cloth to cheap hardware, first
capturing the African market by their novelty, and only
l a t er by
"t
necess~ y. 104
J ean Suret-Cana 1 e repor t s th at t h e
profit margins fixed by the government after World War II
calculated inclusive of initial cost, customs, transport
105
and other expenditures showed the following percentages:
200
Rice, semolina
20%
Household articles
40%
Iron, steel goods
30%
Cement
25%
Shirts, sheets, towels
42%
Percale, guinea cloth
35%
French importation princip1es constituted a sell-smal1-
quantities-at-high-prices philosophy, whi1e export prin-
ciple dictated a buy-little-but-buy-cheap philosophy.
There were several merchants' warehouses in Kankan.
In fact i t became the largest focal point for commerce
south of Bamako.
AlI the important companies had an agent
in Kankan.
In less important centers such as Odienne,
they did not always have a European present, but some-
times Africans who represented the company in posts of
secondary importance.
At Koro, an old market town, Vassa1i
Bakayoko said that there were once three shops located
there with African representatives.
They did not sell to
the peasants, but only bought their local products, in-
cluding sompe which were exchanged for Fre~ch coins.
The
number of shops oscillated with the times.
Between 1906
and 1920 Oelafosse reports the presence of six shops in
l06
Korhogo, six at Tombougou and seven at Odienne.
The
Journal Officiel shows concessions granted in 1905 to Guy
de Quengo de Tonquedec, Emile Louis Marie Hervelen and
,
107
.
Deves et Chaumet
~n the Odienne region.
The taxes on
their concessions ranged from 1.80 francs ta 4.16 francs
201
108
per year.
They were later joined by Damas Julien Roux,
.;'
\\.
h d b
t '
109
A
,"
and Pecourt and Langrene also
a
ou ~ques.
mono-
graph on Touba shows other shops at either Touba or
Odienne owned by L'Africaine Francaise, de Tessière et
Garde, la Societe Commerciale du Soudan Francais, and
Buhan et Tessière.
By 1914 there were nine shops in the
l10
Cercle of Odienne.
In spite of the presence of several merchants to
purchase raw materials in Odienne,
local production
remained lower than demand.
In a 1923 report, one ad-
ministrator mentioned that the prices offered by the
merchants were inferior to what the peasants could get
from trade among themselves or in neighboring cercles.
There were unlirnited possibilities for markets in
Liberia, and Guinea for all local crop production, in-
111
cluding cotton, tabacco, and shea butter.
Many in-
formants stated that they almost never sold to nor
bought from the merchants at Odienne because their goods
were too expensive.
When they did make purchases with
the Odienne merchants, they only bought items for their
own use, but never to resell.
The adrninistrator, however, thought that sales in
Odienne and Touba·were insignificant due to the lack of
cash in the region.
A vicious circle was being created
ln which the European merchants were not willing to pay
decent prices for local goods, and in return the general
202
lack of cash flow prevented the peasants from buying
imported goods in the merchants boutiques.
Further-
more, the fall in the price of rubber made their
presence in Odienne useless.
Many shops closed down,
and most of the shopkeepers returned to Kankan where
business was more lucrative.
Even the Lebanese and Syrians who began migrating
to West Africa during the first decades of the twentieth
century, pushed out of their homeland by poor soil con-
ditions and political instability, could not hold out
against the difficult market conditions in Odienne.
Various informants were able to identify them.
There
were never more than two Lebanese shops at a time.
The
names Youssouf and Ramanos,
later Salim and Bonnet Missa
drifted from the mernories of the informants.
They, like
their French predecessors, returned to
Kankan.
They
sold the same items as the Europeans and bought rubber
112
and wax from the peasants.
Having migrated under
difficult conditions, the Lebanese were willing to under-
cut the French companies to gain a living, whereas the
113
French companies counted on a 15 to 20% markup.
As a
whole, the Lebanese merchants had better rapport with the
African traders than the French did.
They were far more
acquiescent,
received the African traders more warmly,
d
d d
d ' t
'1
114
an
accor e
cre ~
more eas~ y.
African initiative played a part in both the
203
success and failure of European commerce.
Sorne Africans
were able to create their own niches in the developing
commercial chains which allowed for sorne self-expression
and prosperity within the limits of colonialism.
The
Europeans needed Africans who were familiar with the
terrain,
and people to collect local produce which the
Africans transported on their own initiative, usually
with hired porters.
The African traders were also needed
to redistribute imported goods to remote villages.
Not
everyone was a trader.
As one informant stated, sorne
peasants were afraid to trade beyond their villages.
There were rumors that the white merchants captured
115
African traders and locked them away.
So many peasants
were satisfied earning a little less money for their
rubber or wax, by trading with the intermediaries and
having the peace and security of remaining close to home.
Moreover, they were easily discouraged by the incessant
hassles along the trade routes for proof of patents and
tax payments.
50 the
jula maintained an important role
throughout the colonial periode
At first the French were somewhat ambivalent over
the continuing role of local traders,
accusing them of
exploitation of the peasants by charging exorbitant
priees for the goods.
But when they realized that their
merchandise could not be distributed without their help,
the
jula were not only le ft to trade, but encouraged
204
since there was no one to replace them.
Sometimes goods
bypassed administrative control and changed hands several
times before reaching the merchants in Kankan,
just as
they did during the pre-colonial periode
Commenting on the relationship of Odienne to Kankan,
one informant said that the Guineans were shrewd traders.
They sometimes stopped the traders from Odienne on the
road before they reached town, offering to purchase the
local products. If a trader refused, he had difficulty
finding a buyer at Kankan, since aIl the shops had African
116
frontmen.
The well-organized large caravan traders did not
have the same problems.
They went directly to their usual
dealers, deposited their goods,
and were lodged and fed
117
by the company until their departure.
Others followed the European example and became
shop owners.
El Hadj Djemori Diabate opened a shop in
Odienne, as did Kemissa Karanmoko Toure and El Hadj Sori
Toure.
Diabate was the first to own a Ford truck for
transporting merchandise.
Upon the death of Kafka at
Minignan, his kola nut plantations and boutique were
b
ht b
Af .
d '
118
oug
y an
r1can name
D1arra.
Although everyone
did not participate in long
distance trade, the demands imposed by the administration
for taxes and the high cost of imported clothing or
other desired imports did force a wider indulgence in
205
sorne kind of trade.
Due to a scarcity of leisure time,
handmade items became expensive and rare.
In addition,
several informants complained that the cost of a wife was
up as high as 450 francs.
The need for money encouraged
sorne who had not been previously inspired to trade.
Furthermore, under colonial rule there was better
security on the trade routes.
Samori's
wars were over.
The roads that were etched into colonial maps, thanks to
indigenous labor, made movement much easier.
In addition,
new markets were discovered further south and in the
forest zone.
The establishment of markets at aIl colonial
posts became a priority.
The weekly Friday market at
Odienne, for instance, developed its importance under
Administrator Le Campion.
The vicious pacification of the forest zone under
the leadership of Lt. Governor Gabriel Angoulvant had un-
foreseen results for commerce.
Instead of disturbing
trade as so many French merchants had feared,
the paci-
fication encouraged more frequent passage of traders.
The regrouping of villages facilitated their contact
with the traders, and new markets were founded.
Con-
sequently, the effects of pacification were felt by the
Sudanic frontier markets which were once the windows
on the fringe of unknown terrain.
Instead of stopping
at Minignan or Samatiguila, traders continued on to
119
Man, Daloa, Tiassale and beyond to purchase kola nuts.
206
In spite of the need for financial security, most
informants who traded did so only when i t was time to
choose wives, taking to the road perhaps with an older
brother and then returning to the village and their
farms.
50 the spirit of the subsistence farming peasant
had not changed, even though his annual yields and
mobility had increased.
The French were able to profit from the traders
in more ways than one.
The traders were taxed.
The
patente was instituted as a means of acquiring greater
...
/
fiscal revenues for the government.
The arrete of 22
May 1901 signed by Lt.-Governor Clozel fixed the rate.
The fee was based on the value of the merchandise es-
timated by the customs officers at the following rates:
Value of merchandise
Patente
to 200 francs
5 francs
201 to 500
"
10
"
501 to 1000
"
20
li
1001 to 2000
"
30
"
2001 to 3000
"
40
"
over 3000
"
50
"
The patente was only valid for the person in
whose name i t was issued, and only for the year.
It had
to be shown immediately upon request or else aIl of the
trader's merchandise could be confiscated and held until
the Eatente was paid.
In the beginning, several traders
were accused of fraud when they by-passed the eus toms
207
...
.'
stations to avoid the customs officials.
The arrete did
provide for certificates issued at a fee of two francs
to replace lost patentes.
There was also provision for
correction of over-estimated merchandise, but the trader
12
had to go all the way to Bingerville within three months.
Few traders, however, could afford the long journey to
Bingerville to argue a patente.
The trip was too costly,
and the hazards too great,
so most traders accepted the
whims of the customs officers without complaint.
The arrêté of 15 March 1904 from the Government
General further defined the categories of patentes.
Under Title l
there were several classes of patentes
covering everyone from the large companies and banks to
small-scale merchants.
The fifth class patentes covered
retail traders, manufacturers, tailors,
shoemakers, and
charcoal dealers for a fee of fifty francs.
Butchers
pa id only 25 francs.
The money had to be given in a
single payment at the beginning of the year.
Under Title
IV,
the itinerant local traders were subject to the same
restrictions as mentioned in the arrété of 22 May 1901.
The regulations were changed in 1906 by the arrêté
of 28 September 1906 from the Government General which
organized payment by load instead of the value of the
merchandise.
A uniform rate of two francs per load was
collected for each porter, with an average load weighing
25 to 30 kilograms.
If two loads were carried by mule or
208
horse, then the patente accounted for two loads;three
loads were charged if transport was made by cattle, and
four loads for a camel.
The traders still paid one-half
the loaded value for beasts which were not loaded, but
destined for sale, and nothing if the animaIs were not
to be solde
These patentes were strictly controlled and
only valid for a quarter of the year.
In case of expi-
ration,
i t had to be renewed irnmediately upon arrivaI
at the next post.
Many traders said they paid thirty
francs for their patentes, which indicates a caravan of
about fifteen loads, Matche Keita, on the other hand,
said that he paid 300 francs for his patentes which
permitted him to travel with over 100 persons.
It took
at least five huts to lodge his caravan at rest stops
and market towns.
Laisser-passers were issued for goods or animaIs
being transferred from one place to another with no
intention of sale.
The laisser-passers and patentes
were only issued at the administrative posts of each
district.
Those caught without patentes were required
to pay double the amount.
In 1905 a surcharge of 10% ad valorem was placed
on aIl kola nuts gathered and consumed within the colo-
nies.
~
/
Through the arrete of 3 June 1905, signed by
Clozel, aIl attempts to avoid payment were subject to
~
/
punishment.
The arrete was later modified changing the
209
10% surcharge to 0.50 francs per kilograrn payable in
the first district through which the kola nuts
121
transited.
210
Footnotes
to Chapter V
.-
lRoberts, French West Africa, p.34.
2Brunschwig, Mythes et réalities ... , p.27.
3 Roberts, op.cit., p. 18.
4 see discussion, Roberts, Stephen H., History
of French Colonial Policy, p.
34.
5Roberts, op.cit., p.
23, French attitudes
were further expressed in the phrase,
" . . . the colonies
can enrich themselvs in selling us cotton instead of
ruining us in making cotton goàds" from Dubois and
Terrier, Un siècle d'expansion colonial, p.
396.
6Brunschwig, French Colonialism, p.
89.
7Brunschwig, op.cit., p.
95.
8see Roberts, op.cit., p.
621 to compare
investment of Holland into its colonies.
His con-
clusion:
the colonies were starved for want of
capital.
9Brunschwig, op.cit., p.166.
10Journal Officiel, AOF 15 March 1924 No. 1015
Circulaire.
llANCI RRI04 Agriculture indigène et colonisation,
1917-1918, Adm. Le Campion).
12 El Hadj Kanaman, Tienko 24 October 1975.
13 El Hadj Matie Savane, Dakar August 1974.
211
14
~ /
JOCr Arrete 14 May 1901.
15Anoma, Thèse, 3e Cycle, p. 132.
16M. Toure, Odienne, 15 October 1975.
17
,
Anoma, These 3e Cycle, p. 130 says they were
given 5%, while an arrêté of 1 August 1903 shows 10%
for the collectors at Kong and Bondoukou.
18 JOCI 12 July 1904.
19 Amon d'Aby La Cd te d'Ivoire, p. 35.
20 rmam of Minignan 29 October 1975.
He showed
a receipt for 8 franc~ dated 1938.
Also, Dege Kone,
Seguelon, 1 November 1975.
21 L
'
am1ne D'1ab ate, Ab'd'
1 Jan, 1978 .
22 E1 Hadj Matie Savane, Dakar 1 August 1974.
23Marabout of Kabala, 30 October 1975, Almamy
Toure, Sananferedougou, 1978.
24ANCI Correspondance Generale No. 152 B.A.
3 November 1922 Chapon.
25 rmam of Minignan, 29 October 1975.
26 Berna Sangare, Odienne, 16 October 1975.
27Lamine Diabate, Abidjan;
President El Hadj
Mamadou Coulibaly, Abidjan; Adama Kone, Sako.
28 ANCI lEE92 Rapport 4e Trimestre Jacotot.
212
•_---........------.'.r
-
_El_ _I•
•
29Marabout of Kabala, October 1975.
30 ANC1 RR 104.
31 Jean Suret-Canale, L'ère coloniale, p. 169.
32cosnier, op.cit., p. 152-157.
33
'
.
Cosnler,
Op.Clt., p. xix.
34 0 'Sullivan, Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis 1976.
35
.
Cosnler, op.cit., p. 147, p. 189.
36Matche Keita, Kere,
29 October 1975, Adama
Kone, Bako,
3 Novernber 1975.
37ANC1 Q xiii 29 - 1/4, Affaires Economiques
Rapport, 2e Semestre, 25 Decernber 1937, Carlton.
38 AND 2G 26-19 Rapport Service de l'Agriculture.
39 AND 2G21-19, ANCI RPl13.
40 The report shows 5118 Oxen, 27, 317 sheep,
and 39,
475 gosts.
AND 2G22-22.
41AND 2G21-9.
42AND 2G23-31.
43 AND 2G21-19.
44Lamine Doumbia,
Kabangoue,
1975.
45 AND lG17l, 1897.
46
~
BCAF,
"Le Caoutchoue en Cote dl Ivoire", p. 181.
47BCAF , "Le caoutchouc au Soudan," No. 4, 1899,
p. 170.
48 C
'
.
3
osn~er,
op.c~t.,
p . .
49 Vassa 1"1 Bakayok0, Koro, 1975 .
50 ANCI Cercle de Kong, Rapport politique, April
1904.
51 JOC1 1900 , p. 5 .
52 JOCI , February 1900, partie non-officiel, p.S.
53 JOCI , February 1900.
54 BCAF Renseignements coloniaux,
"La situation
commerciale au Soudan francais," p. 153; also field notes
Nawourouya Savane, Odienne; 16 October 1975.
55Suret-Canale. L'ére coloniale, p.
65; BCAF
Rens. Col.,
"Rapport d'ensemble de la Guinée francaise
en 1901," No.
8, 1902, p.
201.
j
56 JOCI , March 1902.
57ANCI , RR120, 1910, 1911.
58
,
Henry, Matieres Premières Africaines,
p.
6
59 Roberts, op.cit., p. 322.
214
60
\\
Suret-Canale, L'ere col., p. 65-66.
6 1 .
.
3
Cosn~er,
op. c~t., p . •
62 Suret-Canale, op. cit., p. 67.
63 BCAF Rens. Col. Ballieu 1898.
64 AND lG171.
65 ANCI Cercle de Kong, Rapports Politiques,
Dalafosse, 1904; also ANCI lEE109, Rapports mensuels,
December 1904.
66Delafosse JCCI, Etudes Notes Renseignements,
31 March, 1906.
67 Henry, op. cit., p. 6.
68 Suret-Canale, op. cit., p. 68.
69 L
·
am~ne Dournb'~a,
Kab angoue, 20 Oct. 1975 .
70ANCI RR104 Agriculture Indigène, 14 Dec. 1917.
71AND 2G22-22 Rapport Agricole 1ère trimestre 1922.
72ANCI lEE92 Rapport trimestriel, 1924.
73 ANCI lEE92 1/5 Rapport trimestriel 1923.
74 Sylla, Odienne, 23 Oct. 1975.
75 Roberts, French Col. Policy, p. 336.
76Moktar Toure, Odienne, 1975; Chief of Sirana,
1975.
77ANCI RR75 1924.
78BCEHSAOF, Monteil,
"Le coton.
. . ," 1926, p.
627.
l
215
79 BCAF, "Le coton au soudan" Rens. Col., No. 8,
1899.
80 Roberts, op. cit., p. 342.
81 AND 2G25-l6.
B2ANcr lEE92, 1925.
83MOrgan and Pugh, West Afr., p.
490.
84
,
Suret-Canale, l'ere col.,
p.
355.
85BCEHSAOF,
"Note sur les ~tudes," No. l,
1928, Belirne.
86 Suret-Canale, op. cit. , p. 359.
87 Suret-Canale, op. ci t. , p. 281-
88 Suret-Canale, op. ci t. , pp. 359-360.
89BCEHSAOF, Monteil, 1926, p. 683.
90BCEHSAOF, L~roide, "La Situation de la culture
du cotonnier a la Cote d'Ivoire," 1916, p.
173.
91 ANcr RR 69, 1924.
92 BCAF, Rens. Col., 1899, p. 143.
93BCEHSAOF Monteil 1926.
94 ANcr lEE92, Jacotot, 1925.
95 BCAF ,
"Le coton . . . " 1899, p.
142; ANcr 1 ee92.
96 ANcr Dvi-28/B 3036.
97Roberts, French West Africa, p. 322.
216
l
98 AND 2G21-19.
99
...
."
Henry, Matieres Prem~eres, p.
435.
100AND 2G21-19.
101 Henry, op. cit., pp. 181-205.
102
/
Charbonneau,
Marches et Marchands, p.
67.
103suret-Cana1e, L'ère col., p.
2391
10 4
.
Franc~s d u Boeu f ,
CAF
B , 19 3 7 , p .
4 6 2 .
105suret-Cana1e, op. cit., p.
239.
106
"'
Anoma, These, p.
68.
107 JOCI , Ju1y 1905.
108 JOCI , Ju1y 1906.
109 Jocr , 31 January 1907, p. 7; Ibrahima Cou1iba1y,
Odienne, 1975.
110ANCI 0 vi-28/8 - 3036.
111ANCI QQ70 Rapport de la Situation Econ. et
Com ' 1, 1922.
112 Lad"
G d '
1978
H d'
K
J~
aoussou, 0 ~enne,
;
a Ja
one,
Abidjan 1978, Matche Keita, Kere, 1978.
113Charbonneau, op. cit., p. 103.
He states that
on1y 10% of the emigrants from the Middle East were
Syrians, p.
93.
114Charbonneau, op. cit., p. 96.
115Marabout of Kaba1a, 1975.
217
116 H d'
K
Ab'd'
a Ja
one,
~
Jan.
117
f
M'
.
1975
Imam 0
~n1gnan,
.
118 L
,
umb'
b
1975
am~ne Do
~a,
Ka angoue,
.
119ANCI D vi - 28/8 3036.
120 JOCI Arr~t~ 22 May 1901, C1oze1.
121 JOC1 Arrèt~ 24 November 1906.
218
CHAPTER VI
LABOR
The Emancipation
The French had mixed emotions over the relationship
between slavery and colonialism.
While slavery had once
been a source of great profit du ring the trans-Atlantic
trade, when the French became possessors of the great
slave-holding kingdoms of West Africa, a re-evaluation was
in order.
One of the major justifications of imperialism
was based on humanitarianism:
The responsibility of the
French to carry the principles of western civilization to
primitive African kingdoms.
The first sanctions against
the institution of slavery were taken around 1794, when
the French abolished slavery in her colonial possessions
in response to slave revolts in the Caribbean.
Another
law, in 1848, abolished slavery in all French colonies
under penalty of having French nationality revoked.
The
slave-holding Africans were not affected by the law.
In
Senegal, where there was a large population of French
citizens, Faidherbe openly announced that the law would
not be respected at all.
Throughout the conquest the French used the already
existing slave system.
Slaves played a major role in
219
in forming the ranks of tirailleurs without whom the
."
conquest could never have succeeded.
The tirailleurs
had to be paid.
50 to maintain loyalty in the ranks,
the booty from the wars of co~quest against African
kingdoms, consisting mostly of slaves, was divided among
the tirailleurs.
The slaves were also sold for profit.
Moreover, prior to the emancipation, caravans of slaves
were taxed like any other commodity by the French.
The
usuru was one tenth of the value of goods, and was payable
in kind, and later, in French money.
Actually,
there
was no discerr.ible difference of attitudes between the
French and the Africans in their use of slaves until
Gallieni began founding freedom villages
(villages de
libert~) in the aftermath of the conquest.
He was
greatly encouraged by the Antislavery Society of France.
Gallieni, under instructions to organize the wandering
refugees of the war, began regrouping the victims to
save them from starvation and also to cultivate desolate
farmlands needed to nourish advancing French troops.l
The inhabitants of the freedom villages were subject to
the beck and calI of administrators to be used as porters
for transporting food and equipment and as laborers to
build and maintain the newly created posts.
50 freedom
villages tended to be created along with the advance of
2
French troops.
In the region of Odienne, Denise Bouche
. /
reported in Les villages de lioerte en Afrique noire
220
francaise,
there were seven freedom villages: Odienne,
ô
Samadougou, Bekone, Kodougou, Guakala,
Ziovasso, and
Dinguele.
In general, the chiefs of the villages were chosen
among ex-tirailleurs, interpreters, and political agents.
In addition to a salary of twenty to thirty francs per
mon th , they received one per cent of the head tax
collected in their villages.
The village chiefs acted
ruthlessly, sometimes returning escaped slaves to their
3
old masters in exchange for gifts.
In the freedom
villages the slaves were allowed to purchase their
freedom from former masters for 200 francs, which eliminat-
ed the hazards of being recaptured or returned.
As the conquest carne to a close the French
recognized the need to control the lives of ten million
4
people, of which half were in servitude.
The French
intended for the peasants to support the costs of
colonial rule:
Therefore, new ways were found to increase
the numbers of inhabitants available to work for the
administration.
One way was by disengaging slaves from
their African servitude.
All European and African
personnel were forbidden to hold slaves.
Escaped captives
nct claimed within three months were to be freed.
Slaves were permitted tobuytheir own freedom for 150 to
250 francs.
Furthermore, mistreated slaves were freed
immediately, and rnasters enrolling their slaves in the
221
French military received bonuses.
In addition, owners
5
were made responsible for the head tax of each slave.
~On 17 May 1895, slave trading in the Sudan was abolished.
Slaves found in trade caravans were freed on the spot
and taken to the freedom villages.
The jula reacted
by saying that slaves were salaried porters, so only
those slaves who showed visible signs of bondage were
freed.
Although the slave trade was eventually suppressed,
slave-holding was not abolished until later.
It has
already been shown how local adrninistrators were able to
rally local support from chiefs by helping to return
escapees.
But, as time wore on and the format of
colonial rule came into focus,
i t became evident that the
French would need more labor than the few ex-slaves the
freedom villages were able to supply.
There was a
reservoir of unexploited labor just waiting to be tapped.
Jean Suret-Canale has vigorously attacked the abolition-
ist movement, saying that their goal was not to free a
minority of innocent men from the horrors of capitivity,
but rather to entrap everyone to work for the colonial
6
regime, freemen and ex-slave-holding masters as well.
The hesitation on the part of the colonial administration
were caused by their apprehension of freeing 30 to 50 per
cent of the population of the Western sudan and Sahel
from slavery.
Sorne colonialists feared abloodyrevolution
L
222
1.
and preferred to let industrial progress and developments
in communications networks influence change.
It was
hoped that the slave would be made obsolete by replacing
porters with the railroad and plantation workers with
7
plows.
Nevertheless, on 12 December 1905, all slaves in
the French colonies and territories were freed by
presidential decree.
AlI violators were subject to two
'to five years imprisonment and fined 500 to 5,000 francs
for any intention to usurp another's freedom.
They
could also be placed in exile for a period five to ten
8
years.
In Ivory Coast about 500,000 slaves were freed.
Following the turmoil of colonial conquest, manu-
mission in the Western Sudan was somewhat anti-climactic.
Captives who could recognize their way back returned to
their home villages, while others remained with their
former masters.
In Odienne a fairly recent history of
expansionism made i t possible for most people to regain
their homelands.
Most of the captives from Wasulu return-
ed to their families.
The freedom village at Bougouni
was never very successful for this reason.
Even in the
aftermath of the Franco-Samorian War which left 30,000
captives stranded in the Mahou
(Touba region),
those
9
returning to the Wasulu were claimed by their families.
For those who had been enslaved on their own land,
emanci-
pation was a political.question.
Authority was returned
to founding families.
223
In sorne cases, slaves who could not find their
original homes or had grown up as slaves in the same
family decided to stay with their former masters.
It has
been estimated that one-tenth of the manumitted slaves
t
d t
h
·
10
re urne
0
t
e1r owners.
Muslim law conveniently
provided for ex-slaves to become clients of former
masters.
Association with free families gave them sorne
recognition and protection in a status-orientated society.
Paternalism prevailed as ex-masters remained the fa of
their former jon.
Spouses,
for example, were found or
approved by the ex-masters.
The freedmen continued to
help in the field in exchange for grains or other remunera-
tion and also cultivated fields of their own.
Former
masters allotted the men a portion of their own land.
In
the meantime, former masters and their families, male and
female alike, were aIl forced to go to the fields.
Quotas
had to he met and the only way to do i t was for the entire
family to participate.
One informant stated that she had
ll
never picked up a daba prior to that.
When numerous
enough, slaves grew enough food for the entire family.
Sorne of the former masters could not face the reality
of life without slaves and resorted to suicide.
Yet, whenever possible, the ex-slaves were still
exploited.
For example, the fa avoided sending their own
children for labor, school, or military service and chose
the off-spring of an ex-slave instead.
Little did they
224
know that those with the most European contact would rule
them one day.
As sorne ex-slaves becarne more financially
secure, farnilies of their ex-rnasters sornetimes became
dependent upon thern.
But in spi te of their newfound free-
dom and responsibility ex-slaves did not have the social
status of horon.
They were regarded with disdain by the
horon.
Embittered by their experiences in bondage, sorne of
them sought revenge on their ex-masters.
The colonial re-
gime proved an outlet for latent hostility.
In positions
of responsibility for the administration, as guards or in-
terpretors, they treated others cruelly.
Moreover, for rnany
ex-slaves freedom meant the ability to own slaves without
having to win the master's approval.
The ernancipation of
Il
1
d
.
d
h
f
h
t '
12
a
s aves
epr~ve
t
ern 0
t
at oppor un~ty.
But, not aIl slaves of unknown origins stayed with
their owners.
Others took refuge in the freedom villages
only ternporarily until they decided where to settle.
Many preferred to be as anonymous as possible and went to
areas where no one knew of their past history of enslave-
ment.
By 1911 the freedom villages were obsolete, many
13
having slowly dropped out of existence.
Forced Labor
Under colonialism aIl men, freemen and ex-slaves
alike, were made equally exploitable.
AlI m~n paid the
nisongo,
'the price of life' as the head tax was called.
They were aIl eligible to work as porters for the
225
administration or for private commercial interests, to
hire on as laborers for the wood industry, pineapple and
palm nut plantations or to work on the railroad.
Finally,
they were all eligible to go to war for France.
There was
equality in the misery suffered under colonial rule.
The potential of indigenous labor reserves was
recognized by Lieutenant Governor Angoulvant in Ivory
Coast, who, upon engaging in aggressive exploitation of
the colony stated,
From day to day, we are better understand-
ing that the real treasure .
.
. in our
colonies is not the natural riches nor the
unoccupied lands, but the indigenous races.
It is the population which makes up the
strength and richness of a country; the
capital to be exploited is man. 14
Forced labor under the French regime is the most
painful memory of colonial experiences.
Administrators
cooperated with private French industrialists in the
~nterest of economic development.
They either participated
directly or turned their heads as hundreds of men were
marched away from their fields to labor in the forest
zone.
The men were recruited in different ways.
In
sorne cases they were hired as a group.
The administrator
recornmended the cantons from which the workers were ta be
taken and the number required of each village.
The
canton chiefs guaranteed the presence of the men at the
~orksites.
The chiefs were sometimes paid two francs
~er
~
man f
or I t
ong
erm 1 a b or
(over one month) .15
0 nce th e
226
men reached the worksites, their employers told them in
16
no uncertain terms that they had been paid for.
One
informant at Gbeleban told how,
upon his first assignment
into the fprest zone all but seven men out of six hundred
escaped and then were all replaced with brothers, fathers,
and cousins.
(See Appendix F.)
Other informants were
convinced that planters were buying labor directly from
the administrators, calling the transaction another kind
17
of slave trade.
Furthermore, if a
European decided to
develop a planatation,
the administrator supplied plenti-
18
ful,
free labor.
In other cases, the men were hired
individually by a recruiter for a given term and salary.
These men could leave a worksite without risking any
repercussion to their families.
Mossi from Upper Volta
was transferred to employers at Bouake for 200 francs
.
19
ap~ece.
The men were recruited for several types of work.
For instance, the palm tree and cocoanut plantations near
Dabou and Bassam were planted and maintained by men from
the north.
Other plantations around the Lagune Cercle,
Agneby,
Sassandra, Daloa and Grand Lahou were at sorne time
2ü
worked by men from odienne.
The present location of
Treichville in the city of Abidjan was initially cleared
21
by them as well.
On the palm treeplantations the
men were required to dig holes and plant at least fifteen
trees each da y •
The worker was beaten if he did not
227
1
complete his quota.
In addition,
the following day he
was required to finish the previous day's load plus a
new quota of fifteen more trees.
To reach the worksites the men usually walked.
It took two weeks to go from odienne to the coast.
If
the plantation was located far from a village,
the men
put up tents made from palm branches.
Unfortunately,
their makeshift shelters did not protect them from the
.
22
ra1n.
Memories of work for the railroad was also vivid.
Railroad construction was initiated because of the di ffi-
culties of navigating the Senegal river, which hampered
the transport of groundnuts from the interior.
The
plans for railroad development eventually encompassed
aIl of French West AFrica.
(See Map 4.)
The goal was
to make the resources of the entire hinterland of Upper
Senegal and Niger available for exploitation and to
facilitate exporte
Governor General Roume,
in the fore-
front of the debate,
insisted on approaching the problem
from several geographical points, namely railroad transport
systems through Guinea,
Ivory Coast, and Dahomey, as
weIl as Senegal.
He also intended to develop ports at
23
Senegal and Ivory Coast.
The railway was intended not
only to transport raw materials from the hinterland,
but
also labor from what the French thought to be heaviIy
populated sudanic zones to the more prosperous
cash crop
228
MAP 4
PROJECTED RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA 1911
N
N
\\0
Dei A
IArLA"T'~
Clrl' du R••••u c0"'Pltt IIIs cht.iu dt 'er proJete."'
-
AFRIQUE or.cmENTlLE FRANÇAN:
,/~11t.,
-
"'''' nJ ft. flr
• • • •
r"Jt~'11
1
j-
I~ _
J
\\.'\\.-
CONt"'".I1U/J tIol~; J" If .M
-
- _ HI _.
_ " _ ..rlrprw""..mpr~nt
~.
=..
..: l,J,." JM'''''
" J " t:
d e
li u i " é .. l
' - - - -
-
~..'L__•
_
• 'UJ)' i ....
' ••
.,
24
zones of the forest.
Roume's proposal was accepted and
."
the French government approved a loan of 65 million
francs to the Government General.
Ten million francs
of the loan was earmarked for railway and port con-
struction in the colony of Ivory Coast.
On 30 November
1903 an arr~t~ was signed to start construction of
79 kilometers from Abidjan to Ery-Macouguie.
By 1906,
Roume reduced the scope of the program to concentrate
on linking the rubber producing regions of Guinea and
Ivory Coast to export channels on the coast.
By law
of 22 January 1907, another 100 million francs in loans
was granted to French West Africa.
The 22 million
francs passed on to Ivory Coast took the railroad to
255 kilometers.
It was 1912 before the railroad finally
reached Bouake
(315 km), and Ferkessedougou
(558 km)
was
25
reached in 1926.
The expenses 1isted for rai1road deve10pment
are not true figures of the value of the network in terms
of human sacrifice that went into its construction.
The
labor cost practica11y nothing.
Men from Odienne were
sent to work for the rai1road.
They were required to
eut trees a certain length and to fi11 a volume of two
eubic meters each day.
The wood was used to heat the
~rain engines.
They nicknamed the work chemin de fer.
If
3
man cou1d not make his daily quota his salary was
reduced.
There were several escapes from the forest sites
230
as men fled to seek other types of work.
Sometimes up
to 16~ men per team of fifty escaped.
But, when they
were found,
they were imprisoned for a week before being
f
d b
k
h
k
·
26
M
d
orce
ac
to t
e wor slte.
ore money was ma e on
plantations as laborers or as tenant farmers than could
be made doingcheminde fer.
Late into the colonial
period, circa 1940, railroad work on1y paid 75 francs
per month while plantation laborers earned 200 francs
27
per mon th.
In spite of the labor that went into railroad
development, the men of Odienne were emphatic that the
railroad did not change the conditions of life in Odienne
at aIl.
World War l deeply affected the metropolitan
and colonial budgets.
Projected extensions of the net-
work into the western region of Ivory Coast and beyond
Kankan, in Guinea
were never accomplished.
The railroad
was to be an incentive for development by bringing
distant regions into closer contact with the coast.
But
the railroad terminaIs at Kankan, Bouake and later,
Ferkessedougou were too far away to have a significant
impact on the Odienne region.
Petty traders and farmers
could not afford to ship their products by train.
Given
the low remuneration for their crops they cou1d lose
~
28
money paying their own transport plus baggage.
A
more prosperous trader mentioned taking the train from
Kankan to Conakry to buy g~npowder.
He returned to
231
Kankan by train but had to engage porters at Kankan to
carry the merchandise to Odienne.
Moreover, the most
ancient of the north-south trade routes were not served
by the railroad.
The arrival of the automobile and road
construction eventually brought more visible changes in
the mode of transportation for local traders, as they
began to lean toward colonial economic persuasion.
But
as Walter Rodney clearly states in How Europe Under-
developed Africa,
Means of communication were net
constructed .
.
. so that Africans
could visit their friends.
More
important still, they were not laid
down to facilitate internaI trade of
Africa's commodities.
There were no roads
connecting different colonies in a manner
that made sense with regard to Africa's
needs and development.
AlI roads and
railways led down to the sea. 29
One of the most dreaded types of work was to
be found in the wood industry.
The men cut down
huge trees, stripped them, and then aligned themselves
to pull the logs with chains out of the forest over
a bed of other logs until they reached the road.
The
men were whipped aIl along the way.
It was the most
dangerous of jobs, for on an incline a runaway log
could roll over to easily injure several men in one
swoop.
Many lost the use of legs or feet,
and many died.
(See Appendix G.)
Medical attention was almost non-
existent.
The employers knewtheycould get more labor
232
from the same source and cared little about the state
of health of their workers.
50 the men worked in fear
under the threat of the whip and the danger of the trees.
The least strong were sometimes forgotten in the forest
and left to die of their wounds, unless fellow laborers
could secretly get them back to camp and, eventually,
b ack to t h
·
. Il
30
h
d
h d
h
e~r v~
ages.
If not, t
e guar s
a
t
e
31
dead men put into sacks and set afloat on the lagune.
Those who did manage to return to their villages were
too physically abused to work again, making them absolute-
32
ly useless to their families.
The employers' neglect is equally shown in the
food rations allowed indigenous labor.
The men often went
to the worksites without breakfast.
At the Hubert work-
site, for example, at the 19th kilorneter of the railroad,
men were getting only 450 grams of rice instead of the
proposed 600 grams of rice per day plus 100 grams of
srnoked fish or meat per week.
Sorne employers only
33
issued meat or fish as rewards.
In cases where men
were given a per diern for food,
i t was shown that the
cost of food out distanced their allowance.
On another
site the men were given a banana and a half of fish at
noon, and then in the evening they were given the same
thing.
Others complained that aIl they had to eat was
1
a piec~ of boiled cassava with palm oil, or sacks of
1
dried corn filled with insects.
Six hundred men were
tli
1
233
allowed only ten sacks of dried corn.
At one site, the
men refused to eat the dried corn, and so forced their
34
employers to give them rice or sorghum.
The lack of
adequate food left the men weakened, unable to combat
illnesses such as colds, dysentary and venereal disease.
Malaria, tuberculosis and syphillis were widespread.
Sores took longer to heal and often developed serious
infections before healing was complete.
To avoid an association with slavery, the men
were paid various token amounts throughout the colonial
period.
In a 1918 report,
Inspector Kair wrote that
salaries averaged one franc per ten hour day.
The
inforrnants agreed that when they were paid, salaries were
about thirty francs per month.
The suggested salary
to be paid, according to the report, was 1.41 francs
per day.
Later in the period, inforrnants said that a
man was considered fortunate to have 250 francs at the
end of six months.
others reported earning up to 500
35
francs in six months.
Rarely did the men see their
complete salaries.
For those hired by groups from the
villages,
the salaries were sent first to the adminis-
trator, who forwarded the money to the canton chiefs.
The head tax and prestation fees were subtracted.
The
rernainder was given to the laborers at the canton chief's
discretion.
The little that remained was usually given to
the fa who used the money ~o help meet the needs of the
234
concession.
Sorne men were partially paid at the work-
sites.
Their employers subtracted the taxes beforehand.
The money they received was mostly used to supplement
the food given at the camps.
Many said they could not
survive on the rations given by their employers.
At
the end of six months, when the men were given the
remainder of their salaries, they bought blankets, or
bicycles: visible signs of their sojourn in the forest
zone.
One administrator wrote that after seven months
36
sorne men returned with less than 100 francs.
The
salaries of the deceased were never forwarded to rela-
tives.
Only those who returned were recompensed for
their labor.
On the other hand, many informants
stated clearly that the laborers were not paid at aIl.
Sorne returned with the same blankets that had been
issued to them at the post just prior to their departure.
Moreover, for the least error, a month's salary could
b
l
t
. hm
t
37
e
os
as pun~s
en.
It is impossible to estimate the number of men
from Odienne who labored in the forest zone.
It is
certain that the labor roles increased yearly.
One
report showed nearly 1,400 men from Odienne on worksites
38
who were legally recruited by contract.
Informants
stated that they left Odienne in contingents of fifty
to four hundred men at a time.
One man said that he
was among six hundred men from Odienne, along with one
235
thousand Mossis on the same plantation.
Gaoussou Toure
of Odienne said that colonialism was directly responsible
for the depopulation of the region.
He stated
that there were two hundred men sent each month to work
in the forest zone.
He also suspected dishonesty in
the recruitment.
Instead of taking one hundred men,
recruiters took two hundred and sold them along the way
to campsites. Toure added that the men left in large
groups, but only returned in groups of five or ten men.
39
He was convinced that most of the men had died.
There was also a great demand for porters.
Just
as porters had been primary means for transporting
merchandise in the pre-colonial period, their services
were also needed after colonization.
The administration
needed them to carry the mails and the belongings of
civil servants from one post to another.
Food and
equipment had to be transported to distant territories
still under military rule.
French merchants needed
them to carry export products to the coast and to return
quantities of manufactured goods to inland markets.
The availability of porters was crucial to the develop-
ment of the colonies.
Yet, there was a direct conflict
with the labor needed to perform other functions,
equally
important for development.
Unresolved conflicts led to
a strain on the labor force which emerged as famines
overtook reqions where peasants were insufficient in
236
number to provide for their own subsistence after the
40
administration took its share of crop yields.
To facilate the development of commerce in the
colonies the administration played a direct role in
supplying porters to transport the Europeans' merchan-
dise and raw materials to and from the seaports.
The
administration's role, though non-official, was often
likened to that of a slaver.
The administrators
asked the canton chiefs to canvas
the villages for men.
Merchants were indifferent to the origin of porters, so
that the porters often walked long distances before
reaching the ~ocation of the goods to be carried.
Through colonial correspondence glimpses of the
unofficial trade are revealed.
In 1903, for instance,
Mr. Langr~ne, who represented D~ves et Chaumet in
Odienne was refused porters from Odienne because they
were aIl engaged in other work.
Langrène then requested
250 to 300 porters from Bougouni to make several round-
trips between Odienne and Kouroussa.
In spite of his
promise to pay the minimum wage, 10 francs per month
round trip, and to give the porters a daily food ration,
the administrator of Bougouni also refused.
The peasants
were involved in more important kinds of work,
like
41
rubber collection.
In another instance, the adminis-
~rator referred to Mr. Piganiol, who had been assisted
~o the point of having arrned political agents accompany
237
l
the porters.
In spite of this,
the 250 porters at his
disposition refused to leave Bougouni to go to Ivory
Coast, complaining that they would be too far away from
home to find food.
The administrator doubled the armed
escort and forced the porters to go.
They were puni shed
for their resistance by having to make two trips from
k
t
rob
.
1
f
. . 1 42
Barna 0
0 To
ougou str1ct y
or Mr.
Plgan10 .
In s t i l l another case, Mr. de Tessiére wanted
porters to go to Korhogo,
for which he was only willing
to pay 0.70 francs per day, without food rations and no
pay for the days in between when porters were not on
the road, or not transporting merchandise.
If a porter
went from Bougouni to Korhogo in twelve days he was paid
8.40 francs.
But, if he returned unloaded, he was not
paid.
And, the travel time from his village to the post
was not paid.
The administrator cited sorne of the
abuses suffered by the porters.
Often, the loads were too
heavy
(30 to 35 kilograms)
which left the porters with
swollen legs and sores.
The porters were poorly
pa id i f they were paid at ail.
When pay was given, i t
43
was sometimes confiscated by greedy canton chiefs.
Moreover,
porters were often forced to march day and
night without food.
The administrator concluded that
porters would be easier to come by if merchants treated
them better.
238
From the post at Odienne, the porters marched
~
great distances to carry products to the main arteries
of evacuation.
It took ten days to walk the 250
kilometers from Odienne to Kankan and back and 17 days
from Odienne to Bouake,
roundtrip.
Porters would be
made to work in other colonies when local porters
were not available.
The peasants found themselves caught
up in a vicious cycle.
The harder they worked and the
more they produced, the greater the demand for porters.
One administrator figured the expense to the local
population as 1,200 man-days per ton of goods sent to
Kankan.
He considered asking the merchants to pay more
for porters, but decided i t would be useless, since
the merchantswouldmerely pay less for the peasants'
44
crops.
In a 1925 report, another administrator sa id
that 30,000 men had served as porters within the first
six months of the year.
His main concern was the ensuing
45
decline in labor reserves.
The abuse of porters was great enough to cause
Lieutenant Governor Roberdeau to caution the administrators
to inform merchants, officers and civil servants not to
overload their porters.
A normal load was 25 kilograms.
He left i t to humanitarian judgement of administrators
46
and civil servants to control themselves.
In 1901,
Lieutenant GovernorClozel, having noticed the use of
pregnant women andnursingmothers as porters advised
239
against the use of women porters for the administration
47
and in all recruiting for the merchants.
Salaries for porters did not vary greatly.
In
1902, an arr~t~ created an official company of 200 men
to serve as porters in Kong.
The pay was fixed at 0.89
francs per day for the head porter, 0.70 francs for
the second man in charge, and finally 0.60 francs for
the rest of the men.
They were allowed either 0.20
francs daily for food, or 800 grams of rice and .02 grams
48
~
/
of salt.
In a later arrete, 1905, porters who were
not in a company, yet engaged for temporary service
by the administration, were placed on a different scale.
In Kong, if loaded they
received 0.75 francs for each
1
20 to 25 kilometers
(approximately one day's journey).
Unloaded they only received 0.25 francs per day.
In
the Baoule Cercle, the rate was 1.0 francs per day loaded,
and 0.50 francs unloaded.
There was no provision for
food or rations. They were allowed one rest day after
the sixth stretch of the journey.49
In 1907, Lieutenant
Governor Clozel called i t ta the administrator's
attention that they were neglecting to give salary
advances to the porters ta meet their subsistence needs
during the voyage.
Villages could not always provide food
for vast caravans of porters circulating throughout the
1
•
50
colony.
Realistically,
if the porter paid for his own
food he was left with only 0.50 francs at the most when
240
carrying a load.
When empty-handed, 0.25 francs just
51
bare1y covered his food needs.
In spite of the scarcity of men, local African
traders did not have any difficulty attracting porters.
They paid better, and cou1d not force the porters'
services.
Nawourya Savane said that her husband paid
25 francs for a porter to go from Bamako to Odienne,
and another 25 francs from Odienne to Da1oa.
The porters
waited unti1 the merchandise was sold before co11ecting
.
52
t h e~r pay.
Labor was a1so demanded of the peasants.
A1though
a provision for prestations was made very early, in 1891
by Governor General Chaudi~, it was not unti1 1912
that more specifie instructions were given.
The
arr~t~ stated that such services were to app1y on1y to
the upkeep of communications networks 1ike roads,
bridges, te1egraph 1ines, etc., and that work projects
were subject to the approva1 by the lieutenant governor
of each co1ony.
Furthermore, on1y ab1e-bodied adu1t
males were to be summoned, 1eaving the aged, mi1itary,
guards,
customs officers, and forestry patro1s exempt
from service.
The number of days required of the villages
was to be reduced by the number of en1isted men from the
village.
Ordinari1y, the men were not to be assigned
more than five ki10meters from their villages without
subsistence provisions.
Officia11y, no man was to work
f41
over twe1ve days.
Article 4 of the arr~tè provided f1ex-
ibi1ity based on the region's population density and
the importance of the project.
Fina11y, those unavai1-
able for work as was the case with traders, those occupied
in 1abor camps, or city dwe11ers cou1d pay the 1abor
53
tax.
Further specifications for Ivory Coast were
fixed in 1913.
A1l transients were to pay five francs.
Later
an annua1 requirernent of ten days service per
pers on was fixed, and an age 1imit of 15 to 50 years
54
was set.
The idea for bringing the automobile to the colo-
nies as a temporary arrangement until the railroad cou1d
be sufficiently developed had been proppsed since
55
1898.
Until then the only mechanization of transpor-
tation was the arriva1 of the bicycle which made its
appearance in Timbuktu around 1896.
But as soon as
they were given authority, administrators pursued the
construction of the road network with unmatched vigor.
In 1908, they began widening footpaths to a full four
meters wide to accommodate the automobiles that wou1d
eventually arrive. The roads were not in full use unti1
after Wor1d War II.
Prior to that the administration
began to substitute one and two-whee1 carts, i.e.,
voitures Lefèvre, for porters.
One cart could hold up
to l50.kilograms.
The single wheel carts passed easily
over footpaths and through the dense forests, as we11 as
242
on the new roads.
Colonial correspondence reveals the determination
to link dirt roads to the railroad terminaIs located
hundreds of kilometers away.
Odienne was to have
access roads to Seguela and Man passing through Touba
and eventually reaching Daloa
(once a proposed railroad
terminal)
and Bouake.
Another route from the north
(BamakO-Bougouni-Odienne) would permit products from
56
the Sudan to be exported through southern seaports.
Routes to the east led to Boundiali, Korhogo and Bouake,
and the route west met the colonial border with Guinea.
The informants commented that they had been doing
road work a long time before ever seeing an automobile.
One said he was working on the road to Katiola,
just
,
pr~or to Wor Id War II,
h
w en h e saw h'~s f'~rst automob'l
~ e. 57
In 1917, the colony had only registered ten automobiles,
three trucks, and five motorbikes.
By the end of the
year 1920, there were nearly 100 cars in the colony.58
In 1920, French West Africa boasted 20,000 kilometers
of roads, and in 1930, there were 63,000 kilometers.
The first transsaharan automobile trip was accomplished
in 1923.
By 1928, there were nearly 6,000 automobiles
59
in French West Africa.
The most common type of work was tracing the roads
that linked major villages to the administrative
capital of the region.
The work consisted of clearing
243
away the bush and cutting through mountains with picks
and shovels.
Trenches were dug and dirt was scattered
and pounded into the road until a smooth surface was
made.
The workers had to be careful not to mix the
different types of soil.
Only red laterite soil was
used on the surface.
For lack of enough equipment
or as punishment by an angry guard, the workers were
sometimes forced to pound the road with their hands.
Laborers arrived at the worksite at six a.m.
If a
man arrived late, he might be thrown into the river by
the guards.
If he did not know how to swim, he drowned.
While sorne road gangs were allowed their own surveil-
lance, or perhaps were assigned only one guard, others
were assigned two guards.
The workers were often
beaten, and sorne died in the same holes they had dug for
the road.
The labor for road construction was recruited by
the village chiefs, who asked each family to supply
someone.
Patriarchs organized themselves the best way
they knew to cope with the pressures of colonialism.
Their methods were not always in keeping with the law,
since official information was rarely, if ever, trans-
lated to thern.
50 when the village chief requested a
worker, if there were no men available, a young woman
was sent instead.
The women sometimes worked along with
the men, carrying away piles of dirt on their heads, or
244
bringing water and pounding the road.
If the work gangs
moved too far away from the village, the women busied
themselves with food preparation.
Food was provided
by the family of each laborer.
They left home with
dried corn flour, roasted fonio, yams, sweet potatoes
and cassava.
On the other hand, if a woman was found
attractive by the guards, she might be kept in concu-
binage for the duration of her prestation.
The women
engaging in heavy labor were not spared from punishment.
Sometimes they worked so hard that they lost their
feminine characteristics and appeared as muscular as
the men.
After two weeks, the men were replaced by others,
usually from the same family.
If there was no one
else available, then the same man returned for another
shift.
Roadwork was continuous except for the temporary
reprieve given during the planting season.
One
informant complained that even when given time to
plant, they were called back to the worksites before
the harvest, leaving the old people to harvest the crops
alone.
For lack of enough field hands crops were often
60
ruined by wild animais before the harvest was completed.
Sorne men worked six months on the roads without returning
ta the village.
Another informant recalled that his
group was assigned a particular stretch of road.
Any-
time i t was in need of repair they were called,
245
irrespective of the nurnber of days work required or the
6l
time of year.
. Roadwork was only one form of executing the
prestation.
The representatives called men from their
cantons to perform other jobs such as cleaning the
civil servants' yards, cutting bamboo and straw for the
construction and maintenance of posts, and field work
in the plantations and gardens of the administration,
in addition to whatever the representative required
in his own fields.
For one quarter, an administrator
reported 3,150 man-days of labor completed in mainte-
nance and f '~eId work around t h e post a t 0 d'~enne. 62
We
also reported 42,387 man-days of road building.
The dry season corresponded to the period of
long distance trading.
During absences traders avoided
the prestations by renewing their laissez-passers.
At
times the administrator limited the nurnber of laissez-
passers and the time allowed for trade in order to have
more available laborers.
Any trader who over-extended
63
his permit was made to serve two shifts.
Matche
Keita commented that roadwork slowed active trading in
the region.
Another informant said that a trader could
be stopped anywhere in Odienne and made to work, if his
prestation had not been liquidated and his travelling
64
papers were not in order.
246
Similar types of labor were demanded of entire
villages as special contributions or fines.
There were
no defined limits to the amount of work the colony might
demande
Order at the worksites was maintained by the
gardes cercle.
Resistance to the guards on patrol
was unthinkable.
They instilled fear in the workers
through numerous exhibitions of extreme cruelty.
Although the guards were "our own sons," meat:ling men
from the northern regions, they took no pitY on the
workers, sometimes displaying more hateful behavior
than the French.
The brutality was approved by the
French administration which the guards sought to protect
and defend.
"We were like their dogs," said an in-
formant, lia dog that follows his master
When
the master wishes, he goesi when the master wishes, he
65
stays.n
They neither resisted nor rebelled against
poor treatment.
The hard work, the beatings, and lack
of food left the men too weak.
Many men were beaten
to death.
If the work did not kill a man, then the
whip certainly could.
The guards used drastic means
for small errors.
If a man stayed too long in the bush
to relieve himself, a guard might maliciously set fire
66
to the bush to force the man out.
One worker was
assigned to cut branches to be used as whipsi he easily
cut seven loads a day.
If there were not enough, he was
247
b
t
·
' "
Il 67
ea en ~nto agon~z~ng pa~n as we
•
Even non-violent
.-
forrns of protest were unheard of.
The breaking of a
tool on a slackening of pace was punished with an
unrelenting whip.
Fear and suffering embraced every
man on the worksites.
Flight, with its self-contained
risks, was the only alternative.
Desertions. from the
forest zone in particular were frequent.
Although obligatory labor for the use of private
interests came under severe international criticism,
labor legislation for the purpose of controlling private
enterprise in the French colonies was non-existent.
The agreement of 25 December
1926 by the League of Nations
strictly forbid private use of forced labor.
Again in
1929, the Twelfth Conference of the Bureau International
de Travail agreed to morally condemn the French govern-
ment for the labor system in existence in the colonies_
Those signing vowed to end forced labor wherever it
existed, except in cases where temporary mandatory
work was needed in the public interest.
AlI of these
moves were ignored by the French.
Under the influence
of strong lobbyists, i.e., Union coloniale, the French
government made moves to leave labor control strictly
in the hands of the colonies.
Further restrictions on
the peasants' freedorn of rnovernent through anti-loitering
legislation made it increasingly advantageous to private
68
enterprise to use forced labor.
248
Conscription
In addition to forced labor demands, the villages
were further deprived of their most able-bodied men by
World War l recruitrnent.
The idea of creating an
all-black arrny was first proposed by Colonel Mangin
in 1908.
Given the lower birth rate of the French and
a reduction of required military service to two years,
he felt that the drop in French military personnel
could be reinforced by black troops.
The practicality
of such a move had already been proven by the success of
the Senegalese tirailleurs used in the colonial conquest
and by limited use of African troops in other areas.
In spite of the strain that the draft could place on
the production of primary materials from the colonies,
the suggestion that 20,000 men be recruited within four
years was incorporated into the 1910 B~dget Report and
69
passed into law.
The Decree of 14 November 1904 already provided
for African volunteers to serve for two to four years.
In response to the need for a permanent black arrny,
another decree made African men between 20 and 28 years
of age eligible for the draft and to serve for four years
if the number of volunteers was not sufficient.
By
1914 there were close to 20,000 tirailleurs serving
the metropole.
After the declaration of World War l
more men were recruited.
In October 1915 the age limit
249
was reduced from 20 to 18, and 30,000 Senegalese went to
Europe.
Over 51,000 soldiers followed in 1916 and
by 1917, nearly 120,000 tirailleurs had been recruited.
Many of thern were sacrificed to the German armies in the
70
war zone where French soldiers refused to fight.
A
change in the administration of the Government General
in 1917 suspended recruitment for the draft, as Governor
General Van Vollenhoven switched the priority of the
colonies from the demand for men to the production
7l
of food and raw materials.
His preference was ignored.
Once again, in 1918, the age limit was extended to
include men up to 35 years old.
To encourage the peasants to participate, volun-
teers were initially given 200 francs upon their
incorporation into military service, and needy families
were accorded up to 15 francs per month.
If death
occurred, a lump sum of 120 francs was given to surviv-
ing widows and children.
Because of the difficulties
of recruiting enough men, the Government General
72
proposed the same benefits for draftees and volunteers.
other benefits were also offered.
The draftees were
exernpted from the head tax, in sorne cases given French
citizenship, sorne families received welfare payments,
and war veterans were guaranteed ernployment.
The real motivation for the draft, and the
challenge which led to the resignation of Van Vollenhoven
250
was personified by Blaise Diagne, the black deputy
from the four communes of Senegal.
He pleaded with
Africans throughout the French territories to fight
for the French flag.
His recruiting efforts brought
forth an additional 63,000 men at a time when the
diminishing male population was making the conscription
more difficult.
Furthermore, deaths and disappearances
took their toll on African recruits.
Over 10 per cent
of the recruits were among the registered dead, and
another ten per cent wereunaccountedfor. But, in spite of
the high death rate, the Army Commission raised the
draft to 60,000 men per year for three years.
This
decision was made after the 1921 census which showed
about 622,500 middle aged men left, after subtracting
nomads, women, children and the aged, to continue to
meet crop requisitions and to provide food for a popula-
73
tion of twelve million inhabitants.
The northern region of Ivory Coast was ruthlessly
plundered of able-bodied men to meet the demands.
It
was thought that the men who had fought with Samori
against the French would weI come an occasion to take up
arms.
But times had changed and the booty of pre-
colonial warfare, i.e., gold and slaves, could not be
matched in European warfare.
When the first draft was called in October 1914,
none of the 70 recruits appeared, but there were eight
251
volunteers in Odienne.
(For comparison,
in Kong 150
recruits out of 200 requested showed up.
In Touba 70
out of 100 showed up.)
In the second draft,
in January
and April of 1918, none of the 50 draftees appeared and
there were no volunteers.
Several village chiefs were
punished for not cooperating with the draft.
Many
were given 15-day prison sentences.
The villages had
to cope with desertions collectively.
The peasants
were made directly responsible for the draftees from
their villages.
Any deserter was replaced by another
man of the same physical ability.
A draftee became a
deserter after six da ys if he had not been in the military
over three months; after 30 days if he had.
The captors
of deserters were to be awarded 25 francs, but no one
was ever turned in.
The administration tried to limit
desertions by dressing the recruits in military attire
within 24 hours of their arrivaI at military camp.
They made sure thatmeals for men from the northern
regions
had adequate rations of rice, and those from
the southern regions had p1enty of yams.
The recruits
were given fruit to fight beriberi, and military command
personnel was admonished to give instructions patiently.
By the third draft in May and June 1915, 34
out of 75 responded to the draft, and 87 volunteered.
Actually, 41 of the volunteers were draftees, but
they preferred to enlist to take advantage of the benefits
252
74
offered at the time.
In the first three drafts, the colony of Ivory
Coast gave 5,312 out of the 29,655 men fro~ French West
Africa.
In other words, the colony's contribution was
17.9% of the total, which far exceeded the proportion
of the colony's population ta French West Africa.
With
1.5 million inhabitants the population of Ivory Coast
only made up 13 per cent of French West Africa.
The quota for the next draft in 1915 was fixed
at 6,000 men from Ivory Coast.
Ta meet the quota the
definition of an able-bodied man grew less demanding.
The military began accepting anyone who could walk
except the mentally i l l and the handicapped.
The
physically fit included those men with goiters, ulcers,
guinea worms, hernias the size of a man's fist, and
other illnesses.
For the physical fitness exam, they
were asked ta run in groups of ten; only the slower
draftees were further examined.
Men weighing less
than 46 kilograms were refused.
The fourth draft quota
was fixed at 500 at Odienne
(Kong: 750, Touba: 500).
The cercle supplied 517 men, which included 88 volunteers,
between October 1915 and April 1916.
The fifth draft
was in January and February 1917.
One hundred men
were ta be drafted, but somehow the local administration
asked for twice as many men.
The cercle supplied 210
75
men,
including only 16 volunteers.
The administrator
253
noted that most of the able-bodied men had already
been called; but, since the cercle could not contribute
vast quantities of grains because of its distance from
the railroad,
the administrator doubled the number of
76
draftees.
In spite of the recruiting success, once the men
were enlisted the French met with protests and revolts.
There were complaints that salaries and monthly
allowances were incomplete.
Administrator Le Campion
noted in August 1917 that old people whose sons never
returned and war veterans were suffering while waiting
f
h
"
.
77
d'
f
th
or t
e1r pens10ns to arr1ve.
In 0 1enne sorne 0
e
draftees cut off their le ft thumbs making themselves unfit
for active warfare.
They were not alone.
For the
period 1914 to 1917 an average of 70 per cent of the
total number of recruits for French West Africa were
unfit for warfare.
In Ivory Coast, the rate was even
higher; about 78.9 per cent were considered unfit for
service.
Desertions were frequent,
especially in the
78
cercle of Kong.
The sixth draft was proposed by Clemenceau,
publicized by Blaise Diagne and,
in Ivory Coast, imple-
mented by Lieutenant Governor Antoinetti.
Al though
the Ivory Coast had already furnished 17 per cent of
the 93,899 recruits from French West Africa, Lieutenant
Governor Antoinetti, whose iron hand and unsympathetic
254
rule made him notorious, found that there were still
about 2,500 to 3,000 able-bodied men to be mobilized
if surprise visits were made on the villages.
By
" "
.
.
arrete of l March 1918, the L~eutenant Governor ra~sed
the number of recruits to be taken from the colony.
Part of his strategy was to require aIl men from 18
to 35 years of age to carry laissez-passers.
The
cercle of Odienne was asked to provide 500 men, but
79
managed to send 550 draftees.
(Kong:
400, Touba:
319).
In addition to men, the inhabitants of the colony also
were made to give their money.
Under Lieutenant Governor
Antoinetti, 1,043,000 francs were collected for the
80
war effort in 1917.
Officially the number of desertions was kept to
a minimum in the Odienne cercle.
In February 1918,
the administrator wrote that there had been sixteen
81
desertions out of approximately 1,500 enlisted men.
The low number of recorded desertions was explained by
informants who said that many families tried to hide
their sons, increasing the ranks of les bons absents.
But
as soon as the man returned to the village he was collect-
ed and sent to the army anyway.
The new recruits were sent to camps at Dimbokro
and Bouake.
Because of their poor physical conditions,
they were kept there to be weIl fed for a few months
before they were sent to Dakar.
Sorne men spent up to
255
82
six months.
From Dakar the men were distributed
among the various battalions:
90th Battalion at
Rufisque, 9lst Battalion at Ouakam
Pyrotechnie
or
92nd Battalion at Thiés-Pont.
Most of the Ivory Coast
recruits were sent to the 9lst Battalion.
Almost 50 per
cent of the losses during the war were due to the cold
European climate.
The black armies were not supposed to
fight during the European winters, from 15 October to
1 May, but were often sent into battle anyway~
Amputa-
83
tions due to frostbite were frequent.
During the period of conscription, the villages
were characterized by a highly charged atmosphere of
fear, suspicion, guilt, and obligation.
In most
cases the fa picked the most able-bodied young man in
the household.
It was a difficult, heartbreaking respon-
sibility to, in effect, decide who was to live or die
among the_male youth.
In sorne cases young men were
forced to volunteer by fathers or uncles who held
responsible positions as village or canton chiefs.
In this way they justified the recruiting of other rnen's
sons.
If the fa refused to give up a son, he was
severely punished by guards.
He was fastened into a
hut full of smoke and hot peppers.
Upon seeing their
fathers undergo the torture, many young men came out of
.hiding.
Sorne men resorted to sending their ex-slaves
in place of their children, but they had been duly warned
256
that the ex-slaves would return one day to ru~e them.
The men were assembled in Odienne at the post.
When
they marched out of town, mothers wept and threw them-
selves upon the ground, certain that their sons would
never return.
Generally informants said that about one-half of
the war recruits from their villages returned to the
84
region.
Once away from their families the enlisted
men from the same region organized themselves so that
every fifteen days they pooled their salaries and sent
85
a money order to one family at a time.
A regular
infantry man was only paid 15 francs per month.
While
sorne men sent their meager salaries to their relatives,
others kept the money to purchase bicycles and other
gifts before returning.
Among the ones who did return,
sorne sought jobs with the administration.
Amara Traore,
for instance, became a guard.
In spite of the promise
for administrative posts, sorne administrators chose
not to rely on the war veterans.
One administrator
noticed an acute desire for more authority on the part
of the veterans and suggested that the administration
86
stick to hereditary chiefs in the villages and cantons.
Among the many tales of war collected, certain
ones stand out as indicative of the plight of black
soldiers once they left the African continent.
The
difficulty of adapting to the cold weather was one of the
257
problems they met.
They encountered derision from
whites, both French and German.
One informant reported
that his time of service had ended when his homeward
bound train was stopped, and he was made to return to
combat.
His group was ambushed by the Germans, but
ail the French lieutenants managed to escape.
The
one remaining French corporal advised them to do as they
were told by the Germans.
They walked for two days
without food and water until they reached a prison camp.
Upon entering the camp, three of the Africans were beaten
to death.
The French prisoners laughed at the tragic
87
scene.
Another informant reported on the harsh conditions
on the battlefront.
The French had told the Germans that
the black soldiers were aIl loyal volunteers who had
come to aid France in the war.
Furthermore, black
soldiers could die three times.
To prove the accusation,
the informant explained that black soldiers were made to
stand in three lines with the most elementary weapons.
As the front line fell,
a second and finally a third
line of men replaced them until they were ail massacred.
Then the French soldiers went into battle.
When the
informant's battalion was imprisoned by the Germans,
they were destined to be executed when the curiosity of
a German soldier led them to ask about the rumors.
The
soldier was informed by a French-speaking Guinean that
258
the rumors were lies.
He explained that the black sold-
iers were taken against their will to fight for the
French, "and their weapons were supplied by the French;
Africans were incapable of producing such sophisticated
weaponry.
Furthermore, added the Guinean, Africans
die only one time, the only difference between them and
the Germans
was the color of their skins.
At the end
of his monoiogue, the Germans did not execute them.
They labored in the German prison camp until the end of
88
the war.
The strain of the cornbined effort of the colonies
to meet the needs of World War l
became a way of life.
The administration accepted it, and pushed the Africans
to limits which left the French astounded that more
Africans did not rebel in proteste
In Ivory Coast,
Lieutenant Governor Antoinetti pointed out,
In fact i t is no secret for anyone to
say that the demands the European war
has made us ask of the Africans to in-
tensify
agriculture for the metropole,
to recruit porters to transport the
produce, to calI men for military train-
ing, to make financial contributions for
the war, and to make so many efforts that
they cannot be accomplished without heavy
sacrifices.89
Such demands were made possible without repercussions
in Ivory Coast because the majority of people had been
disarmed during Augoulvant's pacification measures.
For want of any other means to protest, there was an
259
increase in migration toward the Gold Coast.
World War l has been considered a turning point
in the history of colonialism.
The exposure to different
lands and peoples of different cultures widened the
worldview of black soldiers.
They were not oblivious
to the principles for which they were fighting.
If
anything, i t became clear that they were being exploited
for the benefit of France.
No amount of rhetoric could
convince them that i t was for the benefit of the
Africans thatthey had been colonized.
It appeared that
the French needed Africa more than the Africans needed
90
France.
Unfortunately, the colonial stranglehold
was too tight for divergent thoughts.
The outside
world remained voiceless and considered conditions in
the colonies to be an internaI affaire
It was only
later, after the Second World War, that the Africans
themselves rose in militant opposition to the oppression
of colonialism.
Migration
Migration from the region of Odienne was often
forced.
Many had to migrate to do temporary work as
porters,
field hands, or woodsmen.
Their plight had
already been discussed.
Their absence, however,
diminished the number of field hands available in the
region, and, at the same time, made them negative assets
260
for their families.
First, the productivity of the
family was reduced by the worker's departure.
Other
family members worked harder to make up for his absence.
Second, the family was still held responsible for his
share of the head tax, in spite of the fact that the
tax was deducted in advance from the worker's meager
wages.
Third, the prestation was deducted from his wages.
Fourth, i t was not always certain that any remuneration
would be received for his labor, nor that anything would
be left after the worker supplemented his food rations.
Fifth, the poor working conditions and physical abuse
and illness often left the worker absolutely useless
to his family upon his return.
Migration for labor and trade account for the
numerous people from Odienne who have settled voluntarily
into the forest zone.
In pre-colonial Kabadugu the land
seemed sufficient to meet the needs of the peasants.
But because of French requisitions of crops, men, and
taxes,
local production was no longer adequate.
Famines
accounted for the weakened health of peasants and the
high mortality rate.
The return of sick laborers
provoked a lowering birth rate.
Many villages were
9l
almost deserted, practically void of life.
50 many
young people left the region voluntarily in search of
food and fortune.
Sorne relatives even begged young
people to leave to seek work elsewhere to help supplement
261
the family income.
According to one informant, prior
to the arrival of the Europeans two hundred young people
could be seen in a village.
But during the colonial
period perhaps only ten were visible because most of
them had been sent to one of the many worksites through-
92
out the colony.
Sorne of the young men joined the ranks of hired
laborers.
They were hired for public works, on planta-
tions, and in nascent factories around Abidjan.
After
a prolonged absence, the family sent a wife to join
the
young man; and later, a younger brother joined him.
Eventually there were 3,000 to 4,000 men migrating to
the forest zone from the savannah regions annually.93
Other adventurous migrants took their chances on
cash crop plantations in the forest zone.
Cocoa planta-
tions were part of a program of forced cultivation
initiated by Lieutenant Governor Angoulvant.
The program
became especially important after the rubber crisis, not
only for the French, but also for the peasants who
needed a new export crop to help meet the problerns of
taxation.
Although there were sorne European cocoa
plantations, which were entirely dependent on African
1abor, cocoa rernained largely in the hands of local
producers.
In 1939, thirty years after the program was
initiated, European plantations on1y accounted for
8,000 hectares out of a total of 180,000 hectars of
262
cocoa trees.
The same was true of coffee plantations.
Two-thirds of the productionremained in the hands of
African producers.
An informant stated that the adminis-
trators in the south encourage jula migrants to plant
cocoa and coffee, because i t would bring them large
.
94
pro f ~ts.
Most of the migrants made their introduction into
the forest zone through trade.
Many peasants tried
their luck as traders.
Trading had become less dangerous
since the pacification, and more lucrative due to the
establishment of markets by the French administration.
While some men traded sporadically and returned to
Odienne after short periods away, others settled near
the posts and railroad stations, where they made important
profits as intermediaries between European merchants and
African consumers.
There were a myriad of imported
goods to be distributed into small villages throughout the
colony where neither European nor Lebanese merchants had
dared venture.
Furthermore, the opening of the forest zone took
them closer to kola producers than ever before.
The
jula maintained tight control over the kola trade and
remained evasive to Europeans who wished to participate
.
. t
95
ln
~
.
While trading for kola nuts, they discovered
that the inhabitants of the forest zone appreciated
dried fish.
The fish were prepared by the Bozo fishermen
263
in Mali.
In passing from its source at Goundham to the
market at Bouake, the fish increased to five to ten
times its original priee.
The first jula to settle at Rubino, a village
96
in southeastern Ivory Coast, arrived in 1918.
The
first individual jula to settle in the Bete region came
in 1925, but he did not purchase any land until 1941.
97
There was a greater influx after 1945.
Another study
shows that the jula community developed around the
train stations in the Attie region.
At the time of the
study in 1969, 40 per cent of the stranger population
98
of Anyama was from Odienne.
Claude Meillassoux had
discussed the presence of jula among the Gouro as
intermediaries between the Gouro and the administration.
The jula bought local produce from the Gouro and resold
i t to the Europeans.
Eventually the jula purchased
trucks to transport huge quanitities of coffee and cocoa
from the plantations to markets several kilometers
away.99
Other zones of settlement include Dabakala,
Katiola,
Bondoukou, Abidjan, Gagnoa,
Bouake, and Daloa.
Sorne preferred to stay closer to their region and
100
settled at Touba, Man, or Ferkessedougou.
Lamine Doubia was bitter as he explained that
young people fled the region, abandoning the land of
their ancestors to become refugees in other regions.
When they left,
the young people had no direction;
264
they merely followed their inclinations in trade or
agriculture until a satisfactory place of settlement was
found.
Moreover, he stated that most of them never
10l
returned to Odienne.
Many were too afraid to return
during the colonial period for fear of being discovered
and forcefully taken away by the administration.
The
few who did return came only temporarily out of nostal-
.
t
t h '
l '
.
102
g~a
0
see
e~r re at~ves aga~n.
The increase in mobility led to changes in the
traditional Malinke family unit.
The conditions there
forced out many young people who, far from the family
unit, began making decisions for the first time.
They
became independent of past obligations to the fa.
Although they frequently sent money and gifts back, the
young men decided on their own how much to send.
There
was a general breakdown of authority within the family,
provoked by distance and necessity.
Prior to that respect
for the decisions of elders and obedience to them was
very great.
Any transactions made outside of the family
were made through intermediaries.
Any moves away from
the village were made with permission because of the
dangers and insecurity of travelo
The new ease of
circulation of the widened roads gave young people more
freedom.
The administration was also able to see that the
family was disintegrating, because of the exodus of
265
young people.
Without paternal guidance, crime was on
the increase.
Henri Cosnier suggested a return of
authority
to traditional chiefs as a first step, and
secondly, to educate young people in agriculture and
respect for the family.103
On the contrary, the solu-
tion lay in a change of attitude and economic conditions
on the part of the French administration.
They alone
were responsible for the changes in the family unit.
An
administrator in the region was more accurate in his
description of the problems of young people in the region.
He states that they were often absent or busy working
in the fields,
leaving them little time to show their
real dispositions.
But, he was aware of their displeasure
with the opportunities in the region.
He wrote,
.
.
. the Malinke jula who circulate
throughout the colony and neighboring
colonies must see that no amelioration
has been made in their case, neither by
the creation of the railway, nor by
placing agricultural equipment or ferti-
lizer at their use.
.
.
.
The difficulties
that we notice in the cercle, for which we
accuse the lack of versatility and fore-
sight, their routine stubbornness and aptitude
for agricultural work seem to stem from the
isolation and remoteness of this region
which puts i t at a distance from the economic
movement of the colony.104
Negligence and a rapidly decreasing population laid the
groundwork for regional disparity in these early days
of colonial rule.
The fault lies within the purposes
and goals of colonialism and their inconsistency with
266
with the needs of the region.
The Sarraut Plan
After World War l, the French governrnent once
again focused its attention on development in the
colonies as a means to retrieve the metropole from its
postwar stupor.
If France was to recover, then the
colonies had to provide the raw materials in the quan-
tities needed to put the metropole back on its feet.
The reason that the colonies had not already contributed
was a general deficiency in internal development which
would have permitted greater trade between France and
h
1
·
105
h
d
h
.
f
er co on~es.
T us, un er t
e gu~se 0
a more
liberal colonial policy in which the colonial inhabitants
would be considered in direct association with the
metropole, the African peasants were to provide raw
materials in return for cheap manufactured goods, and
crumbs of westerncivilization, i.e., a few schools and
hospitals.
The new aggressive approach to development
in the colonies was presented to the French government
l06
by Albert Sarraut, Minister of Colonies.
It was
based on the mutual independence of the two:
France
and her overseas colonies.
The plan was a turnabout
from the former policies in which a maximum of autonomy
was encouraged to prevent the colonies from draining
the resources of the metroDole.
Now the French wished
267
to drain the wealth of the colonies to recharge a
weakened France.
Sarraut suggested that maximum profits might be
made through increased regional specialization.
For
instance, cocoa was to be promoted in Ivory Coast,
cotton in the Niger valley, and oil and timber in West
and Central Africa.
Europe had a "responsibility" to
make the natural resources of the colonies available
107
to the rest of the world.
The African peasant would
play an important role in development.
Adequate health
facilities would insure a plentiful supply of labor.
A
dynamic program of public works was proposed.
Sarraut's
ideas were adopted into law on 12 April 1921.
The
program included extensions of ports, bridges, railroads,
and the construction of administrative buildings, more
roads, irrigation, medical assistance, urban development
108
and schools.
The project was to be financed with
loans to the Government General, backed by the French
goernment. But by the end of the year a financial crisis
left France in no position to back loans.
The money to
initiate the plan was not available.
The Government General was entrapped in a program
with no financing.
In spite of the lack of money, the
colonies pushed ahead with parts of the program,
relying
on local budgets increased through higher taxation.
Maurice Delafosse,
in Histoire des colonies francaise,
~
268
congratulated GovernorGeneral Carde's administration
(1923-1929)
for continuing and actively pursuing
development in the colonies without asking for large
109
suros of money from the metropole.
Such "praise-
worthy" acts were made possible by further exploitation
of the African peasant through more forced labor, more
intensive agriculture, and increased taxation.
In
Odienne African peasants did not benefit.
Intensifica-
tion of obligations to the administration led to further
depopulation of the region,
famine, and a breakdown
in the social fabric of the people.
1
1
1
269
•
Pootnotes to Chapter VI
loenise Bouche, Les villages, p.
2.
2Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, L'~re
coloniale, p.
83.
30enise Bouche, Les villages . .
0' pp. 127-123.
4population estimate of Martin Klein in Suzanne
Miers and Igor Kopytoff, eds., Slavery in Africa, p. 74,
footnote 12.
Jean Suret-Canale in Afrique noire, Vol.
II,
p. 87, estirnated 8,250,000 inhabitants with a slave
population of two million.
5capitaine Marchand in "L'Esclavage et
l'Islamisme," BCAF, 1896, p.
38.
6 Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique noire, Vol. II,
p.
82.
7M. E. Salesses in "Le chemin de fer . • . ,"
BCAF, 1898, p.
236.
8Jean-LOuis Boutillier," "Les captifs en AOP,"
l FAN ,
1968, p. 527.
9ANM 7, lE-125.
10
.
d
ff
1
Suzanne M~ers an
Igor Kopyto
, S avery,
p. 74, footnote 12.
•
llHadja
Kone, Abidjan .
l2pelix de Kersaint-Gilly, "Essai sur l"volution
de l'esclavage en AOF," BCEHS, 1924, pp. 469-477.
l3 Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, Vol. II,
~' 88, Denise Bouche, Les villages . . . , p. 156-
14
.
t
Rense~gnemen s
co l '
on~aux, n
10
o . , BCAF 1909 .
270
15 R-P. Anoma, Th~se 3e cycle, p. 165, D. Domergue
The'se 3e Cycl e, p. 187 .
16Moktar Toure, Odienne, Nov. 1975.
17M
d '
. .
ama ou C1sse, M1n1gnan, Nov.
1975.
18 Gaoussou Toure, Odienne Nov. 1975.
19 Jean Suret-Canale, Afrigue Noire, Vol. II,
p.
315.
20AND 2g37-40.
21Marabout of Kabala Oct. 1975.
22Adama Kone, Bako, Nov. 1975.
23 JOCl, 15 June 1906, Roume Address. August
Terrier,
"Le programme de M. Le Gouverneur Général Roume,"
BCAF, 1903, p. 311.
24Henri Cosnier, L'Quest Africain, p.
220.
25 Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique noire, Vol. II,
p.
260.
26
~
R.-P. Anorna, These 3e Cycle, p. 163.
27Tenant farmers returned 1/3 of their crops to
the land owner according to El Hadj Matche Savane,
Dakar, 1974.
28Matche Keita, Koro, Oct. 1975.
29W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,
p.
228.
30 El Hadj Berna Sangare, Odienne, Oct. 1975.
31El Hadj Marnadou Coulibably, Abidjan, Oct.
1975.
271
32 Son of Nawourya Savane, and Berna Sangare,
Odienne, Oct.
1975.
33Danie11e Domergue, Thèse 3e Cycle, p.
567.
34 Marabout of Kaba1a, Oct. 1975. Matche Savane,
Dakar, Aug.
1974.
35 E1 Hadj Kanaman, Tienko Oct.
1975.
Lamine
Doumbia, Kabangoue, Oct. 1975.
36 ANCI 1EE92, 1923.
37A1mami Toure's brother, Sananferedougou,
Oct.
1975.
Nawourya Savane, Odiene Oct.
1975.
38 AND 2G 37-40, 1937.
39E1 Hadj Gaoussou Toure and Ismai1a Toure,
Odienne,
1978.
40 ANCI DD109.
41ANM IQ-8 1899, 1903 Letter No. 393.
42 ANM IQ-8 1903
43ANCI DD 109.
44 ANCI QQ70.
45 ANCI 1EE 92.
Rapport 2e trimestre, 1925.
46 JOCI , Circu1ar 15 aout 1900.
47 JOCI Circulaire 3 juillet 1901.
48 JOCI arrêté 14 December 1902.
49
,-
,
5 . . . . . /
JOCI Arrete 13 February 190 , Arrete
31 December 1905.
272
50 JOCI Circulaire 15 March 1907.
51ANCI Rapport mensuel Cercle de Kong 1904,
p.
19.
52Nawourya Savane, Odienne, Oct. 1975.
53
.... /
JOCI Arrete 25 November 1912 Gov't Gen.
54 R ._P . Anoma, Thèse 3e cycle, pp. 149-151.
55
1"
b '
Fe lX Du OlS,
"L'automobile au Soudan,"
BCAF, 1898, p. 408.
56 ANM Mali 26 IQ 267.
57Almami Toure, Sanaferedougou, Oct.
1975 .
•
58Semi-Bi Zan "La politique coloniale des
travaux publiques en C.I."
Annales, pp.
49-50.
59 Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, Vol. II,
p.
354.
60Mok tar Toure, 0 d"lenne, Nov. 1975 .
6lsiranzi Isiaka Toure, Odienne, Oct.
1975.
62 ANCI lEE92.
63 ANCI QQ 70 Rapport 3e trim. 1923.
64 Imam of Maninian, Oct. 1975.
65chief of Sirana, Oct.
1975.
66chief of Sirana, Oct.
1975.
67Moktar Toure, Odienne, Nov.
1975.
68 Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, Vol. II,
p.
326.
273
69Roberts, Fr. C 1
o . P0 1"l.cy, p. 332 •
70J • Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, Vol. II.
7lM• Oalafosse, Histoire des Colonies frangaises,
pp. 349-50.
72 0 . Domergue, Th~se 3e cycle, p. 365.
73 s . Roberts, Fr. Col. policy, p. 322.
74 Domergue, Th~se 3e cycle, pp. 350, 354, 359, 367.
75 0 . Domergue, Thàse 3e cycle, pp. 369, 371-378.
76ANCI lEE92 (3) p. 3.
77ANCI Rapports politique, 1917.
78 J • Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, Vol. II,
p. 187.
790 • Domergue, Th~se 3e cycle, pp. 387, 394, 406.
80ANO 2G17-l7.
8lANCI lEE92 (3) p. 3.
82El Hadj Kanaman, Tienko, Oct. 1975.
830 • oomèrgue, These 3e cycle, pp. 419, 427.
8 4 .
Lam1.ne Doumb'l.a says 4 out 0 f 8 ret urned .
Almami
Taure said 3 out of 7.
85 Beme Sangare, Oct. 1975.
86ANCI 1 EE92(9).
87El Hadj Kanaman's brother, Oct. 1975.
274
88 Marabout of Kabala, Oct. 1975.
89AND 2G17-17.
90 H. Brunschwig, Mythes and Realities, p.
183.
91E1 Hadj Mamadou Coulibably, Oct.
1975.
92Moktar Toure, Nov. 1975.
9 3 ,
.-
/
Jean Tr1cart,
"Les echanges entre la zone
forestiere . • • " p. 230.
94 J • Suret Canale, Afrique noire, Vol. II,
pp. 282-285.
95 Jean Tricart shows that by 1956 Ivory Coast
was furnishing 75% of the total consommation of kolas
in French West Africa.
"Les echanges . . . "
COM IX,
pp. 213-214.
96Dupire,
"Planteurs Autochtones et Etrangers
en Basse CI orientale" Etudes Eburn~enes, 1960.
97A. Kobben, "Le Planteur noir," Etudes
Eburneenes, V, 1956, p. 1974.
98M. Verniere, "Anyama, Etude de la population
et du commerce kolatier," ORSTOM - vol. VI, no.
l,
p. 87.
99C • Meil1assoux, Anthropologie ~conomique des
Gouros, pp. 300-301.
100 l
A
'
mama1 Toure, Sananf ered ougou, Oc t .
1975 .
1 0 1 .
b'
b
1975
Lam1ne Doum 1a, Ka angoue, Oct.
.
102Mamadou
Cisse, Maninian, Nov.
1975, Mamadou
Toure, Odienne, Oct. 1975.
103C
.
L'
Af"
166
osn1er,
ouest
r1ca1n, p.
.
104ANCI EE VI 13/6 (4018), 1933.
275
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
By analyzing the economy of a kingdom from its
inception, through its expansion and beyond the cataclys-
mic interruption of colonial conquest, the strains of
continuity and change within a society in conflict with
alien economic impulses become apparent.
The pre-
colonial kingdom of Kabadugu has been presented as a
dynarnic political unit in various phases of growth.
From
the centralization of independent clans into one state
under the Toure dynasty,
the kingdom thrived, inter-
acting with surrounding state formations through war,
protective alliances, and trade.
The original stratifica-
tion and political hierarchy existing within the clans of
Malinke peoples laid a
foundation for development of
Kabadugu in the nineteenth century.
The impact of
colonialism was to snatch the kingdom from the arena of
external interactions with other Sudanic peoples, and
to reduce i t to a series of administrative divisions with-
in the colonial regime.
In the process, not only did colonialism break
the reign of the Toure dynasty,
i t also shook the pyra-
midal structure of traditional authority.
For instance,
276
the allegiance which had existed between peasants and
chiefs was shattered, since in order to maintain their
positions the chiefs were obliged to behave with strict
obedience and unrelenting loyalty to the French adminis-
tration.
Artificial relationships were imposed in the
form of African representatives to the administration
who acted as intermediaries between the canton chiefs and
the administrators.
They exercised their will over the
peasants and succeeded in profiting from the chaos of the
transition.
Together with local chiefs, guards, inter-
pretors, and political agents, they formed a colonial
elite.
Their exploitation of the peasants bore no
resemblance to the previous relationship of the ruling
classes to their subjects.
Rarely did a canton or village
chief raise a protest against the terrorism inflicted upon
his people by the administration because of the personal
risks involved.
Previous virtues of traditional society
were smothered in favor of survival.
The colonial police
served as a constant reminder to the peasants that the
teeth of colonialism had firmly clamped around them.
The emancipation of slaves in the region was a
definitive break with the pasto
All peasants were made
available to the exactions of the colonial administration,
equally oppressed and equally responsible to the adminis-
tration.
By eliminating slave owners, the regime had mo~e
direct control over more peasants.
In essence, cololJlalism
277
destroyed the interpersonal relationships which held i t
together and left a me~e skeleton of local authority.
The
skeleton was tolerated only because of the scarcity of
French administrative personnel.
In the early stages of colonialism only the fa
retained the traditional authority and respect due him
by the extended family.
As he had divided the labor,
distributed food,
and served as the keeper of the family's
wealth in the past, so his role continued in the colonial
periode
But his responsibility for the family well-being
declined as he struggled to meet the demands of colonial-
ism.
He chose the men for the forced labor camps, the
prestations, the porters, and the war.
He led the family
into the fields and forests to meet quotas for food pro-
duction and rubber collection.
He directed them onto the
trade routes in search of means to help him meet his
ultimate liability for each farnily's head taXe
The goal of colonial rule was to direct the economic
potential of Africa into the metropole which was in the
midst of industrialization.
The French sought primary
materials for their industrial expansion and freedom from
importation of expensive manufactured goods from other
sovereign states.
The mobilization of every African
peasant was essential to them.
From having actively
participated in a mixed economy of subsistence agriculture
and trade of ~imited surplus, local handicrafts, kola nuts,
278
salt, and slaves, the peasants now found themselves depriv-
ed of every initiative.
Their daily lives were controlled
by a land and people they knew nothing about.
They
produced surpluses enormous in relation to their pro-
ductive capacities, only to see them taken away to the
administrator while they silently suffered from famine.
Even when young men migrated, they often remembered
their families in Odienne and sent the fruit of their
endeavors to the fa.
Still the distance between the young
men and the fa lessened the influence of the latter, and
led to a decline in family cohesiveness.
The changeover to a money economy contributed to
.
the shock.
The peasants could no longer rely on their
own local production, but were compelled to deal with
French commercial houses to exchange their goods for the
precious coins needed to pay taxes.
They were denied the
alternative of offering cotton bands, a calabash of
rice, or a goat as they once did when paying the annual
tribute to their traditional rulers.
Furthermore, services
which were once rendered by traditional associations in
exchange for symbolic remuneration and prestige, e.g.,
clearing fields or harvesting, were reduced to economic
transactions in which individuals were paid in cash for a
day's labor.
The jula responded by playing an intermediary
role between the peasant producers and the European buyers.
279
But peasants were ignorant of the wider implications of
the relationship between their small region and world
markets. Poor remuneration was given to African peasants
for produce requiring much time and labor.
Prior to the
arrivaI of the French, the market reflected the direct
relationship of production to labor, and fluctuations of
supply and demand.
But European imports were over priced,
and the superior knowledge of French merchants allowed an
"unequal exchange of 'quasi-equivalents,,,l within the
market system.
Furtherrnore, the profits the colonialists
were seeking were not in Odienne, but in the fore st zone.
The French forced thousands of men to leave their fields
to labor in the more productive forest regions.
Through
their experiences in the forced labor camps, the men were
exposed to other ethnie groups and discovered regions
they had not known before.
Many recognized the potential
for trade.
Others perceived that remuneration of crops
was better there than in Odienne.
Even African cash
crop producers could afford to hire several men on their
plantations.
There were concrete differences between the
north and the south.
Already at this early period of
colonial history, regional disparity had already become a
reality.
Migrant workers from Odienne spread into the forest
zone, and new trends were set in motion.
Robin Cohen
refers to "processes of reasantization and
280
proletarianization,,2 within societies under colonialism.
The development of sorne peasants into a proletariat as
a result of performing labor for wages was concurrent
with an intensification of agriculture either for the
3
growth of cash crops or for food.
The colonial adminis-
tration's insistence on a maximum of both types of pro-
duction pushed regions like Odienne to the brink of
despair.
Since Odienne cou Id not compete with the cash
crop producing regions to the south, i t lost its most
able-bodied men to the growing rural proletariat.
The African peasant was made to perform unknowingly
within a capitalist mode of productionoverwhich he had
no control.
Colonialism robbed the African peasant of
his ability to influence his own future.
Through the
various mechanisms of oppression discussed in this study,
the French were able to sustain labor conditions favorable
4
to their enterprises.
The intentions of the French were obvious and are
readily visible in the Sarraut Plan of 1921.
The French
aimed to exploit the most
necessary and valuable primary
materials in each colony.
The means to exploit the
primary materials were forced labor and forced cultivation.
The integration and self-sufficiency of each colony was
undesireable.
The West African colonies were to be bound
to the metropole to nourish i t back to health in the
aftermath of World War I.
Furthermore, the French
281
intended to be protected from any future economic crisis.
According to Henri Brunschwig, the post World War period
was a turning point.
He states,
. . • The colonial powers lost their clear
consciences, though this in no way inter-
ferred with their pursuing a policy of
expansion.
It is at this point that the
expression 'colonialism' first comes to have
a deprecatory meaning . . . of the exploitation
of colonized peoples in the 5xclusive
.
interests of the colonizers.
In other words, the humanitarian pretexts for coloniza-
tions were dropped.
Colonization for the sake of
oppression and profit was unveiled as the naked goal of
French imperialism.
The turn of events leading up to
this point wholly confirms the accusations.
Brunschwig
concludes that imperialism is not synonymous with the
civilizing of non-Western peoples.
He says,
They would have followed the same path
whether or not they had been subject to
direct European control.
But, they would
have developed in their own way and accord-
ing to their own rhythm, each achieving
in the form best suited to it a symbiosis
of the elements taken from western society
and its own particular traditions. 6
The end result was, according to Delavignette,
la clochardisation of the colonies.?
The colonies had
been transformed into penniless vagrants susceptible to
unrestrained exploitation.
Colonialism destroyed the
equilibrium of traditional society without offerinq a
viable replacement.
The peasants grappled with colonial-
ism in an attempt to find outlets for self-expression,
282
but they generally responded by performing within the
constraints afforded them by the French regime.
The Odienne case is one example among many in the
Third World of the negative impact of imperialism upon
traditional economic systems.
The failure of the metro-
pole to transform their mode of production into one
capable of competing on an equal basis with the capita-
list system is the primary cause of underdevelopment.
Walter Rodney, in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,
illustrates the impact of European contact on the African
continent and lucidly depicts the limitations of African
response.
The colonies dangled at the mercy of imperial-
ist governments.
Reactions among those who study the history of
oppressed peoples pivot from mournful regret over the
past to aggressive efforts to reestablish the equilibrium
characteristic of pre-colonial society.
Independence for
the colony of Ivory Coast meant the inheritance of a
weakened, crippled land.
On 4 December 1960, the people
accepted a disjointed,underdeveloped nation as their
colonial legacy.
The importance of the president, Felix
Houphouet-Boigny, as the charismatic figure attempting to
laya foundation for national unity in the political and
economic arenas is unmistakable.
The formation of a one-
party government, PDCI-RDA, was a step in that direction.
Through his experience in the French government èS a deputy
283
and Minister of Health, he became a seasoned politician in
domestic and international affairs.
At the same time, as
an African cash crop planter and a country doctor, he had
been exposed to the moral disappointment and physical
suffering of colonized peoples.
In Ivory Coast he was
praised as the one person responsible for the "liberation,"
the end of forced labor in the colonies, and the termina-
tion of the dreaded head taXe
From independence he
steered the state toward the evolution of a sound agricul-
tural based economy.
The initial moves displayed a
repetition of prevailing tendencies set in motion since
the colonial periode
Finally, in 1974, in an historic
visit to ~he Odienne region, he expressed the need to
bring the northern reaches of the country into the main-
stream of economic development.
From 9 May 1974 to
17 May 1974, he listened to grievances from the inhabitants
of the region.
On the eve of the momentous journey, the
President of the Economic and Social Council, El Hadj
Mamadou Coulibaly, stated a need for two items:
(1)
dams
to provide more irrigable land use, and
(2)
regular
access by the local airlines to permit closer contact
with the capital, 950 km.
away.
Mr. Lamine Diabate,
speaking on behalf of the people of Odienne, challenged
the President to "seize destiny by its throat," and
relieve the region from the economic bottleneck of the
pasto
In response, a complete program for the development
284
of the region was devised by the economic task force
which accompanied the President.
They promised aid for
extensive cattle raising projects to make Odienne and
Korhogo the two major livestock producing centers of the
country.
Hundreds of kilometers of paved road were to
be added to link Odienne through Man and Touba directly
to the port at San Pedro.
More permanent bridges, deep
water wells in aIl villages, and running water and
electricity in thesub-prefectures were included.
A
surprising announcement was the nationalization of the
local airline, Air-Ivoire, to permit more frequent ser-
vice to aIl regions of the country.
But the proposed
/
lycee, to be located at the prefecture, and the nine
dams were the most desired projects.
To insure the
confidence of the population and to assure them of the
seriousness of the government, seven additional sub-
prefectures were founded in the region to bring govern-
·8
ment into more direct contact with the people.
In the course of his speeches to the inhabitants,
the President beseeched them to invite emigrants back to
the region to lend a hand in the effort to develop the
region.
He realized that rural exodus could be stopped
by bringing the necessary infrastructure to keep inhabit-
ants in the region.
He recognized that the inhabitants
needed to be provided with work, commodities, decent
housing, maternity clinics, schools, water, electricity,
285
and cultural centers.
He promised to send trained
personnel to help the peasants to improve conditions
around them.
Moreover, he implored the cadres of the
region to actively participate as interpretors of pro-
gress to their relatives.
Today, i t is reassuring to note that many of the
projects have begun and are in the process of being
completed.
As one informant noted,
"At least now young
people who wish to work can find it.,,9
However, the 1974
development package was not an end in itself.
Other
steps, such as the equalization of priees of certain
commodities, like gasoline and sugar, throughout the
country have been taken.
Under the leadership of a
deterrnined president, Ivory Coast has lifted the challenge
of its past to turn the tables around.
Profits reaped
in the south from the combined efforts of northern
immigrants and the forest populations are being re-
distributed in favor of a more equitable development.
It
is their hope that Ivory Coast might face the difficulties
imposed by external world market fluctuations as a
united, egalitarian nation.
286
Footnotes' to Chapter VII
.-
lL. Cliffe, "Rural Political Economy of Africa"
in Gutkind & Wallerstein, eds. Political Economy, p. 114.
2R. Cohen,
"From Peasants to Workers in Africa"
in Gutkind & Wallerstein, eds., Political Economy, p. 156.
3 I . Wallerstein,
"The Three Stages of African
Involvement in the World-Economy," in Gutkind &
Wallerstein, eds., Political Economy, p. 44.
4L • Cliffe, "Rural Political Economy of Africa,"
in Gutkind & Wallerstein, eds., political Economy, p. 114.
5H. Brunschwig, French Colonialism, p. 183.
6Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism, p. 185.
7R• Delavignette, L'Afrigue noire et son destin,
p. 159.
8Frat • Mat. -- 8 May to 18 May 1974.
9
d '
.
.
1975
Marna ou C~sse, M~n~gnan,
•
287
APPENDIX A
I .
Market priees at Danane
ANCI
Monographie de Seguela
25 avril 1904
le Capitaine Commandant le Distreict
signe:
Moutard
p. 33
1 coupe-coupe
200
kola nuts
1 bracelet a cuivre
30 -
40
kola nuts
1 pagne mandingue
3 -
500
kola nuts
1 bila
100
kola nuts
1 collier perle
80
kola nuts
*1 barre de sel
300
kola nuts
1 hache
100
kola nuts
1 kg. riz
40
kola nuts
1 kg. arachide
80
kola nuts
1 boeuf
9 - 10,000
kola nuts
1 sou
5
kola nuts
*Certainly the administrator must be referring
to the 2 kilograrn kokotla of salt.
II.
Market priees at Touba
Van Cassel "La Haute Cote d'Ivoire Occidentale"
Bulletin du Comite de l'Afrique Francaise
Renseignements Coloniaux
1901
p. 109
1 noix de kola
1 centime
kola nuts
1 fusil
1,500 -
2,000
kola nuts
288
Market priees at Touba (continued)
l sabre
600 -
700
kola nuts
l couteau
200 -
400
kola nuts
l
lance
500
kola nuts
l
pagne
1,000
kola nuts
l boeuf
7,000 - 8,000
kola nuts
l
captif
10,000
kola nuts
l natte
50
kola nuts
III.
Market priees at Ouolosebougou
Louis Binger, Du Niqer au Golfe de Guinee, 1887-
1889, Volume I, p. 27
mil
50 kg.
l
ba
2.50 francs
fonio
20 kg.
l
ba
2.50 francs
riz
10 kg.
l
ba
2.50 francs
sel
25 kg.bar
31 ba
77.50 francs
huile
(ce)
50 kg.
2 keme
0.50 francs
,
chevre
12 ba
30.00 francs
mouton
15 ba
37.50 francs
poulet
l
ba
4 keme
3.30 francs
boeuf
68 ba
170.00 francs
ane
48 ba
120.00 francs
fusil a pierre
15 ba
37.50 francs
bandes 10 cm x 66 cm
l keme
0.25 francs
l
pierre a fusil
l keme
0.25 francs
l aiguille
40 cauris
0.10 francs
289
ouo1osebougou (continued)
guinee bleue
1 coudee
3 keme
0.75 francs
15 m.
1 piece
9 ba
22.50 francs
calicot blanc anglaise
15 m.
1 piece
11 ba
27.50 francs
l
turban
2 ba
12.50
*800 cowries - 1 ba
80 cowries - 1 keme
1,600 cowrie -
2 ba -
5 francs
IV.
Market priees at Seguela
Journal Officiel de Cote d'Ivoire
15 mars 1903
Partie non-officiele
Cercle de Kong
"Mercuriale locale"
p. 9
chevel
250 - 300
francs
boeuf
70 - 125
francs
vache
150
francs
mouton
15
francs
ch~vre
sel en barre
l kg.
3.5
francs
riz décortiqué
l kg.
0.30 francs
non-decortiqué
0.15 francs
mil
l kg.
0.10 francs
mais
l kg.
0.05 francs
paille d'arachide
1 botte
0.10 francs
caoutchouc
1 kg.
2.50 francs
ivoire
5 -
8.00 francs
daba
1. 50 francs
haches
1. 50 francs
,
290
Seguela
(continued)
sompe
0.05 francs
cauris
v.
Market priees at Bougouni
AND lG303
Cercle de Bougouni
1904
caoutchouc
kg.
4.50 -
5.00 francs
cire
kg.
0.50 -
l. 00 francs
/
cereals
kg.
0.10 -
0.20 francs
poulet
piece
0.05
l. 00 francs
oeufs
piece
0.05 francs
miel
bouteille
l.00 francs
karite
kg.
l. 00 -
2.00 francs
boeuf
40.00 -
45.00 francs
vache
80.00 - 110.00 francs
mouton
6.00 -
15.00 francs
sel en barre
1 barre40.00 -
50.00 francs
/
guinee
1 piece 9.00 -
I l . 00 francs
toile
1 meter 0.40 -
0.85 francs
25-30 meter14.00 -
17.50 francs
escamitte, basin,
1 meter l. 00 -
2.00 francs
limineas
allumettes, fil,
savon,
le bleu, cordes, absinthe
291
VI.
Market priees at Sikasso
AND 1G146 Mission Capitaine Quiquandon dans
le Kenedougou
No.
32
1890
etoffes anglaises
1 piece
(15 m.)
5.00 fr.
calicot
(vosges)
l
piece
35.00 fr.
limeneas
1 piece
50.00 fr.
calicot
(anglais)
1 piece
25.00 fr.
siamoise
1 pagne
(1.75 m)
25.00 fr.
dampe
(etoffe de
50-57.00 fr.
Kong)
kassa
(etoffe laine de
10.00 fr.
Macina)
pagnes du pays
15-17.00 fr.
aiguilles de 4 cm
0.05 fr.
pierres a fusil
0.15 fr.
boubou rayer bleu
25.00 fr.
jaune rouge blanc
pantalon rayer
10.00 fr.
plomb en petites
40 per kg.
6.35 fr.
baguettes
boules de bleu
(6)
0.50 fr.
cuivre en baguettes
kg.
15.00 fr.
riz
kg.
0.25 fr.
mil
kg.
0.20 fr.
papier la feuille
0.40 fr.
sel la barre
100.00 fr.
mouchoirs de
2.50-
3.00 fr.
couleur rouge
boubou
(etoffe du pays)
25.00 fr.
*3,000 cowries -
5.00 francs
292
VII.
Market priees at Segu
AND lG 320 "Notice sur le Cercle de Segou"
l March 1904
percale
la piece
lB.OO francs
indiennes
la piece
30.00 francs
guinea
la piece
10.00 francs
sucre
kg.
2.50 francs
perles
sel gemme
la barre
30.00 francs
sel marin
kg.
0.75 francs
kola
la noix
0.10 francs
*1,000 cowries -
1.00 franc in 1900
AND lG 24B Notice sur le Cercle de Segou
p. 244
VIII.
Market priees at Bamako
ANM IQ-4 Correspondence Commerciale
Cercle de Bamako
Lettre Capitaine Loyer
l mai 18B7
captives
l
head
200.00 francs
sel
la barre
75.00 francs
tissus
metre
1. 00 francs
kola
la noix
0.25 francs
cheval
1,200.00 francs
mouton
20.00 francs
AND lG299 Monographie du Cercle de Bamako
Avril 1904
toile blanche
metre
0.53 francs
guinea
la piece
(15 m)
B.OO francs
3 rnetres
2.00 francs
293
Bamako
(continued)
shandorce
la piece
9.00 francs
cardes
la paire
2.50 francs·
cauris jeu de 4 (16,18,20,22 cm)
7.00 francs
bleu
kg.
3.00 francs
roum
7.50 metres
5.00 francs
pagnes confectiones
1
5.00 francs
escamittes
metre
1.00 francs
bazin blanc
metre
1.00 francs
teint
metre
1.25 francs
wine, beer, champagne, absinthe, oil, vinegar,
candles, coffee, sugar, legurnes
294
APPENDIX B
The original cantons of odienne
Folo
Bodugu
Vadugu
Tudugu
Fuladugu
Toron
Massala
Naoulu
Nafana
Sienko
seyla
Guanangala
Zona
Bambaia
Tieme
Samatiguila
Kabadugu
295
APPENDIX C
Letter Suleymane Moriba Toure to French officer in command
at Bougouni
1897
(AND 15 G 171).
Written in Arabie, this
is the official translation.
Cette lettre est pour le commandant de Bougouni.
Je previens le commandant, que le jour ou je saurai
que Samory revient dans ce pays,
je le previendrai le
plus t~t possible.
,
Dans ce pays, ne crois jamais a personne, en
dehors de moi.
Tous les dioulas qui reviennent de
Sakhala par le Nien~ ont tous des relations avec Samory.
/
J'ai envoye dire au commandant de Beyla que
trois villages m'appartenant avaient éte rattachees au
Dialakorodougou (pays de Beyla); i l me les a rendu,
j l'en remercie.
Je dernand que des troupes ne passent pas par ici,
parce que les gens de ce pays ont peur des blancs.
Si
les blancs veulent aller joindre Samory, qu'ils passent
par Sikasso.
/
J'ai
envoye du monde partout et j'ai su que
Samory avait ~tè très malade à Kaliva, il etait encore
\\
arrivant à Nafou.
Beaucoup de monde me dit qu'il est a
Bobo-Dioulasso près de Kong et ~ l'est de ce point.
Il ne reste personne dans le pays; tout la monde
est parti avec Samory.
Vous me dites que vous viendrez
296
ici vous installer peu&être avec des soldats;
je nly
tiens pas.
Je demande seulement au gouverneur de me
,
/
donner en garde tout mon pays.
Mon frere Ahmadou Toure
est avec Samory et je suis seul.
Lorsque mon p~re Fakaba Toure faisait le dioula,
le gouverneur d'alors lui a donne un fusil en lui disant
IlIl na faut pas piller les dioulas avec cette arme, i l
faut sien servir contre les voleurs et ceux qui cherchent
,
~
a empecher le commerce. Il
Je suis toujours dans les
A
'd/
' d
l '
b
mernes ~ ees et Je ne
emanda qu a me
attre contre
,
A
ceux qu~ m'empeches le commerce.
Noulou, Zonna Goana et Zannokola sont 4 villages
que Samory m'avait pris.
Tous ces gens viennent de
/
rentrer
Je leur ai envoye demander si oui ou non ils
A
veulent obeir aux FranSais;
je te ferai connaitre leur
/
reponse.
Le fils du chef du Folon 6tait ici dernièrement.
Je lui ai dit qu'il fallait reconstituer son pays et
rétablir le march~ de Maninian.
Quant ~ Diali Moussa le griot de Samory, il
~tait ÀNafou et apprenant que beaucoup de gens de
Kabadougou quittaient Samory,
i l y a plusieurs lunes,
il a fait prevenir 1 1 Almamy qui a garde le Bakoungana et
nous avons eu 349 personnes massacr€es
~ ce passage.
Clest après nous avoir fait cela que Diali
Moussa est revenu
chez nous C,l i l es maintenant.
Voyant
297
/
que la colonne de Bougouni n'avait pas marche et que
les Francais n,ètaient pas dans le Kabadougou, il a
/
envoye sa queue de boeuf ~ Samory en lui faisant porter
cette parole.
"Reviens dans le Kabadougou, les
Francais n'y sont pas"
Le jour ou il viendra je
~
~
n'aurai qu'a me sauver d'Odjenne.
Si tu veux que je te donne Diali Moussa je te
le donnerai mais je pr~f~re le garder.
Je le garderai
au,moins trois ans et ne laisserait pas partir tant
que Samory ne sera pas mort.
Je te demande de me laisser acheter deux
chevaux, pour cela j'envoie Karamoko avec des colas.
Demande au gouverneur de me donner un fusil
gras a 10 coups pour que chacun sache que je suis
un ami des Frangais.
Si le gouverneur voulait me le
donner je voudrai bien l'avoir ~ la fin de septembre.
Ne m'envoie personne autre qu'Abdoulaye ou
Babilé; pour moi je t'enverrai Oufa Tour~, Fasidiki,
ou Karamoko Kamara
Je salue en toi tous les Francais
~
Moriba Tour~
298
APPENDIX D
Colonial Administrators of Odienne to 1940
Lt. Moa1
20 September 1897
Capta in Conrard
16 January 1898
Capta in Moreau
October 1900
Sgt. Houdousse
1901
Lt. Phi11ippe
1902
De1afosse, Maurice
March 1904
Le Campion, Joseph
1912
Rodrigue, Maxim
1 May 1918
Mandel, Joseph
1919
Prouteau, Maurice
23 septernber 1919
/
.
"'
Fevl.er, Eugene
10 August 1920
Jacotot, Louis
25 August 1920
L'homme, Marcel
1920
,
/ .
Fevrl.er, Eugene
1920
Scharcher, Charles
7 January 1922
Raymond, Maurice
25 February 1924
Jacotot, Louis
2 December 1924
Perette, Ernest
5 Ju1y 1926
Chatnet, Edouard
1927
/
Brule, Albert
1928
Susini, Maurice
7 August 1929
Sombardier,
9 March 1932
Tramond, Marcel
12 October 1932
299
saucin, Maurice
8 April 1933
Deve1by
22 May 1933
pichot
1 Ju1y 1933
Vazai11es
15 February 1934
Lacascade, Maurice
31 August 1934
Co1ornbani, Edouard
12 April 1935
Carlton, Edouard
19 April 1935
Barthes, Louis
3 Ju1y 1938
Georget, Emmanuel
25 Ju1y 1938
Ce11iére, Auguste
31 August 1940
300
APPENDIX E
List of head tax collections showing 10% commission
to canton chiefs: JOCI Decisions of 12 August 1905 and
7 December 1905.
Amount
Canton
Chiefs
Collected
Bambala
Fabere Bamba
875 Frs.
87.50 Frs.
Vadugu
Fote Sangare
1,310
131.00
Folon
Moussa Dioumessi
2,225
222.50
Massala
Bambatie
3,500
350.00
Tudugu
Gamba Kone
1,880
188.00
Zona
Kassoye Fanny
880
88.00
Bodugu
Fasseri Doumbia
1,420
142.00
Fu1adugu
Dioulatie Sangara
2,260
226.00
Guananga1a
Fakessi Kone
2,700
270.00
Kabadugu
Ibrahima Tours
26,890
2,689.00
Nafana
Diou1atie Diarassouba
2,830
283.00
Naou1u
Daba Kone
8,745
874.50
Samatiguila
Soumana Diaby
10,280
1,028.00
Sienko
Zaoleni Kone
2,150
215.00
Tieme
Amara Sylla
4,500
450.00
Toron
Kelisseri Diarassouba
1,840
184.00
Boron
Kamassigui Ouattara
1,527.50
152.75
301
APPENDIX F
Oral Account of Forced Labor:
Gbeleban
October 1975.
At the time of forced labor, if a woman gave
birth to a boy, the whole village went to congratulate
the father of the child saying that he should be happy
to have someone to help him through the hard times . . . .
Already at the age of twelve l began doing prestations
at Odienne.
After 15 days l was replaced.
l became
an adult, l began to work on the roads.
l carried dirt
on my head to arrange the road from Odienne to Gbeleban.
Afterwards, l returned to the village.
l was in the
middle of my youth.
A while later, they began recruiting
for the forest.
It was just like army recruitment.
A
great nurnber of young men from Gbeleban went to Odienne.
Thirty of us were recruited.
The 'commandant' told
us nicely that we had been recruited to work in the
forests, but i t would not be hard.
He said that if we
were sick, we would be cared for.
Unfortunately, we
had been sold.
The 'commandant' told us nothing but lies.
It was just to get us to leave.
(They recruited two
times a year for the forest work.
Sorne men stayed six
months andothersnine months.)
The day of our departure
came.
We were six hundred from Odienne.
Each of us
received ten francs for the trip to Ferke by foot.
Unfortunately, ten francs wasnotenough for our food.
302
On our way we devastated all the fields just to have
food to eat.
By the time we reached Ferke, sorne of
us were dying of hunger.
We spent twelve days there
waiting for the train.
For the wait, they gave us
another ten francs, but i t just was not enough.
We
stole food from the market to keep from starving to
death.
Then they gave us another ten francs for
the voyage by train to Abidjan.
.
When we arrived,
we knew not where we were.
A white boss was waiting
for us, with a man from Odienne who had already worked
in the region.
To welcome us the white man told us,
"Of course you are men from Odienne.
We have heard
much about you.
It seems that you do not like to work,
and at each occasion you escape.
Take this advice.
Watch out:
If one of you escapes, we will bring your
mother and father in your place, because we have
bough t
you.
So do your work."
•
They took us in
boats to an island.
Upon our arrival, the meal
for six hundred men was ten sacks of dried corn which
was poured into barrels with water and salt.
That was
for lunch, but the insects and worms in i t were huge.
It was aIl floating on top of the water.
We had to
eat it.
•
• •
We fought among ourselves to be served.
Sorne men only got ten grains of corn, other picked out
the rernaining grains that had fallen to the ground.
Since i t had not been weIl cooked, each man reheated his
303
own.
After the meal, the boss arrived.
He was German,
his narne was John Ross.
He told us i t was impossible
to escape because the water was dangerous.
He said that
if we ended up there i t was because we are bad men;
we do not like to work.
Before reaching the worksite,
they made us walk to lose ourselves, to keep from
finding a way out.
When we reached the site, they
cut a stick they called a meter to measure the space
we had to fill with big pieces of wood.
At night the
white man carne to check.
If youdid not fill the
surface, he beat you until you could not sit down.
You
thought you would die from the whip.
The next day,
you had that space to fill plus the new one.
l assure
you we saw aIl the horrors in the world.
We stayed
there for three months eating only rotten corn, poorly
cooked and full of worms.
We were
scared by the aspect
of starvation.
We did not know what to do.
If we
spent aIl our energy felling trees without eating, we
would surely die.
One night we met and went to see our
black foreman, a man from Gbeleban.
We told him
that we had had enough.
It was better to die in the
water than from beatings and starvation.
.
We
told him not to worry, we had found a spot in the lagune
that was not deep.
When the night to escape carne, l
panicked.
l
thought about what the white man said
about sending my father and mother to replace me.
l
304
left the group and decided·not to escape.
Everyone else
.-
left.
Only seven men remained.
The next day, when
the white man carne, he asked where the others were.
We answered that they had left.
He said,
"AlI six
hundred left but you?
You will pay for aIl of thern.
But
do not forget that another six hundred will corne."
He
made us undress and we were severely punished.
For
four days we could not stand up.
After that our meal
was changed to cassava with palm oil.
Until this day,
l have not eaten a meal that was as good as that one be-
cause that day l
thought l would never eat anything but
grains of corn boiled in salt.
Afterwards, they sent us to a bigger worksite.
Work had become a habit for me.
If l ate weIl, there
was no problem.
A little while later, aIl those who
escaped were replaced by their brothers, fathers,
uncles, or cousins.
When they arrived, the white man
told us,
"You see, aIl your brothers who escaped were
replaced because l bought you.
No one gave you to me
as a gift,
l bought you."
The new arrivaIs were
quickly undressed and given tree fibers to tie around
them.
I, who was almost in the sarne situation, forgot
ail my problems.
l only thought of them,
l wanted
to cry.
They gave each one a hatchet and put them to
work with no food.
These men worked aIl ddY with no food.
305
The men who slowed downwerebeaten pitilessly.
l cried
in their place.
This day was the hardest l have ever
worked, because l had forgotten l was working;
l only
thought about the new arrivaIs who were being treated
like ferocious beasts.
The chief of the new group
could not take it.
He hid in the bush.
Since he was
hungry, he came to the cam~ at night for food.
We could
not turn him in he was just too pitiful.
But because
he could not find a way out, he turned himself in.
He
was beaten in the worst manner l have ever seen.
He
screamed until his voice left him.
They chained him
up.
In the morning, with the chain around his neck, they
chained him to a wheelbarrow that he pushed.
l did
seven months in that hello
When l was to return,
l
received 30 francs to go back to the village with.
Others had 50 francs,
sorne only 20 francs.
Luckily
for me, altogether l got 60 francs before leaving the
worksite.
Our chief got 100 francs.
The second time, six months after my return to
the village,
l was recruited again.
l went back to
the same site.
Since l had already been,
l
noticed
a big change.
Nevertheless, the new people cried over
their plight.
l
told them that they were lucky, for those
of us who came the first time, the second was nothing
to cry about.
We went to Ferke in trucks, and came aIl
the way to Abidjan by train.
We were often given rice
306
sometimes cassava and palm oil, and even smoked fish.
To me, the only thing that had not changed was the
crack of the whip.
The third time was in 1936.
The
day of my
recruitment, my father called me and said,
"My son,
l excuse you and forgive you for the rest of your life.
For the love of God, you must run away.
Even if they
take me in your place, l ' I l accept.
If not, they will
kill you my son."
l told my father l had understood
so as not to disappoint him, but deep in my heart l
knew l could never escape and leave my father in such a
situation.
50 l went.
It was getting easier all the
time~
This time we received 50 fr.
upon leaving Odienne.
We went to a plantation called Boubou.
To confuse us we
were taken by boat to Bassam .
.
.
later Bouna .
spending a whole day in the boat again.
Then we rode
for a whole day in a truck from Adjiake and returned there.
Then we were taken from Aàjiake by boat to the plantation.
This time we were cleaning coffee plantations.
The
others complained that i t was too difficult.
But l
said i t was not difficult, because l had seen harder
times.
On the plantations we had 30 fr.
per month,
whereas before sorne men only got 5 fr.
for the whole
year . .
307
APPENDIX G
Work song of Malinke men during forced labor
Almami Taure, Sananferedougou, October 1975
Ayi bani
Odienneka lu bani
0000
Ayi ya saman
Ayi bani
0000
Mandalaka bani
Ayi ya saman
Translation:
(Laborers):
The men of Odienne and Mandala refuse ta work.
(The guards) :Whip them, make them pull.
308
List of Abbreviations
ANCI - Archives
Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire
AND - Archives
du Senegal Fonds Afrique Occidentale
Francaise - Archieves Nationales de Dakar
ANM - Archives
Nationales de Mali
BCAF - Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrigue Franlaise
BCEHSAOF - Bulletin du Comité d'Etudes Historigues et
Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale
Franlaise
CEA - Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines
JAH - Journal of African History
ORSTOM - Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique
Outre Mer
UNCI -
Universit~ Nationale de COte d'Ivoire
309
BlBLlOGRAPHY
l.
Primary Sources
A.
Archives
1.
Archives du Senegal Fonds Afrique Occidental
Francaise
(AND - Archives Nationales de
Dakar)
a.
Serie "G" Politiques et Administration
Générale
1)
"lG" Etudes G'n~rales:
Missions,
Notes, et Monographies
lG52
Monts du Manding, le Boure
lG67
Mission Monteil,1883-l885
lG146-- Mission Quiquandon, Kenedougou,
1890
lG148-- Notices historiques et géo-
graphiques Cercle de Siguiri,
Capt. Besan~on, 1890
lG156-- Notices historiques et géo-
graphiques R~gion du Sabel,
Capt. Lartigue, 1897
lG16l-- Mission Monteil à Kong
lG17l-- Notices sur la Région Sud, Lt.
Blondiaux, 1895-96
lG172-- Cercle de Kankan, Capt. Parisot,
1896
lG199-- Missions: Caill~, Binger, 1887
lG200-- Mission Blondiaux 1897, Haut
Cavally
lG229-- Coutumes juridiques: Cercles
de Kankan, 1897; Beyla, 1897;
Siguiri, 1897; Bamako, 1904
lG247-- Mission Woelfell-Magnin, CÔte
d'Ivoire, 1899
310
IG249-- Mission Hostains-d'Ollone
IG262-- Mission diversees: C~e d'
Ivoire - production et com-
merce du kola
IG263-- Mission commerciale: Senegal,
Guinée, CSte d'Ivoire
IG270-- Voyage Hérissé, Côte d'
Ivoire, 1912
IG272-- Perrot en C$te d'Ivoire, 1914
IG276-- Mission A. Chevalier, Guinée,
C6'te d'Ivoire
IG297-- Wm. Ponty, Réorganisation de
l'AOF,1903
IG303-- Notice Générale, Cercle de
Bougouni, 1904
IG320-- Cercle de Segou, 1904
IG352-- Monographies: Cercles de CSte
d'Ivoire
2)
"2G" Rapports p~riodiques 1920-1940
a)
Côte d'Ivoire
-Agriculture
-Chemin de Fer
-Affaires économiques
-Elévage
-Travail et Main d'oeuvre
b)
Guinée
-Agriculture
-Chemin de fer
-Affaires économiques
-Elévage
c)
Soudan
,
.
-Affaires economlques
-Chemin de fer
311
3)
5G Le Gouvernment de la CSte d'Ivoire,
1893-1919.
5G41
Région Sud, 1899
5G42
Haute c8te d'Ivoire
5G63
Affaires Musulmanes
5G65
Administration, Haut-Sassandra,
pays Gouro, 1912
5G66 -- Politique Générale 1903-1908
SG67
Politique G€nérale
1909, la
pacification
SG69
Politique Générale, Commerce
et administration
SG70
Politique G€n~rale, Angoulvant,
1910
SG71
Politique Générale, 1908-1912
5G72
Instructions à Angoulvant, 1914
5G73
Divers, 1915-1918
4)
7G
7G30
Région Sud:
Rapport Capt.
Conrad, 1899
7G34
Cercle de Kankan, 1897
7G45
Bulletin agricoles et com-
merciaux 1891-1892
7G46
Bulletin commercial, 1894
7G49
Rapport commercial et agricole
7G57
Politique Générale: Cercles de
Kankan, Touba, Beyla
5)
15G
Affaires politiques et administra-
tives
lSG83-- Renseignements, Cercle de
Bamako
lSG94-- Cercle de Bougouni, Soudan
francais 1894-1896
15G171- Bougouni 1897-1899
6)
17G
Affaires politiques, AOF 1895-
1920
17G9 -- Chemin de fer,
1911
312
7)
18G
18G7
Circulaire, Reduction du per-
sonnel, 1919
18G9
Delimitations de fontières, AOF
b.
Série "0"
065
Chemin de fer 1902
0181
Chemin de fer 1913
c.
Série "Q" Affaires économiques
Q48
Economie du Soudan 1897-1900
Q49
Commerce au Soudan
Q50
Conimerce en A.O.F.
Q54
Situation "
economique de l'AOF 1906-
1911
Q55
Situation economique. de l'AOF 1913-
1918
2.
Archives Nationales de CSte d'Ivoire
(ANCI)
a.
Monographs
1)
Cercle d'Odienne
-Adm. Le Campion 1914: Monographie
d'Odienne
-Insp. de Gentile 1944: Histoire de
Vakaba Toure
2)
Cercle de Touba
-Adm. Marc Simon 1911: Monographie du
Cercle de Touba
3)
Circonscription de Boundia1i
-Adm. Prouteau 1914: Rapport sur la
situation du poste et de la circon-
scription de Boundiali
4)
Cercle de Segue1a
-Capt. Moutard 1904: Monographie des
Diolas
313
5)
Cercle ùe Korhogo
."
-Adm. Maurice Oelafosse 1905: Mono-
graphie du Cercle de Korhogo
b.
Série "BB" Correspondances générales
BBl18
Correspondances entre le gouver-
nement et administrateurs 1922-
1928
BB305
Correspondances: Notables d'Qdien-
ne au Gouverneur
c.
Série "DO" Administration Générale
1)
Anciens côtes
IV-32-5(2847)
-Inspection Cercle de
Korhogo 1941
V-19-4(3050)
-Inspection de M.
Jacquier
V-22-23(3052)
-Equipement social et
économique 1939
V-32-32/399 (3041)-Inspection de M.
Saliceti 1936
V-45-36C3038,3040)-Inspection de M.
deGentile 1944
VI-22/4(2990)
- Tableau recapulatif
de la population indigène 1938-
1941
VI-28/8(3036)
-Rapport Annuel 1934
X-11-230(1821)
-R~organisation térri-
torial, 1936-1938
XIII-47-77/719(83)-Travail force
XIII-48-109/945(715)-Souscription pour
la defense de l'Empire 1940
XIV-34-6(3489)
-Adm. de Korhogo 1930-
31, punition des dioulas
2)
0055
Administration, principes et
arr$tés 1909-1913
0079
Réorganisation territorial
1909-1937
00109-- Voyage de M.
Simon
314
00174-- Missions en C.I. 1890-1910
00284-- Rapport Picanon
00345-- Tournees et inspections 1922-1926
00404-- Exode des peuples du Soudan et
de la Haute Volta à la C6te d'Ivo-
ire
d.
Série "EE"
Affaires Politiques
1)
1EE
Rapports périodiques 1901-
1939
1EE91
Cercle de Kong
1EE92
Cercle d'Odienne
1EE95
Dossier relatif a la délimita-
tion de la frontiere Franco-
Liberienne 1906-1909
1EE96 -- Cercle de Ouorodougou
1EE109-- Poste de Tombougou
1EE111-- Cercle de Touba
2)
2EE
Rapports politiques
2EE7
Cercle d'Odienne 1901-1903
3)
3EE
Affaires musulmanes et cultes
3EE1
Cercles de Kong 1902, Touba
1903
3EE2
R~gion de Kong, Cercle de
Korhogo 1907-1911
4)
4EE
Correspondances 1900-1920
4EE13
Région de Kong
...
4EE14
Region de Kong
4EE15
Région de Kong
4EE20
Cercle de Korhogo
e.
S~rie "QQ" Affaires économiques, 1917-1927
QQ8
Exportation des oléagineuse
QQ9
Circulation des denrées
QQ12
St~tistique des principaux produits
crus
315
QQ28
Rapports économiques, Cercle
d'Odienne
QQ36
Etude économique sur l'alimentation
de la metropo1e
QQ38
Lettres, 1914-1927
QQ62
Statistiques 1922
QQ63
Statistiques et mouvement commer-
cial 1911-1920
QQ68
Rapports économiques des cercles,
1920
QQ70
Rapport économiques et commerciale,
1923
f.
Série "RR" Agriculture et é1évage
RR29
Le caoutchouc de la CSte d'Ivoire
1916-1934
RR33
Rapports sur la culture des pro-
duits divers 1919-1934
RR40
E1évage 1913-1936
RR69
Coton 1924-1925
RR75
Stations contonnières
RR104-- Agriculture indigène et colonisa-
tion agricole européenne en C.I.
RR1l3-- Service de l'Agriculture, Rapports
annuels 1911-1921
RR115-- Rapport Service Agricole 1922-
1923
RR120-- Caoutchouc 1908-1920
RR123-- Caoutchouc 1907-1942
RR132-- L'arachide 1909-1924
3.
Archives Nationales du Mali (ANM)
a.
Fonds anciens
1)
"ID" Monographies, Etudes, Coutumiers,
Notices
ID-2
Etude sur la captivité au
Soudan 1894
ID-S
Notice générale sur le Soudan,
Région Sud 1895-1899
316
ID-13 -- Notice sur les ordres réligieux
musulmans et l'islamisme au
Soudan Marchand 1896-7
ID-33-l- Notice historique et géographi-
que du Cercle de Bamako 1880-
1890
ID-37-l- Notice sur les droits fonciers
indigènes dans le cercle de
Bougouni 1907
ID-37-2- Monographies du cercle de
Bougouni
ID-157-- Notices historiques, g~ogra
phiques topographiques et
statistiques du Cercle de Kong
1900-1903
ID-159-- Poste de Mankono
ID-163-- Poste de Touba, Cercle de Kong
ID-166-- Poste d'Odienne 1902
ID-173-- Notice ~thnographique histori-
que de Seguela
ID-175-- Rapport Ethnographique et
Historique de la circonscrip-
tion de Touba 1900
ID-189-- Coutumier Bambara du Cercle
de Bougouni
ID-234-- Mission Baillaud, études com-
merciales au Soudan 1898-1899
2)
"5D" Recensement
5D-18
Soudan 1 Avril 1899
5D-56
Bougouni 1894-1904
3)
"6D"
A
Impots, Taxes
6D-ll
Impôts et taxes, Tous cercles
1900-1907
6D-15
Etablissement role d'imp8t
Bougouni, 1895
4)
"lE"
Affaires politiques
lE-117-- Renseignements politiques
Cercle de Touba 1899
317
lE-125-- Etats num~riques des villages
de liberté, Bougouni 1894-
1919
lE-182-- Esclavage 1905-1906
lE-183-- Esclavage 1895-1904
lE-184-- Esclavage 1908
5)
"lQ"
Affaires Economiques
lQ-4
Bamako 1887-1912
lQ-8
Bougouni 1894-1907
lQ-18
Kong 1899
lQ-92
Kong 1899
lQ-267-- Etude des routes commerciales
entre le Soudan et la este
d'Ivoire 1915
B.
Official Publications
1.
Journal Officiel de la c8te d'Ivoire 1895-1920
2.
Bulletin du comité de l'Afrique Fran3aise
1895-1910
3.
Bulletin d~ comité d'Etudes Historiques et
Scientifiques de l'AOF 1916-1948
4.
Minist~re des Travaux Publics et des Transports
de la République de CSte d'Ivoire, Direction
de l'Institut Géographique, Cartes Odienne,
Tingrela, Boundiali, Touba, Mankono, Tienko
5.
Ministère de l'Information, Fraternité Matin,
8 mai 1974 -
17 mai 1974, nos.
2845-2853.
C.
Oral Interviews
Many of the following interviews were conducted
in the presence of several persons.
Although one
person's name is listed, the tapes and transcripts
(which are in my possession) may show the parti-
cipation of more than one person.
Bakayoko, Vassali -- Village chief, 4 April 1978,
at Koro.
Cisse, Mamadou -- Secretary General PDCI-RDA,
13 November 1975 at Minignan.
318
Coulibaly, Ibrahima, decd.
-- planter, 13 October
1975 at Odienne.
Coulibaly, Mamadou -- Pres. Economic & Social
Council, 1 October 1975 at Abidjan.
Diabate, Lamine -- banker,
29 March 1978 at
Abidjan.
Diaby, El Hadj -- Secretary Gen'l PDCI-RDA,
3 November at Samatiguila.
Also 6 April 1978
at Samatiguila.
Diarrassouba, Tchefara -- planter, 5 April 1978 at
Samango.
Doumbia, Lamine, decd.
planter, 20 October 1975
at Kabangoue.
Kanaman, El Hadj, decd.
-- Canton chief,
24 October
1975 at Tienko.
Keita, Matche -- tanner and griot, 29 October 1975
at Kere.
Also 3 April 1978 at Kere.
Kone, Adama -- planter,
3 November 1975 at Bako.
Kone, Hadja -- ex-wife of Le Campion, 14 February
1976 at Abidjan.
Kone, Dege -- Canton chief, 1 November 1975 at
Seguelon.
Samake, sidiki -- Secretary Gen'l PDCI-RDA, 5 April
1978 at Odienne
Sangare, Berna -- retired civil servant, Service
d'Elevage, 16 October 1975 at Odienne.
Sangare, Moussa -- Imam, 1 April 1978 at Odienne.
Savane, Nawourouya -- retired trader, 16 October
1975 at Odienne.
Savane, Matche -- trader, 1 August. 1974 at Dakar.
Sidibe, Soulernan -- ex-police inspector 1 August
1974 at Dakar.
Sylla, Yaya -- trader,
2 August 1974 at Dakar.
319
Sylla,
planter, 23 October 1975 at
Odienne.
Toure, Gaoussou -- Village chief, October 1975
at Odienne. Also 2 April 1978 at Odienne.
Toure, Gbatigui Ladji -- transporter, April 1978
at Odienne.
Toure, Moussa El Hadj -- planter, 12 October 1975
at Odienne.
Toure, Almami -- Imam,
21 October 1975 at
Sananferedougou.
Also 2 April 1978 at
Sananferedougou.
Toure, Mamadou -- retired civil servant, 15 October
1975 at Odienne.
Toure, Siranzi Issiaka, decd.
-- planter, 13 October
1975 at Odienne.
Toure, Moktar -- Secretary GenIl PDCI-RDA.
3
November 1975 at Odienne.
Traore, Amara -- Village chief,
30 October 1975 at
Gbeleban.
-- Imam of Minignan, 29 October 1975 at
Minignan.
-- Village chief of Sirana,
31 October 1975
at Sirana.
Marabout,
31 October 1975 at Kabala.
Secretary GenIl PDCI-RDA,
31 October
1975 at Gbeleban.
320
...
II.
Secondary Sources
A.
Books and Articles
"L'automobile au Soudan."
BCAF, 1898, pp.
408-.
"Le coton du Soudan - Rapport sur l'expérience
d'exportation de coton faite en 1899 au Soudan Fr."
BCAF, 1899, pp. 141-.
"La situation commerciale du Soudan Fran<iaise."
BCAF, 1899, pp. 152-.
ilLe caoutchouc au Soudan."
BCAF, 1899, pp. 168-.
"Le Cercle de Kong."
BCAF, 1900, pp.
307-.
"La politique coloniale de la France."
BCAF, 1900,
pp. 7-.
"AOF -
Impot en Nature."
BCAF, 1901, pp.
272.
"Côte d'Ivoire -
Impot de Capitation sur les
indigènes. Il
BCAF, 1901, pp.
311-.
"Le commerce du Territoire de Tombouctou. Il
BCAF,
1902, pp. 87-.
Le recensement de 1901 à la Côte d'Ivoire."
BCAF,
1902, pp. 140-.
"Rapport d'ensemble de la Guinee Fran<faise en
1901."
BCAF, 1902, pp. 179-.
"Le programme de M. Le Gouverneur Général Roume."
BCAF, 1903, pp.
311-.
"Les guinées francaises en Afrique Occidentale."
t
BCAF, 1905, pp.
406-.
"L'organisation budgétaire de l'AOF."
BCAF, 1905,
pp. 112-.
"Chemin de fer de la Côte d'Ivoire."
BCAF, 1909,
pp.
81-.
"Le caoutchouc en C$te d'Ivoire.
BCAF, 1909,
pp. 181-.
A1dige, E.
"La peste bovine en Afrique occidentale
francaise."
BCEHSAOF,
3("-918); 365-.
~
321
_ _ _ _--"_L-
_
Ambassade de France.
Republic of Ivory Coast.
New York:
French Embassy, 1960.
Ames, David.
"The Use of a Transitional Cloth Money
Token among the Wolof."
American Anthropologist.
57(1955): 1016-23.
Amin, Samir.
Le developpement du caoitalisme en CSte
d'Ivoire.
Paris:
Editions du-Minuit, 1967.
Amon d'Aby.
La c8te d'Ivoire dans la cité africaine.
Paris: Larose, 1951.
Angoulvant, Gabriel.
"La pénétration de la CSte d'Ivoire."
BCAF, 1909, pp. 194-.
Angoulvant, G.
La pacification de la Côte d'Ivoire.
Paris:
Larose, 1916.
Anoma, Joseph.
"Le combat du Syndicat Agricole Africain."
Revue Semestrielle Fondation Houphouet Boigny l
(1977): 16-27.
Arnaud, Robert.
L'Islam et la ~olitique musulmane
fran~aise.
Paris:
Comite de l'Afrique Fransaise,
1912.
Atger, Paul.
La France en C8te d'Ivoire 1843-1893
Cinquante ans d'hésitations politigues et
commerciales.
Dakar:
U of Dakar, 1962.
Augagneur, Victor.
Erreurs et brutalités coloniales.
Paris:
Montaigne, 1927.
Avenard, J.N.
Le Milieu naturel de la CSte d'Ivoire.
Paris:
ORSTOM, 1971.
Bai11aud, Emile.
La politique de l'Angleterre en Afrigue
Occidentale.
Paris:
Hachette, 1912.
Balandier, Georges.
The Sociology of Black Africa.
New
York:
Praeger, 1955.
Bal1ieu, Capt.
"Notice agricole, industrielle et commer-
ciale sur le Soudan Francais."
BCAF, 1898, pp. 1-.
Bauer, Peter T.
West African Trade.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
UP, 1954.
Bauman, H.
and Westermann,
D.
Les peuples et les civilisa-
tions de l'Afrique.
Paris:
Payot, 1967.
322
Bazin, Jean.
"Guerre et serv-itude a Segou," L'esclavage
en Afrique precolonial~; ed. C. Meillassoux.
Paris:
Maspero, 1975, pp. 135-181.
Bélime, E.
"Note sur les études effectuées de 1922 a
1926 dans la vallée moyenne du Niger par le
docteur R-H. Forbes."
BCEHSAOF, 1928, pp. 116-.
Belshaw, Cyril S.
Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets.
Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
Benquey, Adm.
"Considerations sur l'islam Africain
(Haute
CSte d'Ivoire)."
BCEHSAOF, 1921, p. 678.
Binger, Louis Gustave.
Du Niger au Golfe de Guinée par le pays
de
Kong et le Mossi:
1887-1889.
Paris: Hachette,
1892.
Blyden, Edward W.
Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race.
2d ed.
London:
W. B. Whittingham and Co., 1888.
Bohannon, Paul and Dalton, George, eds.
Markets in Africa.
Evanston:
Northwestern up', 1962.
Bouche, Denise.
Les villages de liberté en Afrique noire.
Paris and the Hague:
Mouton and Co., 1968.
Boutillier, Jean-Louis.
"Les captifs en AOF 1903-1905."
IFAN.
30(1968B): 513-535.
Blondiaux, Lt.
"La Mission Blondiaux."
BCAF, 1898,
pp. 339-.
Brunschwig, Henri.
French Colonialism 1871-1914: Myths
and Realities.
New York: Praeger, 1966.
Bret, M.
"Les stations expérimentales en AOF."
BCEHSAOF,
1928, pp. 138-.
Caillé, René.
Journal d'un voyage à Tembouctou et à
Jenné dans l'Afrique Centrale 1824-1828.
vols. 1,
II.
Paris: 1830.
Cangah, Guy, and Ekanza, Simon Pierre.
La CSte d'Ivoire
par les textes.
Abidjan: Les nouvelles Editions
Africaines, 1978.
Capet, Marcel.
Traite d'économie tropicale.
Paris:
Pichon, 1958.
323
•
Carlson, Lucille.
Geography and World Politics.
Englewood
Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1958.
Cassel, Van.
"La Haute C6'te d'Ivoire occidentale."
BCAF,
190 1, pp . 100 - .
Charbonneau, Jean and René.
Marché et marchands d'Afrique
Noire.
Paris:
La Colombe, 1961.
Chaudié, Gov. Gen'l.
"AOF - la nouvelle organisation."
BCAF, 1900, pp. 145-.
Chevalier, A.
"La Région Sud du Soudan Francais."
BCAF,
1899, pp. 375 - .
Clausen, John A., ed.
Socialization and Society.
Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1968.
Clozel, Lt. Gouv.
"Dix ans à la Côte d'Ivoire."
BCAF,
1906, pp. 279-.
Clozel, F. J., Dix ans à la CSte d'Ivoire.
Paris:
Challamel, 1906 .
..
Combes, Colonel.
"A la pousuite de Samory."
BCAF, 1896,
pp. 43-.
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine.
"Recherches sur un mode
de production africain."
La Pensée 114
(1969):
61-73.
Cornevin, Robert.
"L'Evolution des chefferies dans
l'Afrique Noire d'expression fran~aise."
Recueil
Penant.
686-688
(1966): pp.
235-.
Cosnier, Henri.
L'Ouest Africain francais, ses resources
agricoles, son organisation ~con&mique.
Paris:
Larose, 1921.
Crowder, Michael.
Colonial Rule in West Africa.
London:
1968.
Crowder, Michael, and Ikime, Obaro, eds.
West African
Chiefs.
New York: African Publishing Corp., 1970.
Curtin, Philip D.
Economie Change in Pre-colonial Africa.
Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1975.
Dalton, George.
Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies -
Essays of Karl Polanyi.
Garden City: Doubleday &
Co., 1968.
324
Dalton, George.
"Comment:
vlhat Kinds of Trade and
Markets."
African Economie History.
6(1978):
134-138.
Deaville, F. Walker.
The Story of the Ivory Coast.
London:
Cargete Press, 1930.
Décrais, Ministre des colonies.
"La réorganisation de
l'Afrique Occidentale Fran~aise."
BCAF, 1899,
pp. 368-.
Delafosse, Maurice.
Les Frontières de la CSte d'Ivoire
de la C$te de L'Or et du Soudan.
Paris:
Masson,
1908.
Delafosse, Maurice.
"Les états d' SIne d'un colonial."
BCAF, 1909, pp. 164-.
Delafosse, Maurice.
Haut-Sénégal Niger, Vol. 1.
Paris:
Larose, 1912.
Delafosse, Maurice.
"De l'origine du mot 'toubab.'"
BCEHSAOF, 1917, p. 205.
Delafosse, Maurice.
"L'année agricole et le calendrier
des Soudanais."
L'Anthropologie.
31(1921):
105-
113.
Delafosse, Maurice.
Histoire des colonies fran~aise et
de l'expansion de la France dans le monde, Vol.
IV.
Paris:
Plon, 1931.
de Lartigue, Comdt. R.
"La pacification du Soudan Fran-
<iais
- opérations de la colonne du sud."
BCAF,
1899, pp. 112-.
Delavignette, Robert.
Service Africain (Les vrais chefs
de l'Empire).
Paris:
Gallimard, 1946.
Delavignette, Robert.
L'Afrique noire fran~aise et son
destin.
Paris:
Gallimard, 1962.
Deherme, Georges.
L'Afrique occidentale francaise.
Paris:
Bloud et Gay, 1908.
~
Derive, M. J.
Chroni ues de Grandes Familles d'Odienne.
Universite d'Abidjan:
Institu
de Linguistique
Appliquee, 1976.
Deschamps, Hubert.
M~thodes et doctrines coloniales en
France.
Paris:
Colin, 1953.
325
Dupire, M.
"Planteurs autochtones et 'trangers en
Basse-C$te d'Ivoire orientale."
Etudes Eburnéenes.
VIII(1960):
9-237.
Ekindare, R. Olufemi.
Economie History of Nigeria 1860-
1960.
Fisher, Allan G.B., and Fisher, Humphrey J.
Salveryand
Muslim Society in Africa.
London:
C. Hurst and
Co., 1970.
Francis-Boeuf, Claude.
"Industrie autochtone du fer en
AOF."
BCEHSAOF, 1937, pp.
403-.
Fraternité-Hebdo.
Odienne 7 aout 1972.
Abidjan:
Imprimerie Nationale, 1972.
Gann, L.H., and Duignan, Peter, eds.
Colonialism in
Africa 1870-1960, 4 vols.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
UP, 1977.
Genovese,
Eugene, ed.
The Slave Economies:
Historical
and Theoretical Perspectives.
New York:
Wiley &
Sons, 1973.
Gutkind, Peter C. W., and Wallerstein, Irnmanuel, eds.
The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa.
Beverly Hills and London:
Sage Publications, 1976.
Guy, Camille.
"Les résultats géographiques et économi-
ques des explorations du Niger (1892-1898)."
BCAF, 1899, pp. 36-.
Hardy, Georges.
Nos grands problèmes coloniaux.
Paris:
Colin 1942.
Henry, Yves.
Matières premières africanes, Vol. 1.
Paris:
Larose, 1918.
Herskovitz, Melville.
Economie Anthropology.
New york:
Norton & Co., 1965.
Hill, polly.
"Land1ords and Brokers:
A West African
Trading System."
CEA.
IV(1966): 349-.
Hill, Polly.
"Notes on Traditional Market Authority and
Market Periodicity in West Africa."
JAH,
VII (1966):
295-311.
326
Hill, Polly.
"Problems with A. G. Hopkins' Economic
History of West Africa."
African Economic History.
6 (1978):
127-133.
Hopkins, A.G.
"The Western Sudan in the Middle Ages:
Underdevelopment in the Empires of the Western
Sudan."
Past and Present.
37(1967):
149-156.
Hopkins, A.G.
An Economic History of West Africa.
New
York:
Columbia UP, 1973.
Hopkins, A.G.
"An Economic History of West Africa:
Further Comment."
African Economic History.
6 (1978):
139-144.
Igbafe, Philip A.
"Slavery and Emancipation in Benin,
1897-1945."
Journal of African History, XVI,
3 (1975):
409-429.
International Council of Archives.
Sources de l'Histoire
de l'Afrigue au Sud du Sahara dans les Archives
et Bibliothegues francaises.
Jones, Ruth.
West Africa, Africa Bibliography Series.
London:
International African Institute, 1958.
Johnson, Marion.
"The Nineteenth Century Gold Mithqals
in West and North Africa."
JAH,
IX(1968):
547-
569.
Johnson, Marion.
"The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa."
JAR,
II(1970):
17-49.
Joseph, Gaston.
La CSte d'Ivoire,
le pays, les habitants.
Paris:
Larose, 1917.
de Kersaint-Gilly, Felix.
"Essai sur l'évolution de
l'esclavage en AOF."
BCEHSAOF, 1927, pp.
469-.
Kobben, A.
"Le planteur noir."
Etudes Eburnéenes, v.
IFAN, 1956.
Kourouma, Mamby.
"Samatiguila: Une communauté peu
commune dans le nord ivoirien."
Maitrise dl
Histoire, Universite nationale de CSte d'Ivoire,
1977.
Labouret, Henri.
Les Manding et leurlangue.
Paris:
Larose, 1934.
327
Labouret, Henri.
"Les Manding et leur langue."
BCEHSAOF,
1934, pp.
29-.
Le Chatelier, A.
L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale
Francaise.
Paris:
G. Steinheil, 1899.
Legassick, Martin.
"Perspectives on African 'Under-
development.'"
Journal of African History.
XVII
3(1976): 435-440.
Lelong, M.H.
"La route du kola."
Revue de géographie
humaine et ethnologie.
4(1949):
35-48.
Lemmet, M.J.
"Note sur la fertilité naturelle des
terres de la vallée du Moyen-Niger."
BCEHSAOF,
1917, vol.
2, p. 128-.
Léroide, Henri.
"Situation de la culture du cotonnier
à la Côte d'Ivoire à la fin de 1916."
BCEHSAOF, 2,
1917, p. 165-.
Londres, Albert.
Terre d'ébène.
Paris: Albin Michel,
1929.
Mage, M.D.
Voyage dans le Soudan occidental.
Paris:
Hachette, 1868.
Malowist, M.
"The Social and Economic Stability of the
Western Sudan in the middle Ages."
Past and
Present.
33(1966): 3-15.
Mangenot, Georges "Etude sur les for~ts des plaines et
plateaux de la C8te d'Ivoire."
Etudes Eburnéenes.
IFAN
(1955): 5-61.
Marchand, Capt.
"L'esclavage et l'Islamisme."
BCAF,
18 96, pp . 35-.
Marty, Paul.
Etudes sur l'islam en Côte d'Ivoire.
Paris:
Leroux, 1922.
Mauny, Raymond.
Tableau géographique de l'Quest Africain
au moyen ~ge.
Dakar:
IFAN, 1961.
Meirs, Suzanne, and Kopytoff,
Igor, eds.
Slavery in
Africa.
Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press,
1977.
Meillassoux, Claude.
Anthropologie économigue des Gouro
de Ce te d'Ivoire.
Paris:
Mouton & Co., 1964.
328
Meillassoux, Claude, ed.
The Development of Indigenous
Trade and Markets in West Africa.
London:
Oxford
UP, 1971.
,
Meillassoux, Claude, ed.
L'esclavage en Afrique preco-
loniale.
Paris:
Fran~ois Maspero, 1975.
Meillassoux, Claude.
Review of Meirs and Kopytoff
(eds.),
Slavery in Africa (University of Wisconsin) ,
African Economie History 5(1978):
37-41.
Mercier, René.
Le travail obligatoire dans les colonies.
Paris:
Larose, 1933.
Merleau-Ponty, Arnedée William.
"La politique indigene."
BCAF, 1909, pp. 348-.
Miege, Jacques.
"Les savanes et forêts claires de CeSte
d'Ivoire.
Etudes Eburnéenes.
IFAN (1955):
5-61.
Monteil, Charles.
ilLe coton chez les noirs."
BCEHSAOF,
1926, pp . 587 - .
Morgan, W.B., and Pugh, J.C.
West Africa.
London: Methuen
and Co., 1969.
N'Oiaye, Bokar.
Les castes du Mali.
Bamako:
Editions
Populaires, 1970.
Monrnarson, Raoul.
L'Afrique noire et son destin.
Paris:
Editions France, 1950.
Monnier, Marcel.
France noire.
Paris:
Plon, Nourrit &
Co., 1894.
Monnier, Y.
"Le Néré."
CURO, Université d'Abidjan,
1971/2.
.
.
Monnier, Y.
"Les paysages vegetaux."
~
CURO, Un~vers~te
d'Abidjan, 1970/2.
Monteil, Vincent.
L'Islam noir.
Paris:
Seuil, 1964.
Neurisse, André.
Histoire du franc.
Paris:
Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967.
Newbury, Colin W.
"The Formation of the Governrnent
General of French West Africa."
Journal of
African History.
1(1960):
111-128.
329
D'Sullivan, John.
"Developments in the Social Stratifi-
cation of Northwest Ivory Coast during the 18th and
19th Centuries:
From a Malinke Frontier Society
to the Liberation of Slaves by the French - 1907."
Ph.D., Univ. of California at Los Angeles, 1976.
Padmore, George.
The Life and Struggles of Negro
Toilers.
London:
RILU, 1931.
Park, Mungo.
Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa.
London:
W. Bulmer & Co. 1799.
Persons, Yves.
Samori, 3 vols.
Dakar: IFAN, 1968.
Pollaud-Dulia9, Marcel.
Aujourd'hui l'esclavage.
Paris: Editions Économie et Humanisme Les
Éditions ouvrières, 1966.
Pollet, Eric, and Winter, Grace,
"L'organisation social
du travail agricole des Soninke."
CEA.
VII,
no.
4
(1968):
509-534.
Portières, Roland.
"La monnaie de fer dans l'Quest
e
Africain au XX
siècle."
Recherches Africaines.
4 (1960) .
Roberts, Stephen H.
French Colonial Policy (1870-1925).
Vol. 1.
London:
P.S. King and Son, Ltd., 1929.
Rodney, Walter.
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
Dar
es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972.
Rostow, W. W.
Stages of Economic Growth.
London:
Cambridge DP, 1960.
Salesses, Capt. M. E.
"Le chemin de fer de Conakry au
Niger."
BCAF, 1898, pp.
225-.
Sarraut, Albert.
La mise en valeur des colonies
francaise.
Paris:
Payot, 1923.
;)
Sanneh, A.
The Jahkanke.
London:
International African
Institute, 1979.
Sarraut, Albert.
Grandeur et servitude coloniales.
Paris:
Editions du Sagittaire, 1931.
Sidibe, Mamby.
"Coutumier du Cercle de Kita."
BCEHSADF,
XV 1(1932): 101-.
330
SODEMI.
"L'or du Baoulé près de Kabangoué."
Mission
Cerez.
Rapport 31 décembre 1954.
Sundstrëm, Lars.
The Trade of Guinea.
Lund: Hakan
Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1965.
Suret-Canale, Jean.
Afrique noire occidentale et cen-
trale: l'ere coloniale (1900-1945).
Paris:
Editions Sociales, 1964.
Suret-Canale, Jean.
"Les sociétés traditionelles en
Afrique tropicale et le concept de mode de
production asiatique."
La Pensée.
117(1964):
21-42.
Tauxier, Louis.
Le noir du soudan.
Paris: Larose,
1912.
Trentinian, Lt. Gov.
"La r~ligion musulmane au Soudan
Francais."
BCAF, 1897, pp. 104-.
Tricart, Jean.
"Les échanges entre la zone forestiire de
C~te dl Ivoire et les savanes soudaniennes."
Cahiers d'Outre Mer.
35(1956): 209-238.
Tricart, J.
"Deux types de production agricole aux
environs d 'Odienne."
IFAN.
19B (1957): 285-294.
Verniere, Marc.
"Anyama, Etude de la population et du
commerce kolatier."
Cahiers ORSTOM.
VI, no.
l
(1969): 83-111.
Vuillet, Jean.
"Culture du riz dans la vallée du Niger
entre Kouroussa et Tombouctou."
BCEHSAOF, 1920,
p. 468-.
Zan, Semi-bi.
"La politique coloniale des travaux
publics en Côte d'lvoire 1900-1940."
Annales
Universite d'Abidjan.
Serie l, Tome II:
(1973-73).
Zunon, Gnobo Julien.
ilLe rôle des femmes dans le
commerce précolonial a Daloa."
Godo Godo.
Bulletin
de L'lHAAA 2(1976):
79-105.
B.
Unpublished Theses
Anouma, René-Pierre.
"L'impat de capitation, le systffine
des prestations, et les corvées en C6te d'Ivoire de
1901 à 1930." Thèse, Doctorat 3 ème cycle, Aix en
Provence, 1963.
331
Bimson, Kent.
"Comparative Rec:onstruction of Proto-
Northern-Western Mande. '~.' Ph. D. dissertation.
University of California, Los Angeles, 1978.
Domergue Colarec, Danielle.
"La CÔ"te d'Ivoire de 1912
à 1920:
Influence de la première guerre mondiale
sur l'évolution politique économique et sociale."
Thèse, Doctorat de 3 ème cycle.
Universite de
Toulouse le Mirail, 1974.
O'Sullivan, John.
Ph.D., dissertation.
University of
California, Los Angeles, 1976.
Zinsou, J.V.
"L'Administration franc;aise en Côte d'Ivoire
1890-1922."
Doctorat 3 ème cycle.
Aix-en-
Provence, 1973.
332